Naval Operations in the Indian Ocean 1942

7/31/2019 Naval Operations in the Indian Ocean 1942

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Naval Operations In The Indian Ocean 1942By Simon Stokes

IntroductionAfter the Japanese successes at Pearl Harbour, Singapore and Java, in April 1942 the Imperial

Japanese Navy headed West into the Indian Ocean. At the time the Allies believed that this was apre-cursor to a full scale invasion of India, and made every endeavour to pull together an appropriatelysized force with which to oppose the move. Indeed Winston Churchill described it as "the mostdangerous moment of the war"

5. Thus it was that for the first time since the attack on Pearl Harbour,

the main Japanese carrier fleet was opposed by another carrier fleet, and an almost entirely Britishfleet at that.

In the event the two carrier fleets never engaged, though the Japanese made strenuous efforts tosearch out the British fleet, mounting several air raids on Ceylon and sinking some isolated Britishnaval units and a large number of mercantile ships before withdrawing. This article aims to describethe historical events that took place during the period, and suggest some wargaming scenarios basedupon these historical events.


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Opposing Forces

British and Dominion Forces

Commander-in-Chief Vice Admiral Sir James Somerville

Force ABattleship: WarspiteFleet Carriers :Indomitable(800 sqdn : 12 Fulmars, 880 sqdn : 9 Sea Hurricanes, 827 sqdn : 12 Albacores, 831 sqdn : 12 Albacores),Formidable(818 sqdn : 9 Albacores, 820 sqdn : 12 Albacores, 888 sqdn : 12 Martlets)Heavy Cruisers : Dorsetshire, CornwallLight Cruisers : Enterprise, EmeraldDestroyers : Napier, Nestor, Paladin, Panther, Hotspur, Foxhound

Force B (Acting Vice Admiral Algernon V. Willis)3

rdBattle Squadron : Resolution, Ramillies, RoyalSovereign, Revenge

Light Carrier : Hermes(814 sqdn : 15 Swordfish)Light Cruisers : Caledon, Dragon

AA Cruisers : Heemskerck(RNN)Destroyers : Griffin, Arrow, Decoy, Scout, Norman, Vampire, Fortune, Isaac Sweers(RNN), Tenedos

Land Based RAF/FAA Squadrons in Ceylon

Colombo Trincomalee11 Squadron RAF with 11 Blenheim30 Squadron RAF with 22 Hurricane258 Squadron RAF with 14 Hurricane803 Squadron FAA with 6 Fulmar806 Squadron FAA with 6 Fulmar

202 Squadron RAF with 1 Catalina205 Squadron RAF with 1 Catalina240 Squadron RAF with 3 Catalina261 Squadron RAF with 19 Hurricane273 Squadron RAF with 6 Fulmar, 3 Martlet, 1 Seal413 Squadron RAF with 3 Catalina788 Squadron FAA with 6 Swordfish


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Japanese Forces

Commander-in-Chief Vice Admiral Nobutake Kondo

Carrier Striking Force (Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo)Fleet Carriers :Akagi(Air Unit Fuchida with 21 Mitsubishi Zero fighters, 21 Aichi 99 VAL Dive bombers, 21 Nakajima 97 Kate Torpedo/Level bombers),

Soryu(Air Unit Egusa with 21 Mitsubishi Zero fighters, 21 Aichi 99 VAL Dive bombers, 21 Nakajima 97 Kate Torpedo/Level bombers),Hiryu(Air Unit Tomonaga with 21 Mitsubishi Zero fighters, 21 Aichi 99 VAL Dive bombers, 21 Nakajima 97 Kate Torpedo/Level bombers),Zuikaku(Air Unit Shimazaki with 18 Mitsubishi Zero fighters, 27 Aichi 99 VAL Dive bombers, 27 Nakajima 97 Kate Torpedo/Level bombers),Shokaku(Air Unit Takahashi with 18 Mitsubishi Zero fighters, 27 Aichi 99 VAL Dive bombers, 27 Nakajima 97 Kate Torpedo/Level bombers)

Battle Squadron (Vice Admiral Gunichi Mikawa)Battleships : Kongo, Hiei, Kirishima, HarunaHeavy Cruisers : Tone, ChikumaLight Cruisers : Abukuma1

stDestroyer Flotilla : Isokaze, Hamakaze, Kagero, Tanikaze, Shiranuhi, Arare, Urakaze, Kasumi,

Akigumo

Malaya Force (Vice Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa)

Light Carrier : Ryujo(Air Unit Yamagami with 16 Mitsubishi Zero fighters, 21 Nakajima 97 Kate Torpedo/Level bombers)Heavy Cruisers : Chokai, Kumano, Suzuya, Mogami, MikumaLight Cruisers : YuraDestroyers : Fubuki, Shirayuki, Hatsuyuki, MurakumoReplacement Destroyers from 4

thApril : Amagiri, Asagiri, Shirakumo, Yugiri


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Historical EventsOn 26

thMarch 1942 Admiral Sir James Somerville formally assumed command of the British Eastern

Fleet. Up to this point allied forces had suffered a string of disasters in the Far East at the hands ofthe Japanese. Starting with Pearl Harbour the run of Japanese successes included the sinking ofForce Z, the fall of Hong Kong, Malaya, Singapore, Philipines, Borneo, Wake Island, Rabaul and Java,the destruction of the Dutch led ABDA striking force in the Java Sea and the raid on Darwin in

Northern Australia. All this was achieved without the loss of a single major unit of the ImperialJapanese Navy. To stem the tide of Japanese successes westward into the Indian Ocean urgentreinforcements were required just at a time when the Royal Navy was least able to provide them.Both Ark Royaland Barhamhad just been lost in the Mediteranean and Valiantand Queen Elizabethput out of commission by a daring Italian torpedoman raid as the two battleships lay at anchor inAlexandria.

On paper the new British fleet (see lists above) looked impressive, and its arrival, with the enviousreputation of the fighting Admiral himself, gave a much needed boost to morale in the region. Thereality was rather different. Somerville summed up is new command in a signal to Admiral Nimitz :My fleet consists for the greater part of ships that have been employed almost exclusively onindependent duties or are newly commissioned. I am engaged in giving them intensive fleet trainingand hope before long to report them as fit for offensive operations. Churchill, as ever, expressed his

own concerns in unequivocal fashion A fleet considerable in numbers but consisting of slow,obsolescent or unmodernised ships that can neither fight a fleet action with the Japanese nor act as adeterrent to modern, fast raiders acting singly or in pairs, will leave themselves and their convoys easyprey. The Rs in particular will be floating coffins. On 28

thMarch Somerville received notice of

Nagumos intended attack on Ceylon, the same day as he sent his signal to Admiral Nimitz. Time hadrun out, hed have to fight the coming campaign with the fleet as it stood.

Indomitable


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The Ceylon Raids ("C" Operation)

On 9th

March Admirals Kondo and Nagumo had received orders to prepare plans for an attack on theBritish naval bases in Ceylon and to seek out and destroy the British Eastern fleet. A simultaneousand subsidiary operation was given to Admiral Ozawa and his Malaya force was to enter the Bay ofBengal and disrupt British sea communications in the area and launch air raids on Indian ports. Theprime objective though was the neutralisation of British naval and air forces so safeguarding Japansoperations in Burma, it was never intended as a prelude to invasion, though the British had no way of

knowing this of course.

The Japanese carrier striking force rounded the southern tip of Sumatra on 2nd

April. Nagumos planwas to strike at the port and installations of Colombo on a Sunday, hoping (as at Pearl Harbour) tocatch the port and ships at a Sunday routine, especially as Sunday 5

thApril 1942 was Easter Sunday.

Thus at one stroke he would deal a knock out blow to the British Eastern Fleet just as he had done tothe US Pacific Fleet a mere five months previous. Nagumos plan was thwarted by two factors. Thefirst was that at 16:00 on 4

thApril an RCAF Catalina piloted by Squadron Leader Leonard J. Birchall

sighted and reported Nagumos position 360 miles South East of Dondra Head before the Catalinawas shot from the skies by the six patrolling fighters from Hiryu. The second was that unbeknownst tothe Japanese the British had set up a base at Addu Atoll, which lies some distance South West ofCeylon, and Somerville had already moved the Eastern Fleet there.

Somerville was now in a quandary. Rarely can a fleet commander have been caught so helplessly onthe hop. He had just arrived for the first time at Addu. Its blistering tropical heat, glaring sun andbarrenness numbed the senses. Somerville reviewed his situation: he was 600 miles from the enemy,far from a position from which he could defend Ceylon. Force A could be got underway almostimmediately (except for the cruisers Enterpriseand Emeraldwho would not be ready till midnight).Cornwalland Dorsetshirewere far away heading for Colombo where they were to undergo a refit. Theslower Force B would not complete topping up empty fuel tanks until the following day so its departurewould have to be delayed. Hermesand Vampirewere at Trincomalee where they were beingprepared for the forthcoming operations against Madagasscar. Tenedoswas already at Colomboundergoing a refit. Force A was ordered to depart as soon as Enterpriseand Emeraldwere ready.Cornwalland Dorsetshirewere ordered to alter course and rendezvous with the rest of Force A SouthWest of Ceylon. Admiral Willis was ordered to sail Force B in support of Force A as soon as it wasready. Hermesand Vampirewere ordered to get clear of Trincomalee and keep to the North East.

What Somerville had in mind was not to engage Nagumo in a daylight action, the outcome of which hehad no illusions about, but rather to strike with his surface forces by night as the Japanese retired fromlaunching their attack on Colombo, possibly following it up with an air strike the following morning tofinish off any ships damaged the previous night. Its worth noting that at this stage in the war theBritish were unaware of either the range of the Japanese carrier borne aircraft (almost twice that of theBritish equivalents) nor the efficiency of the Japanese Navy in fighting night actions, which were amplydemonstrated later that year during the Solomon Islands campaign.

Colombo therefore had to rely entirely on the defenses that Admiral Layton had managed to put inplace. The harbour was cleared of all shipping that could be, leaving only 21 merchant ships, 8 fleetauxiliaries and 5 naval vessels including Tenedosand the armed merchant cruiser Hector. The maindefence for Colombo were the fighter squadrons detailed earlier. There were two airfields, the mainone at Ratmalana and a hastily constructed airstrip at Colombos racecourse which was home to 258

squadron. The Japanese strike force was led by Commander Mitsuo Fuchida, who had led the attackon Pearl Harbour, and consisted of 36 zero fighters escorting 91 bombers. The Japanese strike forcearrived over Colombo at 07:40 and despite the advance warning given to the British, they stillmanaged to achieve an element of surprise (the British had wrongly assumed that the Japaneseattack would come during the moonlight early hours rather than at dawn and had stood down theirfighter squadrons at 03:00). The first casualties of the day were the six Swordfish of 788 squadronwho were flying into Ratmalana on being ordered to transfer there from Trincomalee. The Japanesefighters fell on them and shot all six out of the sky almost before they were aware of what washappening. The Japanese bombers then peeled off to attack their allotted targets of harbourinstallations, shipping and the airfield at Ratmalana. The British fighters at Ratmalana were quicklyscrambled and in the air, but were soon engaged in unequal dogfights with the Japanese fighters (theFAA Fulmars were particularly outclassed and Ceylon proved to be the last time they were used in afront line role). The Hurricanes of 258 squadron fared better and managed to get in amongst theJapanese bombers before being engaged by the Japanese fighter escorts. Losses were heavythough: 4 Fulmars and 14 Hurricanes. Japanese losses amounted to 1 fighter and 6 bombers with afurther 9 bombers damaged. Damage inflicted on Colombo itself was severe and included railway


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workshops, harbour quays and workshops, piers, Government buildings, repair shops and hangars. Inthe harbour the merchant ship Benlediwas set ablaze and both Hectorand Tenedoswere sunk andthe submarine depot ship Luciastruck and seriously damaged by a bomb.

Dorsetshireand Cornwallwere already at sea when they received Somervilles signal to rendezvousand at 07:00 they altered course to comply. At 08:00 they received a signal warning of heavy enemyforces about 150 miles to the east of their position, so they increased to Cornwallsmaximum of 27 knots. At 11:30 Dorsetshires radar picked up a Japanese float plane, that had been launched earlierthat morning from the cruiser Tone, the plane spotted the two cruisers and proceeded to shadowthem. Alerted to the presence of the two British cruisers Nagumo decided to divert the entire secondstrike force (127 planes), that were to have gone in and finish off any remaining targets in Colombo,against this new target of opportunity that had presented itself. With weather conditions clear and littleor no wind, the two cruisers fates were effectively sealed. The Japanese strike force, led byLieutenant Commander Egusa, easily located their target and in a frighteningly clinical display of divebombing sank both within 6 minutes. A total of 1129 weary survivors were eventually picked up byEnterprise, Paladinand Pantherthe following day. A total of 424 men had been lost.

At daylight on the 6th

April, Force B joined Force A and the assembled fleet set course to the eastward.There followed a period of naval operations marked by two powerful fleets manoeuvring a fewhundred miles apart, one fleet seeking a daylight battle where its vast superiority in carrier bomberaircraft would prove decisive and the other fleet prepared to engage only in a night battle where itssuperiority in gunfire (40x15 guns against 24x14 guns) might give it victory. This groping aroundcontinued until 8

thApril during which time there were a considerable number of misleading signals and

aircraft sightings all of which came to nought. Nagumo for his part kept his force beyond a 500 milecircle from Dondra Head. Somerville returned to Addu Atoll at 11:00 on 8

thApril, where he held a

conference of his flag and commanding officers aboard Warspite. The result of the conference,subsequently approved by the admiralty and cabinet, was that Force B which lacked speed,endurance and AA firepower, was dispatched to Kilindini in East Africa to assume convoy protectionduties, whilst he would retire with Force A to Bombay as a deterrent against Japanese raids into theWestern Indian Ocean.

As Somervilles force was withdrawing from the operational area, Nagumo was preparing a secondstrike against Ceylon. On the morning of 9th April the Japanese strike force of 91 dive bombers and 38fighters was launched against Trincomalee. The strike had been anticipated by the British and againall shipping that could had cleared the harbour. The British tracked the Japanese strike force on their


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radar screens and scrambled all their available fighters in good time to meet the attack. The dogfightsthat ensued saw Japanese superiority in machines, sheer numbers and training result in the loss ofeight Hurricanes and one Fulmar. Fuchida, leading the strike force, directed his bombers against whatshipping still remained in the harbour, where the monitor Erebuswas damaged and the merchant shipSagaingwas set ablaze but successfully beached. Fuchida finally called off the attack and headed hisplanes back to rendezvous with Nagumos carriers. A repetition of the incident a few days earlier,invloving Cornwalland Dorsetshire, now occurred. A float plane from Harunaspotted HermesandVampireheading south close inshore, and once again Egusas second attack wave was launched toattack this new target.

After Egusa's force had taken of and whilst the first strike force were re-arming upon being recovered,there occurred an event that was to give Nagumo great cause for concern. No 11 squadron RAF hadbeen despatched, unescorted, to seek out and attack the Japanese carriers. By great good fortunethey had not only managed to locate the Japanese carriers but had somehow managed to escape thenotice of the patrolling Japanese fighters. The first that was known of their presence was a series ofexplosions in the water around Akagi, as bombs bracketed the Japanese flag ship. Such a braveattack executed in the face of overwhelming odds deserved better results, but no hits were scored and5 of the 9 Blenheim bombers that made the attack were shot down by the now fully alerted Japanesefighters.

No ships captain can feel quite so naked and vulnerable as that of an aircraft carrier devoid of aircraftwhen under threat of impending air attack, yet this was precisely the situation that captain Richard F JOnslow found himself in as he stood on the bridge of Hermes. All his serviceable aircraft had beendisembarked at Trincomalee. He was aware that he had been spotted and, still in company withVampire, had reversed course heading back to Trincomalee at full speed, requesting fighter cover. Itnever arrived, instead Egusa with a strike force of 80 bombers and 9 fighters found Hermesand sankher in 20 minutes, inflicting an estimated 40 direct hits from 250 Kg bombs which at one point werelanding at the rate of one every 2-3 seconds. Hermeswas the only British carrier to be lost to enemyair attack during the course of world war 2. Vampiretook a little longer to succumb to the attentions ofEgusas remaining bombers, but a direct hit in boiler room A brought her to a standstill. Soon her bowsection fell away as the result of a series of direct hits, and finally the still floating stern section wasblown apart when her magazine exploded. As luck would have it a hospital ship, the Vita, was onhand to witness the attacks, and unmolested by the Japanese planes was quickly on the scene to

rescue survivors. She collected 590 survivors from both ships, but Captain Onslow with 18 officersand 288 ratings were lost.

Nagumos carrier planes scoured the seas around Trincomalee and accounted for a number of otherBritish ships including the corvette Holyhock. Simultaneously Vice Admiral Ozawa had entered theBay of Bengal with his Malaya force where, with similarly ruthless efficiency, he sank 18 merchantships. Another 5 merchant ships were sunk by Japanese submarines, also operating in the bay ofBengal. These were however the closing moves of C operation for the Japanese, as on 10

thApril

both Nagumos and Ozawas forces were heading East and away from the Indian Ocean, content withthe havoc they had wrought. They were never to return, and with them went the imminent threat ofinvasion for India.

Operation Ironclad

The Admiralty had grave apprehensions about the vulnerability of the vital supply route to Egypt viathe Cape of Good Hope throughout 1942. The allies had only week naval and air forces in South andEast Africa, and no naval base at all between Simonstown and Kilindini. The British therefore decidedthat they needed to sieze key points on the Vichy French controlled island of Madagascar, and inparticular the excellent harbour at Diego Suarez. The assault force left England in March for Durban.It's composition is detailed below, the majority of the supporting warships being supplied by Force Hfrom Gibraltar. Rear Admiral E.N. Syfret, who had taken over command of Force H from Somerville,was also appointed "Combined Commander" of the expedition. The plan was to assault Diego Suarezby landing at it's back door on the west coast of the island, thus taking the main defences in the rear.

British Naval Forces:Battleship: RamilliesAircraft Carriers:

Illustrious(881 Sqdn - 12 Martletts, 882 Sqdn - 8 Martletts & 1 Fulmar, 810 & 829 Sqdn - 20 Swordfish)Indomitable(800 Sqdn - 8 Fulmars, 806 Sqdn - 4 Fulmars, 880 Sqdn - 6 Hurricanes, 827 & 831 Sqdn - 24 Albacores)

Cruiser: Devonshire


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Destroyers: Active, Anthony, Duncan, Inconstant, Javelin, Laforey, Lightning, Lookout, Pakenham,Paladin, PantherCorvettes: Freesia, Auricula, Nigella, Fritillary, Genista, Cyclamen, Thyme, JasmineMinesweepers: Cromer, Poole, Romney, CromartyAssault transports: WinchesterCastle, RoyalUlsterman, Keren, Karanja, Sobieksi,"Special" ships: Derwentdale(for motor landing craft and tanks), Bachaquero(tank landing ship)Troop ships: Oronsay, DuchessofAtholl, FranconiaStores and MT ships: EmpireKingsley, Thalatta, Mahout, CityofHongKong, Mairnbank, Martand

British ground forces:

29th

independent Infantry Brigade

2nd

South Lancashire Regiment

2nd

East Lancashire Regiment

1st

Royal Scots Fusiliers

2nd

Royal Welch Fusiliers

455th

Light Battery - Royal Artillery (4x3.7" Howitzers, 2x25pdr, 4x40mm Bofors)

MG company

B Special Service Tank Squadron (SHQ 2xValentine II, 4 troops of 1xValentine II & 2xTetrarch)

No. 5 Commando (Lt-Colonel Sanguinetti)

17th

Infantry Brigade Group (of 5th

Division):

2nd

Royal Scots Fusiliers

2nd

Northamptonshire Regiment

6th

Seaforth Highlanders

9th

Field Regiment - Royal Artillery (2 troops of 4x25pdr)

13th

Infantry Brigade (of 5th

Division):

2nd

Cameronians

2nd

Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers

2nd

Wiltshire Regiment

French Forces :French defences consisted of eight coastal batteries, "forts" (typically garrisoned by a company), anextensive trench system, various naval vessels and approximately 18 Morane-Saulnier 406 fighters,11 Potez 63 bombers, 1,500 - 3,000 troops in the Diego Suarez area, about 8,000 troops on the islandas a whole (approx 75% native). Native troops formed the Rgiments Mixtes Malgaches (RMM), ofwhich there were several battalions. Other troops included "European" colonial troops, marines, AAand artillery units and obsolescent FT-18 light tanks.

In the very early hours of 5th

May, after minesweepers had cleared the approaches and aircraft fromIndomitableand Illustrioushad neutralised the French airfields and subdued the warships in the mainharbour, the assault troops were successfully put ashore. The French resisted stubbornly on thenarrow neck of land which separates Diego Suarez from the bays on the west coast where the Britishlanded. A detachment of marines were carried round at night by the destroyer Anthonyand

penetrated the harbour via the main entrance, taking the defenders by surprise.

Resistance soon collapsed and by the evening of 7th

May, only 60 hours after the first landings,

Admiral Syfret was able to lead the main body of his fleet safely into the strongly fortified harbour. TheBritish contented themselves with securing their gains. They offered an armistice to the Vichy Frenchwho still controlled the bulk of Madagascar. The French rejected the British armistice on 18

th


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September and a further landing was therefore mounted aimed at Tananrive. Tananrive was enteredon the 23

rdSeptember and there was little further resistance in the south of the island thereafter.

Resistance finally ceased on 5th

November.

Japanese submarines and surface raiders off Madagascar

Longitude 70 degrees east had been set by the Axis as the boundary between German and Japanese

naval operations in the Indian Ocean. On 14th March Admiral Raeder informed Hitler, not altogetheraccurately, that Japan planned to occupy Ceylon and then establish bases on Madagascar. TheJapanese would require approval from their German allies however, since Madagascar lay on theGerman side of the boundary line, and from Vichy France who controlled and defended the colony.The Allies for their part were only too aware of such strategic possibilities. Churchill telegraphedRoosevelt: "A Japanese air, submarine, and/or cruiser base at Diego Suarez would paralyse ourwhole convoy route both to the Middle East and to the Far East....". They feared that the Japanesemight use bases on the island in an advance against the African mainland in the same manner thatthey had recently used bases in Indo-China in their advance against Burma, Malaya, Singapore,British Borneo, and the Dutch East Indies. Indeed it was Japanese bombers based in Vichy controlledIndo China that had sunk Prince of Walesand Repulsein December 1941. De Gaulle wished to makea Free French landing on Madagascar, but his failure at Dakar meant that his plans found no supportfrom the British and open hostility from the Americans. The German naval staff requested that the

Japanese launch operations against Allied convoys in the Indian Ocean. On 8th April the Japaneseformally agreed to despatch submarines to the east coast of Africa.

The 1st

Division of the 8th

Submarine Flotilla was withdrawn from its base at Kwajalein in the MarshallIslands and arrived at Penang in north western Malaya at the end of April 1942. Commanded by RearAdmiral Ishizaki, the division was made up of fleet submarines I-10, I-16, I-18, I-20, and I-30. Three ofthem carried a midget sub apiece and two carried an aircraft. The submarines were supported by apair of auxiliary cruisers come supply ships, Aikoku Maruand Hokoku Maru, both armed with 5.5"guns and torpedoes.

I-30 was first to depart Penang on 20th

April, sending her scout plane over Aden's harbor on 7th

Mayand then working southward with further reconnaissance at Djibouti, Mombasa, Dar-es-Salaam, andZanzibar. The main body took a more southerly course toward Durban where it also undertook

reconnaissance. As many as 40 Allied cargo ships lay in Durban, but the undetected Japanesesubmarines, seeking warships, were not yet ready to show their hand, and no attacks were launched.Instead, the subs concentrated off Diego Suarez and one of their planes discovered the Britishbattleship Ramilliesberthed there on 29

thMay. Although the scout plane was spotted, and Ramillies

left its berth, it was believed to be a Vichy aircraft from Madagascar. On the night of the 29th

I-16, I-18,and I-20 were ordered to launch their midget subs. I-18's midget sub had engine trouble, but at leastone of the other two penetrated the harbour. At 20:25 on 30

thMay Ramillieswas hit by a torpedo and,

while British corvettes dropped depth charges, at 21:20 the tanker British Loyaltytook at least onetorpedo and sank. The I-20's midget sub then grounded on a reef while attempting to retire from theharbour. On 2

ndJune her two-man crew was shot and killed by an Allied patrol near Amponkarana

Bay and their documents recovered. The wrecked midget was later sighted by British airreconnaissance. Prior to discovering the true source of the attack, Allied aircraft flew a retaliatory raidagainst the Vichy airfield at Tananarive and claimed to have destroyed three aircraft. Ramillies

emerged from Diego Suarez on 9th June and limped to Durban for repairs.

Allied vessels en-route to the Middle East via the Cape of Good Hope passed through theMozambique channel between Madagascar and the African mainland. By the summer of 1942 thisshipping remained for the most part without escort or air cover, and it was to prove a happy huntingground for Ishizaki. Aikoku Maruand Hokoku Maruwere also active, sinking the Elysia370 milesENE of Durban on 5

thJune. On the same day Ishizaki's boats sank 3 Allied merchantmen, 2 more

were accounted for the following day and an additional 5 vessels went down in the next few days. By10

thJune, the local Allied naval commander ordered convoys and fast unescorted shipping to detour

to the east of Madagascar to avoid the Mozambique channel. The only advice he could give to othershipping was to hug the shoreline. Shortly thereafter the Japanese submarines sailed to rendezvouswith their supply ships south east of Madagascar for refuelling and replenishing. By the end of themonth they were back in the channel and had resumed operations against Allied shipping. Onevessel was sunk on each of the last three days of the month, and three on 1st July.


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In mid-July the Japanese force, having damaged a British battleship and accounted for some 25 shipstotalling over 120,000 tons, began withdrawing from African shores and returned to Penang in August.Admiral Ishizaki suffered no loss other than his midget sub at Diego Suarez. In the final analysisdamage done to Allied interests in this part of the world was of much more immediate benefit toGermany than Japan, and the IJN was unwilling to devote its precious resources in going to theassistance of its Axis partner.

Whilst the Japanese submarines never returned to the Indian Ocean, Aikoku Maruand Hokoku Marudid. On 11th November at 11:58 in the morning, the naval authorities in Fremantle received an S.O.S.-signal sent out by the corvette Bengal, reporting that she and the tanker Ondinawere under attack bytwo enemy raiders, identified as Japanese, in position 19.45 S - 92.40 E. The battle started when alookout aboard Ondinasighted an unknown vessel at about 11,000 yards away, bearing 270

o,

followed by another ship of similar size. As no allied ships were reported in the vicinity, they couldonly assume they were hostile and for some time these ships were even identified as Japanesecarriers. On the Bengal, the lookouts saw the two warships a few minutes later, bearing 290

o. The

ships both made a quick 90o

turn to starboard away from the enemy to a NNW course. Bengalthenturned to engage, thus hoping to buy enough time for the Ondinato escape. She opened fire at 12:12from 3000 yards, soon followed by the Ondina7000 yards away. The sensible thing to do for theOndinato do was to follow the order to escape, but the captain decided to stay. His ship, armed witha 4" gun, still carried a heavier punch than her smaller companion. In addition, the Ondinacould only

sustain a speed of 12 knots versus 21 knots of the Japanese ships.

Aikoku Maru

The Aikoku Maru(Captain Oishi Tamotsu) and Hokoku Maru(Captain Imazato Hiroshi) commencedfiring at 12:12, and soon straddled the Ondinawith their 5.5" armament. The first hit on Ondinarippedoff a part of the main mast, leaving only a stump standing. The Ondinaherself had her answer ready:the third shell fired was a hit in the superstructure of Hokoku Maru, but apparently did little to effect herspeed or fighting capacity. Content with the hit, the officer in charge then ordered the gunners toconcentrate their fire on the stern. Only a few moments later, a lucky hit on the starboard torpedomount turned the Hokoku Maruin a ball of red and yellow flames, and as the ship emerged from thesmoke, she was listing heavily to starboard, and simultaneously started to settle by the stern. Theexplosion ripped off the stern and threw her two floatplanes overboard, while massive fires raged in

the superstructure. Hokoku Maruwas not built as a warship, and therefore didn't have a sufficientnumber of watertight bulkheads. Shells fell from their lockers as a result of the increasing list andthrew sailors overboard. Reports came in indicating large fires in the engine-room and the loss of allelectricity. There was little hope of salvaging the Hokoku Maru, and Captain Imazato could do littleelse than to order "abandon ship". The raider finally sank in a massive explosion at 13:12.

Meanwhile, the Aikoku Maruhotly engaged the Bengaland Ondina, scoring several hits on the latter.Fortunately, shells and torpedoes have little effect on empty tankers, as the large number of watertighttanks keeps them afloat under the most difficult circumstances. Aikoku Marualso fired at the Bengal,which had shortened the distance to about 2000 yards. One shell hit her in the forecastle at 12:20,luckily doing little damage. After smoke floats failed to work and the supply of ammunition had almostbeen depleted, the Bengalturned away at 12:40 and made smoke. During her retreat, the Bengalwashit in her stern at 12:41, which caused a fire in the officers' baggage room. The last that the Bengal

saw of the Ondina, she was trying to evade the shells that continuously straddled her from the AikokuMaru. A shell was seen hitting her aft of the bridge at 13:08. By 13.45, the sea was empty.


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After Bengalhad disappeared over the horizon, Ondinawas still steaming around at full speed. Notbuilt as a warship, she had only a small stock of ammunition and her rate of fire had slackenedsignificantly. Aikoku Maruclosed the range to 3000 yards, and scored several hits in the followingminutes. A last attempt to escape by dumping smoke-buoys overboard failed, and the captain orderedthe crew to abandon ship to avoid further bloodshed. The engines were stopped, the lifeboatslowered and a white flag was hoisted, all under continuous fire from the Aikoku Maru. A few momentslater, Captain Horsman was killed by a piece of shrapnel from a shell hitting the bridge.

Aikoku Maruapproached Ondinato about 400 yards, and fired two torpedoes to finish her off. Bothblew large holes in the starboard side, but did little to sink the ship itself. These tanks had been emptyand the ship remained afloat on the other undamaged fuel tanks, despite a 30

olist. Then Aikoku Maru

changed course and the Japanese gunners opened fire on the drifting lifeboats, killing the 1st

engineerand three Chinese stokers. Satisfied with the results, Aikoku Maruthen steamed away to pick upsurvivors from Hokoku Maru. Later, the Aikoku Marucame back one more time, firing a torpedo whichmissed the tanker. She paid little attention to the survivors and steamed away, convinced the Ondinawas doomed.

Meanwhile Rehwinkel, the first officer, managed to assemble a small skeleton crew and returned tothe ship, where counter flooding reduced the list. Inspection revealed that her engines were also stillintact. The small fires were extinguished and the last crewmembers in the lifeboats were taken

aboard, after they had been convinced there was no danger of her sinking. Now the long leg back toFremantle began. After two days the first officer was forced to send out an uncoded signal for help.Uncoded, because the code books had all been thrown overboard when "abandon ship" was ordered.This unexpected signal caused a shock in Colombo, as the Ondinahad been reported sunk by theOndinaherself and logically, the British thought the Japanese were playing a trick on them. A signalwent out from Fremantle for Ondinato report her position. Expecting a Japanese trap, the Ondinanaturally didn't reply. Therefore without any form of assistance the Ondinasteamed slowly towardsFremantle. Fortunately on the 17

than Australian Catalina flying boat was sighted, when she was

about 200 miles north west of Fremantle. The lookouts had reported a ship some time earlier, and theCatalina was asked if that ship could provide the much needed medical help. The unknown shipproved to be a hospital ship. On 18

thNovember, the Ondinaentered Fremantle. The corvette Bengal

had entered Diego Garcia the day before.

Wargaming OptionsIn the following sections are some ideas for naval wargames based upon the previously describedhistorical events.

Ceylon Raids as a Campaign

A board game entitled "White Ensign/Red Sun" from Moments in Historywas released a few yearsback that covers the Ceylon raids, and would still seem to be obtainable, however the reviews I'veread were rather mixed. The essential problem is that the British are no match for the Japanese in afull on daylight carrier battle, and in fact did everything they could to avoid such an action. The goal istherefore one of preserving the fog of war by hidden movement and providing an in-built mechanismfor the possibility of inaccurate or misleading sighting reports from scout planes. One board game thatdoes reflect this is 3W's "Scratch one Flattop" double blind game about the Battle of the Coral Sea

(see AGB 108 from May 2003), and a game using this system but adapted to the "White Ensign/RedSun" counters and map would seem the best compromise. It does make it rather expensive howeveras you'd need to purchase 2 games!

Whether the campaign is run as a map and tabletop wargame or a board game, the British player hasto believe that a Japanese invasion force could appear at any moment. It's this fear of an invasion ofIndia or Ceylon that kept the British fleet in the operational area beyond the point when logic indicatedthat they should retire. One way of achieving this is to make the arrival of a Japanese invasion apossibility. For a board game this might be done by means of counters placed face down representingthe invasion force, which are only turned right way up when attacked or when they arrive at theirtarget. For a wargame, the Japanese player can roll 1D10 to see what his main objective for thegame is; 1-4=Elimination of British Eastern Fleet, 5-7=Commerce raiding, 8-9=Invasion of Ceylon,10=Elimination of British base at Addu Atoll. Correspondingly the Japanese player should not know or

at least should not be sure about the location of the British Eastern Fleet's secret base unless they rolla 10 on their objective roll.


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Operation Ironclad

The campaign offers a number of possible small unit actions:1. A "take and hold" British mission against a coastal fort or gun battery from the landward side to freeup additional beaches for subsequent waves.2. A night attack on the main harbour defences at Diego Suarez by a detachment of marinessupported by a destroyer.3. An opposed landing by 29

thBrigade on a "coastal" table using LCMs as transport, and destroyers

as fire support. Both British and French air support would also be included.

Jap Subs off Madagascar

This presents an interesting alternative submarine / convoy game, this time with Japanese submarinesinstead of German ones athwart the only convoy route from the UK to British forces in the Middle East.

A one off "what if" game is also possible based on the premise of how much more damage couldIshizaki have done if, instead of hunting Allied warships, at the end of May he had charged into theunsuspecting Allied shipping anchored off Durban.

Set Piece Actions

Luckily for the British there was no large fleet action that took place, but the following historicalrecreations and "what-if" encounters would seem to make for some entertaining games:1. The Ondinaand Bengal'sbattle against Aikoku Maruand Hokoku Maruis one of the classic

defiant surface actions at sea of world war 2, and makes for an entertaining if rather one sidedgame.

2. The obvious "what-if" game is Somerville's desired night attack on the Japanese fleet. A numberof variables can be introduced in this game, the first being the inclusion of Force B, the second theinclusion of Dorsetshireand Cornwallwith Force A and lastly the possible inclusion of Prince ofWalesand Repulseto Somerville's force. This last variable is on the assumption that theAdmiralty's belated order to Tom Phillips to withdraw his ships to the Indian Ocean had been sentearlier than it in fact had been back in December 1941. Phillips might then have acted upon it andwithdrawn Force Z rather than sailing it into the South China Sea where the Japanese sank it.

3. The full on daylight carrier battle between the British and Japanese carrier forces is a possible

game, but would almost certainly be rather one sided unless the Japanese forces are put at somedisadvantage. Possibilities for this are that the British find the Japanese carriers and launch theirstrike during the Colombo or Trincomalee raids when half the Japanese planes are absent, thatthe Blenheim raid on 9

thApril had had better luck and the Akagiis out of action or simply that one

or more of the Japanese carriers are absent due to mechanical failure. This actually happened tothe Kagawhich had originally been part of Nagumo's force.

References1. Dull, Paul S, A Battle History Of The Imperial Japanese Navy (1941-1945), Naval Institute Press, 19892. Fuchida, Mitsuo & Okumiya, Masatake, Miidway - The Japanese Story, Cassell Military Paperbacks, 20023. Roskill, Captain Stephen W, The Navy At War 1939-1945, Wordsworth Editions, 19984. Thomas, David A, Japan's War At Sea : Pearl Harbour to the Coral Sea, Andre Deutsch, 19785. Tomlinson, Michael, The Most Dangerous Moment, Mayflower Granada Publishing, 1979

6. http://leden.tref.nl/~jviss000/battle_ondina.html

7. http://www.sonic.net/~bstone/history/mozam.shtml

8. http://www.sonic.net/~bstone/history/madagascar.shtml

9. http://www.fepow-

community.org.uk/research/Malaya_and_Singapore/Leading_Figures/Admiral_Sir_Geoffrey_Layton/body_inde

x.htm

10. http://www.history.navy.mil/branches/org11-2.htm

11. http://www.combinedops.com/No%205%20Commando.htm

12. http://www.battlefront.co.nz/Article.asp?ArticleID=123

Naval Operations in the Indian Ocean 1942

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