Natural Right and the Historical Approach

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Natural Right and the Historical ApproachAuthor(s): Leo StraussReviewed work(s):Source: The Review of Politics, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Oct., 1950), pp. 422-442Published by: Cambridge University Press for the University of Notre Dame du lac on behalf of Review of Politics

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Natural Right and the Historical Approach

By Leo Strauss

THE attackon naturalright* in the nameof historytakesin most

cases the followingform: naturalrightclaims o be a rightthat is

discernibleby human reason and is universallyacknowledged;buthistory(includinganthropology) eachesus that no suchrightexists;instead of the supposeduniformitywe find an indefinitevarietyof

notionsof rightor justice. Or, in otherwords, herecannotbe natural

rightif thereare no immutableprinciples f justice,but history hows

us that all principlesof justiceare mutable. One cannotunderstandthemeaningof theattackon naturalright n thenameof history,before

one has realized he utter irrelevance f this argument. In the firstplace,"consentof all mankind"s by no meansa necessary onditionof the existenceof naturalright. Some of the greatestnaturalrightteachershaveargued hat,preciselyf naturalrightis rational, ts dis-

coverypresupposeshecultivation f reason,andtherefore atural ightwill not be knownuniversally: ne oughtnot even to expectanyreal

knowledge f naturalrightamongsavages.1 In otherwordsby provingthat there s no principle f justice hathas not beendeniedsomewhere

or at some time, one has not yet proventhat any given denialwasjustifiedor reasonable. Furthermore,t has alwaysbeen knownthatdifferentnotions of justiceobtainat different imes and in differentnations. It is absurd o claimthatthe discovery f a stillgreaternum-ber of such notionsby modernstudentshas in any way affected he

fundamental ssue. Above all, knowledgeof the indefinitely arge

*This paper is taken from lectures on Natural Right and History which weredelivered at the Universityof Chicago in October, 1949 under the auspicesof the Charles

R. Walgreen Foundation, and which will be published by the University of ChicagoPressunder the same title.

1 Consider Plato, Republic, 456b12-c2,452a7-8 and c6-dl, Laches, 184dl-185a3;

Hobbes, De Cive, II 1; Locke, Of Civil Government,Book II ? 12 in conjunctionwithAn Essay on the Human UnderstandingBook I, ch. 3. CompareRousseau,Discours sur

l'origina de l'inegalite, preface; Montesquieu,De l'esprit des lois I 1-2; also Marsilius,Defensor Pacis, II 12 sect. 8.

422



NATURAL RIGHT AND HISTORICAL APPROACH 423

variety f notions f rightandwrongs sofarfrombeingncompatiblewiththeideaof naturalight, hat t is the essentialonditionor the

emergencef that dea:realizationf thevarietyf notions f right sthe incentiveorthequest ornaturalight. If therejectionf natural

right n the nameof historys to haveanysignificance,t musthaveabasisotherthanhistoricalvidence.Its basismustbe a philosophiccritique f the possibility,r of theknowability,f natural ighta

critiqueomehowonnected ith"history."

The conclusionromthe variety f notionsof right o the non-

existencef naturalight s asold as political hilosophytself. Po-liticalphilosophyeems o beginwiththe contentionhat thevarietyof notionsof rightproves he non-existencef natural ightor theconventionalharacterf all right.2 We shallcallthisviewconven-tionalism.To clarify he meaning f the present-dayejection fnatural ightin thenameof history,we mustfirstgrasp hespecificdifferenceetweenonventionalismnthe onehand, nd"thehistoricalsense"or "thehistoricalonsciousness"haracteristicf nineteenthandtwentiethenturyhought n the other.3

Conventionalismresupposedhat the distinction etween atureandconventions themost undamentalf alldistinctions. t impliedthatnature s of incomparablyigherdignity hanconventionr thefiat of society, r thatnatures thenorm. Thethesis hatrightand

justice re conventionaleant hatrightandjusticehaveno basis n

nature, hat theyareultimately gainstnature,and thattheyhave

theirgroundn arbitraryecisions,xplicit rimplicit,f communities:theyhaveno basisbutsomekindof agreement,ndagreement ayproduce eacebut it cannotproduceruth. The adherents f themodemhistoricaliewon theotherhandreject smythicalhepremise

2 Aristotle, Eth. Nic., 1134b24-27.

3 The legal positivism of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries cannot be simply

identified with either conventionalismor historicism. It seems, however, that it derivesits strength ultimately from the generally accepted historicist premise. See particularlyKarl Bergbohm, Jurisprudenzund Rechtsphilosophie,I (Leipzig, 1892), 409 ff. Berg-bohm's strict argumentagainst the possibilityof natural right (as distinguishedfrom the

argument hat is merelymeant to show the disastrousconsequences f naturalright for the

positive legal order) is based on "the undeniabletruth that nothing eternal and absolute

exists exceptthe One Whom man cannot comprehend,but only divine in a spirit of faith"

(416 n.), that is, on the assumption"that the standardswith reference o which we pass

judgment on the historical, positive law . . . are themselves absolutely the progeny of

their time and are alwayshistoricaland relative" (450 n.).




"Weltanschauung,"hat is, to what Plato had calledthe cave. We

shall call this viewhistoricism.

We havenotedbefore that the contemporaryejectionof natural

right n the nameof history s based,not on historical vidence,buton

a philosophic ritiqueof the possibility r knowability f natural ight.We note now that thephilosophic ritiquenquestions notparticularlya critiqueof naturalrightor of moralprinciplesn general. It is a

critique f humanthoughtas such. Nevertheless,hecritique f natural

right playedan important ole in the formation f historicism.

Historicismemergedn the nineteenthcenturyunder heprotectionof the belief that knowledgeor at least divinationof the eternal is

possible. But it graduallyunderminedhe beliefwhichhad shelteredit in its infancy. It suddenlyappearedwithinour lifetime n its matureform. The genesisof historicisms inadequately nderstood.In the

presentstate of our knowledge, t is difficult o say at whatpoint inthe modemdevelopmenthe decisivebreakoccurredwith the "unhis-

torical"approach hat prevailed n all earlierphilosophy. For thepurposeof a summaryorientation t is convenient o startwith themomentwhen the previouslysubterraneousmovementcame to thesurfaceand beganto dominate he social sciences n broaddaylight.That momentwas the emergence f the historical chool.

The thoughtsthatguidedthe historical choolwereveryfar from

beingof a purelytheoreticalharacter.The historical choolemergedin reaction o the French

Revolution,ndto thenatural

rightdoctrines

that hadpreparedhat cataclysm. In opposing he violent breakwiththe past,the historical choolinsistedon the wisdomand on the needof preservingor continuing he traditionalorder. This could havebeen done withouta critiqueof naturalrightas such. Certainlypre-modernnaturalrightdid not sanctionrecklessappealfromthe estab-lishedorder,or from whatwas actualhereand now, to the naturalorrationalorder. Yet the foundersof the historical choolseemedto

haverealized omehow hat the acceptance f anyuniversal r abstractprincipleshas necessarily revolutionary,isturbing,unsettlingeffectas faras thought s concerned,nd thatthis effect s wholly ndependentof whether the principlesn questionsanction,generallyspeaking,aconservativer a revolutionaryourseof action. For the recognitionof universalprinciplesorcesman to judge the established rder,orwhat is actual here and now, in the light of the naturalor rational



THE REVIEW OF POLITICS

order, ndwhat s actualhereandnow s moreikely hannotto fallshortof theuniversal ndunchangeableorm.5 The recognitionf

universal rincipleshus tends to preventmenfromwholeheartedlyidentifyinghemselvesith,oraccepting,he social rderhat atehasallotted o them. It tends o alienatehem rom heirplaceon theearth. t tends o make hem trangers,ndeven trangersntheearth.

Bydenyinghesignificance,f nottheexistence,funiversalorms,theeminent onservativeshofounded he historicalchoolwere nfact continuingndevensharpeningherevolutionaryffortof their

adversaries.hateffortwas nspired ya specificotion f thenatural.It wasdirected gainstboththeunnaturalr conventional,ndthe

supranaturalr other-worldly. he revolutionistsssumed,we maysay, hat henaturals alwaysndividual,nd hat hereforeheuniformis unnaturalrconventional.The humanndividual asto beliber-atedor to liberate imself o thathe couldpursue ot justhishappi-ness,buthisownversion f happiness.This meanthoweverhatoneuniversalnduniformoalwassetupforall men: thenaturalightof

each ndividualasa rightuniformlyelongingo everymanasman.Butuniformity assaidto beunnaturalndhencebad. It was evi-

dently mpossibleo individualizeights n full accordanceith thenaturaldiversityf individuals.The only kindof rights hatwasneitherncompatibleith social life nor uniformwere"historical"

rights:rightsof Englishmen,orexample,n contradistinctiono the

rightsof man. Localandtemporalarietyeemedo supplya safe

and solidmiddlegroundbetweennti-socialndividualismndunnat-uraluniversality. hehistoricalchooldidnotdiscoverhelocaland

temporalariety f notions f justice:heobvious oesnot have o bediscovered.The utmost necouldsayis that t discoveredhevalue,thecharm,heinwardnessf the localandtemporal,r that t discov-eredthe superiorityf the localand temporalo the universal. twouldbe morecautiouso saythat,radicalizinghetendencyf menlikeRousseau,hehistoricalchoolassertedhatthe localandthe tem-

poralhasa higher alue hantheuniversal.As a consequence,hatclaimedo be universal,ppearedventuallys derivativeromsome-

thing locallyandtemporallyonfined, s the localandtemporaln

5 ". . . (les imperfections(des ttats), s'ils en ont, comme la seule diversite, quiest entre eux suffit pour assurerque plusieursen ont. .. ." Descartes, Discours de Idmethode,Seconde Partie.

426




statuevanescendi.The natural aw teachingof the Stoics for example,was likelyto appearas a merereflexof a particularemporal tate of a

particularocal society:of the dissolutionof the Greekcity.

The effort of the revolutionistswas directedagainst all other-

worldliness6or transcendence.Transcendences not a preserveof

revealedreligion. In a very important ense it was impliedin the

original meaningof politicalphilosophyas the quest for the natural

or bestpoliticalorder. The bestregime,as PlatoandAristotleunder-

stood it, is, and is meantto be, for the mostpart,different rom what

is actualhereandnow,or beyondall actual orders.This viewof thetranscendencef the best politicalorderwas profoundlymodifiedbythewayin which"progress" as understoodn the eighteenth entury,but it was still preservedn thateighteenth enturynotion. Otherwise

the theoristsof the FrenchRevolution ould not have condemned ll

or almost all socialorderswhichhad ever been actual. By denyingthe significance,f not the existence,of universalnormsthe historical

schooldestroyed

heonly

solid basis of all efforts to transcend he

actual. Historicism an therefore edescribeds a muchmoreextremeform of modem this-worldlinesshan the Frenchradicalism f the

eighteenthcenturyhad been. It certainlyacted as if it intendedto

make men absolutelyat home in "thisworld." Since any universal

principlesmake at leastmost men potentiallyhomeless t depreciateduniversalprinciplesn favorof historicalprinciples. It believed hat

by understandingheirpast, their heritage,theirhistoricalsituation,

men could arriveat principleshat wouldbe as objectiveas those ofthe older,pre-historicistoliticalphilosophy ad claimed o be, and, in

addition,wouldnot be abstract r universal ndhenceharmful o wiseactionor to a trulyhumanlife but concreteor particular:principlesfittingthe particular ge or particular ation,principleselative o the

particular georparticularation.

In tryingto discover tandardswhich,whilebeingobjective,wererelative o

particularistorical ituations,he historicalchool

assignedto historicalstudiesa muchgreater mportancehan they had ever

6 As regardsthe tension betweenthe concernwith the historyof the human race andthe concernwith life after death, see Kant's "Idea for a universalhistory with cosmopoli-tan intent," propos. 9 (The Philosophy of Kant, ed. by C. J. Friedrich, The Modern

Library,p. 130.) Consider also the thesis of Herder, whose influence on the historical

thought of the nineteenthcenturyis well known, that "the five acts are in this life." (SeeM. Mendelssohn, GesammelteSchriften,Jubiliums-Ausgabe, II, 1, pp. XXX-XXXII.)




possessed. ts notionof whatone could xpectromhistoricaltudies

was,however,ot theoutcomef historicaltudies, utof assumptionsthatstemmedirectly r indirectlyromthe natural ightdoctrinefthe eighteenthentury.The historicalchoolassumedhe existenceof folk-minds,hat s, it assumecthatnations rethnic roups renat-uralunits,or it assumedhe existencef generalawsof historical

evolution, r it combinedothassumptions.t soonappearedhattherewasa conflict etweenheassumptionshathadgivenhedecisive

impetuso historicaltudies,and the resultsas well as the require-

mentsof genuine istoricalnderstanding.n themomentheseas-sumptionsereabandonedheinfancyf historicismameoits end.Historicism owappeareds a particularormof positivism,hat

is, of the schoolwhichheldthattheology ndmetaphysicsadbeen

supersedednceand for all by positive cienceor which dentified

genuine nowledgef realitywith heknowledgeupplied y the em-

piricalciences.Positivismproper addefined empirical"n terms fthe proceduresf the naturalciences.But therewasa glaring on-

trastbetween hemannern whichhistoricalubjects ere reated ypositivismroperand the mannern whichtheywere reated y thehistorians horeallyproceededmpirically. reciselyn the interestsof empiricalnowledget became ecessaryo insist hatthemethodsof naturalcience e notconsidereduthoritativeorhistoricaltudies.In addition,what "scientific"sychologynd sociology ad to sayaboutman,provedo betrivial ndpoor f comparedithwhatcouldbe learnedromthe

greathistorians.Thus

historywas

thoughto

supplyheonlyempirical,ndhence heonlysolidknowledgef whatis trulyhuman,f manas man: of hisgreatnessndmisery.Sinceall

.humanursuitstart romandreturno man,theempiricaltudyof

humanityouldseem o bejustifiedn claiming higherdignity hanall other tudies f reality. History, istory ivorcedromalldubiousor metaphysicalssumptions,ecamehehighest uthority.

But historyprovedutterlyunable o keepthe promisehat had

beenheldoutbythehistoricalchool. The historicalchoolhadsuc-ceededn discreditingniversalr abstractrinciples;t hadthoughtthat historicaltudieswouldrevealparticularr concrete tandards.Yet theunbiasedistorianadto confesshis inabilityo deriveanynorms romhistory:no objective ormsremained. The historicalschoolhad obscuredhefactthatparticularrhistoricaltandardsanbecome uthoritativenlyon the basisof a universal rinciple hich

428




imposes n obligationn the individualo accept, r to bowto, thestandardsuggested ythetraditionr the situation hich asmolded

him. Yet no universalrinciplewilleversanctionheacceptancefeveryhistoricaltandardrof everyvictoriousause: o conform ithtradition r to jumpon "thewaveof the future" s not obviouslybetter, ndit is certainlyotalways etterhanto bur whatonehas

worshipped,r to resist he "trend f history."Thusall standards

suggested y history s suchprovedo be fundamentallymbiguousandthereforenfitto be consideredtandards.To theunbiasedis-

torian,"thehistoricalprocess"evealedtselfas the meaninglessebspunby whatmendid,produced,ndthought, o more hanby un-

mitigatedhance:a taletold by an idiot. The historicaltandards,thestandardshrown p by thismeaninglessrocess,ouldno longerclaim o behallowedysacred owers ehindhatprocess.Theonlystandardshatremainedere f a purelyubjectiveharacter,tandardsthathadno othersupporthanthe freechoice f theindividual.No

objectiveriterionllowed enceforthhedistinctionetweenoodand

badchoices.Historicismulminatednnihilism.Theattemptomakemanabsolutelyt home n thisworld nded n man'sbecomingbso-

lutelyhomeless.The view hat"thehistoricalprocess"s a meaninglessebor that

there s no suchthingas the"historicalrocess"asnot novel. It was

fundamentallyhe classical iew. In spiteof considerableppositionfromdifferentuarters,t wasstillpowerfulntheeighteenthentury.Thenihilistic

consequencef historicism

ouldhave

uggestedreturn

to theolder,pre-historicistiew. Butthemanifestailure f theprac-ticalclaimof historicism,hat t could upplyifewitha better, moresolidguidancehan thepre-historicisthought f thepasthaddone,did not destroyheprestige f the allegedheoreticalinsightduetohistoricism.Themoodcreated yhistoricismnditspracticalailurewasinterpreteds theunheardf experiencef thetruesituation fmanas man of a situationwhich arliermanhadconcealedrom

himself ybelievingnuniversalndunchangeablerinciples.n oppo-sition o the earlier iew, hehistoricistsontinuedo ascribeecisive

importanceo that viewof man that arisesout of historicaltudies,whichas such areparticularlyndprimarilyoncerned,ot withthe

permanentnduniversal,utwiththevariablendunique.Historyashistoryeemso presento us thedepressingpectaclef a disgrace-fulvariety f thoughtsndbeliefs nd,aboveall,of thepassing way




of everyhought ndbeliefeverheldbymen. It seemso show hatall humanhoughts dependentnunique istoricalontextshatare

preceded ymore rlessdifferentontexts,nd hat mergeutof theirantecedentsn a fundamentallynpredictableay:the foundationsfhumanhought re aidbyunpredictablexperiencesrdecisions. inceall humanhoughtbelongso specific istoricalituations,llhuman

thoughts boundo perishwith he situationo which t belongs, ndto besupersededynew,unpredictablehoughts.

Thehistoricistontentionpresentstself odayasamply upported

by historicalvidence,r evenas expressingn obviousact. Butifthe factis so obvious,t is hard o see how t couldhaveescapedhenoticeof the mostthoughtfulmenof thepast. As regardshe his-torical vidence,t is clearlynsufficiento supporthe historiciston-tention. History eachesus thata givenviewhasbeenabandonednfavorof anotheriewbyallmen,orbyallcompetent en,orperhapsonly bythemostvocalmen; t doesnot teachus whetherhechangewas

sound,rwhetherhe

rejectediewdeservedo be

rejected.Onlyan impartialnalysis f the view n question ananalysishat s notdazzled ythevictory rstunned ythedefeatof theadherentsf theviewconcerned could eachus anythingegardingheworthof theviewandhenceregardinghemeaningf thehistoricalhange.If thehistoricistontentions to haveanysolidity,t mustbebasednot on

history uton philosophy:n a philosophicnalysis rovinghatallhumanhought epends ltimatelyn fickleanddarkate,andnoton

evidentprinciplesccessibleomanas man. The basic tratum f thatphilosophicnalysiss a "critiquef reason"hatallegedly roveshe

impossibilityf theoreticalmetaphysics,nd of philosophicthicsornaturalight. Onceallmetaphysicalndethical iews anbeassumedto be strictly peaking ntenable,hatis, untenables regardsheirclaim o be simplyrue, heirhistoricalatenecessarilyppearso bedeserved.It thenbecomes plausible,lthough ot very mportanttask o trace heprevalence,t differentimes, f differentmetaphysicalandethical iews,o thetimesatwhichheyprevailed.Butthis eavesstill intact heauthorityf thepositiveciences.Thesecond tratumof the philosophicalnalysis nderlyingistoricisms the proofthatthepositiveciencesestonmetaphysicaloundations.

Takenbyitself,thisphilosophicritiquef philosophicndscien-tificthought a continuationf the efforts f Humeandof Kant-

430




would eadto skepticism. ut skepticismndhistoricismre twoen-

tirelydifferentthings. Skepticismegardstselfas in principleoeval

withhumanthought;historicismregardstselfas belongingo a spe-cifichistoricalituation.For theskeptic, ll assertionsreuncertainand hereforeessentiallyrbitrary;orthehistoricist,heassertionshat

prevailt differentimesand n differentivilizationsrevery arfrom

beingarbitrary.Historicismtemsfroma non-skepticalradition:from hatmodem raditionwhichriedto define he limitsof human

knowledgend whichtherefore dmittedhat withincertainimits

genuine nowledges possible.In contradistinctiono all skepticism,historicismestsat leastpartly n sucha critiquef humanhought sclaimso articulate hat s called"theexperiencef history."

No competentmanof ourage wouldregard s simply rue the

completeeaching f anythinker f thepast. Inevery aseexperiencehasshown hattheoriginatorf theteachingookthings orgrantedwhichmustnot be taken orgranted,rthathedidnotknowcertainfactsorpossibilitieshichwerediscoveredn a laterage. Up to now

all thought asprovedo be in needof radicalevisions,r to be in-completer limited n decisiveespects.Furthermore,ookingbackatthe past,we seemto observehateveryprogressf thoughtn onedirection asbought t thepriceof a retrogressionf thoughtn an-otherrespect:whena given imitation asovercomey a progressf

thought,arlierimportantnsightswereinvariablyorgottens a con-

sequencef thatprogress.On thewhole, herewas henno progress,but

merelya

changeromone

typeof limitationo

anothertype.Finally,we seemto observe hatthe mostimportantimitations fearlierthoughtwereof sucha naturehattheycouldnotpossiblyavebeenovercomeby anyeffortof theearlierhinkers;o say nothing fother onsiderations,nyeffort f thoughtwhichedto theovercomingof specificimitations,edto blindnessn otherrespects.It is reason-able o assumehatwhathasinvariablyappenedpto nowwillhap-penagainandagainnthefuture.Humanthoughtsessentiallyimited

in sucha waythat its limitationsiffer romhistoricalituationohistoricalituation,nd hat helimitationharacteristicf thethoughtof a givenepochcannotbe overcomey anyhuman ffort. Therealways avebeenand herealwayswillbesurprising,holly nexpectedchangesof outlookwhichradicallymodify he meaning f all pre-viously cquirednowledge.No merelyuman iewof thewhole, ndin particularo merelyhumanviewof the whole of human ife,




canclaim o be finaloruniversallyalid. Everyhuman octrine,ow-everseeminglyinal,willbe supersededooneror laterby another

doctrine.There s no reasono doubtthat earlierhinkers ad in-sightswhicharewholly naccessibleo us andwhich annotbecomeaccessibleo usehowevercarefully emight tudy heirworks, ecauseourlimitationsrevent s fromevensuspectinghepossibilityf the

insightsn question.Since he limitationsf humanhoughtreessen-

tiallyunknowable,t makes o sense o conceive f them n terms f

social, conomicndother onditions,hat s, in terms f knowabler

analyzablehenomena:he limitationsf human

houghtre set

byfate.

Thehistoricistrgumentasa certain lausibilityhich aneasilybe accountedorbythepreponderancef dogmatismn thepast. Weare not permittedo forgetVoltaire's omplaint: nousavonsdesbacheliersuisaventoutcequecesgrands ommesgnoraient."7partfrom his,many hinkersf the firstrankhavepropoundedll-compre-hensive octrines hichheyregardeds final n allimportantespects

- doctrineswhich nvariablyaveproved o be in needof radicalrevision.We ought hereforeo welcomeistoricisms an allyin our

fight againstdogmatism.But dogmatism or the inclination to

identify he goal of our thinkingwith the pointat whichwe havebecome iredof thinking"8-iso naturalo man hatit is not likelyto be a preservef thepast. We are orcedo suspecthathistoricismis theguise n which ogmatismikes oappearnourage. It seemsous thatwhat s calledhe

experiencef

historys a bird's

yeviewof

thehistory f thought,s thathistoryame o be seenunderhe com-bined nfluencef the belief n necessaryrogressor in theimpossi-bilityof returningo thethought f thepast)andof the belief nthe

supremealueof diversityr uniquenessor of theequalrightof all

epochsor civilizations).Radicalhistoricismoes not seemto be inneedof thosebeliefs nymore.But t hasnever xamined hetherhe

"experience"o whicht referss notanoutcome f thesequestionable

beliefs.Whenspeakingf the "experience"f history, eoplemply hat

this"experience"sa comprehensivensightwhich rises utof historical

knowledge,utwhich annot e reducedo historicalnowledge. or

7 DictionnairePhilosophique,ed. by J. Benda, I, 19.

8 See Lessing'sletter to Mendelssohnof January9, 1771.

432




historical nowledges always xtremelyragmentaryndfrequentlyveryuncertain,hereasheallegedxperiences supposedlylobaland

certain. Yet it can hardlybe doubtedhat the allegedexperienceultimatelyestsona number f historicalbservations. hequestionthen s whetherheseobservationsntitle neto asserthat heacquisi-tion of newimportantnsightsnecessarilyeads o the forgetting fearliermportantnsights,ndthattheearlierhinkersouldnotpos-siblyhave houghtf fundamentalossibilitieshich ame o thecenterof attentionn laterages. It is obviouslyntrue o say, or instance,

thatAristotleouldnot haveconceivedf theinjusticef slavery,orhedidconceivef it. Onemaysay,however,hathe couldnothaveconceivedf a worldstate. But why?TheworldstatepresupposessuchadevelopmentftechnologysAristotleouldnever avedreamedof. Thattechnologicalevelopment,n its turn,requiredhatsciencebe regardeds essentiallyn the service f the "conquestf nature,"and hat echnologyeemancipatedromanymoral ndpoliticaluper-vision. Aristotledidnot conceive f a worldstatebecause e was

absolutelyertain hat science s essentiallyheoreticalndthat theliberationf technologyrommoral ndpoliticalontrolwould eadtodisastrousonsequences:he fusionof science ndtheartstogetherwiththeunlimitedr uncontrolledrogressf technologyasmadeuniversalndperpetualyranny seriousossibility.Onlya rashmanwould aythatAristotle'siew, hat s,hisanswerso thequestionsfwhether r not science s essentiallyheoreticalndwhetherr not

technologicalrogresss in needof strictmoralor

political ontrol,hasbeenrefuted.But whatevernemight hinkof his answers,er-

tainly he fundamentaluestionso which heyaretheanswers,reidenticalwith he fundamentaluestionshatareof immediateoncernto ustoday. Realizinghis,werealize t the same ime hat heepochwhichregardedAristotle's undamentaluestionss obsolete, om-

pletelyacked larity boutwhat hefundamentalssuesare.Farfrom egitimizinghe historicistnference,istoryeems ather

to provehatallhumanhought ndcertainlyllphilosophichought,is concerned ith the same undamentalhemes r the same unda-mentalproblems,ndthereforehatthere xistsanunchangingrame-workwhichpersistsn all changesf human nowledgef bothfactsandprinciples.This inferences obviouslyompatibleiththe factthatclarity bout heseproblems,heapproacho them,andthesug-gested olutionso themdiffermoreor lessfrom hinkero thinkerr




fromageto age. If thefundamentalroblemsersistnallhistorical

change, umanhoughts capablef transcendingts historicalimita-

tion, or of graspingomethingrans-historical.his wouldbe thecaseeven f it were rue hatall attemptso solve heseproblemsredoomedo fail, andthattheyaredoomedo fail on account f the

"historicity"f "all"humanhought.

To leave t atthis,would mounto regardinghe causeof natural

rightas hopeless.There annotbe naturalight f allthatmancouldknowaboutrightwere heproblemf right,or if thequestionf the

principlesf justicewouldadmitof a varietyof mutuallyxclusiveanswers,oneof whichcouldbeprovedo be superioro theothers.Therecannot enaturalightf humanhought,nspiteof its essential

incompleteness,s not capablef solvingheproblemf theprinciplesof justicena genuine ndhenceuniversallyalidmanner.Moregen-erally xpressed,here annotbenaturalightf humanhoughtsnot

capable f acquiringenuine,niversallyalid, inalknowledge ithina limited

pherer

genuine nowledgef

specificubjects.Historicism

cannotdeny hispossibility. or tsowncontentionmpliesheadmis-sionof thispossibility. y assertinghatall humanhought rat leastallrelevantumanhoughts historical,istoricismdmitshathuman

thoughts capablef acquiringmost mportantnsighthat s univer-

sallyvalid,andthatwill in nowaybeaffectedyanyfuture urprises.Thehistoricisthesis s notanisolated ssertion:t is inseparableroma viewof theessentialtructuref humanife. Thisviewhas hesame

trans-historicalharacter r pretensions anynatural ightdoctrine.The historicisthesis s thenexposedo a veryobviousdifficulty

which annotbe solvedbutonlyevaded robscuredyconsiderationsof a more ubtle haracter. istoricismssertshatallhumanhoughtsor beliefsarehistorical,nd hencedeservedlyestinedo perish; uthistoricismtself s a humanhought; encehistoricismanonlybeof

temporaryalidity,r it cannot esimplyrue. To asserthehistoricist

thesismeanso doubt t andthus o transcendt. As a matter f fact,historicismlaims o havebroughto lighta truthwhichhas come o

stay,a truthvalid orallthought,orall time:howevermuchhoughthaschanged ndwillchange,t willalways emain istorical.As re-

gards he decisivensight nto the essential haracterf all human

thoughtand therewithnto the essential haracterr limitationsf

humanity,istory asreachedts end. Thehistoricistsnotimpressed

434




by theprospecthathistoricismaybesupersedednduetimebythedenialof historicism.He is certainhatsucha changewouldamountto a relapse f humanhoughtntoitsmostpowerfulelusion.His-toricismhrivesn the factthat t inconsistentlyxemptstself rom tsownverdictaboutall humanhought. The historicisthesis s self-

contradictoryr absurd. We cannotsee the historicalharacterf"all" hought thatis, of all thoughtwiththeexceptionf thehis-toricist nsightand its implicationswithout ranscendingistory,withoutgraspingomethingrans-historical.

If we call all thoughthatis radicallyistorical comprehensiveworld-viewr a partof sucha view,we mustsay:historicisms notitselfa comprehensiveorld-viewut ananalysisf all comprehensiveworld-views,n expositionf the essential haracterf all suchviews.

Thought hatrecognizesherelativityf all comprehensiveiewshasa differentharacterrom houghtwhichsunder hespellof,orwhich

adopts,a comprehensiveiew. The formers absolute ndneutral;

thelatters relative ndcommitted.Theformers a theoreticalnsightthat transcendsistory;he latter s the outcome f a fatefuldis-

pensation.

The radical istoricistefuseso admithetrans-historicalharacterof thehistoricisthesis. At the same imehe recognizesheabsurdityof unqualifiedistoricisms a theoreticalhesis.He denies hereforethe possibilityf a theoreticalr objective nalysis,whichas suchwouldbe

trans-historical,f the various

omprehensiveiewsor

"his-toricalworlds" r "cultures."ThisdenialwasdecisivelyreparedyNietzsche'sttacknnineteenthcenturyistoricism,hichlaimedobea theoreticaliew. Accordingo Nietzsche,hetheoreticalnalysisfhumanife that realizesherelativityf all comprehensiveiewsandthusdepreciateshemwouldmakeimpossibleuman ife itself, or itwoulddestroyheprotectingtmosphereithinwhichife or cultureoraction s alonepossible.Moreover,incehetheoreticalnalysisas

its basisoutside f life,it will neverbe ableto understandife. Thetheoreticalnalysis f life is non-committalndfatalto commitment,but life means ommitment. o avertthe dangero life, Nietzschecouldchooseone of twoways:he could nsiston thestrictlysotericcharacterf the theoreticalanalysisf life,that s restorehePlatonicnotionof thenobledelusion,r elsehe coulddenythepossibilityf

theoryproperndso conceivef thought s essentiallyubserviento,




ordependentn,lifeor fate. If notadopted yNietzscheimself, t

anyratehissuccessorsdoptedhesecond lternative.9

The thesisof radical istoricismanbestated s follows. All un-

derstanding,ll knowledge,oweverimitedand"scientific,"resup-posesa frameof reference;t presupposeshorizon, comprehensiveviewwithinwhichunderstandingndknowingakeplace. Onlysucha comprehensiveisionmakes ossiblenyseeing, nyobservation,nyorientation.Thecomprehensiveiewof thewhole annot evalidated

byreasoningince t is thebasisof all reasoning.Accordingly,here

is a varietyof suchcomprehensiveiews,eachas legitimates anyother:we have o choose ucha viewwithout nyrationaluidance.It is absolutelyecessaryo chooseone;neutralityr suspensionf

judgments impossible.Our choicehasno support ut itself;it isnot supportedy any objectiver theoreticalertainty;t is separatedfromnothingness,he completebsence f meaning, y nothingbutour choice f it. Strictly peaking e cannot hoose mongdifferentviews. A singlecomprehensiveiew s imposed n us by fate: the

horizonwithinwhich ll ourunderstandingndorientationakesplaceisproduced ythefateof theindividual,r of hissociety.All human

thought ependsnfate,onsomethinghat houghtannotmasterndwhoseworkingst cannot nticipate.Yet thesupport f thehorizon

produced y fate is ultimatelyhe choiceof theindividual,ince hatfatehasto be accepted y the individual.We are free n thesensethat we arefree either o choose n anguishheworld-viewndthe

standardsmposed n us by fate,or elseto lose ourselvesn illusorysecurityr indespair.

Theradical istoricistssertshen hatonlyto thoughthat s itselfcommittedr"historical"oesother ommittedr"historical"houghtdisclosetself,andaboveall,thatonlyto thoughthatis itselfcom-mitted r "historical"oesthetruemeaningf the"historicity"f all

genuinehoughtdisclosetself. Thehistoricisthesis xpresses fun-damental

xperiencehich

byits natures

incapablef

adequatex-

pressionn thelevelof non-committedrdetachedhought.Theevi-

9 For the understandingof this choice, one has to consider its connection withNietzsche's sympathy with "Callicles" on the one hand, and his preferringthe "tragiclife" to the theoretical ife on the other. See Plato, Gorgias481d and 502 ff., and Laws,658d2-5. CompareNietzsche's Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der Historie fiir das Leben

(Insel-Biichereied. p. 73). This passage reveals clearly the fact that Nietzsche adoptedwhat one may call the fundamentalpremiseof the historicalschool.

436




denceof thatexperience ay ndeedbe blurred utit cannotbe de-

stroyed y the inevitableogicaldifficultiesromwhich ll expressionsof suchexperiencesuffer.Witha view o his fundamentalxperiencethe radicalhistoricist enies hat the finaland in this sensetrans-historicalharacterf the historicisthesismakesdoubtfulhecontentof that thesis. The finalandirrevocablensight nto the historicalcharacterf all thoughtwould ranscendistory nlyif thatinsightwereaccessibleo manas manandhencen principletalltimes;butit doesnottranscendistoryf it essentiallyelongsoa specificistoric

situation.Itbelongso a specificistoricituation:hatsituations notmerelyheconditionf the historicistnsight, utits source.10

Allnaturalightdoctrineslaimhat he undamentalsf justicerein principleccessibleo man as man. Theypresupposehereforethata most mportantruthcan be in principleccessibleo manasman. Denying hispresupposition,adical istoricismsserts hatthebasic nsightntothe essentialimitationf all humanhoughts notaccessibleo manas

man,or that t is not the resultof the

progressr

the laborof human hought,but it is an unforeseeableift of un-fathomableate. It is due to fate thatthe essential ependencef

thought n fate is realized ow,andwasnotrealizedn earlier imes.Historicismas this ncommon ithallother houghthat t dependson fate. It differsromall otherhoughtn this, that, hankso fate,it hasbeengiven o realize heradical ependencef thought n fate.We areabsolutelygnorant f the surpriseshich atemayhave in

storefor latergenerations,ndfatemay n the futureagainconcealwhat t hasrevealedo us; butthisdoesnot impairhetruthof thatrevelation.One doesnot have o transcendistoryn ordero seethehistoricalharacterf all thought: here s a privilegedmoment, nabsolutemomentn thehistoricalrocess, momentnwhichheessen-tial characterf all thought ecomesransparent.n exemptingtselffrom ts ownverdict, istoricismlaimsmerelyo mirrorhecharacterof historical

ealityr to be trueto the facts: the

self-contradictorycharacterf thehistoricisthesis houldbecharged,otto historicism,butto reality.

The assumptionf an absolutemomentn historys essentialo

10 The distinction between "condition"and "source" correspondsto the difference

betweenAristotle's "history"of philosophyin the first book of the Metaphysicsand his-

toricisthistory.




historicism.n this,historicismurreptitiouslyollows he precedentsetin a classicmanneibyHegel. Hegelhadtaughthatevery hilos-

ophy s theconceptualxpressionf thespirit f itstime,andyetmain-tainedheabsoluteruthof his ownsystem f philosophyyascribingabsoluteharactero hisowntime;he assumedhathis own timewasthe end of history nd hence he absolutemoment.Historicismx-

plicitlydenieshat heendof history ascome,but t implicitlyssertstheopposite: o possibleuturechange f orientationanlegitimatelymakedoubtful he decisivensightnto theinescapableependencef

thoughtn

fate,andtherewithntothe essential haracterf human

life;in thedecisiveespectheendof history,hat s,of thehistory f

thought, as come. But onecannot imply ssume hat one livesorthinks n the absolutemoment; ne mustshow,somehow,owtheabsolutemoment anbe recognizeds such. Accordingo Hegeltheabsolutemoments the one in which hilosophy,rquest orwisdom,hasbeentransformedntowisdom,hat s, the momentn which hefundamentaliddleshave beenfully solved. Historicism,owever,

stands r fallsbythedenial f thepossibilityf theoreticaletaphysics,andof philosophicthicsor natural ight; t standsor fallsby thedenialof thesolubilityf thefundamentaliddles.Accordingo his-

toricism,herefore,he absolutemomentmustbe the momentn whichthe insoluble haracterf the fundamentaliddleshas becomeullymanifest, r in which he fundamentalelusion f the humanmindhasbeendispelled.

But onemight

realize he insolubleharacterf the fundamentalriddles ndstillcontinueo see in theunderstandingf theseriddlesthetaskof philosophy;newould husmerely eplace non-historicistanddogmatichilosophyya non-historicistndskepticalhilosophy.Historicismoes beyond kepticism.t assumeshatphilosophyn thefull and original ense of the term,namelyhe attempto replaceopinions bout he wholeby knowledgef thewhole,s notonlyin-

capableof reachingts goal,but absurd,because he very ideaof

philosophyestson dogmatic,hatis, arbitraryremisesr,more pe-cifically,npremiseshatareonly"historicalndrelative." orclearly,if philosophy,r theattempto replace pinions y knowledge,tselfrestson mere pinions,hilosophysabsurd.

The most nfluentialttemptso establishhedogmaticndhence

arbitraryrhistoricallyelativeharacterf philosophyroper roceedalong hefollowingines.Philosophyrtheattempto replace pinions

438




about hewholebyknowledgef thewhole,presupposeshat hewholeis knowable,hat s, intelligible.Thispresuppositioneads o thecon-

sequencehat thewholeas it is in itself is identified ith thewholeinsofar s it is intelligiblerinsofar s it canbecomenobject;t leadsto theidentificationf "being" ith"intelligible"r "object";t leadsto thedogmaticisregardf everythinghatcannotbecomenobject,that s,anobjectortheknowingubject,r thedogmaticisregardf

everythinghat cannotbe masteredy thesubject.Furthermore,o

saythatthe whole s knowabler intelligible,s tantamounto saying

thatthewholehasa permanenttructure,r that the wholeassuch sunchangeableralwayshesame. If this s thecase, t is in principlepossibleo predict owthewholewillbeatany uture ime: hefutureof the wholecanbeanticipatedythought.Thepresuppositionen-tioneds said o have tsroot n thedogmaticdentificationf "to be"in thehighestensewith"tobealways,"rin the factthatphilosophyunderstandstobe" in sucha sense hat"tobe" in thehighestensemust mean "to be always."The dogmatic haracterf the basic

premisef philosophys saidto havebeenrevealedy thediscoveryof history r of the"historicity"f humanife. Themeaningf that

discoveryan be expressedn theses ikethese: whatis calledthe

whole,s actually lwaysncompletendthereforeot trulya whole;thewhole sessentiallyhangingn sucha mannerhat tsfuture annotbepredicted;he wholeas it is in itselfcan neverbegrasped,r it isnotintelligible;umanhought ssentiallyepends n somethinghat

cannot eanticipatedr thatcanneverbeanobject, rthatcanneverbemasteredy thesubject; tobe" n thehighest ense annotmean,orat anyrate t doesnot necessarilyean,"tobealways."

We cannotevenattempto discusshese heses. We must eavethemwith the following bservation.Radical istoricismompels sto realizehebearing f thefact that thevery deaof natural ightpresupposeshepossibilityf philosophyn the fullandoriginalmean-

ingof theterm.It compelss at thesame ime o realizeheneedfor

unbiasedeconsiderationf themost lementaryremiseshose alidityis presupposedy philosophy.The question f thevalidity f these

premisesannotbe disposedf byadopting,r clingingo a moreorlesspersistentraditionf philosophy,or it is of theessence f tradi-tionsthattheycoverorconcealheirhumbleoundationsy erectingimpressivedifices n them. Nothingought o besaidordonewhichcouldcreatehe impressionhatunbiasedeconsiderationf the most




elementaryremisesf philosophys a merely cademicr historicalaffair. Priorto suchreconsideration,owever,he issueof natural

right anonlyremainnopenquestion.Forwecannot ssumehatthe issuehasbeen inallyettledbyhis-

toricism.The "experiencef history"ndthelessambiguousxperi-ence of the complexityf humanaffairsmayblur,but theycannot

extinguishheevidencef those imple xperiencesegardingightand

wrongwhich reat thebottom f thephilosophicontentionhat hereis a natural ight. Historicism ither gnoresor else distortshese

experiences.Furthermore,he mostthoroughgoingttempto estab-lishhistoricismulminatedn the assertionhatif andwhen hereareno human eings,heremaybeentia,butthere annot eesse, hat s,that therecanbe entiawhile here s no esse. There s an obviousconnectionetweenhisassertionndtherejectionf theview hat"tobe"in the highest ensemeans"to be always."Besides,herehas

alwaysbeena glaring ontrast etweenhe wayin whichhistoricismunderstandshethought f thepastandgenuine nderstandingf the

thought f thepast;theundeniablepossibilityf historicalbjectivityis explicitlyrimplicitlyeniedbyhistoricismn all its forms.Above

all, in the transitionromearly(theoretical)o radical"existential-ist") historicism,he "experiencef history"was never ubmittedocritical nalysis.It wastaken orgrantedhat t is a genuine xperi-enceandnot a questionablenterpretationf experience. hequestionwasnotraisedwhether hat s really xperiencedoesnotallowof an

entirelyifferent nd

possiblymore

adequatenterpretation.n

particu-lar,the "experiencef history"oesnot makedoubtfulheviewthatthefundamentalroblems,uchas theproblemsf justice,persist rretain heirdentityn all historicalhange, owevermuchheymaybeobscured y the temporaryenialof theirrelevance, nd howevervariablerprovisionalll humanolutionso theseproblemsmaybe.Ingraspingheseproblemssproblemshehumanmind iberatestselffromts historicalimitations.No mores neededo legitimizehiloso-

phyin its original, ocratic ense:philosophys knowledgehatonedoesnot know; hat is to say,it is knowledgef whatonedoesnot

know,orawarenessf thefundamentalroblemsnd, herewith,f thefundamentallternativesegardingheir olution hatarecoevalwithhumanhought.

If theexistencendeven hepossibilityf naturalightmust emainan openquestions longas the issuebetween istoricismndnon-his-

440




toricistphilosophys notsettled, urmosturgent eed s to understandthatissue. Theissue s notunderstoodf it is seenmerelyn thewayin whicht presentstself rom hepointof viewof historicism;t mustalso be seen in thewayin which t presentstselffromthe pointofviewof non-historicistphilosophy.Thismeans,or all practicalur-poses, hattheproblemf historicismust irstbe consideredrom he

pointof viewof classicalphilosophy whichs non-historicisthoughtin its pure orm. Ourmosturgentneedcanthenbesatisfiednlybymeansof historicaltudieswhichwouldenableus to understand

classicalphilosophyxactly s it understoodtself,andnot in thewayin whicht presentstselfon the basisof historicism.We need n thefirstplacea non-historicistnderstandingf non-historicisthilosophy.Butwe needno lessurgently non-historicistnderstandingf his-

toricism,hatis, an understandingf the genesis f historicismhatdoesnottake orgrantedhesoundnessf historicism.

Historicism ssumeshat modernman's urntowards istorym-

pliedthe divinationnd eventuallyhe discoveryf a dimensionf

reality hathad escaped lassicalhought,namely, f the historicaldimension. f this sgrantednewillbeforcedn theend ntoextremehistoricism.Butif historicismannotbe taken orgranted,he ques-tionbecomesnevitablehether hatwashailed nthe nineteenthen-

turyas a discovery, asnot in factaninvention,hatis,anarbitraryinterpretationf phenomenahichwerealways nown ndwhichwere

interpreteduchmoreadequatelyrior o theemergencef "thehis-

torical onsciousness"hanafterwards.We haveo

raise hequestionwhether hats called hediscoveryf historys not n factanartificialandmakeshiftolutiono a problemhatcouldariseonlyon the basisof veryquestionableremises.

I suggest his line of approach.Historymeantthroughouthe

ages primarily oliticalhistory.Accordingly, hat s called hedis-

covery f historys thework,notof philosophyn general,utof po-liticalphilosophy.t wasa predicamenteculiaro eighteenthentury

political hilosophyhatledto theemergencef the historicalchool.The political hilosophyf the eighteenthenturywasa doctrine fnaturalight. It consistedn a peculiarnterpretationf naturalight,namely, he specificallymoder interpretation.Historicisms theultimate utcome f the crisis f modern aturalight. Thecrisisofmodemnaturalightor of modernolitical hilosophyouldbecomecrisisof philosophys such, onlybecausen the modern enturies



442 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS

philosophys suchhad become horoughlyoliticized. Originally,philosophyadbeenthehumanizinguest or theeternal rder, nd

hencet hadbeena pure ource f humanenspirationndaspirations.Since the seventeenthentury hilosophyas become weapon, ndhenceaninstrument.t wasthispoliticizationf philosophyhatwasdiscerneds therootof ourtroublesyan intellectualhodenouncedthe treason f theintellectuals.He committedhe fatalmistakeow-everof ignoringheessential ifferenceetweenntellectualsndphilos-ophers.In this he remainedhe dupeof the delusionwhichhe de-

nounced.For hepoliticizationf philosophyonsists reciselyn this,that hedifferenceetweenntellectualsndphilosophersa difference

formerlynownas the differenceetween entlemenndphilosopherson the one hand,andthedifferenceetweenophists r rhetoriciansandphilosophersntheother becomeslurrednd inally isappears.

Natural Right and the Historical Approach

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