Cruz, Kristine Myrr R.

Natural Resources and Environmental Law 2-C

G.R. No. 110120 March 16, 1994

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner, Vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL JN. SERAPIO, Presiding Judge RTC, Branch 127, Caloocan City, HON. MACARIO A. ASISTIO, JR., City Mayor of Caloocan and/or THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF CALOOCAN, respondents.

FACTS: On March 8, 1991, the Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady of Lourdes Parish, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City, filed a letter-complaint with the Laguna Lake Development Authority seeking to stop the operation of the 8.6-hectare open garbage dumpsite in Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City due to its harmful effects on the health of the residents and the possibility of pollution of the water content of the surrounding area.

On November 15, 1991, the LLDA conducted an on-site investigation, monitoring and test sampling of the leachate that seeps from said dumpsite to the nearby creek which is a tributary of the Marilao River. The LLDA Legal and Technical personnel found that the City Government of Caloocan was maintaining an open dumpsite at the Camarin area without first securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) from the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, as required under Presidential Decree No. 1586, and clearance from LLDA as required under Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983.

The dumping operation was forthwith stopped by the City Government of Caloocan. However, sometime in August 1992 the dumping operation was resumed after a meeting held in July 1992 among the City Government of Caloocan, the representatives of Task Force Camarin Dumpsite and LLDA at the Office of Environmental Management Bureau Director Rodrigo U. Fuentes failed to settle the problem.

On December 5, 1991, the LLDA issued a Cease and Desist Order ordering the City Government of Caloocan, Metropolitan Manila Authority, their contractors, and other entities, to completely halt, stop and desist from dumping any form or kind of garbage and other waste matter at the Camarin dumpsite. On September 25, 1992, the LLDA, with the assistance of the Philippine National Police, enforced its Alias Cease and Desist Order by prohibiting the entry of all garbage dump trucks into the Tala Estate, Camarin area being utilized as a dumpsite.

On October 16, 1992, Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio, after hearing the motion to dismiss, issued in the consolidated cases an order denying LLDA's motion to dismiss and granting the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the LLDA, its agent and all persons acting for and on its behalf, from enforcing or implementing its cease and desist order which prevents plaintiff City of Caloocan

from dumping garbage at the Camarin dumpsite during the pendency of this case and/or until further orders of the court.

On April 30, 1993, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision holding that: (1) the Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction on appeal to try, hear and decide the action for annulment of LLDA's cease and desist order, including the issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction in relation thereto, since appeal therefrom is within the exclusive and appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals under Section 9, par.(3), of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129; and (2) the Laguna Lake Development Authority has no power and authority to issue a cease and desist order under its enabling law, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983

ISSUE: Whether or not that LLDA has the power to cease and desist order

HELD: As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases generally pertains to the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB), except in cases where the special law provides for another forum. LLDA. Section 4 (k) of RA 4850, the provisions of PD 813, and Section 2 of EO 927, specifically provide that the LLDA shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the use or all surface water for any projects or activities in or affecting the said region, including navigation, construction, and operation of fish pens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like. On the other hand, RA 7160 has granted to the municipalities the exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges in municipal waters. The Sangguniang Bayan may grant fishery privileges to erect fish corrals, oyster, mussels or other aquatic beds or bangus fry are a within a definite zone of the municipal waters.

It has to be conceded that the charter of the LLDA constitutes a special law. RA 7160 is a general law. It is basic is basic in statutory construction that the enactment of a later legislation which is a general law cannot be construed to have repealed a special law. It is a well-settled rule in this jurisdiction that "a special statute, provided for a particular case or class of cases, is not repealed by a subsequent statute, general in its terms, provisions and application, unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest, although the terms of the general law are broad enough to include the cases embraced in the special law."

G.R. No. 119619 December 13, 1996

RICHARD HIZON, SILVERIO GARGAR, ERNESTO ANDAYA, NEMESIO GABO, RODRIGO ABRERA, CHEUNG TAI FOOK, SHEK CHOR LUK, EFREN DELA PENA, JONEL AURELIO, GODOFREDO VILLAVERDE, ANGELITO DUMAYBAG, DEOMEDES ROSIL, AMADO VILLANUEVA, FRANCISCO ESTREMOS, ANGEL VILLAVERDE, NEMESIO CASAMPOL, RICHARD ESTREMOS, JORNIE DELA PENA, JESUS MACTAN, MARLON CAMPORAZO, FERNANDO BIRING, MENDRITO CARPO, LUIS DUARTE, JOSEPH AURELIO, RONNIE JUEZAN, BERNARDO VILLACARLOS, RICARDO SALES, MARLON ABELLA, TEODORO DELOS REYES, IGNACIO ABELLA, JOSEPH MAYONADO, JANAIRO LANGUYOD, DODONG DELOS REYES, JOLLY CABALLERO and ROPLANDO ARCENAS, petitioners, vs.

HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FACTS: In September 1992, the Philippine National Police (PNP) Maritime Command of Puerto Princesa City, Palawan received reports of illegal fishing operations in the coastal waters of the city. In response to these reports, the city mayor organized Task Force Bantay Dagat to assist the police in the detection and apprehension of violators of the laws on fishing.

On September 30, 1992 at about 2:00 in the afternoon, the Task Force Bantay Dagat reported to the PNP Maritime Command that a boat and several small crafts were fishing by "muro ami" within the shoreline of Barangay San Rafael of Puerto Princesa. The police, headed by SPO3 Romulo Enriquez, and members of the Task Force Bantay Dagat, headed by Benito Marcelo, Jr., immediately proceeded to the area and found several men fishing in motorized sampans and a big fishing boat identified as F/B Robinson within the seven-kilometer shoreline of the city. They boarded the F/B Robinson and inspected the boat with the acquiescence of the boat captain, Silverio Gargar. In the course of their inspection, the police saw two foreigners in the captain's deck. SP03 Enriquez examined their passports and found them to be mere photocopies. The police also discovered a large aquarium full of live lapu-lapu and assorted fish weighing approximately one ton at the bottom of the boat.

The boat captain and the two foreigners were again interrogated at the PNP Maritime Command office. Thereafter, an Inspection/Apprehension Report was prepared and the boat, its crew and fishermen were charged with the following violations:

1. Conducting fishing operations within Puerto Princesa coastal waters without mayor's permit;

2. Employing excess fishermen on board (Authorized — 26; On board — 36);

3. Two (2) Hongkong nationals on board without original passports.

The following day, SPO3 Enriquez directed the boat captain to get some random samples of fish from the fish cage of F/B Robinson for laboratory examination.

The specimens were brought to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) sub-office in the city for examination "to determine the method of catching the same for record or evidentiary purposes." On October 5, 1992 and immediately brought the specimens to the NBI Head Office. On October 7, 1992, NBI Forensic Chemist Emilia Rosaldes conducted two tests on the fish samples and found that they contained sodium cyanide.

The PNP Maritime Command of Puerto Princesa City filed the complaint at bar against the owner and operator of the F/B Robinson, the First Fishermen Fishing Industries, Inc., represented by herein petitioner Richard Hizon, the boat captain, Silverio Gargar, the boat engineer, Ernesto Andaya, two other crew members, the two Hongkong nationals and 28 fishermen of the said boat.

ISSUE: Whether or not the honorable court of appeals erred in holding that the mere "positive results to the test for the presence of sodium cyanide" in the fish specimen, albeit illegally seized on the occasion of a warrantless search and arrest, is admissible and sufficient basis for the petitioners' conviction of the crime of illegal fishing.

HELD: Search and seizure without search warrant of vessels and aircrafts for violations of customs laws have been the traditional exception to the constitutional requirement of a search warrant. It is rooted on the recognition that a vessel and an aircraft, like motor vehicles, can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the search warrant must be sought and secured. Yielding to this reality, judicial authorities have not required a search warrant of vessels and aircrafts before their search and seizure can be constitutionally effected.

The same exception ought to apply to seizures of fishing vessels and boats breaching our fishery laws. These vessels are normally powered by high-speed motors that enable them to elude arresting ships of the Philippine Navy, the Coast Guard and other government authorities enforcing our fishery laws.

We thus hold as valid the warrantless search on the F/B Robinson, a fishing boat suspected of having engaged in illegal fishing. The fish and other evidence seized in the course of the search were properly admitted by the trial court. Moreover, petitioners failed to raise the issue during trial and hence, waived their right to question any irregularity that may have attended the said search and seizure.

Petitioners were charged with illegal fishing penalized under sections 33 and 38 of P.D. 704 24 which provide as follows:

Sec. 33.Illegal fishing, illegal possession of explosives intended for illegal fishing; dealing in illegally caught fish or fishery/aquatic products.— It shall be unlawful for any person to catch, take or gather or cause to be caught, taken or gathered fish or fishery/aquatic products in Philippine waters with the use of explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substance, or by the use of electricity as defined in paragraphs (l), (m) and (d), respectively, of section 3 hereof: Provided, That mere possession of such explosives with intent to use the same for illegal fishing as herein defined shall be punishable as hereinafter provided: Provided,

That the Secretary may, upon recommendation of the Director and subject to such safeguards and conditions he deems necessary, allow for research, educational or scientific purposes only, the use of explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substance or electricity to catch, take or gather fish or fishery/aquatic products in the specified area: Provided, further, That the use of chemicals to eradicate predators in fishponds in accordance with accepted scientific fishery practices without causing deleterious effects in neighboring waters shall not be construed as the use of obnoxious or poisonous substance within the meaning of this section: Provided, finally, That the use of mechanical bombs for killing whales, crocodiles, sharks or other large dangerous fishes, may be allowed, subject to the approval of the Secretary.

It shall, likewise, be unlawful for any person knowingly to possess, deal in, sell or in any manner dispose of, for profit, any fish or fishery/aquatic products which have been illegally caught, taken or gathered.

The discovery of dynamite, other explosives and chemical compounds containing combustible elements, or obnoxious or poisonous substance, or equipment or device for electric fishing in any fishing boat or in the possession of a fisherman shall constitute a presumption that the same were used for fishing in violation of this Decree, and the discovery in any fishing boat of fish caught or killed by the use of explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substance or by electricity shall constitute a presumption that the owner, operator or fisherman were fishing with the use of explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substance or electricity.

Sec. 38. Penalties. — (a) For illegal fishing and dealing in illegally caught fish or fishery/aquatic products. — Violation of Section 33 hereof shall be punished as follows:

(2) By imprisonment from eight (8) to ten (10) years, if obnoxious or poisonous substances are used: Provided, That if the use of such substances results 1) in physical injury to any person, the penalty shall be imprisonment from ten (10) to twelve (12) years, or 2) in the loss of human life, then the penalty shall be imprisonment from twenty (20) years to life or death;

The offense of illegal fishing is committed when a person catches, takes or gathers or causes to be caught, taken or gathered fish, fishery or aquatic products in Philippine waters with the use of explosives, electricity, obnoxious or poisonous substances. The law creates a presumption that illegal fishing has been committed when: (a) explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substances or equipment or device for electric fishing are found in a fishing boat or in the possession of a fisherman; or (b) when fish caught or killed with the use of explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substances or by electricity are found in a fishing boat. Under these instances, the boat owner, operator or fishermen are presumed to have engaged in illegal fishing.

G.R. No. 68166. February 12, 1997

HEIRS OF EMILIANO NAVARRO, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND HEIRS OF SINFOROSO PASCUAL, respondents.

FACTS: On October 3, 1946, Sinforoso Pascual, now deceased, filed an application for foreshore lease covering a tract of foreshore land in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan, having an area of approximately seventeen (17) hectares. This application was denied on January 15, 1953. So was his motion for reconsideration.

Subsequently, petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, also now deceased, Emiliano Navarro, filed a fishpond application with the Bureau of Fisheries covering twenty five (25) hectares of foreshore land also in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan. Initially, such application was denied by the Director of Fisheries on the ground that the property formed part of the public domain. Upon motion for reconsideration, the Director of Fisheries, on May 27, 1988, gave due course to his application but only to the extent of seven (7) hectares of the property as may be certified by the Bureau of Forestry as suitable for fishpond purposes.

On the other hand, sometime in the early part of 1960, Sinforoso Pascual filed an application to register and confirm his title to a parcel of land, situated in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan, described in Plan Psu-175181 and said to have an area of 146,611 square meters. Pascual claimed that this land is an accretion to his property, situated in Barrio Puerto Rivas, Balanga, Bataan, and covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 6830. It is bounded on the eastern side by the Talisay River, on the western side by the Bulacan River, and on the northern side by the Manila Bay. The Talisay River as well as the Bulacan River flow downstream and meet at the Manila Bay thereby depositing sand and silt on Pascual's property resulting in an accretion thereon. Sinforoso Pascual claimed the accretion as the riparian owner.

On March 25, 1960, the Director of Lands, represented by the Assistant Solicitor General, filed an opposition thereto stating that neither Pascual nor his predecessors-in-interest possessed sufficient title to the subject property, the same being a portion of the public domain and, therefore, it belongs to the Republic of the Philippines. The Director of Forestry, through the Provincial Fiscal, similarly opposed Pascual's application for the same reason as that advanced by the Director of Lands. Later on, however, the Director of Lands withdrew his opposition. The Director of Forestry become the sole oppositor.

Upon motion of Emiliano Navarro, however, the order of general default was lifted and, on February 13, 1961, Navarro thereupon filed an opposition to Pascual's application and opposed that it belong to the public domain. During the pendency of the case, Pascual filed an ejectment case against Emilio Navarro, one Marcelo Lopez and their privies and alleged that it has unlawfully claimed and possessed through stealth, force and strategy. The case was decided adversely against Pascual. Thus, Pascual appealed to the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Balanga, Bataan, the appeal having been docketed as Civil Case No. 2873. Because of the similarity of the parties and the subject matter, the appealed

case for ejectment was consolidated with the land registration case and was jointly tried by the court a quo.

ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in not finding the land in question as an accretion by the action of the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers to the land admittedly owned by applicants-appellants [private respondents].

HELD: The respondent appellate court explained the reversal in this wise:

"The paramount issue to be resolved in this appeal as set forth by the parties in their respective briefs is whether or not the land sought to be registered is accretion or foreshore land, or, whether or not said land was formed by the action of the two rivers of Talisay and Bulacan or by the action of the Manila Bay. If formed by the action of the Talisay and Bulacan rivers, the subject land is accretion but if formed by the action of the Manila Bay then it is foreshore land.

It is undisputed that applicants-appellants [private respondents] owned the land immediately adjoining the land sought to be registered. Their property which is covered by OCT No. 6830 is bounded on the east by the Talisay River, on the west by the Bulacan River, and on the north by the Manila Bay. The Talisay and Bulacan rivers come from inland flowing downstream towards the Manila Bay. In other words, between the Talisay River and the Bulacan River is the property of applicants with both rivers acting as the boundary to said land and the flow of both rivers meeting and emptying into the Manila Bay. The subject land was formed at the tip or apex of appellants' [private respondents'] land adding thereto the land now sought to be registered.

This makes this case quite unique because while it is undisputed that the subject land is immediately attached to appellants' [private respondents'] land and forms the tip thereof, at the same time, said land immediately faces the Manila Bay which is part of the sea. We can understand therefore the confusion this case might have caused the lower court, faced as it was with the uneasy problem of deciding whether or not the subject land was formed by the action of the two rivers or by the action of the sea. Since the subject land is found at the shore of the Manila Bay facing appellants' [private respondents'] land, it would be quite easy to conclude that it is foreshore and therefore part of the patrimonial property of the State as the lower court did in fact rule.

The disputed property was brought forth by both the withdrawal of the waters of Manila Bay and the accretion formed on the exposed foreshore land by the action of the sea which brought soil and sand sediments in turn trapped by the palapat and bakawan trees planted thereon by petitioner Sulpicio Pascual in 1948.

Anchoring their claim of ownership on Article 457 of the Civil Code, private respondents vigorously argue that the disputed 14-hectare land is an accretion caused by the joint action of the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers which run their course on the eastern and western boundaries, respectively, of private respondents' own tract of land.

Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under said Article 457, requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) that the accumulation of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river; and (3) that the land where the accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of the river. Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited, while alluvium is the soil deposited on the estate fronting the river bank; the owner of such estate is called the riparian owner. Riparian owners are, strictly speaking, distinct from littoral owners, the latter being owners of lands bordering the shore of the sea or lake or other tidal waters. The alluvium, by mandate of Article 457 of the Civil Code, is automatically owned by the riparian owner from the moment the soil deposit can be seen but is not automatically registered property, hence, subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons.

G.R. No. 110286. April 2, 1997

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RENERIO P. VERGARA, ERNESTO T. CUESTA, JR., PEDRO G. DAGAO and BERNARDO P. CUESTA, accused. RENERIO P. VERGARA, accused-appellant.

FACTS: At about 7:30 in the morning of 04 July 1992, a team composed of deputized Fish Warden and President of the Leyte Fish Warden Association Jesus P. Bindoy, Police Officers Casimiro Villas and Diosdado Moron of the Palo PNP Station, Leyte, Fish Wardens Mario Castillote and Estanislao Cabreros and Fish Examiner Nestor Aldas of the Department of Agriculture were on board, "Bantay-Dagat," a pumpboat, on "preventive patrol" along the municipal waters fronting barangays Baras and Candahug of Palo, Leyte, when they chanced upon a blue-colored fishing boat at a distance of approximately 200 meters away. The boat, 30 feet long, had on board appellant Renerio Vergara and his three co-accused Bernardo Cuesta, Pedro Dagao and Ernesto Cuesta, Jr., and was on parallel course toward the general direction of Samar. Momentarily, the team saw appellant throw into the sea a bottle known in the locality as "badil" containing ammonium nitrate and having a blasting cap on top which, when ignited and thrown into the water, could explode. The explosion would indiscriminately kill schools and various species of fish within a certain radius. Approximately three seconds after appellant had thrown the "badil" into the sea, the explosion occurred. Vergara and Cuesta dove into the sea with their gear while Dagao and Cuesta, Jr., stayed on board to tend to the air hose for the divers.

The team approached the fishing boat. SPO2 Casimiro Villas boarded the fishing boat while Fish Warden Jesus Bindoy held on to one end of the boat. Moments later, Vergara and Cuesta surfaced, each carrying a fishnet or "sibot" filled with about a kilo of "bolinao" fish scooped from under the water. Having been caught red-handed, the four accused were apprehended and taken by the patrol team to the "Bantay-Dagat" station at Baras, and later to the police station in Palo, Leyte. The fishing boat and its paraphernalia, as well as the two fishnets of "bolinao," were impounded. The accused, however, refused to sign and acknowledge the corresponding receipts therefor. On 10 February 1993, following the submission of the evidence, the trial court rendered judgment convicting Vergara and sentenced a penalty of Twenty (20) years to life imprisonment as punished under Section 2 of P.D. 1058.

ISSUE: Whether or not that the Lower Court erred in convicting the accused Renario Vergara.

HELD: As the hearing held, one Emilio Linde sought to corroborate the claim of appellant that it was another unidentified group of fishermen who threw the bottle of explosives at a school of "bolinao" fish. It was obvious, however, said the trial court, that the statement of this defense witness was incredulous since he apparently had not at all been on board the fishing boat in the company of the accused at the time of the incident. Even the rather lengthy counter-affidavit of the

four accused completely missed to mention Linde. The court a quo went on to observe that the demeanor of the accused at the witness stand and the substance of his testimony failed to elicit belief.

Nestor Aldas, an Agricultural Technologist and Fish Examiner working with the Department of Agriculture, Palo, Leyte, who examined the fish samples taken from the accused, testified that he was with the team patrolling, on 04 July 1992, the waters of San Pedro Bay, Baras, Palo, Leyte, when he, like the other members of his team, witnessed the use of explosives by the accused. Fish samples from the catch showed ruptured capillaries, ruptured and blooded abdominal portion, and crushed internal organs indicating that explosives were indeed used.

The Court is convinced that the trial court has acted correctly in finding accused-appellant guilty of the offense charged.

Sections 33 and 38 of P.D. No. 704, as amended by P.D. No. 1058, read:

Sec. 33. Illegal fishing; illegal possession of explosives intended for illegal fishing; dealing in illegally caught fish or fishery/aquatic products. It shall be unlawful for any person to catch, take or gather or cause to be caught, taken or gathered fish or fishery/aquatic products in Philippine waters with the use of explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substance, or by the use of electricity as defined in paragraphs (1), (m) and (d), respectively, of section 3 hereof: Provided, That mere possession of such explosives with intent to use the same for illegal fishing as herein defined shall be punishable as hereinafter provided: Provided, That the Secretary may, upon recommendation of the Director and subject to such safeguards and conditions he deems necessary, allow for research, educational or scientific purposes only, the use of explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substance or electricity to catch, take or gather fish or fishery/aquatic products in specified area: Provided, further, That the use of chemicals to eradicate predators in fishponds in accordance with accepted scientific fishery practices without causing deleterious effects in neighboring waters shall not be construed as the use of obnoxious or poisonous substance within the meaning of this section: Provided, finally, That the use of mechanical bombs for killing whales, crocodiles, sharks or other large dangerous fishes, may be allowed, subject to the approval of the Secretary.

Section 38. (1) By the penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years to twenty-five (25) years in the case of mere possession of explosives intended for illegal fishing; by imprisonment ranging from twenty (20) years to life imprisonment, if the explosive is actually used: Provided, That if the use of the explosive results in 1) physical injury to any person, the penalty shall be imprisonment ranging from twenty-five (25) years to life imprisonment, or 2) in the loss of human life, then the penalty shall be life imprisonment to death.

G.R. No. 164527 August 15, 2007

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner,

Present: PUNO, CJ, QUISUMBING, YNARES-SANTIAGO, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, - versus - CARPIO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CORONA, CARPIO MORALES, AZCUNA, TINGA,CHICO-NAZARIO, GARCIA, NATIONAL HOUSING VELASCO, AUTHORITY, R-II BUILDERS, NACHURA, and INC., R-II HOLDINGS, INC., REYES, JJ. HARBOUR CENTRE PORT TERMINAL, INC., and Promulgated: MR. REGHIS ROMERO II, Respondents.

FACTS: On March 1, 1988, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Memorandum Order No. (MO) 161 approving and directing the implementation of the Comprehensive and Integrated Metropolitan Manila Waste Management Plan (the Plan). The Metro Manila Commission, in coordination with various government agencies, was tasked as the lead agency to implement the Plan as formulated by the Presidential Task Force on Waste Management created by Memorandum Circular No. 39. A day after, on March 2, 1988, MO 161-A was issued, containing the guidelines which prescribed the functions and responsibilities thereof.

One of the tasked government department was the National Housing Authority (NHA). The respondent NHA was ordered to conduct feasibility studies and develop low-cost housing projects at the dumpsite and absorb scavengers in NHA resettlement/low-cost housing projects. On the other hand, the DENR was tasked to review and evaluate proposed projects under the Plan with regard to their environmental impact, conduct regular monitoring of activities of the Plan to ensure compliance with environmental standards and assist DOH in the conduct of the study on hospital waste management.

At the time MO 161-A was issued by President Aquino, Smokey Mountain was a wasteland in Balut, Tondo, Manila, where numerous Filipinos resided in subhuman conditions, collecting items that may have some monetary value from the garbage. Pursuant to MO 161-A, NHA prepared the feasibility studies of the Smokey Mountain low-cost housing project which resulted in the formulation of the Smokey Mountain Development Plan and Reclamation of the Area Across R-10 or the Smokey Mountain Development and Reclamation Project (SMDRP; the Project). The Project aimed to convert the Smokey Mountain dumpsite into a habitable housing project, inclusive of the reclamation of the area across R-10, adjacent to the Smokey Mountain as the enabling component of the project.

On July 9, 1990, the Build-Operate-and-Transfer (BOT) Law (Republic Act No. [RA] 6957) was enacted. Its declared policy under Section 1 is [t]o recognize the indispensable role of the private sector as the main engine for national growth and development and provide the most appropriate favorable incentives to mobilize private resources for the purpose.

RA 6957 defined build-and-transfer scheme as [a] contractual arrangement whereby the contractor undertakes the construction, including financing, of a given infrastructure facility, and its turnover after the completion to the government agency or local government unit concerned which shall pay the contractor its total

investment expended on the project, plus reasonable rate of return thereon. The last paragraph of Sec. 6 of the BOT Law provides that the repayment scheme in the case of land reclamation or the building of industrial estates may consist of [t]he grant of a portion or percentage of the reclaimed land or industrial estate built, subject to the constitutional requirements with respect to the ownership of lands.

On January 17, 1992, President Aquino proclaimed MO 415 approving and directing the implementation of the SMDRP. In the same MO 415, President Aquino created an Executive Committee (EXECOM) to oversee the implementation of the Plan, chaired by the National Capital Region-Cabinet Officer for Regional Development (NCR-CORD) with the heads of the NHA, City of Manila, DPWH, PEA, Philippine Ports Authority (PPA), DENR, and Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) as members. In conformity with Sec. 5 of MO 415, an inter-agency technical committee (TECHCOM) was created composed of the technical representatives of the EXECOM [t]o assist the NHA in the evaluation of the project proposals, assist in the resolution of all issues and problems in the project to ensure that all aspects of the development from squatter relocation, waste management, reclamation, environmental protection, land and house construction meet governing regulation of the region and to facilitate the completion of the project.

Notices of public bidding to become NHA’s venture partner for SMDRP were published in newspapers in 1992, from which R-II Builders, Inc. (RBI) won the bidding process. Then-President Ramos authorized NHA to enter into a Joint Venture Agreement with RBI.

On March 19, 1993, the NHA and RBI entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) for the development of the Smokey Mountain dumpsite and the reclamation of the area across R-10 based on Presidential Decree No. (PD) 757 which mandated NHA [t]o undertake the physical and socio-economic upgrading and development of lands of the public domain identified for housing, MO 161-A which required NHA to conduct the feasibility studies and develop a low-cost housing project at the Smokey Mountain, and MO 415 as amended by MO 415-A which approved the Conceptual Plan for Smokey Mountain and creation of the EXECOM and TECHCOM. Under the JVA, the Project involves the clearing of Smokey Mountain for eventual development into a low cost medium rise housing complex and industrial/commercial site with the reclamation of the area directly across [R-10] to act as the enabling component of the Project.

On February 21, 1994, the parties entered into another agreement denominated as the Amended and Restated Joint Venture Agreement (ARJVA) which delineated the different phases of the Project. Phase I of the Project involves the construction of temporary housing units for the current residents of the Smokey Mountain dumpsite, the clearing and leveling-off of the dumpsite, and the construction of medium-rise low-cost housing units at the cleared and leveled dumpsite. Phase II of the Project involves the construction of an incineration area for the on-site disposal of the garbage at the dumpsite. The enabling component or consideration for Phase I of the Project was increased from 40 hectares of reclaimed lands across R-10 to 79 hectares.

The SMDRP shall consist of Phase I and Phase II. Phase I of the project involves clearing, levelling-off the dumpsite, and construction of temporary housing units for the current residents on the cleared and levelled site. Phase II involves the construction of a fenced incineration area for the on-site disposal of the garbage at the dumpsite. Due to the recommendations done by the DENR after evaluations done, the JVA was amended and restated (now ARJVA) to accommodate the design changes and additional work to be done to successfully implement the project. The original 3,500 units of temporary housing were decreased to 2,992. The reclaimed land as enabling component was increased from 40 hectares to 79 hectares, which was supported by the issuance of Proclamation No. 465 by President Ramos. The revision also provided for the 119-hectare land as an enabling component for Phase II of the project.

On June 23, 1994, the Legislature passed the Clean Air Act. The Act made the establishment of an incinerator illegal and effectively barred the implementation of the planned incinerator project under Phase II. Thus, the off-site disposal of the garbage at the Smokey Mountain became necessary.

Meanwhile, respondent Harbour Centre Port Terminal, Inc. (HCPTI) entered into an agreement with the asset pool for the development and operations of a port in the Smokey Mountain Area which is a major component of SMDRP to provide a source of livelihood and employment for Smokey Mountain residents and spur economic growth.

Due to HCPTIs failure to obtain a license to handle foreign containerized cargo from PPA, it suffered a net income loss of PhP 132,621,548 in 2002 and a net loss of PhP 15,540,063 in 2003. The Project Governing Board of the Asset Pool later conveyed by way of dacion en pago a number of HCPTI shares to RBI in lieu of cash payment for the latters work in SMDRP.

On August 5, 2004, former Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez, filed the instant petition which impleaded as respondents the NHA, RBI, R-II Holdings, Inc. (RHI), HCPTI, and Mr. Reghis Romero II, raising constitutional issues.

The NHA reported that thirty-four (34) temporary housing structures and twenty-one (21) permanent housing structures had been turned over by respondent RBI. It claimed that 2,510 beneficiary-families belonging to the poorest of the poor had been transferred to their permanent homes and benefited from the Project.

ISSUE: Whether or not Phase II is struck by the Clean Air Act.

HELD: Based on the issues raised in this petition, we find that the March 19, 1993 JVA between NHA and RBI and the SMDRP embodied in the JVA, the subsequent amendments to the JVA and all other agreements signed and executed in relation to it, including, but not limited to, the September 26, 1994 Smokey Mountain Asset Pool Agreement and the agreement on Phase I of the Project as well as all other transactions which emanated from the Project, have been shown to be valid, legal, and constitutional. Phase II has been struck down by the Clean Air Act.

Phase II shall involve the following:

a. the construction and operation of an incinerator plant that will conform to the emission standards of the DENR

b. the reclamation and development of 119-hectare area contiguous to that to be reclaimed under Phase I to serve as the enabling component of Phase II, the exact size and configuration of which shall be approved by the SMDRP Committee.

When the legislature passed the Clean Air Act, the establishment of an incinerator illegal and effectively barred of the planned incinerator of Phase II.

Under Section 20 of the Clean Air Act of 1999, states that:

Section 20. Ban on Incineration. - Incineration, hereby defined as the burning of municipal, biomedical and hazardous waste, which process emits poisonous and toxic fumes is hereby prohibited; Provided, however, That the prohibition shall not apply to traditional small-scale method of community/neighborhood sanitation "siga", traditional, agricultural, cultural, health, and food preparation and crematoria; Provided, Further, That existing incinerators dealing with a biomedical wastes shall be out within three (3) years after the effectivity of this Act; Provided, Finally, that in the interim, such units shall be limited to the burning of pathological and infectious wastes, and subject to close monitoring by the Department.

The case at bar was held during the year of 2007, the Clean Air Act took effect during the year of 1999. And which then prohibits any incinerators three (3) years after the effectivity of the Act.

G.R. No. 163663 June 30, 2006

GREATER METROPOLITAN MANILA SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE and the METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, Petitioners, vs.

JANCOM ENVIRONMENTAL CORPORATION and JANCOM INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS PTY. LIMITED OF AUSTRALIA, Respondents.

FACTS: In 1994, Presidential Memorandum Order No. 202 was issued by then President Fidel V. Ramos creating an Executive Committee to oversee and develop waste-to-energy projects for the waste disposal sites in San Mateo, Rizal and Carmona, Cavite under the Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) scheme.

Respondent Jancom International Development Projects Pty. Limited of Australia (Jancom International) was one of the bidders for the San Mateo Waste Disposal Site. It subsequently entered into a partnership with Asea Brown Boveri under the firm name JANCOM Environmental Corporation (JANCOM), its co-respondent.

On December 19, 1997, a Contract for the BOT Implementation of the Solid Waste Management Project for the San Mateo, Rizal Waste Disposal Site was entered into by the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Presidential Task Force on Solid Waste Management through then Department of Environment and Natural Resources Secretary Victor Ramos, then Cabinet Office for Regional Development-National Capital Region Chairman Dionisio dela Serna, and then MMDA Chairman Prospero Oreta on one hand, and JANCOM represented by its Chief Executive Officer Jorge Mora Aisa and its Chairman Jay Alparslan, on the other.

During the Estrada administration he ordered the closure of the San Mateo landfill. Petitioner GMMSWMC thereupon adopted a Resolution not to pursue the contract with JANCOM, citing as reasons therefor the passage of Republic Act 8749, otherwise known as the Clean Air Act of 1999, the non-availability of the San Mateo site, and costly tipping fees.

JANCOM file legal action as may be necessary to protect its interest with respect to the contract. Respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City to declare the GMMSWMC Resolution and the acts of the MMDA calling for bids for and authorizing the forging of a new contract for the Metro Manila waste management as illegal, unconstitutional and void and to enjoin petitioners from implementing the Resolution and making another award in lieu thereof.

RTC found in favor of respondents. The CA denied the petition for lack of merit and affirmed in toto the May 29, 2000 RTC Decision. This Court affirmed the November 13, 2001 CA Decision and declared the contract valid and perfected, albeit ineffective and unimplementable pending approval by the President.

ISSUE: Whether the court erred in ruling that the subject contract is ineffective and unimplementable until and unless it is approved by the president.

HELD: Petitioners go on to argue that since the contract covers only 3,000 tons of garbage per day while Metro Manila generates at least 6,000 tons of solid waste a day, MMDA may properly bid out the other 3,000 tons of solid waste to other interested groups or entities.

Petitioners moreover argue that the alleged Amended Agreement concluded supposedly between JANCOM and former MMDA Chairman Benjamin Abalos is a mere scrap of paper, a mere draft or proposal submitted by JANCOM to the MMDA, no agreement on which was reached by the parties; and at all events, express authority ought to have first been accorded the MMDA to conclude such an amended agreement with JANCOM, the original contract having been concluded between the Republic of the Philippines and JANCOM.

Petitioners argue that since the contract remains unsigned by the President, it cannot yet be executed. Ergo, they conclude, the proceedings which resulted in the issuance of an alias writ of execution "ran afoul of the [January 30, 2002] decision of [the Supreme] Court in G.R. No. 147465."

Decision in G.R. No. 147465 held:

We, therefore, hold that the Court of Appeals did not err when it declared the existence of a valid and perfected contract between the Republic of the Philippines and JANCOM. There being a perfected contract, MMDA cannot revoke or renounce the same without the consent of the other. From the moment of perfection, the parties are bound not only to the fulfillment of what has been expressly stipulated but also to all the consequences which, according to their nature, may be in keeping with good faith, usage, and law (Article 1315, Civil Code). The contract has the force of law between the parties and they are expected to abide in good faith by their respective contractual commitments, not weasel out of them. Just as nobody can be forced to enter into a contract, in the same manner, once a contract is entered into, no party can renounce it unilaterally or without the consent of the other. It is a general principle of law that no one may be permitted to change his mind or disavow and go back upon his own acts, or to proceed contrary thereto, to the prejudice of the other party. Nonetheless, it has to be repeated that although the contract is a perfected one, it is still ineffective or unimplementable until and unless it is approved by the President.

April 10, 2002 Resolution also in G.R. No. 147465 moreover held:

x x x The only question before the Court is whether or not there is a valid and perfected contract between the parties. As to the necessity, expediency, and wisdom of the contract, these are outside the realm of judicial adjudication. These considerations are primarily and exclusively a matter for the President to decide. While the Court recognizes that the garbage problem is a matter of grave public concern, it can only declare that the contract in question is a valid and perfected one between the parties, but the same is still ineffective or unimplementable until and unless it is approved by the President, the contract itself providing that such approval by the President is necessary for its effectivity.

That the Amended Agreement could have well been negotiated, if not concluded between private respondents and the former MMDA administration, is not far-fetched. Petitioners do not dispute that the President had referred the Jancom contract to then MMDA Chairman Benjamin Abalos for recommendation. Petitioners also do not dispute that private respondents negotiated with the MMDA for the amendment of the contract.

G.R. No. 158290 October 23, 2006

HILARION M. HENARES, JR., VICTOR C. AGUSTIN, ALFREDO L. HENARES, DANIEL L. HENARES, ENRIQUE BELO HENARES, and CRISTINA BELO HENARES, petitioners, vs.

LAND TRANSPORTATION FRANCHISING AND REGULATORY BOARD and DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS, respondents.

FACTS: Citing statistics from the Metro Manila Transportation and Traffic Situation Study of 1996, the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the National Capital Region, a study of the Asian Development Bank, the Manila Observatory and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources5 (DENR) on the high growth and low turnover in vehicle ownership in the Philippines, including diesel-powered vehicles, two-stroke engine powered motorcycles and their concomitant emission of air pollutants, petitioners attempt to present a compelling case for judicial action against the bane of air pollution and related environmental hazards.

Petitioners allege that the particulate matters (PM) – complex mixtures of dust, dirt, smoke, and liquid droplets, varying in sizes and compositions emitted into the air from various engine combustions – have caused detrimental effects on health, productivity, infrastructure and the overall quality of life. Another emission, carbon monoxide (CO), when not completely burned but emitted into the atmosphere and then inhaled can disrupt the necessary oxygen in blood. With prolonged exposure, CO affects the nervous system and can be lethal to people with weak hearts.

Petitioners refer us to the study of the Philippine Environment Monitor 20027, stating that in four of the country's major cities, Metro Manila, Davao, Cebu and Baguio, the exposure to PM10, a finer PM which can penetrate deep into the lungs causing serious health problems. Petitioners likewise cite the University of the Philippines' studies in 1990-91 and 1994 showing that vehicular emissions in Metro Manila have resulted to the prevalence of chronic obstructive pulmonary diseases (COPD), which affects mostly of the jeepney drivers.

To detriment such effects, the petitioners propose the use of CNG, which is a natural gas comprised mostly of methane which although containing small amounts of propane and butane, is colorless and odorless and considered the cleanest fossil fuel because it produces much less pollutants than coal and petroleum; produces up to 90 percent less CO compared to gasoline and diesel fuel; reduces NOx emissions by 50 percent and cuts hydrocarbon emissions by half; emits 60 percent less PMs; and releases virtually no sulfur dioxide.

Asserting their right, the petitioners filed a writ of mandamus basing on the “Clean Air Act of 1999.” The Solicitor General contends that it prohibits the use of gasoline and diesel by owners of the vehicles. RA 8749 does not even mention the existence of CNG as an alternative fuel and the Solicitor General also adds the tasked to the DENR to implement RA 8749.

Petitioners, in their Reply, insist that the respondents possess the administrative and regulatory powers to implement measures in accordance with the policies and principles mandated by Rep. Act No. 8749, specifically Section 2 and Section 21.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent is the agency responsible to implement the suggested alternative of requiring public utility vehicles to use compressed natural gas (CNG).

HELD: In this petition the legal right which is sought to be recognized and enforced hinges on a constitutional and a statutory policy already articulated in operational terms, in Rep. Act No. 8749, the Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999. Paragraph (a), Section 21 of the Act specifically provides that when PUVs are concerned, the responsibility of implementing the policy falls on respondent DOTC. It provides as follows:

SEC 21. Pollution from Motor Vehicles. - a) The DOTC shall implement the emission standards for motor vehicles set pursuant to and as provided in this Act. To further improve the emission standards, the Department [DENR] shall review, revise and publish the standards every two (2) years, or as the need arises. It shall consider the maximum limits for all major pollutants to ensure substantial improvement in air quality for the health, safety and welfare of the general public.

Paragraph (b) states:

b) The Department [DENR] in collaboration with the DOTC, DTI and LGUs, shall develop an action plan for the control and management of air pollution from motor vehicles consistent with the Integrated Air Quality Framework.

There is no dispute that under the Clean Air Act it is the DENR that is tasked to set the emission standards for fuel use and the task of developing an action plan. As far as motor vehicles are concerned, it devolves upon the DOTC and the line agency whose mandate is to oversee that motor vehicles prepare an action plan and implement the emission standards for motor vehicles, namely the LTFRB.

The program recognized, among others, natural gas as a clean burning alternative fuel for vehicle which has the potential to produce substantially lower pollutants. Section 3 of E.O. No. 290, consistent with E.O. No. 66, series of 2002, designated the DOE as the lead agency (a) in developing the natural gas industry of the country with the DENR, through the EMB and (b) in formulating emission standards for CNG. Most significantly, par. 4.5, Section 4 tasks the DOTC, working with the DOE, to develop an implementation plan for "a gradual shift to CNG fuel utilization in PUVs and promote NGVs [natural gas vehicles] in Metro Manila and Luzon through the issuance of directives/orders providing preferential franchises in present day major routes and exclusive franchises to NGVs in newly opened routes…"

It is the firm belief of this Court that in this case, it is timely to reaffirm the premium we have placed on the protection of the environment in the landmark case of Oposa. Yet, as serious as the statistics are on air pollution, with the present fuels deemed toxic as they are to the environment, as fatal as these pollutants are to the

health of the citizens, and urgently requiring resort to drastic measures to reduce air pollutants emitted by motor vehicles, we must admit in particular that petitioners are unable to pinpoint the law that imposes an indubitable legal duty on respondents that will justify a grant of the writ of mandamus compelling the use of CNG for public utility vehicles.

G.R. No. 146360 May 20, 2004

AZUCENA O. SALALIMA, petitioner, vs.

EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION and SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, respondents.

FACTS: Petitioner’s husband, Juancho S. Salalima, was employed for twenty-nine years as a route helper and subsequently as route salesman for the Meycauayan Plant of Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Incorporated. In 1989, during an annual company medical examination, Juancho was diagnosed with minimal pulmonary tuberculosis. A claim for compensation benefits under P.D. 626 as amended was filed by his surviving wife, Azucena, petitioner herein, with the Social Security System (SSS). In a report dated November 12, 1998, SSS Branch Manager Elnora Montenegro and Senior Physicians Corazon Bondoc and Annabelle Bonifacio recommended the denial of petitioner’s claim on the ground that Adenocarcinoma of the Lungs (Cancer of the Lungs) had no causal relationship with Juancho’s job as a route salesman.

Petitioner filed motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence, petitioner brought the case to the Employees’ Compensation Commission (ECC), which affirmed the decision of the SSS. Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals arguing that Juancho’s route as a salesman exposed him to all kinds of pollutants, not to mention the daily hazards and fatigue that came with his tasks. She pointed out that the SSS and the ECC disregarded Juancho’s medical history and the fact that the risk of contracting Juancho’s ailment was increased by the nature of his work. The ECC argued that neither condition is present in Juancho’s case since lung cancer is not an occupational disease nor is the risk of contracting lung cancer increased by Juancho’s working conditions.

Petitioner cited the raison d’être for the passage of Republic Act No. 8749, otherwise known as the Clean Air Act. Petitioner stated that the Act provides for a comprehensive pollution control policy that mainly concentrates on the prohibition of leaded gasoline due to its scientifically proven deleterious effect on the health of individuals.

On April 12, 2000, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the ECC, stating that the factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies, such as the ECC, if supported by substantial evidence, are entitled to great respect in view of their expertise in their respective fields.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Petitioner is entitled to claim in connection with PD No. 626.

HELD: P.D. No. 626 amended Title II of Book IV on the ECC and State Insurance Fund of the Labor Code. Under the provisions of the law as amended, for the sickness and resulting disability or death to be compensable, the claimant must prove that: (a) the sickness must be the result of an occupational disease listed

under Annex "A" of the Rules on Employees’ Compensation, or (b) the risk of contracting the disease was increased by the claimant’s working conditions.

Under the present law, Adenocarcinoma of the lungs (cancer of the lungs) which was the immediate cause of Juancho’s death as stated in his death certificate, while listed as an occupational disease, is compensable only among vinyl chloride workers and plastic workers. This, however, would not automatically bar petitioner’s claim for as long as she could prove that Juancho’s risk of contracting the disease was increased by the latter’s working conditions.

There are two conflicting medical reports on the correlation between Juancho’s work as a route salesman and the illness he suffered which was the immediate cause of his demise. Dr. Pablo S. Santos, Coca-Cola’s Head of Medical Services, stated in his report that while Juancho’s job does not expose him to any chemical material used within the plant. On the other hand, Dr. Ma. Victoria M. Abesamis of the Social Security System declared in her report that Juancho’s exposure to smog and dust is not associated with the development of lung cancer.

Adenocarcinoma of the lungs is one of the four major histologic varieties of bronchogenic carcinoma, the characterization being based upon the cell types that compose the carcinoma. Medical books list the etiology of lung cancers as follows: cigarette smoking, occupational exposure, air pollution, and other factors such as preexisting lung damage and genetic influences.

Thus, in light of Juancho’s continued exposure to detrimental work environment and constant fatigue, the possibility that Juancho’s Adenocarcinoma of the lungs developed from the worsening of his pulmonary tuberculosis is not remote. Juancho’s job required long hours on the streets as well as his carrying of cases of soft drinks during sales calls. The combination of fatigue and the pollutants that abound in his work environment verily contributed to the worsening of his already weak respiratory system. His continuous exposure to these factors may have led to the development of his cancer of the lungs.

Wherefore, the petition is granted. P.D. 626, as amended, is said to have abandoned the presumption of compensability and the theory of aggravation prevalent under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. Despite such abandonment, however, the present law has not ceased to be an employees’ compensation law or a social legislation.

G.R. No. 156052 March 7, 2007

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), VLADIMIR ALARIQUE T. CABIGAO, and BONIFACIO S. TUMBOKON, Petitioners, vs.

HON. JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., in his capacity as Mayor of the City of Manila, Respondent.

FACTS: On November 20, 2001, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8027. Respondent mayor approved the ordinance on November 28, 2001. It became effective on December 28, 2001, after its publication. Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted pursuant to the police power delegated to local government units, a principle described as the power inherent in a government to enact laws, within constitutional limits, to promote the order, safety, health, morals and general welfare of the society.

SECTION 1. For the purpose of promoting sound urban planning and ensuring health, public safety, and general welfare of the residents of Pandacan and Sta. Ana as well as its adjoining areas, the land use of [those] portions of land bounded by the Pasig River in the north, PNR Railroad Track in the east, Beata St. in the south, Palumpong St. in the southwest, and Estero de Pancacan in the west[,] PNR Railroad in the northwest area, Estero de Pandacan in the [n]ortheast, Pasig River in the southeast and Dr. M.L. Carreon in the southwest. The area of Punta, Sta. Ana bounded by the Pasig River, Marcelino Obrero St., Mayo 28 St., and F. Manalo Street, are hereby reclassified from Industrial II to Commercial I.

xxx xxx xxx

SEC. 3. Owners or operators of industries and other businesses, the operation of which are no longer permitted under Section 1 hereof, are hereby given a period of six (6) months from the date of effectivity of this Ordinance within which to cease and desist from the operation of businesses which are hereby in consequence, disallowed.

Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area described therein from industrial to commercial and directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed under Section 1 to cease and desist from operating their businesses within six months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. Among the businesses situated in the area are the so-called "Pandacan Terminals" of the oil companies Caltex (Philippines), Inc., Petron Corporation and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation.

However, on June 26, 2002, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE) entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the oil companies in which they agreed that "the scaling down of the Pandacan Terminals [was] the most viable and practicable option."

The Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified the MOU in Resolution No. 97. In the same resolution, the Sanggunian declared that the MOU was effective only for a period of six months starting July 25, 2002.

Meanwhile, petitioners filed this original action for mandamus on December 4, 2002 praying that Mayor Atienza be compelled to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the immediate removal of the terminals of the oil companies.

ISSUE: Whether respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals.

HELD: Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted right after the Philippines, along with the rest of the world, witnessed the horror of the September 11, 2001 attack on the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York City. The objective of the ordinance is to protect the residents of Manila from the catastrophic devastation that will surely occur in case of a terrorist attack on the Pandacan Terminals. No reason exists why such a protective measure should be delayed.

On the other hand, the Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as city mayor, to "enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city. " One of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief executive of the city, he has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled by the courts. He has no other choice. It is his ministerial duty to do so.

These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. The reason for this is obvious. It might seriously hinder the transaction of public business if these officers were to be permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not judicially been declared unconstitutional. Officers of the government from the highest to the lowest are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it.