Myanmar’s Protracted Transition · Myanmar’s Protracted Transition Arenas, Actors, and Outcomes...

MARCO BUNTE

Myanmar’s Protracted Transition

Arenas, Actors, and Outcomes

ABSTRACT

This article argues that Myanmar is experiencing the beginning of a protracted

transition, in which the military, the opposition, and the country’s civil society are

renegotiating political space. The protracted transition might take decades, and

opposition forces and civil society will face an uphill struggle to fully liberalize the

regime.

KEYWORDS: Myanmar, democratization, military regime, protracted transition,

opposition

THE ‘‘BURMESE SPRING’’ HAS BEEN DESCRIBED as one of the most remark-able political openings of the last half-decade outside of the political changesin the Arab world. Since the inauguration of President Thein Sein in March2011, Myanmar1 has witnessed a series of significant reforms that have trans-formed the long-term, repressive military regime. In his first years in office,Thein Sein released political prisoners, ended press censorship, and enactednew laws to broaden civil liberties and political freedoms. These new free-doms have widened political spaces for opposition and civil society consid-erably. In January 2012, opposition leader and Nobel Peace Prize laureateAung San Suu Kyi asserted that her country is ‘‘on the verge of a breakthroughto democracy.’’2 In the relatively free and fair by-elections of April 2012, themain opposition party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), was ableto secure more than 90% of the seats available in the national parliament

MARCO BUNTE is Associate Professor of Politics and International Relations and Deputy Head ofSchool (Research) at Monash University, Malaysia Campus, Bandar Sunway. He is a coeditor of TheCrisis of Democratic Governance in Southeast Asia (Palgrave, 2011). He wishes to thank an anonymousreviewer for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article. Email: <[email protected]>.

1. This text uses the official name Union of Myanmar (or Myanmar) when referring to devel-opments since the name change in 1989. For the time before, Burma is used.

2. ‘‘Suu Kyi Says Burma ‘On the Verge of a Breakthrough’,’’ Bangkok Post, January 12, 2012.

Asian Survey, Vol. 56, Number 2, pp. 369–391. ISSN 0004-4687, electronic ISSN 1533-838X. © 2016 byThe Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. Please direct all requests for permissionto photocopy or reproduce article content through the University of California Press’s Reprints andPermissionswebpage,http://www.ucpress.edu/journals.php?p¼reprints.DOI:10.1525/AS.2016.56.2.369.

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(43 of 46). Aung San Suu Kyi managed to win a seat in the legislature andstarted to lobby for the full democratization of the country. This processculminated in the historic elections in November 2015.

However, are we really witnessing a ‘‘democratic dawn’’3 or even a ‘‘tran-sition to democracy’’?4 Some scholars have presented a completely differentdiagnosis, pointing to the heavily scripted elections in November 2010 as wellas the ongoing military influence and human rights violations in the country.According to their interpretation, Myanmar’s transition is a ‘‘survival strategyof the quasi-military government to overcome the danger of factionalism andincrease regime durability by creating power-sharing institutions.’’5

How should we understand Myanmar’s political opening? This articleargues that Myanmar’s current liberalization represents the early stage ofa protracted transition, in which oppositional forces, ethnic groups, and themilitary have started to renegotiate political power. The article demonstratesthat Myanmar’s liberalization, though begun as a top-down, elite-managedaffair initiated by former generals, has incorporated a significant amount ofdiscussion with members of parliament and a nascent civil society. While thelatter has influenced political decisions on several issues, the political status ofthe opposition and civil society is too weak to change existing structures andmake the country more democratic. At the moment, the resistance by hard-liners in the administration is too strong for the regime to fully democratize.Furthermore, the military retains considerable influence—even after the for-mal democratization through elections in November 2015. Moreover, the lowlevel of trust among members of the opposition, civil society, ethnic groups,and the government is preventing a compromise or pact from materializing.

Due to the long-term repressive character of the outgoing authoritarianregime and the institutionalization of military rule over the last decade, theprotracted transition might take years, if not decades, to evolve, and oppo-sition forces will face numerous challenges to fully democratizing the regime.

3. Michael Lidauer, ‘‘Democratic Dawn? Civil Society and Elections in Myanmar 2010–2012,’’Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 31, no. 2 (November 2012), 87–112.

4. Udai Singh, ‘‘Do the Changes in Myanmar Signify a Real Transition?’’ Strategic Analysis 37,no. 1 (January/February 2013), 101–104.

5. Aurel Croissant and Jil Kamerling, ‘‘Why do Military Regimes Institutionalize? Constitution-Making and Elections as Political Survival Strategy in Myanmar,’’ Asian Journal of Political Science 21,no. 2 (2013), 105–125; Marco Bunte, ‘‘Burma’s Transition to ‘Disciplined Democracy’: Abdication orInstitutionalization of Military Rule?’’ GIGA Working Paper 177 (August 2011), <https://www.giga-hamburg.de/de/system/files/publications/wp177_buente.pdf>.

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Future setbacks and periods of stalemate cannot be ruled out. The articlebegins with the theoretical literature on political transitions and an analysis ofthe praetorian state before it starts to discuss the protracted transition inMyanmar. It depicts the ongoing liberalization and examines the strategiesof the military, civil society, and ethnic groups in four crucial arenas: (1) thereconciliation with the political opposition and the release of political prison-ers, (2) the debate about freedom of the press and of movement and associ-ation, (3) the peace talks with the armed ethnic groups, and (4) the discussionof amendments to the current constitution. The main analysis centers onevents from 2011 to the end of 2014, when the article was finalized. A finalround of revisions allowed the author to comment briefly on some develop-ments in 2015.

THE TRANSITION LITERATURE AND MYANMAR

The structural impediments to democratization in Myanmar are immense.According to different variants of modernization theory, Myanmar lacksa number of prerequisites for democracy, such as a large middle class, a lowpoverty rate, and a high rate of economic growth. With a per capita GDP ofonly US$ 915 per year, the country is one of the poorest in Asia; Myanmar’sgrowth is still lagging behind its Southeast Asian neighbors. With trade andinvestment concentrated in the resource sectors, Myanmar is especially vul-nerable to the resource curse.6 The most serious obstacle to successful democ-ratization is the lack of a fully legitimate state with institutions accepted by allethnic groups. Since Burma declared its independence from Great Britain in1948, communist and ethnic rebel groups have sought their own indepen-dence, repeatedly challenging the Burmese state through violence.7 Fightinghas been reduced, and the government has signed ceasefires with almost all ofthe ethnic nationalist armies. But the Kachin State ceasefire broke down in2011, and there has been heavy fighting between the Kachin IndependenceArmy and the Burmese Army ever since. This is a major stumbling block for

6. The resource curse refers to the idea that an abundance of natural resources might be more aneconomic curse than a blessing, since resource-rich countries tend to have less economic growth.These countries tend to spend less on human resource development and the diversification of theeconomy. They are also more often engaged in armed conflict and burdened by corruption. SeanTurnell, ‘‘Burma’s Insatiable State,’’ Asian Survey 48, no. 6 (2008), 958–976.

7. Burman is used for the ethnic group, Burmese for all citizens of the country.

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democratic progress, since, as Linz and Stepan argue, ‘‘agreements aboutstateness are logically prior to the creation of democratic institutions.’’8

However, to use Przeworski’s description of the structure–agency prob-lem, ‘‘objective factors constitute at most constraints to that which is possibleunder a concrete historical situation but do not determine the outcome ofsuch situations.’’9 A huge part of transition theory has focused more on thevoluntary choices of strategic actors than on the structural background con-ditions. For instance, O’Donnell and Schmitter explain transitions as strate-gic choices between incumbent governments and the opposition, wherehardliners and softliners on both sides agree on a pact redefining the rulesfor the ‘‘exercise of power on the basis of mutual guarantees for the vitalinterests of those entering it.’’10 Although scholars like Diamond suggest thatMyanmar needs a pact for the transition to succeed,11 this article argues thata pacted transition will not work. Myanmar’s long period of military rule hasdeeply institutionalized military rule; the military’s decades-long repressionhas weakened the opposition and civil society and constrained the represen-tation of ethnic groups.

All in all, the military has not been defeated in a war, nor has it been forcedinto negotiations with the opposition. It has initiated the current liberaliza-tion from a position of strength, and former military elites are taking the leadin the country’s gradual opening. Consequently, Myanmar’s transition willmost likely be protracted, taking years if not decades of negotiations betweenthe military, the opposition, and the ethnic groups. According to Eisenstadt,protracted transitions take place when ‘‘legal but restrained opposition groups(usually political parties, sometimes in tandem with labour unions, businessgroups, or other representatives of civil society) debate political liberalization,

8. Stateness is the capacity of the state to exercise its fundamental functions (such as the pro-duction and circulation of public goods and control of coercive violence). Juan Linz and AlfredStepan, Problems of Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 26.

9. Adam Przeworski, ‘‘Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy,’’ inTransitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives, ed. by Guillermo O’Donnell, PhilippeC. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 47–63.

10. Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: TentativeConclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 37.

11. Larry Diamond, ‘‘The Need for a Political Pact,’’ Journal of Democracy 23, no. 4 (2012),138–149.


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step by step, strategic interaction by strategic interaction, over the course ofyears and decades.’’12

The lens of a protracted transition thus allows us to properly analyze thestrategies of both regime actors and opposition groups within different are-nas, as well as the possible trade-offs among the diverse groups.

THE PRAETORIAN STATE, 1948–2011

Military and Opposition in Burmese Politics

The Burmese military (known as the Tatmadaw) has been deeply involved inpolitics since independence. Because its formation in 1942 preceded theexistence of an independent state, and because the officer corps was politi-cized as a liberating force during the struggle for national independence, thearmy was able to retrospectively assume the role of guardian of the Burmesestate and bulwark of national independence. Confronted with a number ofcountrywide insurgencies after the departure of the British, the militaryinitiated a rapid modernization of the armed forces that overtook the insti-tutional development of the Burmese state. The consequence was a praetorianstate, a ‘‘military aggrandizement of resources, responsibilities and powers intraditional non-military realms.’’13

Burma’s short-lived democratic experiment (1948–1958, 1960–1962) wasovershadowed by rising regional rebellions and a growing polarizationbetween the Burman-led government and the ethnic minority groups. In1962 General Ne Win staged a coup against the elected government of UNu; the latter’s decision to make Buddhism the state religion, along with callsby various ethnic groups for greater autonomy and secession from the union,prepared the groundwork for the intervention of the military, which steppedin to save the country from disintegration.

Since then, the military has ruled, either directly or indirectly; it hasprevented the emergence of autonomous centers of influence and destroyedall civilian institutions. Ne Win formed the Revolutionary Council, whichruled by fiat until 1974. Then, the military government set up its own party,the Burmese Socialist Program Party, which ran the country unchallenged for

12. Todd Eisenstadt, ‘‘Eddies in the Third Wave: Protracted Transitions and Theories ofDemocratization,’’ Democratization 7, no. 3 (2000), 3–23.

13. Callahan, Mary, Making Enemies: War and State Building in Burma (Ithaca, NY: CornellUniversity Press, 2003), 18.


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14 years. Apart from one short period between 1974 and 1976 when demon-strations broke out widely, army and party leaders were able to controlsociety. The military fought relentless counter-insurgency efforts against par-ticular ethnic groups that controlled large parts of the country during the1960s and 1970s. Since the late 1970s, however, most of the armed groupshave lost their ‘‘liberated areas’’ to the Burmese Army. These ‘‘liberated areas’’shrank progressively over time but continue to exist in some ethnic states tothis day. Thus, much of the ceasefire negotiations have had to do with codesof conduct for entering the other side’s territory.14

The ‘‘Burmese Way to Socialism’’ led to a severe economic crisis at the endof the 1980s, which triggered Ne Win’s resignation in July 1988. Studentprotests evolved into a countrywide democracy movement, during whichAung San Suu Kyi emerged as the main counterpart of the military-backedregime. The pro-democracy protests continued until September, when themilitary reorganized, staged a coup, and brutally cracked down on the move-ment, killing thousands of demonstrators.15 The coup, by the State Law andOrder Restoration Council, re-established direct military rule, which contin-ued for over 22 years, until March 30, 2011. At that point the military juntadissolved the ruling body, the State Peace and Development Council,16 andhanded over power to the government of newly elected President Thein Sein.In contrast to military dictatorships in Latin America, however, Myanmar’smilitary was not confronted with a major rift between hardliners and soft-liners that eventually could have led to the regime’s breakdown. Although notfree from factionalism, the military hierarchy prevented an open rift andremained relatively ‘‘professional,’’ preventing top military leaders from sid-ing with opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi.17

The military ruled with an iron fist and exercised a high degree of repres-sion, visible in the large number of political prisoners and the continuousneglect of basic freedoms and political liberties. This left civil society with

14. Martin Smith, Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity (London: Zed Books, 1991); MaryCallahan, Political Authority in Burma’s Ethnic Minority States: Devolution, Occupation and Coexis-tence (Washington, DC: East-West Center, 2007).

15. Bertil Lintner, Outrage: Burma’s Struggle for Democracy (Bangkok: White Lotus, 1990).16. In 1997 the State Law and Order Restoration Council was abolished and reconstituted as the

State Peace and Development Council.17. Kyaw Yin Hlaing, ‘‘Setting the Rules for Survival: Why the Burmese Military Regime Sur-

vives in an Age of Democratization,’’ Pacific Review 22, no. 3 (2009), 271–291; Andrew Selth, Powerwithout Glory: Burma’s Armed Forces (Norwalk: Eastbridge, 2002).


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hardly any room to maneuver.18 Antigovernment protests were vehementlyrepressed, among them student demonstrations in 1996 and the peacefulprotest by Buddhist monks in September 2007. Opposition politicians suf-fered under severe state repression: Aung San Suu Kyi, for instance, has spentmore than 16 of the last 22 years under house arrest.

All in all, the high degree of state repression crippled the democracymovement, which remained incohesive, ineffective, and weak19 despite theinternational appeal of Aung San Suu Kyi, who remained a constant thorn inthe junta’s side. The NLD remained an anti-system party20 that demandedthat the regime acknowledge the annulled 1990 election results and called onthe international community to pressure the military into negotiations withboth the opposition and the ethnic groups by imposing sanctions. During the1990s, the military also managed to divide the ethnic groups, signing separateceasefires with 17 of them. Admittedly, these were no more than ‘‘gentlemen’sagreements.’’ Yet, they were integral in co-opting the armed groups: theceasefires gave political actors in the regions some breathing room, whichthey used to develop their own regions, often for illicit activities such as tradingweapons and narcotics.21 However, a number of ethnic armies, such as theKaren National Liberation Army and the Shan State Army, remained hardlineopposition groups because the military refused to fulfill their demands forcultural and political autonomy.

Institutionalizing Military Influence

The military returned to civilian rule in 2011 after designing a new politicalsystem that institutionalized its formal political role. It acted from a positionof strength. Having consolidated its position internally and weakened theopposition movement severely, the military regime started to entrench its

18. In Steinberg’s words, Ne Win’s military rule effectively ‘‘killed civil society.’’ David Steinberg,‘‘A Void in Myanmar: Civil Society in Burma,’’ in Strengthening Civil Society in Burma: Possibilitiesand Dilemmas for International NGOs, ed. by TNI/Burma Center Netherlands (Chiang Mai:Silkworm Books, 1999).

19. Kyaw Yin Hlaing, The State of Burma’s Pro-Democracy Movement in Authoritarian Burma(Washington, DC: East-West Center, 2007).

20. Giovanni Sartori, Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis (New York: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1962), 142.

21. Callahan calls this evolving dynamic a ‘‘mosaic’’ with varying degrees of autonomy. MaryCallahan, Political Authority in Burma’s Ethnic Minority States: Devolution, Occupation and Coexis-tence (Washington, DC: East-West Center, 2007).


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political prerogatives. The regime used specific strategies to institutionalizethe military’s influence over the long term: formal institution-building, aswell as repression and co-optation of the main opposition and ethnic minor-ities. The most important phases of formal institution-building were:

� drafting a new constitution in a National Convention (1993–1996,2003–2007)

� holding a referendum on the new constitution (2008)

� creating a regime-sponsored party and conducting (heavily scripted)elections in November 2010.

The praetorian conservation strategy from 1988 to 2011 did not representany form of liberalization or a genuine democratic transition. The militarycontrolled every step; political spaces were restricted to a minimum; and staterepression was at its tightest.22

The new constitution ensured that the armed forces would continue toplay a leading political role and enjoy considerable representation in executiveand legislative affairs, and also hold extensive legal immunity. After the newconstitution was adopted in a referendum, the third element of the praetorianstrategy was to hold elections. The junta fielded its own proxy party, theUnion Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), an offshoot of the UnionSolidarity and Development Association. The latter was a mass organization,with approximately 12 million members, established by the State Law andOrder Restoration Council in 1993 to mobilize mass support for the regime.Shortly before the elections, many leading State Peace and DevelopmentCouncil generals, ministers, and members of the military discarded theiruniforms to join the party, which was led by former Prime Minister TheinSein. Most of the regime’s cronies were also asked to join as financiers orstand for parliamentary elections. Altogether, the election results mirroredthe unfair playing field, as the USDP won 76.5% of the seats across all threelevels of parliament (upper house, lower house, and regional parliaments).

By holding elections, however, the junta managed to split the opposition.While the NLD remained an anti-system party—one that boycotted theelections because its members perceived the election provisions as undemo-cratic and was subsequently outlawed for not registering—a splinter group,

22. Susanne Praeger Nyein, ‘‘Expanding Military, Shrinking Citizenry,’’ Journal of ContemporaryAsia 39, no. 4 (2009), 638–648.


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the National Democratic Force, stood for election and secured 16 seats in thenew parliament. Some ethnic parties were also co-opted and were able tosecure a number of seats—for example, the Shan Nationalities DemocraticParty (57 seats), the Rakhine Nationalities Development Party (35), and theAll Mon Region Democracy Party (16). Consequently, the elections managedto co-opt parts of the opposition, while repressing the hardline, anti-systemopposition. When the State Peace and Development Council handed overpower to the new government and dissolved itself in March 2011, it markedthe end of 20 years of direct military rule. Moreover, it fundamentallychanged the rules of the political game, introducing a hegemonic electoral-authoritarian regime under military dominance.23 While new power-sharinginstitutions have been created, the military background of those sitting in topleadership positions has not changed at all, since junta chief Senior GeneralThan Shwe managed to place his close proteges at the helm of the mostimportant state institutions: Thein Sein, the former prime minister, wasmade president; Thura Shwe Mann, former joint chief of staff for the threebranches of the military and third-highest-ranking member of the militaryhierarchy, was elected speaker of the lower house; and Min Aung Hlaingbecame the new commander of the armed forces. The transition from directmilitary rule to electoral authoritarianism thus not only institutionalizedmilitary hegemony but also allowed a generational change within the mili-tary, promoting the second generation of military leaders and allowing theold guard to retire.24

THE START OF A PROTRACTED TRANSITION

From Liberalization by Strength to Political Dialogue?

Burma’s political liberalization was not a product of a schism within themilitary caused by pressures from the weak opposition movement, or a defeatin war. Instead, it was initiated by military elites from a position of strength.Having entrenched military prerogatives and secured the old guard’s exitfrom power, the second guard felt secure enough to liberalize the political

23. Such regimes hold multiparty elections, but violate liberal-democratic principles of freedomand fairness so severely that no open competition is allowed. Andreas Schedler, Electoral Authori-tarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2006).

24. Marco Bunte, ‘‘Burma’s Transition to Quasi-Military Rule: From Rulers to Guardians?’’Armed Forces & Society 40, no. 4 (2014), 742–764.


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system. Paradoxically, although the transition was initiated from a position ofstrength, it met with resistance from hardliners in the military and conser-vative elements in the ruling party and the cabinet who feared a loss of powerand resisted fast and far-reaching reforms.25 Progress, therefore, was very slowat the beginning and was able to slowly proceed only after Thein Seinovercame the resistance of some hardliners within his own administrationby reshuffling his cabinet in August 2012 and July 2013.

In the beginning, President Thein Sein met the demands of the interna-tional community to release political prisoners and ease state repression. Heinitiated a political dialogue with the opposition, and in mid-2011 met withcivil society organizations and invited them to work with the government.With its growing liberalization and opening political spaces, the country’snascent civil society started to influence the political debate. Consequently, inthe end the scope of Myanmar’s liberalization was the result of countlessnegotiations between various groups of stakeholders: the president, conser-vative and reformist elements in parliament,26 members of the opposition,civil society, the military, and various alliances of ethnic groups. Civilianactors have taken the lead in many policy areas previously dominated by themilitary. Parliament has become one of the key arenas for power struggles andreforms over the last two years. Although it was initially meant as a mererubber stamp, under the leadership of former four-star General Shwe Mannthe lower house became more active, discussing potential political, economic,and social reforms and passing a number of laws on these issues. Additionally,NGOs, members of political parties, and business representatives were al-lowed to openly debate economic and social reforms, poverty reductionstrategies, exchange rates, and so on.

Although the military did not act cohesively in parliamentary affairs unlessmilitary interests were at stake,27 it has not taken a completely backseat role in

25. Kyaw Yin Hlaing, ‘‘Understanding Recent Political Changes in Burma,’’ ContemporarySoutheast Asia 34, no. 2 (August 2012), 197–216; Marco Bunte and Clara Portela, ‘‘The Beginning ofReforms and the End of Sanctions,’’ GIGA Focus International no. 3 (2012), <http://www.giga-hamburg.de/dl/download.php?d¼/content/publikationen/pdf/gf_international_1203.pdf>.

26. International Crisis Group, ‘‘Not a Rubber Stamp: Myanmar’s Legislature in a Time ofTransition,’’ Asia Briefing 142 (December 13, 2013), Brussels; Thomas Kean, ‘‘Myanmar’s Parliament:From Scorn to Significance,’’ in Debating Myanmar’s Democratization, ed. by Nick Cheesman,Nicholas Farrely, and Trevor Wilson (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2014).

27. Renaud Egreteau, ‘‘Legislators in Myanmar’s First Post-Junta National Parliament (2010–2015),’’ Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 2 (2014), 91–124.


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the reform process either. It has actively shaped and defined the whole reformprocess through debates in the National Defense and Security Council,a security-related body consisting of 11 members, in which the six militaryrepresentatives have a majority, which was used strategically in the interest ofthe key stakeholders involved. For instance, in 2012 the council repeatedlyblocked the release of political prisoners, asserting security reasons.28 All in all,the military actively participated ‘‘in the national leadership role of the state’’as laid down in the constitution, through its representation in the cabinet andits 25% representation in the legislature. The following sections analyze theprotracted transition in the key areas of reconciliation with the oppositionand ethnic groups, the release of political prisoners, the media, and the newfreedoms of movement and demonstration, and illustrate the debate on thereform of the 2008 constitution.

Dialogue with Aung San Suu Kyi and the Truce with the NLD

The protracted transition started with Thein Sein’s dialogue with oppositionleader Aung San Suu Kyi, the release of political prisoners, and legal changesthat allowed the NLD to reregister as a political party and compete in the by-elections of April 2012. In the course of the liberalization, the NLD has changedits character from an anti-system party to a ‘‘transition-seeking party’’ willing tolegitimize the system by participating in institutions agreed upon by theauthoritarians, but only to the end of reforming them from within.29

Knowing that he could receive the support of Western states, entice themto lift economic sanctions, and rebuild the country only with the help ofAung San Suu Kyi, Thein Sein approached the opposition leader and invitedher to the capital, Naypyidaw, on August 17, 2011. A day after the meeting,Suu Kyi publicly stated that she believed that ‘‘the President wants realchange.’’30 Confidence-building steps taken by the president and the oppo-sition figure progressed over the rest of the year, and in early January 2012

Aung San Suu Kyi described Thein Sein as ‘‘an honest man . . . a man capableof taking risks if he thinks they are worth taking,’’31 an indication that she

28. ‘‘Bitter Struggle Puts Reform Process at Risk,’’ Bangkok Post, February 7, 2012.29. Todd Eisenstadt, ‘‘Eddies,’’ 8.30. International Crisis Group, ‘‘Myanmar: Major Reform Under Way,’’ Asia Briefing 127

(September 22, 2011), Brussels, 3.31. ‘‘Aung San Suu Kyi’s Party Can Rule Burma One Day, Says Presidential Aide,’’ The Guardian

(Manchester, UK), January 5, 2012.


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knew how difficult reform would be in the face of resistance from hardlineelements in the military. Between 2011 and 2014 the president and the oppo-sition leader met five times to exchange views.32

The trust-building exercise was accompanied by legal changes whichallowed the NLD to become reintegrated into the political system. In earlyJanuary 2012, the Thein Sein government amended the political party regis-tration law and the election law to allow Aung San Suu Kyi to stand for futureelection. She gave up her confrontational approach and steered the opposi-tion toward a truce with the regime. In mid-January 2012 the NLD decidedto reregister with the Election Commission and stand in the April 2012

by-elections. The by-elections were generally seen as an important test ofthe will to reform on the part of the new government. The NLD won theApril by-elections in a landslide, taking 43 of 44 possible seats. Aung San SuuKyi herself managed to get elected to parliament in a rural township nearYangon. Most internal and external observers characterized the by-electionsas relatively free and fair.33 Civil society organizations were active in awarenesscampaigns, poll-watching, and civil education. Although there were seriousshortcomings at various levels of the elections, the people were able to gen-uinely express themselves through their votes in a peaceful process. The mainshortcomings of the elections were false voter lists; attempts by some ruling-party candidates to misuse official machinery at the village and district levels;and a lack of voter education. Moreover, international election observers wereinvited too late to observe the campaign period.

Importantly, although the by-elections represent a major step in Myan-mar’s transition, their overall political importance has been constrained sinceonly a limited number of seats were open and the outcome could not signif-icantly alter the balance of power in parliament, which was (and still is)dominated by the ruling USDP. However, the by-elections changed thenature of the opposition. Having secured parliamentary representation, theNLD no longer acted as an anti-system opposition party. Although quite

32. President Thein Sein met Aung San Suu Kyi in August 2011, in April and August 2012, inAugust 2013, and in March 2014. Moreover, she took part in four-party talks in October 2014 andJanuary 2015. ‘‘Suu Kyi’s Call for Four-Party Talks Finally Accepted,’’ Eleven Myanmar, October 29,2014.

33. Election Monitoring Network, ‘‘The Republic of the Union of Myanmar By-Election 2012,’’Election Monitoring Report no. 1, April 7 (Yangon 2012), <http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs13/Election-monitoring_report-01%28en%29-red.pdf>, accessed April 10, 2012.


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critical of the government, in parliament it supported some of the president’sreform initiatives. The party campaigned for constitutional changes,a strengthened rule of law, and democratic peace.

Beyond parliament, the NLD concentrated on rebuilding party offices andstarting public campaigns in order to win the 2015 elections. The NLD’stop-down decision-making approach, which undermines institution-buildingefforts, has received strong criticism from the country’s civil society. More-over, Aung San Suu Kyi assumed the chair of parliament’s Committee forRule of Law and Tranquility. She was also appointed chairperson of thecontroversial investigative commission tasked with scrutinizing the operationof the Letpadaung copper mine, a joint project between a Chinese conglom-erate and the Myanmar military conglomerate Myanmar Economic Hold-ings, a role for which she was heavily criticized within the country.34 With theinvestigative commission’s final decision to continue mine operations despitethe huge environmental and social impacts, she risked losing her credibility asa staunch supporter of human rights. All this indicates that the main oppo-sition party has changed from a pure anti-system party to a ‘‘transition-seeking party.’’ With high hopes of winning the elections in 2015, the NLDacted as a government-in-waiting. In early 2014, Suu Kyi returned to a moreconfrontational approach reflecting the lack of constitutional reforms.35 Afterwinning the 2015 elections, the NLD has changed again, to a ‘‘ruling’’ party,and will consequently challenge the dominance of the military.

The Release of Political Prisoners

The truce with the opposition could not have been achieved without therelease of political prisoners. During his first two and a half years in office,President Thein Sein granted amnesty to selected prisoners on 12 separateoccasions. In total, the government has released 29,601 prisoners, of whom1,002 were political prisoners, according to figures provided by the Assistance

34. ‘‘Fury over Letpadaung Copper Mine Report,’’ Myanmar Times, March 18, 2013, <http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/national-news/5175-fury-at-copper-mine-report.html>.

35. At one point in the debate, in December 2013, Aung San Suu Kyi even threatened to boycottthe 2015 elections, if constitutional reforms were not enacted. Her party did not follow her in thispolicy, and consequently the Central Committee made clear that the NLD would participate in theelections. ‘‘NLD to Contest 2015 Election Even If Constitution’s Article 59(f) Not Amended,’’ ElevenMyanmar, December 29, 2013.


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http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/national-news/5175-fury-at-copper-mine-report.html

Association for Political Prisoners (Burma) at the end of 2013.36 The release ofpolitical prisoners was a contested issue and was often delayed by militaryhardliners in the powerful National Defense and Security Council.37 Progresson this issue was the result of both the president’s constant push to fulfil thepromises he made to the international community and his will to overcomethe resistance of hardliners in the military.

To underline his reformist credentials, in February 2013 Thein Seinannounced plans to form a committee to ‘‘scrutinize the remaining politicalprisoners serving their terms in prisons throughout the country so as to grantthem liberty.’’38 The original 16-member Political Prisoners Scrutiny Com-mittee included representatives from opposition groups with a history ofsupporting the release of political prisoners, such as the 1988 GenerationStudents Group, the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (Burma),and the NLD. The establishment of this committee broadened the presi-dent’s approach toward liberalization, and included main stakeholders, andthus challenged existing institutional structures. It was an important sign ofthe government’s willingness to reduce past practices of repression. SinceFebruary 2013 the committee has met several times.

However, significant differences emerged regarding the definition of‘‘political prisoner’’ and, by extension, the estimates of their number inMyanmar. During his July 2013 visit to the United Kingdom, Thein Seinpledged that all political prisoners would be released by the end of 2013.39 Intwo final rounds of amnesties in December 2013 and January 2014, 109

political prisoners were freed, leading the Office of the President to declarethat the country had no more. Human rights groups and critics of thepresident, however, pointed to the increasing number of arrests of activistssince the new Peaceful Assembly Law came into force in 2011. They considerthe arrested activists political prisoners—certainly a gray area, since they wereseen as violating the new, restrictive Peaceful Assembly Law or older laws.

36. ‘‘56 Political Prisoners Freed in 12th Presidential Release’’ (press release), Assistance Associ-ation of Political Prisoners (Burma), November 11, 2013, <http://aappb.org/category/press-release/page/3/>, accessed January 5, 2014.

37. ‘‘Bitter Struggle Puts Reform Process at Risk.’’38. Quoted in Michael F. Martin, ‘‘Burma’s Political Prisoners and U.S. Sanctions,’’ CRS Report

for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2013), 6, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42363.pdf>.

39. ‘‘Myanmar Admits to Political Prisoners, Pledging Their Freedom,’’ New York Times, July 15,2013.


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http://aappb.org/category/press-release/page/3/

http://aappb.org/category/press-release/page/3/

http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42363.pdf

http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42363.pdf

As of the end of 2014, the president and some committee members continuedto disagree about the proper definition and number of political prisoners inBurma. This illustrates the protracted nature of the current liberalization,the variety of legal interpretations, and the inability of the main politicalactors to compromise on an issue of concern. This is a consequence of thelong authoritarian past, the lack of the rule of law, and missing social capital(for example, a lack of trust and cooperation).

Negotiating Room for Civil Society

Freedom of Movement and Association

In 2011 and 2012 the government began preparing to draft laws on freedom ofmovement and association. The aforementioned Peaceful Assembly Law,40

enacted in 2011 without significant input from civil society organizations,41

allowed peaceful demonstrations only under very specific conditions. Accord-ing to Section 18, organizers are required to ask the authorities for ‘‘permis-sion’’ five days in advance. The law also imposed a penalty of a year’simprisonment for protests staged without permission. But it has broadenedthe freedom of movement considerably, leading to an increase in the numberof protests—for instance, those by residents of Yangon and Mandalay in May2012. Following the suspension of two magazines in July 2012, journalistsrallied in Yangon and Mandalay, urging the government to protect pressfreedom. However, several applications to protest made by ethnic groupsand the opposition were rejected, such as the NLD’s attempt to commem-orate Martyrs’ Day in 2012 and the Yangon University Student Union’s wishto honor the 50th anniversary of the student protests at Yangon University.

Though civil society’s space has grown and many protests have beentolerated, a number of activists have also been charged with demonstratingwithout permission. In November 2012 the authorities violently crackeddown on a protest by villagers and monks against the expansion of theLetpadaung copper mine. More than 70 protesters were injured when riotpolice stepped in. The crackdown led to a public outcry and a rare apology bystate authorities. A number of civil society activists have been jailed fororganizing protests at the copper mine.

40. Law on Peaceful Assembly and Peaceful Procession, <http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs15/2011-Peaceful_Assembly_and_Procession_Act-en.pdf>, accessed April 10, 2012.

41. Interviews with members of several civil society groups in Yangon, April 15–20, 2013.


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http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs15/2011-Peaceful_Assembly_and_Procession_Act-en.pdf

The episode illustrates two developments. First, civil society activists andNGOs have far more room today to mobilize, lobby parliament and thegovernment, and make their voices heard than they have had in decades.Second, the authorities and certain influential people—with vested interests—continue to use the law to stifle public protest. Although Section 18 of thePeaceful Assembly Law was amended in March 2014, it is still used by theauthorities to restrict the free movement of people. Authorities have targetedactivists, farmers, and those organizing around issues including land ownershipand land rights.42

The new association law, under discussion since early 2012, has beenequally important to civil society. During its drafting, the law went throughseveral rounds of consultations in which the government sought the input ofcivil society organizations. The public hearings of the Public Affairs Com-mittee in August 2012 created trust between civil society groups and thegovernment/parliament. Civil society organizations cautiously welcomed thenew government’s approach, and they were willing to comment on the draftto help the government write a good law.43 However, because the July 2013

draft included some repressive elements—such as a penalty of five years’imprisonment for not registering, and the wide discretionary power of theMinistry of Home Affairs to withdraw registrations—civil society organiza-tions were critical of it. A joint meeting between civil society groups, gov-ernment officials, and members of the Parliament’s Committee laid thegroundwork for a new version of the draft law, one which made no mentionof penalties for NGOs or of discretionary powers and which fulfilled thedemands of the various civil society organizations involved. Thus, pressurefrom civil society has resulted in a much less restrictive, less authoritarian law.

All in all, civil society’s room to maneuver has grown remarkably in recentyears. In all areas, however, reforms are fragile, and authorities are usingprovisions in new and existing laws to restrain civil society, which has led

42. The law requires the ‘‘consent’’ of the authorities, which however do not have the right todeny these permissions. The penalty of one year has also been reduced to six months. Nevertheless,authorities use the law to stifle public protest, since the amendments do not give clear legalguidelines. For a translation of the amended law see ‘‘Myanmar: Amended Right to PeacefulAssembly’’ (press release), Article 19, August 2014, <http://www.article19.org/data/files/medialibrary/37666/14-08-01-LA-myanmar-assembly.pdf>; ‘‘Stop Using Repressive Law against Peaceful Protesters’’(press release), Amnesty International, <https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/4000/asa160252014en.pdf>.

43. Interviews with members of several civil society groups in Yangon, April 15–20, 2013.


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http://www.article19.org/data/files/medialibrary/37666/14-08-01-LA-myanmar-assembly.pdf

https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/4000/asa160252014en.pdf

https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/4000/asa160252014en.pdf

to ongoing restrictions of civil liberties and to arbitrary arrests. Civil society istoo weak to overcome the resistance of parliamentarians and bureaucrats. The2015 elections and the NLD landslide might have some democratizing effect,if the party is willing to further broaden the legal environment for protests.

Negotiating Press Freedom

The last three years have seen a remarkable relaxation of Internet and mediacontrols in Myanmar, along with a steady increase in press freedom. In 2015,Reporters without Borders listed Myanmar as the 144th lowest, out of 179

countries, in terms of press freedom; earlier, it had been number 145 (2014),151 (2013), 169 (2012), and 174 (2011).44 Internet control and censorship wererelaxed in 2011, when the government lifted restrictions on certain interna-tional and independent news websites. In August 2012, the governmentproclaimed a complete end to prepublication censorship and the dissolutionof the Press Scrutiny and Registration Division. The abolition of official presscensorship, the easing of repression against journalists, and their release fromjail have together created a remarkably different climate for the media. Thesereforms have also allowed the country’s media associations more room tolobby for press freedom.

However, in parallel, conservative bureaucrats in the Ministry of Informa-tion have constantly resisted opening up. The ministry has tried to regaincertain powers and has attempted to once again curb press freedom in recentyears.45 Some of these attempts have failed, since local journalists have suc-cessfully lobbied against any form of new censorship. For instance, in August2012, the ministry wanted to install a new Myanmar Press Council, whichwould monitor journalists and penalize them for writing reports too critical ofthe government. Local journalists and their associations, such as the Myan-mar Journalist Network, the Myanmar Journalist Association, and the Myan-mar Journalist Union, refused to join. In February 2013, in a move thatsurprised many, the government unveiled the first draft of the Printing andPublishing Bill, which imposed new censorship guidelines for the media.

44. Reporters without Borders’ Press Freedom Index measures the level of freedom of infor-mation. It takes into account the physical security of journalists and the number of censored media,and it sends out questionnaires to experts, who evaluate the quality of the country’s legal frameworkand the transparency of the government’s decisions. Reports for various years are online at <http://rsf.org>.

45. Interview with a local journalist, Yangon, April 7, 2013.


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http://rsf.org

http://rsf.org

Since the draft bill was written in secrecy and without any consultation fromoutside groups, media organizations were shocked and immediately began tolobby parliament for revisions.46 After a year of consultations and lobbying inboth houses, parliament approved the much less restrictive Publishing Bill,together with a new Media Law that was drafted with the input of membersof the Press Council.47

Despite this progress, older laws and guidelines48 are still in place that callfor prison sentences for those disseminating certain types of informationperceived as posing a threat to national security, domestic tranquility, orracial harmony; reporting on corruption or ethnic politics; or portraying thegovernment negatively.49 The government has also used its powers to sus-pend press freedom in recent years, whenever it felt the press violated thisresponsibility. For instance, in July 2012 the magazines The Voice and Envoywere suspended for reporting on a possible cabinet change. In June 2013 thegovernment banned an issue of Time after it reported critically on theBuddhist 969 Movement, triggering protests by nationalist monks.50 InFebruary 2014 the government arrested five journalists and banned theprivately owned Unity Journal for ‘‘disclosing state secrets’’—it had pub-lished a story on the construction of a chemical weapons factory in centralMyanmar. The reporters were sentenced to 10 years in jail based on the 1923

State Secrets Act; the sentence was later reduced to 7 years. All this indicatesthat there is still quite a way to go to establish a free press that can act as thefourth estate.

Negotiating the Nation-State: Peace Talks and Religious Violence on the Periphery

Since liberalization, Myanmar has witnessed two diverging trends: the pre-sident’s new peace initiative, and an outbreak of religious violence in parts ofthe country. As part of his reformist agenda, Thein Sein promised ethnic

46. Interview with a local journalist, Yangon, April 7, 2013.47. The new media laws were approved in March 2014. ‘‘Parliament Approves Controversial

Media Bills,’’ Eleven Myanmar, March 5, 2014.48. Such as the 1950 Emergency Provisions Act, the 2000 Internet Act, and the 2004 Electronic

Transactions Act.49. Reporters without Borders, ‘‘Burmese Media Spring,’’ 2012, <https://en.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/

rsf_rapport_birmanie-gb-bd_2_.pdf>, 18.50. ‘‘Two Rangoon Journals Suspended Indefinitely,’’ Irrawaddy, July 31, 2012, <http://www.

irrawaddy.org/burma/two-rangoon-journals-suspended-indefinitely.html>; ‘‘Protestors March againstTIME,’’ Myanmar Times, July 2, 2013.


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https://en.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/rsf_rapport_birmanie-gb-bd_2_.pdf

http://www.irrawaddy.org/burma/two-rangoon-journals-suspended-indefinitely.html

http://www.irrawaddy.org/burma/two-rangoon-journals-suspended-indefinitely.html

groups a dialogue without any preconditions. However, he has not initiateda tripartite dialogue with ethnic groups and the opposition, as the interna-tional community has demanded for two decades. Instead, he initiated aninformal dialogue with the ethnic groups only. On the government side, the11-member Union-Level Peace Team (or Union Peacemaking WorkingCommittee) was assigned to lead the process under President’s Office Min-ister Aung Min. The process was coordinated by the Myanmar Peace Center.Various rounds of official talks between the committee and the NationwideCeasefire-Coordination Team (NCCT), which represents the ethnic armies,have been held.

The government and the rebel representatives finally managed to signa Draft National Ceasefire Agreement on March 31, 2015. The agreementneeded to be signed by all armed ethnic-group leaders as well. At theirmeeting in June, the NCCT agreed on the text, but demanded 14 furtherchanges to the document. The government’s reaction was lukewarm andrevealed opposition to amending the draft. Finally, it managed to sign a peacedeal with eight armed rebel groups in October, in the hope of ending decadesof conflict. However, some of the largest groups, like the United Wa StateArmy and the Kachin Independence Army, have not signed the ceasefire.Consequently, NLD leader Aung San Suu Kyi promised after the November2015 elections that building peace with ethnic armies left out of the ceasefireagreement will be her ‘‘first priority’’ when the NLD government assumesoffice in March 2016.

The peace process has been overshadowed by constant fighting. In thenortheast part of Myanmar, the Burmese military continues to fight with theKachin and Kokang rebels. Decades of fighting have created a climate ofdistrust. The ethnic groups continue to harbor great reservations about thegovernment; the latter is demanding that the former abandon their armedstruggles, recognize the constitution, and integrate themselves into thenational army. The ethnic groups have not found a common voice. Most,though not all, are demanding a serious revision of the constitution and theestablishment of a truly federal state with a federally structured army. Lastingpeace is a protracted issue, since on both sides economic interests are involvedand major grievances need to be recognized. These include the negativeimpact of (military) development projects on local communities, such as landconfiscations, and the environmental and social impacts of economic pro-jects; competition over control of natural resources; and poverty and


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underdevelopment.51 Moreover, in order to accommodate the key ethnicdemands of a federal state, the government has to offer a political solutionin terms of constitutional change; and what further complicates the issue isthat the military must agree on this so that lasting peace has a chance.

Myanmar’s opening has been accompanied by an escalation of long-simmering religious conflicts between ethnic Rakhine (formerly Arakanese)Buddhists and the Muslim Rohingya in Rakhine State. In June and October2012 clashes between Buddhists and Muslims left almost 200 people dead andapproximately 140,000 displaced. In January 2013 the violence spread tocentral Myanmar. The origins of this religious violence are manifold. Theproblem in western Myanmar has its roots in citizenship issues: the Rohingyaare not considered part of the official nation-state, since most of them arebelieved by the public to have arrived after Independence in 1948. Yet, this ishighly disputed; other sources argue that while there certainly were Muslimsfrom Bangladesh who moved to Rakhine State after 1948, many Rohingyatrace their ancestry further back, some to before British colonization.52

The spread of violence elsewhere has occurred in the context of risingBurman-Buddhist nationalism, including the growing influence of themonk-led 969 Movement, which preaches intolerance and urges boycottingMuslim businesses. The 969 Movement has distributed nationalistic pamphletsand videos which members say are designed to ‘‘protect’’ the country fromMuslim ‘‘infiltration.’’ Xenophobic, nationalistic anti-Muslim sentiments havebeen spread on the Internet. Increasing liberalization has allowed nationalistgroups to mobilize along racial and religious lines, stretching their freedoms ofspeech and organization. Their agitation finally led to an exclusion of theRohingya from the 2015 elections. The Rohingya have not only been blockedfrom standing in the elections but also denied the freedom to vote.53

51. Burma News International, Deciphering Myanmar’s Peace Process: A Reference Guide (ChiangMai: AIPP Printing Press, 2014), <http://www.mmpeacemonitor.org/images/pdf/deciphering_myanmar_peace_process_2014.pdf>.

52. Note that the government’s 1982 citizenship law states that those seeking citizenship mustprove that their ancestors lived in Burma before 1823. This is because the British colonized Arakan in1824. Tin Maung Maung and Moe Thuzar, ‘‘Myanmar’s Rohingya Dilemma,’’ ISEAS Perspective,July 9 2012, <http://www.iseas.edu.sg/documents/publication/ISEAS%20Perspective_1_9jul121.pdf>; Ian Holliday, ‘‘Addressing Myanmar’s Citizenship Crisis,’’ Journal of Contemporary Asia 44,no. 3 (2014), 404–421, 409.

53. U Shwe Maung, ‘‘Myanmar’s Disenfranchised Rohingya,’’ New York Times, November 2,2015, <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/03/opinion/myanmar-election-disenfranchised-rohingya.html>.


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http://www.mmpeacemonitor.org/images/pdf/deciphering_myanmar_peace_process_2014.pdf

http://www.mmpeacemonitor.org/images/pdf/deciphering_myanmar_peace_process_2014.pdf

http://www.iseas.edu.sg/documents/publication/ISEAS%20Perspective_1_9jul121.pdf



http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/03/opinion/myanmar-election-disenfranchised-rohingya.html

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/03/opinion/myanmar-election-disenfranchised-rohingya.html

CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS—PACTED OR PROTRACTED

TRANSITION?

According to political observers, Aung San Suu Kyi has wooed the militaryover the past three years and publicly acknowledged its importance. She hasrepeatedly praised the role of the armed forces for their role in nation-building, and on Armed Forces Day 2013 she attended the military paradein the capital upon invitation by the military. These initiatives can be seen aspart of a strategy to forge a political pact with the military, which still holdsa dominant position in Myanmar.54 However, the military has yet to respondpositively to any of her proposals. Aung San Suu Kyi in the past few years hasrepeatedly attempted to meet with Army Chief Senior General Min AungHlaing. He rebuffed her until her election victory in November 2015, afterwhich they discussed the transition to the new government. Since no pact hasmaterialized so far, a protracted transition is far more likely than a pactedtransition.

Suu Kyi’s attempt to forge a pact with the military is part of a three-pronged reform strategy. First, the NLD attempted to influence the officialrevision of the 2008 constitution. Calls for constitutional changes began togain momentum domestically in March 2013, when senior members of theruling USDP submitted a proposal to form a review committee. BetweenAugust and October, two parliamentary committees discussed possibleamendments and considered submissions from the public, political parties,and government officials. The committees worked by and large in secrecy,although each produced a report which summarized the debate. In June andJuly 2015 two bills were presented to parliament. The military bloc in par-liament, however, vetoed most of the proposed changes supported by theopposition and ethnic groups. First, it blocked the lowering of the 75%

threshold for constitutional change to 70% (Sec. 436), which would havereduced the veto power of the military. Second, it prevented the directelection of regional chief ministers, although it granted new legislative andrevenue-raising powers to subnational governments. Consequently, it recom-mended a greater devolution of political power, a key demand of major ethnic

54. Interviews with members of the NLD and with CSOs in Yangon, April 15–20, 2013, andSeptember 27–October 4, 2014; ‘‘Myanmar Jarred by Peace Laureate at Military Parade,’’ New YorkTimes, March 27, 2013, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/28/world/asia/daw-aung-san-suu-kyi-appears-at-burmese-military-parade.html>.


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groups, but to a much smaller extent than federalism would dictate. The billsdid not include any changes in Article 59f, which bars individuals frombecoming president if their spouses or children hold foreign citizenship,thereby disqualifying Aung San Suu Kyi. The outcome of the revision debateshows that conservative forces in the military and the ruling party are stillusing their power to limit political change.

In line with the second part of the strategy, since July 2013 Suu Kyi hasbeen calling for a private meeting with President Thein Sein, Lower HouseSpeaker Shwe Mann, and the armed forces commander in order to agree onconstitutional changes informally. However, both the president and thespeaker have declined the offer, pointing to the ongoing formal revision ofthe constitution. Third, as it became more and more obvious that the 2008

constitution would only be marginally amended, Suu Kyi mobilized civilsociety to lobby for further changes. At the end of October 2014 PresidentThein Sein took the initiative to invite the country’s main political figures tothe capital to discuss the political transition and the 2015 elections, the peaceprocess, and national reconciliation. The meeting, described as ‘‘disappoint-ing’’ (Aung San Suu Kyi) or ‘‘the start of a new political culture’’ (TheinSein), was a trust-building exercise and a further step in a protracted transi-tion that will unfold over the years to come.

CONCLUSION

Myanmar’s liberalization is a two-pronged strategy for economic renewaland a recalibration of foreign relations. This strategy, orchestrated by themilitary from a position of strength, has led to military dominance in theevolving political framework. While the first phase of this strategy (from1990 to 2011) was intended to build up institutions that guarantee themilitary’s dominant position in the political arena and to limit politicalspace for the opposition under very repressive conditions, the second phase(since 2011) has relaxed the military’s coercive controls and liberalized polit-ical spaces for the opposition and civil society. Thein Sein has started a trucewith the NLD, which has transformed itself into a transition-seeking party.Civil society functions far more freely than ever before, and its room tomaneuver has clearly expanded over the last three years. In all areas, how-ever, reforms are fragile and the situation reflects the long period of militaryrule. Authorities are using provisions in the new and existing laws to restrain


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civil society and the press, which has led to ongoing restrictions of civilliberties and arbitrary arrests.

At this critical juncture, the transition will lead to genuine democratizationonly if liberal elements in the military and the NLD find a way to renegotiatethe dominant position of the military. The 2015 elections have provideda huge democratic mandate to Aung San Suu Kyi. She and her NLD mightintroduce reforms to further democratize the political system and moveforward with Myanmar’s protracted transition. The military remains theultimate guardian and might reverse the country’s transition at any time. Ifthe military is unwilling to give in to the demands of the opposition and theethnic groups, then it will continue to be a dominant player. Army Chief MinAung Hlaing has already indicated that he is willing to cooperate with AungSan Suu Kyi.

The armed forces’ attitude to reform and the extent to which the militaryfeels obliged to control the reform process will be tested by a number of keyissues over the next years, such as the election of a new president with anNLD background and/or the possible push for further reforms. This, how-ever, does not include a reform of the role of the armed forces. In an interviewwith the Washington Post, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing indicated thatthe military might withdraw from politics at a certain point in the future. Healso noted that this might take another 5 to 10 years and is subject to positivedevelopments such as peace, national reconciliation, and the maturing ofdemocracy.

The problem of stateness is the most daunting challenge for the currenttransition, since it provides the military with an ideology that legitimizes itsguardianship over political developments. Needless to say, transitions aremarked by unusual levels of uncertainty, because events can unfold swiftlyand the perceptions and interests of the main actors are largely unknown.The debate about the ‘‘end of the transition paradigm’’55 has highlighted thefact that the outcome of a transition is highly contingent upon variouselements and will not necessarily result in democratization, but might insteadcontribute to the emergence of a new authoritarianism or some form ofhybrid regime. Protracted transitions are especially vulnerable to setbacks,and consequently, Myanmar’s liberalization might face critical moments ifand when the military’s power is really challenged.

55. Thomas Carothers, ‘‘The End of the Transition Paradigm,’’ Journal of Democracy 13 (2002), 5–21.


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Myanmar’s Protracted Transition · Myanmar’s Protracted Transition Arenas, Actors, and Outcomes...

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