Nam-In Lee - Static-Phenomenological and Genetic-Phenomenological Concept of Primordiality

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Husserl Studies 18: 165183, 2002.

2002 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

Static-Phenomenological and Genetic-

Phenomenological Concept of Primordiality

in Husserls Fifth Cartesian Meditation*

NAM-IN LEEDepartment of Philosophy, Seoul National University, Seoul 151-742, Korea

In the fifth Cartesian Meditation,1 Husserl is interested mainly in the transcen-

dental phenomenology of intersubjectivity that aims to clarify the conditions

of the possibility for empathy. In section 44 of this meditation, launching into

the transcendental phenomenology of intersubjectivity, he talks about the

necessity of carrying out a peculiar kind of thematic Epoch (Hua I, 124)

within the universal transcendental realm that has already been disclosed

through the transcendental reduction. In contrast to the transcendental reduc-

tion as the first reduction, he calls this peculiar kind of thematic Epoch the

second reduction. This second reduction consists in disregarding all the con-

stitutive achievements of the intentionality that is related to other subjectiv-

ity (Hua I, 124) and delimiting the whole connection of intentionality . . .in which the ego constitutes itself in its ownness and in which it constitutes

the synthetic unities that are inseparable from and assigned to it (Hua I, 124).

Husserl calls this whole connection of intentionality the primordial sphere.

Primordial reduction, as a method of abstraction, is exactly the means to gain

access to the primordial sphere that is valid only for me, the meditating ego.

According to Husserl, the primordial sphere is the foundation or the moti-

vational ground for empathy and, as such, it is introduced in the fifth CM as

a fundamental concept without which it is not possible to develop the tran-

scendental phenomenology of intersubjectivity. This is the reason why he calls

the definition and articulation of the primordial sphere the transcendentally

very significant preliminary stage (Hua I, 138) for the development of the

transcendental phenomenology of intersubjectivity. One can recognize the sig-

nificance of the primordial sphere for the transcendental phenomenology of

intersubjectivity in the fact that, from its first introduction in section 44, re-

appearing continually until the end of the fifth CM, it guides the whole

phenomenological analysis of intersubjectivity.

Although the concept of primordiality plays such a central role in the de-

velopment of the transcendental phenomenology of intersubjectivity in the fifth

CM, it has undergone many interpretations and critical assessments and there


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are many different views on it. Among the interpreters who are very criticalof it, some hold the extreme view that it is impossible to conceive such a pri-

mordial sphere, since it cannot be observed phenomenologically.2 On the con-

trary, some interpreters hold the view that it is a legitimate concept that is

indispensable to the development of the transcendental phenomenology of

intersubjectivity. Unfortunately, these interpreters do not agree as to the con-

text in which the concept of primordiality is introduced in the fifth CM. Some

interpreters hold the view that it is introduced as a basic concept of genetic

phenomenology of intersubjectivity,3 whereas some other interpreters hold

the view that it is a basic concept essential for the logical clarification of

intersubjectivity.4

In my opinion, the various views have been a consequence of the way the

concept of primordiality was introduced and elaborated in the fifth CM. Al-

though Husserl handles the concept of primordiality in the fifth CM as if it were

a concept that would be self-evident to all those who think phenomenologically,

it is, as will be discussed in detail below, a very unclear concept that is am-

biguous in many respects and needs clarification. Below I will take into ac-

count some ambiguities in the concept of primordiality in the fifth CM. Among

these discussed below the ambiguity that reveals itself in the field of tension

between static and genetic phenomenology of intersubjectivity5 will come to

the fore. In section 1, analyzing some passages of the fifth CM, I will try to

show that the concept of primordiality in the fifth CM is actually in many

respects ambiguous. In section 2 and section 3, I will discuss the static-

phenomenological and the genetic-phenomenological concept of primordialityrespectively. Thereafter, in section 4, I will deal with the relationship among

the ambiguities discussed in sections 13. In section 5, I will make a brief

assessment of the various views on the concept of primordiality mentioned

above and a short remark on the basic character of the phenomenology of

intersubjectivity in the fifth CM.

1. Ambiguities of the Concept of Primordiality in the Fifth CM

In order to understand the basic character of the concept of primordiality in

the fifth CM, one should pay attention to the fact that it came into being afterlengthy reflections about the problems of intersubjectivity on Husserls part.

As Iso Kern correctly informs us, the concept of primordiality, as it is found

as a basic concept in the fifth Cartesian Meditation (Husserliana I), first ap-

pears in about 1925 (Hua XIV, 390). However, one can find the preliminary

form of it already in the works that were written before 1925. In this context,

Husserl writes in a manuscript from 1921 as follows: No matter how much

the attitudes directed to objectivity are already in play, we can abstract from

them at any time. . . . Through this abstraction we gain access to what I called


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the solipsistic world and the solipsistic world-view. (Hua XIV, 109) In thispassage, Husserl tells us that, before the time he wrote this manuscript, he had

called the world-view gained through the abstraction the solipsistic world-

view. This implies that he had dealt with the problem of the solipsistic world-

view in the works written before 1921. In fact, we can find Husserls attempts

to deal with the problem of the solipsistic world-view in the 1910s. For ex-

ample, in a manuscript from 1918 that has been published as the text no. 15

of Hua XIII: Towards a Theory of Empathy, he contrasts the solipsistic

world-view and the intersubjective world-view, and considers the former

as something that can be gained by abstraction (solipsistic abstraction): exclu-

sion of all mental entities from nature, exclusion of every individual being given

through empathy (Hua XIII, 410). The context reveals that the solipsistic ab-

straction in this passage, which is the same as the abstraction in the passage

cited above from the manuscript from 1921, has a function similar to the pri-

mordial reduction in the fifth CM; for this reason, it can be regarded as a pre-

liminary form of this reduction. We can find the solipsistic abstraction as the

preliminary form of primordial reduction as early as the period when Husserl

was working onIdeas II: Each person has, ideally speaking, his/her egoistic

surrounding world within his/her communicative one, so long as he/she ab-

stracts from all the connections of understanding others and the apperceptions

founded upon them. (Hua IV, 193)

Although the concept of primordiality in the fifth CM came into being as

a result of reflections that lasted for a long time, it is ambiguous in many re-

spects. First, as mentioned above, the primordial sphere can be disclosed onlyby abstracting from all the constitutive achievements of the intentionality that

is related to other subjects. That is to say, primordial sphere is a sphere with-

out empathy and this is the reason why Husserl calls it the sphere of my

ownness. Contrary to this position, however, he also maintains that each

consciousness of the other, each way of appearance of him, still belongs to-

gether to the first sphere (Hua I, 131), that is, to the primordial sphere. With

this statement, he is contradicting himself by claiming that the primordial

sphere both includes and excludes the experience of empathy at the same

time.6

Second, the primordial sphere, as a sphere of my ownness that is valid only

for me, the meditating ego, is, by definition, my primordial sphere. Contraryto this fact, Husserl also talks about a primordial sphere in which we already

have found a world, a primordial one (Hua I, 169, my italics). It is clear that

in this case the primordial sphere does not mean a sphere of being that should

exclusively be valid for me as a meditating ego, but rather a sphere that I share

with other subjects. If one defines the primordial sphere as the sphere of my

ownness, how could one meaningfully talk about ourprimordial sphere?

How could it be justified methodologically to extend my primordiality to

ourprimordiality?


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Third, since the primordial sphere is disclosed through the primordial re-duction that, according to the explanation in section 44 of the fifth CM, can

be carried out within the already disclosed universal transcendental realm of

being, it means originally transcendentalprimordial sphere. This fact is also

expressed in the phrase my ego . . . in its transcendentalsphere of ownness

(Hua I, 125, my italics). However, near the end of the fifth CM, in section 61,

Husserl maintains that the primordial sphere is conceivable not only in the

transcendental attitude but also in the natural attitude. According to him, as

in the case of transcendental phenomenology, so also in the parallel case of

intentional psychology (as a positive science) our exposition has manifestly

predelineated a fundamental structure, a division of the corresponding inves-

tigations of eidetic psychology into those that explicate intentionally what

belongs to the concrete ownness of any psyche whatever and those that ex-

plicate the intentionality of the other constituted therein (Hua I, 171). In this

context, we can ask at least two questions: Can the primordiality in the natu-

ral attitude be called primordiality in a true sense? How do the primordiality

in the transcendental and that in the natural attitude fit together?

Fourth, as mentioned already, Husserl defines the primordial sphere as the

foundation for empathy. This definition is, however, only a formal and empty

one, since it is not defined in what sense the primordial sphere can play such

a role. The foundation for empathy can have two different meanings, namely,

the foundation of subjective validity for empathy and the genetic foundation

for empathy. When we investigate empathy from the perspective of transcen-

dental phenomenology, it is the task of static phenomenology of intersubjectivityto clarify the foundation of subjective validity of empathy and it is the task of

genetic phenomenology of intersubjectivity to clarify the foundation of gen-

esis of empathy.7 The static-phenomenological question about the foundation

of subjective validity of empathy can be formulated as follows: What are the

subjective validities on the ground of which the subjective validity of empa-

thy can be justified? The subjective validity in this context means a persons

belief that a fact seems to be valid or true for him. An example of the subjec-

tive validity is the belief contained in the act of empathy, namely the belief

that an entity is experienced by her/him not merely as a thing, but also as a

person. In order to justify, she/he has to appeal to some other beliefs, for ex-

ample, the belief that there is a similarity between my body and the entity thatis experienced by her/him or the belief that the entity is experienced by her/

him as a human body. In contrast to the static phenomenological question about

the foundation of subjective validity of empathy, the genetic-phenomenological

question about the foundation of the genesis of empathy can be formulated as

follows: What are the subjective acts on the ground of which the act of empa-

thy has been generated in the field of consciousness of a person? In this case,

the subjective act as the genetic foundation of the act of empathy can, but does

not have to, contain in itself a belief. Not only the acts that contain a belief,


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but also the acts that do not contain any kind of belief, for example, the in-stinctive intentionality on the lowest level of transcendental genesis, can serve

as the genetic foundation of the act of empathy. Since subjective validity and

genesis are two different basic categories of transcendental phenomenology,

the concept of primordiality as the foundation for empathy must have two

different meanings.

Right after the publication of CM, Husserl became aware of the fact that

the concept of primordiality in the fifth CM is not a perfect and final one,

but rather a very unclear one. This is the reason why, after the publication

of CM and until the end of his life, he was occupied intensively with the

problem of primordiality and left behind, as Hua XV shows, many manu-

scripts on this topic. His efforts to clarify the concept of primordiality dur-

ing this time can be regarded as partly successful. In the 1930s, as distinguished

from the time during which he was working on CM, he was fully conscious

of the following two ambiguities in the concept of primordiality.8 The first

one is the ambiguity that is related to the question whether empathy belongs

to the primordial sphere or not. In this context, in a manuscript from 1934,

he explicitly talks about the ambiguity of primordiality (Hua XV, 635).

The second one is the ambiguity that can be observed in the field of tension

between the transcendental and the natural attitude. In a manuscript from

1933, he discusses this ambiguity intensively and talks about the reduc-

tion to the primordiality in the natural and the transcendental attitude (Hua

XV, 530).

2. The Static-Phenomenological Concept of Primordiality

Husserl explicitly tells us in the fifth CM that he is dealing with static-

phenomenological problems of intersubjectivity.9 Actually the transcenden-

tal phenomenology that has been developed in section 4447 of the fifth CM

is a static phenomenology of intersubjectivity. In fact, these sections aim to

clarify the system of layers of subjective validity contained in empathy. There-

fore, it is not by chance that in these sections one can find such expressions

as meaning and validity (Hua I, 123, 132), unities of validity (Hua I, 96),

a series of evidence (Hua I, 100), and validity of being (Hua I, 106, 107),all of which indicate the task of static phenomenology of intersubjectivity as

the clarification of the system of layers of subjective validity contained in

empathy. Accordingly, the concept of primordiality developed there is a static-

phenomenological one. The concept of primordiality that is formally defined

as the foundation for empathy thereby receives a clear meaning. The primor-

dial sphere in the static phenomenology of intersubjectivity means concretely

the foundation of subjective validity for empathy to which every meditating

ego should go back in order to clarify the validity of empathy. As such, it is


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the sphere of primary evidence, the primary original self-givenness (HuaXV, 572) that makes the validity of empathy possible.

In order to grasp the static-phenomenological concept of primordiality con-

cretely, we should examine the whole context of CM and investigate what

makes it necessary to elaborate this concept in the fifth CM. In the first Medi-

tation, the transcendental reduction enables the meditating ego to discover tran-

scendental subjectivity as the founding realm of being without which the world

as a natural realm of being would not be conceivable. However, the discov-

ery of transcendental subjectivity in the first Meditation, which is guided by

the principle of apodictic evidence, has the limitation that only the tiny core

of transcendental subjectivity that can be experienced by the meditating ego

in the mode of apodictic evidence, namely the living self-presence that the

grammatical meaning of the sentence ego cogito brings to expression (Hua

I, 62), is captured by the reflecting ego. For this reason, Husserl undertakes,

in the second Meditation, the uncovering of the transcendental field of ex-

perience according to its universal structure (Hua I, 62). This process of

uncovering enables the meditating ego to bring to light the immense realm

of transcendental self-experience (Hua I, 68) such as the stream of conscious-

ness according to its structure of noesis-noema, synthesis as the original form

of consciousness, identification as the basic form of synthesis, universal syn-

thesis of transcendental temporality, actuality and potentiality of intentional

life, and, of course, empathy as the type of intentionality that is related to the

other.

During the course of uncovering the transcendental realm of experience thatcontinues until the fourth Meditation, the critique of transcendental experi-

ence and, consequently, of transcendental knowledge in general (Hua I, 68)

is put aside. This critique, that is the critique of the evidence of transcenden-

tal experience and knowledge in general, aims to clarify, with respect to each

form of transcendental experience disclosed thus far, its system of layers of

subjective validity. If one reads the whole CM, one might get the impression

that the critique of transcendental experience has been undertaken nowhere

and put aside forever. However, that is not the case: What has been under-

taken under the title of intersubjectivity and, first of all, under the title of

primordiality in sections 4447 of the fifth CM, is nothing other than the cri-

tique of the evidence of empathy as the condition of the possibility for theconstitution of intersubjective world.

The starting point of the critique of the evidence of empathy is the fact that,

with respect to the system of layers of subjective validity, empathy as the

transcendental constitution . . . of other subjects (Hua I, 124) is in question.

Accordingly, it is the task of the critique of the evidence of empathy to render

intelligible the validity of empathy from the standpoint of subjective validity,

and this task cannot be fulfilled without discovering the foundation of sub-

jective validity on which the validity of empathy is based. The methodologi-


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cal procedure to disclose the foundation of subjective validity for empathy isthe primordial reduction that consists in excluding all that is questionable

from the thematic field (Hua I, 124). Thus it disregards all the constitutive

achievements of the intentionality that is, directly or indirectly, related to the

other subjectivity (Hua I, 124). The procedure aims, finally, to delimit the

whole connection of intentionality . . . in which the ego constitutes itself in

its ownness and in which it constitutes the synthetic unities that are insepara-

ble from and assigned to it (Hua I, 124). This whole connection of intention-

ality is called the primordial sphere. Thus, in order to make the validity-claims

of empathy understandable, I must go back to nothing other than the primor-

dial sphere, since it is the foundation of subjective validity for empathy. In

this context, Husserl states in a manuscript from 1933: If I reduce to my

primordial world . . . it is . . . a layer of validity that is founding for the va-

lidity of the others . . . (Hua XV, 615).

Since the primordial reduction is the method to make, from the standpoint

of subjective validity, the questionable meaning of other transcendental sub-

jectivity understandable, it can be regarded as a method of justifying the pos-

iting of the other as a transcendental subjectivity. Furthermore, it can, as such,

be understood as a method of recognizing the other as a transcendental sub-

jectivity, since it grants me the transcendental right to posit the other as

transcendentally constituting and, thus, finally as existing with me.10 The

discovery of the primordial sphere through the primordial reduction makes

possible the philosophically significant fact that, through an actual inter-

pretation of the intentionality of empathy, the other, at the beginning, the otherin phenomenon that has been put in brackets, has been brought to transcen-

dental recognition.11 Thus, without the primordial reduction, it is impossible

for us to recognize the other as a transcendental subjectivity in a true sense.

In this context, it should be added that the primordial reduction makes it pos-

sible to recognize the other not only as a transcendental subjectivity but also

as a mundane subject with its various forms, such as an animate entity, a psy-

cho-physical entity or a person. Moreover, since empathy lays the foundation

for the constitution of the objective world, the primordial reduction as a method

of gaining access to the primordial sphere can be considered as a systematic

method to bring about a perfect world-view together with the apodictic know-

ledge of its condition of possibility (Hua XV, 617).Since the primordial sphere that is valid only for me, the meditating ego,

builds the foundation of subjective validity for empathy as the way of apper-

ceiving the other, from the standpoint of subjective validity, I have an abso-

lute priority over other transcendental subjectivities. However, this absolute

priority of the meditating ego over other transcendental subjectivities should

not be understood as the priority of genesis in the horizon of transcendental

temporality, since I cannot, as Husserl also puts it, maintain in advance that

the genesis of the apperception of the other presupposes the genesis of a sur-


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rounding world without other subjectivity (Hua XIV, 477). The primordialsphere, as the foundation of subjective validity for empathy, is not a sphere of

being that might actually exist in advance as a concrete entity in the connec-

tion of transcendental genesis and make the genesis of empathy possible. From

the standpoint of transcendental genesis, it is only a product of reduction, an

abstract entity in the concrete ego (Hua XV, 634-5) and, in order to gain access

to it, the meditating ego needs a special act of abstractive reflection like the

primordial reduction.

Therefore, the true meaning of the primordial reduction is not that, with

the help of this reduction, every ego actually goes back to the primordial sphere

in order to really carry out the genetic act of empathy on the basis of this sphere,

but rather that every ego should perform the primordial reduction and go back

to the primordial sphere in order to make the validity of empathy understand-

able. In this sense, the primordial sphere can be called an ideal or normative

sphere12 to which the meditating ego should appeal to make the validity of

empathy understandable and, just for this reason, static phenomenology of

intersubjectivity can be regarded as normative phenomenology. Thus, the

primordial reduction turns out to be an attempt to be faithful to the principle

of all principles (Hua III, 52) discussed inIdeas I, that is, the principle of a

radical self-responsibility that, according to Husserl, should guide every true

philosophy.

3. The Genetic-Phenomenological Concept of Primordiality

Faithful to his explanation that what matters in the fifth CM is a static analy-

sis, in sections 4447 Husserl is carrying out the phenomenological analysis

of intersubjectivity almost exclusively static-phenomenologically. In these sec-

tions, it is difficult to find any hints of genetic problems or even the expression

genesis. In contrast to this, in the following sections, the phenomenological

analysis of intersubjectivity is no longer carried out exclusively static-

phenomenologically, but it also moves to the direction of genetic phenomenol-

ogy. For example, in section 49, where the problem of harmony among monads

as the presupposition for the constitution of objective nature is discussed,

Husserl talks about the genesis that occurs harmoniously in individual mon-ads (Hua I, 137). If we examine the following sections carefully, it is not

difficult to find out that, to our surprise, the phenomenological analysis of

empathy or the higher and lower levels of socialization is guided predomi-

nantly by the idea of the genetic phenomenology of intersubjectivity. In these

sections, we often find fundamental concepts of genetic phenomenology such

as original establishment (Urstiftung) in sections 50 and 55, associative pair-

ing as constitutive component of empathy in section 51, or temporal genesis,

innateness and generativity in sections 58 and 61. Husserl sometimes begins


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the phenomenological analysis of intersubjectivity static-phenomenologicallyand turns to the genetic phenomenology of intersubjectivity without examin-

ing the necessity or possibility of this procedure.

It is quite surprising that, even for the genetic analysis of intersubjectivity,

Husserl employs without hesitation the static concept of primordiality. A typi-

cal example is the analysis of the primordial sphere in section 50 that is carried

out with respect to the explanation of the principle of the genetic establishment

of empathy. According to the principle of original establishment, every ap-

perception can be traced back intentionally to original establishment through

which an object with similar meaning was constituted for the first time (Hua

I, 141). In order to clarify the possibility of genetic original establishment in

a child, Husserl employs the static concept of primordiality developed in the

foregoing sections 4447 and writes as follows: Finally we always come back

to the radical differentiation of apperceptions into those that, according to their

genesis, belong purely to the primordial sphere and those that come into be-

ing with the sense alter ego . . . (Hua I, 141). In this passage, Husserl holds

the view that a child who has never carried out the act of empathy must have

the pure primordial sphere free from any kinds of intentionality directed to

other subjectivities so that, on the ground of this sphere, it can carry out the

first act of empathy.

Long before he worked on the fifth CM, Husserl had attempted to clarify

the possibility of the genesis of empathy by recourse to the primordial sphere

that might have no relation to other subjects. A typical example is a passage

inErste Philosophie where he is considering the possibility that I am alone,or, in my total field of experience, there have appeared no other bodies by

means of which I could experience other subjects in the way of empathy

(Hua VIII, 176). We can find a similar idea in a passage inIdeas IIwhere a

phenomenological analysis of the union of persons is carried out. There Husserl

makes a distinction between the concept of pre-social subjectivity, the sub-

jectivity that does not presuppose any empathy (Hua IV, 198199) and so-

cial subjectivity (Hua IV, 199) that has the experience of others as well as

their inner life. With respect to this distinction, he maintains that obviously

it is also significant from the standpoint of constitutive genesis (Hua IV,

198). What he claims in this passage is that social subjectivity as well as

the intersubjective world as its constitutive product might be geneticallyfounded on a pre-social subjectivity and its world. Even after the publication

of the fifth CM, Husserl did not give up this idea entirely. For example, in a

manuscript from 1931/32 he considers the possibility of the primordial de-

velopment of my singular being (Hua XV, 439) from which primordial quasi-

nature etc. could originate.

But why does Husserl attempt to clarify the genetic condition of the possi-

bility for empathy in this way? The main reason is that, as will be discussed

below, abstracting reflection as a component of the static-phenomenological


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concept of primordiality is indispensable to the clarification of the structureof a certain kind of empathy, namely, the structure of the ideal genesis of

empathy that can be carried out with the help of abstracting reflection. How-

ever, this fact should not mislead one to think that it would be indispensable

to the clarification of the transcendental genesis of empathy in general. In my

opinion, Husserl was partly aware of this kind of difficulty already at the time

that he was writingIdeas II, since, in this work, he calls the distinction men-

tioned above between pre-social and social subjectivity not an actual distinc-

tion that can be observed in the process of actual genesis of empathy, but only

an ideal distinction that can be made with the help of the abstracting method.

He maintains that, ideally speaking, every person has his/her egoistic, that is,

primordial world of the fifth CM, within his/her intersubjective world, so long

as he/she abstracts from all the connections of understanding others and the

apperceptions founded upon them (Hua IV, 193).

The concept of primordiality in the genetic phenomenology of inter-

subjectivity is actually entirely different from that of static phenomenology

of intersubjectivity. In genetic phenomenology of intersubjectivity, the pri-

mordial sphere can also be defined formally as the foundation for empathy.

Since the foundation in genetic phenomenology does not mean the founda-

tion of subjective validity, but that of temporal genesis, the primordial sphere

in genetic phenomenology means exclusively the genetic foundation for

empathy. The genetic primordial sphere as the genetic foundation for empa-

thy can be divided into two kinds, namely the pre-ideal genetic and the ideal

genetic primordial sphere.13 As will be discussed below, the ideal genetic pri-mordial sphere cannot come into being without some kind of methodological

procedure, whereas the pre-ideal genetic primordial sphere is pre-given to us

daily in the natural attitude as the genetic foundation for empathy. I will deal

with the pre-ideal genetic primordial sphere first.

The pre-ideal genetic primordial sphere differs from the primordial sphere

of static phenomenology, first of all, in the fact that it is not a product of

reflection, something abstract. We do not carry out daily the act of empa-

thy on the ground of an abstracting Epoch as a kind of reflective act. This

fact becomes more obvious, if we consider the problem of primordiality in a

child. The problem of the genesis of primordiality in a child is an important

topic of genetic phenomenology of intersubjectivity. In a manuscript on Thechild. The first empathy . . . from 1935, Husserl also attempts to clarify the

genetic process of the constitution of the primordial sphere in a child such as

the process of building primordial thing, primordial body (Hua XV, 605).

No one will consider the primordial sphere in this context as a product of re-

flection, something abstract, since it would be ridiculous to maintain that the

primordial sphere in a child comes into being on the ground of abstracting

reflection. Husserl also denies that a child is a subject that has the ability of

reflection.


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The fact that the pre-ideal genetic primordial sphere is not a product ofreduction, something abstract, means, at the same time, that it is a sphere of

being that contains in itself the social or intersubjective intentions, that is, the

intentions that are related to other subjectivities. Since the transcendental

genesis of a transcendental ego cannot be performed without the various so-

cial intentions functioning incessantly in the field of consciousness, the pre-

ideal primordial sphere is shaped intersubjectively. In this sense, even the

primordial sphere of a child is no exception; through the work of social inten-

tions, it is also organized from the beginning intersubjectively. The social

intentions that can be found in the primordial sphere of a child are mainly the

various intentions of social instincts that are indispensable to its self-preser-

vation.

Due to the social intentions doing their work incessantly in the process of

universal transcendental genesis of a transcendental ego, the pre-ideal genetic

primordial sphere turns out to be a sphere of being in which not only I, but

also other subjectivities dwell together. The others live in me, as I live in them.

For this reason, from the standpoint of transcendental genesis, not from that

of subjective validity, I as a transcendental ego do not have an absolute prior-

ity over other transcendental subjectivities. There is a relation of co-founda-

tion between me and other contemporary subjectivities; I am even one-sidedly

dependent on other subjectivities of former generations.

The pre-ideal genetic primordial sphere is a unity of development and there

are various levels of the pre-ideal genetic primordial sphere. A pre-ideal ge-

netic primordial sphere of an ego can serve for a moment as the genetic foun-dation for a certain act of empathy. After having been carried out, this empathy

does not disappear from the field of consciousness, but it becomes a sediment

of that primordial sphere and thereby motivates this to be changed into a new

level of the primordial sphere. Subsequently this new level of the primordial

sphere can serve as a genetic foundation for another act of empathy, and this

new act of empathy, becoming a sediment of that primordial sphere, also

motivates this sphere to be changed into another level of the primordial sphere.

The same process can repeat itself further and, in this way, various levels of

the pre-ideal genetic primordial sphere can come into being in the field of

consciousness. Therefore, it is possible to dismantle the pre-ideal primordial

sphere from the standpoint of the genetic foundation and this process of dis-mantling can theoretically be continued, until we get to the primordial sphere

that is working as the genetic foundation for the first act of empathy of a tran-

scendental ego. In a manuscript from 1935, Husserl calls this primordiality

the primordiality in the most primitive level (Hua XV, 605) and attempts to

clarify its genetic structure.

Therefore, it is an enormous task for pre-ideal genetic phenomenology of

intersubjectivity to clarify the condition of the possibility for the genetic tran-

sition from the primordiality in the most primitive level to the primordial sphere


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of higher levels. It should be noted that social or intersubjective instinctsand drives are working incessantly in the constitution of the primordiality

in the most primitive level and in the genetic transition from this to the pri-

mordial sphere of higher levels. Since the genesis of various levels of the

primordial sphere in the field of consciousness would be impossible with-

out the incessant work of social instincts and drives, the pre-ideal genetic

primordial sphere of any level can be considered as a system of drives, as

Husserl writes in a manuscript from 1933: Primordiality is a system of

drives. If we understand it as an originally standing stream, there is a drive

that is striving to go into other streams and, under circumstances, with other

subjects. (Hua XV, 594)

Lets consider the concept of ideal genetic primordiality. The genetic tran-

sition from a lower to a higher level of the primordial sphere and empathy

means, at the same time, the development of the transcendental ego. In the

process of development, each transcendental ego, although it can sometimes

be mistaken in its act of empathy, strives to achieve the truth of empathy. In

most cases, it strives to get the truth of empathy quasi-unconsciously or with-

out any kind of methodological consciousness. At a certain moment, however,

it is possible for the ego to make a decision to carry out the act of empathy

consciously and methodologically. In this case, for a responsible ego, there is

only one way to get at the truth of empathy: As we learned from the static

phenomenology of intersubjectivity, it should attempt to carry out the act of

empathy exclusively on the ground of what is given to it evidently. To achieve

this goal, being faithful to the principle of self-responsibility, it should tryto abstract from all the subjective validities that have their origin in other

subjectivities and to carry out the act of empathy on the ground of the sphere

of being that is left after the abstraction. Since this kind of genesis of empa-

thy has as its goal the genesis of truth as an idea, it could be called an ideal

genesis of empathy; accordingly, the methodological procedure that makes

this kind of empathy possible can be called the ideal genetic primordial re-

duction, and the sphere of being that can be disclosed by this procedure, the

ideal genetic primordial sphere.

The ideal genetic primordial sphere means nothing other than the genetic

foundation for the emergence of science and philosophy in a true sense in the

universal horizon of the transcendental genesis of a transcendental ego. Theideal genetic primordial reduction as a methodological procedure that is guided

by the principle of self-responsibility enables a transcendental ego to take part

in the ideal working society of science and philosophy whose vocation is to

find out the truth as an ideal.

The ideal genesis of empathy to which the method of abstraction is indis-

pensable can be regarded as the result of the application of the insight gained

in the static phenomenology of intersubjectivity into the transcendental

genesis of empathy. Therefore, the ideal genetic phenomenology of inter-


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subjectivity that aims to clarify the structure of ideal genesis has a certainsimilarity with the static phenomenology of intersubjectivity. For this reason,

one can get the impression that the ideal genetic primordial sphere might be

exactly the same as the static phenomenological one. In my opinion, due to

this impression, in the fifth CM, Husserl applies the static-phenomenological

concept of primordiality to the analysis of the constitution of lower and higher

societies of monads without examining the correctness of this procedure.

However, the ideal genetic primordial sphere differs basically from that of

static phenomenology; it is a kind of genetic primordial sphere and, as such,

has many similarities with the pre-ideal genetic primordial sphere. Let me

briefly deal with some similarities between the ideal and the pre-ideal genetic

primordial sphere.

First, as is the case with the pre-ideal genetic primordial sphere, there are

various levels of the ideal genetic primordial sphere. The ideal genetic pri-

mordial sphere that is disclosed through the ideal genetic primordial reduc-

tion can serve as the genetic foundation for a certain act of empathy. After its

genesis, the empathy does not disappear from the field of consciousness, but

it becomes a sediment of that primordial sphere and, becoming a sediment of

the primordial sphere, it motivates this sphere to be changed into a new level

of primordial sphere. The process of the genesis of empathy and its becom-

ing a sediment of the primordial sphere from which it is originated can con-

tinue further and, in this way, various levels of the ideal genetic primordial

sphere can emerge in the field of consciousness.

Second, like the pre-ideal genetic primordial sphere, the ideal genetic pri-mordial sphere is also constituted intersubjectively. This does not contradict

the fact that the ideal genetic primordial sphere means a sphere of being that

can be disclosed through abstracting from the subjective validities that have

their origin in other subjectivities. Since I, as a transcendental subjectivity,

am finally responsible for the subjective validity of the ideal genetic primor-

dial sphere, even in the ideal genetic phenomenology of intersubjectivity, from

the standpoint of subjective validity, I have an absolute priority over other

transcendental subjectivities. Despite this obvious fact, from the standpoint

of temporal genesis, I do not have an absolute priority over other transcen-

dental subjectivities, since the factual genetic act of abstracting reflection as

the condition of the possibility for the genesis of the ideal genetic primor-dial sphere cannot be carried out without the help of other transcendental

subjectivities. In this context, it should be noted that no one is able to carry

out or even to begin his/her scientific and philosophical works alone, but only

in a working society of science and philosophy on which he/she is dependent

in many respects. Thus, the genesis of various levels of the ideal genetic pri-

mordial sphere in the field of consciousness of a transcendental ego is not a

solipsistic achievement of this ego, but from the beginning, an intersubjective

one.


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Third, if we focus only on the subjective side, the static phenomenologicalprimordial sphere consists in objectifying acts as the bearers of subjective

validity. Contrary to this, the ideal genetic primordial sphere, like the pre-

ideal genetic one, contains not only the objectifying acts, but also the non-

objectifying acts that are tied to the former inseparably, that is, the social drives

and willings, on the one side, and the various forms of feelings, on the other

side. The objectifying act in the ideal genetic primordial sphere is a neces-

sary, but not a sufficient condition, for the ideal genesis of empathy. The ideal

genesis of empathy cannot be carried out without non-objectifying acts. With

respect to the drives and willings as an essential component of the ideal ge-

netic primordial sphere, this sphere can also be considered as a system of

drives.

4. Relations Among the Ambiguities of Primordiality

It turns out that the concept of primordiality is ambiguous in the field of ten-

sion between the static and the genetic phenomenology of intersubjectivity.

As discussed above, besides this ambiguity, there are other ambiguities per-

taining to primordiality. What is the essence of these ambiguities and what is

the relation between them and the ambiguity of the static-phenomenological

and the genetic-phenomenological concepts of primordiality?

The ambiguity of primordiality in the natural and the transcendental at-

titudes mentioned above can be observed in the static phenomenology ofintersubjectivity. As discussed above, the primordial reduction in static phe-

nomenology of intersubjectivity makes possible the recognition of another

subjectivity not only as a transcendental subjectivity, but also as a mundane

subject. This recognition of the other as a mundane subject, however, is pos-

sible not only in the transcendental attitude, but also in the natural attitude.

The problem of the recognition of other persons can be a genuine problem

not only for the transcendentally reflecting ego, but also for the person who

knows nothing about the transcendental attitude or the transcendental subjec-

tivity. Let us imagine that, in a very critical situation, I who know nothing about

the transcendental find a body that is, in some respects, similar, in some other

respects, not similar, to my body. I believe that it really is a human being.However, at the next moment, it is not obvious for me that it is a human be-

ing. The critical situation requires that I should draw a conclusion whether it

is a human being or not. In this case, there is for me only one way to solve the

problem: Through a kind of thematic Epoch, I should abstract from all the

subjective validities that have their origin in other subjectivities, go back to

the primordial sphere and examine if there is something in this sphere that can

serve as the foundation of subjective validity for my belief. Since this kind of

abstracting method can do its work already in the natural attitude, Husserl calls


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it the reduction to primordiality in the natural attitude, that is, the primor-dial reduction in the natural attitude, and the sphere of being that is disclosed

through this method the sphere that is the concretely own of any psyche (Hua

XV, 530), that is, the primordial sphere in the natural attitude. Since the pri-

mordial reduction in the natural attitude enables the meditating ego to recog-

nize the other as a mundane subject, but not as a transcendental subjectivity,

it can be considered as the preliminary form of the primordial reduction in

the transcendental attitude.

Let us examine the ambiguity of primordiality, according to which it in-

cludes and excludes the experience of empathy at the same time. Husserl

considers this ambiguity as an ambiguity that is essentially founded on a

matter (Hua XV, 635). However, he tells us nothing about the matter on which

this ambiguity is essentially founded. Since this ambiguity affirms and denies

a fact at the same time, one might be tempted to hold the view that the matter

in question is nothing other than a dialectic matter that cannot be clarified

phenomenologically, but only through a kind of dialectic logic of being and

nothingness.14 In my opinion, this view is based on pure speculation that can-

not be verified phenomenologically, since the matter in question is just the

fact that there is a clear distinction between static and genetic phenomenol-

ogy of intersubjectivity. This means that this ambiguity is one aspect of the

ambiguity of the static and genetic concepts of primordiality. The passage of

the manuscript in which the ambiguity in question is dealt with reveals that

this is the case. There Husserl first describes the static concept of primordiality

as follows: In the original methodological sense, it means the abstraction that,excluding abstractly all empathies, I as the ego of the reductive attitude carry

out phenomenologically. (Hua XV, 635) Directly thereafter he introduces the

second concept of primordiality: When I say primordial ego afterwards, it

gets the meaning of the original monad to which the original empathy belongs.

(Hua XV, 635) As discussed above, except for the most primitive level, the

other levels of the pre-ideal as well as the ideal genetic primordial sphere

contain in themselves empathy either as actual or as a sediment. Thus it turns

out that the primordiality in question is a kind of genetic-phenomenological

primordiality. In this manuscript, with the help of the second concept of

primordiality mentioned above, Husserl occupies himself with some problems

of genetic phenomenology of intersubjectivity such as the self-alienation ofmonadization (Hua XV, 639) or the naturalization of I-subjects (Hua XV,

639) that occur in the transcendental temporality. It is not by chance that

this manuscript bears the title: Monadic temporalization and worldly

temporalization . . ..

Finally, the ambiguity of primordiality between my and our primordiality

is also another aspect of the ambiguity between the static and genetic concepts

of primordiality. As discussed above, primordiality in static phenomenology

is essentially my primordiality. In contrast to this, primordiality in genetic


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phenomenology can contain the experience of empathy and, on the basis ofthis experience, each transcendental ego can constitute an intersubjective world

that it shares with other transcendental subjectivities. Since this intersubjective

world can serve as the genetic primordial sphere and as the genetic founda-

tion for empathy, it is quite possible to talk about our primordiality in genetic

phenomenology.

5. Ambiguities of Primordiality and the Basic Character of

Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity in the Fifth CM

The concept of primordiality in the fifth CM needs in many respects correc-

tion and supplementation. We cannot exclude the possibility that, through

further close examination, it can turn out to be ambiguous in other respects than

those discussed above. The examination of the ambiguities of primordiality thus

far enables us to make a general assessment15 of the views mentioned above

from the various interpreters on the concept of primordiality in the fifth CM.

First, one can view the concept of primordiality in the fifth CM as a basic

concept for the logical explanation of intersubjectivity, if one bases ones

interpretation on the static concept of primordiality that is developed in sec-

tions 4447 of the fifth CM. The logical explanation of intersubjectivity in

this context means concretely the explanation of the logical structure of the

foundation of subjective validity. Second, one can view the concept of pri-

mordiality in the fifth CM as a basic concept of genetic phenomenology, ifone bases ones interpretation on the genetic concept of primordiality devel-

oped in the second half of the fifth CM. Finally, one can view primordiality

as something that cannot be justified phenomenologically, if one makes a

confusion between the static and genetic concepts of primordiality in such a

way that, for ones interpretation, one picks up the static-phenomenological

concept of primordiality, but unfortunately regards it as a genetic-phenomen-

ological one. In this case, one is necessarily forced to draw the conclusion that

primordiality is not something that can be observed phenomenologically, since

it is impossible for anyone to observe such a phenomenon as a primordial

sphere that would build a concrete sphere of being in the universal horizon of

a transcendental ego, but would not contain any kind of empathy. As discussedabove, the primordial sphere in static phenomenology is only abstract, a prod-

uct of reduction that cannot be observed as a concrete in the actual connec-

tion of transcendental genesis.

Let me conclude with this note. Since the concept of primordiality in the

fifth CM reveals itself to be ambiguous, first of all, in the field of tension

between static and genetic phenomenology of intersubjectivity, the transcen-

dental phenomenology of intersubjectivity developed there is deeply influ-


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enced through this ambiguity: It is really a mixture of static and geneticanalysis.16 In order to develop transcendental phenomenology of inter-

subjectivity systematically, in my opinion, we should make a clear distinc-

tion between the static and the genetic phenomenology of intersubjectivity. I

believe that, in the 1930s, Husserl was also fully conscious of this fact. In a

manuscript from 1933, with respect to the transcendental problems of the other,

he writes: The meaning of the other presupposes me, my body as a living

body . . . (Hua XV, 615616), and adds to this passage a footnote: How-

ever, presuppose does not mean come into being (Hua XV, 616). There-

after, with regard to the coming into being of the meaning of the other, he

writes: The meaning comes into being as a meaning in the validity of being

in the foundation in establishment genesis. (Hua XV, 616) Thus, Husserl

considers presupposing and coming into being as two different catego-

ries of the phenomenology of intersubjectivity. According to him, from the

standpoint of the subjective validity, the less original form of consciousness,

e.g., the experience of empathy,presupposes the more original form of con-

sciousness, e.g., the primordial intentionality, whereas, from the standpoint

of the transcendental genesis, the less original form of consciousness, e.g., the

genetic primordial sphere of a higher level, comes into beingon the ground

of the more original form of consciousness, e.g., the genetic primordial sphere

of a lower level. In this way, presupposing and coming into being refer

to the foundational relation between different kinds of intentionality from the

standpoint of the subjective validity and that of the transcendental genesis

respectively. It is clear that presupposing is the basic concept of the staticphenomenology of intersubjectivity and coming into being is the basic

concept of the genetic phenomenology of intersubjectivity. Although Husserl

was fully conscious of the necessity of making a clear distinction between static

and genetic phenomenology of intersubjectivity, it was impossible for him

to develop these two forms of the transcendental phenomenology of inter-

subjectivity systematically in the remaining few years of his life. It is the task

of the phenomenologists of the future generation to develop static and genetic

phenomenology of intersubjectivity systematically. Since primordiality is,

transcendentally, the most important fundamental stage for the constitution

of intersubjectivity, it is the first task of the transcendental phenomenology

of intersubjectivity to develop the phenomenology of primordiality system-atically, that is, in its static and genetic form, as I attempted to develop partly.

Only on the ground of the full-fledged static and genetic phenomenology of

primordiality, will it be possible to develop, layer on layer, the other transcen-

dental theories of intersubjectivity such as the theory of empathy, the consti-

tution of the societies of transcendental subjectivities, the constitution of the

intersubjective world, history etc.


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Notes

* This work was supported by the overseas-research fund 20002001 for the faculty mem-

bers of the College of Humanities and the College of Social Sciences of Seoul National

University. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 31th Annual Meeting of

Husserl Circle, Indiana University, Bloomington, February 2225, 2001. I thank G.

Heffernan, J. Mensch, K.M. Haney for their useful comments on this paper that I received

thereafter. I also thank D. Welton, T. Sthler, S. Overgaard for their useful comments on

this paper in a reading group led by D. Welton in summer semester 2001 at The State

University of New York, Stony Brook. I also thank the editors of Husserl Studies for their

useful comments on my paper. A German version of this paper is to be published in the

Festschrift for Klaus Held under the title Der Begriff der Primordialitt in Husserls

fnfter Cartesianischer Meditation.

1. E. Husserl, Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vortrge (The Hague: MartinusNijhoff, 1950) (Husserliana I). In this paper, this work will be referred to with the abbre-

viation CM. Husserls works that have been published in Husserliana will be cited by

giving the number of volume and page in brackets. All translations are my own.

2. For example, A. Schutz, Das Problem der transzendentalen Intersubjektivitt bei Husserl,

Philosophische Rundschau 5 (1957), 81107; H. Zeltner, Das Ich und die Anderen.

Husserls Beitrag zur Grundlegung der Sozialphilosophie, Zeitschrift fr philosophische

Forschung 13 (1959), 288315; E.G. Ballard, Husserls Philosophy of Intersubjectivity

in Relation to his Rational Ideal, Tulane Studies in Philosophy XI(1962), 338; J. Sallis,

On the Limitation of Transcendental Reflection or Is Intersubjectivity Transcendental?,

Monist 55 (1971), 312333; B. Waldenfels, Das Zwischenreich des Dialogs: Sozial-

philosophische Untersuchung in Anschlu an Edmund Husserl(The Hague: Martinus

Nijhoff, 1971).

3. For example, K.M. Haney,Intersubjectivity Revisited: Phenomenology and the Other

(Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1994).4. For example, P. Ricoeur,Husserl: An Analysis of His Phenomenology (Evanston: North-

western University Press, 1967).

5. In Das Problem der Intersubjektivitt und die Idee einer phnomenologischen Trans-

zendentalphilosophie, Perspektiven transzendental-phnomenologischer Forschung

(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972) K. Held lays emphasis on the significance of the

distinction between static and genetic phenomenology for the systematic development

of the transcendental phenomenology of intersubjectivity. What I have attempted to show

below with respect to the distinction between the static-phenomenological and the ge-

netic-phenomenological concept of primordiality is the continuation of his basic idea.

6. In the editors introduction to Husserliana vol. XV, p. XVIIIXXI, I. Kern also discusses

this kind of ambiguity in the concept of primordiality.

7. See the research manuscript from 1933 that bears the title: Static and Genetic Phenom-

enology.


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10. E. Fink, VI. Cartesianische Meditation. Teil 2. Ergnzungsband(Dordrecht: KluwerAcademic Publishers, 1988), 251.

11. Ibid, 260.

12. With respect to the normative character of the primordial sphere, a passage reads as fol-

lows: Constitutively speaking, the human being is the normal case in comparison to the

animal, as I myself am constitutively the original norm for all the other human beings.

(Hua I, 154)

13. The distinction between the pre-ideal genetic and the ideal genetic primordial sphere is

not Husserls, but my own. We can find the expression ideale Genesis in Hua VII, 296.

However, I cannot tell exactly if the ideal genesis that is mentioned in Hua VII is the same

as the ideal genesis discussed in this paper.

14. Zeltner holds just this view: Now it is clear that Husserl, after, with a surprising energy,

he questioned back to the ultimate premise of the experience of the other, unexpectedly

meets with the matters that, from a pure phenomenological standpoint, contain in them-

selves a dialectic, and it seems impossible to eliminate this dialectic through further

phenomenological analysis. (H. Zeltner, Das Ich und die Anderen. Husserls Beitrag

zur Grundlegung der Sozialphilosophie, Zeitschrift fr philosophische Forschung 13

(1959), 289).

15. It is my further task to assess in detail the various views of the interpreters on the con-

cept of primordiality in the fifth CM with respect to the ambiguity of this concept that

reveals itself in the field of tension between static and genetic phenomenology. It will be

a very exciting and tempting task.

16. In editors introduction to Husserliana vol. XV I. Kern also talks about a fundamental

inner tension and ambiguity of the Fifth Meditation (Hua XV, XVIII), the ambiguity

of the meaning of the Fifth Meditation (Hua XV, XXI).


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Nam-In Lee - Static-Phenomenological and Genetic-Phenomenological Concept of Primordiality

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