My “Top Ten” Books Every Student of International Relations Should Read _ Foreign Policy

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My top ten books every student ofInternational Relations should read

APRIL 9, 2009BY STEPHEN M. WALT

Last week Tom Ricks offered us his "Top Ten list" of books any student of military history should read. The

FP staff asked me to follow suit with some of my favorites from the world of international politics and

foreign policy. What follows arent necessarily the books Id put on a graduate syllabus; instead, here are

ten books that either had a big influence on my thinking, were a pleasure to read, or are of enduring value

for someone trying to make sense of contemporary world politics. But Ive just scratched the surface here,

so I invite readers to contribute their own suggestions.

1). Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State, and War.

An all-time classic, which I first read as a college sophomore. Not only did M, S & W provide an enduring

typology of different theories of war (i.e., locating them either in the nature of man, the characteristics of

states, or the anarchic international system), but Waltz offers incisive critiques of these three "images"

(aka "levels of analysis.") Finding out that this book began life as Waltzs doctoral dissertation was a

humbling moment in my own graduate career.

2). Jared Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel.

Combines biology and macro-history in a compelling fashion, explaining why small differences in climate,

population, agronomy, and the like turned out to have far-reaching effects on the evolution of human

societies and the long-term balance of power. An exhilarating read.

3). Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence.



Hes a Nobel Prize winner now, so one expects a lot of smart ideas. Some of Schellings ideas do not seem

to have worked well in practice (cf. Robert Papes Bombing to Win and Wallace Thiess When Governments

Collide) but more than anyone else, Schelling taught us all to think about military affairs in a genuinely

strategic fashion. (The essays found in Schellings Strategy of Conflict are more technical but equally

insightful). And if only more scholars wrote as well.

4). James Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed.

This isnt really a book about international relations, but its a fascinating exploration of the origins of

great human follies (like Prussian "scientific forestry" or Stalinist collectivized agriculture). Scott pins the

blame for these grotesque man-made disasters on centralized political authority (i.e., the absence of

dissent) and "totalistic" ideologies that sought to impose uniformity and order in the name of some

dubious pseudo-scientific blueprint. And its a book that aspiring "nation-builders" and liberal

interventionists should read as an antidote to their own ambitions. Reading Scotts work (to include his

Weapons of the Weak and Domination and the Arts of Resistance) provided the intellectual launching pad

for my book Taming American Power).

5). David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest.

Stayed up all night reading this compelling account of a great national tragedy, and learned not to assume

that the people in charge knew what they were doing. Still relevant today, no?

6). Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics.

I read this while tending bar at the Stanford Faculty Club in 1977 (the Stanford faculty werent big drinkers

so I had a lot of free time). Arguably still the best single guide to the ways that psychology can inform our

understanding of world politics. Among other things, it convinced that I would never know as much

history as Jervis does. I was right.

7). John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.



Why do bad things happen to good peoples? Why do "good states" do lots of bad things? Mearsheimer tells

you. Clearly written, controversial, and depressingly persuasive.

8). Ernst Gellner, Nations and Nationalism.

The state is the dominant political form in the world today, and nationalism remains a powerful political

force. This book will help you understand where it came from and why it endures.

9). Henry A. Kissinger, White House Years & Years of Upheaval.

Memoirs should always be read with a skeptical eye, and Kissingers are no exception. But if you want

some idea of what it is like to run a great powers foreign policy, this is a powerfully argued and often

revealing account. And Kissingers portraits of his colleagues and counterparts are often candid and full of

insights. Just dont take it at face value.

10). Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation.

Where did the modern world come from, and what are the political, economic, and social changes that it

wrought? Polanyi doesnt answer every question, but hes a good place to start.

So thats ten, but I cant resist tossing in a few others in passing: Geoffrey Blainey The Causes of War;

Douglas North, Structure and Change in Economic History; Valerie Hudson and Andrea den Boer, Bare

Branches: The Security Implications of Asias Surplus Male Population; Robert Gilpin, The Political

Economy of International Relations; Steve Coll, Ghost Wars; T.C.W. Blanning, The Origins of the French

Revolutionary Wars; R. R. Palmer, The Age of the Democratic Revolution; Avi Shlaim, The Iron Wall: Israel

and the Arab World; Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War; Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing

Societies; Tony Smith, The Problem of Imperlalism; and Philip Knightleys The First Casualty: The War

Correspondent as Hero, Propagandist, and Myth-Maker. And as I said, this just scratches the surface.

So what did I miss? Keep the bar high.



(And for those of you who dont have time to read books, Ill start working on a "top ten" list of articles).

The Afpak muddle (part 2): How serious isthe threat?

APRIL 7, 2009BY STEPHEN M. WALT

Does the threat of international terrorism specifically al Qaeda justify a costly, long-term engagement

in Afghanistan and Pakistan? President Obama and his advisors think so, but Im still not convinced. I

certainly understand that we have a terrorism problem; I just dont believe that it is serious enough to

warrant the level and type of effort the administration is proposing. And if the results of the recent NATO

summit are any indication, our NATO allies seem skeptical, too.

Just how serious is the threat? According to the U.S. National Counterterrorism Center, there were 14,499

terrorist attacks worldwide in 2007 (the most recent year for which it has data). All told, these attacks

killed 22,684 people and injured about 44,310. This sounds serious (and it is obviously not something to

trivialize), but over half of all terrorist attacks (and two-thirds of all those killed, wounded or kidnapped)

occurred in the context of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, and thus are not a good indicator of al Qaedas

ability to threaten the American homeland or key U.S. allies. To keep these numbers in perspective, bear

in mind that over a million people die in traffic accidents worldwide each year, with many more injured.

Yet no one is proposing that we allocate additional billions to try to eliminate all highway fatalities.



Even more significant for the issue at hand, the number of private U.S. citizens killed by terrorists in 2007

was nineteen, with zero injured and seventeen kidnapped. All of these deaths or kidnappings occurred

either in Afghanistan or Iraq. As John Mueller has argued, if al Qaeda is as dangerous as U.S. officials

maintain, why havent there been more attacks on the United States over the past eight years? In America,

the danger of drowning in a bathtub is greater than the risk of dying in a terrorist attack. And that would

be true even if the United State were to suffer one 9/11-scale attack every ten years. Given these numbers,

does it really make sense to double down in Central Asia?

In short, my concern is that we are allowing an exaggerated fear of al Qaeda to distort our foreign policy

priorities. Having underestimated the danger from al Qaeda before 9/11, have we now swung too far the

other way? I am not arguing for a Pollyanna-like complacency or suggesting that we simply ignore the

threat that groups like al Qaeda still pose. Rather, Im arguing that the threat is not as great as the

administration and most Americans, truth be told seem to think, and that the actual danger does not

warrant escalating U.S. involvement in Central Asia.

I can think of at least three counter-arguments to my position.

First, one could argue that there have been no attacks on the United States since 2001 because weve put al

Qaeda on the defensive, and that going after them in Pakistans frontier provinces will deny them a safe

haven and further reduce their ability to stage another 9/11 (or worse). This line of argument sounds

persuasive, but it falls apart on closer examination. For starters, it is not clear that al Qaeda requires a safe

haven to do damage, especially since the original organization has metastasized into smaller groups of

sympathizers (such as the group that bombed the Madrid railway station in 2004).

Equally important, the United States is not going to mount a large scale invasion of Pakistan, which is

what would be necessary to completely eliminate al Qaeda from that region. And there is little reason to

think that the Pakistani military will do the job for us any time soon. Furthermore, U.S. military strikes in

Pakistan even limited ones tend to undermine the Pakistani government and increase the risk that

Pakistan will become a failed state. As James Traub noted in last Sundays New York Times Magazine:



Pakistan feels as if its falling apart. . .[and] American policy has arguably made the

situation even worse, for the Predator-drone attacks along the border, though effective,

drive the Taliban eastward, deeper into Pakistan. And the strategy has been only

reinforcing hostility to the United States among ordinary Pakistanis.

Fortunately, there are ways to deny al Qaeda a safe haven (or operational base) that do not require a large

U.S. ground presence in Afghanistan and do not require us to conduct extensive military operations in

Pakistan. In addition to improved homeland security and more effective counter-terrorist efforts (e.g.,

cutting off financing, monitoring communications, sharing intelligence, etc.), the United States can

launch preemptive attacks against suspected terrorist targets in Afghanistan, using Predators, cruise

missiles, or in some cases, Special Forces. If we remain vigilant, al Qaeda will not get the free pass that it

enjoyed before 9/11. This will not eliminate the threat, but it can reduce its potency.

Second, one could argue that while the risk from conventional terrorism is manageable, the real danger is

nuclear or WMD terrorism and that this threat justifies upping the ante in Afghanistan and Pakistan, even

if the commitment is costly and open-ended. Nuclear terrorism is a worrisome prospect, but doubling

down in Central Asia isnt the best response to that problem. Pakistan is the key here and our primary goal

should be making sure that its nuclear arsenal remains under reliable control. The best way to do that is to

try to prevent Pakistan from becoming a failed state. As emphasized above, using the U.S. military to go

after al Qaeda in Pakistans tribal areas is likely to destabilize Pakistan, thus increasing the chances that

nuclear materials will fall into the hands of terrorists.



Third, one might concede that the actual danger from terrorism is slight, but the political consequences of

terrorist attacks are disproportionate to their actual impact. In this view, comparing the risk of terrorism to

highway fatalities, or to the danger of being struck by lightning, ignores the psychological and political

effects of successful terrorist operations, and rational politicians have to take the latter into account. There

is no question that this is the situation we now face in the United States, but it does not have to be that

way. Indeed, it is mainly the result of failed political leadership over the past eight years. If our leaders

react to every terrorist incident as if its a monumental disaster, and if they hype the terrorist threat for

political advantage as George Bush and Dick Cheney did the public will surely respond by

demanding that we throw more resources at the problem than is prudent. Getting the opponent to react in

foolish and self-defeating ways is one of the primary goals of most terror campaigns, of course, because

these blunders can help the terrorists win victories that they could not achieve otherwise. We did more

damage to ourselves when we invaded Iraq than Osama bin Laden accomplished on 9/11, and an open-

ended commitment in Central Asia could easily compound that error.

What we need, in fact, is a political elite (and a responsible media) that will help Americans keep the

terrorism problem in perspective. Terrorism is a tactic that various groups have used throughout history,

and it will remain with us for the foreseeable future. Dramatic incidents like the recent Mumbai attacks

are going to happen again, no matter how hard we try to prevent them, and that includes the possibility of

attacks on American soil. But if we can keep suicidal extremists from obtaining nuclear weapons, they will

not be able to threaten our way of life in any meaningful way.

None of this is to say that we should ignore al Qaeda or any other terrorist group that is bent on attacking

the United States, or that we should not sometimes act assertively to protect Americans at home and

abroad. But the threat from al Qaeda does not justify increasing our military presence in Afghanistan, and

certainly does not justify major military operations in Pakistan.

Spencer Platt/Getty Images

My “Top Ten” Books Every Student of International Relations Should Read _ Foreign Policy

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