National Communism

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Eastern Europe's Ten Years of National Communism: 1948-1958Author(s): Richard C. GrippSource: The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 4 (Dec., 1960), pp. 934-949Published by: University of Utah on behalf of the Western Political Science AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/443739 .Accessed: 23/12/2013 07:25

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EASTERN EUROPE'S TENYEARS OF NATIONALCOMMUNISM: 1948-1958

RICHARDC. GRIPP*

SanDiego tateCollegeROMTHE TIME whenYugoslavia asexpelled rom heCominformn1948, o the enfeeblementf the Polishworkers' ouncilsn mid-1958, a-tional ommunism n Eastern urope acillated etween utright ejection

ofSoviet omination nd capitulation efore oviet ontrol. he ten-year eriodwitnessed aried utbreaks f revisionismn several astern uropean ountries;but as a more r less consistent, uidedmovement, ational ommunism ookform nd made n apparent mpressionnly nYugoslavia,oland, nd Hungary.

The Yugoslavmodel f national ommunism ad its origins n Tito's dis-agreements ith talin duringWorld War II. The culmination f the disputewas the separation f Yugoslavia rom he Sovietbloc, thereby nitiating hemovement f national ommunism n the Eastern uropeari ountries. ventsoccurringn Poland and Hungary ince 1952 suggest trend which, n somerespects, arallels evelopments aking lace earlier n Yugoslavia.A constructof the Yugoslavmodel, ollowed y an examination f appropriate vents nPoland nd Hungary, ighlight everal eatures f national ommunism hichgive heappearance f fitting pattern.

THE YUGOSLAVMODEL OF NATIONALCOMMUNISM

Yugoslavvariations n the theory f communism id not appear until afterthat country was expelled from he Cominform. Of the several contributions ocommunist heory, ugoslav s most noted for developing ational communism.Although not nventing heconcept, erhaps Mao Tse-tung ealt with the prob-lem earlier), the Yugoslavs receive credit for popularizing t and for reshapingtheir heory omatch t.' In discussing he subject,Kardelj has noted: We donot believe, n a word, hat there xist universal oliticalblueprints alid for llcountries.... Different onditions all for different ines of socialdevelopmentas well as for variousforms f economic nd political rganization.

The Communist party of Yugoslavia (now the League of Communists fYugoslavia)also was to undergo hange. The party, n the urface, elinquished tspoliticalmonopoly s the sole nterpreter f Marx, lthough one-party ystem asretained. Moreover, heYugoslavs laimthey have given o their ubordinate artycongressesn the republics he right f each to determine ts own political ine.3

*This article s a revision f the author's tudy repared or the TEMPO series TechnicalMilitary lanning peration) fGeneral lectric ompany.

1In another ein,Hammond rgues hat talin, n his socialism-in-one-countryoctrine, nventednational ommunism. ee T. Hammond, The Origins f National ommunism, irginiaQuarterly eview,XXXIV (Spring, 958),279. Neal argues hat YugoslavCommunist

theoryschews national ommunism s

beingbourgeois,solationist,ndin

contrast othe world ommunist ommunity. . Neal, Yugoslav ommunist heory, he AmericanSlavic nd East European eview. IX (February, 960),46.2E.Kardelj, EvolutionnJugoslavia, oreign ffairs, XXIV July, 956), 82.' F. Neal,Titoism n Action: The Reformsn Yugoslavia fter 948 Berkeleynd LosAngeles:

University f California ress, 958), pp. 52, 236-37.934

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TEN YEARS OF NATIONAL COMMUNISM 935

Therehavebeen, lso,relaxationsn the Yugoslav ictatorship,uch s theadoption f more iberal riminal odeand provision or reater ndependenceto the ourts.A measure f electoral eform as been ntroduced

for xample,making seof secret allot nd ntroducing choice fmore han necandidatefor n elective osition), reater reedomf expressionxists, nd excesses f thesecurity olicehave been urbed.4

Apart rommore utonomy orRepublic arty ongresses,ugoslaveadershaveattempted oinvigorate egionalnd localgovernment y turning ver othese evelsmore overningowers.Bythe aw of 1952which reated eople'scommittees to govern ocally), mplemented y the constitution f 1953,ameasure f localautonomy ameto Yugoslavia.The people's ommittees readministrativergans f owns nd districts hich re elective ndwhich erformall functions f the state within heir urisdiction. omewhat eminiscent fAmerican ederalism,hepeople's ommitteesre holders f residual nd non-delegated owers.

TheYugoslavs avemade lterations ncommunistconomics,oo.Probablythe most riginal eature f their conomys the merger f public wnership nda centrally lanned utputwith hat f a distribution f goods hrough hema-chinery f hemarket. he national lanremains hedesired roduction oalbut,departing rom ovietpractice, t does not have the force f law. Instead fdetailed lanning rom he center, nly he basicproportions f the plan areestablished

ythe national

overnment.n a further

eparturerom he Soviet

pattern ll non-rationedoodsnYugoslaviare old t prices corresponding omarket onditions.6

A highpointn the Yugoslavystem as been n attempt odecentralizeheeconomic pparatus. After 950 many f the federal conomic ontrols erelifted. he concentrated roup f federalministries hich irected ndustry asabolished nd was replaced y associations alled Chambers f Industry, fAgriculture, nd of Trade. The governing odies f these ssociationsre com-posedof representativeslected y (1) the workers' ouncils; 2) a technicalstaff; nd (3) members f the government. he purpose f the decentralizationwasto bring reater fficiencys well as more ocal control nto he managerialapparatus f the conomy.

The best-knownontribution f the Yugoslav ersion f communism s theintroduction f workers' ouncils n which, ccording o theory, mployeesmanage hefactories hemselves.n function, heworkers' ouncils f the fac-tories re imilar o the board fdirectors f n American orporation;heymakepolicy nd they perform he entrepreneurial ecision-makingunctions. hecouncils, lected yfactory mployees, etermine hich ommodities re to beproduced, hich nes willbe discontinued, ricing nd methods f selling, ro-

duction scheduling, nd disposal of capital funds. The councils have become2. KovaEevid,ommunal ystem n YugoslaviaBeograd: Kultura, 958), . 20;Neal,Titoism

in Action, p. 214-38.5Neal,Titoism n Action, p. 163,235.'J. Montias, Economic eforms nd Retreat n Jugoslavia, oreign ffairs, XXVII(January,

1959),296. See alsoNeal, Yugoslav ommunist heory, . 54.








936 THE WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLY

quitewidespreadnd byAugust, 958,numbered 0,593with membership f201,683mployees.7espite he uccess laimed or hem y heYugoslavs,hecouncils o not havefull ontrol ver he factories. he councils re imited ntheir ctions y heBasicLaw, he nnual lan, nd bygovernmentalepresenta-tives rom he owns, istricts, nd republics. lso, he ouncils pparently avebeendominated y the Communist arty nd by the trade-union rganizations.

In 1950all tractors nd other gricultural achinery ere sold by theMachineTractor tations o the collective arms. n 1951further ollectiviza-tionwas halted nd tax discriminationgainst rivate easants was eased. In1952 ompulsory eliveries f agricultural roducts y peasant arms as aban-doned. In 1953-54 ollectivizationasendedaltogether nd credit, rice, ndtax policies ere djusted ofavor rivate easants.8

After reeinghemselvesrom ormal ontrol ythe oviet Union he Yugo-slavsbegan ocarry ut a more ndependent oreign olicy. n 1953 hey igneda Treaty f Friendshipnd Co-operation ithGreece nd Turkey. ater n thesameyear hey igned twenty-year efense lliance, heBalkan act,with hesesame ountries. he objectivesf Yugoslav oreign olicy hen, ccordingo oneof ts chief rchitects,nclude ine main points. n addition othe usual goalsof ndependencend peace, hese oints nclude heestablishmentf economicrelations ith ll countries, id to underdeveloped eoples, o-operation ithother ocialist ations n an equaland democratic asis, oexistencemong a-tions f

differingocial

ystems,ndependencerom ither f the wo

great owerblocs, nd maintenance f active nd friendly o-operation ith the UnitedStates.9 eiterating he atter woobjectives, ito has stated hat Yugoslavs onot ntend o oin ither heWestern loc or any ther loc. And,he continues,while stablishingoodrelations ith he SovietUnion nd Eastern urope,wehave no intention f endangeringur relations ith heWest.1oAlthough heYugoslav eadership huns se of the term ational ommunism the term e-visionism asbeen mployed, owever), his eemsmost ptly odescribe ugo-slavforeign olicy ince 948.Communism or he Yugoslavssstill heir tatedobjective, ut onlywithin national ramework.

Has a reorganizationf Marxist heory hichplaysdownthe role of theCommunist arty, hich as achieved general elaxationf a few f the moreodious spects f dictatorship,trengthened egionalnd localgovernment,ndpartially ecentralizedconomicmanagement mounted o a merger f com-munist conomics ith he orms fpolitical emocracy? pparently his s whatthe Yugoslav eaders elieve hey re achieving. lthough essrestrictive ov-ernmental ethods ave no doubt rought reater opularity othe regime ndperhaps igher fficiency o the system, t would be premature o claim theYugoslavs ow have a democracy. o matter ow many echniques f demo.'From Borba, ited n East Europe,VIII (January, 959), . For an extended iscussion f theworkers' ouncils, ee W. Loucks,Workers' elf-Governmentn Yugoslavndustry, orld

Politics, (October, 958), 9-72.sMontias, p. cit., p. 298; Neal,Titoism n Action, p. 210-12.9Kardelj, p. cit., p. 595-600.10J. Broz-Tito,On Certain nternational uestions, oreign ffairs, XXVI October, 957), 7.








TEN YEARSOFNATIONALOMMUNISM 937

cratic overnment ave been ntroduced nto the system, hey o not appearto rest n any nherent elief n the democratic rocess n the part f the coun-

try's eaders.Tito has stated hat he doesnot wantWestern-type emocracyorYugoslavia.11hese eaders, t wouldbe fair o say, re experimenting ithnewcombinationsf olderforms f administration. heir expectations that theywilldiscover or ugoslavia workable ethod hichwillmeet oth heir apa-bilities nd their eeds.Tito and hiscolleagues ave borrowed omefeatures fdemocracy hich o not mpair he tability f their ule; hey till laim o beMarxists nd have not abandoned heir oalof communism. What they dobelieve s that hey re more dvanced han ny ther ommunist ountry. heRussians, f course, rgue hat ust hereverse s true.

TITOISMN YUGOSLAVIATitoism can be viewed as the sum of the practical Yugoslav innovations

which have been grafted n to the structure f theoretical ommunsim. Titoismis communismmodified o accomodate few of the lesserfeatures f democraticgovernment. o doubt many n the West consider t to be the east objectionableform f communism ow extant. It is also an experimental rocess. Even Yugo-slav leaders concede that they have not yet evolved their final, most workablemodel. They are still searching, till modeling, till hoping to evolve a systemwhich will both nsure heir ontinuance n power, yet be fully greeable o the

majority f Yugoslavs, and which will solve the country's major economicproblems.Mostsignificantly, itoism s communism ndependent f Soviet ontrol. his

is the most noteworthy ontribution o Marxist theory s developed by theYugoslavs. Whatever communism has meant to the West since 1917, it hassignified system uided, directed, nd controlled romMoscow. Communismsince the 1920's has meant Soviet communism. The second concept has beeninseparable rom he first oth n theory nd in practice,with the one exceptionof China since the 1930's. Considering he severalmost fundamental lterationsof Marxism since 1917, the establishment f a communist overnment hichdecides for tself hedirection t will take rrespective f the orders nd wishesofMoscow will no doubt go down as the most striking eature f Titoism. It, infact, s Titoism.

POLANDAND THE INDEPENDENTROAD TOSOCIALISM

Of the everal auses f the Polish evolt n October, 956, fewmight enoted. The Polish conomy asthrown ut of balance by attempts ince1949to industrialize apidly t the expense f other ectors f the economy. hedefection f a Polish ecurity fficial n 1953,with ubsequent evelations f

police brutalities, as followed by a gradual relaxation of police controls nPoland. A greater ndependence for writers nd artists hroughout he Sovietbloc since Stalin's death created pressures ormore liberalizations, specially nPoland and Hungary. At the 20th Congress f the Soviet Communist party nn Neal,Titoism n Action, . 238.








TEN YEARSOF NATIONALCOMMUNISM 939

profits. nother bjectivef Gomulka'sconomic odelwasto reshape hepricesystem ore n accordance ith heprinciples f a market conomy. he cen-tralized

ystemf ndustrial

dministration,n Polish

words,outlived ts

pur-pose, hiefly ecause f a rise n the output f ndustry nd the ncreased ual-ifications nd ambitions f industrial anagers.15The private ector f theeconomy asgranted oncessions,oo.During he third uarter f 1957,morethan ,000new hops n Poland were pened, esultingn a measurablencreasein availabilityf consumer oods.By early 958therewere reported 35,000smallbusiness oncerns. n the first ix months f 1958, ,430new private n-dustrial orkshops ere rganized.16 he expansion f private roduction asencouragedhiefly n the ervices ector. Goodsproduced n this manner erenot o compete ith he ocialistector, ut were ntended merely o fill aps nthe market.With ertain imitations,mall hops an purchase rivately anu-factured oods nd can sell these goods, n turn, t a market rice. Also,thelimits f private rofit re not set, the onlyrequirement eing hat producersmust bide by the aw.

As in Yugoslaviao n Poland, ne of thenotable ccomplishmentsn recentyears as been the establishmentf workers' ouncils oaid in the general co-nomic ecentralizationnd to give mployees stronger oice n managing tateindustry. lthough riginatingn Poland ust prior o the October Revolt,workers' ouncils ecame widespread uring nd immediately fter October.

Accordingo the Draft tatute f

March, 957,hecouncils

elected ysecret

ballot n the enterprise) ere ooperate heir wn enterprises, ecidewhat oproduce nd how to produce t, determine rices o be charged or he com-modities, nd work ut the distribution f wages nd profits. he councils eretoelect hedirector f he nterprisend to hare with im he duties f manage-ment. By the end of 1957there were4,647workers' ouncils n operation.

Reforms n agriculture erebegunwhen the government,n September,1956, nnounced he closing f the MachineTractor tations a hallmark fmodern gricultural dministration nder ommunism), he sale of the MTSmachineryothe peasants, nd the nding f compulsory embershipn the ol-lective arms. ' n October, 956,Gomulka upported oluntary embershipand self-governmentn the remaining ollectives. f the 10,600 ollective armsin the fall f 1956 Polandwasthe east ollectivizedountry n the bloc),morethan 8,000had been abolished ithin he year.19 y this ime ompulsory e-liveries f milkwere bolished s were eliveries f certain uotas or ther om-modities. n addition, rices aid for emainingompulsory eliveries ere n-creased. mallpieces f and couldbe sold privately but not over15hectares,15S. Jakubowicz,New Formsof IndustrialManagement, olish Perspectives, o. 2 (June,

1958),15.

16EastEurope, III (February, 959), 8.E. Lipinski, Reform f the Economic Model, PolishPerspectives, o. 5 (September, 958),13-14;J. Kofman, Worker elf-Government, olishPerspectives, o. 3-4 (July-August,1958), 6;Staar, p.cit., . 72.

1 M. Dziewanowski,Limits nd Problems f Decompression:he Case of Poland, Annals,CCCXVII(May, 958), 2.'9 By1959 he tate wned nly 2per ent f the country's rable and.Rozmaryn,p.cit., . 70.








940 THE WESTERN POLITICALQUARTERLY

or 20 hectares n the case of a cattle farm) and nationalization f agriculture,in and of tself, eased to be an immediate nd of the government. nticipating

eventualreturn o

a collectivization rive, however, he party eadership esur-rected prewar ystem f agricultural ircles placed under a National Unionof Agricultural ircles) to encouragemore co-operative nd collective ttitudesamong the reluctant olish farmers. Numbering 6,500 circles with almost halfa million members y ate 1958,their unctions re to educate farmers n modernagricultural echniques, oan agriculturalmachinery, nd to lay the groundworkfor a mass organization mong the peasants.20

Although ndependence n foreign olicyhas not been reached n Poland toa degree imilar o that n Yugoslavia,Poland is still the least restricted, nterna-tionally, f the Eastern European countries. Gomulka has resisted ompleteSoviet domination n foreign olicy and, immediately ollowing is return opower n 1956,his country xtricated tself omewhat rom henarrow onfines fthe ntegrated loc-wide ystem f CEMA. Insteadof exporting reat mounts fcoal to the Soviet Union and to other Eastern European members f CEMA at areduced price, he custom n the past, Poland announced ts ntention o sell itscoal where t would most benefit oland- even if this meant shipping t to theWest. In addition, present Polish leaders miss few opportunities o reiteratePoland's sovereignty nd equal status with all other members f the bloc and topoint out, as recently s mid-1959, hat there re no superior nd inferior om-

munist parties.21Despite the gaining f some liberalizations hich have resulted n political,legal, nd administrative eforms, ommunism asnot been abandoned n Poland.A reorganization nd limited decentralization f industrial nd agriculturalmanagement, artial relaxation f dictatorial ontrols, nd greater iterary ree-doms have not produced either a free citizenry r a democratic government.In the economic phere, he chief dilemma of Polish economists s that of tryingto graft decentralized lanning and management on to what is basically acentralized ystem. To introduce new order of prices and wages requires

higher, ot lesser degreeof centralization. he government pparently s tryingto achievecertain nds (evolvea new system) while depriving tself f the neces-sary means. 2 Even the much-heralded orkers' ouncils have not proven o beparagons f worker utonomy n practice. Gomulka has stated that the councilswould be led and directed y the party, hat they would not follow he Yugoslav20Compulsory deliveries o the state n other products were reduced so that deliveries f grain, s

a proportion f total state purchases, fell from 91 per cent in 1956to roughly 0 per centin 1958. For livestock, omparable figures re 49 per cent in 1956,to 22 per cent n 1958. E.Pszczolkowski, Peasants Co-operative Organizations, Polish Perspectives, No. 4 (April,1959), 18-20.

1 For example, during Khrushchev's visit to Warsaw in July, 959, Gomulka, in a welcomingspeech, referred o equality and brotherly riendship f the socialist countries. Khrushchevreplied by mentioning he free development of each socialist country nd by stating hateach country hould build socialism and work toward communism n accordance with itsown national, cultural, nd economic peculiarities. For these statements, hrushchev wasroundly pplauded in Warsaw. Pravda, July 2, 1959.

2See the extended discussion by W. Stantiewicz, Gomulka's Economic Model, CanadianForum, XXXVIII (July, 958),82.








TEN YEARSOF NATIONAL COMMUNISM 941

pattern, nd that heywouldnot possess olitical ower.23The councilsmustfunction ithin heframework f the national lan and be subject othe awsanddirections f he

respectiventerprise.he

only owerhecouncils o

have,it might e argued, s to mprove heoperating fficiencyf the enterprises, ec-ommend rocedures or roduction, etermine hedistribution f bonuses, ndsuggest he dismissal f the director f the enterprise.24 s of mid-1958 hecouncils ere ohavebeenmerged nto Workers' elf-Governmentonference;this wouldbe an organizationn whichparty nd trade-union epresentativeswouldhave a vetoover ny proposals rom hecouncils. his seems o be theblow which killedPolishhopesof evolving n independent ystem f workercontrol n factory anagement.

Nevertheless,ll gains f the PolishOctober ave not been erased. t hasbeen suggested y Poles that n the morefree xpression f public pinion, npositiveegalreforms, nd n the democratic ivision f power nd authority,they avemoved arther rom talinism hanhasYugoslavia.25 ore utonomyhas been granted oPeoples'Councils territorial rgans f local governmentnumbering pproximately 0,000) which, supposedly, an distribute heir owninvestment eans.The new Sejmhas been revitalized,hough t is still ome-thing f a compromiseetween parliamentaryystem nd one of authoritariancommunist ule. The police are excluded from political activities nd a con-siderable egree f free peech till btains. he retreat rom ollectivizationasnot been

reversed,nd the

working rrangementetween he

partynd the

church continues n force.To what xtent ave the reforms n Polandbeen imilar othose n Yugo-

slavia? n both ountries limited elaxation f dictatorial ontrols s apparent.Restrictions mposedby the security oliceon the freedom f citizens have beeneased and more ndividual xpressions permitted n both ountries. egalre-forms avebeen dopted, uch s a more iberal riminal odewhichprovidescitizens dditional protection rom rbitrary ctions of governmental nd policeofficials. n the economy, othYugoslav nd Polish eaders ave decentralizedparts f their ndustrial nd agricultural dministration. ational lanning asbeen simplified o that the central government n each country ow sets onlythe basicproportions f the plan. In Poland, s in Yugoslavia,nterprises avebeen granted dditional utonomy, nd both countries ave attempted o in.troduce ertain eatures f a market conomy. When workers' ouncilswere es-tablished n Poland n 1956the organizationalattern hey ookwassimilar othat f the Yugoslavmodel. n agricultural eform, othYugoslaviand Polandgranted measure f ndependence opeasants. The MTS sold their machineryto the collective arms, r to peasants, urther ollectivizationashalted, ndcompulsory eliveries f certain ommoditieswere abolished. In foreign olicy,Yugoslaviahas become independent f the Soviet Union. Poland, though not23Staar, op. cit., p. 73.24 East Europe, VIII (January, 959), 7; VIII (March, 1959),28.' From Zycie Warszawy November 29, 1956), quoted in A. Haven, Tito and Gomulka: Some

Contrasts nd Comparisons, roblems f Comunism, VI (July-August, 957), 14.








942 THE WESTERNPOLITICALQUARTERLY

independent, as declared ts ntention o choose ts ownpathway oward om-munism nd has renewed ome f tsformer ontacts ith he West. Similar o

Kardelj's tatement n 1956 hat ugoslavia esires oexistence mong ations fdifferingocial ystems,n ate 1957Gomulka ontended hat oland houldworkfor o-operation ith tates fvarying ocial ystems. his lightmeasure f nde-pendence or oland s the closest arallel f anyEastern uropean ommunistnation o the Yugoslavmodel, t east n ts bjectivefnot n ts ttainment.

The Polish oad s not the Yugoslav oad n all details, owever. olandhas proceeded urther hanYugoslavian relaxing ictatorial ontrols ver tscitizens; ugoslavia,nternally, s still more f a Stalinist tate. Moreover, nelement f democratic ethod asbeen ntroduced nto hePolish egislature.In its conomic odel, ugoslavia asgonemuch urther n decentralizationndin the ntroduction f autonomy orworkers hanhas Poland. n most f theseinstances, owever, hedifferences etween he two ystems ppear obe onesmore f degree han f kind.

THE HUNGARIANEW COURSE: 1953-1955In Hungary heperiod rom uly, 953, oMarch, 955, eferred oas the

NewCourse, onstituted hefirst iberalizationf the communist egimen thatcountry. his periodmarked herise nd fall of the government f mre Nagy.At the ime f his ccessionothe premiershipn 1953,Nagy riticizedhebank.ruptcy f the economy hichhad adopted heSovietpattern ithoutmakingallowances or hecapabilitiesnd needsof Hungary. urthermore, e statedthat he people annot e free f the nation s not ndependent nd if t lackscomplete overeignty. he proper volution f socialist ociety, orNagy, temsfrom eaceful oexistence mong countries raveling different oads underparticular ational atterns, ut ndependent, ree nd equal. 6

The essence f he New Coursewasoutlined yNagy n an inaugural peechofJuly , 1953, ponhis ppointment s Premier. herewas to be lessemphasison heavy ndustry nd more n the ight nd food ndustries; he new regimewould

supportndividual

easantholdingsnd collectivization ould be a

voluntary ssociation;hegeneral tandard f ivingwouldbe raised; heLaborCode wouldbe liberalizednd the aw wouldprovide dditional rotection orworkers; herewouldbe considerably ore reedom or ntellectuals nd therewouldbe greater olerance orreligious ractices; lave-labor ampswould beabolishednd there ould e a marked eductionn the powers f the police; orexample, heywouldbe denied udicial owers.27

A relaxation f the dictatorshipn Hungary asa definite bjective f theNewCourse. n a statement hich s reminiscent f those reviously ade nYugoslavia,Nagyargues hat a safeguard or people'sdemocratic tate s in thebroad participation f the workingmasses n the exercise f power and adminis-26I. Nagy, mreNagy n Communism: n Defense f the New Course NewYork:Praeger, 957),

pp. 28, 31, 83.27 Summarized n F. Fejto, Behind the Rape of Hungary New York: David McKay Co., 1957),

pp. 97-101.








TEN YEARSOF NATIONAL COMMUNISM 943

tration nd n their ontrol ver he government.2 n a passagewritten n 1955resemblingbservations adebyDjilasandGerikovidnYugoslavia, agy tated

that the Hungarian eople's Democracy was being replacedby a personaldictatorshipnd that xpropriationsf the functions f tate rgans y the partyis incorrect nd harmful.29 t the nsistence f Nagy, devoted nd long-timeCommunist, heformal ontrol f the government ythe Communist arty asmoderated y forming he three argest olitical roups Communist, easant,Democrat) nto popular ront, alled the NationalUnity ront. Henceforth,the working asseswere o nfluence nd control hegovernment.

An emphasis n developing heavy ndustry n Hungary, t the urging fthe SovietUnion and CEMA,resulted n a partial tagnation f productivityafter 949.Hungary egan evelopment f a large teel ndustry, or xample,although acking n adequate esource ase. To remedy hisunrealistic olicy,Nagy dvocated reconversionf ndustry, lacingmore mphasis n consumergoods roduction nd on an expansion f foreign rade including ore radewith he West.30 hortly hereafter, woprice eductions ere arried ut whichaffected ome10,000tems f consumer oods. ndustrial orkers eceived ageincreases, ensionswere enlarged, ousing onstruction as stepped p, foodsupplies ncreased,nd 100,000icensesweregranted osmall hopkeepersndartisans oreopen heir hops.

In agriculture, easants eft he collectivesn droves n the fall of 1953.Peasant ebts o the tate n the form f

compulsoryeliveries ere ither an-

celedor reduced, axation rrears ere owered r ended, nd the black ist fKulakswas suppressed. he number f collective arms ellfrom high n1952of 5,315 24.6per cent f the and) to a figure n 1955of 4,816 18.9percent f the and).31

Despite hese chievements,heNewCoursewasonly partial uccess. heeconomic ituation as not markedly mproved.Agricultural nd consumergoodsncreased nly lightly, roduction ostswent p, and while ncome o thestate dropped, dministrativexpenditures id not. In addition o the imitedeffect f the economic eforms f the New Course,Nagynever had the fullsupport f the party pparatus hilehe was Premier. lthough oscow orcedRakosi o relinquish heoffice f Premier n the summer f 1953,he remainedasparty hief oharass he reform rograms. he twofactionsn the Hungarianleadership, hereformisted by Nagy nd the Stalinist ed by Rakosi,werefre-quently n conflict, either eing ble to subdue heother. inally, heRussians,in certain ritical eriods uring hetwenty onths fter uly, 953, upportedRakosi nd the talinists verNagy. nheriting very ifficult,f not mpossible,economicmalaise,Nagywas never ble to achieve ontrol ver the party ndgovernmentoan extent ecessaryocarry ut his policies. inally, e failed o28Nagy, p.cit., p. 215, 21.9 bid., p. 50, 252.

3obid., p. 82,92.nIn this period f time, nly ugoslavia nd Hungary f the Eastern uropean ountries howed

a measurable ecline n the number f collective arms. ee J. Tomasevich,Agriculturein Eastern urope, nnals, CCXVII(May, 958), 7.








944 THE WESTERN OLITICALQUARTERLY

gain the required upport rom he Russians. The downfall f Nagy and his re-moval from ffice n March, 1955, onsequently, ere foreordained.

HUNGARYAFTER1956The temporary uccesses f the New Course were not forgotten y the Hun-

garian people. Their desire for more liberalizations f the Nagy type, oupledwith their owered tandard f living ince 1949and their hate of the Russiansmeant that by the beginning f 1956communism n Hungary, n the eyesof mostHungarians, was completely iscredited. More important, or purposes of therevolt n the fall, hepopulacewas rapidly osing ts fear of the Communist ead-ers both Hungarian nd Russian.

It is difficult ooverestimate he effect f the Soviet 20th Party Congress nthe Hungarian ituation. At this Congress talin was ridiculed, national com-munism was given ukewarm pproval, nd more democratization as promised.In Hungary hesestatements were interpreted s a condemnation f Rakosi, ajustification f Nagy, and an encouragement oclean up public ife and make itmore democratic.32 espite a feeble ffort n the part of Rakosi at self-criticism,a reorganization f the PopularFront, nd large-scale mnesties ollowing he 20thParty Congress, popular pressure aused Rakosi's resignation n July, 1956--just three years fter nauguration f the New Course.

The reforms oming uring nd after he revolt f 1956 were extensive nd

ranged from flirtation ith direct democracy workers' ouncils running ac-tories nd even some cities) to a modification f several normal features f com-munism. Following relaxation f controls, ungarians njoyed ome improve-ments n their lectoral ystem. More candidates ppeared on the ballots thanthere were offices o be filled. There was greater ecrecy n balloting nd thereexisted n element f popular hoice n the pre-election rocess f selecting andi-dates. General legal reforms, t least on paper, were realized through overn-mental provisions estricting heoperating pheres f the state ecurity oliceandof the military ribunals. These provisions lso called for the independence fjudges nd for heguarantee oaccusedpersons f freedom rom ustody endinginvestigation, or ll but exceptional ases. 3

In July, 956, the party's Central Committee made note of the necessity oexpand the rights f the legislature National Assembly) and to broaden theauthority f local governments o that the people would be able to settle theiraffairs t this evel.34 After he Revolt this rend oward greater ocal autonomyincreased. A new law of January, 958,gave local governments dditional fiscalauthority nd more upervision ver their conomic, ocial, nd cultural ife. OneHungarian fficial aid, of the new electoral aw, it is not ideal, but it representsas much democratic rogress s we can afford t this time.35

32Fejto,op.cit., . 126.83Resolutions f the Hungarian ommunist arty entral ommittee, uly, 956.Quoted n P.

Zinner ed.), NationalCommunism nd PopularRevolt n Eastern urope New York:Columbia niversity ress, 956), p.360-61.

34bid., p.358-59.*EastEurope, II (August, 958), 1.








TEN YEARSOF NATIONALCOMMUNISM 945

In moves o decentralize arts f the economic pparatus, he HungarianCommunist arty alled for n end to the exaggerationsf centralism nd for

greater ndependence f ndustrial anagers,ncluding inisters, actory irec-tors, oremen, nd engineers. n 1956 nd 1957 number f centralministrieswere bolished approximatelyne third), nd there were ccompanyingeduc-tions n central oards nd arge-scaleismissalsf administrativeersonnel anestimated 5-28 per cent of the administrativemployeesn the central ndlocalgovernments ereremoved n 1957).6

Concessionsoprivate usiness ere madebythe Kadargovernment ollow-ing heRevolt.Businessmen ere ranted ore reedom orent hops rom hestate nd to hire specified umber f employees;awmaterial llocations othese usinessmen ere ncreased; rivileges eregiven rivate perators n thebuilding onstructionndustry nd for hose xporting uality andicrafts. sa result f these oncessions,herewere 28,000 icensed rtisans n Budapestemploying ,500workers n December, 957 compared o5,000employeesn1956).Private radesmenn Budapest ncreased rom ,000 n 1956 to 5,300 n1958.37 n October, 958,Kadarnoted hat rivate rtisans nd tradesmen adea positive ontribution uring hepost-Revoltonsolidation,nd he assured hemthat heywouldenjoy heopportunity f small capitalists or ome time ocome. Later n the year, however, he regime eganrestricting perations fprivate usinessmen. maximum egal imit f 8 per centwasseton profits f

private rtisans,nd it

became llegal or mployeesn state nterprises o takeemploymentn the private ector. tate etail tores ere imited n the mountof commodities hich hey ouldbuyfrom rtisans, nd private nterprise asbarred rom reditmanufacturingndustries.

As in Yugoslaviand Poland,Hungary, oo,had ts workers' ouncils hich,during he revolution, ssumed dual role of factory anagement nd citygovernment. his highpoint f the ouncils oon passed, owever. ate n 1957the ouncils ere bolishednd replaced y hemore nnocuous actoryouncilswhich, n turn, eem o be dominated ythe trade-unions.

In agriculture, he regime eclared n armistice n forced ollectivizationafter heRevolt, ncreased heprices f farm roducts, bolished hecompulsorydelivery ystem nd, n 1958,pledged qual support ocollective arms nd toindividual armers like. The results f this rogram eant n 8 to 10 per entincreasen peasant ncome or 957over hat or 956, nd an increasen peas-ant onsumptionf heir wnproducts. n 1959, owever,ome 50,000 easantsreportedly ere orced ack nto ollectivearms.39

The recent istory f Hungary esembleshat of Poland n severalways.There xisted n each of the ountries tradition f national attles gainst heRussians, he bitter ostwar xperience f Soviet conomic xploitation, dis-satisfaction ith dictatorial ontrols, widespread popular desire for more in-

Ibid., July, 958), . 6; (August, 958), . 18.3 bid.,VIII (February, 959), 3.s bid., p. 29-30.Ibid., VII (May, 958), 6-7, 8.









dividual reedom,nd a schism ithin he ocal Communist arty. here was,however, very ignificantifference hich et he Hungarian ituation part ot

only from hat f Poland, ut from hat of Yugoslavia lso. Hungary ad nostrong anwho ould uccessfully oderate he ommunist ystem osatisfy hemajority, et etain n established overnmentalrder, nd at the ame time otgoad the Russians nto violent eprisals. ugoslavia ad its domineering ndforceful ito and Poland ts trong nd resourceful omulka; ungary ad onlyits weak, oliticallynept mreNagy s its pokesman ornational ommunism.Nagywasnot great eader f men,not a skillful layer n the gameof com-munist olitics,nd not revolutionary. ost mportant, agywasnever ble toget hemajority upport f the Hungarian ommunist arty. History, t seems,had passed mreNagy y. Followinghefailure f the NewCourse nd stimu-lated by popular eaction gainst he oppressive egimewhich ame after t,national ommunism nd revisionismpread apidly n Hungary. Getting utof hand by the summer nd fall of 1956, heRevolt aught p and consumedNagy.Perhaps ot venTitoor Gomulka ouldhavemoderated he ystem ndprevented narchy n Hungary. ertainly agywasunable o do so. Further-more, henational ommunistsn Hungary t the time f the Revoltwereun-organized;hey acked well-thought-outrogram nd theywereunprepared otake ver he governmentn such period f tress.

The reforms f communismn Hungary ince1953are similar o those f

Yugoslavian several espects. he New Course paralleled ito's ndependentroad;Nagydiscussed henecessity or ountries o travel ifferent oadsunderparticular ational atterns, ach country eing ndependent, ree, nd equal.The effort oplaydownthe monopolizingoleof the party n Yugoslaviawasseen n Hungary n the stablishmentf the Popular ront imed t permittingother, on-party oices oparticipaten governmental olicy.The electoral e-forms arried ut n Yugoslavia ere xpressedn Hungary hen hat ountry,after he Revolt, lsobegan ffering ovotersmore han ne candidate or achelective ffice. he curbing f activities f the ecurity olice n Yugoslavia asreflectedn the general egalreforms nacted n Hungary fter 956. The Yugo-slav nsistencen reinvigoratingocalgovernmentnd grantingt more utonomyhad its counterpart n Hungary oth ust before nd ust fter he Revolt.Therather xtensive conomic-managerialecentralizationn Yugoslaviahad itsparallel n Hungary hroughout 956 nd 1957, vento the similar bolition fsomeeconomicministries. he Yugoslav xperiments ith limited orm fworker elf-rule ight avebeendeliberately opiedby the Hungarians hen,prior othe Revolt, everal eadingHungarian ommunists ent o Yugoslaviato study he functioning f workers' ouncils.The slow-down n agriculturalcollectivizationn Yugoslaviand the nding f compulsoryeliveries,s well as

easing the lot of the peasant through ess restrictive ax policies, had theircounterpart measures n Hungary both during the New Course and after theRevolt.

Apart from he possible nfluence f the Yugoslavmodel, at least two otherfactorsmight ave contributed othe growth f national ommunism n Hungary.








TEN YEARS OF NATIONAL COMMUNISM 947

The New Course n Hungary ascarried ut simultaneously ith like newcourse n the SovietUnionunder remier alenkov.Moreover, any f the

reforms chieved n Hungary ave been n the process f developingn theSovietUnion. Economic-managerialecentralization,mprovementsn the egalsystem, urbing he security olice, bolition f slave-labor amps, slightlygreater reedomf expression, ore utonomy or egionalnd ocal government,and modificationsn the techniques f central lanning re all reforms hichhaveoccurred n the SovietUnion ince 1953.

Furthermore,heYugoslavs aveno patent n nationalism, isappointmentwith he xtremes f communism,nd dislike f Soviet omination. hese feel-ings ouldhave risen n Poland nd Hungary ecause f postwar evelopmentsin Eastern urope rather han from ny overwhelming esire o mimic heYugoslavs.Nevertheless,heYugoslav xample annot e underestimated,ndits nfluence n Eastern uropemay egreater hanwhat ppears n the urface.

CONCLUSIONS

The Yugoslavmodelof national ommunism,n its essence,means nde-pendence n foreign olicy nd a cautious xperimentation ith communisttheory nd with conomic orms, ut upported y firm ictatorship.n Polandnational ommunism odaymeans slight egree f independencen foreignpolicy, conomic xperimentation, greater easure f civil nd political ree-

doms han xists n any ther ommunist ountry, utwith continuance f theparty ictatorship nd a remaining lose alliancewith the Soviet Union. InHungary ational ommunism, espite ts past achievements,s virtually ead.There s no ndependencen foreign olicy orHungarians,nd although ome fthe gains f heRevolt till btain, he ountry asquickly everted o a full-scalesatellite losely upervised romMoscow.

Therehaveoccurredn Yugoslavia,oland, nd Hungary ince1948 ertainparalleldevelopments hichhave contributed o and shaped the patterns fnational ommunismn these ountries. omplete ubservienceo Moscow sunpopular n the three ountries, nd legal afeguards or itizensmore n theform f that xistent n Western ocietiesre favored. he unchecked ctivitiesof ecurity olice re a thing f the past n Yugoslaviand Poland nd were nlyrecently einstatedn Hungary. vercentralizationn governmental perationshas been modifiedn the three ountries; his s also the case with forced ol-lectivization,ompulsory eliveries f agricultural ommodities,nd punitivetaxesdirected gainst easants.Finally, n all three ountries easures avebeen taken o improve hesupply f consumer oods nd to breathe nto theplanned ystem t least he emblance f market conomy.

Why national ommunismrose n Yugoslavia, oland, nd Hungary nd

to what extent t is the same development n all three s not readily nswerable,but several hypotheses an be suggested o explain the phenomenon. Perhapsmere oincidence s the reasonfor he rise of similar vents n the three ountries.There do exist some marked differences mong the patterns f national com-munism n each case. The expression f national aspirations s a common oc-









currence n Eastern urope; ertainly here s nothing omplex boutYugoslav,Polish, nd Hungarian esires o become ndependent f Soviet ontrol. Na-

tionalism as a very onsiderableactor ontributingothe events n Yugoslaviain 1948, n Hungary n 1953, nd n Poland nd Hungary n 1956. Apart fromthe actors f oincidencendnationalism,erhaps olitical ndeconomiceformsunder ommunism, hen hey ooccur, an take nly ne form. onsequently,when the eadership ttempts o liberalize he system, mprovementsuch asgreater ndividual reedoms,conomic eorganizationnd decentralization,ndmodificationsn agricultural ollectivizationre reforms ost asily chievable.In support f this heorys the fact hat uchreforms aveoccurred, hough oa considerablyessdegree, n the Soviet Unionwhere ational ommunismatleast that part of t whichmeansdeviation rom he Sovietmodel) is not atissue.Finally, t can be suggestedhat here s, n fact, causalrelationship onational ommunismnd, consequently,ventswhich ook place n Yugoslaviaafter 948had direct earing n later evelopmentsn Poland nd Hungary.

Evidence or he causalhypothesis, lthough t times ircumstantial, asthe quality f substance.Manyof the reforms n Poland nd Hungary arallelsoclosely hosewhichwereworked ut earlier n Yugoslavias to argue gainsta simple xplanation f coincidence,r nationalism. y Polish dmission, heYugoslav bstinacyignificantlynfluenced olish ommunists. s early s 1948Gomulka emurred n siding ith talin gainst heYugoslavsnd declined o

brand Tito a deviationist.When Gomulkawas removed rom his post asSecretary-Generalf the PolishCommunist arty, olish ources onceded hatthedismissal as connected ith he disgracefulugoslav ffair. 0 In October,1956,Gomulka tated hat he paths or ttaining ocialismn different ountriesmayvary. The model or ocialism, e said,maybe that f the SovietUnion,of Yugoslavia,r somethingtill ifferent. n 1957whenGomulka nd PremierCyrankiewiczisitedYugoslavia, hey upposedly iscussed eparate oadstosocialism ith ito. In Hungary, agy who earlier adbeen ccused f newTitoism ) eferred o Titoism n Yugoslavias the creative pplication f Marx-ism-Leninismn building ocialism nder hespecificocial nd economic on-ditions fYugoslavia. ust rior o the 1956Revolt, delegaton f opHungarianCommunists isited ugoslavia ostudy hat ountry's orkers' ouncils.Thisvisit, aidthe account n the Hungarian ommunist arty ewspaper,s of con-siderablemportance ecause t willbring ack nterestingnd useful xperienceson democracyn Yugoslav nterprisesnd the problem f ndependencewhichinterests s verymuch. 1

Most significantly, erhaps, tatements y Tito and Gomulkaduring heheight f the Hungarian evolt end credence othe causalhypothesis y mply-ing greement n the ssence f national ommunism. ito aid:

The essential parts of the political platform f the new Hungarian political and state eader-ship, such as the democratization f public ife, he introduction f workers' elf-management nddemocratic elf-government n general, he settlement f relations between socialist countries n

40H. Armstrong, ito and Goliath NewYork: Macmillan, 951), p. 157.*EastEurope, III (March, 959),20.






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