NAILTA Amicus Brief
Transcript of NAILTA Amicus Brief
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
Case Nos. 08-56536, 08-56538____________________________________
DENISE P. EDWARDS,
Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
v.
THE FIRST AMERICAN CORPORATION, and
FIRST AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendants/Appellees.____________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
BRIEF OF NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INDEPENDENT LAND
TITLE AGENTS ASAMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT AND IN FAVOR OF REVERSAL
_____________________________________________________________
Gregory W. Happ* Mary Dryovage
Ohio Supreme Court Reg. No. 0008538 Cal. State Bar No. 112551
Texas Supreme Court Reg.No. 0936500 Law Offices of Mary Dryovage
238 West Liberty Street 600 Harrison Street, Suite 120,Medina, OH 44256 San Francisco, CA 94107Telephone (330) 723-7000 Telephone: (415) 593-0095Facsimile (330) 725-8804 Fax. (415) 593-0096
e-mail [email protected] e-mail:[email protected]
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae,National Association of Independent Title Agents
*Counsel of record. Petition for Admission pending.
mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected] -
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTERESTS OF AMICUS.. 1
II. ARGUMENT..... 2
A. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE TITLE INDUSTRY
AND FORMS OF TITLE INSURANCE 2
B. THE GROWTH OF THE TITLE INSURANCE
INDUSTRY AND THE CONSOLIDATION OF
TITLE INSURANCE UNDERWRITERS. 3
C. THE DEVELOPMENT OF REVERSE COMPETITION... 4
D. THE GROWTH OF AN ANTI-COMPETITIVE
TITLE INSURANCE INDUSTRY THROUGH
BUSINESS ARRANGEMENTS.. 7
E. THE GROWTH OF CAPTIVE TITLE
INSURANCE AGREEMENTS-- ANOTHER
REFERRAL SCHEME . 9
F. AN EXAMPLE OF HOW CAPTIVE
TITLE INSURANCE AGREEMENTS
HARM CONSUMERS . 12
III. CONCLUSION 15
Certificate of Compliance 16
FRAP 26.1 Disclosure... 17
Certificate of Service 20
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of Title Insurance, Praeger Press, Westport, CT, 1994 6
Ohio State Bar Association Report, Vol. 59, No. 48,
Section One, December 15, 1986, p. 1968. 14
Title Insurance Cost and Competition: Before the
House Committee on Financial Services
Subcommittee on Housing and Community
Opportunity, 109th
Cong., (2006) (testimony of
J. Robert Hunter, Director of Insurance, Consumer
Federation of America) 5
Chapter XII The Title Assurance and
Conveyance Industries ofReal Estate Closing
Costs,RESPA, Section 14a, Volume II SettlementPerformance Evaluation prepared by Peat, Marwick,
Mitchell and Co. for the Department of Housing
and Urban Development, October 1980 5
State of California Department of Insurance
Bulletin 80-12, December 24, 1980, Subject:
Insurance Code Section 12404 - Unlawful Rebates
Title Insurance Advisory Committee Final Report
to the State Board of Insurance, September 1986 5
INTERNET SOURCES:
American Land Title Association, Preliminary
Third Quarter 2008 Market Share -
Family-Company Summary at
http://www.alta.org/industry/08-
03/Marketshare3rdQuarterfamcosummary.xls
(last visited March 11, 2009) 4
American Land Title Association, Title Insurance:
A Comprehensive Overview, at
http://www.alta.org/about/TitleInsuranceOverview.pdf
(last visited March 11, 2009) 13
iv
http://www.alta.org/industry/08-03/Marketshare3rdQuarterfamcosummary.xlshttp://www.alta.org/industry/08-03/Marketshare3rdQuarterfamcosummary.xlshttp://www.alta.org/about/TitleInsuranceOverview.pdfhttp://www.alta.org/about/TitleInsuranceOverview.pdfhttp://www.alta.org/industry/08-03/Marketshare3rdQuarterfamcosummary.xlshttp://www.alta.org/industry/08-03/Marketshare3rdQuarterfamcosummary.xls -
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I. INTERESTS OF AMICUS
Amicus Curiae National Association of Independent Land Title
Agents (NAILTA) is a national trade association consisting of state-licensed
independent title insurance agents and state-licensed title insurance agencies,
with associate membership extended to title insurance underwriters and title
insurance industry stakeholders from across the United States. Amicus sole
interest in this case is in the application of 12 U.S.C. 2601, et seq. in
order to promote and protect fair competition in the title insurance industry.
Amicus believes that this brief will assist the Court in understanding the
complexities of the title insurance industry and why anti-competitive
practices such as that alleged in this case are harmful to our industry and the
general public.
NAILTA is a non-profit, member-supported national trade
organization working to protect the transparency, credibility and sanctity of
the land title process. As part of that mission, NAILTA represents the
interest of those industry stakeholders, both independent and affiliated alike,
who have been negatively impacted by the rise of anti-competitive business
practices in the title insurance industry. NAILTA works to protect the
independence of the title insurance industry from its referral sources and the
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Association advocates for fair competition in the industry and the removal of
conflicts of interest from the real estate process.
The issues presented by NAILTA are relevant to the current matter as
it is clear to Amicus that the practices alleged in this case restrict
competition, reduce the transparency of both the title insurance industry and
the real estate process, and undermine the consumers choice of title
insurance provider.
Amicus supports reversal of two District Court Orders which denied
the Appellants attempt at class certification due to the tremendous anti-
competitive impacts employed by the Appellees on the land title insurance
industry, the independent land title agents represented by Amicus NAILTA,
and the title insurance consumers (i.e., homeowners, buyers and borrowers).
II. ARGUMENT
A. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE TITLE INSURANCE INDUSTRY AND FORMS
OF TITLE INSURANCE
In 1876 the first title insurance company was formed in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania. This company was the first to issuance guarantees of title
with specific indemnity clauses. From this early Philadelphia System
arose the modern title insurance industry.
In simplest terms, title insurance is a contract of indemnity that is
designed to protect purchasers or mortgage lenders from unforeseen loss due
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to title defects such as: liens or encumbrances upon, defects in, or the
unmarketability of the title to real property for which the policy is issued.
These contracts of indemnity have evolved into two types of recognized title
insurance policies: (i) those policies issued to protect buyers of real estate
(Owners Policy of Title Insurance); and (ii) those policies issued to lenders
to protect the mortgages title, which secures the loan (Loan Policy of Title
Insurance).
The fundamental difference between land title insurance versus other
types of casualty insurance (i.e., homeowners, automobile and commercial
general liability insurance) has always been the commitment of the title
insurance industry to seek risk prevention over risk assumption. The
casualty insurance approach of risk assumption assures financial
indemnity through a pooling of risks for losses arising out of an unforeseen
future event such as death or accident. The title insurance approach of risk
prevention has as its goal the elimination of risks and the prevention of
losses caused by defects in title arising out of events that occurred in the
past.
B. THE GROWTH OF THE TITLE INSURANCE INDUSTRY AND THE
CONSOLIDATION OF TITLE INSURANCE UNDERWRITERS
Prior to World War II, the growth of the title insurance industry had
been limited to local and regional title insurance underwriters. After World
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War II the enormous demand and expansion of home ownership produced an
equally expanded mortgage market which in turn fostered a corresponding
growth in the demand for title insurance.
Starting in the 1960s the title insurance industry saw the emergence
of national title companies which caused a decline in the local and regional
title insurance underwriters. Combinations, consolidation, and mergers of
title insurance underwriters in the national title insurance industry have left
the industry with only four underwriter groups controlling over 92 percent of
all title insurance business nationwide.1
One of these groups includes the
Appellee, First American Title Insurance Company, the nations second
largest title insurance underwriter. This consolidation has greatly impacted
competition among title insurance underwriters and has impacted the quality
of the product and service being provided by the title insurance underwriters.
C. THE DEVELOPMENT OF REVERSE COMPETITION
At least by the 1970s, a recognized marketing trend in the title
industry developed where the providers of title insurance marketed their
products not to the ultimate consumer, who either owned or was buying a
1American Land Title Association, Preliminary Third Quarter 2008 Market
Share - Family-Company Summary at http://www.alta.org/industry/08-
03/Marketshare3rdQuarterfamcosummary.xls (last visited March 11, 2009).
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home, but to third parties involved in the real estate transactions (i.e., real
estate agents, mortgage brokers, lenders and developers).
Marketing to these third parties for the issuance of title insurance
became the dominant source of business for title insurance because of the
third partys access to the real estate transaction and that persons general
ability to refer or direct the consumer to a particular title insurance provider.
The term reverse competition was applied to this title insurance industry
marketing practice.2
The issue of the high market consolidation in the title insurance
industry caused by reverse competition has been well documented by
numerous studies and articles.3
The common theme in each of these studies
2SeeThe Pricing and Marketing of Insurance: A Report of the Departmentof Justice to the Task Group on Antitrust Immunities, January 1977, pages
250-274.
3Title Insurance Cost and Competition: Before the House Committee on
Financial Services Subcommittee on Housing and Community Opportunity,
109th
Cong., (2006) (testimony of J. Robert Hunter, Director of Insurance,
Consumer Federation of America) see also, Jack Guttentag, Real Estate
Settlement Services Take Bite Out of Borrowers, Inman News, September
6, 2005; see also, The Pricing and Marketing of Insurance: A Report of the
Department of Justice to the Task Group on Antitrust Immunities, January1977, pages 250-274; Chapter XII The Title Assurance and Conveyance
Industries of Real Estate Closing Costs, RESPA, Section 14a, Volume II
Settlement Performance Evaluation prepared by Peat, Marwick, Mitchell
and Co. for the Department of Housing and Urban Development, October
1980; State of California Department of Insurance Bulletin 80-12, December
24, 1980, Subject: Insurance Code Section 12404 - Unlawful Rebates; Title
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and articles is the lack of competition that exists in the title insurance
industry and the negative impact reverse competition has on title insurance
underwriters, title insurance agencies, the title insurance consumers and the
third-party attorneys and lending institutions involved in a real estate
transaction.
Due to the development and dominance of reverse competition in
the title insurance industry, most title insurance underwriters and title
insurance agencies compete with other underwriters and agencies for the
attention of these third-party revenue-generating referral sources (i.e., real
estate agents, mortgage brokers, lenders and developers). This competition
for referral sources unfortunately led to widespread abuses and illegal
referral activities in the title insurance industry. This, in turn, led to the
enactment of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-533, 88 Stat. 1724 (1974)("RESPA"), 12 U.S.C. 2601, et seq.
Section 8 of RESPA prohibited kickbacks and unearned fees. In
relevant part, the statute states the following:
Insurance Advisory Committee Final Report to the State Board of Insurance,
September 1986; Nelson Lipshutz, The Regulatory Economics of Title
Insurance, Praeger Press, Westport, CT, 1994, page 5; Birnbaum, Birny,
Report to the California Insurance Commissioner, An Analysis of
Competition in the California Title Insurance and Escrow Industry,
December 2005, page 57.
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(a) Business referrals
No person shall give and no person shall accept any fee,
kickback, or thing of value pursuant to any agreement or
understanding, oral or otherwise, that business incident to
or a part of a real estate settlement service involving a
federally related mortgage loan shall be referred to any
person.
(b) Splitting charges
No person shall give and no person shall accept any
portion, split, or percentage of any charge made or
received for the rendering of a real estate settlement
service in connection with a transaction involving afederally related mortgage loan other than for services
actually performed.4
D. THE GROWTH OF AN ANTI-COMPETITIVE TITLE INSURANCE
INDUSTRY THROUGH BUSINESS ARRANGEMENTS
By the 1970s the title insurance industry saw the development of
another business marketing activity involving title insurance agency
business arrangements with their third-party referral sources (i.e. real
estate brokers, real estate agents, mortgage brokers, and mortgage lenders).
These business arrangements became known as affiliated business
arrangements and controlled business arrangements.
These arrangements involved the referral source becoming a part
owner of a title insurance agency who participated directly in the profits of
412 U.S.C. 2607(a)-(b).
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http://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=40b17f88b4f108c1e049b38495c9d2f5&_xfercite=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b2009%20FED%20App.%200024P%20%286th%20Cir.%29%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_butType=4&_butStat=0&_butNum=103&_butInline=1&_butinfo=12%20U.S.C.%202607&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVtz-zSkAt&_md5=c12b4b1f4c6dfd650c69050751752b13http://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=40b17f88b4f108c1e049b38495c9d2f5&_xfercite=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b2009%20FED%20App.%200024P%20%286th%20Cir.%29%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_butType=4&_butStat=0&_butNum=103&_butInline=1&_butinfo=12%20U.S.C.%202607&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVtz-zSkAt&_md5=c12b4b1f4c6dfd650c69050751752b13 -
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the agency. Often the referral source had no active participation in the
agencys business but due to the referral of business to the title insurance
agency, of which it was a part, the referral source received a significant
profit. The profit in some instances was determined from the gross income
and not net profits. Questions began to be raised whether or not these
arrangements were nothing more than a scheme to circumvent Section 8
of RESPA.
In the years following RESPA's enactment, however, it became clearthat the provision "failed to account for 'controlled business
arrangements' . . . whereby an entity could provide a referral without
the direct payment of a referral fee."5
Indeed, in 1982, a House
Committee Report noted that such practices could result in harm to
consumers beyond an increase in the cost of settlement services:
[In controlled business arrangements] the advice of the person
making the referral may lose its impartiality and may not be
based on his professional evaluation of the quality of service
provided if the referror or his associates have a financial interest
in the company being recommended. . . . [Because the
settlement service industry] almost exclusively rel[ies] on
referrals the growth of controlled business arrangements
effectively reduce the kind of healthy competition generated by
independent settlement service providers.6
5Edwards v. First American Corp., 517 F. Supp. 2d. 1199, 1203 (C.D. Cal.
2007).6Carter v. Welles-Bowen Realty, Inc., 553 F.3d 979, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis
1288 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Kahrer v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., 418 F.
Supp. 2d 748 (W.D. Pa. 2006) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 97-532, at 52 (1982)
(emphasis added))).
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These affiliated business arrangements and controlled business
arrangements were designed to control the referral of business and by their
very nature were anti-competitive. These arrangements are currently
permitted under RESPA but only under tightly-controlled circumstances.
The subject transaction between First American and Tower City is not such
an arrangement.
E. THE GROWTH OF CAPTIVE TITLE INSURANCE AGREEMENTS --
ANOTHER REFERRAL SCHEME.
Similar to title insurance agencies establishing affiliated business
arrangements or controlled business arrangements to exclusively secure
the business of a referral source, the title insurance industry has also
seen the growth of title insurance underwriters utilizing Captive Title
Insurance Agreements (hereafter CTIA or CTIAs) to glean market
share within the title insurance industry to the exclusion of other title
insurance underwriters.7
The importance of these captive agreements to the
title insurance consumer is instantly apparent considering that, in a real
estate purchase or refinance, it is the title insurance agency and not the title
insurance consumer involved that makes the referral to the title insurance
underwriter.
7Birnbaum, Birny, Report to the California Insurance Commissioner, An
Analysis of Competition in the California Title Insurance and Escrow
Industry, December 2005, page 60.
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A CTIA occurs when a title insurance underwriter purchases a
financial interest in a previously independent title insurance agency, who
may already represent multiple title insurance underwriters, and who has a
significant share of a particular localized title insurance market. As part of
the purchase transaction, the title insurance underwriter is referred all or
substantially all of the title insurance agencys title business to the exclusion
of all other title insurance underwriters who, prior to the agreement, received
referral of title business from the now captive title insurance agency.
Prior to the acquisition of interest, the independent title insurance
agent or agency had the power to exercise its independent judgment as to
which title insurance underwriter was best suited for a particular real estate
transaction, i.e. land purchase or refinancing. After the acquisition of
interest, the power of any purchased title insurance agent or agency to
exercise an autonomous choice of title insurance underwriter is eliminated.
In most cases, it is the discerning title insurance agent who is in the
best position to provide insight and advice to title insurance consumers as to
the best title insurance underwriter for a particular transaction. However,
CTIAs remove the choice of title insurance underwriter from competitive
consideration and thereby negatively impact a title insurance consumers
ability to meaningfully participate in his or her real estate settlement.
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A title insurance underwriters use of CTIAs has the same effect of
reducing competition between settlement service providers as that of a
controlled business arrangement.
Generally speaking, RESPA sought to address Congress'
concerns over "controlled business arrangements," whereby real
estate settlement business is referred between two affiliated
entities, which RESPA had not previously addressed. Under
such circumstances, one entity is able to provide a benefit to its
affiliate without the direct payment of a referral fee which
could result in harm to consumers beyond an increase in
settlement charges . . . . Specifically, the advice of the
person making the referral may lose its impartiality and maynot be based on his professional evaluation of the quality of
service providedif the referror or his associates have a financial
interest in the company being recommended. In addition, since
the real estate industry is structured so that settlement service
providers do not compete for a consumer's business directly,
but almost exclusively rely on referrals from real estate brokers,
lenders or their associates for their business, the growth of
controlled business arrangements effectively reduce the kind of
healthy competition generated by independent settlement
service providers.
To address the negative effects on the real estate industry
caused by these controlled relationships, "injury in a RESPA
case can be shown by harm other than allegations of
overcharges," as "the alleged 8(a) violation presents the
possibility for other harm, including a lack of impartiality in the
referral and a reduction of competition between settlement
service provide[r]s."8
8Carter v. Welles-Bowen Realty, Inc., 553 F.3d 979, at 987, 2009 U.S. App.
Lexis 1288 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Kahrer, supra at 754 (citing H.R. Rep.
No. 97-532, at 52 (1982) (emphasis added))), (citing Robinson v.
Fountainhead Title Group Corp., 447 F. Supp. 2d 478, 488-89 (D. Md.
2006).
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At issue in the present case is the selection of a title insurer once the
referral is made. Upon being referred to a title insurance agency, the title
insurance consumer is a captive of the title insurance agencys choice of title
underwriter. The CTIA obscures the opportunity of a homeowner or
borrower to have a meaningful choice of a title insurance underwriter and
thereby the quality of the product or service each offers.
F. AN EXAMPLE OF HOW CAPTIVE TITLE INSURANCE AGREEMENTS
HARM CONSUMERS.
CTIAs remove the necessary independence and impartiality of the
title insurance agency in the title insurance transaction. The title insurance
agencys professional evaluation of the quality of service offered to the
consumerisclouded by thefinancial rewards of the CTIA professional.9
This loss of professional evaluation also results in the title insurance
consumer being denied a meaningful choice in which title insurance
underwriting standards are to be employed for the issuance of the title
insurance policy. One feature of the growing variance among title insurance
underwriter standards is demonstrated by the rising indifference by title
insurance underwriters to a basic industry standard of risk avoidance.
In order to promote risk prevention, a core function of the issuance of
9 SeeCarter supra at 987 (citing Kahrer, 418 Fed. Supp. 2d. at 754 (quoting
H.R. Rep. No. 97-532, at 52) (emphasis added).
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title insurance has historically been a search or examination of the public
land records for title defects prior to issuance of title insurance. This title
searching or examining process prevents title risks by the discovery and
possible removal of any title defects prior to issuance of a title insurance
policy. During the title search, title companies find and fix problems with
the title in 25 percent of transactions usually unbeknownst to the title
insurance consumer or lender.10
Often it is the variance in the title insurance underwriters title search
standards that marks the difference in the quality of the risk avoidance being
performed. Unfortunately, in recent years the standards for a land title
search or title examination demanded by some title insurance underwriters,
prior to the issuance of title insurance, has been lessened due to the rising
cost of securing title insurance market share and the necessity to compensate
the referrer of the title insurance business, whether as CTIAs or other anti-
competitive practices that result from reverse competition.
10American Land Title Association, Title Insurance: A Comprehensive
Overview, pg. 2 at http://www.alta.org/about/TitleInsuranceOverview.pdf
(last visited March 11, 2009).
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In a cost saving measure some national title insurance underwriters
require only a current owner search of title in residential transactions,
meaning that the title abstractor/examiner is required by the title insurance
underwriter to search only the current owners title back to the moment that
owner took title, thereby omitting liens and other encumbrances that would
have attached to the interest held by prior owners in title. This is in contrast
to other title insurance underwriters requirements for the customary full
title search of forty plus years beginning from the deed or root of the
current owners title. Only through a full title search and a detailed listing
of encumbrances, easements and restrictions in a policy can an owner know
the status of his title prior to the issuance of the title insurance policy.11
Title insurance consumers are often unaware of this variance in the
standards of one title insurance underwriter versus another and the impact
this variance has on the quality of the final title insurance product. When a
title insurance agency commits itself through a CTIA to a single title
insurance underwriter, it denies a meaningful and important choice of
11 Ohio State Bar Association Report, Vol. 59, No. 48, Section One,
December 15, 1986, p. 1968. The Council authorized the followingComment in lieu of the OSBA Title Standard 2.2 regarding land title
searches: "There is nothing in the Ohio Marketable Title Act that entitles a
title examiner to rely upon a simple forty year search period. He or she must
be aware of the several exemptions in the Act that are not barred by the mere
passage of 40 years.
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service to the title insurance consumer. In these cases, that choice means the
difference between eliminating risk and assuming it. For unsuspecting title
insurance consumers, that choice could lead to years of real estate-related
litigation and uncertainty.
III. CONCLUSION
The ultimate result of the exclusivity generated by a CTIA is the
damage and harm to the title insurance consumers who were denied a
meaningful choice between the standards offered by various title insurance
underwriters. Appellant clearly represents a class of consumers that was
negatively impacted and damaged by the exclusive referral paid for by
Appellee through its CTIA with Tower City Title Agency.
For the foregoing reasons, the district courts judgment should be
reversed on both Orders currently subject to this Courts review.
Respectfully submitted,
Gregory W. Happ* Mary Dryovage
Ohio Supreme Court Reg. No. 0008538 Cal. State Bar No. 112551
Texas Supreme Court Reg.No. 0936500 Law Offices of Mary Dryovage
238 West Liberty Street 600 Harrison Street, Suite 120,Medina, OH 44256 San Francisco, CA 94107
Telephone (330) 723-7000 Telephone: (415) 593-0095Facsimile (330) 725-8804 Fax. (415) 593-0096
e-mail [email protected] e-mail:[email protected]
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae,
National Association of Independent Title Agents
*Counsel of record. Petition for Admission pending.
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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
1. This brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Fed. R. App. P.
32(a)(7)(B) because this brief contains 2,786 words, excluding the
parts of the brief exempted by Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B)(iii).
2. This brief complies with the typeface requirements of Fed. R. App. P.
32(a)(5) and the type style requirements of Fed. R. App.P. 32 (a)(6)
because this brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced
typeface using Microsoft Word 2003 in Times New Roman, 14-point
font.
DATED: March 11, 2009
By:_/s/ Gregory W. Happ
Gregory W. Happ
Attorney for Amicus Curiae
National Association of Independent
Land Title Agents (NAILTA)
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DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE AFFILIATIONS AND OTHER
ENTITIES WITH A DIRECT FINANCIAL INTEREST IN
LITIGATION
Pursuant to FRAP 26.1, amicus National Association of Independent
Land Title Agents (NAILTA) a 501(c)(6) non-profit corporation
incorporated in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, makes the following
disclosure:
1. NAILTA is not a publicly held corporation or other publicly
held entity.
2. NAILTA has no parent corporations.
3. No publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity owns
10% or more of NAILTA.
4. NAILTA is a national trade association and a list of all
members are provided hereto and incorporated herein by
reference.
/s/ Gregory W. Happ March 11, 2009
Gregory W. Happ
Attorney at Law
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MEMBERSHIP LIST - NAILTA
Brandywine 4 Building
3 Dickinson Drive
Suite 204
Chadds Ford, PA 19317
Anthony L. Affatato, Sr. Freehold, NJ
Frank Carnesi Freehold, NJ
Chuck Rosenblum Freehold, NJ
Elizabeth M. Crowe Freehold, NJ
David Dwyer Philadelphia, PA
Allen Exelby Parsippany, NJGregory W. Happ Medina, OH
Karin T. Hesse Carnegie, PA
Thomas F. Andres Carnegie, PA
Kevin M. Hanley Carnegie, PA
Kim Himmel Massillon, OH
Robert B. Holman Cleveland, OH
Ian Katz Warminster, PA
Francis P. Kelly Reading, PA
Dallys Novarina Blue Bell, PA
John A. Novarina Blue Bell, PA
Charlene M. Ostroski Devon, PA
Linda Percoco Florham Park, NJ
Harvey A. Pollack Wauwatosa, WI
Charles W. Proctor, III Chadds Ford, PA
Maria O. Proctor Chadds Ford, PA
Colleen Curtin Chadds Ford, PA
Donna Grasso Chadds Ford, PA
Carl Samon Parsippany, NJ
Steve Squeo Dublin, OHJames J. Squeo Dublin, OH
Virginia Squeo Dublin, OH
Clanci Moloney-Nelson Dublin, OH
Dorothy E. Tittermary Philadelphia, PA
Matthew H. Waylett Hunt Valley, MD
Allison Waylett Hunt Valley, MD
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NAILTA - Membership List (Continued)
Bill Grossmiller Hunt Valley, MD
Nelson Schwartz Hunt Valley, MD
Lisa Myers Hunt Valley, MD
Dave Wierzbicki West Lawn, PA
Francine DElia Wirsching Blue Bell, PA
David B. Wirsching Blue Bell, PA
Betsy R. McCord Dayton, OH
Teresa Ganka Dayton, OH
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