Nationalism, Society and Culture in Post-Ottoman South East Europe

8/14/2019 Nationalism, Society and Culture in Post-Ottoman South East Europe

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Oxford Balkan Society

South East European Studies Programme (SEESP)

European Studies Centre, St Antonys College_______________________________________________

Nationalism, Society and Culture

in post-Ottoman South East Europe

St Peters College, Oxford29-30 May 2004

Turkish Political Culture and Minorities

Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, SOAS/University of Oxford

_______________________________________________

The conference was convenedby Kerem Oktem and Dimitar Bechev

St Antonys College, Oxford

The conveners acknowledge the financial support of the SEESP, the

Tsakopoulos Foundation, and the Programme on Contemporary Turkey(University of Oxford)


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OXFORD UNIVERSITY BALKAN SOCIETY

2ND

OUBS GRADUATE WORKSHOP 2004

Author: Ioannis N. Grigoriadis

Paper Title: Turkeys Political Culture and Minorities

Institutional Affiliation: PhD Student, School of Oriental and

African Studies (SOAS), University of

London/University of Oxford

Paper Abstract:

This paper is attempting to provide an account of mainstream Turkish political culture as

well as of the political sub-cultures of Turkeys most significant minority groups, Kurdsand Alevis. It will be argued that political and social developments in the late Ottoman

Empire and early republican Turkey had a crucial impact on the formation of a subject

mainstream Turkish political culture. Yet political culture diversity was maintained at the sub-national level through the hammering of minority group political sub-cultures.

Kurdish and Alevi political sub-cultures were shaped under the influence of Ottoman

parochial and republican subject political culture elements, while their distinct historicallegacies were also influential. Being a resultant of mainstream and minority politicalcultures, Turkish political culture indicates the extent to which liberalisation of the

Turkish state and society has been successful.

London, 28/05/04


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OXFORD UNIVERSITY BALKAN SOCIETY2ND OUBS GRADUATE WORKSHOP 2004

Turkeys Political Culture and Minorities

1

CONFERENCE PAPER


By Ioannis N. Grigoriadis

1. Definitions of Political Culturea. What is Political Culture

The failure of purely institutional descriptions of political systems to offer adequate

explanations of post-Second World War political developments led scholars to delve into

the reasons why similar political institutions performed so divergently in different

countries. Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba attempted with the introduction of the term

political culture to offer a new tool for the study of political systems. Political culture

soon attracted the interest of academics whose debate gained intensity in the ideologically

polarised environment of the Cold War era. The building blocks of political culture are,

therefore, the knowledge, beliefs, opinions and emotions of individual citizens toward

their form of government (Hague and Harrop, 2001: 78). Political culture is understood

as a set of citizens orientations toward political objects based on their knowledge, beliefs,

opinions and emotions and is classified into parochial, subject and participant (Gabriel A.

Almond and Verba, 1963). In parochial political culture there are no specialised political

roles in societies, and for members of these societies political orientations to these roles

are not separated from their religious and social orientations. In subject political culture

Ioannis N. Grigoriadis holds an MIA degree from the School of International and Public Affairs,Columbia University. He is currently a PhD student in Turkish Politics at the School of Oriental andAfrican Studies, University of London and a Research Associate at the South East European StudiesProgramme, European Studies Centre, St. Antonys College, University of Oxford.


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there is a high frequency toward a differentiated political system and toward the output

aspects of the system, but there are almost no orientations toward specifically input

objects, and toward the self as an active participant. It is essentially a passive system as

far as government influence is concerned. In participant political culture, citizens tend to

be explicitly oriented to the system as a whole. Close attention is paid to politics, while

popular participation is regarded as both desirable and effective.

It should however be clarified that applying the political culture model is not

tantamount with endorsement of culturalist theories. Political culture should not be

understood as an immutable property that precludes the possibility of political change and

favours the perpetuation of status-quo. Processes of political socialisation are highly

important for the formation of political culture. School, family and other social groupings

have their contribution in the hammering of perceptions, affects and evaluations that

constitute political culture. Although historical memories and political socialisation have

considerable impact on the formation of political culture, political culture can to a large

extent- be considered as independent variable in political science research. While the

relationship between political culture and political structures is interactive, the survival of

traditional attitudes even in states where most intensive political socialisation

programmes were enforced has indicated that there are certain limits to the plasticity of

political culture (Almond, 1980: 31-32). In other words, political culture should not

always be considered as an independent variable in the study of political behaviour and

institutions. Whether political culture is influenced by or influences political behaviour

and/or institutions, is to be examined ad hoc, on the basis of the idiosyncrasies of the

political phenomenon under examination.


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b. The Political Sub-culture DebateThe question whether the political culture of a people is further divisible into smaller sub-

national units (sub-cultures) has resulted to controversy among the exponents of the

political culture concept and a part of their critics that still viewed political culture as a

useful analytical tool in the study of comparative politics. Whether population groups,

distinct on the basis of their ethnicity, religion, class or gender, could hold different

cognitions, affects and evaluations of political systems and states, has been the crux of

this debate. The view that sub-national groups and not only peoples can serve as unit of

political culture analysis has opened new ways in the comparative study of political

systems and states.

Almond and Verbas lack of emphasis on political sub-culture was challenged by

a group of scholars who argued that ethnic, social and gender divisions have a crucial

bearing in the formation of distinct orientations toward political systems and states. In

other words, in parallel with existing national political cultures, minority political

cultures exist and have significant influence on national political cultures. Kavanagh

succinctly pointed out in his study of British political culture the usefulness of a study on

British political sub-cultures, both on ethnic and class bases. A comparison of Scottish

and English political sub-cultures as well as of British working- and middle-class

political sub-cultures could be illuminating for many aspects of British political culture

(Kavanagh, 1980: 166-67).


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c. Aims of this PaperThis paper is attempting to provide an account of mainstream Turkish political culture as

well as of the political sub-cultures of Turkeys most significant minority groups, Kurds

and Alevis. It will be argued that political and social developments in the late Ottoman

Empire and early republican Turkey had a crucial impact on the formation of a subject

mainstream Turkish political culture. Yet political culture diversity was maintained at the

sub-national level through the hammering of minority group political sub-cultures.

Kurdish and Alevi political sub-cultures were shaped under the influence of Ottoman

parochial and republican subject political culture elements, while their distinct historical

legacies were also influential. Tribalism and peripherisation were two critical

determinants in the shaping of a parochial/participant Kurdish political sub-culture, while

resistance tradition, peripherisation and support for Atatrks reform programme resulted

in the hammering of a subject/participant Alevi political sub-culture. Political

liberalisation steps since the 1960s have also imbued Kurdish and Alevi political sub-

cultures with more participant elements.

2. Features of Turkish Political Culturea. Mainstream Turkish Political Culture

Prevalence of state interests over fundamental human rights, the model of passive,

deferential citizen, the lack of tolerance for cultural, religious and ethnic diversity, the

exalted role of the military and bureaucratic elite as guardian of the Western and secular

character of the Turkish state and society are all indicators of Turkeys lack of democratic

consolidation. Despite the Kemalist Westernisation agenda and the introduction of multi-


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party politics since the end of World War II, Turkish political culture remained firmly

attached to the late Ottoman and early republican model, which was dominated by subject

elements. Active participation of citizens in political and social activities remained

insignificant, while the state viewed any citizens effort to engage with issues of broader

social interest with suspicion, if not outright hostility. Citizens had to curtail their critical

thought and individual human rights to the extent that they diverged from the officially

sponsored political, cultural and national models. Dissidents had to choose between

persecution whose intensity would vary according to political circumstances and

emigration.

It would be inaccurate to argue, however, that Turkish political culture has

remained unchanged and void of participant elements or that there has been no interest of

citizens in political and social developments. The 1950-1960 rule of the Democrat Party

has been described as the first attempt to debureaucratise Turkish society. DP policies

attempted to loosen the ideological grip of the Kemalist elite over Turkish society by

allowing for the dissemination of alternative political, social and economic programmes.

The military coup of 27 March 1960 can be rightfully seen as a reaction against the

decline of elite influence in Turkish society (zbudun, 1993: 256-58). Nonetheless, elites

had to come into terms with societal demands. The 1961 Constitution could thus be seen

as a compromise between elites and emerging societal forces: Under the relatively

favourable circumstances of the 1961 Constitution, citizens and civil society associations

engaged in activities aiming at increasing popular participation in politics. Yet any

incremental steps made toward the adoption of participant political culture elements were

weakened by two more military coups that struck Turkish democracy in 1971 and 1980.


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The 1980 coup, in particular, was the biggest setback in the quest to introduce participant

political culture in Turkey, as it occurred at a time when participant political culture and

democratic stabilisation was spreading all over southern Europe, in Greece, Portugal and

Spain, states formerly run by military dictatorships. By restoring illiberal interwar

Kemalist ideology and enforcing subject political culture elements, the leadership of the

1980 coup succeeded in obstructing Turkeys democratic consolidation.

b. Minority Political Sub-cultures in Turkey

The importance of studying political sub-cultures becomes evident in the case of Turkey.

Despite long, systematic efforts to forge a unitary Turkish national identity, Turkeys

population is still characterised by considerable ethnic and religious diversity. A study of

Turkish political culture cannot, therefore, be rendered complete, unless it accounts for

the political sub-cultures of Turkeys minority groups. Turkeys Kurds, Alevis and other

minor Muslim and non-Muslim minority groups continue to claim a separate identity,

which does not necessarily conflict with Turkish national identity or adopts an inimical

approach toward the Turkish state. While the quest for a Kurdish identity resulted in

insurgency and terrorism in the late 20th century, these acts were by no means

representative of the whole Kurdish identity movement and did not significantly impact

the stance of other minority groups. Due to their different historical and social

backgrounds, Turkeys minority groups differed in the way they attempted to define theirrole inside the Turkish society and negotiate their recognition by the Turkish state. In the

following chapter the political sub-cultures of Turkeys Kurds and Alevis will be

examined. A brief historical account will introduce a discussion on the divergent


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cognitions, emotions and opinions of Turkeys minority groups toward the Turkish state

and society, while their impact on the formation of minority group sub-cultures will also

be assessed.

3. Kurdsa. Introduction

Turkeys Kurds are the largest minority1 group in republican Turkey and have repeatedly

challenged republican nation-building policies. Their allegiance to the Ottoman Sultan

and Islam was not translated into willingness to submerge their identity into the modern

Turkish national identity. Kurdish minority rights have been among the most prominent

issues of political debate since the 1960s, while the armed insurgence of the Kurdish

Workers Party ( Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan-PKK) in Kurdish-inhabited provinces of

eastern and south-eastern Turkey posed the gravest threat against Turkeys security and

territorial integrity throughout the 1980s and 1990s.

b. The Birth of Kurdish NationalismThe spread of nationalist ideas among Kurds was not as successful as in the case of other

ethnic groups that comprised the poly-ethnic mosaic of the Ottoman Empire. Ottoman

Kurds remained attached to their religious and tribal identities until the very last years of

1 There is no universally accepted definition of the term minority due to its complicated and politicallysensitive nature. For the purposes of this study a minority will be defined as a group of citizens of a state,constituting a numerical minority and in a non-dominant position in that state, endowed with ethnic,religious or linguistic characteristics which differ from those of the majority of the population, having asense of solidarity with one another, motivated, if only implicitly by a collective will to survive and whoseaim is to achieve equality with the majority in fact and in law. See UN Subcommission on the Preventionof Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, (United Nations, 1985), as quoted in Ivn Gyurcsik, "NewLegal Ramifications on the Question of National Minorities" in Jane Leiibowitz, ed., Minorities: The New

Europe's Old Issue (Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1993), p. 22


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the Ottoman Empire. Despite the formation of Kurdish nationalist groups, the vast

majority of the Kurdish population remained loyal to the Ottoman rule and sided with

those forces that opposed the partition of the Ottoman Empire along ethnic lines. Strong

tribal identity was an additional reason for the failure of Kurdish nationalism to appeal to

the majority of Kurds. Tribal allegiance was stronger than national, which allowed for

state intervention in intra-Kurdish affairs by means of siding with some tribes against

others Intra-Kurdish feuds substantially weakened prospects for the forging of a strong

common Kurdish national identity. Ottoman Kurds fought on the side of Ottoman Turks

in the wars that sealed the demise of the Ottoman Empire. Although the Treaty of Sevres

provisioned the formation of an independent Kurdish state in the territory of todays

south-eastern Turkey, the vast majority of Kurds joined Turkish nationalist forces in their

struggle against foreign invaders of Anatolia. The decision to ignore their own nationalist

ambitions and fight on the side of Ottoman Turks showed that religion was still the

primary defining factor of Kurdish identity to be followed by tribal and not ethnic

allegiance. When Atatrk-led republican Turkey declared its intention to break its links

with its Ottoman, Islamic heritage and establish an ethnic-based Turkish national identity,

Turkeys Kurds had to choose either assimilation or resistance.

c. Early Kurdish Rebellions

The first armed Kurdish rebellion against Kemalist secularisation and ethnichomogenisation plans took place in 1925. Atatrk had already become the undisputed

leader of Turkey and set forth his plans for the formation of a modern, secular nation-

state. Atatrks position on that issue was not clear during pre-republican years (Gunter,


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1997: 5-7). His wartime statements implied that protection of Kurdish minority rights in

post-war Turkey might even get to the point of recognising Kurdish autonomy, while his

aide and eventual successorsmet nn argued that the new state would be a homeland

for Turks and Kurds. Despite all that, the abolition of the Caliphate, the proclamation of

the Turkish Republic and the limitation of public role of Islam were necessary steps

toward ethnic homogenisation of Turkeys population. In 1925 it had already become

apparent that Atatrk would rid Turkey of all Ottoman and Islamic elements that bound

Turks and Kurds together. Under the leadership of Sheikh Said of Palu, a number of

Kurdish tribes rebelled against Turkish rule. The character of the Sheikh Said revolt was

two-fold, religious and ethnic: Reaction against the forced secularisation of the Turkish

state and society initiated by Atatrks modernisation programme was matched with

willingness to resist against state efforts to forcibly homogenise Turkeys ethnically

diverse population through the propagation of an ethnically defined Turkish national

identity. Turkish armed forces succeeded in quickly suppressing the rebellion, which,

nonetheless, became a watershed: Large-scale purges against Kurdish and other dissident

elements in Turkey followed shortly after. The Turkish regime engaged into violent

policy measures to suppress Kurdish resentment and also gave greater impetus to

Atatrks secularisation programme (Barkey and Fuller, 1998: 11-13). Nonetheless,

military and police measures could not extinguish Kurdish opposition to the Kemalist

programme and willingness to resist. A second rebellion occurred in 1930 in Ar and a

third in 1937-1938 in Dersim (Tunceli). Both of them were less important than Sheikh

Saids rebellion in terms of geographical spread and popular participation, yet they


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certified enduring Kurdish resistance against the Kemalist ethnic homogenisation

campaign in republican Turkey.

d. The Re-emergence of Kurdish Nationalism in the 1960s and 1970sThe advent of multi-party politics in 1946 improved the condition of Kurds in Turkey as

competing political parties had to provide them with incentives in order to attract their

vote. The coup of 27 March 1960 did not prevent the ongoing politicisation of the

Kurdish issue in Turkey. Interest in Kurdish identity and cause would re-emerge under

the suitable political environment created by the 1961 Turkish Constitution. The liberal

air of the 1961 Constitution favoured the development of a wide spectrum of political

activities. Political groups like Turkish Workers Party (Trkiye i Partisi-TP) and

Revolutionary Youth (Devrimci Gen-Dev Gen) viewed political developments from a

socialist perspective; showing clear interest in Turkeys dispossessed social classes, they

also became interested in human rights and the status of Turkeys minorities: The

problems of Turkeys Kurds were articulated, and steps toward their representation in

Turkish politics were made. The 1971 coup and constitution compromised some of the

most liberal elements of the 1961 Constitution, yet the emergence of the Kurdish issue, as

one of the most important political issues in Turkish politics could not be prevented.

Kurdish political groups were formed addressing their agenda in a socialist or nationalist

backdrop. The Revolutionary Eastern Culture Hearths (Devrimci Dou Kltr Ocaklar

-DDKO) and Kurdish Socialist Party or Road of Freedom (zgrlk Yolu) and Kawa

(named after a legendary Kurdish folk hero associated with the Kurdish New Years

holiday Newroz) are only a few of the founded Kurdish groups. Political turmoil and


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violence between radical leftist and rightist political groups, which characterised Turkish

politics of the 1970s, played an important role in the radicalisation of Kurdish politics in

Turkey.

e. PKK and the Radicalisation of the Kurdish QuestionThe Kurdish Workers Party (Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan-PKK) was one of the several

Kurdish groups with leftist political leanings. The figure of Abdullah calan, founder and

undisputed leader of the group, would gradually rally most Kurdish nationalists and leave

a heavy personal imprint on the Kurdish issue. Founded in 1977, PKK originated from

the National Liberation Army (Ulusal Kurtulu Ordusu-UKO), which was founded in

1974 by former Dev Gen members; thus, it had a strong Marxist/Leninist political

foundation to which Kurdish nationalism was added. The PKK founding document, titled

The Path of Kurdish Revolution (Krdistan Devrimi Yolu) described Turkeys south-

eastern and eastern provinces as colonies and argued that the Kurdish feudalists and

bourgeoisie had chosen to side with the Turkish ruling classes in order participate in the

exploitation of the Kurdish peasantry and working class. (Kirii and Winrow, 2003: 109-

11) PKK differed from most other Kurdish political groupings in its social composition.

While traditional Kurdish political groups usually had specific regional and tribal

association and were led by Kurdish notable family members, PKK attracted its

membership from the poorest and most marginalised strata, regardless of regional ortribal affiliations, and eventually succeeded in asserting itself as a fighter for the

disenfranchised (Barkey and Fuller, 1998: 23-25). PKK benefited from political anarchy

and turmoil in the late 1970s and severe restrictions in political freedom in the aftermath


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of the 1980 coup. Unfavourable political circumstances led to the dissolution of moderate

Kurdish political groups that opted for a peaceful resolution of Turkeys Kurdish question,

while the ascent of military regimes nurtured political extremism among Kurds. The

hardening of state policies in the aftermath of the 1980 coup, which included abolition of

human rights legislation and came to the point of denying the existence of a separate

ethnic Kurdish group in Turkey, increased the popularity of armed struggle among many

disaffected Kurds. State attempts to champion political Islam as a counterweight to leftist

Kurdish nationalism in south-eastern and eastern Turkey, which were articulated in the

Turkish-Islamic synthesis (Trk-slam Sentezi) doctrine, did not deter the growth of PKK

popularity. PKK started attacking Turkish military and police outposts in south-eastern

and eastern Turkey effectively challenging Turkish sovereignty. Turkeys reaction was

fierce involving major military operations and the establishment of a village guard system

whereby armed local villagers of mostly Kurdish origin would supplement the work of

military forces. The attempt of Prime Minister Turgut zal in the late 1980s to modify

Kemalist national identity doctrine through its inoculation with elements of the Ottoman

millet system, aimed at accommodating the existence of a separate Kurdish ethnic

identity in Turkey but had little success in reducing violence and PKK appeal to Turkeys

Kurds (Ataman, 2002: 127-29). The fall of the Communist bloc facilitated the

transformation of PKK from a Marxist/Leninist to a nationalistic group. PKK reached the

peak of its activity in the late 1980s and early 1990s when it effectively challenged

Turkish sovereignty over considerable parts of territory and -in effect- monopolised

political representation of Turkeys Kurds.


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in a minimal presence of the central state, whose interest was limited in tax collection and

male conscription without limiting the fundamental religious and social values of their

micro-societies. When republican Turkey attempted to enforce its Westernisation

programme, it disturbed the perennial balance of state-society relations by separating the

political from the social and religious. Tribal, religious and local affiliations were

disregarded, and citizenship of republican Turkey was seen as the sole acceptable

affiliation. The Turkish state was actively introducing a novel type of subject political

culture, which could not tolerate the continuation of alternative allegiances. Kurdish

uprisings were suppressed by Turkish armed forces, yet the dissemination of a subject

political culture among Turkeys Kurdish population was not as successful. On the

contrary parochial elements survived and contributed in the formation of a separate

Kurdish political sub-culture in republican Turkey.

Kurdish political sub-culture was also influenced by the centre-periphery divide

within the Turkish state and society. Since the beginning of the Tanzimat in the 19th

century Ottoman modernisation was characterised by an effort to bring Ottoman

periphery under the firm control of the Ottoman state administration and elites. The same

struggle continued in republican years, when the Kemalist elite attempted to take

Turkeys periphery under its ideological control. Kurds were among the biggest periphery

groups, and state efforts for their ideological proselytisation were often met with

opposition. While a significant part of Turkeys Kurdish population was eventually co-

opted2, other Kurds resisted the imposition of subject political culture championing an

2 The migration of a big part of Turkeys rural Kurdish population from eastern and south-eastern Turkey tourban centres in the west of the country, part of a gigantic urbanisation trend in post-World War II Turkey,greatly facilitated state homogenisation programmes. These populations, uprooted from their original


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end of the centre domination over periphery. In order to achieve that, they engaged in

political mobilisation activities, which imbued Kurdish political sub-culture with

participant elements. Since the 1960s there has been Kurdish political extremism and

terrorism could be viewed as unfortunate outcome in a rapid liberalisation process of a

strongly parochial political sub-culture. The obdurate opposition of the Turkish state to

any form of political culture other than the state-sponsored model of subject political

culture was instrumental in that radicalisation process.

4. Alevisa. Introduction

Alevis3, the second most numerous ethno-religious minority of republican Turkey, have

attracted increasing attention since the 1960s due to the largely unexpected revival of

their communal identity. At a moment when Alevis were expected to merge with the

mass of the Turkish secular population, Alevi identity became instead the focus of

political and cultural mobilisation for a significant part of Turkeys population

(amurolu, 1998: 79-84).

Alevis represented heterodox Islam in the Anatolian provinces of the Ottoman

Empire. The legendary figure of Hac Bekta Veli inspired the formation of two main

religious groups: a. Kzlba, nomadic or semi-nomadic populations of Anatolia, later to

be called Alevis and b.Bekta, sedentary populations based mainly in the Balkans

communities and in need for recognition in their new social environment, easier adopted state-sponsoredsubject political culture.3 The word Alevi most probably comes from the name of Caliph Ali, son-in-law of the Prophet and mostrevered among Shiite Muslims.


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(Inalcik, 2000: 193-95). Alevis formed a distinct religious and quasi-ethnic group, 4

Although religion is the primary identification factor of Alevis, the paramount

importance given to descent and family lineage for membership eligibility has

differentiated Alevis from Bektais and added an ethnic element to the Alevi identity. As

Irne Mlikoff put it, Everyone can become Bektai, but no-one who is not born Alevi

can later become one (Melikoff, 1999: 10). While Sultan Selim I was claiming the title

of Caliph after the conquest of the Islamic holy cities of Mecca and Medina in the early

16th century, monopolising the Sunni political and religious authority, Alevis challenged

the dominant Hanefi Sunni version of Ottoman Islam through their own syncretistic,

tolerant and flexible version of popular Islam, a blend of Shiite Islamic, Turkic, Christian

and other local religious and cultural influences. The wars between the Ottoman Empire

and Shiite Safavid Iran would challenge the loyalty of heterodox Alevis toward the

Ottoman Sultan, while the Celli insurrections would further indicate Alevi

disenchantment with Ottoman administration (Inalcik, 2000: 50-51).

The preservation of a distinct Alevi identity would necessarily cause conflict with

dominant Sunni Hanefi orthodoxy. Sunni Muslims classified Alevis among non-believers

to Islam (gvur): Alevi faith was denigrated as apostasy from Islamic faith and heresy or

in the best case as a misunderstanding to be rectified through unconditional Alevi

integration into Sunni Islam. Soon the Sunni majority of the Ottoman Muslim population

developed a series of prejudices against Alevis considering them to be stupid, uneducated,

or immoral. Alevis would be exposed to Ottoman state discrimination, which would be

4 The Alevi case has striking similarities with the Druze in that respect.


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positively correlated with the role of Islam as a shaping factor of Ottoman politics and

identity.

b. Early Republican TurkeyGiven the increasingly important role of Islam in the formation of Ottoman political

ideology in the last years of the Ottoman Empire, Alevis welcomed Atatrks political

programme, which offered an attractive alternative to the Islamic theocracy advocated by

Sultan Abdlhamid and Ottoman Pan-islamists. The abolition of the Caliphate and the

proclamation of the Turkish republic nurtured Alevi hopes that religious discrimination

against them would come to an end. Further steps that Atatrk made in order to introduce

and solidify secularism found support among Alevi circles, although these measures were

among others also targeting the Alevi faith. The banning of religious orders (tarikat)

and associations as well as the decisive removal of religion from all aspects of public life

did not exclude Alevi institutions, customs and practices; yet Atatrks secularization

programme still found resonance among Alevis, as they could only welcome the radical

diminution of the role of Sunni Islam in republican Turkey, planned through these

measures. Alevis joined republican secular political forces in their effort to combat Sunni

Islamic political and cultural domination: A strictly secular Turkey equally repressive for

the public manifestation of all religions and faiths was deemed preferable to preferential

treatment of Sunni Islam against Alevism, which was the rule in the Ottoman times.

c. Increasing Sunni Influence and Alevi RevivalAlevi relief over the decline of Sunni Islam influence on Turkish state and society would,

nonetheless, come to an end after a series of measures that mitigated the strictly secular


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character of the Turkish republic. The opening of religious vocational schools (imam-

hatip), the reluctant return of Islam into visible aspects of the social sphere and its

rehabilitation as a legitimate element of Turkish politics led to resurgence of Sunni Islam,

which was largely identified with the policies of DP, Turkeys ruling party in the 1950s.

Alevis were then identified with the opposition Republican Peoples Party (Cumhuriyet

Halk Partisi-CHP), which had lost power in the 1950 elections. The ideological shift of

the party toward the left coincided with Alevi secular and socialist leanings, and Alevis

constituted one of the major CHP support groups, as the attempt to found in 1966 an

exclusively Alevi political party, the Turkish Unity Party (Trkiye Birlik Partisi-TBP),

found little resonance among Alevi voters (Kaleli, 2000: 32-34).

The military coups of 1960 and 1971 polarised Turkish politics, and Alevis found

themselves on the leftist camp. Their identification with leftist political forces led to

debates whether Alevi identity should be retained or fused into the secularist, leftist strata

of Turkish society. Urbanisation and immigration trends moved a large part of Alevi

populations from rural Anatolia to Turkish urban centres or Western Europe. Traditional

Alevi institutions and customs like dedelik5 or endogamy were challenged by an

increasingly educated and modernity-exposed Alevi youth. Liberation theology, social-

democratic-liberal, mystical-Islamic, or Shiite-inclined versions of Alevism were then

developed (Bilici, 1998: 51-62). Alevis took active part in the ideological debates that

dominated Turkey in the 1970s and were finally among those to count the most civil

strife victims. The slaughters of Kahramanmara and orum in 1978 may well be

evaluated as examples of anti-leftist as well as anti-Alevi violence.

5Dedelik is the office of dede, the religious leader of an Alevi community, who claims his religiousauthority on his descent from an elite Alevi family (ocak).


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The 1980 military coup signalled the overt return of Islam into Turkish politics

and increasing re-alienation of Alevis from official state policies. According to the

Turkish-Islamic Synthesis (Trk-Islam Sentezi) political doctrine, which was selected

to become the official ideology of the Turkish state, Islam (namely Sunni Islam) was

considered to be one of the cornerstones of Turkish identity and culture; this came in total

contradiction with Atatrks intense efforts to dissociate Turkishness and Islam in the

early years of the Turkish republic. Mandatory religious (i.e. Sunni Islamic) education

was introduced, while the State Directorate of Religious Affairs recognised and

financially supported only Sunni Islamic institutions. No special provisions were made

for Alevi citizens, who again felt that their distinct identity was threatened by state

homogenisation policies in favour of Sunni Islam. The threat of Alevi fusion into the

Sunni majority acted as cementing factor for the protection of a distinct Alevi identity

(Zeidan, 1999: 82-84).

The emergence of the Kurdish nationalist movement in the 1960s and 1970s and

the advent of guerrilla warfare in the 1980s would also galvanise Alevi efforts to

articulate their own distinct voice in Turkish society. Although the challenge of Turkeys

ethnic and religious homogeneity as well as increasing demands for human and minority

rights found stronger resonance among Kurds, their activities helped shape similar

movements within Alevis. The latter never came to the use of violent means in order to

further their goals, yet they demanded that their distinct religious and cultural identity be

respected by the Turkish state. This influence was particularly strong among Kurdish-

speaking Alevis, a community whose existence verified the complexity of Turkeys

ethnic and religious map.


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The fall of communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union comprised

an additional reason for the revival of Alevi identity. Socialist political ideas had become

very popular among Alevis in the 1960s and 1970s and were thought to become a

substitute for Alevism itself. As religious faith became less popular, Alevi social and

cultural elements were viewed through a socialist lens and supplemented accordingly.

Nonetheless, the end of communist domination in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union

in the late 1980s dramatically reduced the popularity of socialist ideas. This ideological

vacuum was filled through greater interest in Alevi culture and identity; an increasing

number of young people became interested in exploring their Alevi religious and cultural

heritage.

d. Alevi Political Sub-cultureAlevi political sub-culture was formed under the influence of a long resistance tradition,

peripherisation and identification with the modernisation campaign of the Kemalist elite.

Alevis have historically been suspected by the Ottoman Empire for their religious links

with the Shiite Persian Empire. Persecutions were not uncommon, and their frequency

increased for the additional reason that the Ottoman Empire started adopting a more

explicitly Sunni Islamic character. Like Ottoman Kurds, Ottoman Alevis were influenced

by Ottoman parochial political culture. Yet their long-standing struggle against Ottoman

state religious persecution policies resulted in the instillation of antiauthoritarian elementsthat complemented their established parochial political sub-culture. Alevi

antiauthoritarian political sub-culture was reaffirmed when Ottoman authoritarianism

took the shape of modernising centralisation policies and active support toward Sunni


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Islam in the 19th century. Increasing power concentration and Islamisation 6 in the

Ottoman state, two processes that became clearer than ever in the late Ottoman years,

reinforced Alevi resistance spirit.

The centre-periphery divide was an additional factor in the formation of Alevi

political sub-culture. Ottoman Alevis were disproportionately represented among the

rural and dispossessed populations of Central and Eastern Anatolia, which had little if

any- influence on decision making processes. This situation changed only marginally in

the republican period as the basic elements of centre-periphery relations in the late

Ottoman Empire persisted (Mardin, 1973: 308-09). Multi-party politics, urbanisation and

political liberalisation steps facilitated the emergence of Alevi civil society movements

that aimed at renegotiating centre-periphery relations and securing greater Alevi

influence in the Turkish state and society. Despite setbacks brought about by political

turmoil, the instillation of participant elements into Alevi political sub-culture was largely

successful, and a growing degree of Alevi self-conscience and mobilisation has been

observed since the 1960s.

Overt support toward Atatrk and its modernisation programme also crucially

influenced Alevi political sub-culture. Atatrks modernisation campaign was seen as

liberating Alevis from centuries of Sunni oppression and was, therefore, fully supported,

despite Alevi Islam was also among the victims of Atatrks militant secularisation

campaign. Alevis considered the secular Turkish republic to be much more tolerant

toward them than the Islamic Ottoman Empire and identified with the programme and

6 Ottoman Islamisation policies referred to the introduction of Hanefi Sunni Islam rules to all aspects ofOttoman political and social life and were by no means accommodating toward the rest of the schools ofSunni Islamic jurisprudence (Hanbali, Maliki and Shafii) and even less so toward heterodox beliefs (Alevi,Shiite Islam).


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aims of its Kemalist elite. State-sponsored subject political culture was, therefore, often

well-accepted, and the convergence of Alevi political sub-culture with the dominant one

was remarkable. Yet the Alevi revival of the 1960s showed that despite being closer to

the dominant Turkish political culture paradigm that Kurdish political sub-culture, Alevi

political sub-culture retained a considerable degree of independence and originality

(Kk, 2000: 189-92).

5. ConclusionsStudying the political sub-cultures of Turkeys minority groups reveals a surprising

degree of diversity and points out that the role of sub-national groups as political actors is

all but marginal. Turkeys Kurds, Alevis and other religious and ethnic minority groups

all share to a degree a political culture rooted on the legacy of the Ottoman Empire and

the policies of republican Turkey. Nevertheless, their divergent historical backgrounds

and state policies toward them resulted in the formation of distinct political sub-cultures,which in turn influenced mainstream Turkish political culture. Being a resultant of

mainstream and minority political cultures, Turkish political culture indicates the extent

to which liberalisation of the Turkish state and society has been successful.


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Nationalism, Society and Culture in Post-Ottoman South East Europe

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