Navarro and Tamayo vs CA [GR 141307; March 28, 2001](Local Government, Permanent vacancies in the Sanggunian, Section 45 (b) of the Local Government Code)

Facts: With the death of the Mayor Calimlim, a vacancy was created in the Office of the Mayor so by operation of law, he was succeeded by Aquino the then Vice-Mayor. Petitioner Tamayo, the  highest ranking member of the Sangguniang Bayan was elevated to the position of the Vice Mayor pursuant to the same law.

Since vacancy occurred in the Sangguniang Bayan by the elevation of the petitioner, Governor Agbayani appointed herein petitioner Navarro as Member of the Sangguniang Bayan.Aquino belonged to the political party Lakas NUCD-KAMPI, while both Navarro and Tamayo belonged to REFORMA-LM political party.

Private respondents seek to nullify the appointment of petitioner Navarro arguing that it was the former vice-mayor, succeeding to the position of the mayor, who created the permament vacancy in the Sanggunian Bayan because under the law he was also a member of the Sanggunian. Thus, the appointee must come from said former vice-mayor’s political party.

Petitioners, on the other hand, contended that it was the elevation of petitioner Tamayo, who was the highest ranking member of the Sanggunian Bayan, to the office of the Vice-Mayor which resulted in a permanent vacancy. The person to be appointed to the position vacated by him should come from the same political party affiliation as that of petitioner Tamayo.

However, the CA concluded that it was the appointment of the 8th councilor, to the number 7 position which created the last vacancy; therefore, the person to be appointed to the vacant position should come from the same political party to which the latter belonged, which was Lakas-NUCD KAMPI.

Issue: WON the elevation of the highest ranking member of the Sanggunian to the position of vice-mayor created the last vacancy in the Sanggunian Bayan.

Held: Yes. Under Sec 44 of the LGC, a permanent vacancy arises when an elective official fills a higher vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office.

Sec 45 (b) of the same law provides that “…only the nominee of the political party under which the Sanggunian member concerned has been elected and whose elevation to the position next higher in rank created the last vacancy in the Sanggunian shall be appointed in the manner herein provided. The appointee shall come from the political party as that of the Sanggunian member who caused the vacancy…”

The reason behind the right given to a political party to nominate a replacement where a permanent vacancy occurs in the Sanggunian is to maintain the party representation as willed by the people in the election.

With the elevation of the petitioner, who belonged to REFORMA-LM, to the position of vice-mayor, a vacancy occurred in the Sanggunian that whould be filled up with someone who should belong to the political party of petitioner Tamayo. Otherwise, REFORMA-LM’s representation would be diminished.

EFREN ARATEAv.

COMELEC AND ESTELA ANTIPOLOG.R. No. 195229, October 9, 2012, Carpio, J.

FACTS: Romeo D. Lonzanida (Lonzanida) and Estela D. Antipolo (Antipolo) were candidates for Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in the May 2010 National and Local Elections. Dra. Sigrid S. Rodolfo (Rodolfo) filed a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code to disqualify Lonzanida and to deny due course or to cancel Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy on the ground that Lonzanida was elected, and had served, as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales for four (4) consecutive terms immediately prior to the term for the May 2010 elections.

Rodolfo asserted that Lonzanida made a false material representation in his certificate of candidacy when Lonzanida certified under oath that he was eligible for the office he sought election. Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution and Section 43(b) of the Local Government Code both prohibit a local elective official from being elected and serving for more than three consecutive terms for the same position.

The COMELEC Second Division rendered a Resolutionon 18 February 2010 cancelling Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy.

Lonzanida’s motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc remained pending during the May 2010 elections. Lonzanida and Efren Racel Aratea (Aratea) garnered the highest number of votes and were respectively proclaimed Mayor and Vice-Mayor.

Aratea took his oath of office as Acting Mayor before Regional Trial Court (RTC) Judge of Olongapo. On the same date, Aratea wrote the DILG and requested for an opinion on whether, as Vice-Mayor, he was legally required to assume the Office of the Mayor in view of Lonzanida’s disqualification.

DILG stated that Lonzanida was disqualified to hold office by reason of his criminal conviction, and as a consequence, his office was deemed permanently vacant, and thus, Aratea should assume the Office of the Mayor in an acting capacity without prejudice to the COMELEC’s resolution of Lonzanida’s motion for reconsideration.

In another letter dated 6 August 2010, Aratea requested the DILG to allow him to take the oath of office as Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales. In his response, then Secretary Jesse M. Robredo allowed Aratea to take an oath of office as "the permanent Municipal Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales without prejudice however to the outcome of the cases pending before the COMELEC.

On 11 August 2010, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution disqualifying Lonzanida from running for Mayor in the May 2010 elections. The COMELEC En Banc’s resolution was based on two grounds: first, Lonzanida had been elected and had served as Mayor for more than three consecutive terms without interruption; and second, Lonzanida had been convicted by final judgment of 10 counts of falsification under the Revised Penal Code. Lonzanida was sentenced for each count of falsification to imprisonment of 4 years and 1 day of prisión correccional as minimum, to 8 years and 1 day of prisión mayor as maximum. The judgment of conviction became final on 23 October 2009 in the Decision of this Court in Lonzanida v. People, before Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy on 1 December 2009.

The manner of filling up the permanent vacancy in the Office of the Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales is dependent upon the determination of Lonzanida’s removal. Whether Lonzanida was disqualified under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, or made a false material

representation under Section 78 of the same Code that resulted in his certificate of candidacy being void ab initio, is determinative of whether Aratea or Antipolo is the rightful occupant to the Office of the Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales.

HELD: Antipolo, the alleged "second placer," should be proclaimed Mayor because Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy was void ab initio. In short, Lonzanida was never a candidate at all. All votes for Lonzanida were stray votes. Thus, Antipolo, the only qualified candidate, actually garnered the highest number of votes for the position of Mayor.

The grounds for disqualification for a petition under Section 681 of the Omnibus Election Code are specifically enumerated.

A petition for disqualification under Section 68 clearly refers to "the commission of prohibited acts and possession of a permanent resident status in a foreign country." All the offenses mentioned in Section 68 refer to election offenses under the Omnibus Election Code, not to violations of other penal laws. There is absolutely nothing in the language of Section 68 that would justify including violation of the three-term limit rule, or conviction by final judgment of the crime of falsification under the Revised Penal Code, as one of the grounds or offenses covered under Section 68.

On the other hand, Section 782 of the Omnibus Election Code states that a certificate of candidacy may be denied or cancelled when there is false material representation of the contents of the certificate of candidacy:

Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code details the contents of the certificate of candidacy:

Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. ‒ The certificate of candidacy shall state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said office x x x

1 Sec. 68. Disqualifications. ‒ Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final decision by a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, subparagraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws.

2 Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. ‒ A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by the person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.

The conviction of Lonzanida by final judgment, with the penalty of prisión mayor, disqualifies him perpetually from holding any public office, or from being elected to any public office. This perpetual disqualification took effect upon the finality of the judgment of conviction, before Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy.

The penalty of prisión mayor automatically carries with it, by operation of law, the accessory penalties of temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification. Under Article 30 of the Revised Penal Code, temporary absolute disqualification produces the effect of "deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular elective office or to be elected to such office.” The duration of temporary absolute disqualification is the same as that of the principal penalty of prisión mayor.

On the other hand, under Article 32 of the Revised Penal Code, perpetual special disqualification means that "the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during the period of his disqualification,” which is perpetually. Both temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification constitute ineligibilities to hold elective public office. 

A person suffering from these ineligibilities is ineligible to run for elective public office, and commits a false material representation if he states in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to so run.

Effect of a Void Certificate of Candidacy

A cancelled certificate of candidacy void ab initio cannot give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to valid votes.

As the Comelec stated in their February 2011 Resolution: Since Lonzanida was never a candidate for the position of Mayor [of] San Antonio, Zambales, the votes cast for him should be considered stray votes. Consequently, Intervenor Antipolo, who remains as the sole qualified candidate for the mayoralty post and obtained the highest number of votes, should now be proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales.

Lonzanida's certificate of candidacy was cancelled because he was ineligible or not qualified to run for Mayor.1âwphi1Whether his certificate of candidacy is cancelled before or after the elections is immaterial because the cancellation on such ground means he was never a candidate from the very beginning, his certificate of candidacy being void ab initio. There was only one qualified candidate for Mayor in the May 2010 elections - Antipolo, who therefore received the highest number of votes.

Petition dismissed.

Jesus Conducto vs. Judge Iluminado C. Monzon (291 SCRA 619) Gross Ignorance of the Law

Facts:  Respondent judge was charged with gross ignorance of the law.  He refused to suspend the mayor  due to criminal charges against the latter for the crime of unlawful appointment.  The judge opined that an official cannot be suspended for something that has happened in a previous term.  Settled jurisprudence says this only applies to administrative, not criminal cases.

Held:  Fined for P5000.  While judges should not be disciplined for inefficiency on account merely of occasional mistakes or errors of judgment, it is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles.  A judge is called upon to exhibit more than just cursory acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules; it is imperative that he be conversant  with the basic legal principles and aware of well-settled and authoritative doctrines.  Also, if he did the act deliberately, he violated Canon 18 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics directs a judge to administer his office with due regard to the integrity of the system of the law itself, remembering that he is not a depository of arbitrary power, but a judge under the sanction of law.  An RTC judge cannot overturn a settled doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court, otherwise, litigation would be endless.

+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

Conducto v. Monzon

Facts: On 30 August 1993, complainant filed a complaint with the Sangguniang Panlungsod of San Pablo City against Maghirang, the barangay chairman of Barangay III-E of San Pablo City, for abuse of authority, serious irregularity and violation of law in that, among other things, Maghirang appointed his sister-in-law, Florian, to the position of barangay secretary on 17 May 1989 in violation of Section 394 of the LGC. At the same time, complainant filed a complaint for violation of Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code with the Office of the City Prosecutor against Maghirang, which was, however, dismissed on 30 September 1993 on the ground that Maghirang’s sister-in-law was appointed before the effectivity of the LGC of 1991, which prohibits a punong barangay from appointing a relative within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity as barangay secretary.

The order of dismissal was submitted to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon. On 22 October 1993, complainant obtained Opinion No. 246, s. 1993 from Director Jacob Montesa of the Department of Interior and Local Government, which declared that the appointment issued by Maghirang to his sister-in-law violated paragraph (2), Section 95 of B.P. Blg. 337, the LGC prior to the LGC of 1991. In its Revised Resolution of 29 November 1993,[4] the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon dismissed the case, but ordered Maghirang to replace his sister-in-law as barangay secretary. On 20 December 1993, complainant moved that the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon reconsider the order of 29 November 1993, in light of Opinion No. 246, s. 1993 of Director Montesa. Acting on the motion, Francisco Samala, Graft Investigation Officer II of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, issued an order[6] on 8 February 1994 granting the motion for reconsideration and recommending the filing of an information for unlawful appointment (Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code) against Maghirang. The recommendation was duly approved by Manuel C. Domingo, Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon.

In a 3rd indorsement dated 4 March 1994,[7] the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon transmitted the record of the case to the Office of the City Prosecutor of San Pablo City and instructed the latter to file the corresponding information against Maghirang with the proper court and to prosecute the case. In his Order of 30 June 1995,[9] respondent judge denied the motion for suspension on the ground that: [T]he alleged offense of UNLAWFUL APPOINTMENT under Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code was committed on May 17, 1989, during [Maghirang’s] terms (sic) of office from 1989 to 1994 and said accused was again re-elected as Barangay Chairman during the last Barangay Election of May 9, 1994, hence, offenses committed during previous term is (sic) not a cause for removal (Lizarez vs. Hechanova,

et al., G.R. No. L-22059, May 17, 1965); an order of suspension from office relating to a given term may not be the basis of contempt with respect to ones (sic) assumption of the same office under a new term (Oliveros vs. Villaluz, G.R. No. L-34636, May 30, 1971) and, the Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office.

To do otherwise would deprieve (sic) the people of their right to elect their officer. When the people have elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his fault or misconduct (sic), if he had been guilty if any. MR denied. Complainant then moved that respondent inhibit himself from Criminal Case No. 26240. In his order of 21 September 1995,[13] respondent voluntarily inhibited himself.

The case was assigned to Judge Adelardo S. Escoses per order of Executive Judge Bienvenido V. Reyes of the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City. On 15 October 1996, complainant filed his sworn letter-complaint with the Office of the Court Administrator. In his comment dated 14 February 1997, filed in compliance with the resolution of this Court of 27 January 1997, respondent asserted that he had been “continuously keeping abreast of legal and jurisprudential development [sic] in the law” since he passed the 1955 Bar Examinations; and that he issued the two challenged orders “only after due appreciation of prevailing jurisprudence on the matter,” citing authorities in support thereof.

Issues: 1. WON a criminal offense for violation of Republic Act 3019 committed by an elective officer during one term may be the basis of his suspension in a subsequent term in the event of his reelection to office.

Luciano vs. Provincial Governor: the cases of Pascual and Lizares are authority for the precept that "a reelected public officer is no longer amenable to administrative sanctions for acts committed during his former tenure" but that as to criminal prosecutions, particularly, for violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as in the case at bar, the same are not barred by reelection of the public officer, since, inter alia, one of the penalties attached to the offense is perpetual disqualification from public office and it "is patently offensive to the objectives and the letter of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practice Act . . . that an official may amass wealth thru graft and corrupt practices and thereafter use the same to purchase reelection and thereby launder his evil acts."

Punishment for a crime is a vindication for an offense against the State and the body politic. The small segment of the national electorate that constitutes the electorate of the municipality of Antipolo has no power to condone a crime against the public justice of the State and the entire body politic. Reelection to public office is not provided for in Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code as a mode of extinguishing criminal liability incurred by a public officer prior to his reelection. On the contrary, Article 9 of the Anti-Graft Act imposes as one of the penalties in case of conviction perpetual disqualification from public office and Article 30 of the Revised Penal Code declares that such penalty of perpetual disqualification entails "the deprivation of the public offices and employments which the offender may have held, even if conferred by popular election."

It is manifest then, that such condonation of an officer's fault or misconduct during a previous expired term by virtue of his reelection to office for a new term can be deemed to apply only to his administrative and not to his criminal guilt. As succinctly stated in then Solicitor General (now Associate Justice) Felix Q. Antonio's memorandum for the State, "to hold that petitioner's reelection erased his criminal liability would in effect transfer the determination of the criminal culpability of an erring official from the court to which it was lodged by law into the changing and transient whim and caprice of the electorate. This cannot be so, for while his constituents may condone the misdeed of a corrupt official by returning him back to office, a criminal action initiated against the latter can only be heard and tried by a court of justice, his nefarious act having been committed against the very State whose laws he had sworn to faithfully obey and uphold. A contrary rule would erode the very system upon which our government is based, which is one of laws and not of men."

Aguinaldo v. Santos: a public official cannot be removed from administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his re-election to office operates as a condonation of the officer’s previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. The foregoing rule, however, finds no application to criminal cases pending against petitioner for acts he may have committed during the failed coup.

Thus far, no ruling to the contrary has even rippled the doctrine enunciated in the above-mentioned cases. If respondent has truly been “continuously keeping abreast of legal and jurisprudential development [sic] in the law,” it was impossible for him to have missed or misread these cases. What detracts from his claim of assiduity is the fact that he even cited the cases of Oliveros v. Villaluz and Aguinaldo v. Santos in support of his 30 June 1995 order. What is then evident is that respondent either did not thoroughly read these cases or that he simply miscomprehended them. The latter, of course, would only manifest either incompetence, since both cases were written in plain and simple language thereby foreclosing any possibility of misunderstanding or confusion; or deliberate disregard of a long settled doctrine pronounced by this Court.