NATIONAL EMERGENCY SUPPLY AGENCY SECURITY OF SUPPLY ...€¦ · The National Emergency Supply...

NATIONAL EMERGENCY SUPPLY AGENCY

SECURITY OF SUPPLY SCENARIOS 2030

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Publisher: National Emergency Supply AgencyIllustrations: Pexels, Shutterstock, iStockPhotoLayout: Up-to-Point OyYear of publication: 2018 ISBN: 978-952-5608-53-3

www.nesa.fi

Security of supply refers to society’s ability to maintain the basic economic functions required for ensuring people’s livelihood, the overall functioning and safety of society, and the material preconditions for military defence in the event of serious disruptions and emergencies.

The National Emergency Supply Agency (NESA) is an organ-isation operating under the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment. It is tasked with planning and operative measures related to developing and maintaining security of supply.

The National Emergency Supply Agency operates in con-junction with the National Emergency Supply Council as well as individual sectors and pools that operate as permanent cooperation bodies. Together they form the National Emer-gency Supply Organisation.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PART 1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 3

PART 2 Security of supply scenarios 2030 ............................................................... 6 Scenario summaries ..................................................................................................... 7 Scenario 1: Global interdependency ............................................................ 10 Scenario2:Armedpowerpolitics ................................................................... 18 Scenario3:Blocificationandhybridinfluence ................................... 26 Scenario4:Technologicalworldorder ...................................................... 34 Scenario5:ThedominanceoftheEast ..................................................... 42

PART 3 Scenario-specific contingency plans and general measures essential for ensuring security of supply .................. 50 Impactsofthescenarios ......................................................................................... 52 Securityofsupplymeasuresnecessitatedbythescenarios . 53 Generalmeasuresessentialforensuringsecurityofsupply ... 55 Special commentaries: –Challengesofinformation-basedinfluencingontherise ...... 56 –‘72hours’inspiresurbanpreparedness .............................................. 57

PART 4 The scenario process and method .............................................................. 58

PART 1

INTRODUCTION

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FOREWORDWith uncertainty rising both internationally and in our neighbouring regions, foresight has become an increasingly important part of security of sup-ply operations. One of the methods that has prov-en effective in foresight is scenario development. Finland’s first security of supply scenarios, which extended to the year 2025, were published in 2013. These new scenarios detailed herein cover the period between 2018 and 2030.

The scenario project was carried out collaborative-ly between the National Emergency Supply Agency, the National Emergency Supply Organisation and the Capful management consultancy in summer and autumn 2017. The results of this collaboration were an interview report compiling interviews with experts as well as the actual scenario report, which you are currently reading. An important part of the work was the organisation of four workshops, which filled the National Emergency Supply Agency’s au-ditorium and conference rooms with scenario and security of supply experts. We would like to extend our thanks to everyone who participated in the workshops. Without your contribution, preparing these scenarios – with all of their sector-specific impacts – would never have been possible.

The work ultimately resulted in the development of five scenarios, titled Global interdependency,

Armed power politics, Blocification and hybrid influence, Technological world order and The dom-inance of the East. The impacts of all five scenar-ios on security of supply were assessed both gen-erally and in eight sector-specific working groups. This report contains descriptions of the scenarios, their general impacts as well as material related to the scenario method. A significant proportion of the work – the scenarios’ sector-specific impacts and contingency plans – are reported on the HVO Extranet, which members of the National Emer-gency Supply Organisation have access to.

Global changes result not only in threats, but opportunities as well. Normally, the purpose of security of supply work is to help prepare us for threats. However, in doing so, we should also keep in mind the opportunities, of which there are several in these scenarios as well. One ex-ample would be the development opportunities bestowed by new technologies. On the other hand, new technologies can also supplant us if we neglect to train ourselves in their use. On a similar note, the economic growth of the East may provide us with opportunities to strengthen our position, such as funding for infrastructural investments, but in leveraging such opportunities we must also strive to maintain our territorial sovereignty.

The scenarios are not accurate predictions of the future. Instead, the actual future will most likely turn out to be an amalgamation of the different scenarios. Be that as it may, the scenarios can still serve as tools for thinking about and planning security of supply measures in different situations.

It should be noted that only some of the scenario work can be utilised in the preparation of the Finnish Government’s next security of supply de-cision and its memorandum. The scenarios offer the greatest benefits to the National Emergency Supply Agency and the National Emergency Sup-ply Organisation, the security of supply sectors and pools, which will be able to use them in fore-sight and preparing for changing development paths.

The scenarios and the material produced about them serve as valuable resources in the planning of security of supply work and related deci-sion-making. However, our hope is that the work can also be utilised by several different sectors and actors in the development of continuity and risk management.

Raimo Luoma

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The Security of Supply Scenarios 2030 project is an important part of the development of the National Emergency Supply Organisation’s fore-sight operations. The aim of the scenario project is to provide foresight information to serve as the basis of the Finnish Government’s security of supply decision and the National Emergency Supply Organisation’s strategic and operative decision-making. The goal of the project is to update the security of supply scenarios up to the year 2030 and create the basis for scenario-ori-ented and continuous monitoring of the operat-ing environment.

The scenario work was conducted in the form of collaboration between the National Emergency Supply Organisation and the Capful management consultancy in autumn 2017. Through workshops and interviews, the process was contributed to by a wide range of members of the National Emer-gency Supply Agency, industrial sectors and pools as well as external experts. Information gathering, deliberations by the project group and the work-shop activities formed the basis for five different development paths for the future, i.e. scenarios. The scenarios are descriptions of how the inter-national and national operating environment of security of supply work may potentially and alternatively develop by 2030.

The scenario descriptions are not meant to serve as definite predictions of the future. Instead, they are meant to steer versatile and consistent thought on potential development paths for the future. This is to improve the preparedness for interpret-ing current phenomena and bolster the planning of operations and ability to react. The idea is not to choose one scenario over the others on the basis of probability, desirability or importance, but to examine the whole formed by the scenarios. The actual future is often an amalgamation of different scenarios.

Each scenario summary and narrative is followed by a description of how sectors critical to security of supply (energy management, logistics, manu-facturing, food supply, defence industry and main-tenance, finance, health and social services, and information society) will develop in that scenario. These are followed by summaries of contingency plans for each scenario, which were prepared in sector-specific workshops. The full contingency plans will only be used in the internal preparation work of the National Emergency Supply Organi-sation’s sectors and pools. However, the indus-try-specific contingency plans and essential mea-sures also served as a basis for compiling a list of general recommendations concerning measures and policies as well as proposals on how to devel-

op the operations of the National Emergency Supply Organisation, which are included in this scenario publication.

SCENARIO READING INSTRUCTIONS

PART 2

SECURITY OF SUPPLY SCENARIOS 2030

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SCENARIO SUMMARIES

• The financial crisis faced by developing coun-tries exposes the weaknesses in the econom-ic systems of leading developing countries, such as China.

• Western nations and banks serve as safe havens for investments.

• The rising costs of conflicts and disasters drive nations towards cooperation.

• Interdependence and the legitimacy of inter-national institutions increase.

• Blockchains create new operating models and trust.

• Internal cooperation within the EU increases and the position of EU countries in NATO grows. Finland joins NATO.

• Globalisation slows down and becomes more stable and regulated.

• In China, social problems increase and highly educated people emigrate to western countries.

1. GLOBALINTERDEPENDENCY

2. ARMED POWER POLITICS

• Deteriorating climate conditions result in droughts and unprecedented mass migrations.

• Protectionist and nationalistic thinking increases.• Cultural collisions serve as a basis for wide-

spread organised terrorism.• Conflicts in the Middle East, North Korea and

eastern Ukraine escalate and become inter-twined.

• The world enters an age of power politics char-acterised by conflicts.

• Military alliances expand and grow in power. Finland joins NATO.

• The EU is overshadowed by defence alliances and national interests.

• The space arms race, the Baltic region, the Arctic region and central logistical routes be-come arenas for power politics.

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3. BLOCIFICATION AND HYBRID INFLUENCE

4. TECHNOLOGICAL WORLD ORDER

5. THE DOMINANCE OF THE EAST

• The power of global agreements decreases as the world enters an age of populism.

• The New Cold War escalates and the definition of war becomes blurred: crises are often related to hybrid influencing instead of armed conflict.

• The world is reorganised into complex and layered blocs.

• Social, economic and value-related differences between blocs are significant.

• There is a radical decrease in trust. Cyber risks escalate and protection measures are strength-ened.

• The blocs develop their own internal internets and systems.

• The EU focuses on strengthening the internal market and developing a hybrid defence alliance.

• NATO’s credibility deteriorates: The US with-draws and NATO is unable to react to hybrid influencing.

• Globalisation is rapid, network-oriented and driven by market interests.

• Developments in robotics and artificial intelli-gence radically alter operating models and the need for labour.

• The rapid pace of technological development leaves an increasingly large portion of public institutions behind.

• There is a shift from national solutions to su-pranational ones and from public services to private services.

• The power of technology conglomerates in-creases and the economy becomes increasing-ly dominated by large corporations.

• At the same time, work and production become increasingly fragmented as a result of new technologies and the platform economy.

• Global focus shifts to technology hubs, and the role of cities in relation to nations expands.

• Differences and polarisation between regions and people increase.

• The value of natural resources and rare raw materials increases as new technologies con-tinue to increase their consumption.

• The middle class grows in Asian countries, with Asia subsequently becoming a global trend-setter.

• China, Russia and Islamic nations find a com-mon ambition in bringing an end to the dom-inance of the West.

• The EU’s cohesion decreases and its influence weakens. Finland identifies itself as a neutral channel between the East and the West.

• Asian investments in Europe grow, encompass-ing strategically important sites as well.

• The logistical importance of the Northeast Passage increases.

• The focus of the global economy, corporations and global politics shifts to the East and the reign of the West comes to an end.

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THE SCENARIOS DISTILLED1 Global interdependency

Global networks

ProtectionismNationalism

Centralisedstructures (international institutions)

Techno- logical

revolution

CrisesDecentralised structures

Techno- logical

evolution

Peace

4 Technological world order

Global networks


Centralisedstructures

(large corporations)

Techno- logical

revolution

CrisesDecentralised structures(individuals)

Techno- logical

evolution

Peace

2 Armed power politics

Global networks


Centralisedstructures (nations)

Techno- logical

revolution

Crises(wars)

Decentralised structures

Techno- logical

evolution

Peace

Blocification and hybrid influence

Global networks


Centralisedstructures

Techno- logical

revolution

Crises(hybrid)

Decentralised structures

(individuals and communities)

Techno- logical

evolution

Peace

5 The dominance of the East

Global networks


Centralisedstructures (Eastern

nationsand corporations)

Techno- logical

revolution

CrisesDecentralised structures

Techno- logical

evolution

Peace

3

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SCENARIO 1

GLOBAL INTERDEPENDENCY

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SCENARIO 1

GLOBAL INTERDEPENDENCY 1/3

The Asian financial crisis strengthens the position of the West as a stable safe haven

International regulation increases and expands

Slower, more stable and regulated globalisation and economy driven by the West

• Economic growth slows down due to ageing, other demographic changes and low productivity growth, not only in western countries, but at the global level and in developing economies as well. Both nations and households continue to fall further into debt.

• The Chinese and South Korean property markets overheat. The financial crisis faced by developing countries exposes the weaknesses in the economic systems of leading developing countries and the shadow banking sector, initiating a stock market correction.

• Traditional industrial countries recover from the financial crisis faster than Asia with the help of sol-vency mechanisms created after the 2007 financial crisis. Western banks and traditional currencies serve as safe havens for investments. The West strengthens its position.

• The costs of the protectionist measures, wars and conflicts initiated in the 2010s prove immense, forc-ing nations to engage in cooperation in important international issues. The role of international insti-tutions, such as the UN, expands and global interdependency increases.

• The EU’s internal cooperation and ability to function is restored.. The European Commission initiates free trade negotiations with Australia in a situation in which the free trade agreement with the US has been put on hold.

• Work becomes increasingly automated as a result of digitalisation, leading to the disappearance of some traditional occupations. However, servitisation and the platform economy also create new types of work. The Everything-as-a-Service society expands.

• Applications built upon blockchain technology facilitate agreements between individuals and increase trust. Economic exchange between individuals becomes easier. Blockchain technology is quickly adopt-ed by the public sector as well in areas such as the implementation of land registers and the digitalisa-tion of infrastructure.

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• Conflicts gradually de-escalate. The conflicts in Syria and eastern Ukraine reach a point where armed confrontations end and diplomatic mediation begins.

• Social problems increase in China as the middle class and demands for better quality of life continue to grow amidst an ailing economy. As a result, China’s economic growth slows down and its dominance weakens as the country directs its efforts inward.

• Western countries serve as the driving forces behind international agreements. Most nations agree to the norms defined by western countries in order to promote their exports and economies. Sanctions against Russia and Russia’s counter-sanctions are abolished as mediation begins.

• Internal cooperation within the EU increases and federalisation gains traction. Finland strives to strengthen its position in the EU and its identity as a strong part of the traditional West.

• The great costs associated with the health impacts of global warming and small particle emissions are recognised. Droughts, hurricanes and a change in leadership also prompt the US to participate in climate efforts. A stronger environment and climate convention is established and measures are initiated.

• The position of European countries in NATO is strengthened. Sweden, Austria, Ireland and Finland join NATO. Defence cooperation at the EU level is deemed unnecessary. Russia disapproves of the expansion of NATO, but does not take action.

• In Russia, the end of Putin’s fourth presidency and disenchantment with centralised power lead to policy changes and democratic development. Western countries increase their economic cooperation with Russia.

• The economic growth of China, India and other countries previously characterised by strong growth has slowed down considerably, evening out and slowing down global economic growth.

• Slowing economic growth coupled with the transformation of trade and industry force countries to restructure their social models and social welfare systems. Finland responds to this transformation with changes in regulation, taxation and education.

SCENARIO 1





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• Globalisation has become slower, more stable and more regulated.

• Digital trust platforms and sharing economy transactions have become regulated. Blockchain technol-ogy is also utilised in elections and direct political decision-making, which has also served to increase direct democracy.

• The use of natural resources has been restricted based on ethical, climate and environmental policy perspectives. While natural resources are available in principle, their utilisation is costlier, more regu-lated and, in the case of certain resources, even criminalised. For example, the use of coal as fuel in energy production or the use of oil and diesel as fuel for transportation has been prohibited in many countries.

• Highly educated people from Asia continue to move to western countries in search of a higher stan-dard of living, clean air and a democratic societal model. Finland is also a popular destination for im-migrants, as the country is considered a safe and stable welfare society.

• The EU’s role in global politics has grown. The EU has continued to strengthen its economic ties with Australia, the Unites States, Canada and the UK throughout the 2020s.

• Free trade agreements have been expanded and the western economic area is strong. The United States has retained its position as a major power in international politics and the global economy. China is forced to compete more fairly in global trade after incurring debt and as a result of stricter international regulation of economic policies.

• Living conditions in Eastern Africa have improved as a result of technological development and inter-national cooperation (e.g. irrigation systems and the proliferation of fast internet connections). The improved living conditions have stabilised the political systems of East African nations and evened out the flow of refugees from Africa to Europe.

SCENARIO 1





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SCENARIO 1: GLOBAL INTERDEPENDENCY

NARRATIVE SUMMARYThe driving forces

behind the scenario2017 - 2019

Narrative steps: events and actions of various interested partiesDescription of the

scenario’s culmination2030

The costs associated with

conflicts, protectionism and

climate change are recognised

The role of international institutions strengthens

Digitalisation increases the servitisation of trade and industry

The financial crisis faced by developing countries exposes the weaknesses in China’s economic

system

Global interdependency

International regulation increases and environmental and climate policies

become stricter

Blockchain technologies create

new operating models in the private and

public sector

The EU becomes more competitive and federalisation

gains traction

Western banks and currencies

as safe havens for investments

Economic and social problems

turn China’s focus inward

Globalisation and global economic

growth slow down and stabilise

The position of European countries

in NATO is strengthened and

Finland joins NATO

Highly educated people move from

Asia to western countries

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SECTOR-SPECIFIC DESCRIPTIONSENERGY MANAGEMENT LOGISTICS MANUFACTURING

• Climate and environmental policy as well as the expansion of emissions trading outside of Europe steer the energy sector towards renewable and emission-free energy sources.

• Industrial-scale generation of wind and solar power is often profitable.

• As renewable production increases, so too does the need for load-following power (natural gas).

• The oil and gas market continues to operate: the availability of crude oil, oil products and gas is good.

• The use of fossil fuels is strongly restricted and impeded. Many EU member states stop using coal.

• The EU’s energy market is harmonised and be-comes more integrated.

• Cross-border electricity transmission connections between countries increase. The impacts on the price of electricity are difficult to predict.

• New European actors enter the Finnish energy market.

• The energy use of wood biomass and the culti-vation of biofuels taking up space from food pro-duction is restricted.

• CHP production faces difficulties as price volatil-ity increases. Plants are shut down, which weak-ens security of supply in cold and dark periods.

• Small-scale heat production increases and the competitiveness of district heating weakens.

• Global trade flows grow and interdependence increases. The logistical network becomes faster and more effective. Blockchains are re-moulding and decentralising logistic chains.

• The EU invests heavily in the development and harmonisation of its internal logistics and trans-port system. This harmonisation does not always take into account the special characteristics of Finland.

• European transport companies are given free reign to operate in different member states (com-pare to cabotage).

• Due to well-functioning networks, high domestic ownership of logistical equipment is not consid-ered critical.

• Rail traffic is invested in and increasing railway connections make rail travel faster and more convenient in Europe. The Helsinki–Tallinn tunnel connects Finland’s railway network to Europe.

• The development of logistics and transport is increasingly steered by environmental and climate policy. The Baltic Sea region is a pioneer in re-stricting emissions.

• The price of flying increases, but flight traffic vol-umes continue to increase in spite of this.

• The use of diesel in transport decreases signifi-cantly in most European countries (electrification).

• The EU’s internal market is re-harmonised. In Finland, this development facilitates exports to Europe and increases European imports.

• The availability of industrial raw materials is fair-ly good due to an effective global raw material market.

• However, the availability of some raw materials, especially ones harmful to the environment, is restricted by environmental and climate policy.

• The steering power of emissions trading increas-es and the impacts are felt by industries in the form of increasing costs. On the other hand, the geographic expansion of emissions trading evens out the competition.

• The use of wood-based fuels is restricted and the availability of forestry raw materials remains good.

• Industrial energy efficiency requirements remain in place.

• The importance of effective logistics grows as the world becomes more networked.

• Heavy industries are also servitised (Everything- as-a-Service).

• The stable growth of the global economy serves to increase the trust and consumption of house-holds.

SCENARIO 1: Global interdependency

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SECTOR-SPECIFIC DESCRIPTIONS SECTOR-SPECIFIC DESCRIPTIONSDEFENCE INDUSTRY AND MAINTENANCE

• As international agreements grow in power, pre-dictability and military security of supply improve, planning cycles grow longer and the system be-comes more stable.

• The importance of networks grows in the defence industry. Networks are trusted, which serves to lower national self-sufficiency requirements.

• As interdependencies grow, the dependence of defence systems on connections and information systems outside of Finland increase. As a result, potential disruptions elsewhere in the world have a greater impact on Finland’s situation as well.

• Defence budgets decrease. In Finland, prepared-ness is lowered while still maintaining basic pre-paredness and resources are allocated to peace-ful pursuits.

• NATO allows more extensive defence industry trading between the West and member states, but reduces trading to the East. The most expen-sive and largest defence materiel acquisitions can be handled through NATO.

• Intelligence operations increase for the purpose of ensuring trust (due to growing interdepen-dence).

FOOD SUPPLY

• In an increasingly networked world, the impor-tance of self-sufficient primary production and domestic food products gradually decreases.

• Imports and exports increase. Policy is steered by international standards.

• The food trade becomes increasingly market-driv-en. In the EU, the harmonised European food market is thought of as the domestic market.

• The EU’s agricultural policy relies on the most productive areas and an ideology according to which “not everything needs to be cultivated or produced everywhere.” Agricultural subsidies are reduced.

• In Finland, agriculture and cattle breeding are centralised into larger and increasingly industri-alised units to improve profitability.

• The marketisation of the food trade leads to oc-casional, even major fluctuations in supply and prices.

• International agreements are enacted in an at-tempt to mitigate the climate impacts of food production. The analysis and traceability of food products is also developed to improve the reli-ability of international trade.

SCENARIO 1: Global interdependency

FINANCE

• The financial crisis faced by developing countries exposes the weaknesses in China’s economic and banking systems and the shadow banking sector.

• Western banks and traditional currencies serve as safe havens for investments.

• Global economic growth becomes more balanced, stabilises and slows down moderately.

• Finland’s economic growth remains at 0.5 - 2% (GDP growth per year).

• The federalisation of the EU gains traction. The finance sector is harmonised by EU-level regula-tion and steering.

• Blockchain technology is utilised in the finance sector. Transactions verified using blockchain technology improve the reliability of the finance system.

• Barriers to entry are lowered and companies have to open up their customer interfaces to third parties when requested by the customer.

• Pension companies’ foreign investments increase. Multiplicative effects increase and grow more complex.

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HEALTH AND SOCIAL SERVICES

• The requirements of national security of supply work deteriorate, the steerability of preparedness weakens.

• In the EU, the social services and health care sec-tor and community services are harmonised and the market is developed in a more open and un-regulated direction. The importance of suprana-tional decision-making increases.

• Scientific collaboration increases.

• In Finland, ageing and a desire to maintain an extensive public sector combined with an extend-ed period of slow economic growth pose chal-lenges in regard to the funding of public services.

• The production of public services is challenging and the private sector grows. The infrastructure deficit increases.

• Health care becomes more international and at the same time the public procurement of health services and treatment from other EU countries increases.

• Finland receives an increasing number of health and social services clients from abroad as well. The linguistic and cultural backgrounds of both personnel and clients grow more diverse.

• Some areas of production (such as laboratory examinations) are also transferred abroad.

INFORMATION SOCIETY (INCL. MEDIA)

• The EU steers its member states to both improve data security and open up data and interfaces. Customer interfaces, for example, are required to be opened up to third parties to increase com-petition and develop services.

• The EU restricts the dominance of large corpo-rations based outside of the EU by increasing regulation concerning the autocratic utilisation of personal data.

• The information society gives rise to new global ecosystems. At the same time, many networks and data centres fall under foreign ownership.

• Blockchain technology is also utilised in the pub-lic sector in the digitalisation of operations and political decision-making. This increases direct democracy in the EU and Finland.

• Freedom of speech is strengthened in a large proportion of countries around the world. Infor-mation exchange across the world is open and public service media companies are strengthened.

• Democracy and freedom of speech are viewed as Finland’s strengths.

SECTOR-SPECIFIC DESCRIPTIONSSCENARIO 1: Global interdependency

SECTOR-SPECIFIC DESCRIPTIONS

SCENARIO 2

ARMED POWER POLITICS

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• Deteriorating climate conditions and record-breaking dry periods weaken living conditions especially in Eastern Africa and the Middle East. This leads to growing food shortages, unemployment and unrest.

• The numbers of refugees fleeing to neighbouring countries and Europe increase dramatically. The migration flows of Middle-Eastern refugees focus on the largest cities and Western Europe, areas with existing large concentrations of refugees or good social security. The role of gatekeepers, such as Tur-key and North African countries, grows.

• Nations continue to become more closed off as a result of nationalist and protectionist thinking. Withdrawals from international agreements become more frequent and opposition to globalisation increases.

• Armed conflicts escalate in the Middle East. The situation in Syria remains unresolved. The demands for change highlighted by the Arab Spring increase and lead to conflicts. Unrest increases in Kurdistan, Libya and Yemen as well. Russia and the United States pursue different interests in the Middle East.

• The escalation of the North Korean crisis into an armed conflict pulls China into the rivalry between the United States and Russia. The issue of Taiwan becomes a central political issue and instrument once again.

• Russia takes advantage of the conflict-ridden situation and commences military operations in eastern Ukraine. Airspace violations and military drills are commonplace and unpredictable in Eastern Europe. The EU is incapable of reacting to Russia’s actions.

• Faith in the EU’s ability to operate in the new world order diminishes. Internal conflict increases and member states seek to transfer decision-making power to the national level. The EU remains standing, but its role in decision-making diminishes.

• The United States condemns Russia’s actions and NATO expands its role and presence in Europe. In Finland, the possibility of joining NATO becomes a major theme in the 2019 parliamentary elections.

SCENARIO 2

ARMED POWER POLITICS 1/3

Escalation of challenges related to global control and the environment

Changes and major disturbances in the balance of power

New division between the global, the local and the regional

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20

• Defence budgets grow as the world is plunged into an age of armed conflict. The importance of pow-er politics increases and operations that threaten territorial sovereignty become more frequent. Control of energy and critical resources is used as a weapon in power politics.

• Mass migrations increase cultural collisions, which serve as a basis for widespread and organised terrorism. Terrorist organisations operate similarly to authoritarian nations and engage in regional wars in addition to individual strikes.

• Authoritarian actions are justified with the failure of democracy. Nations characterised by pronounced top-down leadership further increase the power of their highest decision-makers. In Russia, legislation is changed for the 2024 presidential elections so that Putin can continue serving as president during the ongoing state of emergency.

• Support for democratic decision-making, common European values and basic human rights deteriorates and they no longer guide people’s actions. Separatist movements, both political and military, grow in power in places such as Catalonia and Scotland.

• Nations strengthen and form new, more extensive defence alliances. Defence alliances divide nations into different camps. The United Kingdom and France serve as the European drivers of NATO cooper-ation. The EU is overshadowed by the defence alliances and the interests of individual nations.

• Finland and Sweden join NATO. The Nordic countries (Finland, Sweden and Norway) expand their defence cooperation within NATO. Russia reacts to the expansion of NATO by disrupting internation-al trade and the supply of energy. Hybrid influencing targeting Finland increases significantly as well. The impact on Finland’s national economy is severe.

• Maritime transport in the Baltic Sea becomes more difficult. This hinders Finland’s exports and imports, and maritime logistics are subject to occasional, major delays.

ARMED POWER POLITICS 1/3 ARMED POWER POLITICS 2/3




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SCENARIO 2

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• The Arctic region and the space arms race have become the central arenas for power politics. The conquest of space and the risks of space warfare necessitate new kinds of international defence treaties, though reaching a mutual agreement on their content proves challenging.

• The importance of logistical routes has also increased. The Suez Canal, the Strait of Malacca, the South China Sea, the Danish Straits, the Arctic Ocean and the Baltic Sea are stages for international crises and targets of terrorism.

• The increased importance of the Arctic region and the space arms race has brought China back to the stage of international power politics. China, Russia, the United States, Denmark and Norway compete over the logistical routes and resources of the Arctic region.

• The security policy situation and cyber risks have reduced information sharing and cooperation between nations. As a result, there are fewer resources available for research and development. Digitalisation and the implementation of new technologies have slowed down.

• Defence alliances serve as the key wielders of power in global politics. Defence alliances have also expanded their sphere of operation from defence to economic cooperation. At the same time, how-ever, the alliances’ member states strive to hold on to their own national decision-making power. The directives and harmonisation efforts of the European Union are but a memory of the past.

• The increase in conflicts and the faltering of international climate and energy policy have resulted in an uncontrollable increase in greenhouse gas emissions. Problems caused by decreasing land moisture increase in Southern Europe as well, which has led to a significant decline in the region’s agricultural production. Climate change increases immigration from the southernmost parts of Europe to Central Europe.

• Extreme weather phenomena, such as storms and floods, continue to become more frequent in Central and Northern Europe.





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SCENARIO 2

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SCENARIO 2: Armed power politics

NARRATIVE SUMMARYThe driving forces

behind the scenario2017 - 2019

Narrative steps: events and actions of various interested partiesDescription of the

scenario’s culmination2030

Armed power politics

Declining climate conditions deteriorate

living conditions in Eastern Africa and

the Middle East

Immigration flows to

neighbouring nations and Europe

increase

Conflicts in the Middle East, North Korea

and eastern Ukraine escalate and become

intertwined

Protectionism and nationalism

increase

Cultural collisions

and terrorism increase

Nations become closed off

and rivalry increases. Relations between Rus-

sia, the US and China are strained

The defence policy situation

deteriorates and military operations

expand

European values and the EU’s internal decision-

making deteriorate

Defence alliances are

strengthened and inland joins

NATO

Digitalisation and the implemen-

tation of new technologies slows down

The importance of the Arctic region, logistical routes and the space arms race

increase

Defence alliances become the main wielders

of power in global politics

23


• Control over energy is used as leverage in power politics. Finland’s dependence on imported energy poses risks.

• The risk of strikes against the energy system in-creases.

• There are occasional fuel shortages and the price of energy rises.

• The transportation of fuels in the Baltic Sea is challenging. Effective maritime transports become increasingly important for ensuring a stable fuel supply.

• The importance of EU-level steering diminishes. The energy sector is steered primarily through national regulation and taxation.

• The steering of Finland’s energy sector focuses on increasing self-sufficiency and securing ener-gy imports. There is a major push to decrease dependence on Russia.

• Fuel prices rise and the focus of production sub-sidies shifts to securing self-sufficiency (wood, biomass and peat). The importance of renewable fuels diminishes.

• Many countries continue to use coal and strive to preserve existing power plants.

• Energy poverty increases among consumers in Europe and Finland.

• The strategic importance of sea routes increases and they are used as geopolitical tools (e.g. Suez, the Strait of Malacca, the South China Sea, the Danish Straits, the Arctic Ocean and the Baltic Sea).

• Russia seeks to influence maritime transports, and as Finland joins NATO, some maritime trans-ports are lost.

• Maritime transport in the Baltic Sea becomes more difficult. This causes major obstacles for Finland’s maritime logistics, hindering imports and exports. However, membership in NATO provides security to Finland’s critical maritime transports.

• Russia imposes major restrictions on the use of its airspace, which has a notable impact on flight connections from Finland.

• China, Russia, the United States, Denmark and Norway compete over the logistical routes and resources of the Arctic region. China seeks to secure its trade routes and flows.

• The risk of strikes against logistical infrastructure grows.

• The operational preconditions of international logistics operators are doubted and there is a push to bring transport chains under national control.

• Increasing security measures slow down trans-ports and increase costs.

• The availability, import and export of raw mate-rials are hindered by rising protectionism.

• Economic and political barriers, such as customs and sanctions, increase the prices of many indus-trial raw materials.

• Regional conflicts disrupt critical logistical routes and supply channels, which has an impact on the global market.

• The importance of national self-sufficiency in-creases and domestic production is strongly sup-ported.

• NATO reservations on raw materials help Finland as a member of the alliance (mutual aid). Internal resources and materials cannot be accessed with-out NATO membership.

• Caution over trade and industry increases and investments decrease.

• Households’ trust and consumption decrease.


24


• The importance of power politics increases. Op-erations that threaten territorial sovereignty increase and the likelihood of armed conflict increases in Finland’s neighbouring areas as well.

• Defence forces and defence industry budgets increase amidst growing crises.

• Trade blockages increase and the market areas in which industries (including those unrelated to defence) are able to operate grow narrower.

• Risks of production disruptions in the defence industry (such as in the availability of components) increase.

• There is a push to increase self-sufficiency in all critical sectors. Society’s planning cycle shortens.

• Finland and Sweden join NATO. The Nordic coun-tries (Finland, Sweden and Norway) expand their defence cooperation within NATO.

• Besides NATO, the importance of bilateral defence industry agreements increases. The restrictions concerning defence cooperation with Norway are abolished.

• Finland’s defence industry exports focus on stra-tegic partners and al l ies as the NATO market opens up.

FOOD SUPPLY

• The availability of raw materials decreases and problems arise in regard to their sufficiency, qual-ity and safety. Domestic food production is strong-ly supported.

• The availability of capital goods (energy, electric-ity, water) is uncertain and the need for stockpil-ing increases.

• In a world racked by conflict, the importance of ensuring the fulfilment of basic needs, such as an adequate food supply, increases. As a result, the trading and production of non-essential goods decreases.

• The range of available food products diminishes.

• Population growth coupled with abrupt changes in the availability of food result in price fluctua-tions. The need for food products increases.

• Problems caused by decreasing land moisture increase in Southern Europe as well, leading to a significant decline in the region’s agricultural production.

• Extreme weather phenomena, such as storms and floods, hinder agricultural production in Fin-land as well.


FINANCE

• Economic growth and the building of global net-works is hindered by geopolitical crises, customs policy and currency competition.

• The global incurring of debts increases and eco-nomic growth slows down.

• The EU is racked by internal conflict and the union’s ability to operate is weak. The directives and harmonisation efforts of the European Union are but a memory of the past. The role of nation-al actors expands.

• The importance of Nordic cooperation in regard to economic policy increases.

• Discussion about national currencies increases.

• Defence alliances expand their sphere of opera-tion from defence to economic cooperation. At the same time, however, the alliances’ member states strive to hold on to their own national de-cision-making power.

25


• The wartime economy perspective becomes in-creasingly important in security of supply.

• Large refugee movements cause pressure to dis-mantle the structures and services of the welfare society (to reduce taxation) and/or increase their efficiency.

• The role of social and health services as part of a comprehensive defence system expands.

• Finland’s geographical location coupled with trad-ing affected by power politics increase the im-portance of maintaining independence and self-sufficiency in the production of basic services.

• The availability of critical goods declines (depend-ing on NATO preparedness). The availability of supplies, spare parts and medication on the in-ternational market declines.

• Prioritisation becomes increasingly important in health care. Life-threatening conditions and ur-gent patients are treated while the provision of other types of care is postponed.


• The security policy situation and cyber risks have reduced information sharing and cooperation between nations. As a result, there are fewer resources available for research and development.

• The role of the nation state expands in the media sector as well (public services and political steering).

• Digitalisation and the implementation of new technologies slows down. Information and data become increasingly isolated into different com-partments.

• Information-based influence increases in the in-creasingly conflict-ridden world, challenging freedom of speech and traditional media com-panies. Diversity of opinion is compromised.

• The resilience of media becomes increasingly important as citizens flock to information sourc-es that they consider reliable.

• Freedom of speech is trampled by defence alli-ances and nations.

• Authoritarian values become more prevalent in previously liberal societies.

SECTOR-SPECIFIC DESCRIPTIONSSCENARIO 2: Armed power politics

26


SCENARIO 3

BLOCIFICATION AND HYBRID INFLUENCE

27

• The expansion of rhetoric focusing on national interests weakens international cooperation. The steer-ing power of global agreements declines.

• Resource protectionism increases, which increases uncertainty in regard to the availability of energy and minerals.

• The New Cold War escalates. Conflicts between nations are more often related to hybrid influencing and attempts to gain influence instead of geographical areas or armed conflict.

• At first, some actors do not notice or recognise being influenced. Cyber attacks can be undetectable and the actual impacts of information-based influencing may be downplayed.

• Nations realise the actual risks of hybrid influencing as radical hybrid operations start coming to light. Election results have been influenced and strategic areas or infrastructure have been taken over by foreign actors. It is often difficult to determine whether the influencing was carried out by a country, a corporation, an organisation or individual actors.

• As a result of information-based influencing, people’s trust in institutions decreases and objective facts lose their meaning. Different reference groups trust in different information sources and extremist thinking continues to increase.

• Rivalry increases. Western countries highlight China’s unfair competition: its artificially affordable currency, corporate espionage and efforts to hinder the operations of foreign companies. Nations are forced to choose which political camp they identify with.

• NATO’s credibility deteriorates when it proves incapable of reacting to the problems posed by hybrid influencing due to internal conflicts and an inability to renew itself. The United States reduces the re-sources allocated to NATO.

• The EU aims to become a pioneer in hybrid defence cooperation and focuses its resources on creating a new type of defence community.

SCENARIO 3

BLOCIFICATION AND HYBRID INFLUENCE 1/3

The emergence of hybrid influencing

Blocification and the EU hybrid defence alliance

Polarisation and differences between the blocs increase

2018 - 2021 2022 - 2026 2026 - 2030

28

• The world is reorganised into competing alliances, or blocs, based on economic cooperation, ideology, religion or values. In addition to nations, these blocs are composed of companies and other organisa-tions.

• The blocs are often layered. Differing ideologies drive European nations into different blocs. Examples include conservative and isolationist nations or more liberal nations and nations committed to mitigat-ing climate change. Finland aligns itself primarily with the Nordic countries and the Baltic Sea region bloc, which is part of the European Union, which is in turn part of a larger free trade zone.

• Competition between blocs, decreasing openness, customs, sanctions and countersanctions slow down global economic growth and networking.

• Cyber risks escalate and protection measures are strengthened. Critical ICT systems are isolated with-in national and bloc borders.

• The definition of war becomes blurred. Different actors are wary of crossing the definition of war and attempt to harm others by supporting and agitating specific population groups with the aim of under-mining their own countries.

• The EU focuses on strengthening the internal market and developing modern defence measures. The aim is to protect against and respond to cyber attacks and strikes against infrastructure. The EU’s hybrid defence alliance complements the weakened NATO and serves as its European civil defence pillar.

• Finland, Sweden and Norway deepen and modernise Nordic defence cooperation.

• The narratives holding society together are blurred, leading to increasing unrest. Digital networks allow likeminded individuals to find each other easier than before, leading to an increase in tribalism that transcends national borders. The influence of narratives that strengthen blocs increases.

• Hybrid terrorism is based on strikes made by individuals or difficult-to-detect influencing without top-down direction. Besides Islamic terrorism, this gives rise to counter-terrorism, political terrorism, eco-terrorism...

BLOCIFICATION AND HYBRID INFLUENCE 1/3 BLOCIFICATION AND HYBRID INFLUENCE 2/3

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SCENARIO 3




29

• Blocification has increased differences between nations. Democracy is considered the ideal form of society only by certain blocs. Other blocs prefer administration and societal models based on author-itarian leadership or religious doctrine. Information-based influencing and the diversification of media pose challenges to freedom of speech and democratic decision-making.

• Global polarisation has increased economic inequality. Some of the blocs are based on a strong and extensive internal market, while certain countries have remained completely outside of the blocs, which hinders their exports and economic growth. Although internal trade within the blocs may flourish, the global market suffers, which also hinders Finland’s trade and industry, exports and national economy.

• Nations and blocs are also divided by their attitudes towards technology and privacy. Nations and blocs are divided into surveillance states and privacy havens. Some societies allow extensive control of personal data and the surveillance of citizens and companies in the name of security.

• People in different blocs live in different digital realities and thus in different value realities. In China, for example, facial recognition combined with the IoT, advanced analytics, social media and a register encompassing nearly a billion citizens enables completely new types of intelligence gathering.

• Certain areas and communities rely heavily on experience-based knowledge instead of scientific research due to information-based influencing and a declined trust in information. However, instead of shunning science, other areas and communities have strengthened their role as advocates and promoters of research-based information.

• Looking back, the trust, characteristic of the early 21st century, in information, nations, companies and information systems is considered naive. The blocs and/or nations develop their own, separate and internal systems for controlling information in order to prevent external influence and increase security. Examples include geographically or otherwise restricted internets, networks and information systems.


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SCENARIO 3




30

The driving forces behind the scenario

2017 - 2019Narrative steps: events and actions of various interested parties

Description of the scenario’s culmination

2030


SCENARIO 3: Blocification and hybrid influence

NARRATIVE SUMMARY

Digitalisation, IoT and automation

expand rapidly in all industries,

people’s lives and societies

The narratives holding society

together are blurred and

rivalry increases

Blocification and hybrid influence

The world is reorganised

into competing alliances, or

blocs

Nations realise the actual risks of

hybrid influencing as radical hybrid opera-tions come to light

NATO is racked by internal

disputes, rendering it unable to react to

hybrid influence problems

Organisation into online tribes and

value communities that transcend national borders increases

Decentralised terrorism based

on strikes by individuals increases

Economic and social differences increase between

the blocs

The EU’s hybrid defence alliance

strives to respond to the new security

situation

Blocs and/or nations develop their

own, separate internets, systems

and networks

Trust in and desire for international cooperation and

global agreements decrease

The New Cold War escalates

and nations strive to increase their

influence

31


ENERGY MANAGEMENT LOGISTICS MANUFACTURING

• Resource protectionism increases, leading to growing uncertainty over the availability of en-ergy.

• The EU gives nations more latitude, but steers them towards expanding and harmonising region-al energy markets.

• Finland is part of the energy market and electric-ity and gas transfer networks of the Baltic Sea region together with Sweden, Denmark, the Bal-tic states, Poland and Germany.

• Finland and the Baltic states grow increasingly dependent on the Nordic countries for their en-ergy supply. Norway’s and Sweden’s energy pro-duction hold a dominant position, increasing vulnerability.

• US dependence on all forms of imported energy decreases, providing Finland with opportunities in regard to the availability of oil and LNG.

• The importance of LNG grows and the maritime transport of LNG from the US to Europe increases.

• Ensuring the functionality and data security of information networks becomes increasingly im-portant in all sectors and their importance to the energy system grows in all the scenarios, but especially in scenario 3.

• Obstacles and hindrances to global trade flows between blocs or alliances, such as customs, in-crease.

• However, logistical flows within blocs become smoother.

• Blocification increases the importance of agree-ments between partner nations in logistics as well.

• Finland belongs to the “Hanseatic Alliance” com-posed of Sweden, Denmark, the Baltic states, Germany and Poland.

• Transport connections and smart logistics solu-tions are developed between the Baltic Sea region and the Nordic countries.

• Finland is highly dependent on Russian contain-er and ro-ro traffic, which in this scenario becomes a threat to Finland.

• The platform economy and digital networking expand in distribution logistics, but not in main freight logistics.

• The threat of cyber attacks on the control of lo-gistical systems and flight traffic increases.

• Deteriorating international cooperation and grow-ing resource protectionism lead to growing un-certainty over the availability of industrial raw materials (including energy and minerals).

• The EU’s internal market and the internal markets of the blocs within Europe grow and unify. In particular, the importance of the Baltic Sea region bloc to Finnish industries grows.

• Blocification restricts the global exports of Finnish industries. The obstacles and hindrances to trading between blocs drive up costs.

• The importance of trading and customs unions increases, which has an impact on where trade flows are directed.

• Managing situational awareness and ensuring the functionality of management and production systems become increasingly important.

• The threat of cyber attacks and other influence methods increases. Risks include methods based on the exertion of economic pressure and cor-porate acquisitions.


32


• The definition of war becomes blurred and war itself becomes more comprehensive (including political, economic, social, informative, etc. means).

• The world is reorganised into competing alliances, or blocs, which leads to the occasion-al scarcity of materials critical to the defence industry.

• Connections between point-like disturbances are difficult to identify and their perpetrators or pre-meditation is often difficult to determine.

• Finland, Sweden and Norway modernise and deepen Nordic defence cooperation. Countries in the Baltic Sea region also engage in close co-operation.

• Due to the proliferation of hybrid influencing, defence is primarily immaterial.

• The EU’s internal defence industry market is strengthened and the EU’s own defence equip-ment industry grows. This requires integration as well as R&D funding through the EU and EDA.

• France and Germany strive to dominate the EU’s internal defence industry market.

• Connections between the defence industries of the EU and the US deteriorate. The UK maintains its connection with the US and is sidelined from the EU.

FOOD SUPPLY

• Uncertainty over the availability of energy and minerals increases.

• International food trade is hindered by blocifica-tion.

• The EU’s/blocs’ internal markets grow and indus-tries’ dependence on them increases.

• The proportion of domestic goods increases while the range of available products grows smaller overall. Nationalistic thinking increases among consumers.

• State control increases and agricultural subsidies are increased.

• The number of Finnish SMEs operating in the sector increases as domestic production is sup-ported.

• Food industry regulation focuses on the safety, traceability and domestic nature of food produc-tion in particular.

• Cyber threats related to food chain monitoring, distribution and production management in-crease.

• There are attempts to influence food production through methods such as economic pressuring, corporate acquisitions and sowing doubt about its quality and reliability.


FINANCE

• Establishing extensive international agreements and finding global solutions becomes more dif-ficult. Competition between blocs, decreasing openness, customs, sanctions and countersanc-tions slow down global economic growth and networking.

• Global economic growth becomes polarised and more unbalanced as nations have varying degrees of success in solving their structural challenges and creating alliances.

• Some of the blocs are based on a strong and ex-tensive internal market, while certain countries have remained completely outside of the blocs, which hinders their exports and economic growth.

• Although internal trade within the blocs may flourish, the global market suffers, which also hinders Finland’s trade and industry, exports and national economy.

• Cyber risks increase in the financial sector as well. It is often difficult to identify the party behind cyber attacks. “Smart” financial terrorism also increases (such as preventing the payment of pensions).

33


• Society: Health care and social services are major targets for hybrid influencing (low threshold for influence).

• Digitalisation and the vulnerability of information systems cause disruptions in service production, such as patient data and property management systems.

• The risk of systems being highjacked and data resources being corrupted increases.

• Health care support services, such as diagnostics and equipment maintenance, become more sus-ceptible to interference and dependence on in-frastructure increases (such as electricity and hospital IoT).

• Citizens’ trust in basic services and the authorities decreases and the reliability of basic services declines. This also leads to a decrease in crisis tolerance.

• Information-based influencing alters people’s opinions in ways that are damaging for society. Unrest and the threat of terrorism increase.

• The importance of regional and national response readiness increases.

• Nordic cooperation increases.

• Counter-hybrid influencing is developed.


• Cyber risks escalate and protection measures are strengthened. Critical ICT systems are isolated within national and bloc borders. Examples in-clude geographically or otherwise restricted in-ternets, networks and information systems.

• Attempts are made to influence Finnish informa-tion society through the acquisition of land near communications nodes, storage facilities or serv-er hotels related to specific information systems, for example.

• Media companies are attacked with information operations (and physically).

• Information warfare becomes a major focus and is raised to the forefront.

• Fake news is easier to spread, which diminishes people’s trust in institutions and the authorities, for example. Different reference groups trust in different information sources and extremist think-ing increases.

• Linguistic barriers become cultural and informa-tion barriers. Critical ICT systems and media con-sumption are restricted and differentiated.

SECTOR-SPECIFIC DESCRIPTIONSSCENARIO 3: Blocification and hybrid influence

34


SCENARIO 4

TECHNOLOGICAL WORLD ORDER

35

• The pace of technological development and digitalisation continues to increase. Developments in robotics and artificial intelligence reduce the need for labour in nearly all sectors and the price of labour starts to lose its meaning.

• Global technology companies strengthen their position as owners of data and information, and the rapid pace of technological development leaves an increasingly large portion of public institutions behind. Power shifts increasingly from nations to multinational networks. The EU’s role declines gradually.

• Western decision-making and administration models are seen as a hindrance to the utilisation of new technologies. In connection with the transformation of trade, industry and the social structure, regu-lation is loosened and structures are renewed.

• Increasing networking and returns to scale force many systems to go global. A growing share of Fin-land’s economic structure falls under the ownership of international corporations as well. The importance of trade, data communications, capital and competence flows increases.

• Trade and industry undergo a divide: The market becomes increasingly dominated by large actors, but at the same time the digital platforms that they provide and increasing local production enable the proliferation of network-oriented and decentralised operating models.

• Globalisation and technological development change the operating models and competitive arenas of nearly all sectors (such as finance, medicine, transport). There is a steady shift from national solutions to supranational and city-specific regional solutions. Public services are privatised.

• Heterogeneity increases in Finnish society as well as work and the consumption of services become more individual. Responsibility for income and well-being shifts increasingly from societies to the individual.

SCENARIO 4

TECHNOLOGICAL WORLD ORDER 1/3

Old structures collapse Technology enhances, purifies and polarises

A new global market economy driven by technology and dominated by cities and corporations

2018 - 2021 2022 - 2026 2026 - 2030

Google Samsung

Tencent

Amazon

36

• Globalisation continues rapidly and in a market-driven manner as major international corporations and networks continue to increase their influence.

• Trade and industry undergo another divide: While operating models and technologies are harmonised and economies of scale rise to the forefront, opportunities for self-sufficient, decentralised, small-scale production also increase (e.g. decentralised energy production, 3D printing, decentralised pri-mary production).

• Advancements in energy technologies and storage make energy production cleaner, electrify transport and improve resource efficiency. The power of OPEC countries diminishes.

• Cities grow in power and influence in relation to nations. Global geopolitics focuses on technology centres around the world. Cities compete with one another over highly skilled labour and productive business operations.

• Global economic growth becomes polarised and more unbalanced as nations and regions have vary-ing degrees of success in solving their structural and social challenges, adopting technologies and re-newing their infrastructure.

• Difference between individuals in regard to quality of life, income and skill level also increase. In Finland, development efforts focus on the largest conurbations with the aim of improving interna-tional competitiveness. Differences between rural areas and cities grow.

• Increasing differences between population groups lead to the blurring of shared identity and occa-sional unrest. Digital identity becomes equally important to national identity.


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SCENARIO 4



37

• The power of major technology conglomerates in relation to nation states has grown immensely in the 2020s. The national ties of large corporations weaken as new operating models allow them to spread to multiple industries around the world.

• The integration of digitalisation, automation and robotics into everything enables artificial intelligence to surpass human reasoning when it comes to decision-making.

• The importance of international agreements between nations has diminished in the new global market economy driven by technology and dominated by cities and corporations.

• New technologies are utilised to build faster connections between major cities (e.g. Hyperloop). Glob-al urbanisation is increasingly controlled with the help of artificial intelligence.

• China’s role as the factory of the world diminishes. Falling energy prices, bot-shoring and local manu-facturing bring traditional production back to western countries and Finland. However, Chinese cities and companies have managed to grow by shifting from cheap production to technology development.

• The capital generated by technologies is concentrated, although operating models are increasingly decentralised. The majority of economic value is generated by a globally operating expert elite, while decentralised micro-entrepreneurs, or “task-rabbits,” adapt to the new organisation of work. Techno-logical development and robotisation have increased unemployment, but also given rise to new occu-pations. However, a proportion of the working age population never finds employment.

• In Finland, regional differences in education and income level have grown significantly as a result of technological development and the transformation of work. Differences between rural areas and cities in regard to the availability of services and housing as well as well-being have increased. New ways of working, cheap energy and decentralised structures allow people to live in rural areas as well, but the lifestyle is markedly different compared to cities.


2018 - 2021 2022 - 2026 2026 - 2030

SCENARIO 4



38


SCENARIO 4: Technological world order

NARRATIVE SUMMARY




2030

Global technology companies strengthen their posi-tion as owners of data

and information

Market-driven globalisation and

urbanisation speed up

Technological world order

The pace of technological

development and digitalisation

increases exponentially

Micro- entrepreneurship increases as the

platform and network economy grows

Trade and i ndustry become

centralised, but work and production are

decentralised

There is a shift from national solutions

and regulation to supranational solutions and regulation Public servi-

ces are privatised

Increasing networking and

returns to scale force companies and social

structures to go global

Cities and corporations grow

in power and influence in relation

to nations

Individual and regional

polarisation increases

The integration of digitalisation and

robotics into everything makes artificial intelli-

gence superior in decision-making

The importance of international

agreements between nations diminishes

Developments in robotics and artificial

intelligence reduce the need for labour in nearly all sectors

39


• Advancements in energy technologies and stor-age increase renewable energy production, elec-trify transport and improve resource efficiency significantly faster than expected.

• The share of electricity in total energy consump-tion increases.

• New electricity storage solutions improve the capacity to regulate the energy supply and the short-term reliability of supply over the long term.

• The conversion of electricity into heat and gas (P2G) increases.

• Smart buildings and networks make it possible to efficiently regulate consumption and production.

• Decentralised, small-scale production of electric-ity becomes increasingly common and microgrids are built.

• The oil and gas market continues to operate and thus the availability of crude oil, oil products and gas is good.

• The balance of power of the energy sector is bro-ken. Dependence on oil decreases and the pow-er of OPEC countries diminishes. The increase in the global demand for oil and LNG slows down, which improves the availability of fuels.

• The energy sector’s norms are renewed: new ac-tors enter the sector, seeking to challenge energy companies or take over their customer interface.

• The energy market becomes more international and foreign ownership increases.

• Advancements in telecommunications, automa-tion and artificial intelligence cause rapid chang-es in logistics. A smart transport system is realised faster than expected.

• The resulting new logistics system is based on sensor technology, analytics (smart contract) and automation.

• Drones – amateur UAVs and professional re-mote-controlled devices – change the transpor-tation of people and goods (intermodalism).

• Industrial scale 3D printing and e-commerce in-crease the importance of local logistics and trans-port nodes.

• Autonomous transport becomes more common, starting with cars and gradually in heavy traffic as well from 2030 onwards.

• The logistics sector becomes increasingly inter-national and is restructured. The importance of information management increases.

• New technologies are utilised to build faster con-nections between growth centres.

• People and goods flow seamlessly in cities and along growth corridors. Meanwhile transports to sparsely populated areas slow down and become more expensive.

• The transformation of work reduces the need for labour, with drivers mostly needed only for spe-cial transports. This has an impact on the level of respect for the industry and training.

• Developments in robotics and artificial intelligence reduce the need for labour in nearly all sectors. Work is performed by machines and systems that are controlled from elsewhere.

• Industrial occupations change and servitisation increases.

• A growing share of the economic structure falls under the ownership of international corpora-tions.

• Skilled labour is concentrated in major city centres.• 3D printing increases particularly in industrial

manufacturing. Experiments in the self-sufficient, decentralised and small-scale production of goods also increase.

• Falling energy prices, bot-shoring and local pro-duction bring traditional production back to west-ern countries and Finland.

• Artificial intelligence is utilised in manufacturing. The ethical issues of artificial intelligence, such as liability, raise widespread discussion.

• Information management and documentation become easier as systems become more open. However, this also creates new vulnerabilities. Managing disruptions becomes more difficult.


40


• Opportunities for utilising artificial intelligence and machine learning increase. Autonomous systems become increasingly widespread.

• 3D printing increases the supply of spare parts in the defence industry. The fragmentation of work and production increases resilience.

• Cyber vulnerability increases and dependence on data connections grows as a result of compre-hensive digitalisation and IoT.

• Relevant information is often controlled by private actors who usually operate outside of Finland.

• With functions becoming increasingly soft-ware-based, the importance of know-how and intellectual property rights increases in the de-fence industry as well. Safeguarding know-how becomes increasingly difficult (reverse engineer-ing).

• The fragmentation and privatisation of social functions also changes the defence industry’s operating logic.

• Economic optimisation weakens the material dimension of security of supply: the amount of goods held in stock decreases and there is no choice but to adapt to the conditions resulting from the economic optimisation of companies.

FOOD SUPPLY

• Production structures and value chains continue to become more international.

• Distribution is concentrated in large, highly au-tomated centres. The platform and the data are owned by global conglomerates (e.g. smart farming).

• The influence of cities over food policy grows.• Restrictions on the global trading of agricultural

products are released as market-driven globali-sation accelerates and as a result of lobbying by international companies.

• As regards food supply, international competition reduces prices, which in turn reduces profitability.

• Domestic agricultural production decreases and importing increases as a result of increasing com-petition.

• As a result of poor profitability, (upstream) food chain actors are taken over by foreign companies.

• On the other hand, technological development changes food production structures (e.g. 3D print-ing of food, automation), which improves the opportunities available to small-scale producers. Consumers’ and SMEs’ own production increases.


FINANCE

• The finance sector is steered in a market-orient-ed and consumer-driven manner. The sector’s barriers to entry are lowered.

• Demand for the openness of data increases on the basis of competition and service development.

• As market-orientation increases and the bound-aries of the finance sector become blurred, it becomes increasingly difficult to establish strict international agreements. This poses challenges for international trade and finance policy.

• The role of public authority in the finance sector is maintained, but diminished.

• All sectors of the finance industry become supra-national. International ownership and the num-ber of international actors increase in Finland’s finance industry as well.

• The EU can no longer function properly as oper-ations shift to the global level.

• Traditional finance companies are supplanted by new actors from different industries. Value chains and distribution channels change.

• Shadow banks and alternative currencies (cryp-tocurrencies) become more common.

• Although the expansion of the internet and the platform economy create opportunities for the poorest population groups as well, global econom-ic growth becomes polarised as different regions have varying degrees of success in solving struc-tural challenges and adopting new technologies.

41


• Responsibility for well-being shifts increasingly from societies to the individual.

• The production of basic services is increasingly controlled by private actors, such as insurance companies.

• Foreign actors increase their presence in Finland. • The interests of global actors and the lack of na-

tional ties create challenges in regard to infra-structure maintenance, for example.

• Differences in well-being between rural areas and cities increase. Market-oriented actors are pri-marily interested in major city centres.

• Supranational actors hold the data and the pow-er, and they can influence the algorithms govern-ing artificial intelligence, for example. This caus-es Finland to surrender some of its decision-mak-ing power.

• The utilisation of robotics and artificial intelligence introduces new possibilities in health care and also contributes to foresight (e.g. disruption no-tices and monitoring).

• Acquisition and logistics become dominated by a small number of actors.

• Health and illnesses are treated remotely and independently with the help of artificial intelli-gence.


• The market becomes increasingly dominated by large actors, but at the same time the digital plat-forms that they provide enable the proliferation of decentralised operating models.

• Data and information are owned by technology giants, who are also capable of producing global solutions.

• The range of actors becomes increasingly diverse. Public service media companies weaken.

• The sector’s boundaries become blurred. People produce, share and consume data and information via digital platforms. Technology bridges cultural and linguistic differences.

• From the perspective of the media sector, freedom of speech becomes increasingly defined by tech-nology companies.

• Differences in people’s media literacy become increasingly pronounced.

• The integration of digitalisation, automation and robotics into everything enables artificial intelli-gence to surpass human reasoning when it comes to decision-making.

• Artificial/machine intelligence starts to make publication decisions.

SECTOR-SPECIFIC DESCRIPTIONSSCENARIO 4: Technological world order

42


SCENARIO 5

THE DOMINANCE OF THE EAST

43

• China controls a significant proportion of important raw materials, which grow in value as their con-sumption increases in construction, solar panels, batteries and other electronics and technology (e.g. rare-earth elements, lead, nickel, cadmium, lithium, magnesium). Other nations in possession of these resources leverage their advantage.

• The deregulation started by the United States spurs banks to increase their risk-taking. Stock prices continue to grow despite increasing debt and technology companies reporting losses in the billions. However, there is no real basis for the growing stock prices, which leads to the bursting of the proper-ty bubble and a stock market collapse, starting in the United States.

• The West’s recovery from the financial crisis is slowed down by the increasing debt accrued by nations and households as well as the expansion of the protectionism and populist rhetoric that they practice.

• Many Asian countries – China and India in particular – are able to recover from the economic downturn faster than western countries thanks to quick restructuring of the financial system. China renews itself by adopting a strategically managed societal model, a civil service based on the Singapore model and the innovation culture of Silicon Valley.

• China’s extensive natural resources, massive internal market, highly educated experts and socialistic planned economy provide Chinese companies with a strong advantage against the competition, which some even accuse of being unfair. Chinese companies receive affordable funding and access to massive data stores. The market share of Chinese companies in lucrative sectors is secured by the Chinese government. The long-running trend of Asia growing in power and influence becomes even more pronounced.

• China, Russia and Islamic nations will find a common ambition in bringing an end to the dominance of the West. Traditional democracy is considered an ineffective, inflexible and even dangerous social model.

SCENARIO 5

THE DOMINANCE OF THE EAST 1/3

China is renewed – The West suffers from financial problems and an inability to adapt

Asia becomes the driving force of new trends, the global economy and decision-making

Asia rises to the top – China’s dominance in Eurasia

2018 - 2021 2022 - 2026 2026 - 2030

44

• Asia’s middle class grows and consumption increases, making Asia the new global trendsetter. The majority of consumer and B2B products are developed for the Asian market. The focus of the global economy shifts to the East.

• Russia gradually grows in power, fuelled by Asian trade and good political relations with China. The countries are united by their communist history, more or less authoritarian governments and infra-structure projects that aim to unify Eurasia.

• The 21st century Maritime Silk Road strengthens trade policy cooperation between China and India. Indonesia grows, supported by Chinese and Indian trade policy, though competition between the coun-tries also intensifies.

• Asian and Middle Eastern countries seek to fully exploit the natural resources and cheap labour of Africa. Asian ownerships in Africa expand rapidly. Asian countries increase their influence over the politics of many African countries.

• The East takes an active approach to international agreements. Led by China, it strives to promote climate and environmental policies in order to increase demand for advanced Chinese manufacturing technologies and electric cars.

• In Europe, unity is eroded by ageing, the falling employment rate, increasing debt, slow economic growth and populism. The EU’s influence is diminished as member states seek to transfer power back to themselves.

• Asian investments in Europe increase. These investments also include strategically important areas and in-frastructure. Eastern European countries in particular consider Chinese investments to be vital for their economies, believing them to also provide protection against Russia’s potential attempts to increase its sphere of influence. The EU attempts to fight against strategic investments with the help of tighter regulation concerning foreign ownership. However, these attempts are undermined by internal disputes within the EU.

• Finland identifies itself as a neutral country and a channel between the East and the West. The aim is to strengthen trade relations with Asian countries and Russia. Finland withdraws from NATO coop-eration and aligns itself in the camp opposing the EU’s efforts towards unification.

THE DOMINANCE OF THE EAST 1/3 THE DOMINANCE OF THE EAST 2/3

2018 - 2021 2022 - 2026 2026 - 2030

SCENARIO 5




45

• China has managed to solve its demographic challenges with severe policies relating to systematic social class division, retirement and the creation of new types of employment, among other issues.

• The reign of the West in global politics and the global economy comes to an end. Western values and a democratic system of government no longer function as the basis for international operations.

• With the dominance of the West broken, China, Russia and India no longer have as many shared in-terests and the countries enter into fierce competition.

• Many Asian countries, such as Pakistan, Indonesia and India, have secularised. The new globalisation trend is a combination of market economy, political steering by a political decision-making elite and technological development.

• The Forbes Global 2000 list of the world’s largest companies now has over 1,500 Asian companies (75%) (compared to 600 companies in 2016). The companies are very competitive and market-driven, reducing government control and ownership.

• The One Belt One Road strategy started by Xi Jinping has unified the economic engines of Eurasia and further expanded China’s economic area and sphere of influence. Funding primarily from China has built infrastructure such as a very fast railway running from the Port of Piraeus in Greece through Eastern Europe, the Baltic region and Finland to the Barents Sea.

• The logistical importance of the Northeast Passage has increased. Russia has administered traffic in its regional waters, but as the iceless season grows longer, the significance of icebreaker fees diminishes and ships can occasionally bypass Russia’s regional waters.


2018 - 2021 2022 - 2026 2026 - 2030

SCENARIO 5




46




2030


SCENARIO 5: The dominance of the East

NARRATIVE SUMMARY

The West is shaken up by a stock market

collapse and the bursting of the property

bubble, starting from the United States

China, Russia and Islamic nations find a common ambition in bringing an end to

the dominance of the West

The dominance of the East

Asian countries’ strategic ownerships in Europe and Africa

grow rapidly

Many western countries are weakened by

protectionism, increasing debt and internal political problems

The EU’s influence is diminished

and member states transfer power back

to themselves

Traditional democracy is

considered ineffective, inflexible and even

dangerous

Western values and societal models no longer function as the basis for international

operations

Chinese-funded infrastructure

projects unify Eurasia – China’s economic

area expands

The focus of the economy and

geopolitical influence shifts to the East

Finland identifies itself as a neutral channel between the East

and the West

The value of natural resources

and rare raw materials increases as new

technologies increase their consumption

The competitiveness of China and rising Asian economies

increases

47


ENERGY MANAGEMENT LOGISTICS MANUFACTURING

• The energy system and prices are steered by de-mand, supply and politics. The kinds of geopolit-ical shifts depicted in this scenario would not directly affect Finland’s energy sector or the availability of fuels.

• China assumes the role of energy and climate policy driver in order to increase demand for Chinese production and storage technologies and the raw materials needed to manufacture them.

• China becomes an increasingly notable power in the global energy market. Its ownerships in oil fields and mines grow globally (e.g. Iran).

• Russia shifts the focus of its natural gas and oil exports to China. Russia’s energy investments shift from western Russia to Siberia. In Europe, piped gas is replaced with coal and LNG.

• As the EU weakens, its legitimacy as a wielder of power over energy policy decreases and deci-sion-making power is transferred to member states. The national perspective is emphasised.

• The use of forest-based bioenergy becomes more accepted.

• China makes energy investments in Finland as well, particularly in the bioeconomy.

• China’s economic area continues to expand as the Eurasian economic area is unified as a result of major infrastructure projects.

• China’s role grows.

• Europe’s position as a transit traffic node weakens.

• Finland identifies itself as a neutral country and a logistical route between the East and the West. This has a notable impact on air traffic in partic-ular.

• Finland seeks to be a reliable partner and logis-tical transit route in the field of data traffic as well.

• Major infrastructure projects, such as fast railways, are built with international funding. For example, Chinese investments enable the building of the Helsinki-Tallinn tunnel.

• The impact of the Northeast Passage on Finland’s logistics remains minor, but international traffic in the Arctic Ocean increases steadily.

• The importance of air traffic grows as tourism and the air transport of valuable goods increases.

• The majority of industrial products are developed to serve the rapidly growing Asian market.

• In regard to trade policy, Finland positions itself as a neutral channel between the East and the West.

• Asian investments in European industries grow.

• Control over intellectual property rights becomes increasingly important.

• Foreign investments in Chinese companies are difficult to make due to China’s strict regulation.

• Major investments in the bioeconomy increase the demand for wood-based materials and there are occasional challenges in regard to their avail-ability.

• There are obstacles to penetrating the Chinese market, especially in the most lucrative industries.

• Russia gradually grows in power, fuelled by Asian trade and good relations with China.

• Finland strives to improve its competitiveness in the global market by rethinking its regulation and employment market legislation, among other measures.


48


• The relative decline of the West and the dominance of the East can be a threat or an opportunity.

• Finland strengthens its position as a neutral route or bridge between the East and the West.

• Neutrality requires Finland to strengthen its na-tional defence capability.

• The regulation of the Finnish defence industry is changed so as to allow growing exports to Asia as well.

• The presence of China and its strategic invest-ments in Europe (e.g. the Chinese-funded railway across Eastern Europe, from the Mediterranean to the Barents Sea) increase the feeling of stabil-ity and security in relation to Russia. The threat of Russian operations in the Baltic Sea, for exam-ple, decreases.

FOOD SUPPLY

• The growth of the Asian middle class rapidly in-creases the household consumption of food products.

• A significant proportion of the world’s primary production (such as meat, grain, coffee) is direct-ed to Asia, which increases the prices of food products and occasionally even reduces availabil-ity.

• The exporting of Finnish food products to China increases and export licences between countries are increased (e.g. new food products). Finnish food products compete with quality instead of price.

• The Finnish food product chain is supported by strong exports.

• The power and influence of the EU diminishes and the importance of national decision-making increases. National support needs increase.

• The EU’s internal unity diminishes and nations engage in direct cooperation with the East.

• Acceptance of genetic manipulation and growing food in a laboratory at the cellular level increas-es as the demand for food continues to grow.


FINANCE

• The material and immaterial resources of China, India and several other Asian countries allow their strong economic growth to continue.

• The deregulation started by the United States spurs banks to increase their risk-taking. Stock prices continue to grow despite increasing debt and technology companies reporting losses in the billions. However, there is no real basis for the growing stock prices, which leads to the bursting of the property bubble and a stock market col-lapse, starting in the United States.

• Many Asian countries – China and India in par-ticular – are able to recover from the economic downturn faster than western countries thanks to quick restructuring of the financial system.

• The West’s recovery from the financial crisis is slowed down by the increasing debt accrued by nations and households.

• Finland expands and deepens its economic net-works in Asia. Economic dependence on China and Russia increases.

49


• Finland becomes an increasingly important chan-nel between the East and the West.

• Dependence on China as well as the relations between China and Russia increases.

• Chinese-style comprehensive health care: yoga, acupuncture and naturopathy expand.

• Chinese medicine is partially westernised.

• The EU service market declines and loses its sig-nificance. At the same time the freedom of action and choice of companies and customers increases.

• New opportunities open up in the East (e.g. the availability of goods, services and investments).

• The EU’s dependence on critical, patent-free drugs and their raw materials increases.

• The role of private social and health care services and their development become increasingly im-portant. Finland is capable of offering social and health care services.

• There is demand for Finnish environmental en-gineering.

• Increasing numbers of completely new and in-ternational actors enter the Finnish market with new operating models.

• Public health care competes with and claims its share of health tourism.


• The digital surveillance society model established by China and justified with security and order spreads across the world.

• Nearly everything is monitored and optimised automatically with the help of IoT, sensors, video surveillance, facial recognition, fingerprint iden-tification and advanced analytics.

• It is often difficult to discern which companies are purely market-driven enterprises and which are organisations serving national information needs.

• Asian ownership increases in many European countries’ ICT companies and telecommunications infrastructure.

• The Western democratic government model is challenged and power is concentrated to fewer and fewer actors.

• Susceptibility to persevering economic influence increases significantly.

• The importance of education (and media literacy) increases dramatically.



PART 3

SCENARIO-SPECIFIC CONTINGENCY PLANS AND GENERAL MEASURES ESSENTIAL FOR ENSURING SECURITY OF SUPPLY


52

IMPACTS OF THE SCENARIOSCONTINGENCY PLANS AND ESSENTIAL MEASURES

Uncertainty factors, discontinuities

Contingency plans







Contingency plans


Contingency plans


Contingency plans


Contingency plans

Scenario-independentCertainties, continuities, constants

Scenario-independent essential measures

53

Scenario 3 – BLOCIFICATION AND

HYBRID INFLUENCE

• Emphasising international agreements between alliances and blocs.

• Active monitoring of agreements not in-volving Finland.

• Investment in the development of the Baltic Sea region and the region’s security of supply cooperation (Baltic Sea alliance).

• Utilisation potential of the EU’s hybrid de-fence alliance.

• Securing the availability and reliability of data.

• Monitoring the ownership of critical infra-structure and systems.

• Major investments in cybersecurity and responding to hybrid influencing.

SECURITY OF SUPPLY MEASURES NECESSITATED BY THE SCENARIOS

Scenario 1 – GLOBAL

INTERDEPENDENCY

• Emphasising EU-level agreements and NATO cooperation in security of supply operations.

• Strong advocacy, so that the special charac-teristics of Finland as regards security of supply are taken into consideration in the harmonisation of the EU’s operating models.

• Integrating Finland into Europe’s central transport corridors (especially rail trans-port).

• Preparing for disruptions in global control systems, since long and complex value chains are more vulnerable to disruptions in a highly interdependent system.

• Ensuring the security of supply of energy and securing strong electricity transfer connections as the proportion of renew-able energy and variation in production increase.

• Monitoring and utilising the proliferation of blockchain technology.

The security of supply scenarios for 2030 were concretised and their impacts were analysed in autumn 2017 in the National Emergency Supply Organisation’s workshops and within the project group. Below are lists of the key security of supply measures necessitated by each scenario:

Scenario 2 – ARMED

POWER POLITICS

• Emphasising bilateral international agree-ments in security of supply operations.

• Operating in cooperation with NATO espe-cially in Arctic and Baltic Sea logistics.

• Preparing for supply problems in the Baltic Sea region.

• Increasing physical security of supply re-serves and mapping alternative import directions for resources.

• Physical safeguarding of sites critical to security of supply and increasing drills.

• Preserving the diversity of the energy pro-duction portfolio and increasing the degree of national self-sufficiency.

• Preparing for the threat of terrorism.

• Preparing for the mass migrations caused by climate change and conflicts.

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Scenario 4 – TECHNOLOGICAL

WORLD ORDER

• Enabling the adoption of new technologies (devel-oping legislation in a technology-neutral manner).

• Emphasising understanding of information manage-ment and the comprehensive functioning of networks.

• Data management, storage, analytics, hubs, operation, control systems; protecting networked and decen-tralised systems (such as smart devices and decen-tralised small-scale energy production).

• Narrowing of the public sector and the increasingly important role of private actors.

• Shifting towards contract-based security of supply.

• Monitoring the operating methods and holdings of global technology companies and their impacts on security of supply.

• Protecting smart transport and logistics ecosystems and utilising them in security of supply operations.

• Impacts of alternative currencies on the operating reliability of the financial system.

• Emphasising bilateral agreements (especially with Asian countries) and de-emphasising EU level security of supply work.

• Safeguarding the ownership of critical infra-structure, systems and immaterial holdings and preserving central decision-making pow-er in Finland.

• Taking care of Finland’s ample mineral resourc-es; possibilities related to the increase of international infrastructure investments (such as the Northeast Passage, the Arctic rail link, the Helsinki-Tallinn tunnel).

• Investments in high-quality technology edu-cation and R&D activities.

• Emphasising energy self-sufficiency and al-ternative fuels (especially challenges associ-ated with the supply of Russian gas to the East).

• The impacts of the bank and financial crisis affecting western countries on the operating reliability of the financial system.

SECURITY OF SUPPLY MEASURES NECESSITATED BY THE SCENARIOS

Scenario 5 – THE DOMINANCE

OF THE EAST

55

GENERAL MEASURES ESSENTIAL FOR

ENSURING SECURITY OF SUPPLY

Continuity management of industries critical to security of supply The operation of the National Emergency Supply Organisation

1. Safeguarding critical energy, logistics, capital and information flows: There is a particular emphasis on energy security and balance man-agement; national and international flows of raw materials, goods and finance; ICT connections and the ability to transfer data.

2. Identifying, maintaining and developing national know-how in all industries: Technology know-how and cybersecurity are particular-ly important.

3. National ownership and management of critical production systems and resources: Critical production know-how and ownership, in-cluding related patents and other intellectual property rights (IPR), must be retained. This also applies to strategic land and soil, water and infrastructure holdings.

4. Preparing for diverse hybrid influencing: Combinations of political and economic as well as infrastructure- and information-related means must be taken into consideration. The reliability of informa-tion must be checked. Point disturbances and their confluence needs to be analysed.

5. Preparing for the scarcity or reduced availability of natural resourc-es: Means include: the circular economy, alternative raw materials, monitoring and establishment of international agreements as well as taking the impacts of climate change into consideration.

The industry-specific contingency plans and essential measures served as a basis for compiling a list of general recommendations concerning measures and policies relevant to all sectors as well as proposals on how to develop the operations of the National Emergency Supply Organisation.

Relating to the changes in the operating environment in particular, there were eight development themes highlighted as a result of the scenario project. Some of these themes are intrinsically linked to the continuity management of industries critical to security of supply, while others are more directly linked to the operation of the National Emergency Supply Organisation.

6. Strengthening systemic thinking and security of supply cooperation as the boundaries between industries become blurred: The inter-dependencies and causal relationships of international and nation-al organisations, the public and private sector and different industries must be identified and analysed. Digital preparedness must be more closely integrated into all industries critical to security of supply. Active training between industries (roles and responsibilities) is par-amount.

7. Monitoring and responding to changes in social and economic structures and operating models: For example, work and production will become increasingly decentralised and the operating environment will become fragmented. Production will become more real-time and the amounts of goods held in stock will continue to decrease. The operating environment must be monitored and a shared situa-tional awareness must be established. Legislation and preparation obligations related to security of supply must be updated, taking into account new actors and ecosystems. Improving flexibility and reaction speeds (productisation, modularity, trials) would increase the effectiveness of security of supply operations.

8. Integrating security of supply more closely into national policy and decision-making: Security of supply requires a national strategy and shared performance requirements, strong agreements and interna-tional cooperation.

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SPECIAL COMMENTARY CHALLENGES OF INFORMATION-BASED INFLUENCE ON THE RISEOne of the main issues expected to rise to the fore-front during the 2018–2020 scenario period is infor-mation-based influencing and fact-based information exchange. While the media pool serves the Nation-al Emergency Supply Organisation as an expert body in these issues, responding to disinformation and supporting the media will require action on a much wider scale.

Finland is one of the top nations in the world when it comes to freedom of speech. This is the result of centuries of journalistic tradition. Our media com-panies are committed to the ethical principles of the Council for Mass Media and the principles of respon-sible information exchange. In addition to this, Fin-land’s preparedness of responding to the modern challenges of information-based influencing are further improved by our high level of education and good media literacy.

Disinformation and information-based influencing played a key role in the war that started in eastern Ukraine in 2014. In recent years, false information has also been used in attacks against the democratic system in the French and US elections, for example.

The media sector is currently undergoing a major transformation driven by global digitalisation that is changing the sector’s revenue models and the pub-lic’s media consumption. One of the results of this transformation is the diminishing of resources avail-able for journalistic work. At the same time, more

and more people are turning to social media, which are not governed by the journalistic process, for their information needs.

On social media, exerting effective information-based influence is easy and affordable. Even media compa-nies have been targeted in attacks perpetrated by foreign nations. These attacks have included online hate campaigns targeting individual reporters and lasting up to several years, with the aim of disrupting journalistic processes. In several countries, perpetra-tors sponsored by foreign nations have also carried out data breaches in order to sabotage the operations of media companies.

The need to safeguard the operation of the media poses new challenges for security of supply. Society must be able to recognise the impacts that informa-tion content created outside of journalistic process-es have on safety and security of supply. In practice, this means measures such as analysing internation-al and national interdependencies and effect rela-tionships.

Responsible media take the necessary steps to ensure the reliability of information exchange. However, the production and sharing of domestic, reliable and independent information should also be supported by security of supply operations. Today’s new chal-lenges require the media to be able to better recog-nise different forms of information-based influencing. At the same time, the transparency and openness

of the media’s own production must also be ensured. When it comes to cybersecurity, the shift to proactive preparedness requires training that utilises the ex-pertise of hackers, for example. Furthermore, access to international services and information resources and data streams must also be ensured.

Mobile communications and social media provide media companies and the authorities with new ways of communicating with the public besides newspapers, television and radio. As regards the development of related regulation, the main challenge is the fact that these platforms are owned by international technol-ogy giants that operate outside of traditional media.

Citizens’ access to reliable information must be secured in crisis situations as well. After all, from the perspec-tive of security of supply, reliable information is con-sidered a vital commodity akin to food, transportation or energy. The public’s trust in the media is high in Finland. Finnish media are responsible, free and mul-tivoiced, but operate in increasingly challenging con-ditions. Ultimately, the aim of security of supply op-erations in relation to the media is to ensure the operational preconditions of domestic media and their resilience against fake news and information-based influencing. At the same time, these operations ensure that the media’s responsibility of making content-re-lated decisions independently and based on the in-formation itself is not compromised.

Tero Koskinen, Media pool

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SPECIAL COMMENTARY

”72 HOURS” INSPIRES URBAN PREPAREDNESSIn Finland, non-governmental organisations, or the so-called third sector, engage in effective cooperation with the authorities at the national level and in emer-gency operations. In the future, however, NGOs will need to increasingly focus on spontaneous civic ac-tivity. These aspects come together in the 72 hours concept, some of the key questions of which are: Would you be able to cope on your own for 72 hours? How would your day-to-day be if you had no electric-ity for three days? No water? Or no access to any shops? Would you be able to navigate the stairs if the lift was out of order? Where could you find help and who could you trust?

A concept developed in collaborationThe 72 hours concept inspires people to think about their own and their immediate circle’s preparedness for emergencies, such as storms and power outages. The concept was designed in collaboration with NGOs and security of supply actors in the Committee for Home Emergency Preparedness (KOVA). Studies show that self-preparedness is among the most effective ways of mitigating the negative impacts and losses caused by emergencies.

Based on trainingIn 2017, the concept’s first year of operation, the Finnish National Rescue Association SPEK trained 12 course leaders and 118 instructors. Later in the year, a further 28 instructors were trained by other NGOs. Additionally, students studying to become home economics teachers at the University of Helsinki

participated in a course titled Households in a Cri-sis-prone Society, in which they received training on how to organise process drama exercises based on the 72 hours concept at schools or youth summer camps, for example.

The course leaders are trained in the organisation of one-day-long instructor training courses. Instruc-tors receive information on security of supply and preparedness as well as training on the 72 hours concept. As a result, instructors are able to organise quick, 1–2-hour-long training sessions on the topic of preparedness. The aim is to make every citizen aware of the 72 hours concept. Some of the best environments for insightful, awareness-raising and discussion-based preparedness training include res-ident evenings, building meetings, clubs and neigh-bourhood events.

Finland is a crisis-resilient society with a desire to help

No less than 95% of Finns would be prepared to help their neighbours and loved ones in the event of a long power outage, for example. Additionally, over 90% would be willing to help with or participate in volunteer operations in the event of a long-term emergency situation. These are some of the findings of the Finnish National Rescue Association SPEK’s survey on household preparedness for emergencies (Laurikainen, 2016). In other words, the basis for improving preparedness is sound.

Urban environments pose challenges for preparednessBut are we really prepared for everything? House-holds have relatively little experience in real emer-gencies, especially in urban environments. The fact is that conscious preparedness for emergencies other than fires is very low. We must reach target groups whose interests in these matters has not yet led to concrete actions to increase safety. In urban areas, groups that have been iden-tified as having particularly little experience in pre-paredness include women and young people. How-ever, women were found to be slightly more worried about safety than men. What kind of empowering elements in communications could inspire these groups to take an interest in self-preparedness?

Everyone can do somethingThe key aspect of 72 hours thinking is coping with emergencies – everyone can do something. In inter-national models, 72 hours is the timeframe in which self-preparedness has been found to make the great-est difference in aiding society in its emergency re-sponse. In addition to home supplies, important as-pects include maintaining practical skills and commu-nity activities, such as helping neighbours. In the end, 72 hours is all about recognising the resources in your everyday life and living environment and finding solu-tions that work for you in collaboration with peers.

Mia Kunnaskari and Karim Peltonen, Committee for Home Emergency Preparedness (KOVA)

SPECIAL COMMENTARY

”72 HOURS” INSPIRES URBAN PREPAREDNESS

PART 4

THE SCENARIO PROCESS AND METHOD

59

INTRODUCTION TO THE SCENARIO PROCESS AND METHODProject organisation The scenario project, carried out in collaboration between the National Emergency Supply Organisation and the Capful management consultancy, began in summer 2017 and continued up to February 2018. The work consisted primarily of meetings of the project group (composed of representatives from the National Emergency Supply Organisation and Capful), interviews conducted focusing on industries critical to security of supply as well as workshops and sector-specific events for a broader range of participants. Through workshops and interviews, the process was contributed to by a wide range of mem-bers of the National Emergency Supply Agency, in-dustrial sectors and pools as well as external experts.

Information gatheringThe scenarios were constructed utilising several ex-isting international reports (such as the Global Risk Report 2017, the National Intelligence Council ’s Glob-al Trends Report) and national reports (such as the Government’s Defence Report 2017, the Government Report on Internal Security 2016). These reports were sourced for information particularly on future conti-nuities and trends as well as various events threaten-ing operations, or so-called black swans.

As part of the scenario project’s information gathering, consultants also interviewed 20 leading experts from various fields who are familiar with security of supply work and have insight on the development of the security of supply operating environment as well as

the operating logic and future of different fields. The interviews were conducted either face-to-face or over the phone between August and December 2017. The resulting material was also used to compile a separate interview report, which summarises the interviewed experts’ views on the security of supply operating environment in Finland, the potential development of industries critical to security of supply up to 2030 as well as the development and future needs for change of Finnish security of supply operations.

Scenario methodThe security of supply scenarios for 2030 were formed using an inductive method, starting with the identi-fication of the most notable uncertainty factors. With the help of a so-called futures table, potential de-velopment options were defined for each uncertain-ty factor by way of analysing how each factor could potentially develop from 2018 to 2030. The interde-pendence and compatibility of the different devel-opment options was tested with the help of Scenar-io BuilderTM, a dedicated scenario building tool. The analysis produced by Scenario BuilderTM allowed the identification of different internally logical scenarios relevant to security of supply work.

The scenarios, their development and their causal re-lationships were detailed on a timeline extending from 2018 to 2030. Due consideration was also given to key trends and continuities, such as climate change, digi-talisation, urbanisation and the servitisation of different industries. These are reflected in all the scenarios.

The scenarios were concretised and commented up-on, and their impacts were analysed in several sce-nario workshops. These were followed by sector-spe-cific workshops, which involved describing the sce-narios from the perspective of industries critical to security of supply (energy management, logistics, manufacturing, food supply, defence industry and maintenance, finance, health and social services, and information society) and preparing sector-specific contingency plans and scenario-independent essential measures. Finally, the material produced in the work-shops and the interview report were used as the ba-sis for compiling a list of general recommendations concerning measures and policies as well as propos-als on how to develop the operations of the National Emergency Supply Organisation.

Scenario reading instructionsThe scenario descriptions are not meant to serve as definite predictions of the future. Instead, they are meant to steer versatile and consistent thought on potential development paths for the future. This is to improve the preparedness for interpreting current phenomena and bolster the planning of operations and ability to react. The idea is not to choose one scenario over the others on the basis of probability, desirability or importance, but to examine the whole formed by the scenarios. The actual future is often an amalgamation of different scenarios.

The following pages consist of slides detailing the scenario process and methods.

60

INTRODUCTION TO THE SCENARIO PROCESS AND METHOD PROJECT ORGANISATIONSECURITY OF SUPPLY SCENARIOS 2030

Project groupProject lead

Members

Capful

Christian Fjäder

Hannu HernesniemiMika KaijamoNuutti NikulaMikko Vähä-SipiläTiina ÅbergKatja Ahola

Kimmo Kivinen, Nette Lehtinen, Lotta Takala

Active communication using different communication chan-nels and forums during the project and communicating the results.

• Participants: select persons from NESO, trade and industry representatives, public sector actors and Capful

• The objective is to update the scenarios and define impacts

Workshops

• Scenario workshops: – Participants consisting of experts from the National

Emergency Supply Agency and representatives of the National Emergency Supply Organisation

– The objective is to comment on the structure and descriptions of the scenarios and the conclusions drawn in the scenario work

• NESO’s sector-specific workshops: – Participants consisting of pool secretaries, pool

chairpersons and other experts from the National Emergency Supply Organisation

– The objective is to focus on the scenarios from the perspective of individual sectors and carry out impact analysis

Workshops

• Utilisation of existing national and international reports and research: reference scenarios, threat models and other infor-mation on the future

• Interviews and hearings with experts: information gathering on the key themes highlighted

• Information gathering with the objective of creating a foresight agenda and collecting facts and views, analyses and syntheses

Information gathering

• Comprehensive process consultancy and information gathering

• Capful: method, facilitation and reporting

Capful

61

INFORMATION GATHERINGEXPERT INTERVIEWS

Person Organisation Job title

1 Ole Johansson National Emergency Supply Council Chairperson

2 Veli-Matti Mattila Elisa Chief Executive Officer

3 Rauni Haaranen Danske Bank Head of Cash Management Finland, Vice-chair of the financing pool

4 Jorma Mäntynen WSP Finland Director, former Tampere University of Technology Professor

5 Tuomo Haukkovaara IBM Nordic Vice President, Solutions

6 Mika Anttonen ST1 Chairman of the Board of Directors

7 Esa Vakkilainen Lappeenranta University of Technology Professor

8 Jukka Ruusunen Fingrid Oyj President and CEO

9 Heikki Juutinen Finnish Food and Drink Industries' Federation (ETL) Departing Director General

10 Timo Leppä Chemical Industry Federation of Finland President and CEO

11 Timo Jaatinen Finnish Forest Industries Federation Director General

12 Mika Aaltola Finnish Institute of International Affairs Programme Director – The Global Security Research Programme

13 Mikko Kosonen Sitra President

14 Martti Setälä Insta Trust Oy Director, Customer Relations and Business Development

15 Aaro Toivonen Joint Authority for the Hospital District of Helsinki and Uusimaa (HUS)

Director, Security and Preparedness

16 Markku Mäkijärvi Joint Authority for the Hospital District of Helsinki and Uusimaa (HUS)

Chief Medical Officer

17 Juha Mustonen Hybrid CoE Director of International Relations

18 Lauri Kivinen Yle (Yleisradio, Finnish Broadcasting Company) Chief Executive Officer

19 Jyri Kosola Finnish Defence Forces Research Director

20 Leena Mörttinen Ministry of Finance Director General, Financial Markets Department

62

PROGRESS OF THE SCENARIO PROJECTKEY STEPS

1: Focus and information management

2: Analysis of change factors 3: Futures table

4: Scenario Builder™ 5: Concretisation of the scenarios 6: Impacts of the scenarios

Scenario surveyExpert interviews

Reference scenariosOther background material


Contingency plans







Contingency plans


Contingency plans


Contingency plans


Contingency plans

Scenario-independentCertainties, continuities, constants

Scenario-independent essential measures

Globalisation and

international relations

Slower and safer globali-

sation

Faster market- driven

globalisation

Blocification and the birth of

new alliances

Protectionism and

deglobali-sation

Geopolitical focus points

Traditional industrial nations

Focus shifts to the

increasingly market-driv-

en East

Nations with pronounced

top-down leadership increase foothold

Power shifts from nations to supranational

networks

Security situation

Territorial conflicts

Conflicts related to (hybrid)

influence

Escalation of terrorism

Conflicts de-escalate

Finland’s way of

operating in international

politics

Impartial and neutral

Finland

Finland allied at the

European level

Trans-European alliances

and NATO membership

Finland seeks to protect itself,

relying on bilateral

agreements

Natural and other

resources and global population movements

Pronounced regional resource scarcity

Declined availability of

resources

Improved resource availabili-

ty and resource efficiency

Extreme environmental

phenomena become less

severe

Information, data openness

and data security at the

global level

Open and public

data

Cyber risks, protection

measures and isolation

Data controlled by

the few

Post-truth era

The global economy

Positive and more equally distributed

growth

Positive but polarised growth

Slower economic

growth

Economic crises and turbu-

lence

Develop-ment of Europe

Slow diminishing of the EU’s role

Harmonisation and strong

interdepen-dence

Blocs within Europe

Decline of the EU

Smart systems

and machines

Digital evolution

– Machines aiding people

Digital leap – Machines alongside

people

Digital revolution – Machines make the decisions

Digital stagnation

Economic structure and work

Traditional

Everything- as-a-service

New wave of globalisation

Age of robotisation

4A. Technological world order + robotisation

5B. The dominance of the East + The East as a balancing power

5A. The dominance of the East + polarisation

3. Blocification and hybrid influence

2B. Armed power politics + terrorism

2A. Armed power politics

4B. Technological world order + corporations and megacities

1B. Global interdependency + EU

1A. Global interdependency + NATO

Globalisation and



sation


globalisation


new alliances

Protectionism and

deglobali-sation



Focus shifts to the

increasingly market-driv-

en East




networks

Security situation



influence



Finland’s way of

operating in international

politics


Finland


Europe-an level


and NATO membership



agreements

Natural and other

resources and global population movements



resources

Improved resource availabili-

ty and resource efficiency



severe

Information, data openness

and data security at the

global level

Open and public

data



Data controlled by

the few

Post-truth era

The global economy


growth


Slower economic

growth

Economic crises and

turbulence

Develop-ment of Europe

Slow diminish-

ing of the EU’s role


interdepen-dence

Blocs within Europe

Decline of the EU

Smart systems

and machines

Digital evolution



people


Digital stagnation


Traditional



Age of robotisation

• Conflicts gradually de-escalate. The conflicts in Syria and eastern Ukraine reach a point where armed confrontations end and diplomatic mediation begins.

• Social problems increase in China as the middle class and demands concerning quality of life continue to grow amidst an ailing economy. As a result, China’s economic growth slows down and its dominance weakens as the country directs its efforts inward.

• Western countries serve as the driving forces behind international agreements. Most nations agree to the norms defined by western countries in order to promote their exports and economies. Sanctions against Russia and Russia’s counter-sanctions are abolished as mediation begins.

• Internal cooperation within the EU increases and federalisation gains traction. Finland strives to strengthen its position in the EU and its identity as a strong part of the traditional West.

• The great costs associated with the health impacts of global warming and small particle emissions are recognised. Droughts, hurricanes and a change in leadership also prompt the US to participate in climate efforts. A stronger environment and climate convention is established and measures are initiated.

• The position of European countries in NATO is strengthened. Sweden, Austria, Ireland and Finland join NATO. Defence cooperation at the EU level is deemed unnecessary. Russia disapproves of the expansion of NATO, but does not take action.

• In Russia, the end of Putin’s fourth presidency and disenchantment with centralised power lead to policy changes and democratic development. Western countries increase their economic coop-eration with Russia.

• The economic growth of China, India and other countries previously characterised by strong growth has slowed down considerably, evening out and slowing down global economic growth.

• Slowing economic growth coupled with the transformation of trade and industry force countries to restructure their social models and social welfare systems. Finland responds to this transfor-mation with changes in regulation, taxation and education.

SCENARIO 1




Slower, more stable and regulated globali-sation and economy driven by the West

2018 - 2021 2022 - 2026 2026 - 2030

63

KEY CERTAINTIES AND CONTINUITIESUP TO 2030

Climate change and resource scarcity Technological transformation and digitalisation

Urbanisation Transformation of work

New forms of globalisation Diversifying ways of life and values Increasing inequality Platform economy and servitisation

New forms of democracy Ageing and age dependency ratio Migration and labour mobility

64

KEY CHANGE FACTORSUP TO 2030

IMPACTMINOR MAJOR

4 5 6 8 10

MIN

OR

MAJ

OR

UN

CERT

AIN

TY

Uncertainties and discontinuities

Trends and certainties

Information, data openness and data security at the global level

Natural and other resources and global population movements


Globalisation and international relations

Security situationThe global economy

Smart systems and machines

Economic structure and work Development of Europe

Finland’s way of operating in international politics

Technological development and digitalisation

Ageing and declining age dependency ratio

Urbanisation

Servitisation and the platform economy

Diversifying ways of life and values

Increasing inequalityIncreasing labour mobility Climate change and resource scarcity

65

SCENARIO BUILDER™SEEKING VARIOUS LOGICALLY UNCONTRADICTORY SCENARIOS ON THE SCENARIO MAP

4A. Technological world order + robotisation

5B. The dominance of the East + The East as a balancing power

5A. The dominance of the East + polarisation

3. Blocification and hybrid influence

2B. Armed power politics + terrorism

2A. Armed power politics

4B. Technological world order + corporations and megacities

1B. Global interdependency + EU

1A. Global interdependency + NATO

66

FUTURES TABLESCENARIO 1: GLOBAL INTERDEPENDENCY

Globalisation and


Slower and safer

globalisation


globalisation


new alliances

Protectionism and

deglobalisation



Focus shifts to the

increasingly market-driven

East




networks

Security situation



influence



Finland’s way of oper-

ating in interna-tional politics


Finland


European level


and NATO membership



agreements

Natural and other resources

and global population movements


Declined availability

of resources

Improved resource

availability and resource effi-

ciency



severe

Information, data open-

ness and data security at the

global level

Open and public

data



Data controlled by

the few

Post-truth era

The global economy


growth


Slower eco-nomic growth

Economic crises and turbulence

Development of

Europe



interdepen-dence

Blocs within Europe

Decline of the EU

Smart systems

and machines

Digital evolution



people


Digital stagnation


Traditional



Age of robotisation

In this and the following tables, the coloured tiles denote the factors that characterise the scenario in question. Darker colours denote factors that have a very signifi-cant impact, while lighter colours denote factors that have a significant impact.

67

FUTURES TABLESCENARIO 2: ARMED POWER POLITICS

Globalisation and


Slower and safer

globalisation


globalisation


new alliances

Protectionism and

deglobalisation



Focus shifts to the


East




networks

Security situation



influence






Finland


European level


and NATO membership



agreements





resources

Improved resource

availability and resource efficiency



severe



global level

Open and public

data



Data controlled by

the few

Post-truth era

The global economy


growth


Slower economic

growth


Development of

Europe



interdepen-dence

Blocs within Europe

Decline of the EU

Smart systems

and machines

Digital evolution



people

Digital revolution – Machines

make the deci-sions

Digital stagnation


Traditional



Age of robotisation

68

FUTURES TABLESCENARIO 3: BLOCIFICATION AND HYBRID INFLUENCE

Globalisation and



sation


globalisation


new alliances

Protectionism and

deglobalisation



Focus shifts to the


East




networks

Security situation



influence






Finland


European level


and NATO membership



agreements





resources

Improved resource

availability and resource

efficiency



severe



global level

Open and public

data



Data controlled by

the few

Post-truth era

The global economy


growth


Slower economic

growth


Development of

Europe



interdepen-dence

Blocs within Europe

Decline of the EU

Smart systems

and machines

Digital evolution



people


Digital stagnation


Traditional



Age of robotisation

69

FUTURES TABLESCENARIO 4: TECHNOLOGICAL WORLD ORDER

Globalisation and


Slower and safer

globalisation


globalisation


new alliances

Protectionism and

deglobalisation



Focus shifts to the


East




networks

Security situation



influence






Finland


European level


and NATO membership



agreements





resources

Improved resource




severe



global level

Open and public

data



Data controlled by

the few

Post-truth era

The global economy


growth




Development of

Europe



interdepen-dence

Blocs within Europe

Decline of the EU

Smart systems

and machines

Digital evolution



people


Digital stagnation


Traditional



Age of robotisation

70

FUTURES TABLESCENARIO 5: THE DOMINANCE OF THE EAST

Globalisation and


Slower and safer

globalisation


globalisation


new alliances

Protectionism and

deglobalisation



Focus shifts to the


East




networks

Security situation



influence






Finland


European level


and NATO membership



agreements





resources

Improved resource




severe



global level

Open and public

data



Data controlled by

the few

Post-truth era

The global economy


growth




Development of

Europe



interdepen-dence

Blocs within Europe

Decline of the EU

Smart systems

and machines

Digital evolution



people


Digital stagnation


Traditional



Age of robotisation

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