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Jean-Luc Nancy, Ego sum Paris: Flammarion, 1979. 163 pages

Peter M. Schouls, The Imposition of the Method in Descartes and Locke Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980. 259 pages

Nancy's and Schouls' books propose to examine two different but necessarily related problems: the question of the "subject," its epistemological and philosophical premises in Descartes, and the concept of "method," its foundation and application in both Descartes and Locke. Whereas Nancy's project inquires into the nature of the Cartesian subject insofar as its pre-eminence as "subject" defines it as the basis of modern philosophy, Schouls discusses how this new definition of reason equating man with thought leads to a redefinition of procedures for thinking. He defines Cartesian method as both presupposing the nature of the object to be known and imposing such a nature on its object (252). Schouls' analysis of the method proceeds from Descartes' rationalism to Locke's empiricism, and thereby provides an unusual insight into the relation of the French and English philosophical traditions, their common metaphysical premise yet distinctive philosophical discourse. Thus these analyses are vital, not only as regards their topical relation of subject and method, but in a more fundamental sense, as representative contributions of the French and English philosophical traditions.

Jean-Luc Nancy's Ego sum examines the question of the subject in Descartes as represented by its emblem and most fundamental tenet "I think, therefore I am." This equation of thought and being, which constitutes the ground of modern metaphysics, is itself the product of a search for certitude in order to assure future philosophical investigation. Nancy notes that the epistemological constraints alter the very nature and content of thought, and consequently, change the very meaning of philosophical thought. He observes that thought is established by Descartes as an identity anterior to all distinctions of intuition and concept, that is to say, that it posits itself as the intuition of its concept. The formula "I think" establishes the ground for all representation by its very refusal to have content or to recognize itself as either self-consciousness, psychological or existential, as "self" or "self-consciousness" (35). In other words, Descartes absolutely refuses to introduce any kind of thought, within and upon thought, as reflexivity of the cogito. Nancy stresses this fundamental paradox in the definition of the Cartesian subject. He notes that its very foundation as a "subject" corresponds to the necessary exhaustion of all its possibilities as essence: the constitution of the subject provoques the collapse and destruction of its substance.

Nancy's analysis thus becomes more than an assessment of the nature and the status of the subject in Descartes. It serves as the starting point for a more general inquiry and meditation on the heritage of this definition of the subject in modern thought. His conclusions, briefly outlined, are as

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follow. To begin with, Descartes' definition of man as a thinking substance which is identical with the universal subject of truth implies at once that the subject cannot have any historical (psychological or existential content), and more significantly, that it lacks all philosophical content insofar as it denies the very basis for critical thought. It is in this sense, that the Cartesian subject establishes the concept of the "subject" in absolute terms as the substratum and condition of possibility for all representation, philosophical, scientific and literary. For Nancy, the question regarding the subject is always posed in the context of representation and as the basis of representation. Hence his observation that Descartes' subject cannot be considered as "subjective" in modern terms, since it defines itself as freedom from every definition of content. As an extension of his challenging inquiry, Nancy finally raises the question of the relation of "man" and his "humanism" to this purely formal definition of the classical subject.

This is the implicit question that underlies both Nancy's and Schouls' analysis. Schouls' The Imposition of the Method in Descartes and Locke focuses on the evolution of the concept of universal method as a reflection of a new mentality made possible by Descartes' definition of reason. Schouls describes the method in terms of its two fundamental operations: resolution and composition. Resolution is, however, the most important operation of the two, involving the breakdown of complex items into their simplest constituents in order to meet the epistemological constraints of the method, those of universality and certitude. For Locke, the method ceases to operate in this virtual and absolute sense, since as an empiricist, he takes into account sensations as having both a foundational and a restrictive role. As Schouls notes, this involves a basic difference in the status of human mind's reasoning power which must be autonomous for Descartes, and restricted for Locke. Whereas, for rationalism the materials of knowledge are given to the mind by the mind, for Locke ideas as "materials of knowledge" are given to the mind by objects through the senses. Thus Locke's empiricist principle evokes a causal theory of knowledge which rules out skepticism without reverting to Cartesian arguments against skepticism.

Schouls also touches on the question of the "subject" when he explores Locke's concept and use of the method in political theory. He understands the evolution of the concept of man in Locke as an extension of the manner in which the method orders the world. The concept of "individual" emerges as a kind of indivisible simple of resolution and becomes the unit of measure applied to political theory. While he understands the epistemological basis of the Cartesian method, he does not question sufficiently its applicability to Locke's formulation of political man as "individual." Although Schouls recognizes that this method of resolution and composition imposes its nature on the objects to be known, that is to say, that the objects of a geometrician's interests become identical

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to those of a political theorist, he leaves the nature of this influence unexamined. In other words, although Locke, as Schouls shows, does not consider skepticism by reverting to a causal principle, nonetheless, his method already presumes it in terms of the concept of rationality inherited from Descartes. Schouls' comprehensive analysis of the method in Descartes and Locke opens up the possibility for understanding the common ground shared by the French and the English philosophical traditions. However, his exclusive focus on the concept of method leaves open its possible transposition into the domain of political theory. As Schouls himself shows, Locke's political definition of man as "individual" depends on the rationalist formulation of the subject of the method. In other words, the indivisibility of the "individual" as a political unit is contingent on his indivisibility as thought. This leads us back to Nancy's question regarding the relation of this purely formal-rational subject and the content ascribed to it, be it as "man," "humanism," or "individuality." The reader is left to ponder this fundamental discrepancy between the original definition of the subject in Descartes, as freedom from content, and the content, nonetheless, ascribed to it, as if by accident.

University of Pennsylvania DALIA JUDOVITZ

Gerard Defaux, Moliere, ou les metamorphoses du comique: de la comedie morale au triomphe de lafolie Lexington, Kentucky: French Forum, 1980. 370 pages

A new work of synthesis is always welcome. When the aim of synthesis is combined with a determination to prove the existence of an evolution in the work by penetrating to the depths of the artist's moral and creative consciousness, the effort commands respect. Add to these laudable purposes a nice talent for the well-turned rhetorical phrase: Defaux's Moliere is a seductive and entertaining creation, a portrayal of the playwright as "un artiste qui pense" (p. 27).

The term employed in the title is apt: the movement Defaux discerns in Moliere's work is a stunning metamorphosis. Relying heavily upon the Lettre sur la comedie de l'Imposteur and drawing parallels between the reasoning of contemporary moralists and Moliere's raisonneurs, Defaux defines Moliere's initial vision as Counter-Reformation optimism. "La com6die premiere maniere," the work between Les Precieuses ridicules and Le Misanthrope, flows from a comic moralist who feels so completely in harmony with his audience that they can act as his collaborators. Laughter is the expression of reason and moral health, a merited punishment meted out to a clearly guilty individual. Vice is a recognizable aberration in a fundamentally good human nature. Virtue, just as clearly recognizable, is embodied in the values of society: the honnete homme and the homme de bien

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