Navy V-22 Concept of Employment

Navy V-22Concept of Employment

January 2004

Developed for Bell/Boeingby

Whitney, Bradley & Brown, Inc.1604 Spring Hill Rd. Suite-200

Vienna, VA 22182(703) 448-6081

Presented to US Naval War College14 October, 2004By Arnie Easterly

V22 Business DevelopmentBell Helicopter Textron

Navy V-22 COE

US Marine Corps Concept

Purpose

– Depict the enhanced multi-mission capabilities of the Navy V-22 Osprey in support of the Carrier Strike Group (CSG) or Expeditionary Strike Force (ESF) commander operating in the 21st

century

–The COE is intended to be used as a baseline document to stimulate discussions regarding the role of the Navy V-22, and its ”value-added,” during expeditionary operations in the 21st century

Presenter

Presentation Notes

This Concept of Employment (COE) depicts the advantages of the Navy V-22 in support of the Carrier Strike Group (CSG) or Expeditionary Strike Force (ESF) commander operating in the 21st century. It is intended to be used as a baseline document to stimulate discussions regarding the role of the Navy V-22, and its ”value-added,” during expeditionary operations in the 21st century.

Background

System Description

Employment Scenarios

Summary

Background

Planned Aircraft Allocation

• Marine Corps: 360 Aircraft

•US Special Operations Command: 50 Aircraft

Planned Aircraft Allocation (Navy)

• The table below reflects the planned allocation of Navy V-22 aircraft, as of December, 1995.

• The fielding plan at that time called for basing one squadron of 16 aircraft on each Coast.

System Description

Fleet Logistics Support (COD / VOD) Features:

• 2,038 gal. Mission Fuel

+ Air Refueling

• Multi-function or Weather Radar

• 24 Crashworthy Passenger (troop)

Seats

• 6’x6’x24’ Cabin

• Rear Cargo Ramp

• 739 cu. ft. usable cabin volume

• Flush Roller Rails

• 2,000 lb capacityCargo Winch

• Passenger Door

• 5,000 & 10,000 lbCargo Tiedowns

• Personnel Hoist

• V/STOL Capable

• Dual ExternalCargo Hooks

Navy V-22 Systems Description

Navy V-22 System Description

• Navy V-22 Performance– Tilt-rotor design– VTOL– Speed/Range/Ceiling of Turboprop– Nominal Cruise 240Kts– Mission Radius 350nm– Service Ceiling 25,000ft– Normal Altitude w/pax 10,000ft– Ferry Range 2100nm w/ 1 refuel

Versatility of a Helicopter Speed/Range of a Turboprop


Navy V-22 Shipboard Compatibility



– Designed for Shipboard Operations– 90sec Wing and Blade Fold– Certified for Ops:

All Logistics Ships Carriers Amphibious Assault

– To be Certified (current list expanded2005-2006 by Lakehurst): Destroyer Class Cruiser Class

Designed for Naval Operations


US Marine Corps Concept• Cargo-Lift Capacities

– Internal Cargo Capacity 20,000# Internal 739ft3 Usable volume 20.8ft Pallet/Container Length 24 Combat Troops (4) 40x48in Warehouse Pallets (2) 463L Half-Pallets Roller Conveyer Winch

– External Cargo Capacity Two retractable external

cargo hooks 10,000# single hook 15,000# dual hook 130kts

Internal capacity of COD with External Lift / VOD Capability


Navy V-22 System Description• Navy V-22 Aerial Refueling

– Auxiliary Tanks: 2 x 430 gal (5590 lbs.)– Internal Fuel: 11,700 lb/1720 gal– Fuel Giveaway: Auxiliary + Internal

(17,290 lbs.) – Kit Weight: 660 lbs– Fuel rate: 120gpm– Reconfigure time: < 1.5 hours– V-22, CH-53E, AV-8, F/A-18, JSF, etc.– 230kts– 80-91 ft hose length


Wing Feed Tank

Wing Tank

Right AftSponson

Tank

Cabin AuxFuel Tanks

Fwd SponsonFuel Tanks

Aerial RefuelingProbe

Aerial Refueling provides warfighting flexibility



• Navy V-22 Supportability

– Improved design for maintainability:

Extensive use of composites

Central, Integrated SystemsTestability

Improved Maintenance Accessibility

T-406 Engine commonality– C-130J– Commercial Aircraft

–(Saab 340)

Increased Availability

31

25

20

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35 CH-53DCH-46EMV-22

31

25

20

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Maintenance Man-Hrs / Flt Hour

CH-53DCH-46EMV-22


Employment Scenarios

Navy V-22 COE Assumptions


• Set in the 2015 timeframe

• Services have developed their force structure according to thecapabilities based approach articulated in the 2004 Defense PlanningGuidance

• Operational adjustments by the Navy to reflect the tenets of SeaPower 21 have been successfully implemented

• The Navy V-22 will be operating with emerging platforms such asthe High Speed Vessel, Littoral Combat Ship, and ships in theMaritime Pre-positioning Force (Future)

Presenter

Presentation Notes

Set in the 2015 timeframe, the Services have developed their force structure according to the capabilities based approach articulated in the 2004 Defense Planning Guidance. Operational adjustments by the Navy to reflect the tenets of Sea Power 21 have been successfully implemented. The Navy V-22 will be operating with emerging platforms such as the High Speed Vessel, Littoral Combat Ship, and ships in the Maritime Pre-positioning Force (Future). The COE is intended to be used as a baseline document to stimulate discussions regarding the role of the Navy V-22, and its ”value-added,” during expeditionary operations in the 21st century. Utilizing the “1-4-2-1” paradigm (Defend the homeland, Deter in four critical regions, Swiftly defeat an opponent in two overlapping conflicts, and Win decisively in one of the two conflicts) as a framework, the COE uses three employment scenarios containing embedded vignettes to highlight Navy V-22 employment concepts.

V-22 Mission Areas-2015

–Sea Strike

Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR)

Aerial Refueling

Special Operations Forces Support

–Sea Shield

Maritime Intercept Operations (MIO)

ASuW, ASW, MIW force multiplier

–Sea Basing

SAR/MEDEVAC

VOD/COD

LCS/SAG Reconstitution

Multi-Mission capabilities across a diverse set of operational tasks

Presenter

Presentation Notes

Potential conflicts have taken on a new dimension very different from the past. From transnational actors to nation states, from non-sophisticated car bombs to weapons of mass destruction, new platforms must be flexible, adaptable, and versatile to produce the capabilities needed to deal with these uncertainties. The Navy V-22’s multi-mission capability across the multitude of missions provides force commanders options not available today to deal with diverse operational tasks. These capabilities cross the spectrum of the pillars of Sea Power 21 contributing directly or indirectly to mission success. Range, speed, payload, and basing options are critical characteristics to achieve the objectives framed by Sea Power 21. To sustain a sea-based striking force will require an increased logistics capability for the Expeditionary Strike Force. Inter-theater transfer of mission-critical equipment, personnel, and supplies becomes a critical capability prior to and during the hostilities. The Sea Base, as the principal enabler for the other tenets of Sea Power 21, must be robust and responsive. Time, distance, speed, and payload become critical. The Navy V-22 can operate from all certified ships within the ESF as well as Intermediate Support Bases (ISBs) ashore. In support of Sea Shield, the Navy V-22 releases rotary wing assets for critical multi-mission roles. Currently the Navy’s primary airborne logistic asset, the MH-60S also has mine-counter measures, ASuW, CSAR, SOF, and MIO missions. The increased range and speed of the Navy V-22 offer a wider variety of CSAR, SOF, and MIO options to the ESF Commander. Similarly, the F/A-18 E/F will be the only organic tanker upon retirement of the S-3. Configured as a tanker, the Navy V-22 can release F/A-18 E/Fs from overhead or mission tanking responsibilities, permitting them to execute strike missions. As a mission tanker, the Navy V-22 can increase the responsiveness of airborne assets performing Close Air Support (CAS) missions.

Navy V-22 COE Naval Expeditionary Forces

US Marine Corps ConceptThemes

– Changing threat requires new capabilities

– Multi-mission utility across Sea Power 21 pillars

– Speed, Range, Payload combinations unique

– Flexible Basing Options enable innovative solutions

Navy V-22 is a Transformational Force Multiplier

Presenter

Presentation Notes

These Concept of Employment themes reflect the Navy V-22 enhanced capabilities across the Sea Power 21 Pillars. With a unique combination of range, speed, payload, basing options, and multi-mission capabilities across a diverse set of operational tasks, it gives the battle force commander increased options to deal with a dynamic threat environment. As explored in various vignettes throughout this COE, the Navy V-22 is truly a transformational force multiplier.

Navy V-22 COE Naval Expeditionary Forces


• Operational Environment 2015 OverviewNaval Expeditionary Forces

MCO-1

MCO-2

ISB

•Dispersed Theaters of Operations•Force Rotation Requirements•Reconstitution

Presenter

Presentation Notes

This section will focus on the contributions of the Navy V-22 to typical missions associated with the sea base. Vignettes are set in a notional region and are occurring in the first MCO in the "swiftly defeat aggression in two overlapping conflicts" construct of the "1-4-2-1" DPG guidance. They are intended to represent the potential impact of the Navy V-22 on 2015 ESF operations. The Ronald Reagan / Bonhomme Richard ESF will be detached from the MCO 1 theater by the theater combatant commander and diverted to proceed to the vicinity of Country Red MCO-2. Open conflict has not yet occurred, but indications and warnings based on Red's saber-rattling and confirmed by national technical means convinced the NCA of the prudence of positioning forces in the area as a show of support to its ally, Country Green, bordering Red. In order to arrive on-scene prepared for any tasking, the ESF will need to reconstitute enroute at an ISB.

2015- MCO 1• Situation

– US and coalition forces conducting combat operations for months vs. Orange.

– The aggressor's combat power has been significantly reduced

– The allies have gained the initiative and have forced the aggressor to retreat.

• Threat– Two armored and three mechanized infantry

divisions – 4th generation fighter-attack aircraft– fixed / rotary wing transports and attack

helicopters.• Forces

– Three Air Expeditionary Forces– Four Army divisions organized and equipped

per the Future Combat System. – Four CSGs, 4 MEB* level ESGs*, and two

MPGs*.• *Marine Exp Group / Exp Strike Group / Maritime Prepo Group

• Mission

Vignettes– Recovery Tanker– Search and Rescue

Continue to assist Orange in ejecting invading forces and be prepared to return to CONUS.

MCO-1

Presenter

Presentation Notes

US and coalition forces have been conducting combat operations for several months in Country Orange. The allied objective is to assist Orange in ejecting invading forces from a neighboring nation whose goal is to seize coal and natural gas reserves. The allies have gained the initiative and their attacks have forced the aggressor to retreat. It is clear that while the conflict is not over, it is lessening in scope and intensity, permitting the eventual withdrawal of selected coalition forces from the theater. Three months previously, aggressor forces crossed Orange's borders with ground forces consisting of two armored and three mechanized infantry divisions supported by an air force of 4th generation fighter-attack aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles, and modern fixed / rotary wing transports and attack helicopters. At this stage of the conflict, the aggressor's combat power has been significantly reduced due to losses inflicted by the allies. Earlier operations have led to the destruction of much of the aggressor's air and ground forces, and Orange's borders are on the verge of being restored. With conflict termination approaching, the theater combatant commander has issued warning orders to several organizations in the Joint Task Force (JTF), among them the Ronald Reagan / Bonhomme Richard ESF and an accompanying MPG, to be prepared to return to the US in the near future. The MCO-1 Vignettes examined involved Navy V-22 missions are a recovery tanker and as a SAR platform.

Navy V-22 Recovery Tanker Mission

Sea Strike EnablerReleases Recovery F/A-18E/F Tanker for Strike Missions

Situation• Launches last, climbs to 10K• Consolidates w/ YoYo Tanker • Meets strike group ovhd “Red

Crown” as egress tanker• Return overhead as Recovery

Tanker for 2nd cycle• Recovers last in second recovery • Relieves F/A-18E/F for strike/enroute

tanking• 1+30 cycles

Attributes• 15,000# give• 120 gal/min@ 50psi • Efficient Delivery- economical• Speed, altitude fit tanking role • Low O&S cost• Can support fixed or RW• Restaging/basing options

MCO-1

Presenter

Presentation Notes

Pending further direction from the theater combatant commander, Reagan is continuing to conduct air operations against the MCO 1 opposing forces. The current Air Tasking Order (ATO) initially directs Reagan to provide 140 strike sorties per day, all at night. With 12 F/A-18Es, 12 F/A-18Fs, and 20 F/A-18Cs aboard, the air wing and flight deck crew are near full capacity with the strike sortie generation rate. Approximately 20 aircraft (including spares) per cycle are required to meet this tasking. To maximize the combat power of his strike assets, the Air Wing Commander (CAG) assigns all of the Hornets to the strike role, using some of the Super Hornets as mission tankers. These Super Hornets enter hostile territory with the strike package, tank aircraft ingressing further, and then conduct their prescribed strikes. CAG meets his recovery tanker requirements with the Navy V-22 in order to release F/A-18s for strikes. Launching to meet the returning strike package, the Navy V-22 climbs to 8,000 ft to rendezvous with the off-going V-22 tanker. The latter Navy V-22 has the option of recovering aboard the carrier, or other nearby CSG assets should CAG want two tankers overhead to meet returning aircraft but desires to avoid interrupting the carrier’s deck cycle to land and refuel the off-going Navy V-22. Note for Arnie: (Need to check on the GPM flow rate, Bell/Boeing data indicates 120gpm, this seems very low, the F/A-18 can take 200gpm.) In a tanker configuration, the V-22 has 10,000 lbs giveaway fuel for a full cycle, a 67% increase as compared to the existing S-3 with 6,000 lbs of fuel. This translates to four strike fighters each gaining 20 minutes of flight time, a safety margin much greater than is currently available with the S-3 tanker.

Navy V-22 SAR Mission

US Marine Corps ConceptAttributes• Speed: 250 kts• Range: 400+ nm• Comm suite: Data link, UHF/ VHF voice• Sensor suite: FLIR, NVD, GPS• Medical personnel & equipment fit

Sea Base EnablerAircrew Survivability increases as exposure decreases

Situation• F/A-18 suffers engine fire at 200 nm• Pilot ejects; At “Bingo” state,

Wingman returns to CVN• Environmental

•Night (2230 Local)•Water Temp 46°F•Air Temp 38°F•Sea State 4•Wind: 15-20 knots

• Range exceeds Plane Guard Helo• Alert 15 Navy V-22 launched for SAR

TIME 15 30 45 60 75 90 105 120 135 150SurvivabilityMH60SNavy V-22

TOC SURVIVAL DOUBTFUL

2+00 To Survivor With Lily Pad In Place1+05 To Survivor

200n

m

MCO-1

Pilot rescued in 65 minutes

Presenter

Presentation Notes

A section of F/A-18Cs from Ronald Reagan has completed a night precision strike in Orange and has crossed the coastline, returning to Reagan about 200 nm at-sea, when the #1 engine of the wingman's Hornet catches fire. The section lead informs Reagan of the ejection via the airborne E-2C. Since the plane-guard MH-60 is range limited to approximately 190 nm, it cannot reach the survivor’s position without the use of a “lily pad” operation. Reagan immediately prepares to launch a SAR configured Navy V-22. Launching in 12 minutes, the SAR aircraft climbs to 15,000 ft, accelerates to 240 knots and is vectored to the survivor’s estimated location. At 240 knots, it will take the Navy V-22 48 minutes to reach the survivor. Using FLIR and NVD, the Navy V-22 locates the survivor’s raft and commences its approach to deploy a rescue swimmer. These aircraft systems enable an expeditious detection and localization. The survivor has been in the water for almost an hour. The SAR aircraft commences a descent using his coupled approach system to achieve a stable position over the survivor. The survivor is aboard the Navy V-22 65 minutes after entering the water. The plane guard helicopter would not have had the range and endurance to reach the Hornet pilot. Hypothermia would have taken its course prior to a surface asset reaching the site. Even if the geometry had been perfect, allowing the MH-60 to “lily-pad” and refuel on an escort vessel favorably positioned, the MH-60 would still have required approximately twice the time as the Navy V-22 to arrive on-scene.

2015- Reconstitution

• Situation

– REAGAN CSG & Bon Homme Richard ESG diverted from homeward transit to MCO-2

– ESG & MPG back load/reconstitution commences in MCO-1

– CSG sprints ahead of ESG • MCO 2 Combatant Commander directs ESG todelay at ISB until further notice

– Maintain 15 knot SOA

• Forces– One CSG , ESG & SAG – MV-22 not available to CSG

• Mission

VignettesReconstitutionMEDEVAC

–Take most direct route to MCO-2– Resupply from ISB at ranges that

optimize reporting to MCO-2 in shortest time

– Move high priority cargo, parts & pax between CSG, SAG & ISB

MCO-1

MCO-2

ISB

CSGESG

SAG

Reconstitution

Presenter

Presentation Notes

Within the context of operating mobile, dispersed forces from a Sea Base, Navy and Marine Corps doctrine addresses how reconstitution at sea “enables the rapid reemployment of a fully capable naval force for subsequent operations”. Once underway from MCO 1 and proceeding homeward, the ESF was diverted and directed to proceed to the vicinity of Country Red. In order to arrive on-scene prepared for any tasking, the ESF must complete its reconstitution efforts for the new theater. Three aircraft types are available to the transiting CSG and SAG to support their resupply efforts: the C-2A, the Navy V-22, and the MH-60S helicopter. In order to make best time to the new theater, and to effect rendezvous with fuel and ammunition ships enroute, the ESF must maintain the most direct route possible, consistent with completing the bulk of its reconstitution and resupply efforts from an Intermediate Support Base (ISB) enroute. The required transit track will not permit passage any closer than 750 nm from the ISB. In this scenario, an island with which the U.S. has established temporary air and logistics support facilities privileges has been selected.

Air Logistics Range vs. Payload Trade-OffsUtility Role of V-22

• V-22 enhances the family of small to medium lift capability with greater ranges than helos • Heavy, over-sized cargo capacity at medium ranges to meet operational readiness needs of

aircraft and ships remains H-53 mission (not projected to be in service in 2015)• Long range cargo and passenger movement necessary to overcome lack of intermediate

support base opportunities in several areas of world’s oceans– V-22 capability comparable to C-2A (projected to leave USN inventory by 2020)

• Short to medium range external lift necessary to meet intra-strike group ship-to-ship logistics– MH-60s remain preferred VERTREP platform but Navy V-22 also has that capability

INTERNALV-22

EXTERNAL

V-22 Internal & External Load capabilities make it a viablereplacement for both C-2A and MH-53E

Reconstitution

Presenter

Presentation Notes

The chart above provides a payload vs. range capability overview of airborne logistics delivery platforms employed by US Naval Forces today. The Navy V-22 can fill a large capability gap, specifically when the MH-53E and the C-2A cease to be part of the Navy inventory, 2013 and 2020 respectively. Thus the Navy V-22, operating either from the CVN, large deck amphibious ships, CLF ships or self-deploying from out of theater to an ISB, has the capability to become the principal VOD asset, as well as a suitable COD platform, to the task force commander. With the limitations of the C-2A (carrier ops only) and MH-60S range and payload limitations, the Navy V-22 can easily assume the leading role for long range, medium to heavy movement of critical cargo, repair parts, personnel and other materiel. MH-53E is not projected to be in service in 2013, thereby leaving a significant gap in Med-Heavy lift capability. H-53s provide theater logistics airlift support (VOD), but once they are retired, the MH-60S can only provide a marginal capability by comparison. Navy V-22 is the best option to fill a larger percentage of that lost capability. Based on initial estimates, the Navy V-22 is at least an equal to, if not slightly better replacement for the C-2A COD. In addition, with its external lift capability, Navy V-22 could be a single Type Model to replace both C-2A and MH-53E.

Navy V-22 COE for Reconstitution

• Situation- Navy V-22 (2) and C-2 (2) operate

between CVN and ISB- Re-supply effort via point-to-point mode

commences at 750- 850 nm along CSG/SAG track

- Redistribution between CSG & SAG units via V-22 and MH-60S

Versatile Sea Basing EnablerNavy V22 Provides a Long Range Option Comparable to C-2A Plus…

500

1000

750

ISB

CSG

CODDirect Track

2.5 Day Transit @ 15 kt SOA

900 nm

CODV-22

SAG

Reconstitution

• Movement Metrics- Based on equal sorties, V-22 moves comparable payloads to C-2A

~ 7% fewer pax~ 4% more cargo

• Navy V-22- Can deliver direct to escorts & CVN

-- Internal & External load options-- VTOL and STOL capabilities

- Affords greater fixed wing vs non-fixed wing deck configuration flexibility for CVN

Presenter

Presentation Notes

Having the range to reach an ISB out to 750 nm to expedite the movement of critical materiel or passengers to the CSG and SAG becomes a timesaving capability for the CSG commander. As shown in (Figure 5‑4), the C-2A and Navy V-22 operating from the Ronald Reagan, provide the critical logistics support to the CSG and SAG. The Navy V-22, unlike the C-2A, can also support direct delivery to the smaller combatants. The presence of the V-22 doubles the amount of materiel that can be moved to the CSG and SAG. The C-2A COD is limited to CVN operations only and lacks airborne refueling capability. Any material delivered to the CVN destined for other ships in the CSG needs to be forwarded via other organic means, such as MH-60S. The Navy V-22 with its air refueling and VSTOL/STOL capability provides the CSG Commander with more flexible options associated with the resupply effort. Likewise, the Navy V-22’s take-off flexibility affords a broader range of sortie availability over the C-2A (more options for CVN flight deck configurations), a significant tactical advantage when CVN deck space is at a premium and time is of the essence. The Navy V-22 provides a broad and flexible range of onboard delivery options for the ESF Commander. The platform’s ability to provide medium lift long range logistics service throughout the CSG via internal and external carriage provides a viable option to the forecasted capabilities gap associated with MH-53 and C-2A shutdown plans.

Navy V-22 COE for Medevac• Situation

- Collision at sea during underway replenishment results in significant injuries to 12 sailors. All require medevac to shore facility.

- Both CSG and ISB are out of helo range. COD not accessible unless carrier strike group closes SAG to 200 nm

- V-22 launches off carrier with 12 litter configuration and medical team

- 4 litter max for helos will require 3 helos

500

1000

750

ISB

CSG

Direct Track

900 nm

V-22

SAG

COD

V-22 Flt PathSH-60 Flt Path

Medevac

• Movement Metrics- C-2A + (3)MH-60’s

Pax (3 H-60 w/ 4 each) 12Load Pax (twice) 2 HrsShips close 10 Hrs 4 Sorties (3 Helo, 1 COD) 8 Hrs Total Time 20 Hrs

- V-22 (1 A/C)Pax (1 V-22) 12 Load Pax (once) 1 Hr2 Sorties 5 Hrs

Total Time 6 Hr

Presenter

Presentation Notes

The SAG is located 400 nm ahead of the CSG and is conducting underway replenishment. As is normally done, the oiler simultaneously refuels two surface combatants, one on each side. Midway through the evolution, the combatant on the port side develops a steering casualty and collides with the oiler. Twelve sailors on the combatant are seriously injured, requiring medical attention beyond the capability of the combatant or the CSG. While the Air Force is tasked with transporting these patients out of theater, the Navy must deliver them to an appropriate airhead. The SAG Commander requests MEDEVAC assets from the CSG to transport the wounded sailors to the ISB. Although both the V-22 and COD can reach the ISB from their present position, the C-2A would require three MH-60s, each configured with four litters, to transport the patients from the combatant to the carrier prior to transfer via the COD. Additionally, the carrier must close to within 200nm of the SAG to get within the MH-60s’ range. On arrival at the ISB, the patients would have endured 15 hours time in transit. The CSG Commander elects to use one Navy V-22 configured with 12 litters and a medical team to conduct the operation. Within one hour from the original call for support a re-configured Navy V-22 is launched from the USS Reagan. The Navy V-22 is able to complete the transfer of wounded personnel from the ship directly to the ISB. The entire evolution is accomplished in under 7 hours.

2015- MCO 2• Situation

– Red has successfully pressured its neighbors to deny the US access to bases

– Red deployed minefields in nearby straits and littoral areas, followed by a similar “seeding” in Green’s major ports.

– Red then attacks on a multi-axis front with the strategic objective of achieving hegemony over Green and compelling the US to substantially reduce its presence in the theater.

• Threat– Five diesel submarines– Several flotillas of patrol craft with 70mm cannon

and surface to air / surface to surface missiles, as well as a paramilitary organization based aboard numerous, armed, small boats.

– Red's tactical ballistic missiles can be fitted with conventional, chemical, or biological warheads and are protected by a formidable air defense system..

• Forces– One CSG, SAG and LCS sqd– Three CSGs and two ESGs enroute– Two AEFs on standby

• Mission– Establish Q route through straits– Establish air supremacy and sea superiority– Combat air operations ashore

VignettesLCS/SAG SustainmentSOF SupportCAS TankingCombat Search and Rescue

MCO-2

Presenter

Presentation Notes

The Ronald Reagan / Bonhomme Richard ESF has completed its reconstitution effort and is continuing its transit to the Country Red theater. As the local regional power Red has successfully pressured its neighbors to deny the US access to bases, particularly airfields, for resupply or tactical operations. Hoping to defuze the situation, the ally, Country Green, has requested that the US refrain from reinforcing its limited forces in the country. As the ESF maneuvers toward the theater, Red decides to act. It boldly strengthens its anti-access measures by deploying minefields in nearby straits and littoral areas, followed by a similar “seeding” in Green’s major ports. Red then attacks on a multi-axis front with the strategic objective of achieving hegemony over Green and compelling the US to substantially reduce its presence in the theater. Red's armored and mechanized divisions are more robust and better trained than those of Country Green. The Air Force has platforms of similar sophistication and in greater quantity, while the Navy has five diesel submarines, several flotillas of patrol craft with 70mm cannon and surface to air / surface to surface missiles, as well as a paramilitary organization based aboard numerous, armed, small boats. Red's tactical ballistic missiles can be fitted with conventional, chemical, or biological warheads and are protected by a formidable air defense system. The Ronald Reagan / Bonhomme Richard ESF, are second to arrive in theater behind 2 divisions of 3 LCS which have been patrolling country RED’s Littorals for 2 days. Vignettes in this scenario occur in a notional region approximately 5,000 nm from Country Orange and represent the second MCO in the "1-4-2-1" construct. They are intended to portray the potential impact of the Navy V-22's attributes of speed, range, and flexibility as manifested in increased tactical options for the 2015 ESF Commander.

Navy V-22 Sustainment –MCO2

Sea Shield - Maintaining Combat Capability On-station

MCO-2

~400 nm

Sustainment of LCS

CSG

SITUATION• 2 Divisions of LCS ships patrolling RED littorals• Intelligence reports RED submarine force

unexpectedly sorties• Replacement part critical to ASW operations• A replacement part is within the CSG• CSG lead elements currently 24hrs from op area

when one LCS reports Underwater Vehicle (UUV) malfunction

SOLUTION• Use Navy V-22 to fly the UUV replacement part from the CNV to the LCS

ATTRIBUTES• Navy V-22 able to make the 400nm delivery within 7hrs from initial distress call

• Internal Carriage of asset• Hoist used to lower replacement part to LCS

Presenter

Presentation Notes

Two LCS divisions of three ships each, configured for a mine countermeasure (MCM) or anti-submarine warfare (ASW) role, have been operating in the littoral regions of Country Red. Their presence serves to symbolize US resolve as well as to bolster the area Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) effort. Timely sustainment is essential to maintaining this forward posture, and the relatively limited storage aboard the LCS for provisions, parts allowances, or consumables create a demand for frequent sustainment efforts. In this vignette, the two LCS divisions are conducting surveillance operations within Red’s and Green’s littorals using unmanned, underwater vehicles (UUVs) and vertical takeoff and landing unmanned aerial vehicles (VTUAVs). The leading elements of the ESF are slightly less than twenty-four hours from their initial operating area when one of the ASW configured LCS ships tasked, to detect portions of the Red submarine force that have unexpectedly sortied, sends word that a sensor on his UUV is malfunctioning. To continue his mission he urgently needs a replacement sensor. One is aboard the CVN, but the CSG will not be within range to launch an MH-60 with the part for another eight hours. This situation effectively leaves the littoral unguarded for over nine and one-half hours, and during this window, the threat submarine is capable of slipping past the LCS vessel into the open ocean. The Navy V-22 platform provides the Force Commander with a solution. As the part is being retrieved, a Navy V-22 is directed to land, top off with fuel, and fly the part to the LCS 400 miles distant. The part arrives slightly over an hour and a half after launch and, by the time the V-22 returns to Reagan, the sensor is installed, and the UUV back in the water. In this instance, use of the Navy V-22 allowed the LCS to resume its ASW mission 74% quicker compared to the MH-60. Navy V-22 is just as responsive when exchanging LCS mission module crews or operational specialists.

Navy V-22 SOF Mission

Increased mission effectiveness with fewer assets

SITUATION• Insert Seals 5 nm off beach for recon mission• 500 nm round trip• Carry 8 Seals + Soft duck (inflatable boat)• Recover Seals at drop point prior to sunrise

ATTRIBUTES• V-22 carries Seals directly from CVN

– Off axis course to avoid PTGs– “Soft duck” carried internally– Entire mission at night

• No “lily pad” required – No pre-staging of a surface ship

in “hot” areas

• H-60’s available for SUW & USW

MCO-2

Presenter

Presentation Notes

Special Operations As the ESF approaches Country Red, the CSG is in the lead with the ESG and MPG twenty-four hours behind. Imagery reveals that major elements of the threat army have left their garrisons. Also identified is an assembly area containing unidentified equipment in a makeshift compound on the coast, away from any villages. The theater commander, aware of recent discussions by Country Red with European arms manufacturers, is concerned as to the purpose of the equipment, and receives authorization to perform a covert reconnaissance. The SEAL detachment is embarked in Reagan, and the distance to the insertion point is 250nm. The Navy V-22 is selected to transport the SEAL’s as the range is too great for the MH-60S unless a surface escort is detached from the CSG to act as a lily pad. The SEALs’ soft duck must be externally mounted to the helicopter for the mission due to size constraints, limiting the MH-60 to 70 kts and a range of no more than 70 nm. The escort would need another nine hours before it was in position to launch the helicopter, and the elapsed time would force the mission to slide one day. It would also leave the escort in potentially hostile waters during mission execution and final recovery. Unwilling to lose the opportunity by postponing the mission and endangering the escort ship, the ESF commander tasks the Navy V-22 to insert an eight-man team ten miles off the coast that evening with recovery prior to sunrise. One Navy V-22 launches at 1845 local, ingressing at low level to stay under Red’s radar. Use of the Global Positioning System (GPS) for navigation, FLIR for contact avoidance, NVG’s for visual reference and a coupled approach system for night over-water operations enhance the potential for mission success. Most significant however, is the ability for the Navy V-22 to fly 250 nm, drop the SEALs at night over water from a hover, and return to the ship with no additional support. Nine hours later, as planned, the Navy V-22 launches and extracts the seal team as planned. The performance characteristics and operational capability of the V-22 enabled the entire mission to be accomplished prior to sunrise. Use of the Navy V-22 for the special operation proved advantageous to the ESF commander in several ways: A narrow window of opportunity was successfully exploited Operational tempo was maintained, rather than accepting a one day delay Navy V-22 capabilities obviated the need to detach escort to a position to launch MH-60s within range of mission objective Force protection issues were mitigated as Navy V-22 was able to accomplish tasking and return to force during one period of darkness without assistance of escort ship positioned in hostile waters

Navy V-22 CAS Tanking Mission

CASTanker

Provides Division of Hornets with 20-25 minutes additional time on station

SITUATION• Support on call CAS• Increase Time On Station / Responsiveness• Altitude 10,000 ft; 50nm from CAS orbits

Attributes• Speed: 250 kts• Range: 200 nm• 10,000 lbs give• 120 gal/min• On Station time 1+00

200 nm

MCO-2

Presenter

Presentation Notes

Air operations against Country Red have commenced following their thrust into Green. Forces ashore have engaged Red formations and require near-continuous close air support. The ATO now tasks Ronald Reagan with 100 CAS sorties per day in addition to 40 strike sorties. Many of the CAS sorties are classified as on-call and frequently require extended time on station and on-site relief. This requires CAS aircraft to orbit in close proximity to ground engagements, refueling on-station if they have not yet expended their weapons. CAG positions a V-22 CAS Tanker at 10,000ft in a safe area about 50 miles from the CAS orbits. The CAS Tanker provides multiple benefits: it ensures the ground troops have immediate CAS on call; it allows CAG to exploit the full warfighting potential of his Super Hornets by enabling full weapons loads on all wing stations; and it increases the probability of utilizing those air-to-ground weapons on the battlefield rather than returning unexpended ordnance to the CVN, or jettisoning it at sea. Each Navy V-22 has 10,000 lbs of fuel to give, providing a division of Hornets 20-25 minutes of additional on-station time. During Reagan’s twelve-hour launch and recovery cycle, that equates to 1.3 – 1.6 additional hours over the battlefield for a division of F/A-18s.

CSAR Mission

620 nm

Situation• Regan CSG conducting night air ops in support of SOF in RED

• F/A 18 hit by SAM and ejects in safe area• CSAR mission tasked

•V-22 Overhead tanker refuels mission V-22 enroute at 250nm

•Threat updates from F/A-18s via data link, uses GPS to skirt threat envelopes, reach pick-up point, pick up survivor, exit threat environment.

• V-22 airborne tanker joins CSAR at 250 nm

Attributes• Responsive- time critical mission• Range- 450nm w/10 min on station• Speed-250knot• Survivability

• Ballistic tolerance• Reduced IR signature

Enhanced CSAR Mission CapabilityProvides Force Commander Options not available today

250 nm

MCO-2

Presenter

Presentation Notes

Early in the evening, a section of F/A-18E/Fs is conducting precision strikes 620 nm from Reagan against an emerging target set in Country Red One of the Hornets descends to provide strafing fire and is hit with a manpad surface-to-air missile. The pilot heads for a designated safe area. Rapidly losing control, the pilot alerts his flight leader and ejects. Word of the ejection is passed to the CVN and it launches the alert Navy V-22 as Air Force CSAR assets have not yet arrived in theater. Time is critical in a CSAR situation, as every minute the survivor is on the ground increases the possibility of capture by the enemy. The Navy V-22 is vectored to the coast-in point and is joined by the recovery V-22 tanker. At 250 miles from the CVN, the tanker “tops off” the CSAR aircraft, and returns. F/A-18 E/Fs overhead the survivor provide threat warnings to the Navy V-22 via tactical data link, assisting the CSAR aircrew in threat avoidance and enhancing their situational awareness. Ingressing at high-speed and low altitude to evade threat systems, the GPS-aided moving map displays allow the aircrew to fly to the survivor’s position as furnished by his CSEL radio. Although known threat envelopes are skirted, the CSAR V-22 has the capability to dispense chaff / flares, while maneuvering, to nullify pop-up threats, should they be needed. Data-link-generated friendly position tracks assist with route de-confliction and VMF communications provide mission updates. Upon reaching the survivor’s vicinity, the aircrew establishes communication with the survivor, who advises there was some small-arms fire just before sundown two hours ago. As the Navy V-22 approaches the survivor’s position, the aircrew use FLIR, and NVGs to visually acquire the survivor and effect the pick-up. On egress, the aircraft rapidly accelerates to 240 knots. Although some small-arms fire is encountered and several rounds hit the aircraft, the increased ballistic tolerance and decreased vulnerability of the V-22 prevent any significant damage. Once clear, the Navy V-22 proceeds to a point 250nm from the CVN where it is met by the Navy V-22 recovery tanker and receives enough fuel to return to Reagan. An alternative Navy CSAR aircraft, the MH-60, would have taken over seven hours AND four refueling events to reach the survivor, if the ground refueling locations were available. Because of its limited speed and range, assigning the MH-60 this CSAR mission would place the survivor at much higher risk of capture by enemy forces.

Navy V-22 vs MH-60SCSAR

MH-60S• 201 nm radius with 2 add’l 195 gal aux tanks• 125 kts, 1.6 hrs to 201 nm• Max of 2 survivors• No increase in range with higher alt transit• Max alt 10,000 ft; cannot fly over high mountains• Cannot carry security team• Alert on deck for standby• Inflight refuel can extend range

Navy V-22 • 485 nm radius w/ 1 add’l 430 gal internal tank• 261 Kts, 1.9 hrs to 485 nm• Room for multiple survivors• Increase range with higher altitude transit• Max alt 25,000 ft; can fly over high mountains• Can carry security team• Loiter in flight near target area for standby• Second 430 tank or Inflight refuel to extend range

201 nm radius

485 nm radius

Navy V-22

MH-60S

MCO-2

Presenter

Presentation Notes

CSAR Profile is as follows: (Entire mission is at Tropical Day) 1. Warm-up 2. Takeoff (HOGE 1 minute) 3. Cruise at V99%BR 4. Climb to 3000 ft 5. Hover OGE, pick up 2 (200 lbs ea.) survivors (hover 5 minutes per survivor) 6. Descend to SL 7. Cruise at V99%BR 8. Land w/Reserves, grtr of 10% or 20 minutes @ VBE MH-60S does 201.1 nm in the above profile. MV-22B does 361.0 nm If you added one 430 gallon MAT, additional radius would be about 124 nm, for a new total of 485 nm radius. (430 gal x 6.8 lbs/gal x .085 nm/lb x .5 for radius = 124.3 nm)

Navy V-22 COE

Questions?

Summary

Sea Strike, Sea Shield, Sea Basing Enabler

Multi-Role Utility• V-22 provides 85% mission utility across four other

platforms (H-53, C2, H-60, H-46)

V-22 provides the Navy with acrossthe board mission utility withoutintroducing a new TMS

Greatly extends operational lift capabilityand flexibility

• Pacific theater stressors

Provides force commander withSAR/CSAR unique capability

Future Operational Requirements• H-53 and COD replacement not currently identified

Backup Slides

Ship Number Obstruction Deck Strength Servicing ShipClass in Class Clearance Land & Park Land & Storm Fuel Hangaring Motion &

in SS 5 Park (SS 8) Stability

DD 963DDG 51CG 47AOE 1AOE 6LPD 4LPD 17LSD 41LHA 1LHD 1MCS 8

25572744

111212571

Minor ModMinor ModMinor ModMinor ModMinor Mod

NONONO

Major ModMajor Mod

NO

NO

Sources: 1. Naval Sea Systems Command Ship Design and Engineering Directorate: SV-22 Staging Shipboard Compatibility Study, 9 Sept 19872. NKF Engineering, Inc.: V-22 ASW Variant Shipboard Compatibility Study, 15 August 1986

163

V-22 Ship Compatibility

5-99 Navy Color Rev. 5/7/99

, Printed 1/12/2010

The Navy Operational Concept

Naval Warfighting Concepts

• Continuum of Forward Operations• Littorals: a starting point – a destination• Maritime Superiority – defense projected

ashore– Sea Shield (Joint TAMD)– Self sustaining

• Project Power to influence events ashore– Sea Strike – Sea Basing

• FORCEnet – the “enabler”

• Forward deployed enabling forces• Sea and land as a maneuver space• Full spectrum of conflict• Extended littoral operating area• Exploit enemy gaps/vulnerabilities• Operate at night and adverse weather• Decisive actions with massed fires• Sea-based C2, Fires and Logistics

Driving closer ties, increased synergies

Fires

Operational Maneuver From the Sea

Naval Operational Concept

Presenter

Presentation Notes

Here are the two elements that make up the Naval Operational Concept, for the Navy its Sea Power 21 and for the Marines, Operational Maneuver Form the Sea. The boxes under each concept details the elements of each concept.

Sea Power 21

US Marine Corps ConceptStrategy

National Security Strategy Defense Planning Guidance Joint Vision 2020 Sea Power 21

Sea Power 21 MissionDeliver unprecedented offensive power, defensive assurance, and operational independence to Joint Force Commanders

Sea Power 21 Tasks Project layered, defensive power Extend homeland security with forward presence Sustain access via littoral dominance Protect joint forces and allies ashore

–Extend defensive umbrella deep inland–Strengthen strategic stability–Provide operational security

Project Precise and Persistent Offensive Power

FORCEnet

Sea Shield

Sea Strike

Sea Basing

Projecting Decisive Joint Capabilities

Presenter

Presentation Notes

Naval Global Concept of Operations outlines a tranformational Naval Strategy called “Sea Power 21”. This strategy is supported by three main pillars, Sea Strike, Sea Shield, and Sea Basing. FORCEnet is the “glue” that enables network centric operations. Sea Strike is a broad concept for projecting decisive, effects-based combat power from the sea in support of joint objectives by capitalizing on the strategic agility, operational maneuverability, and precise weapons employment inherent in Naval forces. Sea Shield exploits control of the seas to defeat an opponent’s anti-access strategy by projecting a counter-theater ballistic missile and counter-air layered defense for joint forces ashore and afloat. Sea Basing provides sustainment, without the need for major shore facilities, for US power projection efforts by providing a sovereign, defendable, at-sea logistics base. As envisioned, it will facilitate the phased deployment of joint forces, their at-sea arrival and assembly, and the selective off-load of materiel and equipment. Once forces are ashore, the sea base serves as the source for persistent fire-support, force protection, and precision sustainment. Its ability to reconstitute logistically provides the joint force “staying power,” or upon retrograde, to re-equip, re-arm and re-configure for future operations. At an operational level, the sea base accelerates expeditionary deployment and employment timelines. FORCEnet’s objectives are to provide the joint force shared situational awareness, distributed collaborative planning and decision superiority. It is the enabler for network-centric warfare’s pursuit of information dominance in future conflicts.

Navy V-22 Issues


Issues

• Issues– Over Water Night Hover Capability

• GPS/INS system capability vs. Doppler

– Lack Of Pressurization• Long range passenger carriage

– Force Structure For 48 Aircraft• Push to decrease manning• Carrier/Air Wing manning getting close scrutiny

– Navy V-22 and High Speed Vessel

Navy V-22 Issues


Issues

• Issues– Platform Configuration Definition

• Navy V-22 needs to be close to MV-22 configuration• Same TMS• CV-22 cost• MV-22 configuration can fill the Navy’s needs

– Flight Deck Operations• Destroyer class / Small decks yet to be validated • Spotting factor, (larger than H-53, longer than E-2)

– Arial Refueling Capability• Need more data on pkg. configuration and basket stabilization

– Rotor Downwash• Over water

Trade Studies

•Navy V-22 COE As A Building Block– Requirements Gaps– Platform Configuration– Flight Deck Operations– Force Structure– Re-Supply / Re-Constitution

PLUS• Common spares/support items

• Infrastructure cost for planning, managing, operating and executing

• Linked indirect costs

• Modification improvements

PLUS• Operations and

Support (Includes operating production support)

• Disposal

PLUS• FOT&E• Facility construction

PLUS• Initial spares

PLUS• TECH DATA• Publications• Contractor services• Support Equip.• Training Equip.• Factory Training

PLUS• Non-Recurring• Ancillary Equip

Recurring Flyaway• Management• Hardware• ECOs

Total Ownership CostLife Cycle Cost

Acquisition Cost

Procurement Cost

Weapon System CostFlyaway Cost

Issues

Navy V-22 Concept of Employment

Documents

Transcript of Navy V-22 Concept of Employment