San Miguel Corporation vs. Court of Appeals

Facts:

A petition for review on certiorari was filed by San Miguel Corporation (SMC) against Court of Appeals for denying its application for registration of a parcel of land located at Sta. Anastacia, Sto. Tomas, Batangas with lot number 684 with an area of 14,531 square meters.

The lot was purchased by SMC from Silverio Perez in the amount of Php 133,084.80 on December 23, 1975. Accordingly he inherited the land from his parents when he got married. Allegedly, his parents occupied the said area since 1925.

On February 21, 1977 claiming ownership in Fee Simple of the land, SMC filed before the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court of Batangas an application for registration under the Land Registration Act. The Solicitor General contended that ownership in Fee Simple on the basis of Spanish Title or grant could no longer be availed for the sixth-month period, from February 16, 1976 prescribed by P.D. 892 has elapsed, so the parcel of land in question is a public domain. On October 12, 1977 an initial and only hearing was conducted wherein SMC was allowed to mark documentary evidence and to establish documentary facts and to prevent additional evidence.

On December 12, 1977 the lower court granted the application for registration and adjudicating the property to SMC. The Solicitor General appealed the decision of the lower court to the Court of Appeals which reversed the decision of the lower court and declared the land involved as public land.

Hence, SMC appealed the decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court and allegedly the Court of Appeals committed grave errors:

1. CA failure to hold the prescription is a mode of acquiring title or ownership of land and the title thus acquired id registrable.

2. CA disregards SMC’s evidence3. CA reversal of the factual findings of the trial court which had the opportunity of

observing the demeanor and sincerity of the witnesses.

Issue:

Whether or not the lot purchased by SMC is a public land.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that “Open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for the period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period and without the need of judicial sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private property”.

In the case at bar the only evidence presented was a tax declaration and receipt which are not conclusive evidence of the ownership or a right possession of the land.

The testimony of the vendor Silverio Perez was uncorroborated hence is simply self-serving and undeserving of any weight, hence the decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed by the Supreme Court.

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Hong Hok vs. David

Facts:

This is a petition for certiorari from the Court of Appeals which affirms the decision of the lower court, to grant the Torrens Title to respondent Aniano David, which was greatly opposed by the plaintiff-appellant.

The plaintiff-appellant claiming is ownership to the Naga cadastre with lot number 2863, a portion of which is the source of the disputed lot 2892 containing an area of 226 square meters. This lot was occupied by the wife of Aniano David since 1938.

The respondent’s wife applied for registration of the said lot, unfortunately she died respondent renewed the application. On June 18 1958 the respondents acquired a lawful title grant from the government represented by the Director of Lands, on this basis the undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources issued on August 26, 1959 a miscellaneous Sales Patent no. V-1209 pursuant to which an OCT No. 510 was issued by the Register of Deeds of Naga City to the defendant on October 21, 1959.

The auction sale of land and the awarding of the land to the defendant were all done publicly but the plaintiff-appellant failed to put up an opposition thereto. They rely on their theory that the said lot came into being through accretion brought by the reclamation they did to their land, this was rejected by the court of appeals.

Issue:

Whether or not the grant granted by the government to the defendant was valid.

Held:

Notwithstanding the rejection of the Court of Appeals to the source of the disputed lot, the Supreme Court held that the theory is untenable.

Furthermore, the Supreme Court said that “only the government, represented by the Director of Lands or the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, can bring an action to cancel a void certificate of title pursuant to a void patent. In the case at bar, this was initiated by the private parties like the plaintiff, who claims to be the owner of the Naga Cadastre”.

It must also be noted that the constitution adopted the regalia doctrine wherein the state is the owner of all the lands, and it can be disposed to anybody provided that it complied with the essential requisites provided by the law.

The fatal error committed by the plaintiff-appellant is that they did not put up any opposition or adverse claim from all the proceedings in connection to the acquisition of the lot by the respondent, Aniano David. Thereby automatically it comes to the operation of R.A. 496 subject to the safeguards provided under section 38 of R.A, 496. Any questions concerning the validity of the Certificate of Title based on fraud should be raised within one (1) year from the date of the issuance of the patent, which had already prescribed.

Wherefore the Supreme Court, Affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals

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Director of Lands vs. Kalahi Investment, Inc.

Facts:

Kalahi Investment, Inc is an investment company with interest in mining. They found valuable mineral deposits in Floridablanca, Pampanga. As a locator who found the mineral deposits in lot no. 1851-B, Kalahi intended to have it registered and titled, but the Bureau of Lands represented by its Director contended that they cannot have it registered for lot no. 1851 is a vast mountain ranges.

Kalahi, abandoned its previous claim over the land and limited it to lot no. 1 of Plan sgs-3690, which contains an area of 1,730 square meters formerly lot no. 1851-B. Since the President of the Philippines issued Proclamation no. 82 on August 9, 1966 declaring it as Mount Dorst Forest Reserve through the recommendation of the Director of Lands and Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.

Their application for registration of the lot was opposed by the Director of Lands from the Court of the First Instance of Pampanga. Hence their application was denied, so they elevated it to the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether or not mining claims acquired, registered, perfected and patentable under the old mining law mature to private ownership thereof.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that mere patentable mining claim does not mean absolute ownership of the land. It merely segregates the located land from other who would want to be locator for themselves.

Furthermore, under P.D. 1214 promulgated on October 14, 1977 directing holders of subsisting and valid patentable mining claims, lode or places, located under the provision of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902 to file a mining lease application, within one year from the approval of the said decree.

Records show that Kalahi has already filed a mining lease application with the Bureau of Mines.

Wherefore the decision of the Court of the First Instance of Pampanga is affirmed by the Supreme Court with modification that Kalahi may proceed with the mining lease application with the Bureau of Mines.

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Republic vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

Facts:

This was an application to register for title four (4) parcels of lots designated as lot 1, 2, 4 and 4 under the Roman Catholic Bishop, a corporation sole represented by its Bishop Msgr. Jose T. Sanchez.

Lot no. 1, 2 and 3 are situated in Barrio Maasin, Candelaria, and Quezon Province. While the fourth parcel of lot is situated in Barrio Bucal (Taguan) of the same municipality and province.

The applicant for the said lots claimed that they acquired it through purchase\or donation as far as 1928. Like lot 1 which was acquired by the Roman Catholic Church thru Rev. Fr. Raymund Esquenet by purchase from spouses Atanacio Yranso and Maria Coronado on October 20, 1928, while portion of lot 2 was also purchase by the church thru the same representation from spouses Benito Maramot and Venancia Descallar on May 22, 1969 and the remaining portions of lot 2 and 3 were already owned and possessed by the Roman Catholic Church even prior to 1928, and was even used as Roman Catholic Cemetary in Candelaria, Quezon as early as November of 1918. While lot 4 was donated by spouses Paulo G. Macasaet and Gabriela V. de Macasaet on February 26, 1941.

The Roman Catholic Bishop applied for the titling of the said four (4) parcels of lands on February 2, 1979 but the Republic of the Philippines thru the Director of Lands and the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development represented by the Solicitor General, filed an opposition on April 20, 1979 in the Court of the First Instance of Quezon, alleging that the applicant did not have an imperfect title or title in fee simple to the parcels of lands. The court a quo decided in favor of the respondent church. The Republic contended and brought the case to the Civil Case Division of the then Intermediate Appellate Court, which affirmed the decision of the lower court, hence this case, was brought to the Supreme Court by the plaintiff. The Solicitor General further contended that granting title to alienable lot of public domain to respondent would be in violation of Article XIV, section II of the 1973 constitution.

Issue:

Whether or not, Private Corporation such as the Roman Catholic Bishop can acquire alienable land of public domain.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that “a determination of the character of the lands at the time of institution of the registration proceedings must be made”.

According to Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee “open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for the period prescribed by the law creates a legal fiction whereby the land, upon the completion of the requisite period and without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private property”. (Director of Lands vs. IAC).

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In the case at bar it is very clear that they have performed or acquired the entire conditions essential to grant certificate of title for the disputed lots, what was done by the respondent church was a mere formality for the registration of the title already conferred, vested or recognized.

It must also be noticed that the respondent church was not just a private corporation but a corporation sole as defined in Batas Pambansa Blg. 68 sec. 113. It is a special kind of corporation in which usually associated with the clergy with only one successor at a particular time.

Wherefore the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court is affirmed by the Supreme Court.

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Director of Lands vs. Aquino

Facts:

Hon. Juan P. Aquino is the Judge of the Court of the First Instance of Abra, where the Abra Industrial Corporation (AIC for brevity), a registered corporation engage in the production of cement applied for the registration in its name the parcel of land located at Bucay, Abra with an area of 70 hectares as indicated in survey plan PSU-217518, PSU-217519, PSU-217520 with a total assessed value of Php 6, 724.48.

The 70 hectares land is limestone rich which is an ingredient essential to cement production. Allegedly 66 hectares of which are within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve, but AIC said that its predecessors-in-interests had been in possession of the said land since July 26, 1894.

On July 22, 1966 Judge Aquino issued an order for registration of the parcel of land under the Land Registration Act.

On December 22, 1967 the commissioner of Land Registration issued Decrees for the registration of the parcel of land in the name of AIC.

On May 22, 1968 the Republic of the Philippines thru the Solicitor General filed a petition for review in the Court of the first Instance of Abra invoking section 38 of Act no. 496, that the land purchased by AIC was only 24 hectares but the application included 46 hectares of the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve, AIC employed actual fraud.

On November 27, 1969 the lower court denied the petition it said that judicial error is not synonymous with actual fraud. So this petition for review on certiorari under R.A. 5440 was filed by the Solicitor General to the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether or not, forest land or Forest Reserve can be alienated from public domain.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that under the Commonwealth Act no. 141 the power to exclude or reclassify area from the forest zone belongs to the President of the Philippines upon the recommendation of the secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and not to the District Forester or even the Director of Forestry, their failure to appear in the case should not affect the resolution of the case.

The Supreme Court found the contention of the petitioner meritorious for it is enshrined in the Constitution through the regalian doctrine, in which all lands of public domain, waters, mineral, coal, forest or timber and other natural resources are owned by the state.

Even though the Forest Land had not been denuded and its actual occupants resort to agriculture it does not mean that the area had been cancelled and de-established from its original classification. Henceforth the decision of the lower court are hereby reversed and set aside by the Supreme Court.

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The Director of Forestry vs. Villareal

Facts:

The petitioner, Director of Forestry was one of the several persons who opposed the application for registration of a parcel land classified as mangrove swamps in the municipality of Sapian, Capiz with an area of 178,113 square meters of mangrove swamps, to the applicant Ruperto Villareal.

He alleged that he and his predecessors-in-interests had been in possession of the said parcel of land for more than forty years (40).

Both parties agreed in one point that the disputed land was a mangrove swamp. The respondent argued that mangrove swamp are agricultural land but the petitioner contended that it is a forestall land therefore not disposable.

The Court of the First Instance of Capiz however grants the application of the respondent. The decision of the lower court was later affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Hence the Director of Forestry elevated the case to the Supreme Court for review on certiorari.

Issue:

Whether or not, mangrove swamps are agricultural land or forest land.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that mangrove swamps as forest lands is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like.

Furthermore the legislative definition embodied in section 1820 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 which declares that mangrove swamps or manglares form part of the public forests of the Philippines hence they are not alienable.

The evidence presented by the respondent in its claim were not sufficient to prove its possession and ownership of the land, he only presented tax declaration.

Wherefore the decision of the Court of Appeals was set aside and the application for registration of title by the respondent is dismissed by the Supreme Court.

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Mustang Lumber, Inc vs. CA

Facts:

Petitioner Mustang lumber, Inc is a duly registered lumber dealer with the Bureau of Forest Development (BFD). Its lumberyard is located at Fortune Street, Fortune Village, Paseo de Blas, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, their office is located at Nos. 1350-1352 Juan Luna Street, Tondo, Manila, and their permit will expire on September 25, 1990.

The Special Action and Investigation Division (SAID) of thee DENR received information that the petitioner is hiding stockpile of prohibited lumbers, some though not prohibited but without proper documents. On April 1, 1990 SAID organized a team of Policemen and Foresters to conduct surveillance at the lumberyard, in the course thereof the team saw coming out from the lumberyard of the petitioner truck with plate no. CCK-322 loaded with Lauan and Almaciga of assorted sizes and dimensions. Since the driver was unable to produce the required documents the team seized the truck together with its cargo and impounded at the DENR compound.

Due to the refusal of the owner, the team was unable to gain entry thereof. On April 3, 1990 the team was able to secure search warrant from Executive Judge Adriano R. Osorio of the RTC of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. Armed with the search warrant the team proceeded to the lumberyard of the petitioner and seized truckloads of Narra shorts, trimmings and slabs, a number of Narra lumber and approximately 200,000 board feet of lumber and shorts of various species including Almaciga and Supa. On April 4, 1990, the team returned to the lumberyard and seized stockpile of Almaciga, Supa and Lauan lumber with a total volume of 311,000 board feet for the petitioner were unable to produce the required documents for the said items and place it under administrative seizure. Wherein the lumberyard seized will remain in the custody of the petitioner but he is not allowed to dispose it.

On April 23, 1990, acting on the memorandum submitted by the Chief of the SAID Atty. Vincent A. Robles, Secretary Factoran issued an order suspending immediately the petitioner’s lumber-dealers permit.

On May 3, 1990 Secretary Factoran issued another order to confiscate in favor of the government, to be disposed of in accordance with the law the approximately 311,000 board feet of Lauan, Supa and Almaciga lumber.

On July 11, 1990 petitioner filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for certiorari and prohibition with regards to April 1, 1990 incidents.

On September 17, 1990 the DENR received reports that petitioner was violating P.D. 705. A team of DENR agents went to the office of the petitioner at Tondo, Manila, since the gate were open they proceeded and caught petitioner operating as a lumber dealer although its permit has already been suspended on April 23, 1990, furthermore the team were informed that an owner-type with a trailer loaded with lumber is about to be delivered with sales invoice with it. As a consequence of which petitioner filed the second Civil Case with the RTC of Manila s petition for certiorari and prohibition.

While Atty. Robles filed with the DOJ a complaint against the petitioners President and General Manager Ri Chuy Po, for violation of section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended, the investigating prosecutor recommended for the filing of appropriate cases to Ri Chuy Po. On

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this basis, information was filed by the DOJ at the RTC of Valenzuela Charging Ri Chuy Po with violation of section 68 of P.D. 705 on June 5, 1991.

Both civil cases filed by the petitioner were dismissed by the court a quo for lack of merit and was later affirmed by the Court of Appeals, hence they bought it to the Supreme Court.

The criminal case filed against Ri chuy Po was dismissed, for according to Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong “possession of lumber without the legal documents required by the forest laws and regulations is not a crime”. Hence the people filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, alleging that Judge Dizon-Capulong acted with grave abuse of discretion, after their motion for reconsideration has been denied.

Issue:

Whether or not, possession of lumber without legal permit is a crime.

Held:

All three cases were consolidated by the Supreme Court. The court held that the incident on April 1, 1990 is a legal seizure without warrant since the object to be searched is a moving vehicle so the dismissal of the Court of Appeals to the first civil case is affirmed by the Supreme Court.

With regards to the second civil case the court held that Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the dismissal of the case hence the petitioner never disputed the fact that their permit was suspended by Secretary Factoran and it was never lifted.

On the criminal case brought against Ri Chuy Po the court held that Judge Dizon-Capulong committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the said case. The Judges disposition and conclusion is incorrect since possession of lumber is punishable under PD 705 since lumber is a processed log or timber cut into desired sizes. Hence lumber is also a timber.

Wherefore the resolution is hereby set aside and annul and directing the Judge on her successor to hear and decide the case with purposeful dispatch since she committed grave abuse of discretion.

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Republic vs. CA

Facts:

On June 17, 1978 spouses Mario Lapina and Flor De Vega bought a parcel of lot situated in San Pablo City with lot nos. 347 and 348 with a total area of 91.77 square meters, from Cristeta Dazo Belen who inherited the lot from his father, who has been in possession of the lot since 1937 which was corroborated by the sister of Cristeta.

On February 5, 1987 the spouses filed an application for registration of title of the two parcels of land before the RTC of San Pablo City. However they were no longer Filipino citizen at the time of the application for registration of the said parcels of lot.

Even with the opposition by the Republic, the court a quo decided to approve the application for registration to the parcel of lot designated as lot 347 and 348. Not satisfied with the decision of the lower court the Republic appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals which affirms the resolution of the lower court. Hence the Republic filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court to nullify the decision of the Court of Appeals.

Issue:

Whether or not, the vendee or applicant considering that he is a foreign national can apply for the registration of title over a parcel of lot.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that, it matters not whether vendee or applicant has been in possession of the subject property for only a day so long as the period and/or legal requirements for confirmation of title has been complied with by his predecessor-in-interest, the said period is tacked to his possession .

In the case at bar it must be noticed that the predecessor-in-interest has been in possession of the land since 1937, the public land act requires that the applicant must prove: (a) the land is alienable public land (b) his possession, in the concept above stated, must be either since time immemorial or for the period prescribe in the public land act. Which was complied with as presented in the evidence, which includes a certification from the Bureau of land with a letter from the Bureau of Forest Development, proving that the land in question is alienable public land, and an affidavit from the vendor Cristeta Dazo and her sister, proving that she inherited it from their father.

Since the adoption of the 1987 constitution up to the present no other law has been passed by the legislature on the subject matter at bar, it remains to be B.P. 185, which grants to natural born Filipino citizen who has lost his citizenship to own a land.

Wherefore the petition has been dismissed by the Supreme Court and the decision of the Court of Appeals has been affirmed by the court.

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Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS

Facts:

Manila Prince Hotel is a Filipino corporation, who is one of the two qualified bidders to the sale of the 30% - 51% of the share of the respondent GSIS to the Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC for brevity).

The other qualified bidder is the Renong Berhad a foreign corporation who owns the ITT-Sheraton Hotel. Renong Berhad is a Malaysian corporation, invited to bid for the MHC.

On September 18, 1995 is the date of the bidding, were petitioner offers to buy 51% of the shares at Php 41.58 per share or Php 15,300,000.00 while Renong Berhad bid for Php 44.00 per share or Php 2.42 more than the bid of the petitioner. On September 28, 1995 petitioner sent a letter to respondent GSIS to match the bid of Renong Berhad at Php 44.00 per share and on October 20, 1995 petitioner sent a managers check to respondent for a bid security amounting to Php 33,000,000.00, but respondent GSIS refused to accept it.

On October 17, 1995 petitioner filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus if fear that GSIS would hastened the execution of the contract and on October 18, 1995 the Supreme Court issue TRO to respondent from perfecting and consummating the sale to the Malaysian firm.

Issue:

Whether 51% share form part of the national economy and patrimony covered by the protection mantel of the constitution.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that in Art. XII, Sec. 10 second paragraph of the national economy and patrimony uphold the Filipino first policy wherein Filipino corporation are given preference.

This article of the constitution is a self executing provision of the constitution because government agency such as GSIS is so greatly involved with the private sector, does make the government responsible for his action and the government thru GSIS has approved or authorized the action.

It must be noted that GSIS carried out the sale of the 51% of the MHC with the approval of the state acting through the Committee on Privatization.

This Filipino first policy is a product of Philippine nationalism to preserve historic relic such as the Manila Hotel, who is a mute witness to various event that change the course of this country. According to the Supreme Court national patrimony does not only pertain to natural resources but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos. Manila Hotel had become land mark, a living testimony to Philippine heritage. Many dignitaries around the world who visited the Philippines stayed in Manila Hotel to experience Philippine heritage. This national pride will vanish if entrusted to foreign entity.

Wherefore the respondent GSIS, MHC Committee on Privatization and Office of the Government corporate counsel are directed to cease and desist from selling 51% of the shares

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of MHC to Renong Berhad and to accept the matching bid of petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation by the Supreme Court.

Heirs of Yap vs. CA

Facts:

Lorenzo, Ramon and Benjamin are sons of Chua Mia. Sometime in February 1966, Ramon Yap purchase a parcel of land situated at 123 Batanes Street, Galas, and Quezon City from the spouses Carlos and Josefina Nery, then Ramon registered the parcel of lot he bought under his name.

In 1967 Ramon Yap constructed a two storey 3-door apartment building on the said property for the use of Yap family. One-fifth of the cost of the construction was shouldered by Ramon while the rest was shouldered by their mother. Upon its completion the improvement was declared for real estate tax purpose in the name of Lorenzo, upon the request or the wish of their mother.

On July 11, 1970 Lorenzo Yap died, months later petitioner moved to Manila to reside their permanently. Ramon Yap allowed them to used one unit of the apartment.

On March 18, 1992 Ramon Yap sold his land and share in the 3-dor apartment to his brother Benjamin Yap in the amount of Php 337, 500.00.

The controversy started when, on June 8, 1992 petitioner sent a letter of advice Ramon yap with regards to their claim of ownership over the property and demanded to execute proper deed to transfer the ownership of the property to them.

On July 22, 1992 Benjamin Yap filed an action with the RTC of Quezon City for quieting of title against petitioner. The petitioner averred that in 1966 spouses Carlos and Josefina Nery offered to sell the parcel of land to Lorenzo Yap in the amount of Php 15,000.00. Since Lorenzo and his wife Sally were both Chinese citizens, they requested Ramon to use his name for the purchase which the latter consented. It was agreed that the lot would remain under his name until they acquire Philippine Citizenship or should he, until his heirs acquires Philippine Citizenship.

Petitioner further contented that it was Lorenzo who finance for the construction of the apartment, but during trial Sally Yap admitted to the court that their business was razed by fire in 1964 two year before the purchased of the disputed land.

After assessing the evidence presented the trial court adjudged that Benjamin Yap to be the lawful owner of the property, this was later affirmed by the Court of Appeals, giving full credit to the Deed of Sale executed by spouses Nery in favor of Ramon Yap.

Now petitioner is seeking the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals before the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether or not, the trust agreement between Lorenzo Yap and his brother are enforceable.

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Held:

The Supreme Court held that the trust agreement between brothers is an implied trust which can be established by parol evidence. To establish it in real property the parol evidence should be fully convincing and proven by authentic documents.

The testimony given by Sally Yap wife of deceased Lorenzo Yap is self-serving. She herself admitted that in 1964 that their business was razed by fire that would place somehow doubt, as to their capacity to purchase the land in about two years, while Ramon Yap is an Accountant who has all the means to purchase property.

Wherefore the petition is denied and the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals was affirmed by the Supreme Court.

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Almeda vs. CA

Facts:

Alfredo, Leonardo and Ernesto all surnamed Almeda are the heirs of the parcel of land owned and possessed by their father Emiliano Almeda by virtue of “Escretura de Particion Extrajudicial” executed on June 15, 1935 between him and his brother Adriano. This parcel of land was inherited by their father from his parents, Vedasto Almeda and Josefina C. Concepcion, who inherited the same from their parents.

Emeliano Almeda died on May 1, 1948, his wife Ana Menguito and their children received the fruit of the land and rented out portion of the property. Upon Ana’s death on April 3, 1950 his children inherited the property and apportioned it among themselves on June 9, 1980 thru the execution of extrajudicial partition.

On September 12, 1984 Almeda brothers applied for the registration of the land in the RTC of Pasig. On the date of the hearing nobody opposed the application except the Director of Lands through the Solicitor General. An order of default was executed by the judge against the whole world. The trial court found that the applicant had been in possession of the land to be registered, together with their predecessors-in-interest for over 30 years.

On January 18, 1986 the court a quo conferred the title of the parcel of land to the petitioner.

However the Republic of the Philippines represented by the Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals, alleging that the statutory requirements on possession of the land under section 48(b) of CA 141 because the land applied for was a forest land and became alienable and disposable land on January 3, 1968 only.

The CA, reversed the decision of the lower court in its decision dated May 9, 1988. It held that the applicant had not qualified for the grant under section 48(b) of commonwealth Act 141 which requires public, continuous, adverse possession of the land in the concept of owner for a period at least 30 years. They only have in their credit 17 years in possession and occupation of the said land.

After its motion for reconsideration was denied by CA, applicant filed a petition for review before the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Does land classification affects the vested right of the applicants and their predecessor-in-interest.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that under section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act the applicant did not qualify for the grant of title because their possession of the land, while it was still inalienable forest land. When they occupy it and became alienable and disposable land on January 13, 1968 could not ripen into private ownership. Hence the applicant had only been in actual occupation of the land for only 17 years.

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Wherefore the petition for review is denied for lack of merit by the Supreme Court.

Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals

Facts:

The Director of Lands through the Solicitor General is one of the opposition to the application for registration of a parcel of land owned and possessed by private respondent/ applicant.

The land in dispute is located at Obando, Bulacan with lot no. 2347 with an area of approximately 9.3 hectares. The applicant converted the lot to fishpond.

On May 10, 1976 the applicant applied for registration for the said parcel of lot and claimed that they are the co-owners of the parcel of lot in Fee Simple and partly through inheritance in 1918 and partly purchased on May 2, 1958.

The Director of the Bureau of Forest Development opposed the application on the grounds that the land applied for was unclassified region of the Obando, Bulacan. Accordingly areas unclassified are denominated as Forests lands and do not form part of the disposable and alienable land of public domain.

However the trial court ordered the registration of the subject land in favor of applicants. This was later affirmed by the Court of Appeals, which found that their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, public, continuous, peaceful possession of the land for more than 30 years. Hence the petitioner appealed the decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether or not, courts can reclassify land of public domain.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the power to reclassify lands is beyond the power of the judiciary, it belongs to the executive department.

Since the subject property is still unclassified, whatever possession applicants have over the property cannot ripen into private ownership of the subject land.

Wherefore the appealed decision was reversed and the applicant for registration of the disputed land was hereby dismissed by the Supreme Court.

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De Castro vs. Teng Queen Tan

Facts:

In 1938, petitioner sold a 1,258 sq.m. residential lot in Bulan, Sorsogon to Tan Tai, who is a Chinese citizen. In 1956 Tan Tai died leaving her widow and children.

On August 11, 1956 one of his sons, Joaquin, became naturalized Filipino citizen. On November 18, 1962 his heirs executed an extra-judicial settlement to adjudicate entirely the lot to Joaquin.

On July 15, 1968 petitioner commenced suit against the heirs of Tan Tai for annulment of the sale of the lot, alleging violation of the 1935 constitution prohibiting the sale of land to aliens. Respondent move to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds: (a) lack of cause of cause, the plaintiff being in pari delicti with the vendee (b) laches (c) acquisitive prescription.

The trial court dismissed the compliant sustaining the first two grounds invoked by the respondent. So the plaintiff filed a petition for review on certiorari to the Supreme Court

Issue:

Whether or not the sale of a residential lot to an alien, but now in the hands of a naturalized Filipino citizen valid.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the petitioner was in leaches considering that she sold the disputed lot in 1938. She instituted the action to annul the sale only on July 15, 1968, as cited in Sarsasa case.

Wherefore the appealed order is affirmed by the Supreme Court.

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Director of Lands vs. IAC

Facts:

The director of Lands appealed to the Supreme Court for certiorari to review the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court which affirms the decision of the Court of the First Instance of Isabela which ordered registration in favor of Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc of the five parcel of land with a total area of 481, 390 square meters more or less, which they acquire from Mariano and Acer infiel members of the Dumagat Tribe.

Issue:

Whether or not the land possessed by Acme is of required character and length of time to grant title to it.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that since its predecessor-in-interest had been in possession of the said property since time immemorial, no proof being admissible to overcome or conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings would in truth be little more than a formality. The proceedings would not convert the land possessed by Acme from public to private land but simply confirms the already vested in it by operations of the law, from the moment the required period set by the law for the possession of the land became complete.

Wherefore, the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court was affirmed by the Supreme Court.

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Guiang vs. Kintanar

Facts:

This is a petition for certiorari and mandamus seeking to set aside the decision of the Court of the First Instance of Quezon City, where it consolidated the three related cases between the Guiang’s and the Kintanar’s.

In the first complaint, the plaintiff is seeking certain sums of money and an accounting from the defendant in his management of the plaintiff’s 216 hectares of land in San Roque, Sta. Maria, and Davao Del Sur.

In the second and third complaint the plaintiff is seeking rescission of the sale of their land in favor of the defendant due to the failure of the defendant to pay the installment price agreed upon.

On August 20, 1975 the parties in these three cases jointly move for a decision based on a Compromise Agreement. On the same day the respondent judge promulgated a decision approving the Compromise Agreement.

On August 17, 1978 private respondent file a petition for execution of the judgment pertaining to the Compromise Agreement and praying that the plaintiff be declared in contempt for their failure to execute deeds of conveyance to lot nos. B-1 and B-2 and lot nos. A-2 and A-3 despite the payment of the total sum of Php 240, 000.00 as stipulated in the Compromise Agreement. The petitioner contented that the agreement should be declared null and void for it violates sec. 11 of article XIV of the 1973 constitution in relation to public land act, setting the maximum limit that an individual may acquire by purchase of land from the government.

However on November 14, 1978 respondent judge issued an order denying the petitioners counter-motion to declare the Compromise Agreement void as to sale and order the issuance of a writ of execution and denying respondent’s petition for contempt.

Issue:

Whether or not, the Compromise Agreement entered into by the parties was void ab initio.

Held:

The Supreme Court that the Compromise Agreement between parties is void ab ignition since it violates the 1973 constitution in relation to public land act, which sets the limit an individual, can acquire land by purchase from the government to 24 hectares.

Private respondent already owned 29 hectares of land purchase from the government which would bar him from acquired the plaintiffs land. The latter was order by the court to return to the plaintiff without any compensation lot nos. B-3 and B-3.

In connection to the petitioner’s rental estimation, the court adheres to the estimation made by private respondent that it had paid the amount stipulated in the agreement.

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The Supreme Court grants the herein petition.

Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands

Facts:

Oh Cho, a Chinese citizen, purchased from the Lagdameos a parcel of land in Tayabas, which they openly, continuously and adversely possessed since 1880. On January 17, 1940, Oh Cho applied for registration of this land. The Solicitor General opposed on the ground that Oh Cho lacked title to said land and also because he was an alien.

Issues:

Whether or not Oh Cho had title Whether or not Oh Cho is entitled to a decree of registration

Held:

Oh Cho failed to show that he has title to the lot, which may be confirmed under the Land Registration Act.

All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors in interest since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been a private property even before the Spanish conquest.

The applicant does not come under the exception, for the earliest possession of the lot by his first predecessor in interest began in 1880.

Under the Public Land Act, Oh Cho is not entitled to a decree of registration of the lot, because he is an alien disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain.

Oh Cho's predecessors in interest would have been entitled to a decree of registration had they applied for the same. The application for the registration of the land was a condition precedent, which was not complied with by the Lagmeos. Hence, the most they had was mere possessory right, not title. This possessory right was what was transferred to Oh Cho, but since the latter is an alien, the possessory right could never ripen to ownership by prescription. As an alien, Oh Cho is disqualified from acquiring title over public land by prescription.

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Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., INC. vs. The Deputy Executive Secretary

Facts:

After the change of government in February 1986, petitioner sent a letter dated March 17, 1986 to the Office of the President, and another letter dated April 2, 1986 to Minister Ernesto Maceda of the Ministry of Natural Resources [MNR], seeking: (1) the reinstatement of its timber license agreement which was cancelled in August 1983 during the Marcos administration; (2) the revocation of TLA No. 356 which was issued to Twin Peaks Development and Realty Corporation without public bidding and in violation of forestry laws, rules and regulations; and, (3) the issuance of an order allowing petitioner to take possession of all logs found in the concession area [Annexes "6" and "7" of the Petition; Rollo, pp. 54-63]. Petitioner made the following allegations:

(a) That on October 12, 1965, it entered into a timber license agreement designated as TLA No. 87 with the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources, represented by then Secretary Jose Feliciano, wherein it was issued an exclusive license to cut, collect and remove timber except prohibited species within a specified portion of public forest land with an area of 54,920 hectares located in the municipality of Maddela, province of Nueva Vizcaya * from October 12, 1965 until June 30, 1990;

(b) That on August 18, 1983, the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development [hereinafter referred to as "Bureau"], Director Edmundo Cortes, issued a memorandum order stopping all logging operations in Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino provinces, and cancelling the logging concession of petitioner and nine other forest concessionaires, pursuant to presidential instructions and a memorandum order of the Minister of Natural Resources Teodoro Pena [Annex "5" of the Petition; Rollo, p. 49];

(c) that on August 25, 1983, petitioner received a telegram from the Bureau, the contents of which were as follows: PURSUANT TO THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE PRESIDENT YOU ARE REQUESTED TO STOP ALL LOGGING OPERATIONS TO CONSERVE REMAINING FORESTS PLEASE CONDUCT THE ORDERLY PULL-OUT OF LOGGING MACHINERIES AND EQUIPMENT AND COORDINATE WITH THE RESPECTIVE DISTRICT FORESTERS FOR THE INVENTORY OF LOGS CUT PRIOR TO THIS ORDER THE SUBMISSION OF A COMPLIANCE REPORT WITHIN THIRTY DAYS SHALL BE APPRECIATED — [Annex "4" of the Petition; Rollo, p. 48];

(d) That after the cancellation of its timber license agreement, it immediately sent a letter addressed to then President Ferdinand Marcos which sought reconsideration of the Bureau's directive, citing in support thereof its contributions to alleging that it was not given the forest conservation and opportunity to be heard prior to the cancellation of its logging 531, but no operations (Annex "6" of the Petition; Rollo, pp. 50 favorable action was taken on this letter;

(e) That barely one year thereafter, approximately one-half or 26,000 hectares of the area formerly covered by TLA No. 87 was re-awarded to Twin Peaks Development and Reality Corporation under TLA No. 356 which was set to expire on July 31, 2009, while the other half was allowed to be logged by Filipinas Loggers, Inc. without the benefit of a formal award or license; and,

(f) That the latter entities were controlled or owned by relatives or cronies of deposed President Ferdinand Marcos. Acting on petitioner's letter, the MNR through then Minister Ernesto Maceda

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issued an order dated July 22, 1986 denying petitioner's request. The Ministry ruled that a timber license was not a contract within the due process clause of the Constitution, but only a privilege which could be withdrawn whenever public interest or welfare so demands, and that petitioner was not discriminated against in view of the fact that it was among ten concessionaires whose licenses were revoked in 1983. Moreover, emphasis was made of the total ban of logging operations in the provinces of Nueva Ecija, Nueva Vizcaya, Quirino and Ifugao imposed on April 2, 1986

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner’s cancellation of timber license was a violation of his right as forest product businessman and that no due process was observe

Held:

The ongoing administrative reassessment is apparently in response to the renewed and growing global concern over the despoliation of forest lands and the utter disregard of their crucial role in sustaining a balanced ecological system. The legitimacy of such concern can hardly be disputed, most especially in this country. The Court takes judicial notice of the profligate waste of the country's forest resources which has not only resulted in the irreversible loss of flora and fauna peculiar to the region, but has produced even more disastrous and lasting economic and social effects. The delicate balance of nature having been upset, a vicious cycle of floods and droughts has been triggered and the supply of food and energy resources required by the people seriously depleted. While there is a desire to harness natural resources to amass profit and to meet the country's immediate financial requirements, the more essential need to ensure future generations of Filipinos of their survival in a viable environment demands effective and circumspect action from the government to check further denudation of whatever remains of the forest lands. Nothing less is expected of the government, in view of the clear constitutional command to maintain a balanced and healthful ecology. Section 16 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides: SEC. 16. The State shall protect and promote the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. Thus, while the administration grapples with the complex and multifarious problems caused by unbridled exploitation of these resources, the judiciary will stand clear. A long line of cases establish the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies. More so where, as in the present case, the interests of a private logging company are pitted against that of the public at large on the pressing public policy issue of forest conservation. For this Court recognizes the wide latitude of discretion possessed by the government in determining the appropriate actions to be taken to preserve and manage natural resources, and the proper parties who should enjoy the privilege of utilizing these resources. Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest products therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause

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Barsobia vs. Cuenco

Facts:

The lot in controversy is a one-half portion (on the northern side) of two adjoining parcels of coconut land located at Barrio Mancapagao, Sagay Camiguin, Misamis Oriental with an area of 29, 150 square meters, more or less. The entire land was owned previously by a certain Leocadia Balisado who had sold it to the spouses Patricio Barsobia (now deceased) and Epifania Sarsosa, one of the petitioners herein. On September 5, 1936, Epifania Sarsosa sold the land in controversy to a Chinese, Ong King Po P1, 500.00. Ong King Po took actual possession and enjoyed the fruits thereof. On August 5, 1961, Ong King Po sold the litigated property to Victoriano T. Cuenco, respondent therein, a naturalized Filipino for the sum of P5, 000.00. Respondent immediately took actual possession and harvested the fruits there from. On March 6, 1962, Epifania Usurped the controverter property, and on July 6, 1962, Epifania through her only one daughter Emetaria Barsobia sold a one half portion of the land in question to Pacita Vallar. Epifania claimed that it was not her intention to sell the land to Ong King Po and the she signed the document of sale merely to evidence her indebtedness to the latter in the amount of P1,050.00. On September 19, 1962, respondent filed a forcible entry case against Epifania before the Municipal Court of Sagay, Camiguin which was later dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction. On December 27, 1966, respondent filed a complaint for recovery of possession and ownership of the litigated land against Epifania and Vallar. In the petitioners answer, they insisted that they were the owners of the litigated land. The trial court rendered judgment against respondent now plaintiff, declaring the two deed of sale are void ab initio and declaring Vallar the lawful owner of the land. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the aforementioned decision and decreed instead that the respondent was the owner of the litigated property. Upon denial of their motion of reconsideration, petitioners filed the instant Petition for Review before the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether or not the sale of parcel of land to Ong King Po and later sold to a Filipino citizen is void ab initio and inexistent? Who is the rightful owner of the disputed property?

Held:

There should be no question that the sale of the land in question in 1936 by Epifania to Ong King Po was in existent and void ab initio (Art. 1409 [7], Civil Code) because it was a contract executed against mandatory provision of the 1935 constitution, which is an expression of public policy to conserve lands for the Filipinos. But the factual setup has changed. The litigated property is now in the hands of a naturalized Filipino. It is no longer in the hand of disqualified vendee. Respondent, as a naturalized citizen, was constitutionally qualified to own the subject property. There would be no more public policy to be served in allowing petitioner Epifania to recover the land as it is already in the hands of qualified person. It is likewise inescapable that petitioner Epifania had slept on her rights for 26 years from 1936 to 1962. By her long inaction, she should be barred from asserting her claimed to the litigated property. Respondent, therefore, must be declared to be the rightful owner of the property and award the actual damages in respondent’s favor of P10, 000.00, as well as attorney’s fee and expenses of litigation.

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Lee vs. Republic

Facts:

Sometimes in March 1936, Rafael, Carmen, Francisco, Jr., Ramon, Lourdes, Mercedez, Conception, Mariano, Jose, Loreto, Manuel, Rizal and Jimmy, all surnamed Dinglasan sold to Lee Leong, a Chinese citizen, a parcel of land with an approximate area of 1,631 square meters situated at the corner of Roxas Avenue and Pavia Street, Roxas City.However, in 1948, the former owners filed with the court of First Instance, Capiz an action against the heirs of Lee Liong for annulment of sale and recovery of land. The plaintiff assailed the validity of the sale because of the constitutional prohibition against aliens acquiring ownership of private agricultural land including residential, commercial or industrial land. Rebuffed in the trial court and the court of appeals, plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court on June 27, 1956. Also in September 7, 1993, Elizabeth Manuel Lee and Pacita Yu Lee filed with the Regional Trial Court, Roxas City a petition for Reconstitution of the said litigated title, petitioner alleged that they were the rightful heirs of deceased Lee Liong. On June 10, 1994, Regional Trial Court ordered to reconstitution the lost or destroyed certificate of title in the name of Lee Liong, deceased. On January 25, 1995, the solicitor General filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for annulment of judgment in Reconstitution of the said title. The SolGen contends that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the case and that of petitioners were not the proper parties in the reconstitution of the title, since their predecessor-in-interest Lee Liong did not acquire title to the lot because he was Chinese citizen and constitutionally not qualified to own the subject land.

Issue:

Whether or not the sale of parcel of land and reconstitution of the litigated land title to an alien constitute violation of the 1935 constitution?

Held:

The Supreme Court ruled granting the sale to be null and void cannot give the title to the vendee, it does not necessarily follow there from that the title remained in the vendor, who had also violated the constitutional prohibition or that he (the vendor) has the right to recover the title of which he has divested himself by his act in ignoring the prohibition. In such contingency another principle of law sets into bar the equally guilty vendor from recovering the title which he voluntarily conveyed for a consideration that of pari delicto. The proper party that could assail the sale is the Solicitor General. While it took the Republic more than sixty years to assert itself, it is not barred from initiating such action; prescription never lies against the state. Reconstitution of the original certificate of title must be based on an owner’s duplicate, secondary evidence thereof, or other valid sources of the title to be reconstituted. In this case, reconstitution was based on the planned technical description approved by the Land Registration Authority. This renders the order of reconstitution void for lack of factual support. Any change in the ownership of the land must be the subject to separate suit. Thus, although petitioners are in possession of the land, a separate proceeding in necessary to thresh out the issue of ownership of the land.

Wherefore, the court reverses and set aside the decision of the court of appeals and the court sets aside the order of the reconstitution and dismisses the petition.

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Tano vs. Socrates

Facts:

 On 15 December 1992, the Sangguniang Panlungsod ng Puerto Princesa City enacted Ordinance 15-92 (taking effect on 1 January 1993; An ordinance banning the shipment of all live fish and lobster outside Puerto Princesa City from 1 January 1993 to 1 January 1998, and providing exemptions; penalties and for other purposes thereof). To implement said ordinance, Acting Mayor Amado L. Lucero issued Office Order 23 (series of 1993) dated 22 January 1993 authorizing the inspection of cargoes shipped out from the Puerto Princesa Airport, Wharf, and any other port within the jurisdiction of the City. On 19 February 1993, the Sangguniang Lalawigan of Palawan enacted Resolution 33 [A resolution prohibiting the catching, gathering, possessing, buying, selling, and shipment of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms, to wit: Family: Scaridae (Mameng), Epine Phelus Fasciatus (Suno), Cromileptes Altivelis (Panther or Senorita), Lobster below 200 grams and spawning, Tridacna Gigas (Takllobo), Pinctada Margaritefera (Mother pearl, Oysters, Giant clams, and other species), Penaeus Monodon (Tiger Prawn, Breeder size or mother), Epinephelus Suillus (Loba or Green grouper), and Family: Balistidae (Tropical Aquarium Fishes) for a period of 5 years in and coming from Palawan waters]. Puerto Princesa City and the province of Palawan implemented said ordinances. Tano, et. al., who were criminally charged with violating Sangguniang Panlalawigan Resolution 33 and Ordinance 2 of Palawan in Criminal Case 93-05-C of the 1st MCTC of Palawan; and Robert Lim and Virginia Lim, who were charged with violating City Ordinance 15-92 of Puerto Princesa City and Ordinance 2 of Palawan before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa, questioned the validity of the said ordinances before the Supreme Court.

Issue: 

Whether the ordinances in question, which prohibit the fishing of certain marine species in Palawan, are constitutional and/or valid.

Held: 

Laws (including ordinances enacted by local government units) enjoy the presumption of constitutionality. To overthrow this presumption, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative contradiction. In short, the conflict with the Constitution must be shown beyond reasonable doubt. Where doubt exists, even if well-founded, there can be no finding of unconstitutionality. To doubt is to sustain. In light of the principles of decentralization and devolution enshrined in the Local Government Code (LGC) and the powers granted therein to local government units under Section 16 (the General Welfare Clause), and under Sections 149, 447(a) (1) (vi), 458(a)(1)(vi) and 468(a)(1)(vi), which involve the exercise of police power, the validity of the Ordinances cannot be doubted. The ordinance also find full support under Republic Act 7611 (Strategic Environmental Plan for Palawan Act), approved on 19 June 1992; which adopts a comprehensive framework for the sustainable development of Palawan compatible with protecting and enhancing the natural resources and endangered environment of the province, which serve to guide the local government of Palawan and the government agencies concerned in the formulation and implementation of plans, programs and projects affecting said province. The first objective (to establish a “closed season” for the species of fish or aquatic animals covered therein for a period of five years) is well within the devolved power to enforce fishery laws in municipal waters which allows the establishment of “closed seasons.” The second objective (to protect the coral in the marine waters of the City of Puerto Princesa and the Province of Palawan from further destruction due to illegal fishing activities) falls within both the general welfare

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clause of the LGC and the express mandate there under to cities and provinces to protect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment.

Santa Rosa Mining CO. vs. V. Leido, Jr.

Facts:

Petitioner assails validity of Presidential Decree No 1214 which requires holders of subsisting and valid patentable mining claims located under the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902 to file a mining lease application within one year from the approval of the decree.

Petitioner accordingly filed a mining lease application, but “under protest” Petitioner contends that its 50 mining claims had already been declared as its own private and exclusive property by a judgment of the CFI. Also, that they already had a vested right over its mining claims even before PD1214 Respondents claim that petitioner did not exhaust all administrative remedies. They also cited the pendency of petitioner’s appeal with the office of the president, of the ruling of the respondent secretary of natural resources which stated that 44 of the mining claims were void for lack of valid “tie points” as required under the Philippine Bill of 1902, and that all the mining claims have been abandoned and cancelled for petitioner’s noncompliance.

Issues:

1. W/N property right is absolute2. W/N PD1214 is unconstitutional

Held:

1. Property right is not absolute but is merely a possessory right. Petitioner’s claims are still unpatented. They can be lost through abandonment of forfeiture or they may be revoked for valid legal grounds.

2. PD1214 is constitutional. It is a valid exercise of the sovereign power of the state, as owner, over lands of public domain of which petitioner’s mining claims still form a part, and over the patrimony of the nation, which mineral deposits are a valuable asset.

Mere location does not mean absolute ownership over the land / mining claim, to rule otherwise would imply that location is all that is needed to acquire and maintain rights over a located mining claim. The locator should faithfully and consistently comply with the requirements for annual work and improvements in the located mining claim.

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Paat vs. CA

Facts:

Leonardo Paat in his capacity as Officer-in-charge of the Regional Executive Director of DENR in region 2, appealed to the Supreme Court the decision of the Court of Appeals which grants the replevin case against DENR and ordered the return of the truck to private respondent.

The controversy started on May 19, 1989 when the truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman while on its way to Bulacan from San Jose, Baggao, Cagayan was seized by DENR personnel in Aritao, Nueva Viscaya because the driver could not produce the required documents for the forest products found concealed in the truck. Petitioner Jovito Layugan, the CENRO in Aritao, Cagayan ordered the confiscation of the truck, which prompts the private respondent to write a letter to the former Regional Executive Director of DENR Rogelio Baggayan with regards to the incident that happened. Part of the letter reads as follows; “If this motion for reconsideration does not merit your favorable action, thus this letter should be considered as an appeal to the Secretary”.

Director Baggayan affirms the decision of the CENRO Layugan. Then Director Baggayan forwarded her letter to the Secretary of DENR on appeal. But private respondent file a replevin case in the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan, which issued a writ ordering the return of the truck to private respondent.

After its motion for reconsideration was dismissed, petitioner appealed the decision of the lower court to the Court of Appeals, which affirms the decision of the RTC of Cagayan.

Issue:

Whether or not the secretary of DENR or his authorized representative has the authority to confiscate conveyance used to transport forest products illegally obtain.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that PD 705 or the Revised Forestry Code as amended by E.O. 277, section 68 of PD 705 “Allows the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest products, cut, gathered, collected, removed or possessed as well as the machinery, equipment, implements, and tools illegally used in the area where timber or forest products are found”. It is further amended by E.O. 277 which states under section 68-A, thus “Administrative Authority of the Department or His Duly Authorized Representative to Order Confiscation. In all cases of violation of this Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations, the Department Head or his duly authorized representative, may order the confiscation of any forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances used either by land, water or air in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the same in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations and policies on the matter”. It is very clear that the foregoing provision that the secretary and his authorized representatives are given authority to confiscate any conveyance used in violating the code or other forest laws, rules and regulations.

Thus the Supreme Court reversed and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals.

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Cheesman vs. IAC

Facts:

Thomas Cheesman is an American citizen married to a Filipina named Criselda who sold a residential of lot she allegedly owned using her own money to Estelita Padilla also a Filipina in Olongapo City. Herein petitioner is seeking to declare the sale of the residential lot null and void.

Thomas Cheesman and Criselda P. Cheesman were married on December 4, 1970 but have been separated since February 15, 1981.

The “Deed of Sale and Transfer of Possessory right” was executed in favor of Criselda Chessman, Filipina and wife of Thomas Chessman on June 4, 1974 by Armando Altares the owner of the unregistered lot, located at No. 7, Neptune Street, Gordon Heights, Olongapo City. Petitioner and his wife at that time is residing at lo no. 1, Blk. 8, Filtration Road, Sta. Rita, Olongapo City, Although the petitioner is aware of the transfer to his wife but he did not object.

After which a tax declaration under the name of Criselda Chessman was made and she assumed management of the property, then again without any objection from Thomas Chessman, and leasing the property to a tenant.

On July 1, 1981, Criselda Cheesman sold the property to Estelita Padilla without the consent of her husband. The deed described Criselda as being “of legal age and married to an American citizen”.

On July 31, 1981 Thomas Cheesman filed a petition to annul the sale of the property to Estelita Padilla alleging that it does not have his consent before the Court of the First Instance of Olongapo City. But the court a quo said that the sale was valid, for petitioner is an American Citizen hence prohibited owning a property under the 1973 constitution. Later, affirmed by the Intermediate Appellate Court on appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not, an alien can own a property in the Philippines.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that under the 1973 constitution an alien is bar from owning a property in the country. The main consideration is that Estelita Padilla is an innocent buyer who believed that Criselda Chessman the exclusive owner of the property. An innocent buyer is entitling a protection of the law from her purchase of the property.

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Ramirez vs. Vda. De Remirez

Facts:

This case is about the testate estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez is a Filipino citizen who died in Spain with his companion Wanda de Wrobleski. Among the beneficiaries are Jorge and Roberto Ramirez his nephew, Marcelle Demoron de Ramire his wife and his companion.

The trouble is that Marcelle is French and lives in Paris, while Wanda is an Austria who lives in Spain.

His will was accepted by the probate Court of the First Instance of Manila on July 27, 1965. The court appointed Maria Luisa Palacios as administratrix of the estate. On June 23, 1966 the administratrix submitted its partition project, which was opposed by the Roberto and Jorge, but the court a qou approved the partition. Hence this case was appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether or not the partitioning of the estate of Jose Ramirez among the principal beneficiaries valid.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the constitution allows alien to hold or acquire property only by succession. Hence the court ordered the distribution of the properties as follows:

One-half (1/2) thereof to his widow as her legitime;

One-half (1/2) thereof which is the free portion to Roberto and Jorge Ramirez in naked ownership and the usufruct to Wanda de Wrobleski with a simple substitution in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez.

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Oposa vs. Factoran

Facts:

The petitioners, all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents, filed a petition to cancel all existing timber license agreements (TLAs) in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements.  This case is filed not only on the appellants’ right as taxpayers, but they are also suing in behalf of succeeding generations based on the concept of “intergenerational responsibility” in so far as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.

Together with the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), the petitioners presented scientific evidence that deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies.  One of these is the reduction of the earth’s capacity to process carbon dioxide, otherwise known as the “greenhouse effect”. 

Continued issuance by the defendant of TLAs to cut and deforest the remaining forest stands will work great damage and irreparable injury to the plaintiffs.  Appellants have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant’s office regarding the plea to cancel the said TLAs.  The defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel existing TLAs.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing on the said case2. Admitting that all facts presented are true, whether or not the court can render a valid

judgment in accordance to the prayer of the complaints3. Whether or not the TLAs may be revoked despite the respondents standing that these

cancellations of these TLAs are against the non-impairment clause of the Constitution

Held:

The petitioners have locus standi (legal standing) on the case as a taxpayers’ (class) suit.  The subject matter of complaint is of common and general interest to all the citizens of the Philippines.  The court found difficulty in ruling that the appellants can, for themselves, and for others file a class suit.

The right of the petitioners to a balanced and healthful ecology has been clearly stated.  A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action.  The granting of the TLAs, as the petitioners claim to be done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful ecology hence, the full protection thereof requires that no TLAs should be renewed or granted. The appellants have also submitted a document with the sub-header CAUSE OF ACTION which is adequate enough to show, prima facie, the violation of their rights.  On this basis, these actions must therefore be granted, wholly or partially.

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Despite the Constitution’s non-impairment clause, TLAs are not contracts, rather licenses; thus, the said clause cannot be invoked.  Even if these are protected by the said clause, these can be revoked if the public interest so required as stated in Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705).  Furthermore, Section 16 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that: “The State shall protect the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.”  The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the government.  The said right is also clear as the DENR’s duty – under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under Executive Order No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 to protect and advance the said right.

Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded.  It is not a contract, property or property right protected by the due process clause of the Constitution.

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Cruz vs. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources

Facts:

Petitioners are Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a case for mandamus and prohibition before the Supreme Court as citizen and a taxpayer, assailing the constitutionality of Republic Act 8371 otherwise kwon as Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997, and it’s implementing rules and regulations.

The respondent in the herein case is the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, represented by the Solicitor General

On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) filed a motion to intervene and/or appear as amicus curiae. The CHR said that IPRA is an expression of the principle of parens patriae.

Issue:

Whether or not, IPRA is constitutional.

Held:

After due deliberation by the Supreme Court the votes is tied at 7-7 and the necessary majority was not obtain. A redeliberated was necessary, obtain the same result. Pursuant to rule 56, section 7 of the rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is Dismissed.

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Lausan Ayog vs Judge Cusi

Facts:

On January 21, 1953, the director of lands, after bidding, awarded to Binan Development Corp., Inc. on the basis of its 1951 sales application a parcel of land with an area of about 250 hectares located in Barrio Tamugan, Guianga, and Davao City. This sale was protested on and was rejected by the trial court. This was later affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The protestors contented that the sale, patenting of the said land was in violation of the constitution, which prohibits Private Corporation or association may hold alienable land of the public domain except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares in area.

Issue:

Whether or not sales application of a private corporation who acquired vested right to the land applied for before the effectivity of the 1973 constitution is retroactively affected?

Held:

Vested rights of the private corporation acquired before the effect of the constitutional prohibition cannot be retroactively applied the present case. Due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested rights except in the exercise of police power. The said petition is dismissed for lack of merit.

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