Dr Ingolfur Blühdorn

Department of European Studies

University of Bath, UK

Bath BA2 7AY

I.Bluehdorn@bath.ac.uk

Myths of Empowerment and Ecologisation On the re-materialisation of post-materialist politics

(ECPR Joint Sessions Workshop NEW FORMS OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION: ACTIVISM IN

GREEN AND ALTERNATIVE PARTIES, Copenhagen, April 14-19, 2000)

Three decades after ecological issues first appeared on the political agenda of most

European countries, political scientists, environmental sociologists, and environmental

campaigners are trying to assess the achievements and failures of green politics so far.

To some extent such endeavours are spurred by the transition to the new millennium.

Considerably more important, however, is the wide spread awareness that quite

irrespective of the calendar the eco-movement and the public discourse about

environmental issues are currently going through a phase of fundamental reorientation.

The old ecological certainties have become uncertain. The established values, objectives

and strategies of ecological politics are up for reconsideration and redefinition. Powerful

shifts in the social, cultural, political and economic constellations in an increasingly

globalised world do not leave ecological issues unaffected. They give rise to new

problem perceptions and require the actors of ecological politics as well as their

sociological observers to adapt their political and analytical tool kit.

One of most striking characteristics of this review process which has been ongoing since

the first half of the 1990s1 is the discrepancy between the perspectives offered by

various breeds of innovation-oriented eco-optimists, on the one side, and increasingly

disillusioned eco-pessimists, on the other. Their respective assessments of the ecological

status quo and the future potential of eco-politics are radically incompatible. Secondly,

although there are very few signs, indeed, that late modern societies have performed, or

are about to perform, the long-demanded ecological U-turn, optimistic views of the

future seem to be dominant.2 Scientists, industrialists and politicians all display

overwhelming confidence in (bio-)technological innovation, ecological modernisation,

the emergence of so-called third ways, the rise of a global civil society, etc., which all

1 For an earlier attempt to describe the ‘generational change in the ecology movement’ see, for example,

Blühdorn 1995. 2 Despite some undeniable ecological achievements, the most threatening developments like deforestation,

the depletion of resources (most threatening: fresh water resources), dramatically increasing car and air

travel, climatic change, global population growth, loss of biodiversity etc. continue in an unabated

fashion. The impressive accumulation of century-catastrophes in the 1990s (the mud-slides in Venezuela

and the unprecedented hurricanes in continental Europe being the December ‘99 examples) appears like

the immediate consequence of the failure to address these issues.

2

seem to imply that by and large things are under control, or can be brought under

control, if only we consistently pursue the strategies which are - at least embrionically -

already in place. And thirdly, it is striking that in the current debate it is no longer the

survival of nature or humankind which is at stake and which provides the crucial bone

of contention. The apocalyptic discourses which once dominated the ecological debate

may now be regarded as a typical phenomenon of the cold war era. Ten years after the

collapse of the bipolar structures, the dominant question is how changing physical

conditions will affect specific parts of national societies and the global population at

large, and how their response may be managed. Issues like social justice, social equality

and social inclusion or exclusion, i.e. distributive issues, have become focal points of

the eco-political debate. The formerly ecological question has obviously turned into a

new social question.

The irritating incompatibility between optimistic and pessimistic perspectives, the

curious preponderance of optimistic views, and this re-emergence of the social question

provide the incentive for my explorations in this paper. Using the German experience as

my prime point of reference, I want to explore the relationship between the development

of late modern societies and the ongoing evolution of green political ideals.

Furthermore, I will try to anticipate what the foreseeable future may hold for the green

movement. The main hypotheses I want to present are, firstly, that contemporary

societies are not moving towards the realisation but towards the abandonment of green

ideals. Secondly, this chapter suggests that the green movement and green parties in the

ecologist sense are becoming redundant. Changing political, economic and cultural

constellations in increasingly globalised and at the same time highly individualistic

societies provide a favourable framework for the supposedly post-materialistic and

trans-ideological ecological issue to be translated into material and economic issues. As

such they are being reintegrated into the established political structures and addressed as

distributive questions. This leaves no space and legitimation for green parties and green

movements in the ecologist sense.

Of course, these hypotheses are crude generalisations. When talking about eco-politics,

it has become a standard exercise to point towards the very different national contexts,

the very diverse sub-discourses within the ecological debate and the large number of

ideological and organisatory shades of green which can hardly be regarded as forming

one homogeneous eco-movement. But too much differentiation obscures the view for

large scale cultural shifts and developments. If the latter are meant to be made visible,

complexity must be reduced, generalisations must be made and diversity must be

ignored. Undoubtedly there is something like a common denominator, a set of basic

ecological aims and beliefs that integrate the European (and even global) green

movement. It is this shared foundation that I am interested in and whose ongoing

rearrangement I want to explore. Germany and its Bündnis90/Die Grünen - although my

prime point of reference - will therefore only serve as an example. Ultimately, the

questions this chapter concerns itself with cannot be dealt with from the perspective of

only one specific country. I will develop my theses in four main steps. Section I reviews

the argument that the environmental movement has failed and exhausted its political

potential. Section II turns to Bündnis 90/Die Grünen whose performance as the junior

3

partner in the German coalition government seems to reconfirm this impression. Section

III focuses on the composition of the ecologist ideological package-deal and the way it

has been unpacked during the 1990s. The concluding section, finally, explores the post-

ecologist repackaging of environmental issues. Contrary to its libertarian, inclusive and

post-materialist predecessor, the emerging post-ecologist politics [Blühdorn 1997, 2000]

that will probably dominate the only just inaugurated ‘century of the environment’

[Weizsäcker 1999] is authoritarian, exclusive and neo-materialist.

I Disillusionment and democratic sclerosis

The idea that environmentalism and political greenery are no more than a passing fad is

as old as the eco-movement itself. And just as the opponents of the post-1968 social

movements - for whatever political motivation - never got tired of predicting that the

green humbug would soon be over, it has become a standard exercise for the

ecologically committed to insist that the green issue will not go away and that eventually

society will be forced to face it. Ironically, it seems that just as the anti-green voices

have finally been muted by the ever swelling pro-environmental consensus, their

predictions might be coming true. In 1994, just before Bündnis90/Die Grünen re-entered

the Bundestag, thus putting an end to the unexpected four year period during which the

western Die Grünen had been banned to extra-parliamentary opposition, Anna

Bramwell diagnosed The Fading of the Greens and the ‘decline of environmental

politics in the West’ [Bramwell 1994]. The German experience and the German Greens

were her main witness and evidence3 for the thesis that ‘the era of sunflowers and

banjos is over’ [ibid.: 108]. The death of Petra Kelly and her partner Gert Bastian

(October 1992) were presented as a symbol for the death of political ecology in general.

At the time, the resurrection of Bündnis90/Die Grünen as a parliamentary party (7.3%)

seemed to provide sufficient evidence that Bramwell’s hypothesis was wrong. Rather

than as a spent force, the party was then widely celebrated as the firmly established

(historically always important) third power in the German political landscape relegating

the liberal democratic FDP (6.9%) to position four [Jesinghausen 1995; Scharf 1995;

Markovits and Silvia 1997]. The unprecedented strength of the major environmental

NGOs seemed to reconfirm that the eco-movement - rather than fading - had become an

influential political player. Bramwell’s book therefore attracted very little attention.4

Just a few years later, however, the thesis of the ‘fading of the greens’ was back on the

table and had become a much more widespread concern.

In 1997 Michael Jacobs noted that ‘politically the environment is marginal’, that it ‘fails

to excite conflict between the major political parties’, and that it ‘doesn’t figure in

election campaigns’ [Jacobs 1997: 5]. Jonathon Porritt demands that in order to avoid

3 Apart from the German case, she also makes reference to Britain, Italy and the USA.

4 Not just because it had evidently misjudged the immediate electoral potential of Bündnis 90/Die Grünen,

but also because Bramwell had based her wider prognoses on an analysis of green thinking and ecological

politics that was in many respects - both academically and ethically - deeply flawed (see the more detailed

comments further below). Acknowledging its ‘powerful and unconventional intelligence’, Gray correctly

speaks of ‘a perverse and wrong-headed book’ [1997: 71].

4

that the eco-movement completely ‘loses its soul’, it is high time that its values are

finally ‘brought to the forefront of its work rather than allowed to languish in obscurity’

[Porritt 1997: 71]. Neill Carter complains that the ‘major political parties, after taking a

crash course in environmentally friendly rhetoric, have since returned to politics as

usual - the economy, taxation, health, education, law and order’ [Carter 1997: 192]. All

these comments referred to Britain, which is certainly not known as particularly eco-

friendly. Mutatis mutandis, however, they are all equally applicable to most other

European countries. With regard to the Netherlands, undoubtedly one of the eco-

politically most advanced EU-countries, Paul Lucardie comes to the conclusion that

although ‘CO2 emissions have increased, energy consumption remains high,

eutrophication and desiccation of waters continue, exhaust fumes and manure pollute

the air and acidify natural areas’, etc., ‘voters as well as politicians seem to have lost

interest in environmental issues’ [Lucardie 1997: 190]. For Germany, Karl-Dieter Opp

notes that the major environmental NGOs today command considerably larger resources

than in the early 1990s, but that the number of environmental protest events as well as

the number of individual participants per protest event have declined [Opp 1996: 352f].

Looking back on the Kohl-era, Weidner and Jänicke come to the conclusion that the

Federal Republic has built up considerable eco-political capacities5, but that in recent

years, due to ‘insufficient will and skill’, the ‘existing potential for action is not being

realised’. In ‘certain areas there is even a loss of eco-political capacities’ [Weidner and

Jänicke 1998: 202]. Reiterating the concerns Carter voiced, Karl-Werner Brand notes

that in Germany, too, ‘traditional arguments of growth and costs are once again pushing

the discourse of ecological modernisation into the background’ [Brand 1999: 245]. One

might say that although the level of environmental awareness and concern remained

consistently high [Eurostat 1999], unification has wiped the topic from the political

agenda. Throughout the 1990s, environmental issues have always been regarded as less

urgent by the German public than unemployment, asylum seekers, and various other

social issues [Gibowski 1999]. The brief period of the Brent Spar affair in 1995

represented the only notable exception from this pattern. Apart from minor rows about

fuel-prices, Castor-transports, and British beef, the ecological issue has never again

reached the political salience it had in the late 1980s. And looking ahead into the

foreseeable future, Detlef Jahn predicts that ‘the environment does not look like

becoming a major issue again’ [Jahn 1997: 181]. In his view ‘the special conditions

which created the original core support for the German Greens (student protest,

economic prosperity, repressive state responses) show little sign of returning’ [Jahn

1997: 181].

Across Europe, the phase of initial mobilisation for the environment, which often

implied conflict and confrontation, has given way to a new phase of pragmatism and co-

operation [Blühdorn 1995; Kreisi and Giugni 1996]. Paradoxically, the now

unchallenged societal consensus that the environment is a high-priority issue, helped to

depoliticise the issue and contributed to its demotion to a status of latency rather than

immediate urgency. Arguing on the basis of a rational choice approach, Opp suggests

5 The term refers to the totality of societal conditions determining the success or failure of environmental

politics (e.g. level of information, env. awareness, env. value orientations, efficient eco-political actors,

efficient institutions etc.).

5

that the successful institutionalisation of the eco-movement decreases the motivation for

the individual to become active her/himself. The availability of powerful international

organisations (from Greenpeace to the UN and the World Bank) and their regularly

reiterated reassurances that they fully accept responsibility for ecological matters and are

taking these issues very seriously tempts comparatively powerless local actors and

individuals into shifting ecological responsibility to higher levels. This trend is probably

reinforced by the fact that local environments are generally perceived as significantly

better than the national or even global environment. Survey research shows that almost

worldwide the quality ratings increase from global via national to local [Dunlap and

Mertig 1996: 211-213], which means that there is not so much need for lower-level

environmental action provided that the international organisations take care of the

significant large-scale problems.

Undeniably, there is a list of eco-political achievements. However, as Weidner and

Jänicke correctly point out, these improvements are primarily related to ‘environmental

problems of high visibility and potential for politicisation’ [1998: 221]. Less visible but

in the long term perhaps even more devastating problems and trends like ground water

contamination, loss of biodiversity, the expansion of built-up areas, etc. could not be

stopped or reversed. For these issues there is no straight forward technological solution,

and - perhaps more importantly - there is no immediate economic gain to be expected

from addressing them. Such issues demand ‘fundamental structural change for the

benefit of the environment also at the expense of established industries’, but this

structural change has not really been achieved [Weidner and Jänicke 1998: 221f].

Despite the undeniable minor improvements, Dieter Rucht, too, therefore certifies the

eco-movement, nationally as well a globally, an ‘unambiguously negative achievement-

record’ [Rucht 1996: 15ff].

This disillusioning assessment of the eco-movement may well be expanded to the social

movements in general. In the early 1970s the new social movements had appeared on

the political stage with the slogan and diagnosis that ‘the system is bankrupt’ [Kelly

1984]. They wanted to organise the ‘departure into a different society’ [Brand, Büsser

and Rucht 1986]. Particularly in Germany they had emerged from a situation of political

standstill (grand coalition), and with their new topics and strategies they promised to

bring new movement and innovation into social and political affairs. Three decades later

their participatory revolution has led to an unexpected result. In the movement-society

(Bewegungsgesellschaft) or protest-society (Protestgesellschaft) [Neidhardt and Rucht

1993, 1999] political protest and direct intervention have become a normality, a political

means employed by all kinds of social groups. Farmers, mothers, doctors, ravers,

miners, gays, etc. all take to the streets and demand to be heard. Differentiated minority

interests are extremely well organised and effectively articulated. An equlibrium

between contradicting but equally valid concerns, and the permanent threat of popularity

polls and upcoming elections renders effective political decision making rather difficult.

A new form of political deadlock becomes visible, and the social movements

themselves have clearly contributed to it. The political blockade [Beck 1993, Raschke

1999], the democratic sclerosis brings everything to a halt. Once again, new movement

and new political ideas are urgently required, yet there are neither any large-scale

6

integrative topics, nor any movement organisations commanding the required capacity

of mobilisation. As Raschke puts it, ‘postindustrial society does not provide the

conditions for coherent mass movements with an efficient strategic centre’ [Raschke

1999: 74].

Under the conditions of globalisation, social movements have fundamentally changed

their function. Social change comes no longer from the bottom up, but it seems to be

coming from the top down. Innovation and change are no longer a demand that is

carried forward by progressive protest movements, but in late modern societies it

imposes itself on society - partly originating from quasi-evolutionary systemic

necessities, and partly being enforced by national governments who are desperately

trying to provide evidence that they can still be pro-active and in control of

developments. In this context, social movements are becoming largely defensive. In

Raschke’s words, they ‘normatively demand a restriction of change’, but they no longer

‘proactively intervene into determining change’ [Raschke 1999: 78]. In other words,

social movements no longer offer a positive vision but become largely reactive. Instead

of developing and promoting ideas for a radically different society, they fight

undesireable local side effects of large scale developments which they can hardly

conceptualise let alone influence. They have a negative agenda, dominated by

imperatives of avoidance. In the mealstrom of innovation that characterises late modern

societies social movements are focusing on the task of slowing down uncontrolled

change, to restrict the damage done by self-imposing developments like the neo-

liberalist free market agenda. They become a retarding, often regressive, rather than

progressive force. Working to the logic of the lesser evil, they prefer the present

conditions which - although admittedly in need of considerable improvement - are

known and calculable and which therefore generate a sense of security, to the hasty

departure into a future whose parameters and implications are neither known nor

foreseeable. ‘If there is a consensus that democracy was the topic of the new social

movements, there is nothing but the conclusion that is so typical of social movements: A

historical mission unfulfilled’ [Roth 1999: 59].

II Deadlocked in government

The 1998 elections to the German Bundestag certainly confirmed this negative

assessment of the social movements and in particular the ecology movement. During the

election campaign environmental issues were playing no significant role [Semetko and

Schoenbach 1999: 81]. Topics like the phasing out of nuclear energy or plans for an

ecological tax reform were occasionally mentioned, but firstly it was the SPD rather

than the Greens who claimed political ownership6 of these issues, secondly, Gerhard

Schröder was keen to present himself as friendly to the business world (Genosse der

Bosse) and sympathetic to middle class motorist enthusiasm (Kanzler aller Autos) and

was therefore restricted to a very moderate and non-conflictual environmentalism. The

6 Justified particularly by Schröder’s long-standing negotiations with the nuclear industry

(Energiekonsensgespräche) and Lafontaine’s long-standing commitment to an ecologically more sensible

system of taxation.

7

one notable exception from the conspicuous absence of environmental issues from the

election campaign was the debate about fuel prices. In spring 1998 the Greens retabled a

much older suggestion7 according to which the price for petrol was to be gradually

increased (roughly trebled) to five DM per litre. Strategically, this suggestion turned into

a fiasco. Public support for this environmental measure was at rock-bottom level. For

several weeks the media kept the debate going and secured that during the run-up to the

elections Die Grünen were primarily associated with higher petrol prices.

In as much as on election day Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (6.7%) nevertheless managed to

reconfirm their position as the third political force in Germany, and then actually

replaced the FDP (6.2%) as the junior partner in the new coalition government, the

October 1998 elections were a major success for the Greens. Being involved in the

federal government and securing three ministerial portfolios8 seemed like the ultimate

victory for political ecology. However, compared to their 1994 results, Bündnis 90/Die

Grünen had actually lost votes (0.6%), thus continuing the negative trend established by

the four 1998 state elections (see table 1). Furthermore, the social composition of the

Green clientele had changed in rather worrying ways. In both the old and the new

Länder a disproportionately large number of young voters (age group 18-24) had turned

away from the Greens (-4% in the West and -2% in the East). In the west, the Greens

had also lost 3% in the age group from 25-34 (+2 in the East). For the group 35-44 there

was a 1% increase in the new Länder (none in the old), and votes from the age group

45-59 were slightly up (+1%) in both parts of the country [Gibowski 1999: 24f].

Obviously the Green constituency is ageing, and the party does not manage to attract

new young voters. Furthermore, despite the overall losses, the Greens actually increased

their votes from public sector employees and the self-employed (+2% each). Amongst

blue-collar workers and farmers, on the other hand, the figures went down by the same

proportion [ibid.]. It seems that environmental issues do not just generally lose their

political salience, but even more than in the past, environmentalism is becoming a

phenomenon largely restricted to the middle aged middle classes, i.e. the well-educated

and economically secure sectors of society.

Once in government, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen found it extremely difficult to realise any

of their core demands. German troops did participate in the Kosovo war. The so-called

ecological tax reform melted down to rather modest increases in petrol prices. The high

speed rail connection between Hamburg and Berlin (Transrapid) was stopped for

economic rather than ecological reasons. An agreement on the phasing out of nuclear

energy could not be achieved. During the Kosovo war, foreign minister Joschka Fischer

emerged as the most popular politician, yet he was keen to retain a clear distance to his

own party, and in particular he sought to keep clear from ecological issues. Amongst the

German public, the Ober-Realo was hardly associated with greenery at all. As a matter

of fact, he could just as well have defected from his party and joined the Social

Democrats, which often seemed more likely than his staying on with the hopelessly

7 In 1994 the Sachverständigenrat für Umweltfragen had suggested that by the year 2005 the petrol price

should rise to about 4 to 5 DM per litre. 8 Joschka Fischer: Foreign; Jürgen Trittin: Environment, Nature Protection and Reactor Safety; Andrea

Fischer: Health

8

fragmented, inefficient and unprofessional Greens. The former Fundi and now

environmental minister Jürgen Trittin, on the other hand, did try to push ecological

issues - and quickly emerged as one of the most unpopular politicians in Germany,

almost matching the unpopularity of Oskar Lafontaine who in March 1999 had

unexpectedly resigned from all his political offices [Dostal 2000]. Undoubtedly, Trittin

was a credible and vociferous proponent of green grass-roots demands, yet he was

unable to communicate his policies to the wider public. After a series of confrontations,

Trittin - although he remained in office - was completely silenced by both the

government and his own party who had to fight further electoral contests.

Nevertheless, the Greens did not manage to stop their electoral decline. Just as in the

previous year, every single Land election throughout 1999 meant a further defeat for the

party.

Table 1: Bündnis 90/Die Grünen in 1998 and 1999 Länder elections:

Federal Elections

10/1998 by Federal State

Länder elections since 1/1998 compared to previous

Baden-Wurttemberg 9.2%

Bavaria 5.9% 9/98 5.7% (-0.4%)

Berlin 11.3% 10/99 9.9% (-3.3%)

Bremen 11.3% 6/99 9.2% (-3.9%)

Hamburg 10.8%

Hesse 8.2% 2/99 7.2% (-4.0%)

Lower Saxony 5.9% 3/98 7.0% (-0.4%)

North Rhine-Westphalia 6.9%

Rhineland-Palatinate 6.1%

Saarland 5.5% 9/99 3.2% (-2.3%)

Schleswig-Holstein 6.5% 2/00 6.2% (-1.9%)

Brandenburg 3.6% 9/99 1.9% (-1.0%)

Mecklenburg-West Pomerania 2.9% 9/98 2.7% (-1.0%)

Saxony 4.4% 9/99 2.6% (-1.5%)

Saxony-Anhalt 3.3% 4/98 3.2% (-1.9%)

Thuringia 3.9% 9/99 1.9% (-2.6%)

Bündnis 90/Die Grünen did not manage to convert the publicity bonus they had as a

partner in government into electoral capital. Although Fischer retained his high ratings

in the political popularity charts, his party did not benefit electorally. Against the

background of consistently high unemployment figures and the debate about Germany’s

competitiveness as an industrial location in an increasingly globalised economy

(Standortdebatte), environmental issues were simply not in demand. Whilst Schröder

tried to restyle his party and modernise social democracy following the example of Tony

Blair, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen were paralysed by internal tensions and the attempt to

resolve their major identity crisis. The European elections in June 1999 once again

reconfirmed that the environment did not figure highly on the concern list of the

electorate. In the election campaign environmental issues were even less visible than in

the campaign the year before. Compared to the European elections of 1994, the German

Greens lost dramatically (3.5% and 5 MEPs). They even lost in comparison to the

9

federal election in October 1998. This is particularly striking as the Greens traditionally

fared significantly better in European elections9 than at the national level.

Table 2: Bündnis 90/Die Grünen in the 1998 national and 1999 European elections:

total west east

Bundestag 10/1998 6.7% (-0.6) 7.3% (-0.6) 4.1% (-0,2)

European Parliament 6/1999 6.6% (-3.5) 7.4% (-3.8) 2.9% (-2.9)

After only one year in government, it appeared fairly uncertain whether the red-green

coalition would survive for much longer. Whilst in the first months of this year the

Greens were once again completely absorbed by debates about internal structural

reforms, the public was first and foremost concerned about social and economic affairs.

When in November 1999 the Bundestag finally passed phase two of the ecological tax

reform according to which from 2000 to 2003 petrol prices will rise every year by six

Pfennigs (2 pence) per litre, the overwhelming majority of the German public (70%)

rejected this ecological innovation. Given that this increase is rather tame and that the

extra revenue is earmarked (in full) for reducing employer and employee contributions

to the social insurance system thus improving Germany’s economic competitiveness, the

public rejection of this policy is hardly understandable - and certainly not indicative of

any noticeable environmental commitment. Only towards the very end 1999, the red-

green coalition seemed to restabilise itself. With a view to the Land elections in

Schleswig Holstein and North-Rhine Westphalia Schröder initiated yet another attempt

to reach some kind of agreement with the nuclear industry about the decommissioning

of at least one nuclear reactor within his first term as federal Chancellor. In order to

legitimate their participation in the coalition government, the Greens desperately needed

an eco-political success. Helmut Kohl’s secret CDU-bank accounts brought the

opposition parties into deep disrespect and provided the governing parties with the

opportunity to present themselves in a more favourable light. Bündnis 90/Die Grünen

however, did not manage to use this unique opportunity for boosting their political

profile. Even in the short term their political survival seems under serious threat.

III Untying the ecological package-deal

Although the German Greens were clearly the main losers of the 1999 European

elections, their identity crises and poor electoral showing are by no means an exception.

In 1990 the Green Group of the European Parliament (GGEP) consisted of 27 MEPs.

Four years later they went down to 21 (losses in Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy and

The Netherlands), and it was only the accession of three new EU members (Austria,

Finland, Sweden) during the following two years, which brought them up to 27 again.

The 1999 European elections then did indeed look like a major victory. Admittedly,

there are still four EU-countries with no green MEPs at all, but gains in Belgium and

9 It was for the European elections in 1979 that the party was first founded (1979: 3.2%; 1984: 8.2%;

1989: 8.4%; 1994: 10.1%).

10

The Netherlands (+3 each), Austria and Finland (+1 each) and, most notably, the UK

(+2) and France (+9) brought the European Greens up to an impressive 38 MEPs. This

seems to reflect a major upsurge in environmental concern and eco-political

commitment in the respective polities. However, a brief look at the electoral turnout and

the specific situation in the individual countries reveals a more differentiated picture.

Table 3: The Green Group of the European Parliament (GGEP)

1994 1999 Turnout

Austria 1 (1996) 2 49%

Belgium 2 5 91%

Britain - 2 24%

Denmark - - 50%

Finland 1 (1996) 2 30%

France - 9 47%

Germany 12 7 45%

Greece - - 75%

Ireland 2 2 51%

Italy 3 2 70%

Luxembourg 1 1 86%

Netherlands 1 4 30%

Portugal - - 40%

Spain - - 64%

Sweden 4 (1995) 2 39%

Compared to the 1994 elections, the average turnout in all EU countries fell from 56.5%

to 49.4% [Helms 1999: 165]. For Green Parties this traditionally implies better results

because green-minded voters can in general more easily be mobilised [Richardson and

Rootes 1995; O’Neill 1997]. In the UK, The Netherlands and Finland, where electoral

participation was by far the lowest of all EU countries, this is undoubtedly a major

reason for the good relative performance of the Greens. Britain was for the first time

using a system of proportional representation. As research into different electoral

systems has demonstrated, proportional representation tends to benefit Green Parties

and smaller parties in general [Richardson and Rootes 1995; O’Neill 1997].

Furthermore, the British Greens were riding the strong wave of Euroscepticism which

swept their country in the late 1990s. Given this set of rather favourable conditions, their

at first sight positive performance of 6.3% is actually rather disappointing. In France as

well as Austria the effect of the exceptionally low turnout was reinforced by the

availability of a highly charismatic front person who was at the centre of the campaign

(Daniel Cohn Bendit, Alexander van der Bellen). The surprisingly good result in France

furthermore has to be seen against the background that green results in France have

always jumped up and down, reflecting changing constellations in the French party

system rather than changing levels of environmental concern.10

The one notable

exception from the pattern of low general turnout and high green returns was Belgium

where attendance at the ballot box is compulsary and where the Greens - despite the

high turnout - did very well both at European as well as national level (see table 4). To a

significant extent the green gains in Belgium have to be interpreted as a public (protest)

10

In 1989 Les Verts went up from none to nine MEPs, in 1994 neither of the two competing green parties

(Les Verts and Génération Ecologie) gained EU representation. For the 1999 elections the French

political ecologists joined forces again, and achieved as Les Verts 9.7% [Szarka 2000].

11

response to the series of political scandals throughout 1999 (paedophile affair, various

corruption affairs, dioxin crisis) which shattered public confidence in the established

political structures and institutions, and which brought Belgium internationally into

disrespect. So throughout Europe green parties are clearly far less firmly established

than one might want to believe, and the question arises whether the German Greens -

which have, rightly or wrongly, often been described as the proto-type of Green Parties

throughout Europe - might just be anticipating the fate of political ecology in general. In

order to answer this question it is useful to turn away from specific green parties which

represent very different shades of green and whose political fortunes depend on a whole

range of country specific political parameters. Instead we might focus on the ideological

package of political ecology11

and explore to what extent this package is still

appropriate for the structure of contemporary European society and the organisation of

its environmental politics.

When in her above mentioned ‘sharp polemic against Green parties and movements’

[Gray 1997: 71] Anna Bramwell predicted the ‘decline of environmental politics in the

West’, her main argument was that ‘what is usable in the Green critique has largely been

subsumed by the political system’ [1994: 206], whilst Green Parties themselves are left

with no more than ‘the residue’. In Bramwell’s view they are now doomed to failure

because this residue is ‘radical, romantic and wrong’ [ibid.: 110]. In her conceptually

rather obscure way, Bramwell distinguishes this ‘residue’ from the ‘real problems’ and

notes that ‘the ecological package-deal’ is actually ‘not a response to real problems at

all’ [ibid.: 166]. In her view ‘the ecological movement does not depend on real

problems’ [ibid.: 168], and in particular, political ecologists are not ‘really attacking

pollution and overuse of resources’ [ibid.: 180]. On the contrary, according to Bramwell

‘it is the abandonment of Greenness that accounts for the earlier success of the German

Green Party’ [ibid.: 135]. She believes that Die Grünen had only ‘hijacked the

environmental train’, and then ‘briskly drove off in the opposite direction’ [ibid.]. But

eventually, so the argument runs, the established political structures recaptured and

reintegrated the important and legitimate components of the green critique (‘the real

problems’), and therefore ‘Green parties have [now] outlived their usefulness’ [ibid.:

203]. In Bramwell’s view, the ‘future development of environmentalism will lie mainly

in the development of accords, regimes and agreements between nation states’ [ibid.: 6].

Approvingly she predicts that ‘the adoption of environmental goals by international and

supra-national bodies’ will render ‘national political Green parties superfluous’ and

‘turn the national movements into a second division affair’ [ibid.: 204].

Bramwell does not provide a sound analysis of what she describes as the ‘ecological

package-deal’. Uncritically, she equates national green parties or movements with the

11

This is not to suggest that there is only one homogenous ecologist ideology. Undeniably there are many

varieties of ecologism, not to mention the manifold forms of non-ideological environmentalism and

conservationism. But we may assume that underneath their distinctive features the various ecologisms all

share an ideological common denominator which characterises ecologism as an ideology in its own right.

This common denominator is perhaps best codified in the 1983 manifesto of the German Greens. Die

Grünen themselves have long since departed from the beliefs and demands of their early period, but in the

early 1990s this manifesto was still described as ‘proto-typical’ and ‘canonical for the green movement

worldwide’ [Goodin 1992: 86, vii].

12

ideology of ecologism, and then confuses the fate of the former with that of the latter.

As the table below demonstrates, national Green Parties have not yet become redundant.

Also, although the ideology of ecologism is clearly in decline, there is little indication

yet of the proclaimed ‘decline of environmental politics in the West’.

Table 4: Electoral results of national Green Parties in the European Union

% of votes in the

most recent national

elections

Members

of Parliament

Belgium12

7.4+7.0 % (+6.0) 11+9/150

Luxembourg 7.5 % (-2.4) 5/60

Netherlands 7.3 % (+3.7?) 11/150

Finland 7.3 % (+0.8) 11/200

Austria 7.1 % (+2.3) 9/183

France 6.8 % 7/577

Germany 6.7 % (-0.6) 47/656

Sweden 4.5 % 16/349

Ireland 2.8 % 2/166

Denmark 2.7 % 5/179

Italy 2.5 % 21/630

Britain 0.2 % -

Portugal - -

Spain - -

Greece - -

Nevertheless, Bramwell’s account of the German Greens does highlight some important

points. Firstly, it is true that the ‘ecological package-deal’ comprised significantly more

than scientifically measurable conditions in the physical environment (‘real problems’).

It is an established truth that the success of Die Grünen was primarily due to other

parameters than an exceptionally poor state of the natural environment in Germany.

Secondly, it is also true that the supra-national level and internationally operating

organisations are becoming increasingly important for environmental politics.

Undoubtedly, this does affect the political fate of national green parties. And thirdly,

traditional political organisations and the established political structures have indeed

opened up to accommodate ecological concerns. This has shifted environmental issues

from the political margins right into the centre. For the eco-ideological package-deal and

the political organisations trying to promote it, all these developments have very

important implications which need to be further explored.

Developing Bramwell’s distinction between the ‘real problems’ and the ‘residue’ within

the green critique, one might safely say that the eco-ideological package consists of two

analytically distinct dimensions which are, however, in practice inseparably intertwined:

on the one hand ecologism is concerned about the physical environment and the material

foundations of human and other life (Bramwell’s ‘real problems’), on the other hand it

responds to specific cultural concerns and identity needs (Bramwell’s ‘residue’). In

ecological politics and the eco-theoretical literature the existence of both these

dimensions is widely acknowledged, yet due to its elusive nature, the cultural dimension

tends to be badly neglected. Up to the present, the quality and relative significance of

12

There are two Green Parties in Belgium, the Flemish Agalev and the francophone Ecolo.

13

cultural parameters within the ecological discourse and eco-politics remain undervalued

and underresearched. Nevertheless, the rather banal truths that there tends to be no

environmental politics where there is no environmental concern, and that concern may

well have its origins in completely fictitious realities, make immediately clear that green

politics is not primarily about physical conditions or objectively existing problems, but

first and foremost about human anxieties, i.e. the violation of cultural expectations and

beliefs. In other words, as at least the social constructionist literature recognises and

tries to explore [Blühdorn 2000], ecological politics is to a large extent about a set of

cultural values, practices and beliefs which decide about the way in which the material

world and specific physical conditions are perceived (mediated), and environmental

problems (anxieties) framed, publicised and remedied.13

For the European political

ecology movement and the ideology of ecologism the tradition of Enlightenment

humanism provided this normative foundation.14

The supposedly universalist values of

this tradition (rationalism, egalitarianism, liberalism, human rights) determined the

specifically ecologist way of constructing nature, naturalness and Self-identity. They

were assumed to promote not just the collective Self-construction, Self-determination,

Self-realisation, Self-control and Self-experience of the rational and autonomous

individual, but at the same time to secure the integrity of nature and thus the systematic

coherence and equilibrium of the universe. Ecologist politics therefore implies not

merely - and arguably not even primarily - the task of protecting the extra-social

physical environment, but also the task of constructing a specific kind of individual

identity and societal order. The so-called ecological problem is the inseparable unity of

an environmental problem and a societal problem. Ecologist politics is the inseparable

amalgamation of a politics of material conditions and a politics of Self-identity

[Blühdorn 1997a; 2000].

But as Bramwell correctly points out, green issues, which started their career at the grass

roots level gradually moved up to the national and international levels. Ecologists

themselves actively promoted this development. Because grass roots activism was often

inefficient and certainly insufficient, they established their own national and

international organisations. Increasingly, environmental problems were seen as

international or even global problems, and therefore they had to be dealt with by

international and global structures and actors. But the gradual shift of environmental

politics to the international level had a considerable impact on the substance of

environmental politics. At the international level the dominant mode of communication

is scientific rationality, and the main code of negotiation is the economic code. At the

international level, ecological problems therefore have to be reformulated as scientific

and economic problems. This implies that the ecologist package-deal, i.e. the

specifically ecologist construction of nature, naturalness and self-identity (physical

conditions seen through the glasses of a particular value system) is untied. But in the

13

In order to illustrate this at first sight perhaps irritating idea, one might refer to the different ways in

which different cultures think, for example, about the practice of whaling or the barren hills of the English

Lake and Peak Districts. Furthermore, one might ask why the killing of whales, seals and dolphins triggers

significant waves of protest, whilst the disastrous depletion of cod, haddock or anchovy populations raises

hardly any public concern. 14

To the extent that the so-called deep ecologist currents display anti-humanist elements, they remain

exempt from this generalisation.

14

process of repackaging the ecological issue anything that cannot be scientifically

measured, quantified, compared and expressed in economic terms necessarily has to

remain excluded. The internationalisation of environmental politics therefore implies

the reduction of the ‘ecological package-deal’ to scientifically and economically

communicable issues. Ultimately it means the reduction of the ecological issue to its

material dimension at the expense of its cultural dimension.

This untying of the eco-ideological package is reinforced by the differentiation,

pluralisation and individualisation of cultural values, practices and preferences. Due to

ongoing processes of modernisation culture-specific patterns of constructing nature,

naturalness and self-identity become ever more diversified and exclusive. They become

restricted to ever smaller cultural communities, eventually perhaps culminating in

completely idiosyncratic preferences, interests and expectations. Accordingly, the self-

determined realisation, articulation and experience of sub-culturally (personally)

specified constructions of nature, naturalness and identity can no longer be organised at

the national level and through national organisations. It moves down to the level of

more diversified and exclusive sub-cultures. In a simplifying and schematic way, the

following model might help to illustrate this two-way process of unpacking the

‘ecological package-deal’, and to capture the element of truth contained in Bramwell’s

argument.

Diagram 1: The unpacking of the eco-ideological package

international environmental politics

agent: international organisations code: scientific & economic rationality issue: scientific & economic problems

politics of physical

material input: conditions

physical conditions

Eco-ideological package:

Ecologist construction of nature,

naturalness and Self-identity

cultural input:

Enlightenment values politics of

identity

diversified identity politics agent: regional & sub-cultural actors & interest groups

code: culture-specific values issue: regional & sub-cultural identities

Undoubtedly, Bramwell is right in suggesting that this simultaneous upward and

downward movement of specific aspects of the eco-ideological package can lead to the

decline of national green parties. But such parties may try to redefine themselves in

other than ecologist terms.15

More important is therefore the question how the

15

Table 4 may indicate that many of them successfully do.

15

repackaging of ecological issues at the international as well as the sub-national levels

reshapes environmental politics. Contrary to Bramwell’s prophecy, the untying of the

ecological package-deal does not imply the ‘end of environmental politics’, but it does

imply significant changes in the substance, style and ethos of environmental politics.

The pluralisation of cultural constructions of nature, naturalness and self-identity leads

to the internal differentiation and fragmentation of the eco-movement. If it ever really

could, the ecological issue can clearly no longer function as a generally shared basis for

collective mobilisation towards an all-inclusive eco-humanist utopia. Although in

abstract terms the environment remains a common concern and interest, it loses its

status as a potential source of a new social consensus. The ecologist vision of a

participatory, inclusive and integrative eco-politics gives way to a politics of conflicting

interest groups (conflicting representations of nature and naturalness). In every-day

political practice, the diversity of eco-political demands as well as the need to reconcile

eco-political with other political interests promotes the attempt to reframe

environmental issues as material and economic issues. In this way the reductionism of

international environmental politics is reproduced at the national and sub-national

levels, too. Phrased positively, this may be described as the integration of environmental

issues into the existing political and economic structures and processes. Yet during this

integration procedure, the ecologist issue in the original sense actually disintegrates.

Given the cultural and political parameters that determine contemporary European

societies, there is obviously no space for ecological politics in the ecologist sense. The

eco-ideological package has become unsuitable. The specifically ecologist constructions

of nature, naturalness and self-identity have successfully been deconstructed and

environmental issues reconstructed in a different way. In this process of reconstruction,

the environment has lost the status of an issue that transcends the divisions of left and

right, that cuts across all existing social and ideological cleavages, and that necessitates

the formation of a radically different social, political and economic order. In its

reinvented appearance the environmental issue can efficiently be dealt with by the

established structures. What Joseph Szarka notes with regard to ecologism in France is

an apt description of the fate of political ecology in general. In line with our theses

above he suggests that ‘the distinct constructions of the environment championed by ...

[ecologist] parties resulted in an extreme form of political deconstruction of the

environment, namely the fragmentation of the environmental cause’ [Szarka 2001,

Ch.3]. And he goes on: ‘Like iron filings in a magnetic field, the shattered segments of

the environmental cause reconfigured along the existing political poles’, thus leading to

‘the abandonment of the non-alignment stance’ [ibid.]. Coming back to the hypothesis

formulated in the introduction we may therefore say that green parties in the ecologist

sense are indeed becoming redundant. Where they still exist they will either decline or

redefine their identity. Obviously this implies that ecologist ideas will never be realised

and that contemporary societies are not moving towards ‘green futures’ in the ecologist

sense. But it does not imply a ‘decline of environmental politics in the West’.

Contemporary societies will continue to deal with their redefined environmental

problems - but just as their problem definitions are no longer the ecologist ones, they

will undoubtedly also apply post-ecologist strategies and solutions. By reconsidering

16

and further developing Inglehart’s theses of the silent revolution, we may learn

something about the set of values determining post-ecologist environmental politics.

IV The silent counter-revolution

In the social movement literature and the eco-theoretical debate, Ronald Inglehart’s

thesis of the Silent Revolution [1977, 1990] has become part of the standard repertoire.

Inglehart suggests that in modern societies the materialist value orientations of industrial

modernity are gradually being superseded by post-materialist value orientations. In his

more recent work Inglehart also speaks of a shift from the modernisation towards the

postmodernisation of contemporary societies [Inglehart 1997]. According to this theory

environmental movements (and social movements in general) emerge and flourish

particularly in societies, where the basic material needs are met and where major parts

of the population can therefore engage in social activities centred around their self-

development and self-realisation. Postmaterialists in Inglehart’s sense ‘are not non-

materialists, still less are they anti-materialists’ [Inglehart 1997: 35], but as material

security is taken for granted, the main focus of attention is on non-material needs and

concerns. In the context of the argument developed in the previous section Inglehart’s

theory is interesting because it supports the view that the political ecology movement

was not primarily triggered by a specific state of the physical environment, but by the

development of a certain set of cultural values and preferences. In other words, his

theory confirms that ecological politics is not just about scientifically measurable

physical conditions in the so-called natural environment, but crucially about specific

cultural parameters and the constructions of nature, naturalness and self-identity to

which they give rise. For Inglehart the politics of the eco-movement is an integral

component of the transition from materialist towards postmaterialist politics. Whilst the

former was organised along the lines of the traditional class conflict (social distribution

of material wealth) and relied on the political organisations of the industrial era, the

latter is the politics of cultural self-realisation, self-determination and self-expression. It

focuses on the development and social distribution of opportunities for democratic

participation, autonomous self-determination, cultural plurality, personal freedom,

aesthetic values, etc.. These needs require their own political structures and

organisations, i.e. they cannot easily be accommodated in the hierarchical, bureaucratic,

and alienating structures of industrial society, which further economic growth and

efficiency but restrict the autonomy of the individual and the realisation of its

individuality.

The close connection between Inglehart’s politics of post-materialism and the ecologist

politics of identity outlined in the previous section is evident. Apart from the often

criticised Maslowsian hierarchy of needs, Inglehart’s model is based on two other

fundamental hypotheses: firstly, the theory of the ‘diminishing marginal utility of

economic growth’, and secondly, the ‘socialisation hypothesis’. The idea of the

diminishing marginal utility of economic growth assumes that security and autonomy

17

are the basic values pursued by each individual as well as by societies at large.16

Initially, the quest for security and autonomy materialises as the desire for material

security and autonomy. However, once a certain level of economic wealth has been

achieved, further accumulation of material wealth does not increase the level of security

and autonomy. At this stage, cultural emancipation takes the priority over further

economic emancipation. The goals of both individuals and of societies are changing.

What is emerging are postmaterialist values - and accordingly postmaterialist politics -

which ‘give a higher priority to self-expression than to economic effectiveness: people

are becoming less willing to accept the human costs of bureaucracy and of rigid social

norms’ [ibid.: 29]. Given that European societies have for more than a generation

enjoyed an unprecedentedly high level of material security, and that ‘one’s basic values

[tend to] reflect the conditions that prevailed during one’s preadult years’ (socialisation

hypothesis) [ibid.: 33], postmaterialism has become deeply rooted and has silently

revolutionised the politics of contemporary European societies.

Inglehart’s model helps to explain why in most European countries the eco-movement

emerged in the early 1970s. Furthermore, it sheds light on the value system underlying

the specifically ecologist constructions of nature, naturalness and self-identity. What is

particularly useful is Inglehart’s emphasis on the core values of security and autonomy.

Inglehart is right in highlighting that the unprecedented level of material security was a

crucial parameter for the development of European political culture and in particular for

the emergence of political ecology. But apart from the material security, cultural

security made an equally important contribution.17

What I mean by cultural security is

the availability of a normative belief system that provided a firm framework of

orientation and that allowed individuals to construct themselves, their societies, their

nature, and their development as meaningful. The development of contemporary

European societies was not just influenced by relative material affluence, but it was

stabilised and driven by the unshakeable belief in the gradual progress towards an all-

inclusive civil society that would provide freedom, security and a meaningful life to all

its members - and eventually to humanity at large. It was only against the background of

this unshakeable belief in the availability of a reliable normative basis that the social

movements including the ecology movement could begin to question certain aspects of

what was regarded as normal, necessary, moral and natural, and strive for the

emancipation from overly restrictive and authoritarian social norms and conditions. But

wherever established certainties were questioned, this emancipation and critique always

proceeded within the framework - and with the legitimation - of higher certainties, i.e.

16

Once again reconfirming the priority of subjective concerns and perceptions over objectively

measurable conditions, Inglehart points out that what counts is ‘one’s subjective sense of security, not

one’s economic level per se’ [1997: 34]. 17

In Inglehart’s analysis this aspect remains undervalued. The suggestion that ‘an increasing sense of

security brings a diminishing need for absolute rules’; that ‘raised under conditions of relative security,

they [postmaterialists] can tolerate more ambiguity’; that postmaterialists ‘can more readily accept

deviation from familiar patterns than can people who feel anxiety concerning their basic existential needs’

[Inglehart 1997: 40], implies that increasing tolerance and value pluralism (postmodernisation) are a

direct consequence of material security. But Inglehart does not explain the analytical connection between

postmaterialism and libertarianism. Furthermore, he does not take account of the fact that in many respects

the social movement (and particularly the ecological) postmaterialists were rather fundamentalist.

18

higher norms and values (rational Enlightenment humanism) which were themselves not

up for debate but, quite the contrary, whose validity was constantly reconfirmed.

Since the beginning of the 1990s, however, these conditions of high security have

fundamentally changed. As it has now been widely acknowledge, the 1990s marked a

paradigm shift both in material as well as in cultural terms. The process that Beck,

Giddens and others have described as reflexive modernisation [e.g. Giddens 1994; Beck,

Lash and Giddens 1994; Beck 1997] implies that the full range of established certainties

have collapsed, and a new fundamental uncertainty and vulnerability has broken to the

surface. The new material uncertainty is captured in buzz words like the flexibilisation

of the labour market, unemployment, precarious employment, competitive wages, etc..

Economic globalisation has led to considerable new poverty even in rich industrial

countries. Wealth disparities and social inequality are rising dramatically both within

particular societies and at the global level. As the old systems of social benefits are

being restructured, social exclusion and a new societal polarisation between material

winners and material losers of globalisation become clearly visible. In cultural terms,

the new vulnerability, disorientation, or as Habermas once wrote, the new obscurity, has

been visible for some time. What the 1980s discussed as postmodernist arbitrariness

was reinforced in the 1990s by the crisis of the established political belief systems.

Conservatism, Liberalism, Social Democracy and Ecologism are all in fundamental

disarray and are desperately trying to redefine themselves. The ‘entire political and

social lexicon has become obsolete in one stroke, and must be rewritten’ [Beck 1997:

7]. The values, practices and beliefs that used to underlie the self-descriptions of

contemporary society, i.e. that determined the perspective onto achievements, problems

and further developments, have suddenly lost their validity and leave behind a sense of

fundamental insecurity.

These developments undermine the foundations of the libertarian postmaterialism

typical of the social movements including the ecology movement. Within just a few

years - much faster than the socialisation hypothesis would have suggested - major value

shifts have taken place and are changing society, once again, in a revolutionary way. In

economic terms, the goals of growth and competitiveness have once again moved to the

very top of the political agenda where they have been reinstalled as the uncontested

priorities. The emergence of religious and nationalist fundamentalisms mirrors the

political-economic fundamentalism of free market neo-liberalism. Security and

autonomy remain the crucial goals for the individual and society at large, but under the

conditions of globalisation they are - partly out of economic necessity, and party because

of the absence of other normative guidelines - once again primarily sought as material

security and autonomy. Put differently, late modern societies are experiencing the ‘silent

counter-revolution of an authoritarian security-materialism’ [Raschke 1999: 87].

This counter-revolution is not easily compatible with Inglehart’s model. Inglehart does

point towards a certain ‘authoritarian reflex’ [ibid.: 38]; he does recognise a new

‘polarization between postmodernism and fundamentalist values’ [1997: 246]. In other

words, at least with regard to the cultural dimension he notices a new ‘severe insecurity’

[38], and notes that ‘the issues actually being debated today mainly concern support and

19

opposition to postmodernisation’ [1997: 266]. But his model does not take account of

and cannot accommodate the neo-materialist reflex. It cannot explain why the

aggressive neo-materialism emerged, and in particular, it cannot explain the connection

between the authoritarian reflex and the neo-materialist reflex. For the specific

conditions of late modern societies since the 1990s his model therefore seems

inappropriate. But the parameters Inglehart’s theory provided for describing the

ecologist way of defining environmental issues, are equally useful for capturing the

post-ecologist way of reframing them. The following diagram illustrates how the silent

counter-revolution changes the normative framework for the definition of

environmental issues.

Diagram 2: Ecologist and post-ecologist value systems

libertarian

postmodern societal

IDENTITY inclusive

ECO- LOGISM

cultural

certainty

neo-materialist material material post-materialist

uncer tainty

cultural

POST- ECOLOGISM

exclusive

IDENTITY

individualistic authoritarian

fundamentalist

In this diagram the vertical axis indicates the level of tolerance for competing values.

The horizontal axis relates to the quality of the values. In accordance with the

assumption that environmental politics always centres around social constructions of

nature and naturalness rather than intrinsic (a priori) values of nature, this diagram does

20

not represent ecological values (ecologist or post-ecologist) in the narrow sense. Instead,

it sketches the antagonistic framework parameters within which ecologists and post-

ecologists generate their respective constructions of nature, naturalness and self-identity.

So the diagram indicates how the cultural and economic conditions around the turn

towards the twenty-first century lead to a radically different kind of environmental

politics. The aggressive new materialism which is the most characteristic feature of the

globalising industrial societies is not simply a response to new material insecurities. For

significant parts of society such insecurities are hardly noticeable. But as late modern

societies are running out of normative values and are desperately seeking to repress the

re-emergence of religious and political fundamentalisms, the allegedly non-political

belief in the free global market managed to install itself as a quasi-transcendental meta-

narrative. The new metaphysics of economic growth and competitiveness reinforces the

translation of ecological issues into economic issues and thus further accelerates the

integration of the latter into the established political structures and processes. It puts the

seal on the demise of ecologism and its political organisations.

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