MUNUC DISEC Background Guide

DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE

MUNUC XXIX

Topic A: Prevention of Extremist RadicalizationTopic B: Securing Movement of Refugees

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DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE MUNUC XXIX

LETTER FROM THE CHAIR

Hello Everyone!

It’s a pleasure to meet you! My name is Srikanth Krishnan, and I’ll be serving as your chair for the Disarmament and International Security Committee at MUNUC XXIX.

While I find all issues handled by the United Nations to be of international priority, I believe that topics closely related to current events to be the most engaging and thought provoking. To that end Topics A and B, Prevention of Radicalization into Violent Extremism and Securing the Movement of Refugees, deal with what we’ve seen on the news and has captured national attention. As a delegate, much of the world’s response to these problems are as yet too young to be able to endorse with certainty, and the positions taken by different countries around the world may stand in stark opposition to each other as well as your own beliefs. As your chair, I ask that you take the simulation to its fullest and embody your national policy truly, so that we might all better understand why the world currently deals with the radicalization of militants and dangerous refugee crises in the way that it does.

I am a sophomore undergraduate student majoring in Economics and Public policy. Here at the college and in addition to MUNUC, I compete as a member of our traveling Model UN team and am part of our college conference CHOMUN. Outside the MUN world I help organize TEDxUchicago, work for DC Thinktanks, play soccer, and am involved with our university Institute of Politics.

I am extremely passionate about backpacking, camping, and all things outdoor. I deeply miss my Labrador retriever, Pepper, back home in Maryland and watch Archer, Parks and Rec., and Narcos to procrastinate schoolwork. If you are a Chicago local, feel free to belatedly celebrate the last World Series with me again.

I look forward to meeting you in person at MUNUC, until then research hard and follow the news! If you have any questions or need any clarification, feel free to reach out to me.

Best,

Srikanth KrishnanChair, Disarmament and International Security [email protected]

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HISTORY OF THE COMMITTEE

The Disarmament and Security Committee (DISEC), also known as the First Committee of the General Assembly, concerns itself primarily with issues dealing with global security and threats to peace. Each member nation of the UN is allowed a delegation (of no greater than five representatives) in DISEC, and the body meets for a four to five-week session every year beginning in October.1 This year will mark the 72nd meeting of the First Committee and the United Nations.

DISEC has a very wide purview, in that it is charged with dealing with every threat to global peace within the Charter of the United Nations.2 This charter charges the General Assemblies with dealing with issues that might concern DISEC, including “the general principles of co-operation and security, including the principles governing disarmament.”3 The purpose of the General Assembly is to provide a forum for discussion and debate amongst all member nations of the UN (and, under some circumstances, nonmembers), allowing for a diversity of opinion that is hard to find in smaller decision making bodies such as the Security Council. However, DISEC, like all other General Assembly committees, maintains an advisory role rather than one of direct action. In fact, Article 10 of the United Nations charter limits the power of the General Assembly, stating that its ultimate power is to “make recommendations to the Members of the United Nations or to the Security Council or to both.”4

Voting in DISEC is identical to the other General Assembly committees. Substantive decisions on international peace and security are passed by a two-thirds majority in which every nation gets exactly one vote. Minor decisions and procedural motions are made by a simple majority of member nations.5

Despite its inability to pass treaties or laws that bind member states, DISEC nonetheless remains an integral part of the United Nations, as it serves as an invaluable measure of global opinion and a fair forum for international debate. Resolutions, the main instrument of legislation for DISEC, are considered very carefully by the rest of the United Nations, and the Security Council depends on DISEC for input on its decisions. Important action taken in the past as a result of discussions in DISEC include the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The Disarmament and Security Council has a mandate to protect the peace and stability of the world through open discussion and discourse, and has shown that this is an effective tool in the past. The role of DISEC is only set to grow as matters of international security become increasingly complicated and polarizing.

1 “Disarmament and Security: The First Committee,” General Assembly of the United Nations, accessed November 17, 2016, http://www.un.org/en/ga/first/.

2 Ibid.3 United Nations Charter, “Chapter IV: The General Assembly,” United Nations, 1945.4 Ibid.5 “Chapter IV: The General Assembly.”

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TOPIC A: PREVENTION OF EXTREMIST RADICALIZATION

Statement of the Problem

The classic narrative of radicalization is that of a very simple equation; in the face of an occupying force, ethnoreligious persecution, totalitarian regimes, or rapid cultural change, a set of likely impoverished and uneducated people transform into a violent oppositional force. In turn, this equation prescribes a very predictable solution of legal rights expansion, education reforms, and economic empowerment. Imagine then, the surprise of Swedish policymakers when they realized they were exporting terrorism in the form of over 300 Swedes leaving to join the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in 20166 alone from data collected by their national security service, Säpo. So strange was this finding that Swedish Prime Minister Stefan Löfven stated that “Sweden has been naïve.” The PM noted that his country, believed both at home and abroad to be an open democracy lacking neither in economic opportunity nor educational access, seemed implausible as an incubator of ISIL’s violent ideologies.7 Yet Sweden had exported more radicalized Swedes than even the United States, whose population is over thirty times that of Sweden’s.

In the context of international affairs, radicalization is defined as the process by which a person becomes an advocate of radical political or social reform and their way of thinking and engaging with society becomes drastically different from the normative set of behaviors.8 On the other hand, violent extremism is when a person decides that methods making use of fear and terror are justified to achieve an ideological or political agenda. While radicalization does not necessarily lead to violent extremism, the two concepts are often highly interrelated.9 Radicalization into violent extremism is far from a uniquely Swedish problem. According to a report from the U.S. Department of homeland defense, fighters leaving for conflicts in the Middle East number in the hundreds from the U.K., Germany, and Lebanon, then climb to over a thousand from Turkey, France, Russia, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. In Tunisia, the home of the Arab Spring and the democratic surge of the Middle East and North African (MENA) region, approximately five thousand fighters left to join the violence in Syria and Iraq. 10 While this list only covers a number of top contributors of fighters to the conflicts across the Middle East, they include both Islamic and non-Islamic nations as well as nations that present a wide spectrum of governmental openness and vastly different economic systems. As Sweden demonstrates, it is no longer enough to hope that open democracies and secular cultures will be sufficient in disrupting Radicalization into Violent Extremism (RVE).

6 “300 Swedes have left to fight in Middle East,” The Local, October 5, 2015, http://www.thelocal.se/20151004/300-swedes-have-left-to-join-extremist.

7 “PM: Sweden has been ‘naïve’ about terror threat,” The Local, November 19, 2015, https://www.thelocal.se/20151119/swedish-pm-country-naive-about-terror-threat.

8 “Radicalize,” Merriam-Webster, accessed November 16, 2016, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/radicalize.9 Chris Angus, “Radicalisation and Violent Extremism: Causes and Responses,” NSW Parliamentary Research Service, February 2016. 10 “Final Report of the Task Force on Combating Terrorist and Foreign Fighter Travel,” Homeland Security Committee, September 2015.

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Contemporary conflicts, particularly those involving non-state actors, are increasingly characterized by asymmetric warfare, that is, conflicts where there is a large discrepancy in the military capability of the warring parties. Rather than conventional open combat between standing armies, violence has taken indirect venues such as political terrorism, cyberwarfare, and guerilla or irregular combat.11 This method of combat has proven largely advantageous for non-state actors and rebel groups looking to challenge a state’s governing regime; since 1950 the ‘weaker’ combatant has won a majority of all asymmetric conflict.12 Additionally, modern communications technology in the form of such things as internet, social media, and handheld smartphones offer substantial new venues for ideology transmission and membership recruitment for these organizations. This pattern of combat has two relevant effects for this committee to consider.

First, violent extremist organizations must allocate resources to cultivating individuals who will invest their lives into the ideology of the organization. To do so requires extensive recruitment attempts as well as active culturing of recruits to fanaticism, a process known as radicalization. This understanding also implies opportunity to disrupt radicalization, either by targeting at-risk groups and individuals susceptible to violent ideologies, or by disrupting the channels through which ideology is spread. Second, the actions of violent extremist organizations usually cause political and humanitarian crises in their targeted states. Often, states coordinate their internal responses in various forms of a crisis commission. Such commissions benefit from the political expediency of a state reacting to a crisis, and are able to quickly set internal policies that are rapidly entrenched.13 While convenient for immediate response action, policies set in this manner can be prepared hastily, and without adequate global coordination to remain effective.14 Dialogue regarding this issue should begin with discussing ways to disrupt the process of radicalization performed by violent extremists and the cultivation of a more cohesive and prepared global framework for response to extremist activity.

The face of radicalization today is quickly evolving. Consider, as a case study, perhaps the most successful radicalizer of modern times, known worldwide as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or as Daesh (dā`ish) in the Arabic speaking world. ISIL currently is directly combatting the Syrian Assad Loyalist, Iraqi, Kurdish, and various Syrian Revolutionary governments for territory, alongside ostensibly sixty other states in the stated pursuit of establishing a worldwide Caliphate. Organizations affiliated with ISIL are additionally active in Nigeria, Libya, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.15,16 The American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) estimated that by the end of the year 2015, approximately 30,000

11 Robert R. Tomes, “Relearning Counterinsurgency Warfare,” Parameters: U.S. Army War College 34:1 (2004): 16-28.12 Ivan Arreguin-Toft, “How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict,” International Security 26:1 (Summer 2001): 93-128.13 Ryan Shaffer, “Counter-Terrorism Intelligence, Policy and Theory Since 9/11,” Terrorism and Political Violence 27:2 (2015): 368-375.14 Ibid.15 Hamid Shalizi, “Exclusive: In turf war with Afghan Taliban, Islamic State loyalists gain ground,” Reuters, June 29, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/

article/us-afghanistan-islamic-state-idUSKCN0P91EN20150629.16 Katie Zavadski, “ISIS Now Has a Network of Military Affiliates in 11 Countries Around the World,” New York Magazine, November 23, 2014, http://

nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2014/11/isis-now-has-military-allies-in-11-countries.html.

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foreign fighters had been recruited from outside its primary territory in Syria and Iraq. Such numbers suggest that upwards of half of ISIL’s military capacity is sourced from abroad.17

Much of this success may be attributable to an eager and skillful adoption of increasingly universal internet-based social media. Experts find that ISIL’s media wing operates a more sophisticated program on websites such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube than most American private companies.18 Their campaigns, carefully cross-coordinated and utilizing select hashtags or images out of Raqqa, the capital in North Central Syria, depict the organization as a religious authority, capable state builder, and successful in its military campaigns. Not only has this lead to radicalization figures called “unprecedented” by the UN19 but it has also been believed to be successful in soliciting large support from anonymous donors worldwide.20

It is not simply that ISIL’s use of social media is impactful, but that an entire apparatus dedicated to radicalization through media is central to ISIL’s success. Three media wings have been founded simply to aid in this process: the Al-Furqan Foundation for Media Production, the Al-I’tsam Media Foundation, and the Al-Hayat Media Center. Between these three wings, ISIL produces physical propaganda such as CDs, DVDs, prints, and web media. Originally distributed via the Deep Web, ISIL produces and distributes the magazines Dabiq, Dar al-Islam, Konstantinyye, and Rumiyah which have been translated into a number of languages including English, French, German, Turkish, Russian, and Indonesian, among others.21 ISIL also coordinates sophisticated electronic media outreach efforts.

An ISIL produced and distributed mobile application, known as The Dawn of Glad Tidings, or more colloquially Dawn, allows users to submit personal information regarding their social media accounts to ISIL. The organization in turn mass posts imagery, messages, news, and custom hashtags through Dawn surrogate users. Furthermore, the application is carefully calibrated to not trip various social media platform anti-spam algorithms, and has intelligently used mass posting to change search suggestions to instead display whatever ISIL leadership wants.22 Such massive expansion into recent communications tech has allowed ISIL to turn the internet into a gargantuan radicalization network. States have as yet lacked major responses to such growth,

17 Amre Sarhan, “CIA: 30,000 foreign fighters have traveled to Syria and Iraq to join ISIS,” Iraqi News, September 29, 2015, http://www.iraqinews.com/iraq-war/cia-30000-foreign-fighters-traveled-syria-iraq-join-isis/.

18 Roula Khalaf and Sam Jones, “Selling terror: how Isis details its brutality: Jihadists issue ‘annual report’ of operations,” Financial Times, June 17, 2014, https://www.ft.com/content/69e70954-f639-11e3-a038-00144feabdc0.

19 Simon Tomlinson, “UN report says ‘unprecedented’ number of jihadists are flocking to join ISIS… partly thanks to the terror group’s love of posting kitten photos on Twitter,” Daily Mail.com, October 31, 2014, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2815895/UN-report-says-unprecedented-number-jihadists-flocking-join-ISIS-partly-thanks-terror-group-s-love-posting-kitten-photos-Twitter.html.

20 Christine Spolar, “The slow death of hope for America’s loyal friends in Iraq,” Financial Times, November 29, 2015, https://www.ft.com/content/19f0eece-9539-11e5-8389-7c9ccf83dceb.

21 “ISIS Declares Islamic Caliphate, Appoints Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi As ‘Caliph’, Declares All Muslims Must Pledge Allegiance To Him,” The Middle East Media Research Institute, June 30, 2014.

22 J. M. Berger, “How ISIS Games Twitter: The militant group that conquered northern Iraq is deploying a sophisticated social-media strategy,” The Atlantic, June 16, 2014, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/06/isis-iraq-twitter-social-media-strategy/372856/.

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and private web companies are left largely without support in combatting the expansion of extremist radicalization that has been hijacking their services.23

As a response to the diverse and widespread tactics used for radicalization, states have attempted to develop equally innovative reactionary mechanisms. It is important to note that while counterterrorism initiatives aim to eliminate violent threats, counter-radicalization methods cannot rely on forceful or military-driven solutions. States must focus on the underlying causes that allow radicalization to become globally proliferate and make it appealing to a general populace.24 Many existing programs try to accomplish this through education programs and on-the-ground intervention schemes. National governments and regional institutions have allied themselves with local leaders and community centers to help raise awareness. European states have also begun to implement local community-policing programs in which people may report on suspicious activity and such incidents would then be further investigated by a local task force.25 The European Union as a whole has also incorporated a central database of information regarding radicalized and terrorist groups into their response mechanism. Their Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) uses this information to then provide local guidance to communities that request assistance.26 Additionally, a number of states – including the United States and the United Kingdom – have increase national security measures, with the commitment to preventing high-risk individuals from entering the nations’ borders.27

Radicalization into violent extremism is a diffuse problem that has disastrous consequences if left unchecked. This committee’s commitment to international security should not be taken lightly as delegates begin to wrestle with this topic. It is similarly important to emphasize that the topic of radicalization is complicated a nuanced, as demonstrated by the aforementioned examples. Organizations that rely on both radicalization and violent extremism have well-established social networks that allow them channels through which to spread

23 David Goldman, “Twitter goes to war against ISIS,” CNN, February 5, 2016, http://money.cnn.com/2016/02/05/technology/twitter-terrorists-isis/.24 Rami G. Khouri, “Military responses alone will not defeat ISIL,” Al Jazeera, November 15, 2015, http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2015/11/

military-responses-alone-will-not-defeat-isil.html.25 “Preventing Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism: A Community-Policing Approach,”

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, February 2014. 26 “Strengthening the EU’s response to radicalization and violent extremism,” European Commission, January 15, 2014, http://europa.eu/rapid/

press-release_IP-14-18_en.htm.27 Angus, “Radicalisation and Violent Extremism.”

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their ideas and the adequate infrastructure into which new members can be incorporated and indoctrinated. Therefore, any responses posed by the committee, to address these complexities, needs to be similarly multi-faceted. The international community currently lacks a coordinated response and effective mechanism to stop radicalization at its roots. Members of this committee are encouraged to exercise their creativity and draw upon lessons learned from history to craft new solutions.

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History of the Problem

Early Religious Extremism

The history of Radicalization to Violent Extremism is fairly closely tied to the history of terrorism itself. Contemporary discussions and language, especially in the West, suggest a narrow set of actions that are prescribed as ‘terrorism.’ This said, as the history will demonstrate, terrorism and the radicalization inherently tied to it exists in different incarnations and different contexts throughout history.mViolent extremists have likely existed for as long has humanity has experienced ethnoreligious and socioeconomic strife. Earliest histories point to tactics associated with violent extremism within a religious context.28 The earliest known organization, the Sicarii, were Jewish Zealots operational during the first century. Named for the small daggers they concealed on their persons, called ‘sicae’, the Sicarii assassinated Roman Officials and Hebrew Sympathizers instrumental to the Roman occupation of Judea. This political targeting easily follows from their ideologies as a resistance organization, and radicalization likely appealed to the suffering resulting from the occupation of Judea as well as a defense of the Jewish communal ethnicity and religion.29

The Gunpowder Plot of 1605 is another such example of early violent extremism based on religion. As the Crown of England grew more and more Protestant in its leanings, ordinances against Catholics became increasingly severe with laws banning priests practicing Catholicism. Despite the threat of violence against active practice however, Catholicism continued in secret in some areas of England.30 A group of Catholic men of military backgrounds, one of whose uncle was executed on account of being a Catholic priest,31 conspired to detonate barrels of gunpowder below the English House of Lords. While the plan was narrowly defeated by British authorities it is evident that, radicalized by the suppression of their religion and possibly the personal loss of a father, the plotters turned to violent extremism as a defense of their Catholicism.

Secular Terrorism

With the climaxing of the Enlightenment began the western concepts of modern citizenship and nationalism that sparked a field of secular terrorism of several new motivations. Terrorism in the contemporary western definition begins as an official policy of revolutionary leaders in France during the French Revolution of the late eighteenth century in what is now known as the Reign of Terror. Maximilien Robespierre, spokesman of the Jacobin Club that drove much of the Revolution’s violence, described terrorism as an “Emanation of Justice”32 and used violence to execute mass numbers of political enemies in a highly public format. The Jacobins hoped

28 David C. Rapoport, “Fear and Trembling: Terrorism in Three Religious Traditions,” The American Political Science Review 78:3 (September 1984): 658-677.

29 Daniel C. Peterson and William J. Hamblin, “Who were the Sicarii?,” Meridian Magazine, June 7, 2004, http://ldsmag.com/article-1-4364/.30 Alan Haynes, Gunpowder Plot: Faith in Rebellion (Gloucestershire: The History Press, 2016). 31 Antonia Fraser, The Gunpowder Plot: Terror and Faith in 1605, (London: Phoenix, 2002).32 Maximilien Robespierre, “Justification of the Use of Terror,” February 1794.

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that through terrorizing the country, they could root out or silence any opposition to their republican ideals. To Robespierre, such an action was in the name of freedom, or as “a consequence of the general principle of democracy.” The consequent radicalization of members of the French elite can be attributed perhaps to a belief in the justness of their actions, as well as their political leanings which served as a distinct identity they wished to protect.

An early major populist extremism came in the form of the Narodnaya Volya, or the “People’s Will” in the late nineteenth Century. With the serfdom of Tsarist Russia abolished, Russian intelligentsia looked for ways to uplift their country. A series of intellectual dialogues across the nation resolved in a loose consensus upon a form of democratic socialism, but upon the intelligentsia’s attempts to begin speaking to assemblies, as many as 1,600 of them were jailed by the Tsar’s secret policemen.33 Enraged, the now populists formed the Narodnaya Volya and began a campaign of targeted bombings culminating in the assassination of Tsar Alexander II.34 For the Narodnaya Volya, just as for the French Jacobin Revolutionaries, the ideology that radicalized their followers was political. Its members were acutely aware of the intense serfdom the Russian people had been subjected to, and found their populism as a rallying cry for their betterment and dignity. Assassination targets were given internal absentee trials within the organization using researched arguments presented by its members.35 Such arguments were also distributed via a party newspaper which documented the party’s actions. This paper was spread through Russian intelligentsia in places such as schools. In fact, a large portion of arrested Narodnaya Volya members were discovered to be schoolteachers.36

While the French Jacobins and Russian Narodnaya Volya were operating against the existing native powers in their homeland, political extremism on the basis of ethnoreligious emancipation from foreign occupation is also historically prevalent. The Fenian Brotherhood was founded in the United States around 1858 by political dissidents from British occupied Ireland. Under British rule, Irish nationals suffered reductions in suffrage, economic collapse, and religious diminishment of the predominant Catholic faith. The Fenians hoped to trade for the freedom of Ireland by capturing strategic points in British Canada.37

They enjoyed short term success due in part to two factors. First, American politicians were initially apathetic to their founding due to anger over the lack of British aid for the Union during the American Civil War. As such, American law enforcement did not persecute Fenian militants and even facilitated their initial development by removing their militants from formal American draft lists. Second, by capitalizing on the increasingly affordable mass printing technology available at the time, the Fenians were able to issue propaganda and sell printed war bonds amongst the hundreds of thousands of Irish immigrants to the United States. In this

33 Derek Offord, The Russian Revolutionary Movement in the 1880s (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1986. 34 Ibid.35 Ibid.36 Ibid.37 Leon, Ó Broin, Fenian Fever: An Anglo-American Dilemna (London: Chatto & Windus, 1971).

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manner, even partially radicalized persons, the Irish immigrant populace, were utilized to further the actions and ideals of fully radicalized soldiers of the Fenian Brotherhood.38,39

The ability to use advances in media and information distribution, such as mass printing, allowed for the development of new support groups to extremists among sympathizers who were only somewhat radicalized. This effect cannot be understated; mobilizing more ‘normal’ individuals through such methods as financial support, voting and political support, or even social media presence in the case of ISIL allows a massive expansion of operations for the radical organization in question. Additionally, non-state organizations tend to deviate from open, conventional armed conflict. Instead, aggression on the part of such organizations is necessarily expressed through cyber-attacks, terrorist attacks, or small-scale operations, such as suicide, targeted assassinations, and car bombings, favored by current militants in Syria and Iraq.40,41 Violent non-state organizations rely on smaller groups of highly dedicated members to achieve their goals. Prominent, new, forms of contemporary violent extremism fall into several categories: nationalist insurgencies/colonial independence movements, domestic or “Lone-Wolf” terrorism, leftist insurgencies, and fundamentalist terrorism.

Radical Nationalist Insurgencies Case Study: Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)

Before and during its colonization, the island of Ceylon was home to three major kingdoms. Two of these, the Kingdom of Kotte and the Kingdom of Kandy, were Buddhist majority states of Sinhalese ethnolinguistic heritage and controlled most of the island. The final Jaffna Kingdom, concentrated in the island’s north, was of Tamil ethnolinguistic heritage and predominantly Hindu beliefs. After a tumultuous sixteenth and seventeenth century, Ceylon was “united” under the British empire as a protectorate in 1815 during the colonial era. The union under the British Empire as British Ceylon crown colony laid the foundation for the social discord in Sri Lanka. To further complicate the social strata, the British brought around a million Indian, non-Ceylon native, Tamilians and settled them as indentured workers in the hill country at the center of the island.42

Modern-day unrest in Sri Lanka has its roots in the development of nationalist sentiment as well as state-sponsored and independent aggression towards the Tamil Minority. Protestant missionary activity from America inspired Tamilian community leaders to begin creating separate schools, temples, community organizations, and cultural literature to strengthen Tamilian culture in Sri Lanka.43 Tamils were able to enjoy

38 Owen McGee, The IRB: The Irish Republican Brotherhood, from the Land League to Sinn Fein, Second edition (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2007). 39 Ó Broin, Fenian Fever.40 “Several killed in Syria car bombings,” BBC News, November 5, 2012, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-20205432.41 “Syrian revels emboldened after assassinations,” CBS News, July 19, 2012, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/

syrian-rebels-emboldened-after-assassinations/.42 “The Population of Sri Lanka,” Committee for International Cooperation in National Research Demography,1974.43 Murugar Gunasingam, Sri Lankan Tamil nationalism: A study of its origins (London: MV Publications LTD, 1999), 108, 201.

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disproportionate success in British style college education due to a focus on the English language in Tamil schools. 44

After Sri Lankan independence in 1948, however, the majority Sinhalese government began instituting a number of measures that negatively affected the Tamil minority. First, the Ceylon Citizenship Act of 1948 denied citizenship to all Indian Origin Sri Lankans, attempting to deport the approximate million Tamils brought by British imperialism and alienating all minority communities.45 Following this, a series of harsh policies that banned the English language, colonized Tamil land, repressed Tamil culture, and limited external intervention was enacted and enforced. 46 When the 1958 race riots occurred, during which up to 1,500 Tamilians were killed and countless others subjected to physical abuse, the Sinhalese majority government blamed and banned the Tamilian Federal Party.47 After the 1973 Standardization Act, which created an affirmative action system in education favoring Sinhalese, Tamilian Politicians began calling for a separate Tamilian State.48

The Liberation Tamil Tigers Eelam (LTTE) paramilitary insurgency was formed as a response to the denial of this request for a Tamil State in 1976. Radicalization for the defense of Tamilians from repressive Sinhalese programs and perceived humiliation of Tamil culture motivated the LTTE’s operations. Militant members engaged in socially intensive behaviors such as abstaining from sex, drugs, alcohol, and tobacco, as well as carrying cyanide capsules to prevent their interrogation upon capture.49 It effectively united all elements of society into mobilization, overcoming the traditional gender, caste, and religious divides of the Tamil community by establishing secular ideologies inclusive of the Tamil Muslim population alongside the majority Hindus in addition to the inclusion of women as equals.50,51

Next, the LTTE was respected within its de facto controlled areas as a state, not just an insurgency. The Tamil Eelam state founded by the LTTE provided courts, policing, human rights associations, humanitarian divisions, health boards, educational provisions, a bank, and an official radio station.52,53 So effective were these measures that systemic problems such as domestic abuse dropped due to LTTE governance.54 The LTTE was

44 J. E. Jayasuriya, Education in the Third World: Some Reflections (Bombay: Somaiya, 1981). 45 R. Cheran, “Roots of Sri Lankan conflict,” The Real News, November 4, 2016, http://therealnews.com/t2/index.php?option=com_content&task=vie

w&id=31&Itemid=74&jumival=3555.46 Russel R. Ross and Andrea Matles Savada, ed., “Sri Lanka: a country study,” Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress, 1988.47 “Root Causes of the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka,” Tamil Guardian, February 19, 2008, http://www.tamilguardian.com/content/

root-causes-ethnic-conflict-sri-lanka.48 Jayasuriya, Education in the Third World. 49 Stephen E. Atkins, Encyclopedia of Modern Worldwide Extremists and Extremist Group (London: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2004), 252.50 “Tamil Tiger proposals,” BBC News, November 1, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3232913.stm.51 Velupillai Pirabaharan, “Women’s International Day Message,” March 8, 1992. 52 Kristian Stokke, “Building the Tamil Eelam State: Emerging State Institutions and Forms of Governance in LTTE-Controlled Areas in Sri Lanka,” Third

World Quarterly 27:6 (2006): 1021-1040. 53 Deirdre McConnell, “The Tamil people’s right to self-determination,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 21:1 (2008): 59-76.54 Rahila Gupta, “Sri Lanka: women in conflict,” Open Democracy, March 7, 2014, https://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/rahila-gupta/

sri-lanka-women-in-conflict.

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extremely successful in leveraging sympathetic, partially-radicalized support from abroad, operating a number of front organizations that collected donations, curated investment portfolios, developed propaganda, and even negotiated arms deals with North Korea.55

In addition to these elements, what may be the most decisive element of mass radicalization for the LTTE was Black July. Victims of a particular LTTE ambush of Sinhalese soldiers were to be buried by the government in the capital en masse rather than given the standard procedure of being returned to their home villages.56 Public outcry incited a riot which began growing through the city of Colombo and spread to a number of other cities throughout the following week. This event united Tamilians regardless of their origin: Indian or Ceylonese, Hindu, Muslim, or Buddhist.57 Eyewitness reports cite that during this period, Tamils being systematically hunted using checkpoints and voter registration, as well as Tamils being targeted for beatings, rapes, immolation, and dismemberment. Government forces in both military and police branches were observed by the international community to be either apathetic or even complicit in the violence.58 Black July effectively turned entire communities into martyrs; it became a recruitment campaign for the LTTE and a rallying cry for their radicalization. Young Tamilians joined the LTTE and other counter-Sinhalese insurgent groups in the thousands; the fleeing Tamil diaspora became a massive international financial support structure.59

Domestic ‘Lone Wolf’ Case Study: Oklahoma City Bombing

Around 9:00 am on April 19th, 1995 a truck bomb with the estimated explosive force of 2,300 kilograms of TNT60 exploded outside the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in the heart of Oklahoma City. The blast killed 168 people, injured upwards of 680 additional victims, and damaged $652 million worth of property.61,62 Media sources and investigators alike conjectured on whether the bombers were the same radical Islamic terrorists responsible for the 1993 World Trade Center bombing two years before, or possibly Latin American drug cartel operatives targeting DEA officers within the building.63 However within a matter of hours primary perpetrators Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols had been apprehended; both bombers were confirmed to be American born and raised.64

55 Rohan Gunaratne, “Transcript – Rohan Gunaratne,” Lessons Learnt & Reconciliation Commission, October 1, 2010, https://llrclk.wordpress.com/2010/10/01/rohan-gunaratne/.

56 Edgar O’Ballance, Terrorism in the 1980s (New York: Arms and Armour Press, 1989), 21.57 Roland Buerk, “Sri Lankan families count cost of war,” BBC News, July 23, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7521197.stm.58 Edward Aspinall and Robin Jeffrey, Diminishing Conflicts: Learning from the Asia-Pacific, ed. Edward Aspinall, Robin Jeffrey, and Anthony J. Regan

(London: Routledge, 2013), 104.59 Frances Harrison, “Twenty years on – riots that led to war,” BBC News, July 23, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3090111.stm.60 Paul F. Mlakar et al., “The Oklahoma City Bombing: Analysis of Blast Damage to the Murrah Building,” Journal of Performance of Constructed

Facilities 12:3 (August 1998): 113-119.61 Sheryll Shariat, Sue Mallonee, and Shelli Stephens Stidham, “Oklahoma City Bombing Injuries,” Oklahoma State Department of Health, December

1998.62 Christopher Hewitt, Understanding Terrorism in America: From the Klan to al Qaeda (New York: Routledge, 2003), 106. 63 Mark S. Hamm, Apocalypse In Oklahoma: Waco and Ruby Ridge Revenged (New England: Northeastern, 1997).64 Richard A. Serrano, One of Ours: Timothy McVeigh and the Oklahoma City Bombing (New York City: W. W. Norton & Company, 1998), 139-141.

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Both the 1992 Ruby Ridge Standoff and second the 1993 Waco Siege were cited as motivations for the bombing. These incidents involved escalations to violence between American government agencies and private citizens that resulted in unnecessary civilian death.65 McVeigh felt sympathy for the victims of these two events and a growing distaste for the American government that culminated in the creation of a bomb. Deeper analysis of McVeigh’s character and influences may yield better understanding of why he became a lone wolf extremist. He experienced a troubled childhood, with his parents divorcing during his adolescence and he was targeted for bullying by classmates throughout his early schooling.66 McVeigh then quickly dropped out of college and joined the U.S. Infantry.67 Despite honorable discharge with a number of service awards, McVeigh claims that his hatred of the government first began during his time in the military. He is additionally noted as having gained access to study material on explosives as well as affiliating with the KKK.68 After military service McVeigh struggled to hold any semblance of a normal life; he was unable to find a wife, felt that he harmed his family, left home, and began obsessively gambling. Again, he found control over his life in the form of guns, visiting eighty gun shows in over forty states where he sold survivalist items and copies of The Turner Diaries, an internationally-designated hate book espousing White Supremacy.69

An important delineation should be made here regarding McVeigh’s mental health. There is a popular belief within the Western general public that the perpetrators of such acts of violent extremism experience mental disability or disorder of some form. Little scholarly data exists to support this conclusion. While incarcerated, McVeigh was examined by psychiatrist Dr. John Smith who found him sane. He additionally was not found to be psychopathic; during his examination, he hinted that he deeply regretted the death of the nineteen children who died in the blast. Further, he noted that he had initially intended to target another government building, but when he learned it had a private florist shop on the ground floor, he instead chose the Murrah building for its entirely public staffing to prevent collateral death. Dr. Smith concluded that “[McVeigh] was a decent person who allowed rage to build up inside him to the point that he had lashed out in one terrible, violent act.”70

McVeigh’s experiences suggest a possible mixture of conditions that foster lone wolf radicalization. First, he was never able to make connections in his personal, social, and romantic lives so as to integrate smoothly into society. Second he was able, through his military experience and cultural upbringing, be exposed to methods of combat and the technology that contributed to his ability to craft an explosive. Third, McVeigh felt a connection between his identity and that of the events at Ruby Ridge and Waco such as to consider their

65 Hamm, Apocalypse In Oklahoma.66 Dale Russakoff and Serge F. Kovaleski, “An Ordinary Boy’s Extraordinary Rage,” The Washington Post, July 2, 1995, http://www.washingtonpost.

com/wp-srv/national/longterm/oklahoma/bg/mcveigh.htm.67 “Timeline: Oklahoma bombing,” BBC News, May 11, 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1319772.stm.68 Lou Michel and Dan Herbeck, American Terrorist: Timothy McVeigh & The Tragedy at Oklahoma City (New York: Harper, 2002). 69 Ibid.70 “Profile: Timothy McVeigh,” BBC News, May 11, 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1321244.stm.

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victims to be martyrs. These conditions may explain why McVeigh felt an impetus to radicalize against what he perceived was a great evil in the American government.

Radical Left Wing Extremism Case Study: Naxalite-Maoists

The Naxalites take their name from the West Bengal village of Naxalbari in India, where their uprising had its origins. This movement sprung from dissatisfaction with landlord ownership of property.71 Therefore, the theories of Chinese Communist Revolutionary leader Mao Zedong became the popular literature and rallying cry of the Naxalite movement.72 Ever since, Naxalite armed cadres have engaged in guerilla warfare with state police forces, have created legal political parties vying in Indian parliament elections, and have extorted taxation across their de facto control zone in the Red Corridor. While estimates of Naxalite size vary, all sources agree that the organization has grown rapidly and the highest estimates put their numbers at 10,000 to 40,000 regular members alongside 50,000 to 100,000 militia irregular members.73

The socioeconomic context and successful government response are what make the Naxalites a beneficial case study. Heavy Naxalite presence and operations define an area known as the ‘Red Corridor’ of India, starting in Nepal and running along the eastern side of the peninsular subcontinent until the northern fringes of Tamil Nadu, the south easternmost state. Economically, these districts encompassed are some of the country’s poorest, with low wealth as well has high levels of economic inequality.74 Industrially, these districts are almost purely primary sector economies, with agriculture being supplemented only by mining and timber harvest. Primary sector economies are usually unable to support large population expansions, such as the one India is experiencing, or provide the modernizing influences associated with urbanized society.75 Socially, these districts remain close to traditional caste separations leading to heavy stratification of society.76 Additionally, they all exhibit high populations of India’s impoverished remnant tribal groups such as Santhal and Gond peoples.77 These factors may explain why the Naxalites are able to easily radicalize and levy local people in the Red Corridor against the Indian Government.

There exists an interesting caveat to the Red Corridor known as the Odisha Gap. While the Red Corridor covers lengthwise nearly the entire longitude of India, the State of Odisha’s coastline stands out as having significantly lower Naxalite activity and support and as such is not considered part of the Corridor. Odisha’s coastal region is characterized by higher literacy rates as well as greater economic diversification than that

71 A. K. Diwanji, “Who are the Naxalites?,” rediff.com, October 2, 2003, http://ia.rediff.com/news/2003/oct/02spec.htm.72 “History of Naxalism,” Hindustan Times, December 15, 2005, http://www.hindustantimes.com/india/history-of-naxalism/story-

4f1rZukARGYn3qHOqDMEbM.html.73 William Magioncalda, “A Modern Insurgency: India’s Evolving Naxalite Problem,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 8, 2010.74 Debal K. SinghaRoy, Peasant’s Movements in Post-Colonial India: Dynamics of Mobilization and Identity (London: SAGE Publications, 2004).75 Dietmar Rothermund, An Economic History of India (London: Routledge, 1993).76 Human Rights Watch, Broken People: Caste Violence Against India’s ‘Untouchables’ (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999).77 Oliver Springate-Baginski and Piers Blaikie, ed., Forests, People and Power: The Political Ecology of Reform of South Asia (Sterling, VA: Earthscan,

2007).

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of the Red Corridor.78 The Odisha Gap suggests that the economic opportunity and education in a more prosperous economic zone may stave off the radicalizing elements present within left wing extremism.

The successful response of Indian authorities to the uptick of Naxalite killings and recruitment in the late 2000s may offer a set of possible solutions to addressing radical groups via socioeconomic means. In 2009, the union government announced the implementation of the “Integrated Action Plan” or IAP. The IAP employed a two-pronged plan: a modernization and expansion of police infrastructure as well as an expansive series of development. On the policing side, the IAP expanded the coverage of police offices, increased staff size and training, developed police intelligence networks, improved coordination protocols, and even obtained police helicopters. On the economic side, 70,706 developmental projects were arranged to help building schools, community centers, public sanitation facilities, road infrastructure, healthcare facilities, and irrigation.79,80 The follow-up program, the Additional Central Assistance (ACA), created community councils to represent either local poor or tribal authorities that worked with the government to provide vocational trainings to rural poor youth, offer preschool education, expand mobile services, begin Credit societies, and fight slum development through improving housing.81,82 The two-pronged approach effectively brought governance to sectors of East India that had seen very little of it in the past and has, thus far, been largely successful. Death rates have decreased in the hundreds every year since IAP deployment, and in 2015, measured at about a quarter of what they were before the IAP in 2009.83

78 Sanjoy Chakravorty and Somik V. Lall, Made in India: The Political Geography and Political Economy of Industrialization (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

79 Magioncalda, “A Modern Insurgency.”80 “Integrated Action Plan for Naxal-hit districts a success: Chidambaram,” The Hindu, May 9, 2012, http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/

integrated-action-plan-for-naxalhit-districts-a-success-chidambaram/article3400381.ece.81 “Guidelines: Additional Central Assistance to States for Slum Development,” Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation of the Government

of India. 82 “Development Schemes in Naxal Affected Districts,” Press Information Bureau of the Government of India, March 4, 2011, http://pib.nic.in/newsite/

PrintRelease.aspx?relid=116427.83 Muhammad Zamir, “India faces internal challenge from Maoist-Naxalites,” The Financial Express, September 16, 2013, http://print.

thefinancialexpress-bd.com/old/index.php?ref=MjBfMDlfMTZfMTNfMV85Ml8xODM1NDA=.

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Past Actions

Relevant Past actions include attempts by the UN to provide a global framework for disrupting radicalization as well as expansion of research on the psychology and pathways radicalization hinges upon.

Global framework for specifically targeting the radicalization process is lacking both in its global participation and clear policy agenda. Much of the pertinent and specifically international discussion has centered around UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon’s “Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism”84 in which the Office of the Secretary offered explanation of contexts as well as policy suggestions for combatting radicalization across the globe. The policies proposed are a diverse attack on radicalizing organizations including “better service delivery, accountability for gross violations, enhancing community policing, empowering youth, addressing existing human rights violations, protecting and empowering women, mainstreaming gender perspectives, fostering an entrepreneurial culture amongst youth.”85 Despite the comprehensiveness of this 22-page report, the following General Assembly resolution86 simply stated:

1. Welcomes the initiative by the Secretary-General, and takes note of his Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism; 2. Decides to give further consideration to the Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism beginning in the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy review in June 2016 as well as in other relevant forums.

Without formal adoptions in national policies, or General Assembly resolutions securing international programs to enact the Secretary General’s proposals, the international conversation has stagnated.

Additionally, Naz Modirzadeh, founding Director of the Harvard Law School Program on International Law and Armed Conflict, has noted six critical flaws with the Secretary General’s proposal. First, that Violent Extremism is globally undefined. Second, there is a dearth of scholastic research on radicalization which makes it difficult to identify causal links to radicalization. Third, that the proposals made for states to reduce radicalized extremism prescribe too broad and too unspecified of solutions to be practically achievable. Fourth, the proposal suggests that existing resources be remobilized away from existing international efforts rather than the levying of new resources, harming those humanitarian and security programs which are already in place. Fifth, the Secretary General’s proposals do not ground themselves in, or interact with, existing international law. Sixth, the proposal suggests the merging of Counter Violent Extremist programs with others which would

84 “Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism: Report of the Secretary-General,” United Nations General Assembly, December 24, 2015.85 Naz Modirzadeh, “If It’s Broke, Don’t Make it Worse: A Critique of the U.N. Secretary-General’s Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism,” Lawfare,

January 23, 2016, https://www.lawfareblog.com/if-its-broke-dont-make-it-worse-critique-un-secretary-generals-plan-action-prevent-violent-extremism.

86 “Draft resolution submitted by the President of the General Assembly: Secretary-General’s Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism,” United Nations General Assembly, February 9, 2016.

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disadvantage both. Lastly, seventh, if the Secretary general’s proposal is fully accepted and every state redrafts its counter extremism programs, they may themselves inspire extremist backlash.87 These problems will have to be taken into consideration when considering the Secretary General’s proposals and in crafting future solutions.

Other global initiatives to consider are the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee, as well as the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF). The Counter-Terrorism Committee, founded after the September 11 attacks in the United States, exists as a subsidiary body to the Security Council and is entrusted with carrying out the resolutions 1373 and 1624. These include such provisions as criminalizing state and individual assistance of extremist activities, financial freezing of extremist assets, information sharing about possible attacks, and improved border screening.88 The CTITF was given its mandate by the General Assembly in 2006 to carry out the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. It operates as a collective of 38 international entities – including Interpol, The Office of the Secretary General, and the Al-Qaida/Taliban Monitoring Team , among others – vested in the combatting of violent extremism.89,90 While the organizations of CTITF and the Counter-Terrorism Committee may have the ability to leverage large resources amongst themselves, their activities are currently focused on actions specifically against existing, known, radical organizations, and lack distinct programs against the radicalization process itself.

Research into the pathways that bring either an individual or a group into radicalized behavior has not been conclusive, perhaps due to the lack of international support for the work or the difficulty of collecting data on the subject. Nonetheless, theories have been drawn up on what forms radicalizations takes, the prevailing of which categorizes these forms as individual level factors, group level factors, and mass radicalization.91

Individual forms of radicalization include personal grievance, group grievance, slippery slope, love, risk and status seeking, and unfreezing. Personal grievance specifies feelings of revenge for acts perceived to be committed against an individual. Possible examples include conspirators of the aforementioned Gunpowder Plot, brothers Robert and Thomas Wintour, whose uncle was publicly hung, then drawn and quartered by the English Government. Another could be the Chechen ‘Shahidikas’, or ‘Black Widows’, female suicide bombers whose husbands were killed by the Russian Government.92 Group grievance operates the same, except that the individual acts on behalf of a group or cause, such as the LTTE against the Sri Lankan Government.

87 Modirzadeh, “If It’s Broke, Don’t Make it Worse.” 88 “The United Nations Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee,” Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee, accessed November 17,

2016, https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/.89 “Entities,” United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, accessed November 17, 2016, https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/ctitf/

en/structure.90 “UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy,” United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, accessed November 17, 2016, https://www.

un.org/counterterrorism/ctitf/en/un-global-counter-terrorism-strategy.91 Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, Friction: How Radicalization Happens to Them and Us (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).92 Andrew Osborn, “Moscow’s bombing: who are the Black Widows,” The Telegraph, March 29, 2010, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/

europe/russia/7534464/Moscow-bombing-who-are-the-Black-Widows.html.

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Slippery slope refers to when individuals are become increasingly involved with political cause to the point of obsession, such as Timothy McVeigh’s involvement with far-right politics before he committed the Oklahoma City bombing. Love as a pathway refers to when people radicalize due to their emotional connection to other radicalized persons, as may have happened with the families present at Ruby Ridge and the Waco Siege. Risk and Status seeking refers to the tendency of individuals, particularly young and underserved men, to commit risky actions for social capital within a group.93 Finally, unfreezing would be the increased openness to radical ideas of individuals who experience loss of social connection to friends, family, or society at large. Timothy McVeigh may once again be an example of this form, and similar forms of radicalization has been noted in the development of prison gang culture.94

Group level factors include group polarization, group competition, and group isolation. Instances of group polarization can occur when a group engages in persistent discussion and interaction with itself, increasingly favoring a certain, extreme viewpoint. The Russian Narodnaya Volya, or People’s Will, through their academic discussion roots, may be such an example. Group competition refers to the escalation of policy within a radical group when it operates in competition with other radical groups. An example may be the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). While the group initially did not employ suicide bombings as a tactic, when competing radical organization Hamas gained political power and influence through suicide bombings, the PFLP shifted towards staging suicide bombings as well.95 Group isolation refers to the increase in control that radical elements of a group gain when the group becomes isolated from society at large.96 With the group experiencing social contact only with itself, radical beliefs have less resistance against their spreading.

Mass radicalization methods include martyrdom, hatred, and jujitsu politics. Martyrdom is the institutionalized belief in the value of death within some radical elements, especially predominant in fundamentalist radicals. The death-based ideology of the Nizari Assassins may be considered such a form of martyrdom. Hatred is specific reliance of a radicalizing group upon anger against another group, particularly in cases where the others are demonized or considered unhuman. The KKK, in all of its iterations, very clearly utilizes such a radicalizing element in its rhetoric against Black Americans, Jewish Americans, immigrants, and other American minorities. Finally, jujitsu politics, named for its similarity to the martial art technique of leveraging an opponent against itself, refers to the strategy of specifically provoking a government or dominant group into a crackdown using a highly public attack. The resulting crackdown creates in sociopolitical backlash, radicalizing members of what was the minority’s moderate section. This tactic has been successfully employed

93 McCauley and Moskalenko, Friction. 94 John Fighel, “The Radicalization Process in Prisons,” International Institute for Counterterrorism, December 25, 2007.95 Sean Yom and Basel Saleh, “Palestinian Suicide Bombers: A Statistical Analysis,” Economists for Peace and Security, November 2004.96 Lorenzo Vidino, “Countering Radicalization in America: Lessons from Europe,” United States Institute of Peace, November 2010.

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by several Fundamentalist and Leftist radical organizations, including the Naxalites and most famously by Al-Qaida through its September 11 attack.97,98

Research has also suggested that there exist some misconceptions popularly held by contemporary policymakers. First, there is little evidence for causality between poverty and radicalization. The Naval Postgraduate School has found that many terrorists have hailed from their country’s middle class, and often hold university level degrees.99 This is further supported by an article published by The Economist that compiled research from a number of institutions to assess correlations between public support for radical attacks and economic or educational level, along with comparisons of radical suicide bombers demographics against that of their native male populations.100 Additionally, mental health issues have not been shown to have significant interplay with the radicalization process. University of Chicago Scholar Robert Pape finds that, even amongst suicide bombers, the investigations into radicalized individuals have not found a correlation between psychological disorders such as sociopathy or schizophrenia and propensity to radicalize toward violence.101

97 Craig Rosebraugh, The Logic of Political Violence: Lessons in Reform and Revolution (Minneapolis: Arissa Media Group, LLC, 2004).98 David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 99 Anne Marie Baylouny, “Emotions, Poverty, or Politics? Misconceptions about Islamist Movements,” Connections 3:1 (March 2004): 41-47.100 “Exploding misconceptions: Alleviating poverty may not reduce terrorism but could make it less effective,” The Economist, December 16, 2010,

http://www.economist.com/node/17730424.101 Robert Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (New York: Random House Trade Paperbacks, 2006).

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Possible Solutions

While coordinated, large-scale efforts against radicalization currently only exist in the United States and Denmark, cues may still be taken from their actions as the committee seeks to develop its own policy recommendations. The Politiets Efterretningstjeneste (PET), Denmark’s Security and Intelligence Service, has developed a triage and assessment system for dealing with radicalization. It begins first and most generally with an ‘Outreach’ section, then a ‘Capacity Building’ section, then finally the ‘Exit’ section. The Danish model has been effective in its diminishment of radicalization influences.102

The Outreach section addresses societal structures and institutes that may encourage radicalization, but are not themselves an immediate security threat. This section of the plan is not overseen by the PET, but is instead handled by the Danish Ministry of Social Affairs. First, the Ministry locates areas at risk of radicalization, then works with local and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), community centers, community leaders, and parents to disseminate anti-radicalization information and programs aimed at halting the radicalization of young people.103 The Capacity Building section is run by the PET and consists of PET field workers cultivating specific partnerships with community leaders such as sports coaches or religious figures to create a network. These field workers are additionally given extensive training in mediation, identification procedures, and preventative policy work to help shape local communities as well as identify problematic trends which may result in radicalization.104 Finally, the Exit section very closely works with individuals believed to have been at some point radicalized. In the case of Denmark, this largely refers to individuals who have left combat zones in the Middle East and returned home. PET workers monitor and work with these individuals to ensure their psycho-social reintegration to Danish society while preventing a future outbreak and possible violence from these affected individuals.105

Next, the American Model has developed over the course of its responses to radicalized extremist attacks first during the September 11 attacks in 2001 and continuing into 2016 with the Pulse Night Club shooting and the San Bernardino shooting. The current iteration of American response to radicalization has been built upon a groundwork of targeted dismantling of radical organizations and lethal action against radical leaders, while offering little policy towards disruption of the radicalization process.106 However, there are indications that more emphasis will be placed on targeting the source of radicalization with U.S. President Barack Obama meeting with American Silicon Valley social media and internet leaders such as Facebook, Twitter, Apple,

102 “The Preventative Security Department,” Danish Security and Intelligence Service, accessed November 17, 2016, https://www.pet.dk/English/The%20Preventive%20Security%20Department.aspx.

103 Naser Khader, “The Danish Model for Prevention of Radicalization and Extremism,” Hudson Institute, August 14, 2014, http://www.hudson.org/research/10555-the-danish-model-for-prevention-of-radicalization-and-extremism.

104 “The Preventative Security Department.” 105 Khader, “The Danish Model for Prevention of Radicalization and Extremism.”106 “Fact Sheet: The President’s May 23 Speech on Counterterrorism,” The White House Office of the Press Secretary, May 23, 2013, https://www.

whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/fact-sheet-president-s-may-23-speech-counterterrorism.

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Microsoft, LinkedIn, Dropbox, and YouTube.107 While there has not yet been a sweeping executive reform to result from this partnership, the White House’s shift in focus may result in improvements in encryption cooperation between private social media firms and counter-terrorism forces, alongside the development of improved resources in social media to flag and halt radicalizing messages. The American State Department has also announced its intentions to work with allied nations to perform similar actions.108 As initially discussed with the example of ISIL, the usage of social media as a radicalizing tool cannot be ignored, and policies similar to American cooperation with social media should be considered.

Both the Danish and American Models may hold a successive path forward, but both are an offensive against radicalizing forces by directly disrupting the process. It is likely necessary to also incorporate defensive policies that address the contextual landscape of radicalization. Here, the aforementioned CTITF Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism pushed by the Office of the Secretary General can again be referenced. The Plan of Action first calls for the need of all National Governments to produce their own Plans of Action for Preventing Violent Extremism, alongside Regional Plans of Action created in cooperation between states.109

Then, the Secretary-General specifically calls for multidisciplinary approaches to be present, alongside sustainable practices that will carry into the future. Furthermore, the Plan of Actions calls for seven specific policy recommendation areas that member states should look to address: Dialogue and Conflict Prevention; Strengthening Good Governance, Human Rights, and the Rule of Law; Engaging Communities; Empowering Youth; Gender Equality and Empowering Women; Education, Skill Development, and Employment Facilitation; and Strategic Communications, the Internet, and social media.110 While the Plan of Action identifies these core areas for discussion, and justifies their relevance to fight against radicalization, it lacks specificity and does not point to concrete, legislative actions. This committee, then, will have to assess the success of existing policy both at home and abroad to make informed contributions in a solution that will, ideally, be effective in actualizing and addressing the areas of concern highlighted by the Secretary-General’s plan.

107 Danny Yadron, “Agenda for White House summit with Silicon Valley,” The Guardian, January 7, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/jan/07/white-house-summit-silicon-valley-tech-summit-agenda-terrorism.

108 Greg Miller and Karen DeYoung, “Obama Administration plans shake-up in propaganda war against ISIS,” The Washington Post, January 8, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/obama-administration-plans-shake-up-in-propaganda-war-against-the-islamic-state/2016/01/08/d482255c-b585-11e5-a842-0feb51d1d124_story.html.

109 “Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism.”110 Ibid.

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Bloc Positions

Africa

The African Continent is the region perhaps most affected by radicalized elements outside of the Middle East. Notable radical elements include the Al-Qaeda affiliated Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Boko Haram, Al-Qaeda affiliated Al-Shabab, and the Christian Fundamentalist Lord’s Resistance Army.111 Despite this, counter-radicalization efforts in Africa face political realities of the region. Both national governments and the African Union’s internal discussions have addressed the need for continued focus on development, and the lack of available resources to dedicate to counter-terrorism. Recently, the African Union has recognized radical elements and laid out legal parameters against them in such measures as the Assembly of the Union on the Prevention and Combatting of Terrorism [Assembly/AU/dec.311(XV)] and has appointed the AU Special Representative for Counter-Terrorism Cooperation.

Since the AU’s 2002 Plan of Action, the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) in Algiers has provided the scholastic leadership for AU counter-radicalism policy.112 Unfortunately, lack of resources and an increasing division in African politics along sectarian lines has caused state response to radical groups to stagnant and possibly even counterproductive. For example, the Institute for Security Studies has found that excessive force on behalf of the Kenyan Security Forces had driven young Muslims into Al-Shabab, and that simultaneously, Kenyan government statements have denied any connection between domestic policy and the growth of radical elements at home.113 To move forward, Africa nations will likely have to prioritize the development of sustainable counter-radical resources that do not pull away from national focus on development, while being more sensitive to the contexts causing radicalization. The region may seek to draw on international support and a coordination of national and international resources.

Middle East and North Africa (MENA)

The MENA Region is the foremost victim of radical extremist violence and the primary supplier of radicalized militants. Much of Radicalism’s success in the region is consequent of collapsing state control, with primary terrorist activity in states such as Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Yemen, Afghanistan, Syria, and Iraq, all of which have roots in civil disturbance during the recent Arab Spring. In states where no such civil disturbance has occurred, radical violence and recruitment risk are significantly lower, such as in Oman, Saudi Arabia, the

111 “Kidnapped Nigerian Girls: Key Terrorist Groups in Africa,” ABC News, accessed November 17, 2017, http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/fullpage/african-terrorist-groups-infographic-23610960.

112 “The African Union Counter Terrorism Framework,” African Union Peace and Security, last modified November 23, 2015, accessed November 17, 2016, http://www.peaceau.org/en/page/64-counter-terrorism-ct.

113 “Is Kenya’s response to terrorism making it worse?,” Institute for Security Studies, October 15, 2014, https://www.issafrica.org/about-us/press-releases/is-kenyas-response-to-terrorism-making-it-worse.

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United Arab Emirates, Iran, and Morocco.114 Regional framework and legislation for counter-radicalization is grossly outdated, and unreflective of the current political landscape of the region. The standing regional papers governing cooperation on counter terrorism are the League of Arab States’ Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (1998), and the Convention of the Organization of the Islamic Conference on Combating International Terrorism (1999). Cooperation for future legislation seems unlikely, especially as Saudi Arabia and Iran, both accused of state-sponsored terrorism, jockey for regional hegemony.115,116 Furthermore, Amnesty International has cited these conventions as problematic in their possibility for abuse of human rights.117 MENA States will need to prioritize counter-radical programs that can halt the movement of radicalism between states engaged in civil strife and the rest of the region.

114 “Middle East and North Africa,” in “Political Risk Outlook 2016,” Verisk Maplecroft, January 22, 2016.115 Edward Clifford, “Financing Terrorism: Saudi Arabia and Its Foreign Affairs,” Brown Political Review, December 6, 2014, http://www.

brownpoliticalreview.org/2014/12/financing-terrorism-saudi-arabia-and-its-foreign-affairs/.116 “State Sponsors of Terrorism,” U.S. Department of State, accessed November 17, 2016, http://www.state.gov/j/ct/list/c14151.htm.117 “The Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism: a serious threat to human rights,” Amnesty International UK, January 31, 2002, https://

www.amnesty.org.uk/press-releases/arab-convention-suppression-terrorism-serious-threat-human-rights-0.

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East Asia and Oceania

The response of this region has primarily been through the conventions of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). The APEC Counter-Terrorism Task Force (APEC CTTF) was founded in 2003 to handle implementation and capacity building for counterterrorism efforts. Its relative success resulted in an expansion of force and purview in 2013. The highly commercial status of APEC, coupled with the geography of the Pacific region has led to focus on travel-based disruption of radicalization, with extensive measures to improve airport and seaport screening security, and regional radical identification mechanisms. In order to protect the lucrative and trade through the Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea, APEC has developed Trade Recovery Programs to stave terrorist activity away from disrupting commercial and financial structures.118

While financial protection is not immediately pertinent to the process of radicalization, it should be recognized that radical groups could access accounts and funds illicitly and repurpose these for their own activities. This is similar perhaps to what ISIL has done with banks in its zone of de facto control.119 The commercial focus of counter terrorism should not diminish the threat of radicalization occurring in the region. Turkic and Uyghur separatist radicals, such as the Grey Wolves and the Turkistan Islamic Party involved with the Xinjiang conflict, have committed bombings and attacks in both China and Thailand.120,121 The Association of Southeast Asian nations (ASEAN) have also experienced a rise of Islamic radical sentiment, with terrorist attacks and organizations across both the Filipino and Indonesian archipelagos. Indonesia and Malaysia should also consider ways to curb exporting of terrorism, as there have been estimates of nearly a thousand Malay and Indonesian persons leaving for conflict zones in the Middle East.122

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), NATO Global Partners, and India

While not all responses to radicalized organizations for NATO states have been coordinated through NATO itself, their origins and policies have remained similar. Article 5 of the Treaty, invoking collective defense, was activated for the only time in history in response to the September 11 attacks in the US. Consequently, NATO states in North America and Western Europe have some of the most extensive counter-terrorism infrastructure in place.123 Despite this, not all have looked specifically at the process of radicalization, with efforts being more invested in military intervention in radical zones abroad. American, Canadian, and British armed forces have

118 “Counter-Terrorism Working Group,” Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, accessed November 17, 2016, http://www.apec.org/Home/Groups/SOM-Steering-Committee-on-Economic-and-Technical-Cooperation/Working-Groups/Counter-Terrorism.aspx.

119 Michael Kaplan, “ISIS Bank Robber? Islamic State Funds Military Endeavors with $1B In Looting From Syria, Iraq Vaults,” International Business Times, December 11, 2015, http://www.ibtimes.com/isis-bank-robbery-islamic-state-funds-military-endeavors-1b-looting-syria-iraq-vaults-2222460.

120 Philip Sherwell, “Bangkok bombing: Was it the Grey Wolves of Turkey?,” The Telegraph, August 29, 2015, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/thailand/11832701/Bangkok-bombing-Was-it-the-Grey-Wolves-of-Turkey.html.

121 “China separatists blamed for Kunming knife rampage,” BBC News, March 2, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-26404566.122 S. Pushpanathan, “ASEAN Efforts to Combat Terrorism,” Association of Southeast Asian Nations, August 20, 2003, http://asean.

org/?static_post=asean-efforts-to-combat-terrorism-by-spushpanathan.123 “Countering terrorism,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, last modified September 5, 2016, accessed November 16, 2016, http://www.nato.int/

cps/en/natohq/topics_77646.htm.

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been extensively deployed across the Middle East for the express purpose of eliminating radicalizing leaders. Additionally, the European Union has adopted the 2002 council framework decision defining the definitions and legality necessary to pursue counter-radical policy.124

Despite global leadership in the combatting terrorism, culture in the West holds that government actions should uphold human rights to expression and privacy even in instances where their restriction could possibly be useful in locating radicalizing individuals or ending radicalizing elements. This cultural division can be demonstrated by the stigma associated with the historic lois scélérates or ‘villainous laws’ of France which criminalized radicalizing press, and recent outcry over the American Patriot Act surveillance for lone wolf radicalized individuals or the National Security Agency’s collection of mobile phone record via the PRISM program.125,126 These states, along with those that are NATO Global Partners, will likely seek to maintain a respect of private rights in any UN prescribed recommendations.

India, while neither a member of NATO nor a NATO Global Partner, retains deep similarities to the West on counter-radical policy, perhaps due to its similar democratic institutions. India passed the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance (POTA) in 2001 and the Prevention of Terrorism Act in 2002. These bills defined terrorism in India and granted expanded investigative rights to prevent radicalization. Similar to the Patriot Act, POTA came into serious controversy amongst the Indian populace.127 India also holds a unique position in that it is deeply concerned both with Islamic Fundamentalism due to a series of attacks by Kashmiri Islamic radicals Lashkar-e-Taiba and others, as well as leftist insurgency from the aforementioned Naxalites. The nation is now considering ‘softer’ responses to radicalization, similar to the Denmark Model.128

Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)

Commonwealth of Independent States coordination on counter-radicalization began with a common framework through the 1999 Treaty on Cooperation among the States Members of the CIS in Combating Terrorism which established necessary legal developments for specifying and criminalizing radical extremism.129 Most CIS nations look to Russia for strategic leadership, despite geographic and demographic differences. Russia has recognized Islamic Radicalism as a key security threat following the discovery of a Jihadist Caucasus Emirate

124 “Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism,” Official Journal of the European Communities, June 22, 2002.125 Lydia Saad, “Americans Generally Comfortable with Patriot Act,” Gallup, March 2, 2004, http://www.gallup.com/poll/10858/americans-generally-

comfortable-patriot-act.aspx.126 George Gao, “What Americans think about NSA surveillance, national security and privacy,” PewResearch Center, May 29, 2015, http://www.

pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/05/29/what-americans-think-about-nsa-surveillance-national-security-and-privacy/.127 Jayanth K. Krishnan, “India’s “Patriot Act”: POTA and the Impact on CIVIL Liberties in the World’s Largest Democracy,” Maurer School of Law:

Indiana University, 2004. 128 Shweta Desai, “India Turns to a Soft Approach to Prevent Radicalisation,” Centre for Land Warfare Studies, September 28, 2015, http://www.claws.

in/1443/india-turns-to-a-soft-approach-to-prevent-radicalisation-shweta-desai.html.129 “17. Treaty on Cooperation among the States Members of the Commonwealth of Independent States in Combating Terrorism, 1999,” Convention of

the Organisation of the Islamic Conference on Combating International Terrorism, June 4, 1999.

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operating in Chechnya and Dagestan.130 To this end, Russian legislation has recently expanded anti-radical legal codes to include forcing data storage for telecommunications companies.131 To the rest of CIS states, primary concerns include the easy access that radicalized organizations have over transnational borders, and the susceptibility of CIS state Muslims to growing pressure from ISIL propaganda.132

Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC)

Latin America and the Caribbean diverges from much of the rest of the world in terms of counter-radicalization infrastructure due to the prevailing dominance of a primarily leftist form of radicalization. Continued insurgencies by radical leftist organizations, founded largely in the 1960s, such as Peru’s Shining Path, the National Liberation Army of Colombia, and the Paraguayan People’s Army remain active today.133 Given that the causes of radicalization for leftist radicals are more distinctly economic, CELAC member states will push for policies that fight the large economic imbalances that foster radicalization. Further, Peru’s capture of Shining Path Leader Abimael Guzman in 1992, alongside a campaign of other successful organizational decapitations through the capture of Leftist leaders, has demonstrated to CELAC states the need and efficacy of targeting the leaders of radical organizations.134 Legal frameworks for counter-terrorism for these countries have been established under the Organization of American States through treaties such as the Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism (2002) and the Convention to Prevent and Punish the Acts of Terrorism Take the Form of Crimes Against Persons and Related Extortion that are of International Significance (1971).135

130 Darion Rhodes, “Salafist-Takfiri Jihadism: the Ideology of the Caucasus Emirate,” International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, September 3, 2014, http://www.ict.org.il/Article/132/Salafist-Takfiri%20Jihadism%20the%20Ideology%20of%20the%20Caucasus%20Emirate.

131 Nataliya Vasilyeva, “Russia adopts controversial counter-terrorism amendments,” The Washington Times, June 24, 2016, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/jun/24/russia-adopts-controversial-counter-terrorism-amen/.

132 Sébastien Peyrouse, “Drug Trafficking in Central Asia: A Poorly Considered Fight?,” George Washington University, September 2012.133 Michael Jensen, “Terrorism in Latin America: Infographic,” War on the Rocks, July 15, 2014, http://warontherocks.com/2014/07/

terrorism-in-latin-america-infographic/.134 Ibid.135 “Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism,” Organization of American States, June 3, 2002.

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Glossary

asymmetric warfare: any armed conflict in which the military capabilities of one combatant far outweigh that of the other. As a result, the weaker power tends to rely on alternative combat methods such as guerilla warfare rather than fight the stronger opponent in traditional, open combat.

crisis commission: a group or branch of a body formed and assigned to handle a specific domestic or international crisis. These groups may coordinate efforts between relevant actors and are often able to act much more quickly than a national government.

Deep Web: the part of the World Wide Web that is not discoverable by standard search engines. It operates through encrypted networks and password-protected or dynamic pages.

fanaticism: a belief or behavior that one espouses or supports with unusually obsessive enthusiasm.

insurgency: a rebellion against authority to achieve a certain political end

non-state actor: an individual or organization that is influential politically but is not necessary allied to the government of any particular country

primary sector economy: an economy that is mostly or entirely dependent on the production and sale of natural resources. Parts of the primary sector include agriculture, forestry, fishing, and mining, among others.

radicalization: when a person’s thinking and behavior become significantly different from how most members of their society and community view social issues and participate politically

terrorism: the use of violence and manipulation of fear to achieve political goals

violent extremism: the engagement in ideologically motivated or “justified” violence to achieve a certain social or political agenda.

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United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force. “Entities.” Accessed November 17, 2016. https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/ctitf/en/structure.

United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force. “UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.” Accessed November 17, 2016. https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/ctitf/en/un-global-counter-terrorism-strategy.

United Nations General Assembly. “Draft resolution submitted by the President of the General Assembly: Secretary-General’s Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism.” February 9, 2016.

United Nations General Assembly. “Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism: Report of the Secretary-General.” December 24, 2015.

World Wide Web Sites

ABC News. “Kidnapped Nigerian Girls: Key Terrorist Groups in Africa.” Accessed November 17, 2017. http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/fullpage/african-terrorist-groups-infographic-23610960.

African Union Peace and Security. “The African Union Counter Terrorism Framework.” Last modified November 23, 2015. Accessed November 17, 2016. http://www.peaceau.org/en/page/64-counter-terrorism-ct.

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation. “Counter-Terrorism Working Group.” Accessed November 17, 2016. http://www.apec.org/Home/Groups/SOM-Steering-Committee-on-Economic-and-Technical-Cooperation/Working-Groups/Counter-Terrorism.aspx.

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Danish Security and Intelligence Service. “The Preventative Security Department.” Accessed November 17, 2016. https://www.pet.dk/English/The%20Preventive%20Security%20Department.aspx.

History Learning Site. “Emily Wildling Davison.” Last modified August 16, 2016. Accessed November 16, 2016. http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/the-role-of-british-women-in-the-twentieth-century/emily-wilding-davison/.

History Learning Site. “Women’s Social and Political Union.” Last modified August 16, 2016. Accessed November 16, 2016. http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/the-role-of-british-women-in-the-twentieth-century/womens-social-and-political-union/.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization.” Countering terrorism.” Last modified September 5, 2016. Accessed November 16, 2016. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_77646.htm.

The inside story on emergencies. “Conflict timeline.” Accessed November 16, 2016. http://www.irinnews.org/report/84146/sri-lanka-conflict-timeline.

University of Missouri – Kansas City. “Timothy McVeigh in Waco.” Accessed November 17, 2016. http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/mcveigh/mcveighwaco.html.

U.S. Department of State. “State Sponsors of Terrorism.” Accessed November 17, 2016. http://www.state.gov/j/ct/list/c14151.htm.

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TOPIC B: SECURING MOVEMENT OF REFUGEES

Statement of the Problem

In 2005, six people were displaced from their home every minute, a distressing and troubling figure. But in 2015, that figure has quadrupled to twenty-four people a minute. According to the UN Refugee Agency’s Global Trends report, this is the largest refugee crisis that has been documented since the UNHCR’s founding in 1950. Global Trends finds that the 2015 count of refugees worldwide arrives at approximately 65.3 million individuals, a number greater than the populations of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand combined. Of these, 40.8 million people are believed to remain within their native country, while 21.3 million have sought refuge in a foreign country.136 Such a massive movement of people demands attention not simply as a political and logistical problem of states, but as a protection of the human rights and lives and therefore the common responsibility of all the United Nations.

Refugees are a central issue in international politics today, but the issue is often misunderstood and, at the very least, discussed in vague terms. Central to this problem is obtaining a basic understanding of what refugees are. While the terms ‘refugee’ and ‘migrant’ are often used interchangeably, they are not the same. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), “Refugees are persons who are outside their country of origin for reasons of feared persecution, conflict, generalized violence, or other circumstances that have seriously disturbed public order and, as a result, require international protection” whereas international migrants are persons who change their country of residence.137 Thus, while all refugees can technically be considered migrants, all migrants cannot be considered refugees.

While refugees leave their home countries due to fears of persecution, conflict, or violence, among others, they often face similar challenges when crossing the borders between states. On one level, this violence can make the journey refugees undertake to a safer life just as dangerous as the life they left behind in their home country. On another level, this violence can destabilize the countries in which it occurs.138 That second consideration brings the importance of securing the movement of refugees into focus. While states are often already hesitant to accept refugees into their countries due to worries about stress on their social services and general resistance to becoming involved in the conflict the refugees are fleeing, the possibility of violence that accompanies the movement of refugees only heightens states’ resistance to allowing refugees to move across their borders. Consequently, in order to ensure that refugees are able to leave the dangerous situations in their

136 “Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2015,” UNHCR: The UN Refugee Agency. 2016.137 “Definitions,” Addressing Large Movements of Refugees and Migrants-The United Nations, accessed November 12, 2016, http://refugeesmigrants.

un.org/definitions.138 “Global Trends.”

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home countries, the movement of refugees must be secured both for their own safety and so that they have opportunities to leave those situations at all.139

The types of violence that refugees face as they travel across international borders fall into several categories. While these are distinct categories, they all affect each other. They also tend to occur concurrently; when one form of violence happens as refugees cross borders, other forms of violence are likely to follow. Thus, in order for this issue to be effectively resolved, all of the following forms of violence must be addressed.

Violence in Refugee Camps

When refugees cross borders, they are often grouped by states into refugee camps. While these camps are intended to be safe locations where refugees can live for short periods before their asylum claims are processed or they can return to their home countries, they are often violent places where refugees’ physical safety is under threat.

Reasons for violence in refugee camps are numerous, but they all relate to issues of overcrowding and frustration with a lack of information. Regarding overcrowding, most refugee camps are not built to accompany the

139 Ibid.

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number of inhabitants they eventually end up housing. In fact, this argument makes it seem as if there is a sort of planning process for refugee camps, of which most of the time there is not. The majority of refugee camps spring up quickly, often within a span of a few days, and gradually grow as more refugees arrive, yet this growth is often much slower than the refugees’ arrival rate.140 Lack of sufficient infrastructure in refugee camps leads to several issues. First and foremost is that refugees often have issues obtaining enough food and clean water in the camps. Most refugee camps rely on external aid for food; when that aid dries up as conflicts continue, the refugees are left to make due on smaller portions of food.141 Such situations are not only harmful to the refugees’ health, especially for the young children who live in refugee camps, but can lead to physical altercations between residents of the camps, especially when they are forced to wait in food lines for hours.142

Adding to the potential for violence brought by poor infrastructure in refugee camps is the lack of information refugees receive about their legal status. Because refugees are often blocked from entering other states, they live in a constant state of uncertainty on the borders between states. The fear that they may be forced to return to their home countries and again face the violence they are fleeing causes incredibly high tensions among residents of the camps. Just as with the poor infrastructure in the camps, this tension can lead to violence between members of the camps.143

Police Violence

While one danger to refugees’ security certainly comes from the camps they travel through, another is the police forces of the countries the refugees travel through. As previously stated, the countries refugees travel through are more often than not opposed to the refugees’ presence. This means that police will often go to extreme lengths to keep refugees from crossing the border into their country. For example, police will often wait wearing full riot gear on the internal side of a country’s border for the refugees to arrive; should the refugees make any signs of trying to cross the border, the police can respond with tear gas or even more violent means of crowd control.144

While this may seem like an extension of violence that threatens refugees in border camps, the roots go much deeper. This problem cannot be resolved by changing how refugee camps are operated, as physical violence between the camps’ inhabitants may be. Rather, this seed of this problem lays in the lack of communication

140 Michael Day, “Refugee Crisis: Fears of Violence in Border Camps if ‘Balkan Route’ into Europe is Closed,” The Independent, March 7, 2016, accessed November 13, 2016, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/refugee-crisis-fears-of-violence-in-border-camps-if-balkan-route-into-europe-is-closed-a6917641.html.

141 Louise Ridley, “Syrian Refugee Camp Hunger Means Some Think It’s ‘Better to Drown’ Than Live Like This,” The Huffington Post, April 2, 2016, accessed November 13, 2016, http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2016/02/04/syria-peace-talks-refugees-camps_n_9157920.html.

142 “Hunger Drives Refugees Back to Syria,” National Public Radio, October 18, 2015, accessed November 13, 2016, http://www.npr.org/2015/10/18/449662979/hunger-drives-refugees-back-to-syria.

143 Day, “Refugee Crisis.”144 Liz Alderman and Dimitris Bounias, “Violence Erupts as Migrants Try to Cross into Macedonia,” The New York Times, February 29, 2016, accessed

November 13, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/01/world/europe/greece-macedonia-border-refugees-riots.html?_r=0.

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between governments about the status of refugees and general disinterest in hosting them. As governments have resisted cooperation in ensuring the safe passage of refugees away from areas of conflict, situations arise such as the one in Europe in 2015 and 2016 in which police have to respond to refugees who have become frustrated due to being stuck at a border for an extended period of time. Were governments more willing to cooperate on coordinating refugee policy, they would be able to address this type of violence refugees face as they flee conflict.

Unsafe Means of Travel

The final major threat to their security that refugees face as they cross international borders is unsafe means of travel. More often than not, refugees travel on paths not intended for large-scale human movement. The terrain they cross are often hostile and many die in the process of seeking a safe life. One of the clearest examples of this is the passages across bodies of water that refugees from various regions in the world undertake. Given that many refugees are unable to swim, these trips are already incredibly dangerous as the refugees travel in unsafe boats across large bodies of water. Should anything go wrong in these journeys, such as choppy winds causing the boat to capsize or the boat’s motor malfunctioning, refugees are left in the middle of freezing bodies of water and are forced to swim for their lives. Often, these situations result in the refugees drowning.145 While instances of drowning are the most extreme example of dangerous travel conditions that refugees face, they are by no means the only ones. Along any path that refugees take, they travel unprotected from the elements. In the events of extreme weather, or even should refugees have trouble locating sources of water, their chances of survival decline drastically.

These methods of travel underscore a larger aspect of the problem of ensuring the safety of refugees as they cross international borders. In order to be guided on the path from their home country to their destination country, refugees will often pay smugglers large amounts of money. These smugglers, however, do not concern themselves with the safety of refugees. As such, refugees are subject to a number of unnecessary dangers along their path. Some of these dangers may include being transported on dangerous equipment. Smugglers also financially exploit refugees, charging them extremely high sums of money to make journeys that are never guaranteed to succeed.146 Refugees will often spend their entire life’s savings to make these journeys. Upon arrival in a new country, refugees then lack the financial security and stability to properly start a new life. Thus, while the monetary price they pay to flee their home countries does not affect physical security directly, it is nonetheless an aspect of the refugees’ security.

145 “Scores Drown after Boat Capsizes off Egypt’s Coast,” Al Jazeera, September 21, 2016, accessed November 13, 2016, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/09/refugees-drown-boat-capsizes-egypt-coast-160921130002889.html.

146 Michael Birnbaum, “Smuggling Refugees into Europe is a New Growth Industry,” The Washington Post, September 3, 2015, accessed November 13, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/smuggling-refugees-into-europe-is-a-new-growth-industry/2015/09/03/398c72c4-517f-11e5-b225-90edbd49f362_story.html.

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The issue of securing the movement of refugees across international borders is clearly complicated, but that is precisely what makes it necessary for this committee to address. There are numerous ongoing conflicts in the world that are forcing people to flee their home countries, which has caused the global number of refugees to swell in recent years. As aforementioned, the total number of worldwide refugees at the end of the year 2015 was 65.3 million, an increase of over 5 million people from the previous year.147 The increasing number of refugees means the international community has an obligation to pay refugees’ security concerns the attention they deserve. Finding a consensus on the issues highlighted above will not be simple, but the members of this committee have the capacity to affect meaningful change and protect the lives of millions of people.

147 Euan McKirdy, “UNHCR Report: More People Displaced Now Than after WWII,” CNN, June 20, 2016, accessed November 13, 2016, http://www.cnn.com/2016/06/20/world/unhcr-displaced-peoples-report/.

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History of the Problem

Mass refugee crises have followed nearly every largescale military conflict, natural disaster, economic collapse, and political upheaval. This effectively means that such mass migration has existed since the beginning of civilization. While data pertaining to size and refugee safety is unfortunately unavailable, there are a number of pre-contemporary examples of such displacement of people that can nonetheless be informative. Beginning in the eleventh century and originally driven by mass exodus following a short lived and brutal occupation by the nearby Ming Empire, the Vietnamese people pushed south from their heartlands to roughly their current national border.148 Native peoples such as the Aboriginals of Australia, the Native Americans of both Americas and the Caribbean, and the Ainu people fled inland before the mass settlement of their lands by larger imperial nations such as the British, French, Spanish, Dutch, Portuguese, and Japanese Empires during the Age of Exploration. In the Late Modern Era, nearly three million Jews fled the pogroms of the Russian Empire via emigration to the United States when their security and livelihood were targeted.149 Between 1910 and 1970, some seven million African American individuals in the United States left the social persecution and economic hardship of post-reconstruction South for locations in the North and Midwest.150,151

Roots of the modern framework for handling refugee movement are distinctly found in the aftermath of the First and Second World Wars and their reconstruction movements. The collapse of the Ottoman and Russian Empires, in particular, created a mass refugee crisis, as minority Christians in Ottoman Anatolia fled to the Balkans, and minority Muslims in the Balkans fled to Anatolia. The Ottoman genocide of the Armenian people drove at least several hundred thousand ethnic Armenians out as refugees, and Jewish communities in both empires emigrated in the hundreds of thousands to either America or Palestine.152 World War II in particular caused the largest mass migration known to history before contemporary times. In addition to the 40 million people fleeing war torn regions of Europe and Asia as well as genocide, the Potsdam Agreement mandated the expulsion of around 16.5 million Germans from Eastern Europe, 3 million Poles, as well as an unknown number of ethnic Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, and Belarusians.153,154 While proportions are unknown, it is believed that the majority of Eastern Europe’s remaining Jewish population of several hundred thousand fled to Israel-Palestine and the United States.

148 Ronald J. Cima, ed., Vietnam: A Country Study (Washington: GPO For the Library of Congress, 1987). 149 “Jews in America: The Jewish American Family,” Jewish Virtual Library, accessed November 17, 2016, https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/

Judaism/usjewfamily.html.150 Ibid.151 Alex Nowrasteh, “Post-World War II Migration and Lessons for Studying Liberalized Immigration,” Cato Institute, January 28, 2014, https://www.

cato.org/blog/post-world-war-ii-migration-lessons-studying-liberalized-immigration.152 Patrick Manning, Migration in World History (London: Routledge, 2012), 132-162.153 Lydia DePillis, Kulwant Saluja, and Desnise Lu, “A visual guide to 75 years of major refugee crises around the world,” The Washington Post, December

21, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/world/historical-migrant-crisis/.154 Jerzy Kochanowski, “Gathering Poles into Poland: Forced Migration from Poland’s Former Eastern Territories,” in Redrawing Nations: Ethnic

Cleansing in East-Central Europe, 1944-1948, ed. Philipp Ther and Ana Siljak (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2001).

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Led by the United States, the first organization specifically founded to protect the interests of refugees was the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA). Despite the name, this organization predated the inception of the United Nations, and the UNRRA was created only to serve displaced peoples of concern to the Allies during the Second World War. For example, while the UNRRA aided the eleven million non-German refugees held in Germany, it did not offer any aid to ethnic Germans who had similarly been displaced by the conflict. Its actions included the provision of four billion USD worth of farm equipment, medicine, and food rations, as well as the arranging of mass transit for displaced persons seeking to return home.155 One important move of the UNRRA included the commissioning of 120 Liberation Class Locomotives from the Vulcan Foundry in the United Kingdom. The UNRRA deployed these trains to Luxembourg, Yugoslavia, Poland, and Czechoslovakia to serve as a transit system specifically for refugees as well as a protected distribution method of delivering refugees supplies.156 While it was hastily put together, dominated by American and Allied influences, and occasionally inefficient, the UNRRA response to the WWII refugee crisis was ultimately successful in ensuring the safe movement of millions of people back to their homes.157 The UNRRA eventually was converted into the International Refugee Organization (IRO) in 1947, and then absorbed by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in 1950.

In contrast to the relative success of the UNRRA in Europe, the case of the Indian Partition can be examined as an example of the horrors of refugee movement unguarded. While wars such as the ongoing one in Syria or historically in Europe during the World Wars cause migration for a litany of different but connected reasons, the Partition of India in 1947 is thought to be the largest mass migration in human history from a single cause.158 The Partition separated British India into two separate and sovereign states, one predominantly Muslim country of Pakistan (Now Pakistan and Bangladesh) and one predominantly Hindu country of India. A single British lawyer, Cyril Radcliffe, was responsible for the entire process, and had little personal understanding of the subcontinent’s demographics and outdated census data and maps to work with. Furthermore, the Partition was announced hastily, and British officials provided no mechanisms for movement between the newly drawn up states.

The region immediately fell into chaos. UNHCR, in retrospect, estimates that fourteen million people of Hindu, Sikh, and Muslim faith were displaced.159 The violence from retributive genocide was horrific. British estimates place the death count at 200,000. Indian estimates place it at 2,000,000. People died from malnutrition and contagious disease, but primarily from violence. Recorded survivors remember their families

155 “Agreement for UNRRA,” United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, November 9, 1943. 156 “Luxemburg Railways and U.N.R.R.A.,” Vulcan Locomotives.157 Charles Wesley Sharpe, “The Origins of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, 1939-1943,” University of Pennsylvania,

January 1, 2012.158 Crispin Bates, “The Hidden Story of Partition and its Legacies,” BBC History, March 3, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/modern/

partition1947_01.shtml.159 “The State of The World’s Refugees 2000: Fifty Years of Humanitarian Action,” United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), January 1,

2000.

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being shot for simply being of a different faith.160 Estimates also place 75,000 women as having been abducted and or raped by men of any faith, even their own. Some women drowned themselves in wells to avoid rape, ending their lives and inadvertently contaminating water sources. People had no protected travel, and used any means of movement available, including buses, animals, cars, and trains.161 Especially, in places of active contest, such as West Bengal near then East Pakistan, and Punjab near West Pakistan, reports note that in Sikh and Hindu areas, armed bands roved around killing Muslim refugees to prevent their resettlement in the area. Similar reports note Muslims doing the same to Hindu refugees. Race riots broke out in other locations across the country, and arson of public buildings enfeebled the remnant British police from being useful.162

It is easy to disregard the outcomes of the Partition as solely resulting from the lack of an effective response, as neither Pakistani nor Indian officials anticipated the partition as possibly problematic, but the specific issues raised in the partition provide valuable lessons. Movement of people was unstandardized and unprotected. Displaced persons moving sporadically towards their goal were therefore vulnerable to sexual assault and outright violence by xenophobic communal sentiments. Border security between the two states was additionally non-existent, and even on arriving at their destination, most displaced Indians and Pakistanis had no clue if they had managed to make it to the correct country. Finally, the context of the migration was not respected by the political authorities of the time. When Sir Cyril Radcliffe redistricted the Northwest section of India, he completely disregarded the substantial Sikh minority present there, by classifying populations centers as either “Muslims or Non-Muslim.” Such failures led to the resulting catastrophe.

In contemporary times, the areas of the world most affected by refugee movement are Europe’s reception of Middle Eastern refugees, and intra-African movement of refugees due to sociopolitical strife. While the migrations in Africa arise from several separate crises, the migration to Europe very specifically pertains to the ongoing instability in the Middle East and North African (MENA) Region. The recent Arab spring, with its consequent civil disturbances in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, and Syria, along with the mass insurgency of radical groups such as ISIL and the Taliban in Iraq and Afghanistan have displaced numerous people. UNHCR reports estimate that of the refugees travelling to Europe, 46.7% are of Syrian ethnicity, 20.9% of Afghan ethnicity, and 9.4% of Iraqi ethnicity. Further demographic data includes that of these refugees, 58% are men, 17% women, and 25% children.163,164 It should be noted that in addition to Europe, immigrants are arriving en masse to states such as Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan in the Middle East.165

160 Tanya Basu, “The Fading Memory of South Asia’s Partition,” The Atlantic, August 15, 2014, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/08/the-fading-memory-of-partition-india-pakistan-bangladesh/376120/.

161 Urvashi Butalia, The Other Side of Silence: Voices From the Partition of India (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2000).162 Paul R. Brass, “The partition of India and retributive genocide in the Punjab, 1946-47: means, methods, and purposes,” Journal of Genocide

Research 5:1 (2003): 71-101.163 “Statistical Yearbooks,” UNHCR, accessed November 16, 2016, http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4a02afce6.html.164 Press Trust of India, “Over 1 million arrivals in Europe by sea: UNHCR,” Business Standard, December 30, 2015, http://www.business-standard.com/

article/pti-stories/over-1-million-arrivals-in-europe-by-sea-unhcr-115123000668_1.html.165 “Statistical Yearbooks.”

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These refugees have been victim to a host of lamentable and preventable problems. A reliance on migrant smugglers for entry to the European Union rather than conventional immigration has led to the usage of unsafe boating practices to cross the various stretches the Mediterranean. These boats are both unfit for extended voyages and often overladen with people to maximize profits for the smugglers, leading to a number of capsizing incidents across the Mediterranean. A compilation of reports from the National Broadcasting Company (NBC) in the United States has placed the death count of these incidents at over 1200 people, with another 450 people completely missing.166 Many of these deaths occur barely off the coast of such countries as Libya, Italy, Greece, Turkey, and Tunisia. These figures simply refer to the deaths by drowning.

The rising black industry of people smuggling has additional risk factors leading to a primary death count of 4,721 death in the Mediterranean by the independent Missing Migrants Project.167 This new industry is poorly understood and poorly countered. Survivors have reported that, in addition to the possibility of capsizing, people smugglers commit blatant abuse of international human rights by employing exploitative measures against their customer refugees such as sexual violence, torture, threats, and unfair payments.168 Boat refugees in particular should not be considered a uniquely Mediterranean problem. When Rohingya Muslims fleeing violent persecution from Myanmar fled by boat towards ASEAN nations, they entered into a prolonged wait at sea as Malaysian, Thai, and Indonesian authorities tried to place responsibility for the refugees elsewhere.169

Further violence against refugees has been instigated by both state and non-state actors across Europe. Syrian refugees, particularly families with children, attempting to approach the Turkish border were beaten and shot at, with at least five dead.170 Greek locals have threatened international aid workers and assaulted Iraqi asylum-seekers on various Greek islands as they await application responses from the Greek Government.171 These Iraqis were Yazidis, very the same group whose siege by ISIL garnered worldwide support and brought NATO air forces into increased bombing runs in the Levant. When a refugee center in Bautzen, Germany erupted into flame due to arson, a gathering crowd of native Germans cheered. In another instance, an unidentified individual threw a hand grenade into a refugee center, fortunately the grenade was not live, according to the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC).172 In the French city of Calais, Doctors Without Borders workers have reported having to provide medical aid for refugees assaulted by French policemen and civilian ‘militias’

166 “Sea of Death: Many Migrants Drown Trying to Reach Italy,” NBC News, April 19, 2015, http://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/sea-death-many-migrants-drown-trying-reach-italy-n344381.

167 “Mediterranean Migrant Arrivals Reach 340,778; Deaths at Sea: 4,271,” Missing Migrants Project, November 11, 2016, http://missingmigrants.iom.int/.168 Anne T. Gallagher and Fiona David, The International Law of Migrant Smuggling (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014).169 “8 ways to solve the world refugee crisis,” Amnesty International, accessed November 17, 2016. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/

campaigns/2015/10/eight-solutions-world-refugee-crisis/.170 Ceylan Yeginsu and Karam Shoumali, “Turkish Border Guards Accused of Attacking Syrian Refugees,” The New York Times, May 10, 2016, http://

www.nytimes.com/2016/05/11/world/europe/turkey-syria-immigrants-human-rights-watch.html?_r=0.171 Patrick Strickland, “Volunteers leave Greek island after attacks on refugees,” Al Jazeera, July 10, 2016, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/07/

volunteers-leave-greek-island-attacks-refugees-160710132258629.html.172 Jenny Hill, “Migrant attacks reveal dark side of Germany,” BBC News, February 22, 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35633318.

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posing as authorities.173 The violence has not been one-sided. Several riots in refugee centers in Germany have been reported, and rioting refugees have attacked restraining police forces arriving on scene.174 A Syrian asylum seeker detonated a suicide bomb at a German music festival, injuring 15 others, when he was rejected from the asylum process due to applying to multiple European states for asylum. Another young refugee seeker brought an axe onboard a train in Wurzburg, attempting to commit an attack.175 These escalations of violence on both sides are likely to lead to an increase in violence as people from all sides of the issue grow increasingly fearful and frustrated.

173 Press Association, “Police and ‘militias’ attacking refugees at Calais, says charity,” The Guardian, February 13, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/13/police-civilian-militias-attacked-migrants-calais-charity.

174 “50 asylum-seekers stage riot, attack guards at refugee center in Berlin,” Russia Today, September 30, 2016, https://www.rt.com/news/361229-refugees-storm-berlin-security/.

175 Angela Dewan and Jason Hanna, “Germany’s Merkel stands by refugee policy despite ‘terrifying’ attacks,” CNN, July 28, 2016, http://www.cnn.com/2016/07/28/europe/germany-merkel-security-refugee-policy/.

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Past Actions

Many of the causes of the current refugee crisis are likely tied to the very recent action of such bodies as the European Union (EU). Three particular legal stipulations are integral to the current EU stance and indeed the refugee crisis itself, the Schengen Agreement, the Dublin Regulation, and the later Schengen Convention’s article 26.

To better coordinate border security response across the EU, in 1985 several European States arrived at the Schengen Agreement. After the addition of several additional conventions and additional signatories, the Schengen Agreement currently stipulates that a group of 26 European Countries, have relinquished internal border checks and instead oblige each member with an external border to regulate it on behalf of the entire union using national resources. Countries may only reinstate internal borders for a couple of months at a time for security reasons.176 Note that border security remains a national responsibility rather than a shared pool of resources, and thus when a certain geographic area is disproportionately affected, those countries alone are left to deal with the crisis. Since contemporary conflicts are largely in the MENA Region, Southern and East Central European states such as Italy, Greece, Hungary, and Spain are left to handle much of the problem on their own.

The Dublin Regulation states that when any EU member state examines an asylum application, they are to determine if the applicant has applied to another state at the same time. If they have, then the application is to be dropped.177 The motivation is to prevent what is known as ‘asylum shopping’ where multiple applications for one person are approved and then the applicant can ambiguously be part of both states’ reintegration programs or be approved for countries they did not have the means of travelling to. The further stipulation is that the administrative responsibility of checking that the Dublin regulation is upheld is left to the country of entry. This again places significant strain upon the regulatory bodies of external border nations as mentioned above. Further, there are reports of asylum seekers who intentionally burn their fingers in order to mask their fingerprints and help hide themselves from this regulation.178

Article 26 of the Schengen Convention defines what’s known as carrier’s responsibility. In effect, any entity which transports people to the Schengen area is obligated to pay the return trip of anyone not granted entry, as well as pay an additional fine.179 The effects of Article 26 are profound. Within the legal economy, in order to avoid paying fees and return costs of refugees that may not be approved, most legal travel entities, whether naval, overland, or air, refuse outright service to anyone without a demonstrable visa. Such visas are rare

176 “EU legal framework on asylum and irregular immigration ‘on arrival’ State of play,” European Parliament, March 2015.177 Harriet Grant and John Domokos, “Dublin regulation leaves asylum seekers with their fingers burnt,” The Guardian, October 7, 2011, https://www.

theguardian.com/world/2011/oct/07/dublin-regulation-european-asylum-seekers.178 Ibid.179 “The Schengen acquis,” European Union, June 14, 1985.

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amongst the refugees, who in turn look to the black economy of people smuggling to make up for this.180 Taken together, these three legal parameters create a massive bottleneck in the ability of the EU to process applications and protect borders.

The European Union response to border security has had mixed results. As of 2004, the Coast Guard and border security agency of the EU is Frontex. Frontex, rather than serving as the managing agency for a combined response, instead works to coordinate between individual states, train workers to common regulation, perform relevant research, and allocate support.181 The agency has come under heavy scrutiny for weaknesses related to its unclear mandate and poor staff recruitment or retention.182 Response to the Mediterranean route of refugee movement was initially handled only by the Italian government, which deployed its air force and navy to patrol waters and surveil against people smugglers in Operation Mare Nostrum. Operational costs, alongside lack of support from additional EU states, ultimately led to it being replaced with the Frontex Operation Triton in 2014.183 Almost immediately, 2015 under the Triton operation was wracked by a series of high publicity and high death count boat capsizings across the Mediterranean, with the death of innocent children evoking

180 “Schengen: Controversial EU free movement deal explained,” BBC News, April 24, 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-13194723.181 “More about Frontex,” Frontex, accessed November 17, 2016, https://web.archive.org/web/20120206134810/http://www.frontex.europa.eu/

more_about_frontex/.182 “External evaluation of the European Agency for the Management of Operation Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the

European Union, Final Report,” COWI, January 2009.183 “Mare Nostrum Operation,” Ministero Della Difesa, accessed November 16, 2016,http://www.marina.difesa.it/EN/operations/Pagine/MareNostrum.

aspx.

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worldwide outcry.184 Most notably, a photo of drowned Syrian Kurd, three year old Alan Kurdi, washed ashore brought the debate to the front of international media.185

Efforts made towards refugee detention have been similarly problematic rather than beneficial towards the issue at hand. Consider the case of Australia, a country with a long history of successful refugee absorption in the post-world war aftermath that is now relatively soured.186 Following historical procedures, including full signatory status to a number of refugee support resolutions, Australian political parties have recently turned coldly against the resettlement of refugees. Rather than handle them on native soil, Australian politicians have claimed that the refugees are likely harboring criminal elements, and chose instead to utilize refugee processing centers on small islands around the Indonesia Archipelago, such as Christmas Island, Manus Island, and even the State of Nauru. In place of the state mechanism of asylum seeker screening, housing, and protection, the Australian Government has subcontracted these vital functions to privatized agencies such as Serco, G4S, Transfield Services, and Wilson Security. Primary contractors, Serco and G4S, are securities firms specializing in prison operation.

The UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, Juan Mendez, performed an assessment of the Australian response to refugees, and concluded in 2015 that the Australian Government was in violation of the International Convention Against Torture by failing to provide adequate detention conditions.187 The full evidence against them is horrifying. Reports collected by Al-Jazeera note issues such as confiscation of phones used to call separated loved ones, unexplained deaths, provision of rotten meat, sewage waste on island beaches, nonfunctional toilets, lack of basic medical aid, and even human teeth being found in food.188 Several riots have occurred at both Manus and Christmas Island, with CNN finding that they had begun purely as peaceful protests by the refugees.189 Watchdog group CorpWatch notes that Serco facilities are grossly understaffed, and that policies employed by Serco were promoting cultures of self-harm and suicidal thought by refugees.190

184 “The worst yet?,” The Economist, April 19th, 2015, http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21648896-another-boat-capsizes-between-libya-and-italy-europe-debates-migration-policy-worst-drowning-yet.

185 Julian Borger, “EU under pressure over migrant rescue operations in the Mediterranean,” The Guardian, April 15, 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/15/eu-states-migrant-rescue-operations-mediterranean.

186 Damian Wnukowski, “Asustralia’s Asylum and Migration Policy: Lessons to Apply to the European Refugee Crisis,” The Polish Institute of International Affairs 142:1 (2016).

187 Juan E. Méndez, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,” Human Rights Council, March 6, 2015.

188 Diana Al Rifai, “Riot at Australian detention camp after refugee’s death,” Al Jazeera, November 9, 2015, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/11/riot-australian-detention-camp-refugee-death-151103083241635.html.

189 Georgia McCafferty, “Riots at Christmas Island detention center after escaped refugee dies,” CNN, November 9, 2015, http://www.cnn.com/2015/11/09/asia/christmas-island-riots-refugee/.

190 Patrick O’Keeffe, “Nightmare on Christmas Island: Serco’s Australian Detention Center,” CorpWatch, October 25, 2011, http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=15664.

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These reports have all surfaced after Australia agreed to the resettlement of 12,000 refugees within her borders, according to its border agency.191 Meanwhile, the Australian Government has attempted to arrange resettlement deals away to Canada, Kyrgyzstan, the Philippines, and Cambodia. Detention centers have been built in Nauru, Indonesia, and Papua New Guinea rather than at home despite court decisions in these nations moving to end them. Its border security response has, rather than a sensitive response by specialized border security policy, been a military operation termed Operation Sovereign Borders, using the Australian Navy to forcefully return approaching refugee ships.192

While the riots and abuse of the Australian Christmas Island facility have taken social media and news outlets worldwide by storm recently, violence in the camps is not a purely Australian problem. The UNRWA continues report human rights abuse being a possibility even in UN camps for Palestinian refugees in Jordan, and the NGO European Resettlement Network finds similar problems occur for Somali refugees in Kenya. Solutions to these problems will have to respect the variety of contexts this violence may stem from.193

191 “Australia’s response to the Syrian and Iraqi humanitarian crisis,” Australian Government Department of Immigration and Border Protection, accessed November 16, 2016, https://www.border.gov.au/Trav/Refu/response-syrian-humanitarian-crisis#not-considered.

192 “Operation Sovereign Borders,” Australian Government Department of Immigration and Border Protection, accessed November 17, 2016, http://www.osb.border.gov.au/en/Outside-Australia.

193 “Newsroom,” UNRWA, accessed November 17, 2016, http://www.unrwa.org/newsroom.

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Possible Solutions

There are at least three distinct methods of improving security for refugees. The first method is to strike at the root cause of the migrations themselves. While the United Nations likely lacks the control to prevent the social, political, natural, and economic causes of mass migration, it can seek to influence the inefficiencies in global and national responses through direct improvement of border security and asylum acceptance systems. It can take offensives against the criminal elements that provide unregulatable and abusive practices of people smugglers and unsafe travel, and it can recommend a series of cultural and legal provisions to ensure that refugees remain safe from hostile elements in both public policing, camps, and the general public.

To help with the admission process and improve border security, DISEC should look to unify and expand existing measures employed by the national governments while fixing legal conflicts. In the European Migrant Crisis, the United Nations should consider whether measures such as the Schengen Agreement, particularly the affiliated Dublin Agreement and Article 26, are equitable for disproportionately affected states.194 After deliberating, a policy recommendation should be offered to Schengen Agreement Nations. Further, legal provisions such as carrier responsibility should be considered in more detail with regards to whether it should be deemed ethical by the international community to stop people fleeing violence and persecution at home by demanding that they hold visas.195 Similar considerations should be made regarding the construction of fences across the Balkans. Alternatively, worldwide visa policy, particularly for asylum seekers, should be revisited to possibly expedite the legal process and forgo illegal immigration practices. This committee should also address international equity in responsibility regarding the refugee problem, as currently several developing nations have borne the brunt of refugee influx, rather than redistribution of duties to consenting developed states. Existing international cooperation, such as the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) which provides temporary support for countries experiencing mass influx of refugees, should be considered for expansion both of purview and of resources.196

Particular measures for ensuring safe travel practices, regardless of the committee discussion on asylum expansion, are necessary. The reliance on people smugglers, whether by boat, air, or land, must be subverted by all means available. This could include measures designating sponsored mass travel methods for asylum seekers and finding alternatives for policies such as carrier responsibility in order to provide a legal economy to address their transportation needs. Members of the committee might even consider going on the offensive, working with international agencies to investigate and halt the operations of smuggling organizations worldwide. Concurrently, measures must be taken to mini197mize the risk experienced by those who do utilize smugglers

194 “The Schengen acquis.”195 “The Human Cost of Fortress Europe: Human Rights Violations Against Migrants and Refugees at Europe’s Borders,” Amnesty International, 2014.196 “About Us,” European Asylum Support Office, accessed November 17, 2016, https://www.easo.europa.eu/about-us.197 “Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”

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by surveilling migrations routes with ready response forces to mobilize in the event of catastrophic events such as a capsizing.

Violence faced by refugees also needs to be addressed regardless of the legal and ethical discussion the committee holds on expansion of asylum seekers. Elements of national politics seeking to scapegoat refugees for socioeconomic issues they did not create need to be fought culturally alongside the more vehement undertones of xenophobia and racism. Such policies are likely to only incite violence or fear on both the native and refugee sides of the question, and certain to be counterproductive to any solution. Asylum seeking should be addressed in national legal structures as a human right, and oversight structures, either national, international, or independent, should exist in some form to observe national policies and their adherence to UN policy. Protection structures for refugee detainee camps may warrant consideration as well. Special provisions better enabling national police to understand, cooperate, and communicate with refugees could help in preventing camp violence through rioting. Close work with the UNHCR to recommend camp locations, layouts, and resources to specifically target security of the camp could prevent violent attacks committed against camps by locals. Additionally, special consideration should be paid to the vulnerability of refugee women and children to sexual predation and trafficking.

Finally, the members of this committee need to ensure that whatever policies and programs are implemented or proposed have reasonable structures of sustainability. Incoming Secretary-General Antonio Guterres has referred to UN refugee programs such as the UNHCR as “broke” due to a massive expansion of the refugee problem with little to no multilateral increasing in funding. This committee will either need to find ways to generate financial support from member states or employ solutions of low resource cost by locating and rerouting existing international state and non-state resources.198

198 Harriet Grant, “UN agencies ‘broke and failing’ in face of ever-growing refugee crisis,” The Guardian, September 6, 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/06/refugee-crisis-un-agencies-broke-failing.

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Bloc Positions

North America and Western Europe

Refugee policy for the West has been tumultuous, but vaguely accepting. The EU response has varied drastically, with states such as Germany, France, and the United Kingdom agreeing to take respectively 12,000, 24,000, and 20,000 refugees each while Eastern and Central European states take as low as 150 in Estonia. Hungary has adamantly demanded to receive no refugees at all.199 Across the Atlantic, the Obama and Trudeau Administrations in the US and Canada have agreed to accept 10,000 and 25,000 refugees each. These decisions have been extremely contentious, with massive political movements such as the British EU exit vote, the American 2016 presidential election, and 2016 Austrian presidential election.200 Indeed, each of these events are extremely recent, and the upcoming new Non-EU British government, Trump American Presidency, and revote for Austrian Presidency could presently reversals of policy in each of these states. Policies for improving border control, and subsequently refugee rights, have largely been enacted in the self-interest of these states rather than on behalf of the migrants. President Obama of America and German Chancellor Angela Merkel have been outspoken champions of the need to accept and address the refugee problem.201

East and Central Europe

The Visegrad Group of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia collectively declared to oppose any and all resettlement of refugees into their countries.202 Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban has even gone so far as to order the firing of tear gas at migrants approaching Hungarian borders and promised to keep Hungary a Christian state.203 These countries are disproportionately affected depending on their involvement with the Schengen Area, and are proximal to high migrant traffic along the overland route from Turkey through the Balkans. Rather, national leaders have expected primary responsibility for refugees to fall to the countries lobbying within the EU hardest for resettlement such as Germany and France. These states have also exhibited the most forceful border security response, closing borders through various central Europe and Balkan states to each other legally while simultaneously deploying border security guards and constructing razor-wire fences.204

199 “A look by country at EU commitment to taking in refugees,” The Japan Times, September 8, 2015, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/09/08/world/look-country-eu-commitment-taking-refugees/#.WC1uBfkrK00.

200 Haeyoun Park and Rudy Omri, “U.S. Reaches Goal of Admitting 10,000 Syrian Refugees. Here’s Where They Went,” The New York Times, August 31, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/08/30/us/syrian-refugees-in-the-united-states.html.

201 Kate Connolly, “Angela Merkel defends Germany’s refugee policy after attacks,” The Guardian, July 28, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/28/merkel-rejects-calls-to-change-germanys-refugee-policy-after-attacks.

202 Ian Traynor, “Refugee crisis: east and west split as leaders resent Germany for waiving rules,” The Guardian, September 5, 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/05/migration-crisis-europe-leaders-blame-brussels-hungary-germany.

203 Adam LeBor, “We must keep Europe Christian says Hungarian PM,” The Times, September 17, 2015, http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/world/europe/article4558874.ece.

204 Ibid.

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Middle East

Despite being poorly equipped to handle the crisis, Middle Eastern states not currently engaged in the civil disturbances causing the refugee crisis have absorbed the brunt of the refugee influx. Turkey alone currently hosts 2.7 million refugees, over half of all refugees who have left their home states, while Lebanon and Jordan host the next largest group of refugees at approximately 1 million and 650,000 respectively.205 These states have lacked the infrastructure to adequately prepare for the conflicts in Palestine, Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan, and would certainly look for resource allocation aiding in their resettlement or refugee processing. This is not to say that they are necessarily accepting of the hosted refugees; as mentioned earlier Turkey has had several incidents of military force against waves of migrants due to poor security procedure.

Asia, Africa, Latin and South America, and Oceania

Although there are expressions of sentiment in favor of the families and human rights in the refugee crisis, much of the developing world has not made any commitment to accept refugees. Even China, currently the world’s second largest economy, has referred to existing crises as the responsibility of developed, western nations.206 Many Asian and African states are themselves experiencing smaller refugee crises due to political upheaval in such places as Somalia or Myanmar, while in Oceania climate refugees have, due to global warming, become a growing concern. None of this is to say that developing countries do not hold a possible solution to the problem. In November of 2015, European leaders met with numerous African leaders and many international agencies in the Valletta Conference on Migration, where discussion on exchanging a large European Trust fund on African development of up to 22 billion Euros a year for African cooperation in hosting refugees took hold. This Europe-Africa relationship may be a key dynamic in future diplomatic action against the refugee crisis.207,208

205 “Syria Regional Refugee Response,” UNHCR, accessed November 17, 2016, http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php.206 Liang Pan, “Why China Isn’t Hosting Syrian Refugees,” Foreign Policy, February 26, 2016, http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/02/26/

china-host-syrian-islam-refugee-crisis-migrant/.207 “Migration summit: ‘We are in a race against time to save Schengen” – Tusk,” Times of Malta, November 12, 2015, http://www.timesofmalta.com/

articles/view/20151112/local/watch-valletta-summit-concluding-press-conference.591885.208 Herman Grech, “Live commentary: Valletta summit sounds warning on Schengen, provides aid to Africa: Malta to contribute

€250,000 to Africa fund,” Times of Malta, November 12, 2015, http://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20151112/local/live-commentary-valletta-summit-the-final-day.591857.

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Glossary

asylum: protection granted by a nation to someone who has fled their home state as a refugee.

asylum shopping: when one refugee or displaced person submits applications for asylum to multiple countries and is approved in more than one country thereby allowing the applicant to be a part of multiple reintegration programs.

carrier’s responsibility: a part of the Schengen agreements that requires transporters of refugees into the Schengen zone to pay for the return trip of a refugee if asylum or status is not granted. This section also requires that transporters pay an extra fine if refugees are turned away.

migrant: someone who has left their country of origin.

pogroms: an organized massacre of a particular ethnic group.

refugee: persons who are outside their country of origin for reasons of feared persecution, conflict, generalized violence, or other circumstances that have seriously disturbed public order and thereby require protection.

Schengen Agreement: the treaty that created the Schengen Area, inside of which internal border checks between countries have been abolished so as to allow for ease of mobility between the participating states.

xenophobic: describing a dislike or prejudice against people from other countries.

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MUNUC DISEC Background Guide

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Transcript of MUNUC DISEC Background Guide