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NATO EXPANSION
Prof. Dr. Muhammad Saleem Mazhar
Former Director
Centre for South Asian Studies
University of the Punjab
Lahore-Pakistan
Samee Uzair khan
Assistant Professor
Incharge Principal
University law College
University of the Punjab
Lahore-Pakistan
Naheed S. Goraya (Corresponding Author)
Senior Research Fellow
Centre for South Asian Studies
University of the Punjab
Lahore-Pakistan
Sponsoring Information
Centre for South Asian Studies
University of the Punjab
Lahore-Pakistan
ABSTRACT
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was formed against the danger posed by Soviet military power in order to defend the
Western Europe in 1949. Its initial purpose was to provide the security umbrella to Europe. As a military organization, NATO
since its inception has paid attention on the direct defence of its members. 9/11 has brought into question the relevance of this
organization, as NATO is being used as a tool for grave combat operations. This paper is an attempt to examine the future of
NATO along with the American agenda of its expansion in the changing world.
KEY WORDS: NATO, Mediterranean Dialogue Programme, Cold War, Warsaw Pact, Blockade of Berlin, 9/11, Major Non-
NATO Ally
Introduction
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization came into existence on April 4, 1949 and was approved in the subsequent
five months. Its original twelve countries comprised of US, UK, Canada, France, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway,
Portugal, Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg. At present, 28 world countries are its members among which
Albania and Croatia were the most recent addition in April 2009. NATO members and its partners comprise of one
third of world’s nations. The provision of enlargement is given by article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty which
states that “membership is open to any European State in a position to further the principles of this treaty and to
contribute to the security of the North Atlantic Area”
(http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm). The “collective defence system” of NATO was
streamlined in the post World War II amid the “North Atlantic and Europe” as an outfitted milieu. Within this
framework, it attained legitimacy under Article 51 of UN Charter. The “context of NATO” was regional both in
terms of “membership and outfitted milieu” (Mazari, 2006). When the Cold War ended, it helped in establishing the
fact that this war was a “double edged sword” for NATO by “outliving Warsaw Pact” but its significance was
challenged in the Post Cold War era, concurrently by the fading of its “raison d’etre” (Akram, 2009). In the post
Cold War era, Berlin Wall was fallen and as a result Germany was unified in 19901
and Warsaw Pact was dissolved.
These events led to the prospects of the enlargement of NATO. However in April 1999, NATO launched the
“Membership Action Programme (MAP)” in Washington Summit. At present, NATO is on expansion of its previous
and contemporary boundaries and this is the reason that today it has expanded its relation outside the “Euro-Atlantic
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Region”. Japan, South Korea, New Zealand and Singapore are known as “Other Partners across the Globe”
(http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2009/Asia/nato_partner_asia/EN/index.htm). The countries like Algeria, Egypt,
Israel, Jordan, and Marrakechkech, Tunis are included in NATO’s “Mediterranean Dialogue Programme”. While
Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates (UAE) are included in its “Istanbul
Cooperation Initiative” (Qureshi, 2010: 6). The expansion in NATO is greatly opposed by Russia because it is
assumed that “growth of NATO is purely a medium for the US and a chance to broaden its hard power
internationally as in opposition to a resurgent Russia” which may show the way to a new “Cold War” between the
superpower and Russia (Akram, 2009).
(www.nato.int/icons/map/b_nato_overview.jpg)
Background
The concept of Cold War gained popularity in 1945, shortly after the World War II which continued till 1979. On
April 16, 1947, Bernard Baruch, an American Statesman in his speech in Columbia coined the term of Cold War. It
was the time when American Congress was discussing “Truman Doctrine”2
(Palmer, 1993: 100). This doctrine was
initiated in March 1947 and proved to be a real defining moment in the foreign policy of the United States.
Consequently, Czechoslovakia was taken over by the Soviet Union and the blockade of Berlin3 intensified the
conflict. The division of Europe was completed by the formation of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in
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1949-50 and Soviet Union signed the Warsaw Pact in 19554. The first step in the “Post-War Reconstruction” of
Western European security was Brussels Treaty of 19485, modified in 1984. It was the initial step in the process that
led to the “signature of the North Atlantic Treaty” in 1949 and the establishment of the “North Atlantic Alliance”.
The Brussels Treaty is considered to be the “founding manuscript of the present day Western European Union
(WEU)” (http://www.nti.org/treaties-and-regimes/north-atlantic-treaty-organization-nato/).
Thus with the intensification of the Cold War, the Western powers began to come closer. A Euro-American Alliance
came into existence during the blockade of Berlin and before the start of Korean War (June 25, 1950). The western
powers wanted to establish an effective association to contain communism in Europe and North America. Thus
NATO comprising of twelve states was established which declared that “an armed attack on any one of them in
Europe and North America would be regarded as an attack on them all and each member state would take action
including the use of force as it deemed necessary. The area covered by the treaty was defined as the territories of
each signatory”. It opened the doors for the spread of Pentagon and for the access to the new military bases in
Europe from Britain to Turkey, from Italy to Norway and from West Germany to Greece. It was during the Korean
War and after its end in 1953 when US started establishing different organizations like NATO in the Pacific Ocean
of Asia.
1. Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty (ANZUS)-1951
This treaty also known as AZNUS Pact was intended to strengthen the American position in Pacific. It was signed
between the governments of Australia, New Zealand and the United States for the purpose of coordinating their
efforts for collective defence and the preservation of peace in the Pacific area. Each party in this Pact declared that it
would meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional process and any armed attack would be
immediately reported to the Security Council for necessary action
(http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/new_zealand/anzus.pdf). Australia and New Zealand supported America in Vietnam
War under this Pact. In 1984, the ANZUS Treaty began to disentangle when New Zealand stated its country a
“nuclear-free zone” and rejected the aspirations of “American nuclear-powered submarines” to visit its ports.
Shortly, after two years, George P. Schultz, Secretary of State and Bill Hayden, Australian Foreign Minister
completed a series of mutual meetings by verifying that “their countries would maintain to respect their
commitments to one another under the ANZUS Treaty, despite the fact that the “trilateral characteristics of the
agreement had been cut short” and the Security guarantees of New Zealand were abolished. However, the United
States hanged up its treaty requirements to New Zealand on September 17, 1986 (http://2001-
2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/cwr/102768.htm).
2. South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO)-1954
Since the emergence of Communist China, the debates on the “defence of South-East Asia” had been under
dialogue. The countries like Philippines, Siam and South Korea felt themselves vulnerable in the face of Communist
regimes. Thus in this backdrop, including the “AZNUS Powers” Great Britain, France, Pakistan, Thailand and the
Philippines signed the treaty of “Collective Defence of South East Asia (SAETO)”. South Korea and South Vietnam
were included as “Dialogue Partners” in SEATO. It was also known as Manila Pact which aimed at stopping
communism in the pacific. The members of SEATO except Pakistan provided soldiers in Vietnam War. Pakistan left
this organization in 1973 as a result of 1971 war with India where it did not get support against India while France
left it in 1975 and was dissolved in the same year.
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3. Middle East Treaty Organization (METO)-1955
In 1955, Iran and turkey signed Middle East Treaty Organization (METO), also known as Baghdad Pact. In 1958,
METO under the so-called Eisenhower Doctrine6 had supported the presence of 14, 000 US soldiers in Lebanon.
When Iran withdrew itself from the Pact in 1959, it was renamed as Central Treaty Organization (CENTO).
Baghdad Pact was died out without Baghdad and thus was dissolved after Iranian Revolution in 1979
The above mentioned organizations were aimed at the containment of Soviet Union and its allies which could
ultimately help Pentagon to settle in the southern part of Soviet Union.
Objectives and Structure
The Treaty maintains the individual rights of the member states as well as their intercontinental responsibilities
which are appropriate to the Charter of the United Nations. It entrusts each member country to share the threats and
responsibilities in addition to the “benefits of collective security”. It involves each of them to “undertake” not to go
into any other global obligation that might clash with the Treaty.
The composition of NATO consists of separate civil and military configuration and diverse organizations and
agencies. “NATO Headquarters (HQ), the Permanent Representatives and National Delegations, the Secretary
General, and the International Staff (IS)" are the main bodies within the civil structure. While Military Committee,
the Chairman of the Military Committee, Strategic NATO Commanders, International Military Staff, Allied
Command Europe (ACE), and Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT) are the principle bodies of military structure.
Moreover, Regional bodies correlated unofficially to NATO contain the “Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the
NATO Parliamentary Assembly”.
Conditions for Withdrawal
Any Party may stop to be a Party one year following its “notice of denunciation” has been given to the American
government which will notify the governments of the “other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation”.
Role of NATO
The NATO’s role can be best divided into three phases of history:
1. Cold War
2. Post Cold War
3. 9/11
NATO nonetheless started the quest of a new legitimacy instantly with the creation of the “North Atlantic
Cooperation Council” as a “forum for discussions between NATO members, East European States and the former
Soviet Republics”. Ever since NATO has initiated to focus more on fetching into its fold the “Eastern European
States”, primarily through its “Partnership for Peace Initiative of 1994”, in addition to making available a “definite,
limited access to Russia through the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council set-up in 1997”. The “Czech, Hungary
and Poland were the earliest Eastern European States to join NATO, in 1999, which intended that NATO borders
has “expanded 400 miles towards Russia” (Mazari, 2006).
The reality that NATO serves up the fundamental US interests cannot be rejected and is obvious from its
dedication to follow NATO growth regardless of varied rejoinders that emerged on part of “Germany and France”.
For the United States, the Alliance is a practical opportunity for “trans-Atlantic dialogue” and serves as an
imperative foundation for arranging multinational military missions “outside” Europe. In the modern years NATO
has “set off on” budging away from its original focus on Europe and makes out that the “threats in front of the
alliance are more varied and geographically far-away than the coercion during the Cold War”. However this
endeavor can be termed as “globalization of alliance’, as most of the threats to Western community are originating
from outside the European borders (Larrabee, 2003).
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The disintegration of Soviet Union surfaced with the “end of bipolarity”, rather than the “end of Cold War”.
America emerged on the world scene as Sole superpower. Russian disintegration “physically transformed the Asian
map with the establishment of new states in the Caucasus and Central Asia” which were “strategically at risk”
(Mazari, 2006). NATO remained fully occupied in dealing with the threatening costs of the Soviet disintegration
during the first decade of post Cold War era. However, gradually NATO unswervingly was caught up in ending the
civil war of Yugoslavia where it carried out the offensive military operations for the first time (Akram, 2009).
Nevertheless, the “Serbian ethnic cleansing campaign” in Kosovo was brought to an end by NATO (Schmidt, 2006-
07: 93: 106). These military operations led to the formation of “peacekeeping operations” of NATO in Bosnia and
Kosovo respectively. However, a conflict rose about NATO’s status of carrying out the “offensive military
operations”, especially with regard to the Serbian bombing campaign of 1999.
NATO in Afghanistan and Its Implications
Kuhn (2009) writes, “As Afghanistan goes, so goes NATO. The power of the Trans-Atlantic Alliance will be either
“prevail” or “vanish” on Afghan land”. Hence, Afghanistan might prove “graveyard for NATO in future”.
The changing geo-Politics and military landscape call into question the very existence of NATO. The future will
decide whether “NATO should cease to exist or that the US would be better off leaving the alliance”. Today
NATO’s future is undecided and there are two developments which are truly frightening:
The first is Obama’s declaration earlier in 2012 that tackling China’s growing military supremacy and
encouraging allies in Asia would obtain precedence over Europe. With Europe progressively more seen by
America as a “producer” rather than a “consumer’ of defense and security.
The second worry is that the economic calamity inside the “Euro-Zone” leaves NATO’s European members
less capable to play their role. Monetary graveness, together with the theory that Europe looks few real threats
to its security, means that defence budgets, previously trimmed to the bone, face additional cuts. When the
“cold war ended, European countries accounted for 34% of NATO's military expenditure while at present it has
dropped to 21%. Apart from America, only 4 of 28 members meet up the alliance's defence-spending target of
2% of GDP: Britain, France, Greece and Albania” (http://www.economist.com/node/21551491).
The events of 9/11 helped in the transformation of NATO’s role drastically and its relevance went under serious
doubts. The September 11 attacks established the fact that NATO had been inadequately operational to tackle the
“key security threats”. NATO got split after 9/11 because the Great Britain and the US wanted to act forcefully
while the rest of the member wanted to be simply involved in “peacekeeping operations’. The war waged in
Afghanistan is the “NATO's first war in a foreign country, its first land war and its first trial in the post-September
11 era – an era where threats are less from states than from rogue actors” (Kuhn, 2009). Article 5 was raised “for the
first time in its history in post 9/11 and allies stepped forward with the proposals of military support for the
successive military operation in Afghanistan” while concurrently, European Allies offered very little. The American
denunciation of most of the recommendations disheveled “allied feathers and hoisted questions about the application
of a military coalition where simply an individual member could project importance, high-end, expeditionary
military influence” The US has faced this challenge because:
It wanted influence the “European Allies” to collect their inadequate capitals so that a “distinct multinational,
European-centered NATO Response Force (NRF)” may be established. This force will not barely be skilled and
prepared with American principles but would also be proficient to “set out jointly and fight successfully
together with the US forces”
It hunted to plead with the allies that NATO required expanding its authorization and command ahead of the
conventional borders of Europe with the intention that NATO forces might set off “out-of-area” to where the
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intimidations essentially were. Even the French were capable to welcome this reasoning, and the two ideas were
taken on without any grim disagreement at the Prague Summit in November 2002 (Schmidt, 2006-07: 98).
A working scheme was built up within the American Government after 9/11, in order to launch a
“counterterrorism cell at NATO” which might facilitate in following the “terrorists and manage arrests”. This offer
by no means made it to NATO, on account of a long-standing inclination for “using conventional, primarily bilateral
conduits in a few quarters of the American government (Schmidt, 2006-07: 102). In February 2004, it was agreed by
the Western allies that Pakistan and India might be included in “NATO’s PIP programme after the concentrated
persuasion by the US; because such an arrangement would allow two nuclear rivals of South Asia to consult the
alliance in the event of direct threats to their internal ad external security. With the change in its geographic focus,
NATO plans to take control of several international military peacekeeping operations under the UN mandate”. In
2004, Pakistan was declared as a “major Non-NATO Ally” (MNNA), according to the US aspirations in order to
acknowledge its job in the “war against terrorism”. Earlier the “militarization of the containment policy in Europe
and the former change in NATO’s policy for the successive stages” was characterized by the political curves of the
cold War; while at the moment it is the Global War on Terror that is yet again changing the course of NATO
(Rafique, 2004).
The control of the “International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)” was undertaken by NATO in 2003. It was
the first “out of area operation” in the history of alliance, however, the countries agreed to the US demands (Akram,
2009). American stance was not accepted by France because it does not want to involve in other areas beyond the
scope of NATO. Regardless of these dissimilarities of opinion among the member states, American agenda on
NATO has been much more striving, mainly in Afghanistan, where “US has been progressively pressurizing allies
to enlarge the span of menace they are keen to take”. Simultaneously, the US is eager to suggest and work for the
extension of NATO connections with “non European Western allies”, which might provide the alliance an additional
universal focus. Moreover, US is also compressing NATO to engage in a more significant task in the Middle East
and Africa, which, taken jointly means that these inventiveness devise a striving revelation of an “ever more
internationally focused alliance” adopting a wider series of issues and assignments headed by the US. Russia has
constantly been opposing NATO’s expanded role, alleged to encircle Russia. NATO has amplified importance on
“energy security for its member countries” which is observed as “Eastward Expansion’. If Georgia and Ukraine
enter the alliance as members, it would in that case unquestionably be in a very strapping place to exercise power
over and guard “oil supplies from the Caspian Sea through Georgia” and present assistance to Ukraine in any
upcoming difference of opinion with Russia over gas (Amies, 2008). This is obvious from the details that Russia
facilitated in “splintering the Ukrainian government and also attacked Georgia” in 2008, consequently making it
lucid that it regards both countries as its territory and that the West ought to remain at a distance. In order to count
Russia as a result of attack on Georgia, NATO congealed all knots with Russia. Nevertheless, the dependence of
Russia over NATO for providing “troops to Afghanistan” disallowed the alliance in approaching Russia too stiff and
therefore, infuriated a very callous reaction. The conflict between Russia and Georgia engendered the intense
discussion within NATO headquarters over its growth. This confirms that extension will not be only the single
challenge for NATO in “redefining and transforming” its liaison with Russia, moreover, NATO must assure some of
its newer members that its vow to Article 5 “remains sound” and the NATO ambitions of its members will persist to
be taken gravely (Smith, 2008). Germany and France do oppose NATO expansion and this stance favors Russia.
The main reason behind this opposition is that “Germany obtains most of its energy supplies from Russia” while
France had been the “negotiator of peace between Russia and Georgia when war broke out between them in August
2008”. The underlying principle for “eastward expansion deep into post-Soviet territories of the Eurasian region” is
“energy and trade centered”. A “new Great Game” is being endorsed in the area in which “Czarist Russia and
Imperial Britain” have been “reinstated by the United States on one hand, and on the other by Russia and China”.
This might lead to a “neo-Cold War in the making”. The foremost American intention in Central Asia and the
surrounding region relate to “securing access to energy resources” (Weisz, 2006: 156-167). In this background,
NATO has a new-fangled “long-drawn-out role in energy security” and it owing to this rationale that it is “building
partnerships with the energy-rich states in Central Asia and the Caucuses” (Kamal, 2008: 187-196). Conversely,
“Russia’s drive in the area focuses on implementing its role as the basis and a tool of energy supply to Europe”.
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Other than that, military prevalence, the restitution of Moscow’s power and economic liberty are noteworthy for
Russia as it does not crave to undergo any type of elimination. It is not only Russia that views NATO’s expansionist
policy detrimental to its security; rather other countries show resentment over NATO’s growing military influence.
According to US President Obama, NATO is the “foundation of common refuge, liberty and opulence for almost 65
years. It has not just been suffered rather has been flourished” because in his words, the "nations are stronger when
we stand collectively” (http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=116435). The US is pushing NATO to
acquire further significant responsibility as far as Middle East and Africa are concerned. Fort this very objective, it
might go for setting up military training centers. As a whole, these ideas outline a striving visualization of a
progressively more “global focused alliance” taking up ever more extensive range of potential matters, actions, and
operations, which will definitely be led by the US (Schimdt, 2006-07: 100).
Conclusion
Today NATO has converted from “Collective Defence Organization” to a “Collective Security Organization” while
internationally; there is no legitimacy for this kind of organization. NATO has become offensive rather than being
defensive.
NATO has experienced deep transformation in the “post-Cold War era” and, the most reflective one is
“NATO’s expansion”, leaning to its “geographic reach, peacekeeping and relief operations”. Long-drawn-out realm
of NATO is also an outcome of fresh international politics that came forward in the post Cold War era and the
universal menace of terrorism after the twin towers attacks. Regardless of its extensive list of success, the
organization maintains to put up with a “strategic gist”, with intense dissection within the Alliance on future errands
and operations. Its existing task in Afghanistan is an illustration per se, seeing that the alliance is short of “both
resources and political will”, and “division within member states” stimulate the contemporary dilemma. It might be
much premature to foretell the “future of Alliance”, however a great deal banks on its triumph or collapse
in Afghanistan and the dynamic contribution of Superpower. If NATO presence remains permanently in
Afghanistan, it will threaten Iran, China and Pakistan’s security too in future As long as America remains the
driving power behind NATO; it will persist to survive but might come across tribulations owing to the potential
deficits of the “European Allies”. Most notably, numerous issues remain unreciprocated and these indecisive
discussions embrace Russia’s new resentment, which “might seem like NATO’s salvation” as the Alliance could
utilize “Russia’s renaissance to redefine itself”. The questions like “American unilateralism, aptitudes of members
and a probable strain” still outdo the Alliance. As successive measures would divulge, NATO, in spite of its many
accomplishments, faces immeasurable confrontations, the “toughest being Afghanistan”. Only time will tell if the
justification for “NATO’s future existence” will be a “resurgent Russia or a nuclear-armed Iran” (Akram, 2009).
While NATO agenda has stretched out, its “membership remains limited to Europe and US”, which is more like a
conduit between “North Atlantic and Europe”. Subsequently, if it symbolizes “mutual benefits”, these are the
“interests of these two geographical units”. Nonetheless its “theater of operations on the ground” has become
progressively more Asian; an area that has slight say in NATO agenda or execution. Unless NATO amends its very
character through Asian members, it will, by classification, be “plugging European-US agendas in Asia” (Mazari,
2006). The trance of a “global NATO”, that recruits allies from all over the world and intrudes wherever problem
rears its head, flourished a few years ago, however has since drooping. Once its troops are outside Afghanistan, the
alliance ought to relapse to its local roots. The bond that grasps the pact jointly has become incontestably fragile
today than it was “during the Cold War”. The actual dilemma is that the US does not truly acquaint with the fact
what it needs from NATO. It persists to recognize the alliance through what is fundamentally a “Cold War Prism”,
as the key mechanism through which the US attempts to project influence in Europe. The accomplishments of
NATO enlargement procedure, which dealt with true security concerns among the freed former Communist states
and of NATO participation in the Balkans, have merely facilitated to maintain this opinion. The present US efforts
to offer NATO a more “universal reach” besides reproduces the similar insight of NATO supremacy, with the
Alliance setting off from its “European core to grip the wider globe”. It is unquestionably a striking revelation, but
evidently, it lies at variance with realty. The conception of “giving pride of place to a military alliance, made logic
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during the Cold War, but not today when the most critical threats are more varied and disseminated. NATO is of
partial use as a “diplomatic player”, and this is the reason that the US has never truly used it in this capacity
(Schimdt, 2006-07: 105).
The Strategic Concept of 1999 offers the institutional rationalization and path for the additional growth of
NATO, and is liable to remain the major design for the fruition of NATO during the next 2 to 5 years. Nevertheless,
its shift has moved up “questions about the aptness of a military coalition reorienting itself to project the supremacy
for rationale of conflict deterrence and conflict management outside its member states”. Brzezinski (1998) writes
while defining NATO Alliance as a “component of an incorporated, wide-ranging, and long-standing policy for the
entire Eurasia” in which NATO would “sooner or later get in touch with Asia and where other military pact would
hook up the Pacific and South-East Asian States”. It is becoming factual in the contemporary world, whereas it is
important to note that NATO ministers had determined over a “forward looking strategy” for “European Security” in
September 1950, because on the global scene, the “Korean War” had emerged.
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Notes
1. Berlin Wall
The wall dividing East and West Germany, the symbol of division was broken in a surge of popular sentiment. The
Communist leader Honecker quit in 1989 itself. In 1990, East Germany held its first free elections since Hitler
subverted democracy in 1933.
2. Brussles Treaty of 1948
On April 17, 1948, Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg signed a treaty for collective
defense alliance because their military power had been fragile in post World War II. It provided for the joint
defence against aggression in Europe along with the economic and socials cooperation. It established permanent
consultative machinery to carry out joint policies. This was the core of the future strategic development, not only in
Europe but also in the Atlantic region. It led to the formation of NATO and the Western European Union. Its
purpose was to illustrate that western European states could cooperate and accordingly might persuade the United
States to engage itself in a responsibility, related to the safety measures of Western Europe.
3. Truman Doctrine
This doctrine helped the US to take the military and economic responsibilities of Greece and Turkey which Britain
had been incapable to do. Even though the true rationale of this doctrine was to facilitate the Greek Government
against the Communism and contain the Soviet Union from interfering in Turkey, yet the doctrine sought to give an
ideological color to the policy of containment which the US was to follow thereafter.
4. Blockade of Berlin
The Soviet Union in complete violation of her assurances to the Western Powers sealed off Berlin and cut off food
and fuel supplies to the Western zones of Germany in 1948. The blockade was ultimately lifted by Soviet Union in
May 1949 after 323 days.
5. Warsaw Pact
This Political and military alliance between Soviet Union and many Eastern European Countries was established on
May 14, 1955 as a counterbalance to NATO.
6. Eisenhower Doctrine
It was propounded in March 1957 and was a new version of Truman Doctrine. However, in this case, the military
and economic aid was not mixed up; rather a country could receive military or economic aid or both.
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