NATO · Bukovski during a visit to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia* on 29 August to...

InterviewwithMartti Ahtisaaripages 24-25

Military reformin Central andEastern Europepages 30-33

NATONATO’s evolving partnerships

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AUTUMN 2001

NATO’s evolving partnerships

NATOPublished under the authority of theSecretary General, this magazine isintended to contribute to a constructivediscussion of Atlantic issues. Articles,therefore, do not necessarily representofficial opinion or policy of membergovernments or NATO.

EDITOR : Christopher BennettASSISTANT EDITOR : Vicki NielsenPRODUCTION ASSISTANT: Felicity BreezeLAYOUT : NATO Graphics Studio

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Printed in Belgium by Editions Européennes© NATO

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Hard copy editions of the magazine may beobtained free of charge by readers in the follow-ing countries from the addresses given below:CANADA :Foreign Policy Communications DivisionDepartment of Foreign Affairs and Int’l Trade125 Sussex DriveOttawa, Ontario K1A 0G2UNITED KINGDOM :Communication Planning UnitMinistry of DefenceRoom 0370 Main BuildingLondon SW1A 2HBUNITED STATES:NATO Review— US Mission to NATOPSC 81 Box 200 — APO AE 09724

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Every mention in this publication of the formerYugoslav Republic of Macedonia is marked by anasterisk (*) referring to the following footnote:Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia withits constitutional name.

NATO review2 Autumn 2001

contentsNATOreview

ON THE COVER

Allied and Partner soldiersparading together.

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FOCUS ON NATO4Alliance news in brief

NATO’S EVOLVING PARTNERSHIPS

6Building security through partnershipRobert Weaver analyses the evolution of NATO partnerships.

10Getting Cinderella to the ballRobert E. Hunter examines thepotential of the Euro-AtlanticPartnership Council.

13Promoting regional securityJames Appathurai examines howNATO promotes regional securitycooperation.

16Partnership in practice:Georgia’s experienceIrakli Menagarishvili describesGeorgia’s relationship with NATO.

ESSAY

18Imagining NATO 2011Michael Rühle imagines how theAlliance and the Euro-Atlanticsecurity environment might look inten years.

FEATURES

22Monitoring contamination inKazakhstan

23Easing the transition to CivvyStreet

INTERVIEW

24Martti Ahtisaari:international mediator

Autumn 2001 NATO review 3

fore

wor

d During the production of this issue of NATO Review,the United States suffered a devastating terrorist attack,the effects of which have been felt around the world. Thereaction of America’s Allies to the barbaric attacks of 11September was immediate: total solidarity with the UnitedStates in its time of need. As a profound symbol of thatsolidarity, on 12 September, NATO’s members agreed that,if it were determined that this attack had been directedfrom abroad against the United States, it should be regard-ed as an action covered by Article 5 of the WashingtonTreaty, which states that an attack against one or moreAllies shall be considered an attack against them all. On 2October, the US government confirmed that the attackshad indeed been launched from abroad, by terrorists fromOsama Bin Laden’s al-Qaida organisation.

NATO’s essential foundation – its bedrock – has alwaysbeen Article 5, the commitment to collective defence. Ofcourse, this commitment was first entered into in 1949, invery different circumstances. But it remains equally validand essential today, in the face of this new threat. With thedecision to invoke Article 5, NATO’s members demon-strated, once again, that the Alliance is no simple talkingshop. It is a community of nations, united by its values, andutterly determined to act together to defend them.

On 12 September, it was also demonstrated that theEuro-Atlantic community today is much broader than the19 NATO members. Within hours of NATO’s historicdecision, the 46 member countries of the Euro-AtlanticPartnership Council – from North America, Europe andCentral Asia – issued a statement in which they agreedthat these acts were an attack not only on the UnitedStates, but on our common values. In the EAPC state-ment, the 46 countries also pledged to undertake all effortsneeded to combat the scourge of terrorism.

It is too early to say what role NATO and its members,or the EAPC, will play in the coming international strug-gle against the scourge of terrorism. That struggle will belong and sometimes difficult. It will require all the tools atour disposal, political, economic, diplomatic as well as mil-itary. And it will need the active engagement of the widestpossible coalition of countries, all working towards com-mon goals. The solidarity and determination displayed inBrussels on 12 September, by the North Atlantic Counciland the EAPC, are a vital first step. They show the practi-cal importance of NATO’s partnerships and underline thetimeliness of this issue of NATO Review.

Lord Robertson

Volume 49Autumn 2001

REVIEW

26The new Macedonian questionChristopher Bennett reviews recentliterature on the former YugoslavRepublic of Macedonia.*

SPECIAL

28Educating a new eliteColonel Ralph D. Thiele describeshow the NATO Defense Collegecaters for citizens of Partner countries.

MILITARY MATTERS

30Reform realitiesChris Donnelly examines militaryreform in Central and EasternEurope.

STATISTICS

34Defence expenditure and size ofarmed forces of NATO andPartner countries

NATO Secretary General LordRobertson visited Berlin, Germany,on 20 and 21 September to attend theNATO Review conference, an annualevent to discuss the future of theAlliance, and meet ChancellorGerhard Schröder, Foreign MinisterJoschka Fischer and other politicalleaders.

Armitage briefs

US Deputy Secretary of State RichardArmitage visited NATO on 20September to brief Lord Robertsonand the North Atlantic Council on thestate of investigations into the terror-ist attacks of 11 September.

Follow-on forceOn 19 September, President BorisTrajkovski of the former YugoslavRepublic of Macedonia* askedNATO to deploy a reduced, follow-onforce in his country after the end ofOperation Essential Harvest on 26September.

Between 17 and 22 September, fourNATO members and five Partnersparticipated in CooperativeEngagement 2001, the first maritimeNATO/Partnership-for-Peace exerciseto take place in Slovenia, at Ankarannear Koper.

Seven NATO members and threePartners participated in CooperativePoseidon, the second phase of a sub-marine safety exercise, which tookplace in Bremerhaven, Germany,between 17 and 21 September. Theexercise was also attended byobservers from seven Mediterra-nean Dialogue countries.

Military personnel from nine NATOand 13 Partner countries took part inCooperative Key 2001, an exercise in

peace-support operations, whichtook place in Plovdiv, Bulgaria,between 11 and 21 September.Representatives of the office of theUN High Commissioner for Refugeesand several non-governmental organ-isations also participated.

Between 10 and 21 September, par-ticipants from seven NATO membersand 13 Partner countries took part inCooperative Best Effort 2001 atZeltweg Airbase, Austria, an exercisedesigned to train participants inpeace-support skills.

German General Dieter Stöckmannsucceeded UK General Sir RupertSmith as Deputy Supreme AlliedCommander Europe at a ceremony atSupreme Headquarters, AlliedPowers Europe (SHAPE) in Mons,Belgium, on 17 September.

Lord Robertson visited Skopje, theformer Yugoslav Republic ofMacedonia,* on 14 September toconsult with President BorisTrajkovski and his government andreview progress of OperationEssential Harvest.

Three minutes silenceOn 13 September, NATO staff joinedmillions of people across Europe inobserving three minutes silence forthe victims of the 11 September ter-rorist outrage and their families.

NATO and Russia expressed theirdeepest sympathy with the victims ofthe 11 September terrorist attacks inNew York and Washington DC andtheir families and pledged to intensifycooperation to defeat terrorism at ameeting of the NATO-RussiaPermanent Joint Council on 13September. Similar sentiments wereexpressed at extraordinary meetingsof the NATO-Ukraine Commissionand the Euro-Atlantic PartnershipCouncil.

New UK ambassadorAmbassador Emyr Jones Parry suc-ceeded Ambassador David Manningas the permanent representative ofthe United Kingdom to NATO on 13September. Ambassador Parry, 53, isa career diplomat and was politicaldirector of the Foreign andCommonwealth Office from July1998 until August 2001.

Article 5On 12 September, NATO ambassa-dors agreed that if the 11 Septemberterrorist attack was directed fromabroad, it would be considered as anattack on all NATO Allies, thus invok-ing Article 5 of the WashingtonTreaty, NATO’s founding charter, forthe first time in the Alliance’s history.

On 11 September, Lord Robertsonand the North Atlantic Council con-demned terrorist attacks on innocentcivilians in the United States andexpressed their deepest sympathyand solidarity with the American peo-ple.

On 7 September, Lord Robertsonattended the last day of a three-daysymposium in Oslo, Norway, whichfocused on technological, industrialand scientific aspects of adapting totoday’s transformed security environ-ment. The event was hosted jointly bythe Supreme Allied Commander,Atlantic (SACLANT), the NorwegianDefence Command and the US JointForces Command.

New US ambassador

Ambassador Nicholas Burns suc-ceeded Ambassador AlexanderVershbow as permanent representa-tive of the United States to NATO on4 September. Ambassador Burns, 45,was formerly US ambassador toGreece from 1997 until July 2001.

Between 1995 and 1997, he wasspokesman of the US StateDepartment.

A live-flying exercise to train airforces in tactical air operations,including the suppression of enemyair defences and electronic warfare,took place between 3 and 14September from Main Air Station inØrland, Norway. Air Meet 2001involved air forces from 13 NATOmember countries and was conduct-ed by the headquarters of Allied AirForces North, based at Ramstein,Germany.

Lord Robertson met President BorisTrajkovski, Prime Minister LjubcoGeorgievski, Interior Minister LjubeBoshkovski, Foreign Minister IlinkaMitreva and Defence Minister VladoBukovski during a visit to the formerYugoslav Republic of Macedonia*on 29 August to assess progressmade by NATO troops in collectingweapons from ethnic Albanian rebels.

Disarming rebels

Operation Essential Harvest waslaunched on 22 August, two monthsafter the government of the formerYugoslav Republic of Macedonia*requested NATO assistance to restorepeace and stability in its country. The30-day mission, which effectivelystarted on 27 August, was to disarmethnic Albanian rebels and involvedsome 3,500 troops, with logisticalsupport.

The situation in the former YugoslavRepublic of Macedonia* dominatedthe regular joint meeting of the NorthAtlantic Council and the EuropeanUnion’s Political and SecurityCommittee, held in Brussels,Belgium, on 22 August.


FOCUS ON NATO

Indicted war criminal Dragan Jokic, aBosnian Serb implicated in the 1995Srebrenica massacre and attacks onUN observation posts, surrendered toSFOR troops on 15 August.

The headquarters of Task ForceHarvest deployed in the formerYugoslav Republic of Macedonia*on 15 August — two days after thesigning of a political frameworkagreement to provide for internalreforms and allow NATO-led troopsinto the country to disarm ethnicAlbanian rebels — to assess the situ-ation and prepare the launch ofOperation Essential Harvest.

Vidoje Blagojevic, a former BosnianSerb commander indicted for warcrimes, was detained on 10 Augustand transferred to the InternationalWar Crimes Tribunal in The Hague.

Flood preparationsWork on a pilot project to improveflood preparedness and response inthe Tisza river area in Ukraine beganin September. The project is beingdeveloped in the context of the NATO-Ukraine work programme for 2000.

Lord Robertson joined EU HighRepresentative for Common Foreignand Security Policy Javier Solanaand the OSCE Chairman-in-Office,Romanian Foreign Minister MirceaGeoana, in Skopje, the formerYugoslav Republic of Macedonia* on26 July for talks with governmentleaders and political parties to rein-vigorate talks aimed at ending fivemonths of violence.

Lithuanian Prime Minister AlgirdasBrazauskas met Lord Robertson atNATO on 24 July.

On 19 July, the Military Committee,NATO’s highest military authority, and

its chairman, Admiral GuidoVenturoni, visited the regional south-ern command, Allied Forces SouthernEurope (AFSOUTH), which is respon-sible for all NATO-led operations inthe Balkans.

Serbian Deputy Prime MinisterNebosja Covic and Yugoslav ForeignMinister Goran Svilanovic met LordRobertson and addressed the NorthAtlantic Council on 18 July.Discussions focused on develop-ments in southern Serbia andKosovo.

New NATO DeputySecretary General

Ambassador Alessandro MinutoRizzo succeeded Ambassador SergioBalanzino as NATO Deputy SecretaryGeneral on 16 July. AmbassadorRizzo is an Italian career diplomat andwas previously his country’s perma-nent representative to the EuropeanUnion’s Political and SecurityCommittee.

Lord Robertson and the 19 NATOambassadors visited Albania andBosnia and Herzegovina on 12 and13 July for wide-ranging discussionswith government leaders.

Current Euro-Atlantic security issueswere discussed at a five-day meetingorganised by the NATO Parliamen-tary Assembly for young and newly-elected parliamentarians from NATOand Partner countries, held inBrussels, Belgium, between 9 and 13July.

Romanian President Ion Iliescu andForeign Minister Mircea Geoana metLord Robertson on 9 July at NATO todiscuss the situation in the Balkansand Romania’s cooperation withNATO.

On 6 July, the day after a cease-firebetween the government and ethnicAlbanian rebels in the formerYugoslav Republic of Macedonia*was signed, Foreign Minister IlinkaMitreva came to NATO to meet LordRobertson.

Lord Robertson visited Kyiv,Ukraine, on 4 and 5 July, where hemet President Leonid Kuchma,Prime Minister Anatolyi Kinakh,Foreign Minister Anatolyi Zlenkoand Defence Minister OlexandrKuzmuk, as well as other key figures.He also addressed a Partnership forPeace symposium organised bySACLANT.

A ceremony to mark the inaugurationof a project aimed at destroyingAlbania’s stockpile of 1.6 million anti-personnel mines — as requiredunder the Ottawa Convention pro-hibiting the use, stockpiling, produc-tion and transfer of anti-personnelmines — took place at Mjekës, southof the capital Tirana, on 29 June. Thisis the first demilitarisation project tobe implemented under a Partnershipfor Peace Trust Fund set up for thispurpose in 2000.

Essential HarvestOn 29 June, the North AtlanticCouncil approved Essential Harvest,an operation plan drawn up bySHAPE, for the possible deploymentof NATO troops to the formerYugoslav Republic of Macedonia,*at the request of the government, tohelp disarm ethnic Albanian groups.The plan would be implemented oncondition that the parties pursuepolitical dialogue and end hostilities.

Moldovan President Vladimir Voranvisited NATO on 28 June, where hemet Lord Robertson and signed anagreement, which will enable NATOexperts to provide material assis-tance and training to ensure theimplementation of a Partnership forPeace Trust Fund project aimed atthe safe destruction of highly corro-sive rocket fuel, as well as anti-per-

sonnel landmines and surplus muni-tions.

UN Special Representative to KosovoHans Haekkerup briefed NATOambassadors on the situation in theprovince and preparations forupcoming elections there at NATO on26 June.

Polish President AleksanderKwasniewski visited SHAPE in Mons,Belgium, on 21 June, where he metthe Supreme Allied CommanderEurope, US General Joseph W.Ralston.

US visitDuring a trip to the United Statesfrom 19 to 22 June, Lord Robertsongave a speech to the Chicago Councilfor Foreign Relations, before travel-ling to Washington to meet NationalSecurity Advisor Condoleezza Rice,Secretary of State Colin Powell andSecretary of Defense DonaldRumsfeld. He then attended theannual seminar organised bySACLANT in Norfolk, Virginia, whichthis year focused on NATO’s militarycapabilities.

Between 18 and 29 June, 15 NATOcountries took part in Clean Hunter2001, a live-flying exercise overnorthern Europe and northernFrance. This annual event involvesthe headquarters of Allied Air ForcesNorth and its subordinate combinedair operations centres in exercisesaimed at maintaining effectiveness inplanning and conducting coordinatedlive air operations.


For more information, see NATO Update at: www.nato.int/docu/update/index.htm

FOCUS ON NATO


In addition to hosting the EAPC, a dynamic, multilateral forum for the discussion and promotion ofsecurity issues, NATO is the focal point of a web of inter-locking security partnerships and programmes. TheAlliance is working via the Partnership for Peace to helpreform militaries and assist the democratic transition inmuch of former Communist Europe. Moreover, specialbilateral relations have been forged with both Russia andUkraine, the two largest countries to emerge out of the dis-integration of the Soviet Union. And a security dialogue isongoing with an ever increasing number of countries in theMediterranean region (see box on page 9).

Today, 27 Partners use this institution to consult regularly with the 19 Allies on issues encompassing allaspects of security and all regions of the Euro-Atlanticarea. In addition, Allied and Partner militaries exercise andinteract together on a regular basis. And some 9,000 sol-

Robert Weaver works on NATO enlargement and EAPCmatters in NATO’s Political Affairs Division.

W hen the 46 ambassadors of the Euro-AtlanticPartnership Council (EAPC) meet, they take itfor granted that they will be able to debate and

discuss the most pressing security issues of the day in anopen and constructive environment. But just a little overten years ago, diplomats from countries that belonged tothe Warsaw Pact – which represent close to half of today’sEAPC members – were unable even to enter NATO head-quarters. If they wished to deliver a message, they wereobliged to leave it at the front gate. This contrast illustratesthe evolution of Euro-Atlantic security in the past decadeand, above all, the way in which an Alliance strategy builtaround partnerships has altered the strategic environmentin the Euro-Atlantic area.

Building security through partnership

Robert Weaver analyses the evolution of NATO’s partnerships ten years after thecreation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council.

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Historic event: the Soviet Union dissolved during the first meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in December 1991

diers from Partner countries, including about 4,000Russians, serve alongside their Alliance counterparts in theNATO-led peacekeeping operations in the Balkans.

Anyone predicting in 1991 the kind of evolution ofEuro-Atlantic security that has taken place over the pastdecade would likely have faced ridicule. At the time, withthe end of the Cold War, it was more fashionable for ana-lysts to predict the imminent demise of NATO or, in thewake of the Moscow coup of August 1991, a return to theconfrontational stances, which had characterised Europeanpolitics for the best part of half a century. Moreover, look-ing back, things could have gone horribly wrong. That theydid not is in large part because the Allies offered a “hand offriendship” to their former adversaries and is a tribute tothe partnership-building strategy, which NATO has pur-sued over the past decade.

At the end of the Cold War, NATO’s primary task was totry to overcome lingering misconceptions about what theAlliance stood for and how it operated. Explaining thatNATO was a defensive Alliance was critical. In London, inJuly 1990, NATO leaders decided to reduce the role ofnuclear weapons in the Alliance’s military strategy to thatof “weapons of last resort”. This move signalled NATO’sbenign intentions and was meant to deny the anti-reformforces in Moscow the pretext of an alleged “NATO threat”to crack down on the liberalisation process in central andeastern Europe. Beyond this, NATO needed to considerhow best to establish a genuine security relationship withthese countries, which would allow the Alliance actively toshape security developments. At NATO’s Rome Summit inNovember 1991, the Alliance proposed the creation of theNorth Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) as a forumfor a structured dialogue with former Warsaw Pact coun-tries.

The NACC met for the first time in December 1991 with16 Alliance and nine Partner countries in attendance. Suchwas the pace of change in Europe at the time that the meet-ing itself witnessed a historic diplomatic event. As the finalcommuniqué was being agreed, the Soviet ambassadorasked that all references to the Soviet Union be struck fromthe text. The Soviet Union had dissolved during the meet-ing with the result that, in future, he could only representthe Russian Federation. In March 1992, a further ten newlyindependent states from the former Soviet Union joined theNACC. Albania and Georgia became members in June ofthat year.

In the immediate post-Cold War period, NACC consulta-tions focused on residual Cold War security concerns, suchas the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic States.Meanwhile, political cooperation centred on security anddefence-related issues, including defence planning, con-ceptual approaches to arms control, civil-military relations,air-traff ic management and the conversion of defenceindustries, as well as NATO’s so-called “Third Dimension”,

that is the Alliance’s scientific and environmental pro-grammes.

The NACC broke new ground in many ways. However, itfocused on multilateral, political dialogue and lacked thepossibility of each Partner developing individual coopera-tive relations with NATO. The Partnership for Peace,launched in January 1994, was designed to meet this need,offering tailored programmes of cooperation with NATOand a strengthened political relationship. This included theright of any Partner to consult with the Alliance, if it per-ceived a threat to its political independence, security or ter-ritorial integrity. The focus of the Partnership was on thedevelopment of forces that would be interoperable withthose of the Alliance – primarily military forces – andissues such as civil-emergency planning. The Partnershipfor Peace allowed Partners to develop their own bilateralrelationship with NATO at their own pace.

As the political relationship between Allies and Partnersdeepened, the Partnership for Peace also provided themechanisms by which Partners could take part in NATO-led operations if they wished to do so. In practice, this hasmeant participation in NATO actions in the Balkans,where, even before deployment of the first peacekeepingmission, Partners have played a critical role.

During the Bosnian War, several Partner countries helpedthe Alliance enforce an arms embargo against the whole ofthe former Yugoslavia, economic sanctions against Serbiaand Montenegro and a flight ban over Bosnia. Albania, forexample, allowed NATO ships to use its territorial waters toenforce the arms embargo and economic sanctions, andHungary, then a Partner, allowed NATO Airborne EarlyWarning Aircraft to use Hungarian airspace to monitor theBosnian no-fly zone. Moreover, troops from 14 Partnercountries served alongside their Alliance counterparts inthe Implementation Force (IFOR), the f irst NATO-ledpeacekeeping operation, bringing in extra force capabilitiesand added legitimacy for the mission.

As Partners placed their soldiers in the field and theirforces operated under NATO command in a high-risk envi-ronment, they naturally sought greater opportunities to takepart in the decision-making process, which determined theobjectives and operating procedures of the mission. In thebuild-up to IFOR, this had largely been carried out on anad hoc basis, as the mission was a first for the Alliance.With Partners willing to show such commitment to helpingsolve security problems beyond their own borders, a newapproach to partnership was needed.

In the wake of a visionary speech by then US Secretaryof State Warren Christopher in September 1996, whichproposed the creation of a new security forum, NATOundertook a major examination of its partnership strategy.One of the prime aims of this process was to ensure greaterdecision-making opportunities for Partners across the



entire scope of the Partnership. The other was to seize theopportunity to focus the Partnership ever more closely onoperational issues. The outcome was the creation of theEAPC and an Enhanced and More OperationalPartnership.

On the political-consultation front, it now made sense tomove beyond the NACC and to build a security forum tomatch the increasing sophistication of the relationshipsbeing established through the Partnership for Peace. Ratherthan define its membership by who used to be NATO’sadversaries, a new cooperative body needed to encompassall Euro-Atlantic countries wishing to build a relationshipwith NATO. This new body could include traditionally neu-tral countries, which had proved to be valuable members ofthe Partnership for Peace, such as Austria, Finland andSweden, who were not full members of the NACC.

In moving beyond the NACC, the EAPC represented acommitment on the part of NATO to involve Partners evermore closely in Alliance decision-making processes. Itwould also provide a framework for involving Partnersmore closely in consultations for the planning, executionand political oversight of what are now known as NATO-led PfP Operations. As the multilateral body pulling thethreads of the Partnership together, the EAPC retained theNACC’s focus on practical political and security-relatedconsultations. But it expanded the scope of these consulta-tions to include crisis management, regional issues, arms-control issues, the proliferation of weapons of massdestruction and international terrorism, as well as defenceissues, such as defence planning and budgets, includingdefence policy and strategy. Civil-emergency and disasterpreparedness, armaments cooperation and defence-relatedenvironmental operations made up an impressive list.

In addition to traditional consultations, the EAPC hascarved out a role for itself in helping address major issuesof concern to both NATO members and Partners. It hasachieved this by making the most of the flexibility provid-ed by a minimum of institutional rules to adopt innovativeapproaches to security issues. Use has, for example, beenmade of open-ended working groups, enabling those coun-tries most concerned to take initiatives and prepare workfor the full forum. Consultations on the Caucasus andsoutheastern Europe have, for example, benefited from thisapproach. The EAPC has also encouraged its members tolook at issues from new angles, rather than seeking toresolve long-standing sticking points, an approach that hasproved fruitful where other organisations have the recog-nised lead responsibility.

As for the Enhanced and More Operational Partnership,its new direction built upon experience gained during theearly years of the Partnership for Peace, and on lessonslearned in the NATO-led peacekeeping operations inBosnia. Among steps taken to reinforce and improve thePartnership to make it more operational, three initiatives



stand out. These are the Planning and Review Process(PARP); the Operational Capabilities Concept (OCC); andthe Political-Military Framework for NATO-led PfPOperations.

The PARP lays out interoperability and capabilityrequirements for participants to attain and includes anextensive review process to measure progress. By provid-ing the standards to aim for, it helps Partners develop thecapabilities that will form the backbone of the more opera-tional aspects of Partnership. Over the years, the require-ments have become more complex, demanding and linkedto the capability improvements that Allies have set them-selves in the Defence Capabilities Initiative. Indeed,increasingly, the PARP has come to resemble the Alliance’sown defence-planning process, with ministerial guidancefor defence-planning objectives; Partnership Goals similarto NATO Force Goals; and the PARP Assessment mirroringNATO’s Annual Defence Review.

When considering an actual operation and the use ofthese Partner forces, NATO commanders need to knowwhat forces are available and how capable they are. TheOCC was developed to address these critical issues andaims to provide NATO commanders with reliable informa-tion about potential Partner contributions to allow for therapid deployment of a tailored force. This complements theassessment made under the PARP and should help improvethe military effectiveness of those forces assessed. ForNATO commanders, more militarily effective Partner con-tributions improve the Alliance’s capability to sustain long-term operations.

Putting into place mechanisms to help increase Partnercontributions is, of course, only part of the story. In the firstinstance, Partners have to decide whether they want theirforces to be involved in a particular operation. This is thecritical interface between the practical and the political –brought together by the EAPC.

Through the EAPC, all Partners are involved in consul-tations on developing crises, which might require thedeployment of troops. In order to encourage Partners tocommit forces to complicated and potentially dangerousoperations, NATO has developed a mechanism to ensurethat consultations are no longer conducted on an ad hocbasis, but are institutionalised according to procedures thatrecognise the importance of Partner contributions. This ini-tiative, the third major element of the Enhanced and MoreOperational Partnership, is known as the Political-MilitaryFramework for NATO-led PfP Operations.

When an escalating crisis is under discussion, all EAPCmembers are involved. If NATO believes that troops mayneed to be deployed, the North Atlantic Council, NATO’shighest decision-making body, can recognise Partners whodeclare an intention to contribute to the force. ThesePartners are then able to exchange views with Allies and

associate themselves with the first stage of planning for anoperation. They will also be consulted on the plan for theoperation and be involved in the force-generation process,when the commander draws up the composition of theforce. It is at this stage that the OCC should save time andeffort through the increased predictability about the capa-bility of Partner forces that are available.

Once Partner contributions are accepted, discussions onthe operation can take place between NATO and those con-tributing Partners. Meanwhile, the full EAPC is stillinvolved in general discussions on the particular operationand the political circumstances surrounding it. Whiletroop-contributing Partners are consulted to the maximumdegree possible, final decisions still need to be taken by theAlliance, upon whose assets such operations depend. Thisconsultation process continues for the duration of an oper-

ation, ensuring that Partner voices are heard when impor-tant decisions are taken.

The contribution of Partners to the peacekeeping opera-tions cannot be overestimated. Indeed, it could be arguedthat NATO’s involvement in bringing peace to Kosovowould not have been possible without Partner participation.Not only have Partners provided valuable political support,but also mission-essential assets for NATO’s use, includingthe use of airspace during the air campaign and vital logis-tics bases to sustain lines of communication for KFOR. Asthe relationship between Allies and Partners grows, it isincreasingly possible to speak of a shared community ofvalues underlying these practical undertakings. In the tenyears since the inception of the NACC, Partnership hasevolved to become a fundamental feature of Euro-Atlanticsecurity. ■



Mediterranean DialogueNATO launched its Mediterranean Dialogue in 1994

in recognition of the fact that European security andstability is closely linked to that in the Mediterranean,writes Alberto Bin.

This programme, which includes Algeria, Egypt,Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia, aimsto contribute to regional security and stability, toimprove mutual understanding, and to correct misper-ceptions about NATO among Mediterranean countries.

The Dialogue is based primarily on bilateral relationsbetween each participating country and the Alliance.However, it also allows for multilateral meetings on acase-by-case basis. It offers all Dialogue countries thesame basis for discussion and joint activities and com-plements other related but distinct international initia-tives, such as those undertaken by the European Unionand the Organisation for Security and Cooperation inEurope.

The Dialogue provides for political dialogue andpractical cooperation with participating countries. Thepolitical dialogue consists of regular bilateral politicaldiscussions, as well as multilateral conferences atambassadorial level. These provide an opportunity toexchange views on a range of issues relevant to security

Alberto Bin works on the Mediterranean Dialogue inNATO’s Political Affairs Division.

in the Mediterranean, as well as on the future develop-ment of the Dialogue.

Practical cooperation is organised through an annualWork Programme and takes various forms, includinginvitations to officials from Dialogue countries to par-ticipate in courses at NATO schools. Other activitiesinclude seminars designed specifically for Dialoguecountries, particularly in the field of civil-emergencyplanning, as well as visits of opinion leaders, academ-ics, journalists, and parliamentarians from Dialoguecountries to NATO.

The Alliance awards institutional fellowships toscholars from the region. In addition, the Dialogue pro-motes scientif ic cooperation through the NATOScience Programme. In 2000, for instance, 108Dialogue-country scientists participated in NATO-sponsored scientific activities.

The Work Programme also has a military dimensionthat includes invitations to Dialogue countries toobserve exercises, attend seminars and workshops, andvisit NATO military bodies. In 2000, 104 military offi-cers from the seven Dialogue countries participated insuch activities. In addition, NATO’s Standing NavalForces in the Mediterranean visit ports in Dialoguecountries. Otherwise, three Dialogue countries – Egypt,Jordan and Morocco – have contributed peacekeepersto NATO-led operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina.And Jordan and Morocco currently have soldiers in theKosovo Force.


“an institutional relationship of consultation and coopera-tion on political and security issues” – those states that hademerged from the wreckage of the Warsaw Pact and theSoviet Union. Later in the decade, however, the NACCseemed a bit of an anachronism: defined more by what itsnon-Allied members had been than about aspirations forthe future. And the NACC did not formally include most ofthe states that emerged from the break-up of Yugoslavia orEurope’s neutral and non-aligned countries.

It made sense to recast the NACC to make a fresh startand enable countries that were neither “ex-communist” nor“ex-Warsaw Pact” to become full members. The initiativecame in a speech by then US Secretary of State WarrenChristopher at Stuttgart, Germany, on 6 September 1996.This date marked the 50th anniversary of an historicaddress by one of his predecessors, James Byrnes, whichwas called the “speech of hope” because of its vision forpost-war Europe and US engagement. SecretaryChristopher chose to speak of a New Atlantic Communityand wanted a headline-grabbing idea, which the State

Robert E. Hunter is a senior adviser at the RANDCorporation and was US ambassador to NATO between1993 and 1998.

W hen created in May 1997, the Euro-AtlanticPartnership Council (EAPC) was NATO’s poorstepchild. It lacked, then and now, the decision-

making power of the North Atlantic Council, which is lim-ited to the 19 NATO Allies. Initially, it had no role in man-aging the practical work of the Partnership for Peace, withwhich it shares almost the same membership. Even itssemi-annual ministerial meetings and occasional summitshave tended to be long on speeches and short on substance.But this Cinderella of an institution has the potential tocontribute to Euro-Atlantic security in a way that no othercan match.

The EAPC was born almost by accident. It was precededby the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), creat-ed in 1991 to bring within the broader NATO family – in

Getting Cinderella to the ballRobert E. Hunter examines the potential of the Euro-Atlantic PartnershipCouncil and proposes that it play a greater role in Euro-Atlantic security.

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ATO

Ministerial meeting: the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council has the potential to contribute to Euro-Atlantic security in a way that no other institution can match

Department hastily provided: namely, to convert the NACCinto something new and to call it the Atlantic PartnershipCouncil. Details were left for later.

As the new institution began to take shape, the prefix“Euro-” was added to the proposed name. Both existingNACC members and other European countries thatbelonged to the Partnership for Peace were invited to join.And views were canvassed within the Alliance about whatthe new EAPC should be and do. The results were agreed atthe EAPC’s formal founding – the NACC’s final meeting –at Sintra, Portugal, on 30 May 1997. The EAPC wouldfocus on issues like crisis management, arms control, inter-national terrorism, defence planning, civil-emergency anddisaster preparedness, armaments cooperation and peace-support operations. And NATO pledged that the EAPCwould “provide the framework to afford Partner countries,to the maximum extent possible, increased decision-mak-ing opportunities relating to activities in which they partic-ipate”. Unclear, then and now, is the meaning of “to themaximum extent possible”.

These were ambitious goals and the newly createdEAPC agreed to institutionalise a wide range of meetingsto see them implemented. These included monthly meet-ings of ambassadors; twice-yearly meetings of foreign anddefence ministers; occasional meetings of heads of stateand government; as well as so-called “16 (now 19)-plus-one” meetings of the Allies and individual Partners. Sincethen, the EAPC has sought to make its mark in a variety ofareas, ranging from identifying ways in which it might con-tribute to the challenge of small arms and light weapons toorganising exercises in civil-emergency planning with theEuro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre.

The EAPC could, of course, do much more. However, itstill lacks decision-making authority. This power is jealous-ly guarded by the North Atlantic Council, in large measurebecause the Allies have special obligations and responsibil-ities under the Washington Treaty, NATO’s founding char-ter, and bear the brunt of organising and funding EAPCactivities. Yet, in 1999, the Allies began to engage EAPCmembers in helping to shape the way in which Partnercountries would take part in so-called “non-Article 5 oper-ations”, that is operations not related to collective defence.The aim was to engage Partner countries, within limits, inpolitical consultations and decision-making, in operationalplanning and in command arrangements for future NATO-led operations in which they participate.

Because of the growing importance of the Partnershipfor Peace, this was a natural step. Further developmentsincluded issues affecting Partner countries under NATO’sDefence Capabilities Initiative and the creation of anExpanded and Adapted Planning and Review Process – inpart to improve the interoperability of forces and capabili-ties – and consultations on crises and other political andsecurity-related issues. The EAPC’s Action Plan for 2000-

2002 also covers consultations and cooperation on regionalmatters, including Southeastern Europe and the Caucasus,as well as issues relating to the Stability Pact, the EU-ledinitiative to develop a comprehensive, international frame-work to help build long-term stability in southeasternEurope.

Despite these efforts, the EAPC has yet to reach itspotential. There are two reasons for helping it do so. First,however many countries are invited to join the Alliance atnext year’s Prague Summit, some aspirants will be left out.It is critical that the EAPC give these countries a firm sensethat they belong within the broader NATO family. Second,some EAPC countries, notably in the Caucasus and CentralAsia, are unlikely ever to join NATO. Nevertheless, theEAPC could help them, as well, gain in security and confi-dence.

Giving the EAPC true decision-making powers, beyondthe capacity to help shape decisions of the North AtlanticCouncil, is not currently on the Alliance agenda. However,as Partners demonstrate their capacity to take on additionalresponsibilities, this should be reviewed. Certainly, furtherintegration of the activities of Partners with Allies shouldbe the next immediate goal. Several possibilities stand out:

Crisis management: At present, most crisis consulta-tions at NATO centre on the North Atlantic Council. Evenhere the Alliance is handicapped because it lacks the com-petence of a sovereign government. NATO’s role in helpingto manage crises – like that in the former Yugoslav Republicof Macedonia* – is largely limited to specific tasks thatmember states assign to the Secretary General. In Bosniaand Herzegovina (Bosnia) and Kosovo, for instance, NATOfound itself called upon to act militarily, without havingbeen directly engaged in the preceding diplomacy. TheEAPC cannot be expected to develop a competence thateven the North Atlantic Council does not have, but it isstriking that EAPC members include countries with a gooddeal of experience in, as well as proximity to, areas mostchallenging to NATO, especially in the Balkans. The EAPCshould therefore be developed into a primary forum fordevising viable crisis outcomes, not just a place to brief onthe results of North Atlantic Council deliberations.

The Balkans: The EAPC is already active in Southeast-ern Europe, and in particular much of the formerYugoslavia, which is a special challenge for the interna-tional community. At the Alliance’s 1999 WashingtonSummit, NATO launched its South East Europe Initiative,one pillar of which is an Ad hoc Working Group, under theauspices of the EAPC, which promotes regional coopera-tion. At an EAPC ambassadorial meeting in July 2000,Bulgaria announced the establishment of the South EastEurope Security Cooperation Steering Group (SEE-GROUP), a forum in which all countries of the region areable to meet to exchange information and views on projectsand initiatives designed to stimulate and support practical



cooperation between members. Since the change of gov-ernment in Zagreb in early 2000, Croatia began to buildbridges with the Alliance. As a first step, the country joinedboth the EAPC and the Partnership for Peace in May of thatyear and is now an active participant in SEEGROUP. As thenew, democratic government in Belgrade opens up toNATO, the EAPC should play a leading role in assisting theFederal Republic of Yugoslavia’s transition and reintegra-tion into the international community.

“Out-of-Area” dispute and conflict management:Many other areas of concern to NATO members eitherinclude or border EAPC member states. So far, the EAPChas had little experience in trying to mediate, ameliorate orresolve tensions and conflict between its members in theCaucasus and Central Asia. But the Alliance – and specifi-cally the EAPC – should not shy away from this possibili-ty, nor accept that, of necessity, ad hoc arrangements orsome other body (like the Organisation for Security andCooperation in Europe) should take precedence.Leadership will be important. So, too,will be the development of a senseamong its members that the EAPC canadd value as a basic European securityinstitution, born of NATO, to whichregional disputes and crises can properlyand productively be brought. This willonly emerge through experience, afterthe EAPC selects one or more such situ-ations and sets a positive precedent forits potential role.

Engaging Russia: In some cases, thedevelopment of such a dispute and con-flict-management role for the EAPC,among its own members, will be more possible and pro-ductive – for example, as a support to or even replacementfor the Minsk Group on Nagorno-Karabakh, a region con-tested between Armenia and Azerbaijan – if Russia can beconvinced to play a greater role. In the run-up to thePrague Summit, with the prospect of invitations to joinNATO being extended to Central European states, theAlliance will, in any case, have to reach out to Moscow todemonstrate that NATO is neither challenging Russia,strategically or politically, nor seeking to isolate it. Russiahas so far chosen to play a relatively passive role in theEAPC and the Partnership for Peace, and it has been reluc-tant to test the limits of the Permanent Joint Council, theforum for NATO-Russia consultation and cooperation.NATO already has an interest in convincing Russia that ithas a valid place within a broader concept of Europeansecurity and that its basic interests in Europe are compati-ble with NATO’s. Indeed, if Russian President VladimirPutin’s musings about Russia’s one-day joining NATO canbe nurtured, not so much for the specific idea but for widerpossibilities, then the EAPC could become a useful vehi-cle for Moscow to work with NATO. This could supple-ment the Permanent Joint Council, while providing



Moscow with more legitimacy than it now has for engag-ing other EAPC countries, without generating fears thatMoscow would gain undue influence over their strategicand political choices. The EAPC could therefore become amechanism for helping to reconcile Russia to NATO’sexpansion to include as members countries close to itsborders.

EAPC, ESDP and EU-NATO Relations: NATO hasbeen building a relationship with the European Union asthat institution develops a European Security and DefencePolicy (ESDP). This process is far from complete and, inmy view, far from harmonious. One way of trying to recon-cile differences is via the alignment of their respective bod-ies, especially through joint meetings of the North AtlanticCouncil and the European Union’s new Political andSecurity Committee (PSC) at ambassadorial and ministeri-al levels. Given that both the European Union and NATOare taking in new members from Central Europe and areotherwise deeply involved there, that both are engaged in

the Balkans, that both have developedspecial relationships with Russia andUkraine, and that both have interests inthe Caucasus and Central Asia, thesejoint meetings should be extended toinclude parallel EAPC-PSC consulta-tions. This could also stimulate theEuropean Union’s companion CommonForeign and Security Policy to be moreoutward-looking. In any event, theEuropean Union and NATO do share abroad agenda, even if they approachmost non-defence issues from differentperspectives. In the effort to eliminatethe artif icial barriers that have for so

long existed between these two institutions, the EAPCcould prove a useful instrument.

Finally, it is important to remember that, as NATO con-tinues to take in new members, both the EAPC and thePartnership for Peace will naturally change in character,and in some regards in purpose. With further NATOenlargement, the relative balance between Partners andAllies in the EAPC will progressively shift towards the lat-ter. The non-Allied membership of the EAPC will increas-ingly be dominated by countries east of Turkey. This is astrong argument for the EAPC to emphasise dispute andconflict resolution, as well as coordination with theEuropean Union and other institutions, to help countries ofthe Caucasus and Central Asia develop their politics andeconomies, as well as reform their militaries.

Looking to the future, the vision of a “Europe whole andfree” can only be realised if “security” is understood in thebroadest sense. The EAPC has much to offer towards thatgoal and could develop into an effective political and secu-rity instrument with a remit that goes far beyond its origi-nal purposes. ■

As NATO continues totake in new members,both the EAPC andthe Partnership forPeace will naturallychange in character andpurpose


ety of documents and policies, each of which applies to aspecific area or issue – but which, when taken together,form an intellectually coherent whole. The Alliance worksto promote regional security cooperation primarily in theBalkans, the Caucasus and the Baltics, as part of NATO’soverall efforts to promote peace and security across theEuro-Atlantic area. NATO takes an individual, targetedapproach to each region, because each faces its own securi-ty challenges in a unique geopolitical context, and becauseeach is of unique security interest to the Alliance.

The Balkans

Southeastern Europe is of enormous geopolitical impor-tance to NATO. Kosovo, for example, sits in a vital strate-gic area for the Alliance: just above two NATO members,below new NATO members in Central Europe, and organi-cally linked to Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia).Instability, conflict and widespread human rights abuses inthis region have posed direct challenges to NATO’s inter-ests over the past decade and the Alliance has been obligedto work to ensure that crises do not destabilise neighbour-ing countries.The highest-profile tools through whichNATO has promoted peace and security in the Balkans arethe NATO-led peacekeeping operations in Bosnia andKosovo. But the Alliance has also engaged in a number ofother military and political efforts to promote stabilityacross southeastern Europe, from preventive diplomacy tothe active promotion of regional cooperation.

Perhaps the most prominent example of such efforts isNATO’s South East Europe Initiative. Launched at theAlliance’s 1999 Washington Summit to promote regionalcooperation and long-term security and stability in theregion, it built on already extensive cooperative relation-

James Appathurai is senior planning officer in the policyplanning section of NATO’s Political Affairs Division.

In the field of Euro-Atlantic security cooperation, cer-tain big-ticket arrangements get almost all the press:NATO and its Partnership for Peace, the European

Union’s developing defence dimension, and theOrganisation for Security and Cooperation (OSCE). Butalongside these large and well-established structures,smaller fledgling regional arrangements are making impor-tant contributions to building security in sensitive areasthroughout the Euro-Atlantic area. These lower-levelefforts at cooperation are an important pillar in the overallsecurity architecture and the Alliance is eager to assist theirdevelopment.

The logic of regional security cooperation is clear. Bypooling resources in the right way, like-minded countriescan enhance their own security more effectively.Economically, cooperation allows for economies of scaleand the acquisition of equipment that would otherwise beunaffordable for individual, especially smaller countries.Militarily, cooperation multiplies the potential of any indi-vidual country’s armed forces. Politically, cooperation inthe security field is the ultimate confidence and security-building measure because it requires transparency, coordi-nation and mutual trust.

NATO stands as vivid testimony to the success of thisapproach. What began, in 1949, as a group of nations divided by very recent history – and, not least, by an ocean– has become the most cohesive and effective political/mil-itary Alliance ever. And the NATO experience demon-strates that regional cooperation is not a substitute for otherendeavours, but a complement to them. Any country canhave multiple security affiliations, without any individualaffiliation suffering as a result. Hence, for example, theNorth American Aerospace Defence cooperation betweenCanada and the United States, or the European Union’ssecurity and defence identity.

It is precisely because the potential of regional and sub-regional cooperation is so clear that the Alliance has lentincreasing support to these efforts, even among countriesthat do not aspire to NATO membership. No single,approved document sets out the rationale behind regionalcooperation and the modalities by which the Alliance willsupport it. Instead, that approach is set out through a vari-

Promoting regional security James Appathurai examines how NATO promotes regional security cooperation

in the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Baltics.

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ships with Partners through the Euro-Atlantic PartnershipCouncil (EAPC) and the Partnership for Peace. It alsoextended to include countries that did not belong to theseinstitutions and programmes, Bosnia and (at the time)Croatia, and foresaw the extension to the Federal Republicof Yugoslavia. An Ad hoc Working Group on RegionalCooperation, set up under EAPC auspices, promotesregional cooperation to stimulate and support practicalcooperation among countries of Southeastern Europe. Thecountries of the region, for example, established the SouthEast Europe Security Cooperation Steering Group (SEE-GROUP) in September 2000, the chair of which rotatesamong members, to support the various cooperativeprocesses now at work. Activities include demining, effortsto control small arms and light weapons, crisis-manage-ment simulation and air-traffic management.

Together with other international organisations, theAlliance is working to build regional stability in the frame-work of the EU-sponsored Stability Pact for South EasternEurope. In this way, NATO has helped set up programmesto assist discharged officers make the transition from mili-tary to civilian life (see article on page 23) and others toclose military bases and convert them to civilian uses.Other activities require regional leadership. A good exam-ple is the South East Europe Common Assessment Paperon Regional Security Challenges and Opportunities(SEECAP). This was a NATO idea, taken forward by coun-tries of the region, including the Federal Republic ofYugoslavia. The SEECAP sets out common perceptions ofsecurity challenges among signatory nations and should bea vital f irst step in building peaceful relations in theBalkans. It also sets out opportunities for participatingcountries to cooperate in addressing these challenges.

The CaucasusThe scenario is different in the Caucasus, where NATO

is also promoting regional cooperation. Although there areequally intractable problems in this region, the onlyAlliance member directly to feel the effects is Turkey.Moreover, there is certainly a perception that NATO as anorganisation has limited influence in the region and thatNATO members can more usefully contribute to peace andsecurity there through bilateral measures, or by workingthrough other organisations such as the OSCE or theUnited Nations.

For all these reasons, NATO takes a more low-keyapproach in the Caucasus. Even at this lower level, however, the Alliance still actively supports security coop-eration in the region as a way to promote transparency andconfidence-building. The central vehicle for these NATOefforts is the EAPC Ad hoc Working Group on Prospectsfor Regional Cooperation in the Caucasus. Priority areasidentified by the Working Group for practical regionalcooperation are defence-economics issues, civil-emer-gency planning, science and environmental cooperation,and information activities.



Under the auspices of the EAPC, a regional cooperationseminar on energy security in the Caucasus took place inAzerbaijan in 2000, which covered the environmental, eco-nomic and civil-emergency aspects of energy security.Seminars have also been held elsewhere in the regionon defence economics, civil-emergency planning, civil-military cooperation, small arms and light weapons, andscientific cooperation. The possibility of further confer-ences is now being discussed on international terrorismand non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, aswell as on crisis management and mine action. These areall valuable endeavours because the focus is on issues ofimmediate security interest to the countries of the region.

It must be stressed that when it comes to promotingcooperation in the Caucasus, other regional groupings,such as the OSCE and the GUUAM, an organisation

including Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan andMoldova, take the lead. But NATO continues to play a role,encouraging the development of common solutions amongcountries facing common challenges.

The BalticsThe third major region in which NATO takes an active

interest in promoting cooperation is the area of the BalticSea. Unlike the Balkans, where the challenges are severeand NATO’s interest immediate, or the Caucasus, where thechallenges are equally intractable but affect the entireAlliance less directly, the Baltics are a region of directgeopolitical importance to the Alliance, but one in whichregional cooperation is already progressing nicely and doesnot require the same level of support from NATO.

This indigenous success should come as no surprise, asthis is an area in which regional cooperation has a long history. Certainly, once Estonia, Latvia and Lithuaniabecame states in the beginning of the 20th century, theynaturally looked to closer forms of cooperation, for clear

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geographic, political, economic and military reasons.Today, that cooperation is stronger still – and the reasonsare obvious. From a geographical standpoint, these threecountries still form a natural region. They are all smallstates, with small populations and small economies.Furthermore, their socio-economic evolution since the1920s has been similar and, at present, they have no realdisagreements among themselves.

Perhaps as a result, it is safe to say that nowhere inEurope has subregional cooperation been as profound inthe post-Cold War era as in the Baltic Sea area. TheCouncil of Baltic Sea States (CBSS), which was initiated in1992 by the then Danish and German foreign ministers, isan excellent example of a successful regional grouping,bringing together 12 countries to deepen cooperation on avariety of issues. While traditional security was not initially

on the agenda, the CBSS now promotes subregional coop-eration against organised crime and search and rescue atsea, even including the use of military units.

The CBSS has served as an example for similar endeav-ours in other parts of Europe, in particular the Balkans.Furthermore, the cooperative activities at the state level areunderpinned by a well-developed network of specialisedorganisations, as well as a web of cooperation betweenprovinces, cities and municipalities across the Baltics. Thisis especially the case in the security sector, where all threestates share a desire to consolidate their independence andrebuff any instability from the East. Regular trilateral coop-eration on protection of airspace, for example, has led tothe recent establishment of the regional airspace surveil-lance system (BALTNET) for all three countries.

The three countries also realise that with their limiteddefence resources, it makes sense to work on their develop-ment together. The Baltic Security Assistance Group is aneffective body for international coordination of security assis-

tance to the defence forces of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.The Baltic Defence College, a military academy primarilyfor officers from the Baltics that operates in English, is alsoa good example of cooperation in defence education.

The three Baltic countries also want to demonstrate thatthey are good European partners, willing to contribute tosecurity. The joint peacekeeping battalion, BALTBAT, andthe Baltic squadron (BALTRON) are obvious examples ofconcrete cooperation in action. The BALTBAT has alreadybeen active in the NATO-led peacekeeping operations inthe Balkans.

NATO’s support for Baltic participation in its peace-keeping operations is one way in which the Alliance and itsmembers are encouraging cooperation among the threeBaltic countries. These operations have demonstrated that,by working together, the Baltics can punch above theirweight and have an influence on Euro-Atlantic events dis-proportionate to their individual size.

NATO is also facilitating such cooperation through theMembership Action Plan and the Partnership for Peace.Both projects aim to improve the military capabilities ofparticipating countries and both focus, in particular, onimproving interoperability for combined operations. Theseare essential standards for increased regional cooperation,which the three Baltic countries are working to meet.

Alliance members are also supporting Baltic regionalcooperation on a national basis. Denmark, for example, hasplayed a leading role, providing assistance to the BalticDefence College and accommodating Baltic peacekeepersin Danish formations in the Balkans. The United States hasalso provided crucial political support. This has manifesteditself, in particular, through the 1998 US Baltic Charter, anagreement that, according to then US President BillClinton, is designed to encourage close cooperation amongthe Baltic states and their neighbours and to demonstrate“America’s commitment to help Estonia, Latvia andLithuania to deepen their integration, and prepare for mem-bership in the European Union and NATO.”

President Clinton’s linking of regional cooperation andmembership in Euro-Atlantic institutions is importantbecause it is in the Baltic region, in particular, that con-cerns are sometimes raised about how successful regionalcooperation might undermine aspirations to join NATO.Far from being a constraint against Alliance membership,successful regional cooperation is a powerful selling pointfor aspiring members. NATO is an organisation withinwhich member states work together, pool resources anddevelop policy through consensus. Successful regionalcooperation not only prepares aspirants for membership, italso demonstrates to existing members that these countriesare willing and able to accept the conditions and workingmethods of the Alliance – while of course building securi-ty for all participants. ■



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increased its involvement in the Partnership for Peace, bothin quantitative and qualitative terms, and now participates inmore than 100 activities every year.

This summer, Georgia achieved a milestone when it host-ed the first, full-scale Partnership for Peace exercise in theSouthern Caucasus, Cooperative Partner 2001. The exercise,which took place in and around the Black Sea port of Potiand included some 4,000 servicemen from nine NATO andsix Partner countries, aimed to develop combined naval andamphibious interoperability between Alliance and Partnerparticipants in peace-support operations and the provision ofhumanitarian assistance. This was the largest-scale activityin which Georgia has been involved with NATO. It hashelped promote military-to-military cooperation betweenthe Georgian armed forces and those of Alliance members.And it reflects an ever-deepening relationship betweenGeorgia and NATO.

Georgia has also consistently supported NATO’s efforts toend the violence and build stability in the Balkans. Indeed,we have sent an infantry platoon to the NATO-led KosovoForce (KFOR) to demonstrate our commitment to the peaceprocess in that part of Europe. Moreover, we firmly believethat, since no country can insulate itself from instabilityelsewhere, threats to security in one part of the Euro-Atlantic area are threats to the entire Euro-Atlantic area. Inorder to build genuine security in Europe, therefore, everycountry should contribute, according to its own means, toeradicating all hotbeds of instability. Georgia has thereforeconsistently been eager to participate in activities designedto improve security throughout the Euro-Atlantic area andaspires eventually to integration in NATO.

Both Georgia and the wider Caucasus have great poten-tial. Georgia is, for example, at the centre of efforts to buildthe Eurasian Transport Corridor – a key east-west tradeartery between Asia and Europe. It is also a natural transporthub for this revitalised “Silk Road” which has three maincomponents: the Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia,a Trans-Caucasian Strategic Energy Corridor (to transportCaspian energy resources to Western markets) and a Trans-Caucasian Telecommunications Network. However, forthese projects – which are being assisted by the EuropeanUnion and other interested countries – to see fruition, it willbe necessary to stabilise the entire region and create tangibleguarantees for peace and sustainable development.

Irakli Menagarishvili is foreign minister of Georgia.

Georgia’s overriding foreign policy aim is to integrateitself into Euro-Atlantic political, economic andsecurity structures to join the European community

of nations and fulfill an historical aspiration of the Georgianpeople. Ever since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, mycountry has attempted to build a modern, democratic socie-ty and forge closer and deeper relations with countries andinstitutions throughout the Euro-Atlantic area. At the sametime, Georgia and the wider Caucasus have experiencedmuch instability and turbulence. Developing a long-termand mutually beneficial relationship with the Alliance hastherefore been a national priority for the past decade, onewhich is evolving to the benefit of both Georgia and NATO.

As NATO opened its arms to former members of theWarsaw Pact and successor states of the Soviet Union in theearly 1990s, Georgia was quick to join all new security insti-tutions and programmes. It became a member of the NorthAtlantic Cooperation Council in 1992; signed thePartnership for Peace Framework Document in 1994; andbecame a founding member of the Euro-Atlantic PartnershipCouncil (EAPC) in 1997. Georgia has progressively

Partnership in practice:Georgia’s experience

Irakli Menagarishvili describes Georgia’s relationship with the Alliance and howit is evolving to the benefit of both Georgia and NATO.

Georgia’s position towards the wider Caucasus is basedon principles presented by President Eduard Shevardnadzein his Initiative on a Peaceful Caucasus of 1996 and joint-ly signed by the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan.This initiative, which excludes the use of force in resolv-ing disputes, proposes a political formula that aims attransforming the existing confrontation and crises in theregion into cooperation and general welfare.Implementation of these principles will only be possiblewith the concerted efforts of countries of the region,neighbours and other leading actors on the world stageinterested in a peaceful and stable Caucasus. In this con-text, other initiatives – including the proposed StabilityPact for the Caucasus – deserve serious consideration.

In addition to cultivating closer relations with NATO,Georgia has sought to build bridges with and join otherinternational organisations. It is a member of the Councilof Europe, the Organisation for Security and Cooperationin Europe (OSCE) and the World Trade Organisation, andit signed a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement withthe European Union in 1996. Georgia is also a member ofthe Black Sea Economic Cooperation organisation, whichseeks to promote mutual understanding, an improved polit-ical climate, and economic development in the Black Seaarea. And it is part of the GUUAM – Georgia, Ukraine,Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova – a regional organi-sation aiming to build common approaches to political,economic, humanitarian and ecological problems.

The most pressing security issues within Georgia arethe internal disputes with separatists in Abkhazia andTskhinvali (formerly known as South Ossetia).Satisfactory resolution of these disputes is an essentialprecondition for the establishment of stable political,social and economic conditions, and for the return of some300,000 Georgians who were forced to flee ethnic vio-lence in the early 1990s. We aim to consolidate our inde-pendence by making it clear to our neighbours that anindependent, prosperous, stable and unified Georgia is intheir best interests. This applies especially to the RussianFederation, which currently has some 6,000 troops sta-tioned on Georgian soil. Georgia seeks the phased with-drawal of all Russian troops from Georgian territory andthe closure of their military bases. At the OSCE’s IstanbulSummit in 1999, Russia signed an agreement to this effect,including a withdrawal timetable for two of the four bases,only one of which was fully met.

Georgia views the EAPC as a particularly importantinstitution, capable of reviewing and helping solve numer-ous security problems in the Euro-Atlantic area. SincePartners are able to propose the topics of discussions andconsultations in the EAPC, Georgia has used this forum totable a series of issues of special concern. These includeissues related to regional security, conflict resolution andprevention and conventional arms control. Georgia hasalso made the most of the mechanism within the EAPC of

calling meetings between the 19 Allies and individualPartner countries, so-called 19+1 meetings, to consultwith NATO on questions of interest for both Georgia andthe Alliance. The first political consultations betweenGeorgia and NATO took place at NATO in spring 2001 atthe level of assistant secretary general for political affairsand deputy foreign minister. The usefulness of these meet-ings demonstrates the potential of the relationship betweenthe Alliance and a Partner, given a genuine will to fostercooperation and understanding.

In recent years, Georgia has given special importance toimplementation of its Individual Partnership Programmewith NATO and participation in the Planning and ReviewProcess, which we joined in 1999. To date, Georgia hasaccepted and is working towards fulfilling 29 PartnershipGoals. We have also has hosted a significant number ofEAPC activities. This includes a regional course on civil-emergency planning and civil-military cooperation in May1997; the first ever EAPC seminar on practical regionalsecurity cooperation in October 1998; the meeting of LandArmaments Group 9 of NATO and Partner countries inOctober 1998; another EAPC workshop on EconomicAspects of Defence Budgeting in Transition Economies inJune 2000; a NATO Science Programme Advisory Panelon Life Science and Technology in May 2001; and a NATOScience Committee meeting in October 2001.

Regional security cooperation in the Caucasus is an areaof EAPC activity which Georgia has consistently spon-sored and is eager to take forward so that both Georgia andthe wider region realise their potential. Since the EAPCBasic Document sets out the possibility of creating specialregional groups, Georgia proposed the formation of a spe-cialised working group on the Caucasus. The initiative wassupported by both Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well asother members of the EAPC and led to the creation of theEAPC Ad Hoc Working Group on Prospects for RegionalCooperation in the Caucasus. This Working Group metformally in Autumn 1999 to explore possibilities of practi-cal cooperation in the region, building on work alreadyundertaken in informal discussions in 1997. It recom-mended a number of activities falling under the followingidentified priority areas: defence economics, civil-emer-gency planning, security-related science and environmen-tal cooperation, information and public relations. TheWorking Group met again in 2000 to take stock of workundertaken in these areas and to consider other possibili-ties for further cooperation.

In the course of the past ten years, both Georgia andNATO have travelled a long way. Through involvement inthe EAPC and by expanding bilateral relations with keyNATO members, Georgia has been able to move political-ly closer to the Alliance and join the process of Euro-Atlantic integration. Clearly, Georgia’s relationship withNATO has already borne much fruit. Yet there is potentialfor an even more fruitful partnership. ■




This approach appears particularlyappropriate in a security environmentas conducive to shaping as today’spost-Cold War Europe. In this fluidsetting, institutions such as NATOare playing a major role in influenc-ing the direction of Euro-Atlanticsecurity. Put differently, institutionshave become agenda-setters. Notonly do they enable collective actionin a crisis, they also foster new secu-rity relationships and thereby addressquestions of Europe’s wider stabilityand even long-term political order.

This exercise in exploring NATO’spotential to shape the Euro-Atlanticsecurity environment of the nextdecade will proceed in three steps. Itwill outline a benevolent scenario for2011; identify some major condi-tions and variables affecting that sce-nario; and make some suggestions asto what NATO must do now to helpachieve the benevolent scenario.

A benevolent scenario 2011Perhaps the most obvious

characteristic of “NATO 2011”is that it will be larger. Afterseveral waves of enlarge-ment, the Alliance will havegrown to 25 or more mem-bers. It will therefore stillhave more members thanan enlarging EuropeanUnion. Even so, the overlap inmemberships will remain closeenough to enable both organisationsto continue their institutional rap-prochement. Fears that NATO’s deci-sion-making process will be undulycompromised by the growth of

Michael Rühle is head of policy planning and speechwriting in

NATO’s Political Affairs Division.

Alliance membership will have beenput to rest. The unique political andmilitary role of the United Statesin Euro-Atlantic security willremain and will continue tohelp ensure a pre-dispositionamong Allies to seek com-mon solutions.

T h eEuropean Union’sambition to develop aEuropean Security and DefencePolicy (ESDP) will have manifesteditself in an even stronger Europeanmilitary role in the Balkans, as well

In 1984, a famed Norwegianpeace researcher came up with alist of what he considered to be

Europe’s most secure states. Hischoice of Switzerland as the numberone was hardly surprising. By con-trast, his choice of second and thirdseemed peculiar even at the time:Albania and Yugoslavia. His reason-ing was as straightforward as it wasworrying. Since NATO and theWarsaw Pact were undoubtedlygoing to war with one another, thosecountries furthest removed from the“military blocs” would have therosiest future.

It may be tempting to belittle thisunfortunate analysis as a typical“period piece” from the early 1980s.Yet, dire predictions about NATO’sfuture have hardly fared better thanpredictions about the Balkans.Although NATO’s current primacy inEuro-Atlantic security may suggestotherwise, only a decade ago theAlliance’s future seemed bleak.Indeed, in the early 1990s, evenstaunch Atlanticists harboureddoubts about the future of an organi-sation that seemed to have accom-plished its mission. Had it been pre-dicted then that, in 1999, NATOwould admit three former WarsawPact members and conduct a pro-tracted air operation in the Balkans,the likely reaction would have beendisbelief or even derision.

Speculating about the futureremains a hazardous undertaking,but one which is nonetheless useful.Even if not every prediction willcome true, the very exercise of fore-casting helps to concentrate the mindon the key issues. It forces thinkingabout a “preferred future”, the meansnecessary to achieve this outcome,and the variables that could interfere.

Imagining NATO 2011Michael Rühle gazes into his crystal ball and imagines how the Alliance and

the Euro-Atlantic security environment might look in ten years.

as in more coherent foreign-policyinitiatives regarding the Caucasus,the Middle East and Northern Africa.Mainly as a result of streamliningprocurement practices and poolingEuropean military assets, EU coun-tries will have made some progresstowards improving their defencecapabilities. However, continuingshortfalls in capabilities critical forhigh-intensity conflict will remain,

making it necessaryto maintain close

links betweenthe European

Union and NATO.

The EU-NATOrelationship will have sig-

nif icantly broadened beyondESDP to include regular consulta-tions on southeastern Europe, theMediterranean, Russia, terrorismand particularly crisis prevention.Regular back-to-back EU-NATOministerial meetings will be held,

underlining the will of Europe andNorth America to maintain coher-ence in institutions and policies.

NATO will still have troopsdeployed in the Balkans, but the scaleof the Alliance’s military presencewill have been greatly reduced, as aresult of political and economicprogress in the region. Bosnia andHerzegovina and Yugoslavia willhave long ago joined the Partnershipfor Peace and will both be formalaspirants for NATO membership.

With proliferation risks havingever-deepening significance, NATOAllies will have established a coordi-nated policy on preventing the spreadof weapons of mass destructionthrough diplomatic and economicmeans. The United States will havedeployed a rudimentary defenceagainst strategic missiles. SeveralEuropean Allies will have fielded

tactical missile defences withintheir armed forces. This new

relationship between deter-rence and defence will also

be reflected in NATO’smilitary strategy, whichwill feature counter-proliferation elementsand an increasedemphasis on activedefence and counter-terrorism.

The Euro-Atlantic Partnership

Council (EAPC) willhave developed for-

mal links to theOrganisation for Security

and Cooperation in Europeand will have become a steering

organ for pan-European disasterrelief. Exchanges on terrorism willhave intensif ied. It will also haveacquired a role as a facilitator ofregional cooperation in the Caucasusand Central Asia, where it will serveas a framework for addressing issuessuch as border control and energysecurity.

The Partnership for Peace will havedeveloped further as the hub of pan-


European military cooperation and,together with the EAPC, serve as ameans to keep Partners, particularlythe remaining non-NATO EU mem-bers, closely associated with NATO.The Partnership will cover the fullrange of military cooperation betweenNATO and Partner nations, includingdefence planning and defence reform.It will feature a stronger focus onregional cooperation and on crisisprevention, for example, through tar-geted security cooperation pro-grammes, confidence-building meas-ures, preventive deployments andconsultation mechanisms.

While repeated Russian overturesto join the Alliance will not yet haveborne fruit, the NATO-Russia rela-tionship will have signif icantlyimproved and will resemble a quasi-associate status. In the context of theBaltic states’ accession to NATO, asatisfactory solution will have beenfound to Kaliningrad, the Russianenclave between Lithuania andPoland. The dialogue will haveexpanded to cover the full range ofissues specified in the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act, such as non-proliferation, defence reform andcivil-emergency planning. The rela-tionship will also include seriousmilitary cooperation beyond theBalkans, inter alia in the frameworkof an experimental joint NATO-Russian peacekeeping brigade. Itwill also include armaments cooper-ation, for example, on tactical missiledefence.

NATO’s relations with the UnitedNations will have been consolidatedboth formally and conceptually.Formally, a permanent liaison officeat UN Headquarters will underlineNATO’s role as an institution centralto European crisis management.Conceptually, NATO’s experience inthe Balkans will form an importantpart of the United Nations’ reform ofits own approach to peacekeeping.

The rising strategic importance ofthe southern Mediterranean regionwill have elevated the MediterraneanDialogue out of its role as the

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stepchild of NATO’s outreach activi-ties. It will have evolved along simi-lar lines to the Partnership for Peace,with serious military cooperation,notably in the field of crisis manage-ment, and a strong focus on non-pro-liferation. Reflecting the growingimportance of the Asia-Pacif icregion, the bi-annual Japan-NATOconferences will have been super-seded by a broader Asia-NATODialogue, modelled after theMediterranean Dialogue.

This undoubtedly represents abenign scenario, with NATO playinga major, though far from singular,role in managing change. The majordifference between 2011 and 2001will be the fact that the ad hoc rela-tionships between major institutionsthat developed out of necessity in theBalkans will have led to strong for-mal relationships, facilitating a com-prehensive approach to crisis man-agement and, hopefully, prevention.NATO’s internal post-Cold Warreadjustment, which was largelycompleted by the late 1990s, willhave been augmented by some addi-tional mechanisms, in line with newchallenges that will have emergedafter 2000.

Essential conditionsIt would be analytically question-

able at best and outright useless atworst to sketch a benevolent scenarioof the future without discussing atleast the most important conditionsfor its realisation. Indeed, the condi-tions that need to be fulfilled in orderfor the benevolent scenario to materi-alise say as much about the wayahead as the scenario itself.

Clearly, Russia’s positive evolutionwill be a decisive condition for abenevolent scenario. Should Russia’sdemocratic experiment fail, orshould Russia’s very statehood bejeopardised by political and econom-ic fragmentation, the attainment ofthe preferred future sketched abovewould seem impossible. To be sure, aRussia in decline need not necessari-ly precipitate a new Cold War. Yet, acrisis-ridden Russia would severely

compromise the development of allEuro-Atlantic institutions.

Another condition is coherence inthe enlargement processes of theEuropean Union and NATO,Europe’s key institutional actors. Ifthe enlargement of one or both insti-tutions were to stall and differencesin memberships were to widen, thechances for developing coherent andeffective policies – the potential ofwhich has been recently demonstrat-ed in the Balkans – would againdiminish.

The sound development of aEuropean Security and DefencePolicy is another major variable. IfESDP remains within its currentAtlanticist philosophy, it couldaddress at least some of the burden-sharing demands put forward by theUnited States. By contrast, shouldESDP become an exercise in EUself-assertion or even in “counter-balancing” a unilateralist UnitedStates, it would become a liabilityrather than an asset for transatlanticrelations.

Continued US interest in Europewill also be crucial. If US interest inEuropean security remains high, pos-sible adjustments within the transat-lantic relationship, such as a strongerEU security role or a greater USfocus on Asia, could be effectedwithout tearing the transatlantic fab-ric. However, should US interest inEurope diminish – because of deteri-orating transatlantic relations orother pressing global interests for theUnited States – NATO would bebereft of the leadership it requires tofunction as a meaningful agent ofchange.

Coping with the evolution of mili-tary technology will be another con-dition for a benign scenario. Missiledefence, for example, could go along way to offer protection againstthe challenge of proliferation – andshould therefore be an organic part of“NATO 2011”. However, if mishan-dled politically, it could also moveEurope and the United States out of


step with each other. A wideningtransatlantic technology gap woulddiminish the importance of EuropeanAllies for the United States and fuelthe burden-sharing debate. It couldalso reinforce unilateralist tendenciesin the United States, which, in turn,would lead to increasing resentmentin Europe.

Sufficient resources are anothercondition for an optimistic scenariofor 2011. Devoting insufficient fundsto defence would restrain the poten-tial security roles of the EuropeanUnion and NATO and hamper thebenevolent scenario. In the context ofa more heated burden-sharingdebate, failure to fund adequatelyprogrammes such as the EuropeanUnion’s Headline Goal or NATO’sDefence Capabilities Initiative couldhave political ramif ications farbeyond these programmes’ immedi-ate military value. In a similar vein,European defence industry consoli-dation and/or restrictive US policieson defence industry cooperationcould lead to a “Fortress Europe” anda “Fortress America”, which wouldseriously damage transatlantic rela-tions.

Finally, there is the evolution ofrisks and threats in and aroundEurope. This is, of course, the great-est variable with potentially the fur-thest-reaching consequences, asdemonstrated by the terrorist attacksagainst New York and Washington of11 September. Assuming that thesecurity evolution in and aroundEurope remains essentially benign,some US isolationists as well assome “Europhiles” might feel tempt-ed to declare the end of a need for USmilitary engagement in Europe. Yet,one should not conclude from thisthat NATO can only thrive in avolatile environment, nor that it wouldnecessarily do so. Disagreementsamong Allies on how to addressanother war in the Balkans, for exam-ple, could even provoke strategicrealignments among Allies and weak-en NATO. Shaping European securityby peaceful means clearly remainsNATO’s preferred option.

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What NATO must do now forthe benevolent scenario tocome true

Stay in business: The currentEuropean security architecture is farfrom perfect, but it features a strongcooperative momentum that offersmany built-in disincentives againstrogue action or the reckless pursuit ofnational interests. By contrast, ifNATO were to disappear, some coun-tries would fear being marginalised.This could lead to a heightened senseof insecurity throughout Europe andmay lead to policies that wouldreverse the positive evolution the con-tinent has witnessed over the pastdecade. While the NATO frameworkhas clear limitations, there is noviable institutional alternative to it forthe foreseeable future.

Stay the course: Whether the issueis NATO enlargement, engagingRussia, ESDP or the Balkans, there iscurrently no need for any radical pol-icy change. Indeed, as the NATO-minded reader will have alreadyguessed, if the Alliance’s currentagenda were implemented to the full,it could essentially lead to the benev-olent scenario sketched above, give ortake a new initiative or two. By con-trast, a sudden U-turn on any of theseissues would simply re-open battlesthat were fought in the mid-1990s.NATO will continue to develop newmechanisms to address a changingsecurity landscape, not least intensi-fying its coordination efforts to dealwith international terrorism, but thebasic parameters are already set.

Get the basics right: The hysteri-cal overtones in the current transat-lantic debate may sometimes suggestotherwise, but a transatlantic divorcedue to “irreconcilable differences”over greenhouse gases and genetical-ly modified food is not in the offing.A look at the fundamentals oftransatlantic security puts things inperspective. These demonstrate, forexample, that the United States willnot deny Europeans a distinct securi-ty policy, just as Europe will notimpose a policy of strategic vulnera-bility on the United States by oppos-

ing the development of a missiledefence. They also indicate thatNATO has made the case of theBalkans irreversibly its own – andthat succumbing to the temptation ofdisengagement would only re-invitethe transatlantic discord experiencedin the first half of the 1990s. Finally,they show that Europe and NorthAmerica share many other strategicinterests, such as preventing prolifer-ation, combating terrorism and main-taining open markets. Pursuing theseinterests will require continuedtransatlantic cooperation. As theAlliance’s decision to invoke its col-lective defence commitment inresponse to the terrorist attacks onNew York and Washington con-firmed, NATO is too valuable strate-gically to allow it to be damaged bysquabbles over tactical issues.

The implicit theme of this essay isthat NATO is changing. Compared tothe Alliance of today, “NATO 2011”will be bigger, somewhat more“European” and perhaps somewhatmore “southern” in its strategicfocus. In addition, the Alliance’s evo-lution will be increasingly dependenton external developments in theBalkans, the European Union, theMediterranean and Russia. None ofthese changes, however, woulddeprive “NATO 2011” of the funda-mental characteristics that have madeit both valuable and durable, particu-larly its strong transatlantic dimen-sion and unique military compe-tence. Marlene Dietrich onceobserved that: “Most women set outto change a man, and when they havechanged him, they do not like himany more.” By contrast, despite manychanges, “NATO 2011” shouldremain an Alliance that Allies andPartners will still like, and very muchapprove of.

• • •This essay is based on a popular lecture Michael Rühle gives regular-ly at the NATO School inOberammergau, Germany. It is a per-sonal view, but he wishes to thankRad van den Akker, JamesAppathurai and Nick Williams forcomments and suggestions. ■


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Partnershipconference

NATO is hosting an internationalconference to mark the tenthanniversary of the formation of theNorth Atlantic Cooperation Counciland celebrate a decade of ever-closer relations between Alliancemembers and Partners.

The conference, entitled TenYears of Partnership and Cooper-ation, takes place on Friday 26October at NATO headquarters andwill be attended by participantsfrom all 46 members of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council(EAPC).

In addition to reviewing keyevents in the formation of NATO’sPartnership strategy and assessingachievements to date, the confer-ence will examine the future evolu-tion of relations between Alliancemembers and Partners and considerways in which the EAPC mightdevelop in the years to come.

NATO Secretary General LordRobertson will use the event tomake his major speech of the yearon partnership and cooperation.That speech and those of otherkeynote speakers will be broadcastlive on the NATO web site.

NATO’s Off ice of Informationand Press is also publishing a spe-cial, 20-page brochure to coincidewith the conference. EntitledPartnership in Action, it looks backon the birth and development of thePartnership idea and examines howPartnership works in practice.

Further information on theconference, the webcast and

the Partnership in Action brochurecan be found, closer to the event, onNATO’s web site at: www.NATO.int


FEATURES

Between 1949 and 1989, a totalof 456 nuclear tests were car-ried out at Semipalatinsk in

Kazakhstan, the former SovietUnion’s premier test site, before itsclosure by presidential edict in 1991.For the rest of the decade, despitefears about the level of radioactivityand the potential impact on the localpopulation, flora and fauna, the sitewas left largely unmonitored. Now,however, scientists have begun sys-tematically measuring and studyingcontamination at the site, as part of aNATO-sponsored project.

The Semipalatinsk project, whichis a joint venture between scientistsfrom Kazakhstan and the UnitedKingdom, aims to examine contami-nation levels across some600 square kilometres of the22,000 square kilometresite, an area about the size ofWales. It brings together sci-entists from MiddlesexUniversity in London withtheir peers at the Al-FarabiKazakh State NationalUniversity in Almaty, theInstitute of Radiation Safetyand Ecology in Kurchatovand the Institute of NuclearPhysics in Almaty. Experthelp is also being providedby University College,Dublin, in Ireland.

NATO’s involvement inthe project follows a seriesof tests carried out by theInternational Atomic Energy Agency(IAEA) in 1997, which confirmedthat the site represented a “seriousrisk to the health of some individualsand population groups”. The IAEArecommended further monitoringand a UN resolution of December1997 urged collective internationalaction to “fund a viable solution for

the ecological problems at theSemipalatinsk test site”. Following adonors’ conference in Tokyo in 1998,NATO decided to fund a three-yearstudy, which began in 1999, to thetune of 20.5 million Belgian francs(some $500,000).

Nicholas Priest, professor of envi-ronmental toxicology at MiddlesexUniversity, and MukhambetcaliBurkitbayev, head of inorganic chem-istry at the Al-Farabi Kazakh StateNational University, are joint direc-tors of the project. They chose the600 square kilometre area for studybecause it has fresh water, an elec-tricity supply, was formerly used forgrazing and hay production, and bor-ders the village of Sarzhal, which has

a population of about 2,000. “BeforeNATO funded our research, monitor-ing of radioactivity and contamina-tion levels took place on a limitedand ad hoc basis,” Professor Priestsaid.

The area of study is especially sig-nificant because it was in the plumeof a 1953 ground-level, hydrogen-

bomb explosion. It lies close to theDegelen mountains, where 239underground nuclear tests were car-ried out, and was the site of twoexperiments, exploring the possibili-ties of creating canals and divertingrivers by using nuclear explosives. Itis also close to another test areacalled Balapan, where more than 100nuclear explosions were carried outin vertical shafts underground.

The Semipalatinsk project seeks tomeasure contamination levelsthroughout the 600 square kilometrearea, identifying land that is immedi-ately fit for human settlement, landwhich could be settled with minimalclean-up work, and land whichshould permanently be placed offlimits to humans. In addition, theconsequences of the two experimentsaimed at creating canals and divert-ing rivers are being studied. ThreeKazakh doctoral students are alsoexamining respectively plutoniumlevels in people living near the site,plutonium levels in water, and the

potential for contaminationof surrounding areas via air-borne plutonium. Results ofthe various studies areimmediately fed into a sec-ond project on land utilisa-tion funded by the UnitedKingdom’s Department forInternational Development.

The Semipalatinsk proj-ect is one of the largest of 97projects currently supportedby NATO’s Science forPeace programme. This pro-gramme, which was estab-lished in 1997 and currentlyhas an annual budget ofmore than $5 million, isbased on the principle that

science and technology are critical tothe security of nations. All NATO-funded scientific research projectsrequire cooperation between scien-tists from Alliance member andPartner countries. A call for propos-als in 2000 generated some 850applications, of which an additional45 to 50 projects will eventually besupported. ■

MONITORING CONTAMINATION IN KAZAKHSTAN

Monitoring radioactivity

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A n innovative, NATO-spon-sored programme is helpingrecently and soon-to-be dis-

charged off icers in Bulgaria andRomania find work and make newlives for themselves outside the mili-tary and will soon be extended toCroatia and possibly Albania.

The programme, which was drawnup within the framework of the EU-sponsored Stability Pact for SouthEastern Europe, brings together insti-tutions and organisations that havenot traditionally worked together,such as NATO and the World Bank,to help tackle deep social problemsand contribute to building long-termstability in Southeastern Europe. Intotal, some 60,000 officers — 20,000each in Bulgaria, Romania andCroatia — will be beneficiaries andthousands more could benefit if theprogramme is extended to othercountries in the region.

“Both NATO and the World Bankare doing what each organisationdoes best,” says Chuck Parker, coor-dinator of NATO’s South East EuropeInitiative. “NATO is helping Partnercountries downsize their armedforces and the World Bank is lendingsome of the money to f inance thereforms and help turn soldiers intocivilians.”

Parker, a former US Army colonel,helped devise and develop the pro-gramme together with colleagues atthe World Bank, Stability Pact andthe relevant Bulgarian and Romanianministries. “NATO and the WorldBank are not natural bedfellows, butwere able to come together becauseof the framework provided by theStability Pact and the resulting syner-gy is now generating results that canbe understood by the man in thestreet,” he says.

After initial discussions in themonths following the creation of theStability Pact in July 1999, NATOdespatched teams, including Dutch,German, French and US experts, toBulgaria and Romania in Februaryand March 2000 to help design therespective programmes. This assis-tance, combined with NATO’s follow-up monitoring, helped persuade theWorld Bank to provide the necessaryloan financing.

Romania borrowed $500,000 fromthe World Bank to get its programmeoff the ground in March of this yearand is currently negotiating a further$3 million loan. The Romanian pro-gramme, which was drawn up onsimilar lines to an existing assistance

scheme aimed at unemployed min-ers, is administered by the defenceministry. It brings together severalgovernment departments and agen-cies and operates on a peripateticbasis, visiting military bases, coun-selling soon-to-be discharged offi-cers to help them get over the shockof redundancy and advising them ontheir options in civilian life. BySeptember, some 2,000 former mili-

tary personnel had made use of theprogramme.

Bulgaria decided not to take theWorld Bank loan on offer andappealed, instead, for donor-financing.In response, the United Kingdomdonated computers and theNetherlands, Norway and the OpenSociety Institute, the charitable foun-dation of billionaire philanthropistGeorge Soros, contributed close to$500,000 to get the programme offthe ground. It has funding until theend of 2001, the Netherlands hasagreed to fund one of four regionalcentres through 2002, and the pro-gramme is looking for additionaldonations for next year.

The Bulgarian programme differssomewhat from the Romanian. It isadministered by a non-governmentalorganisation, the NGO ResourceCentre, which is run by a retiredBulgarian colonel and has estab-lished four regional centres. By Julyof this year, some 2,500 out of about3,000 discharged officers had visitedone of the centres. Some receivedinitial support and set out on theirown to find jobs. About 1,000 for-mally registered or requested that theprogramme f ind employment forthem. Of these, 200 have found jobsand between 400 and 600 are follow-ing leads or preparing for interviewsarranged by the programme.

As the Bulgarian and Romanianprogrammes began to yield results,both Albania and Croatia expressedan interest in launching similar initia-tives. Croatian envoys visitedRomania to examine how the pro-gramme was operating there and getan idea of the preparatory workinvolved. In March 2001, a NATOteam was despatched to Croatia toadvise on the next steps.

The Bulgarian and Romanian pro-grammes form part of NATO’s SouthEast Europe Initiative, an initiativelaunched in 1999 in the wake of theKosovo air campaign to contribute tobuilding stability in SoutheasternEurope. ■

Looking for new careers

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EASING THE TRANSITION TO CIVVY STREET

NR: The Euro-Atlantic PartnershipCouncil has become an importantforum for dialogue on securitymatters. How do you see this insti-tution evolving in the comingyears?MA: The EAPC provides a veryuseful forum for high-level politi-cal consultation and dialoguebetween Partners and Allies. In thewake of the terrorist attack in theUnited States, I see even greaterpossibilities for cooperation in theEAPC. This depends very much onhow the situation is handled, but Isee great possibilities for transat-lantic cooperation between theUnited States, Europe and Russiain the EAPC.

NR: Both NATO and the EuropeanUnion are considering expansion atpresent. What potential problemsdo you foresee?

MA: The enlargement of NATO, from an organisationalpoint of view, is an easier exercise. When it comes tothe European Union, it is clear that we have to examineboth the decision-making processes and the institutionsthemselves. I have advocated the enlargement of theEuropean Union for many years and therefore see morepossibilities than problems. I am also sympathetic tothose countries wishing to join NATO. Above all, theywant to secure a peaceful atmosphere within which todevelop democratic traditions, respect for human rightsand the rule of law. The challenge is for existing mem-bers and applicant countries alike to utilise the comingyears to make sure that the enlargement process issuccessful.


NATO Review: In the past decade,the Euro-Atlantic security environ-ment has changed almost beyondrecognition. What are the greatestthreats to security today?Martti Ahtisaari: In the wake of thetragic attacks in New York andWashington DC, the threat of ter-rorism and the f ight against it isclearly high on everybody’s agen-da. Indeed, this is a good exampleof how new security threats canseriously challenge what is still alargely state-centred security sys-tem. Many of today’s most seriousthreats are global in scale. In addi-tion to terrorism, they include cor-ruption, organised crime, drug traf-f icking and the spread of smallarms. On the other hand, most oftoday’s armed conflicts are notbetween states but within states,involving systematic violations ofhuman rights and internationalhumanitarian law. Typical features include collapsed statestructures and political mobilisation of populations basedon ethnic and religious identity. Traditional means of man-aging international disputes do not work in these circum-stances.

NR: What more could be done to enhance security in theEuro-Atlantic area? MA: Taken together, these new threats are such that it isextremely difficult for governments to come up with effec-tive responses. Clearly, these problems cannot be solvedwithout effective international cooperation. It is thereforecritical, above all, to improve the ways in which we coop-erate and exchange information.

Martti Ahtisaari:international mediator

In June 1999, when President of Finland, Martti Ahtisaari persuaded thenYugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic to accept NATO’s terms for ending

the Kosovo air campaign. Since leaving office in 2000, he has chairedvarious conflict-prevention organisations, has been an independent

inspector of the IRA’s arms dumps in Northern Ireland, and has foundedan association to facilitate his international work.

NR: You have deep insight into Slobodan Milosevic’s rolein the wars of Yugoslav dissolution. How does a mediatornegotiate with someone of his ilk?MA: I first met Mr Milosevic when I was chairman of theBosnia and Herzegovina working group at the InternationalConference on the Former Yugoslavia in Geneva fromAugust 1992 until October 1993. But if you look at my CV,you realise that almost all my interlocutors have been ratherdifficult personalities. In South Africa before democratisa-tion took place, for example, we had to negotiate with indi-viduals who were not especially forthcoming. This was agood experience for dealing with Mr Milosevic. But it isimportant to remember that Viktor Chernomyrdin and Iwere not negotiating with Mr Milosevic. We were simplypresenting an offer that would facilitate an end to thebombing, provided that he committed the Yugoslav govern-ment to certain principles.

NR: How important will Slobodan Milosevic’s trial be?MA: Mr Milosevic knew before we went to Belgrade thathe had been indicted. At the time, however, I believe that henever thought he would be going to The Hague. Indeed, thismatter was not raised during our discussions. I think ingeneral it is important that all political leaders are madeaware that they cannot escape justice, if they misbehave tothe extent that is the case here. Perhaps that is the best formof preventive diplomacy.

NR: Are the various Balkan peace processes on track, orshould the international community change tack?MA: I always look at the Balkans in the light of what wehave learned elsewhere in Europe. Take, for example, theunification process in Germany. At the time of unification,my German friends said that the process would take onegeneration. However, I recently met people working onthese issues there, who said that we should expect theprocess to take as much as two generations. It is not only aquestion of administrative solutions, but also a mental andpsychological process. If it takes one to two generations inGermany, it will definitely take longer in the Balkans. Aslong as the international community is prepared to committo staying there for 10 to 20 years, we will be able to setshort-term implementation targets and take the process for-ward. The challenge is, however, enormous. Recent opin-ion polls have shown that some 62 per cent of Bosniansbetween the ages of 14 and 30 wanted to leave the country.Clearly, a lot of work remains to be done. That said, wehave both achieved and learned a lot as well. We are begin-ning to establish functioning institutions. Elections takeplace on a regular basis. People are learning to respectdemocratic processes. And local people are beginning torun key institutions. That is much better than having theinternational community running the process and the localscriticising what we are doing.

NR: The international community has invested manybillions of dollars in the former Yugoslavia in the pastdecade. Are there more effective and timely ways ofmanaging, or heading off conflict, that you wouldadvocate?MA: One lesson of the international community’s experi-ence in the Balkans is the importance of creating a con-ceptual framework in which to operate and analysing allactions and policies. In the absence of an intellectualframework, we risk simply wasting our money. It is there-fore extremely important to f inance some of the thinktanks working on these issues in Europe. In the past yearand a half, I’ve read some very interesting studies carriedout by the European Stability Initiative, with whom aschairman of the East-West Institute, I collaborated on aproject evaluating Stability Pact programmes. It is impor-tant to make such studies available to a much wider audi-ence.

NR: Since leaving political office, you have been workingon a number of initiatives to improve internationalresponses to crises. What are these and how might theycontribute?MA: I have initiated three activities via my association,the Crisis Management Initiative. Firstly, I am workingto improve the use of information technology in crisismanagement. Having run a complex international mis-sion myself in Namibia from 1989 to 1990, I am awarehow useful it would have been had I been able to tie thewhole operation together with the kind of technology,which was not available at the time. Indeed, when head ofadministration at the United Nations, I reformed the wayin which information technology was used. Technologymakes it possible to bring people together easily, to shareinformation, and to save time and money. Secondly, I amworking to improve civilian responses to crises. If wecompare the preparedness of the military with that ofcivilians for crisis-management tasks, the difference isenormous. The military has well-established training pat-terns and no one is sent on a peacekeeping mission with-out prior training. The same cannot be said for civilians.In the European Union we need to create a group of civil-ians who have undergone specialised training for crisis-management operations. There should be common teach-ing for everybody and more tailored programmes for thedifferent professions. If such a programme can be set up,we will be better prepared to deal with crises. Thirdly,I have been promoting the idea of a crisis-managementportal on the internet to bring together analysts, decision-makers, journalists and other parties interested in crisismanagement to provide them with the tools to generate,disseminate and accumulate related knowledge. I hopesuch a portal could also be used as an active discussionforum. ■


INTERVIEW


Army from its territory. It survived a limited economicembargo, the fall-out of international sanctions againstMontenegro and Serbia and the loss of its markets elsewherein the former Yugoslavia. And it joined a host of internation-al organisations and programmes, including NATO’sPartnership for Peace and Membership Action Plan, to max-imise its security. As a result, unlike other parts of the formerYugoslavia, whose agony during the past decade has gener-ated a massive literature, the former Yugoslav Republic ofMacedonia* has largely escaped such scrutiny. Indeed, onlythree books have appeared on it in recent years in English.

The pick of the bunch is without doubt Who are theMacedonians? (Hurst & Co, 2000) by Hugh Poulton. This isa comprehensive yet concise history of Macedonia and itspeoples in the broadest sense, which should be requiredreading for anyone interested in or attempting to resolve thecurrent crisis in the former Yugoslav Republic ofMacedonia.* Poulton is a prolif ic writer on Balkan andminority questions who has worked on these issues as aresearcher for Amnesty International, Article 19 and theMinority Rights Group. Moreover, in addition to publishingseveral, original books in recent years, he has fronted a rockband called the Walking Wounded, many of whose songshave been inspired by the past decade of conflict in theBalkans.

Who are the Macedonians? traces the histories of themany peoples who inhabit or have inhabited geographicMacedonia from antiquity to the present. In the process, itanalyses the formation of modern national identities and, inparticular, the so-called millet system, the system by whichOttoman subjects were governed within their religious com-munity, or millet. This is significant because it was the milletsystem that enabled the Ottoman lands to become so ethni-cally mixed and accounts for the link between religion andethnicity today.

Poulton considers the competing territorial claims of thevarious peoples living in geographic Macedonia when it stillformed part of the Ottoman Empire and the actions of eachwhenever they were in a position to make good those claims.In a short yet insightful analysis, he illustrates how thenation states that emerged from the disintegration of theOttoman Empire were largely created by ethnic cleansing,persecution and repression. He also examines the notoriousInternal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation or VMRO,whose terrorist activities in the inter-war period reflectednational frustration at the absence of a Macedonian Slav

Christopher Bennett is editor of NATO Review and authorof Yugoslavia’s Bloody Collapse (New York University Press).

A s the Yugoslav federation was breaking up in 1991,two of the country’s republican leaders fought a rear-guard action to keep it together – Alija Izetbegovic

and Kiro Gligorov, presidents of Bosnia and Herzegovina(Bosnia) and the Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia respec-tively. Both men feared that the consequences ofYugoslavia’s disintegration would be greatest in theirrepublics. On 3 June 1991, therefore, they presented the restof the federation with their own compromise model forinter-republican relations. Sadly, nothing came of this bold,eleventh-hour initiative and in less than a month war brokeout. Ten months later, Bosnia was engulfed by a conflict,which confirmed Izetbegovic’s greatest fears. By contrast,despite countless predictions of doom, the former YugoslavRepublic of Macedonia,* managed to avoid similar blood-shed and violence for the best part of a decade.

That the new country should prove so durable surprisedmany analysts. At the time of Yugoslavia’s disintegration, itwas poor, ethnically divided, militarily weak, landlocked andsurrounded by historically, aggressive neighbours. At thebeginning of the 20th century, the Macedonian question hadhaunted Europe’s Great Powers, whose diplomatic effortsfailed to head off bloody conflict. In the course of the ensu-ing Balkan Wars, whose scale and savagery appalled con-temporary observers, geographic Macedonia – an areabounded to the north by the Skopska Crna Gora and the SharPlanina mountains; to the east by the Rila and Rhodopemountains; to the south by the Aegean coast aroundThessalonika, Mount Olympus and the Pindus mountains;and to the west by the lakes of Ohrid and Presp – was wrested from Ottoman rule and divided three ways, betweenBulgaria, Greece and Serbia. Moreover, in the inter-warperiod, Macedonian terrorists were active way beyond theBalkans. Indeed, even at the end of the 20th century, muchabout the new state, from its borders, to its language, histo-ry, flag and even its name, remained controversial. If ever acountry was ripe for disintegration, surely this was it.

Perhaps it is inevitable that prophecies of doom havedominated and continue to dominate media analysis of theformer Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.* After all, predic-tions of a country’s peaceful survival are hardly newsworthy.But for most of the 1990s, the new state defied the odds. Itnegotiated the peaceful departure of the Yugoslav People’s

The new Macedonian questionChristopher Bennett reviews recent literature on the latest part of the former

Yugoslavia to succumb to ethnic violence.

national state and extended way beyond the Balkans. In laterchapters, Poulton analyses the evolution of a MacedonianSlav national identity in Tito’s Yugoslavia, the creation of anindependent state in the wake of the break-up of Yugoslaviaand relations between Macedonian Slavs and ethnicAlbanians. He points out that, unlike Bosnia, there was min-imal mixing between ethnic groups. Indeed, he cites an opin-ion poll from 1974, showing that 95 per cent of bothMacedonian Slav and ethnic Albanian and 84 per cent ofethnic Turkish heads of households would not let their sonsmarry a girl of different nationality, while for daughters thepercentages were even higher.

Mutual suspicion and animosity between MacedonianSlavs and ethnic Albanians pre-date the creation of an inde-pendent state. Indeed, Poulton describes “neo-Malthusian”measures taken in the 1980s aimed at restraining the ethnicAlbanian birth rate. This included obliging families to payfor medical services for any children above the ideal numberof two and the withdrawal of child allowance foradditional children. In 1989, the constitution wasamended in such a way that therepublic was def ined as a“nation-state of Macedonianpeople” instead of the previousformulation which defined it as“a state of the Macedonian peo-ple and the Albanian and Turkishminorities”. This change reflectedthe growing unease of theMacedonian Slav authorities in theface of Albanian nationalism andthe possible break-up of Yugoslavia.Inevitably, however, a more assertiveMacedonian Slav nationalism generated in turn a similarethnic Albanian response. Ethnic Albanians boycotted therepublic’s independence referendum in 1991 and held theirown autonomy poll in 1992. Since then, issues of nationalsymbols and minority rights have remained close to the sur-face of political life and came to the fore again in the wakeof NATO’s Kosovo campaign.

Poulton is also a contributor to The New MACEDONIANQUESTION (Palgrave, 2001), a collection of essays editedby James Pettifer. His chapter, Non-Albanian MuslimMinorities in Macedonia, is as informative as his book andcovers Muslim Slav Macedonians, variously referred to asTorbesi, Pomaks, Gorans and Poturs, Turks, Roma and,remarkably, “Egyptians”, since many Roma have chosen todeclare themselves as Egyptians in recent censuses, becauseof the perceived stigma attached to the name Roma.

The New MACEDONIAN QUESTION contains a hugebreadth of contributions, including works by Albanian,Bulgarian, Greek, Macedonian Slav, Russian and Serbianauthors as well as Western European analysts of the Balkans.This is both its strength and weakness, since, despite severalexcellent chapters, the book is extremely uneven. Moreover,

a deliberate decision to allow each writer to use his or herown terminology and style leaves the reader confused. Inaddition to Poulton’s chapter, Pettifers’s two contributions –chapters entitled The new Macedonian Question and TheAlbanians in western Macedonia after FYROM – are cer-tainly worth reading. So, too, is the first chapter by the lateElisabeth Barker and originally published in 1949, which,according to Pettifer “sets out the traditional pro-Greek viewof the British Foreign Office”. Otherwise, Evangelos Kofos’chapter, Greek policy considerations over FYROM inde-pendence and recognition, is particularly insightful. Overall,however, The New MACEDONIAN QUESTION is disap-pointing because it fails to live up to its title and dwellslargely on what most people would consider to be an olderMacedonian question.

By contrast, Alice Ackermann’s Making Peace Prevail:Preventing Violent Conflict in Macedonia (Syracuse

University Press, 2000) focuses on the very recentpast. That said, an uncharitable reviewer could dis-

miss it. The second chapter on preventivediplomacy reads like a litera-ture review prepared for a doc-toral thesis. An analysis of the“successes” and “failures” ofpreventive diplomacy, whichcontrasts international responsesto disputes between Hungary andSlovakia, and Estonia and Russia,with international responses to theHutu-Tutsi conflict in Rwanda andthe wars of Yugoslav dissolution,seems to be comparing apples andoranges. And the analysis of

Yugoslavia’s disintegration, which borrows excessively fromthe controversial writings of Susan Woodward and containsseveral (minor) factual errors, is weak. Despite this, anybodywishing to understand the current conflict should read thisbook.

The strength of Ackermann’s well-intentioned book is theoriginal research she carried out into international attemptsto head off conflict. This includes analyses of the work of theWorking Group on Ethnic and National Communities andMinorities of the International Conference on the FormerYugoslavia, the Organisation for Security and Cooperationin Europe and its high commissioner on national minorities,the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force, and theactivities of certain non-governmental organisations, includ-ing Search for Common Ground and the Ethnic ConflictResolution Project. What becomes abundantly clear is thatthe painstaking and unsung work of several organisationsand individuals, dealing with essentially identical issues tothose which dominate today’s agenda, did contribute to theyoung country’s survival in the early years. Macedonians ofall ethnic origins must be hoping that today’s internationalmediators have as much patience, tact and success as theirpredecessors. ■

REVIEW


Timely publications


Research Seminarsand the FellowshipProgramme. Everyyear, four fellows –two from Partnershipfor Peace and twofrom MediterraneanDialogue countries –are sponsored to carryout their own security-related research at theDefense College.

The focus of coursesat the Defense Collegeis not tactics or opera-tional techniques, butinternational politico-military issues at thestrategic level. In addi-tion, all courses pro-vide a forum forexchanging informa-tion, building consen-sus and improvingunderstanding andcooperation between

Alliance and Partner countries. With course members com-ing from some 50 nations and a multinational staff and fac-ulty, the Defense College is a truly multinational institu-tion, which promotes an Alliance – as opposed to a national– viewpoint. The objective is not to teach but to provide alearning environment for expanding students’ horizons, sothat course members see for themselves that consensus andbonding is possible even among people with the most var-ied backgrounds. The Defense College provides an excep-tional learning opportunity, but it is up to course membersto make the most of it.

Courses tend to generate their own team spirit, which inturn develops into a useful network of contacts betweencourse members from NATO and Partner countries. Thisesprit de corps helps to overcome barriers that may haveexisted before, as well as strengthening trust between therespective nations. The spirit of consensus runs like athread through the course members’ daily life. Moreover,since all discussions take place on a non-attributable basis,participants are able to speak their mind.

Colonel Ralph D. Thiele is Chef de Cabinet at the NATODefense College.

F ifty years afterNATO’s f irstSupreme Allied

Commander, GeneralDwight D. Eisenhower,founded the NATODefense College, therationale behind its cre-ation, namely the needto develop individualscapable of adapting to anew security environ-ment, remains as validas ever. With the end ofthe Cold War, thedemise of the WarsawPact and the emergenceof new, multi-facetedand unpredictable secu-rity threats, NATO hassucceeded in makingitself the cornerstone ofEuro-Atlantic security.But the need for indi-viduals able to inno-vate, think laterally andcome up with creativesolutions has never been so great.

As countries that were enemies for more than 40 yearsbecame NATO Partners, the Defense College has movedwith the times and evolved to cater for the needs of theirmilitary establishments as much as those of Alliance mem-bers. Increasingly, the Defense College has opened itsdoors to senior representatives of Partnership for Peace andMediterranean Dialogue countries, inviting them to partic-ipate in the full range of educational activities, togetherwith their NATO counterparts. Indeed, for several yearsnow the Defense College has been running practically allits courses – the Integrated PfP/OSCE, NATO General andFlag Off icers’, NATO Reserve Off icers’ and SeniorCourses – within the Partnership for Peace framework. Thisis also the case for its activities, including the Conferenceof Commandants, co-sponsorship of International

Educating a new elite

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Purpose-built: the NATO Defense College moved into new premises in autumn 1999

Colonel Ralph D. Thiele marks the 50th anniversary of the NATO DefenseCollege by describing how the institution has expanded its courses and activities

to include citizens of Partner countries.

Course members of different ranks and from all servicesand diplomatic and governmental departments learn tounderstand each other. The time and effort they invest inestablishing trust and friendship with their peers is repaidin kind. They develop and improve a sense of solidarity,cooperation and understanding with fellow course mem-bers. They also f ind that it is possible to have an openexchange of ideas and to reach group consensus, withoutsacrificing individual or national identity. Beyond the aca-demic programme, deep bonds develop between coursemembers and their families as a result of the extensivesocial and cultural side to life in Rome.

In autumn 1999, the Defense College moved into new,purpose-built premises so that it can properly serve theneeds of future generations. Organisational structures andprocesses have been streamlined and adapted. On the aca-demic side, over the past few years the Defense College hasfocused on four areas. These are adapting the curriculum tothe fundamental security tasks contained in NATO’s newStrategic Concept; using the new facilities to educate morepeople from NATO, Partnership for Peace andMediterranean Dialogue countries, as well as to take onmore activities; engaging the best speakers; and developingthe newly established capacity for research-related activi-ties. Like NATO itself, the Defense College now has thecapacity to respond to the fundamentally changed securityenvironment and to take on new tasks appropriate to itsnew missions and Partners.

Since April 2000, the Defense College has supported thePartnership for Peace Consortium of Defence Academiesand Security Study Institutes, a group that helps forge newpartnerships between defence academies and practioners,

scholars and experts in Partner and NATO countries. In thisway, the Defense College is serving as a focal point withinNATO for the Consortium. It is also participating as a fullmember in the guiding secretariat working group, harmon-ising the activities of the Conference of Commandants withthe Consortium, and participating in selected Consortiumworking groups, particularly where strategic-level educa-tion is discussed.

Early this year, the Defense College sponsored an inter-national week at the Ukrainian National Defence Academy.In this way, it was able to offer Ukrainian students a uniqueand qualitatively different academic introduction to Euro-Atlantic security. Judging by their reactions, particularly inthe small group discussions, it seems that the initiative wasgreatly appreciated. This event was not just important in itsown right, but also as part of a broader process of helpingtransform Ukraine’s military education and may serve as aprecedent for similar activities elsewhere.

As the Defense College celebrates its 50th anniversarythis autumn, it remains committed to playing the educa-tional role envisaged by its founding father. As in the past,it will continue to supply Alliance and Partner countrieswith men and women who have the courage to grasp thesecurity challenges of the 21st century and whose mindsare equipped to deal with them effectively. ■

SPECIAL


More information on the NATO Defense College andits courses can be found at: www.ndc.int

More information on the Partnership for PeaceConsortium of Defence Academies and Security

Studies Institutes can be found at: www.pfpconsortium.org

Like the Defense College, the NATO School(SHAPE) at Oberammergau, Germany, has adaptedits intake and curriculum in the past decade to caterfor increasing numbers of students from Partner coun-tries. In 2000, 5,818 students from 47 countriesattended courses and conferences at the school, ofwhom only 4,722 came from Alliance member states.

Students from countries active in the Partnership forPeace and the Mediterranean Dialogue gain insightinto how NATO works and participate in courses,including subjects as diverse as crisis management,resource management, civil-emergency planning andcivil-military cooperation. Organisations such as theInternational Committee of the Red Cross and theOffice of the UN High Commissioner for Refugeesalso regularly send students and speakers.

NATO School (SHAPE)As NATO has become increasingly involved in

peacekeeping, the School has supported ongoing mili-tary operations and developed courses to assist thepeace processes. In this way, commanders and staffwith f ield experience are able to pass on lessonslearned to course participants. In addition, a securitycooperation course has been organised specifically forcivilian and military personnel from Bosnia andHerzegovina, aimed at building confidence and instill-ing a spirit of openness and cooperation among partic-ipants.

Oberammergau also hosts a number NATOsymposiums and conferences. The most significantis the annual Defence Planning Symposium towhich Partner representatives have been invitedsince 1999.


Party and governmental control mechanisms that were notreplaced by any corresponding mechanisms for democraticcontrol. New governments everywhere lacked militaryexpertise and had no adequate civilian mechanisms eitherto make military policy or to direct the course of militaryaffairs and the development of their armed forces. Wheremechanisms existed, they were crude and amounted to lit-tle more than establishing ever-lower financial ceilings fordefence expenditure. In many countries, internal powerstruggles resulted in authority over the armed forces eitherbeing split between many ministries and agencies, includ-ing some which would not normally have expected to haveresponsibility over troops, or being moved from one branchof the executive to another, such as from the government tothe president, or vice versa. In some countries, politicianssought to use the military directly in power struggles. Thisfurther reduced the degree of real political control over thearmed forces.

The second stage in the process saw the armed forces’leaderships rally to protect and preserve their military sys-

Chris Donnelly is NATO’s special adviser for Central andEastern European affairs.

Over the past ten years, the armed forces of everycountry in Central and Eastern Europe have under-gone drastic transformation and downsizing.

Brought about by the end of the Cold War and the changingnature of the threats to national security, this is an ongoingprocess. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe differin terms of size, economic capability, geostrategic situationand the nature of their relationships with the EuropeanUnion and NATO. However, notwithstanding the corre-sponding differences in size and composition of theirarmed forces, the path of military reform has followed aremarkably similar pattern everywhere.

The first stage was characterised by a loss of rationaleand ideology, and by massive force reductions brought onby the change in geostrategic, economic and political cir-cumstances. This was attended by a loss of Communist

Reform realitiesChris Donnelly examines why military reform has proved so difficult in Central

and Eastern Europe and prospects for future restructuring.

About turn: military reform has followed a remarkably similar pattern throughout Central and Eastern Europe

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tems, striving to retain as much of the old force structureand infrastructure as possible. This was influenced by acombination of motives in which vested interests undoubt-edly played a part. But sincere conviction, based on patriot-ism and a strong belief in the validity of the former system,reinforced by the lack of competence and expertise of newcivilian governments, was the driving factor. This wasexacerbated by the militaries’ lack of exposure to alterna-tive professional views and by the naturally cohesive qual-ities found in all effective military systems.

The effects were quickly felt. Trying to maintain a mas-sive but obsolete structure at a time of rapid social changeand economic decline proved disastrous. As Central andEastern European countries moved painfully towards a realcash economy, resources for the military began to dry up.In most countries, this was not immediately obviousbecause the military establishment had traditionally beenable to draw on resources in kind rather than in cash andhad its own means of generating income and consumableresources. Exploiting these assets allowed the core of themilitary to survive, despite the lack of government funding.

After more than four, and in some cases seven, decadesof a command economy, all Central and Eastern Europeancountries lacked appropriately trained accountants andeffective accounting procedures. Moreover, neither policenor judiciary were equipped to monitor and control finan-cial irregularities. This was particularly the case in defenceestablishments, where the need for military secrecy furtherimpeded transparency. As a result, the defence sector inCentral and Eastern Europe was slow to set up properbudgetary systems and, as a result, corruption becameendemic in some instances. The uncontrollable sale or dis-tribution of military material, the lack of guidelines onofficers using their positions and forces under their com-mand for personal purposes, the hiring out of soldiers byofficers, straightforward theft and other corrupt practices –all highly destructive of military discipline – proliferated.This led to a rapid decline in training standards and then inliving standards, both for conscripts and for those officersand senior non-commissioned officers who lacked the rankor position to control marketable resources, or – the major-ity – who were simply honest.

In the third stage, the procurement system broke down.Defence industries, deprived of a tied domestic market,generally tried to avoid restructuring and reorientation, tak-ing refuge in the fiction that arms sales abroad would savethem. In the event, as a result of corruption, an unwilling-ness to reform and a lack of expertise in market-economicrealities, Central and Eastern European defence industriesmissed what might have been a window of opportunity inthe early 1990s to seize a share of the world market. Withthis export opening lost and with domestic demand col-lapsed, defence industries looked to governments to bailthem out. Defence factories soaked up massive state subsi-dies but used the money to keep large numbers of idle

workers on subsistence pay, rather than to restructure theindustry. In the long term, no country can maintain thequality and cost benefits that make for attractive exportswithout the security of a good home market. The ability todraw on vast reserves of fundamental, scientific research aswell as existing military research and development hasenabled the industries to survive in their obsolete form andavoid painful reform. But these reserves are now runningout and defence industries in Central and Eastern Europethat have not yet restructured face near-total collapse.Reform today will be far more difficult and painful thanhad it been undertaken ten years ago.

The impact of this myriad of problems was in almost allcountries first felt among conscripts, whose training andliving standards disintegrated. The failure of the militaryestablishment in some countries to change with societymeant that the young were no longer willing to serve andthe breakdown of the established system meant that theycould no longer be compelled to do so. The system of uni-versal conscription decayed rapidly and, with it, any pre-service military training in schools and universities.Henceforth, only a fraction of the eligible age groupswould serve in the military. Legal exemption, the ineffec-tiveness of the draft and bribery would ensure that the better-off and better-educated would never have to serve inthe ranks.

With the disintegration of national service, the conceptof a “socialist nation-in-arms” died. Moreover, it could notbe restored because the social basis it sprang from anddepended on had gone forever. In retrospect, this seemsobvious. But, at the time, in the early to mid 1990s, it wasnot appreciated by decision-makers brought up in a verydifferent system, so the decline continued. The fall in thenumber and quality of conscripts, the endemic problem ofphysical abuse of conscripts by senior soldiers and officers,the catastrophic decline in training and the consequent col-lapse of the armed forces’ prestige next took its toll on theranks of young off icers, many of whom resigned.Meanwhile, standards of entry to officer training collegesdropped. Moreover, many cadets, having received a goodtechnical education, decided not to enter the army and lefton or just before graduation. This completed the self-destruction of the old system.

The armed forces of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact,working to a common Soviet model, had relied on youngofficers to conduct all the junior command and trainingtasks at unit level that in most Western armies are carriedout in depots or by regular professional long-service non-commissioned officers. The lack of young officers meantthat the steady downward spiral of training accelerated. Avicious circle had become established. Training standardsfell. Equipment broke down and was not replaced. Poortreatment of soldiers increased. The gap between the com-mand and the soldier grew. Recruitment of young officersbecame more difficult. Morale fell and, with it, public

MILITARY MATTERS


The “NATO factor” has played a role in the process inmany Central and Eastern European countries. In somecountries keen to get into NATO, the military command hason occasion proposed the procurement of unnecessary andoften unaffordable equipment arguing that: “It will beneeded to get us into NATO.” At a time when the politicalleadership and their civilian staffs, as well as parliamentar-ians and journalists, did not know enough about militaryissues, this argument could sound persuasive. Moreover,Western arms manufacturers often peddled the same line.In other countries, governments sometimes used NATO“demands” as the excuse for pushing for defence reformbecause they lacked the self-confidence to tackle this issueon their own authority. Both approaches have damagedcivil-military relationships and eroded public confidence.

In Russia, the “NATO factor” has been used differently.The maintenance of a perception of a military threat fromNATO has been used to justify the preservation of much ofthe old military infrastructure. This has in turn distracted

attention and siphoned off money fromreal defence reform.

The final element in the “NATO fac-tor” has been the readiness of Centraland Eastern European governments andmilitaries alike to look to the West formodels of military organisation andreform. All NATO members have differ-ent military systems, while Central andEastern European countries have widelydiffering requirements for defencereform or for building forces anew.Central and Eastern European countrieshave therefore found it exceptionally dif-

ficult to evaluate successful models, to work out which ele-ments are relevant for their own development and to findreliable, unbiased advice. Governments and armies havegone from the one extreme of rejecting any Western influ-ence to the other of rushing to embrace Western ideas, suchas professionalisation, without any real understanding ofwhat it involves – or costs.

Many efforts to reform from below failed. At one stage,advocates of reform hoped that young officers would beable to rejuvenate the system and bring in new ideas fromthe bottom up. Indeed, this approach did have some tempo-rary successes. However, in the end, there were too fewenergetic, young officers to create sufficient momentumfor reform. They failed, either because they could not over-come the inertia of the mid-level structures or because theywere undermined by superiors who viewed them as athreat.

The story is similar with officers sent for training andeducation abroad, most frequently to Canada, France, theUnited Kingdom and the United States. These individualswere expected to return home and infuse their military sys-

MILITARY MATTERS

respect. The result was declining competence, accompa-nied by a steady command and administrative drain, asofficers left their posts at all levels and the force structurecrumbled. When this process was also accompanied bymilitary action, such as affected the Russian Army in thefirst Chechen War, the results of the decay were instantlyvisible.

As armies shrank, their officer corps became grosslytop-heavy and this itself created an obstacle to reform. Butattempts to reduce drastically the officer ranks were alsoharmful. The sight of the government discharging unwant-ed senior officers without thanks, without proper pensionsor social security and with little chance of taking up a newcareer led those who were not qualified for other employ-ment to do all in their power to stay in the armed forces. Italso demoralised younger officers and put many youngmen off the idea of a military career.

The deterioration of the armed forces did not take placeat the same speed everywhere and thepace differed even within the armedforces of the same country. In general,problems have been worse in Russia andsome new countries of the former SovietUnion than in most of Central Europe.But many experiences are common tomost countries. Successive ministers andchiefs of defence attempted to rationalisetheir shrinking armies and succeeded todiffering degrees. In units and forma-tions with exceptional commanders,competence and combat capabilitieswere retained. By concentrating effortsand resources on a small number of units– regiments, squadrons or ships – some of these have beenmaintained at a reasonable standard of military readiness.

But, in the main, the decline was not halted. As a result,during the 1990s, none of the armed forces of countries inthe former Soviet Union or its former Central and EasternEuropean allies managed to reconstruct an effective andsustainable military system on modern lines. Indeed, apoint was reached in most Central and Eastern Europeancountries where the situation got so dire that the armedforces became desperate. Their plight was obvious and theonly way they could see to pursue reform was to seek moremoney from the state.

A thorough military reform programme is expensive.However, experience in Central and Eastern Europe hasshown that, when money was made available to defenceestablishments in advance of reforms, it tended to be spentnot on reform but on keeping the old system on life sup-port. Cosmetic improvements were made, but the essential,fundamental reform was actually put off and the situationgot worse. Indeed, reform became more difficult becausethe money stiffened resistance.

Reforms are beingspurred by therealisation that, werethey to be postponed,the process would beeven more difficult inthe future


tems with new ideas. In practice, however, this proved afalse hope as, all too often, the military establishmentclosed ranks to protect itself. In some Central Europeancountries, even as late as 2000, every single officer whohad been sent abroad on training courses was on return,either dismissed, demoted or sent to serve in a dead-endpost in some military backwater. In another country,although all senior officers had received training abroad,their lead was ignored by the mass of colonels beneaththem, who obstructed the implementation of the ordersfrom on high. “Democratic control of the armed forces” isusually taken to mean that the generals will obey the politi-cians. But democratic control can also fail if colonels donot obey the generals.

A further common failing has been the inability ofdefence ministries in Central and Eastern Europe to imple-ment an effective budgetary and planning system. This isextremely difficult because it requires converting the men-tality of the military collective. Militaries have traditionallywished to retain the existing system, while modernisingweapons and improving conditions for soldiers. As a result,they have pushed for the resources for such a vision, refus-ing to accept that economic realities make excessivedefence spending unjustif iable and that social and economic changes necessitate reform. Western armies, bycontrast, approach the issue of defence planning from thebudget, working out what that pot of money will buy andprioritising on the basis of current threat assessments.

Linked to this common failing is the almost totalabsence of an honest and open system for evaluating theabilities and qualifications of officers. In the absence ofsuch a system, it is almost impossible to develop a properpromotion and posting process. Without this, defence min-isters will never be able to institutionalise reform becausethey will not be able to identify officers with the qualitiesneeded to create a new kind of army, or put them into posi-tions where they can transform words into action.

Much attention has been given in all Central and EasternEuropean countries to the issue of democratic control of

MILITARY MATTERS

THE NATO SCIENCE PROGRAMME“Bringing scientists together for progress and peace”

The NATO Science Programme supports collaborative projects between scientistsfrom Allied and Partner countries.

The programme – which is not defence-related – aims to stimulate cooperationbetween scientists from different backgrounds, to create enduring links between

researchers, and to help sustain scientific communities in Partner countries.

Full details can be found on the NATO web site: http://www.nato.int/science

armed forces. But a frequently neglected aspect of demo-cratic control is the issue of whether the government isactually competent to decide on and implement a defencepolicy and direct the course of military reform. This is acommon failing, with frequently disastrous results. Thefact is that Central and Eastern European countries havenot yet been able to develop the body of civilian expertisein defence issues, which is needed to ensure balance and toprovide dispassionate advice. The rapid turnover of gov-ernments in Central and Eastern European compoundedthis lack of expertise. When governments are reliant on themilitary for advice on defence issues, it is the armed forces,and not the government, which effectively decide policy.This state of affairs still persists in some Central and East-ern European countries, despite the existence on paper –and in law – of what would otherwise be adequate mecha-nisms for democratic control.

In recent years, the situation in some Central and EasternEuropean countries has, nevertheless, begun to change.The decline has been halted and prospects for rebuilding anew kind of armed forces appear good. Countries that havefaced up to the fundamental nature of their problems arenow poised to take the plunge, do away with the remainingelements of the old system and rebuild anew. But, this isnot true everywhere. In some countries, such as Russia, thefundamental problems are yet to be faced.

In those Central and Eastern European countries wherereform has taken root and is now capable of flourishing, ithas been a process led by a few senior officers of vision,courage, determination and technical knowledge. Theyhave been able to inspire subordinates to follow them andto draw on external experts to help them. Moreover, theyhave also been fortunate to have strong political backing toprotect and encourage them, and to organise public infor-mation campaigns so as to ensure popular support. Thereform processes now underway in several Central andEastern European countries will take a long time to seethrough. But they are being spurred on by the growing real-isation that, were they to be postponed even further, reformwould be even more difficult in the future. ■


STATISTICS

NATO countries

Belgium

Canada

Czech Republic1

Denmark

France

Germany

Greece

Hungary1

Iceland

Italy

Luxembourg

Netherlands

Norway

Poland1

Portugal

Spain

Turkey

United Kingdom

United States

Partner countries2

Albania

Armenia

Austria

Azerbaijan

Belarus

Bulgaria

Croatia

Estonia

Finland

Georgia

Ireland

Kazakhstan

Kyrghyz Republic

Latvia

Lithuania

Moldova

Romania

Russia

Slovakia

Slovenia

Sweden

Switzerland

Tajikistan

Turkmenistan

Ukraine

Uzbekistan

1994 1999

1.7 1.5

1.7 1.2

2.6 2.3

1.9 1.6

3.3 2.7

2.0 1.6

5.7 5.0

1.6 1.6

n.a. n.a.

2.1 2.0

1.2 0.8

2.1 1.8

3.1 2.2

2.5 2.1

2.6 2.2

1.6 1.3

3.2 5.5

3.4 2.6

4.3 3.1

2.7 3.6

3.1 8.6

0.9 0.8

8.7 4.4

2.2 5.0

2.5 3.3

10.2 4.1

3.8 1.5

2.0 1.4

2.4 2.4

1.2 0.9

3.5 3.5

1.4 4.5

3.8 1.0

3.9 1.0

3.8 0.5

2.9 1.8

9.6 5.1

2.5 1.9

2.1 1.8

2.5 2.3

1.6 1.3

4.0 7.6

2.2 2.0

1.1 3.3

2.1 2.9

2.4 3.9

63.041.8

78.160.6

92.958.2

27.024.3

409.6317.3

367.3332.8

159.3165.6

74.543.4

322.3265.5

0.80.8

70.956.4

33.530.7

283.6240.7

50.749.7

206.5186.5

503.8639.0

254.3212.4

1650.51371.5

73.054.0

32.753.451.3

40.556.0

69.992.5

80.9101.9

80.8105.0

61.02.54.8

31.231.7

10.226.3

13.011.5

40.065.8

12.09.2

2.65.78.912.1

11.110.7

230.5207.0

1714.01004.1

47.044.9

8.19.6

64.053.1

29.827.7

3.09.010.416.0

28.019.0

517.0311.4

45.074.0

The above statistics are from The Military Balance 1995/96 and The Military Balance 2000-2001, published by the London-based International Instituteof Strategic Studies.

Numbers in armed forces (000)Defence expenditure

as % of GDP

Defence expenditure and size of armedforces of NATO and Partner countries

(1) Joined NATO in 1999 (2) Members of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC)

1994

1999

n.a.

The former YugoslavRepublic of Macedonia*

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