Multi-District Quo Warranto Matter in re Strunk Consolidated Reply Declaration in ACORN v USA EDNY...

8/14/2019 Multi-District Quo Warranto Matter in re Strunk Consolidated Reply Declaration in ACORN v USA EDNY 08-Cv-4888

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Christopher-Earl: Stnu& inesse593 V-It Avenue#281Brooklyn,NewYo* I 1238Email: ci&@hmkwsCe11-845-901-6767TheHmrabIe Royce C. LamberthUnitedStatesDistrict Chief udge fortheU.S. District for the District of Columbia333 ComtitutionAvenue,NW,washington,DC 20001

b ailzv. ObumgpCD 1OcvaO151 nd related case~ ~ D C D o & C v - 2 2 3 4RIL)Subject:Request for permissionto transfk with the 28 USC 91407The MultidistrictmatterACORN t al. v. U,SA,e4al.EDNY 09-c~-4888BIG)with demand forQuo Warrantoinquest of Barack Hussein Obama(aka arry !hetom).

Iam he Petitioner, Chri--Earl: Stnmk inesse, with the pending motiontointerveneWin asa ex-refator Pfaintifffbm the r e W asebeforeUS.DistrictMge RichardJ. Leon. Judge Leonorderedastayofdiscoverypending a decision on my Quo Warrantodemand fbran nquestofmuttidegimcehcb sssociatedwiththcAugust 4,1%1 birtb ofB m k Hussein ObamaJr., &a Barry Soetoro(the Usurper).and make this statementunderpenaltyofperjurypursumtto28 USC $1746. Declarant is self-- in the above civilactions on-going in WashingtonDistrictof Coiumbia,and hereby m p s t ptms6ssion to transferwith the 28 USC $1407dK matterD R N t sl,v. U,S.A. etd.EDNY 09-cv-4888resentfybeforeJudgeNim Gersban whenmy Motion to intervene there isdecided by &at Court n thatas I argue lhereonJanuary23,2009 1duty fired theDef- O h ecause He is unqualifiedto actwith mypower of attarney becauseHe hasdual ailegiamx atbirthbyhisown admissionandhisactions are void ab initio;and therefm,with dual all- i d i g i i e tohald the officeof PresidentaccoPding oU.S.constitutionArticle IISection 1, is nat amtmhm4t i zenwithout twoU.S. Citizen parents onhisbirthAugust4,1961. Of importanceto thePlaintiffherein,I concr~ ith an cxpe&ed inquest schedule ecyuwtedby Dr. Taitz onk t s iled befarethisComt hatprove heD e f a rts comrnittadafiaud thatpersonally injmedSheandme.I am d i a r with the factsassociated 64th the referenced casesas each aretelated and subject to the transferhere as an urgent matter of National Security before this Courtand thattheU.S.Government has argued hatanyQuoWarranto be done in Wasbgton Districtof Columbiaand I urge hesein applieswithaMulti-ct Judicial Panel accdingly.A copy oft h i s r eq u e s t h a s b e cn s e u t m h l s d c o m t i n b o th

cc: 3eRicAafda-JudgeNina Gershon . .


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United States District CourtsEasternDistricto f ~ e w ork In Case- ACORN etd. . U.S.A.et al.EDNY 09-cv-4888Washington District of Columbia In Case -Taitzv . Obama DCD 10-cv-0015 1Washington District ofColumbia InCase - Stnmk v. DOS et al. DCD 08-cv-2234

CERTIFICATEOF SERVICEOn February 17,2010, I, ChristopherEarl Strunk, declare and certifjr under penalty of perjurypursuant to 28 USC 5 746: That I caused the serviceofNine (9)copiesof the Christopher-Earl:Strunk in esse Request for permission to transfer with the 28USC $1407 The Multidistrict matterACORN et al . v. U.S.A. et al . EDNY 09-cv-4888 (NG) declared February 16,2010,with exhibitsannexed and that each set was placed in a sealed folder properly addressed with proper postage forUnited States Postal Service Delivery by mail upon:The Honorable Nina GershonUnited States DistrictJudge for theU.S.D.C. for the Eastern District of New York225 Cadman Plaza EastBrooklyn New York 11207The Honorable Richard J. LeonUnited StatesDistrict Judge for theU.S. District for the District of Columbia333 Constitution Avenue, NW, Room 6315,Washington,DC 2000 1

Andrew Cuomo New York State AttorneyGeneral 120 Broadway 24&Floor New YorkNew York 10271ChanningPhilips, theU.S. AttorneyC/OWynneP. Kelly, AUSAOffice of the U.S. Attorney for theWashington District of Columbia555 4th St, N.W.Washington, D.C.20530Eric Holder,U.S. Attorney GeneralDr. Orly Taitz, D.D.S. C/O Brigham John Bowen, AUSA

29839 Santa Margarita Parkway, STE 100 U.S.DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICERancho Santa Margarita CA 92688 20 Massachusetts Avenue, NWWashington,DC 20530Darius Charney,Esq. Center forConstitutionalRights 666 Broadway, 7th Barack Hussein Obarna in esseFloor New York, NY 10012 C/O The White House1600 Pennsylvania AvenueNWPeter D. Leary USAAG Department of Justice Washington, DC 2050020 Massachusetts Avenue, NW Room 7322Washington, DC 20530Dated: FebruaryBrooklynNew York Christopher-Earl: Strunk in esse593 Vanderbilt Avenue #28 1Brooklyn,New York 1 123 8Email: [email protected] Ph: 845-901-6767


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01UNITED STATES DISTRICT COU RTEASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK---- ___________l__l-l_----- x Case No.: 09-cv-4888ACORN (Association of Community Organizations forReform Now) ACORN Institute, Inc., and NEW YORK @GI &B)ACORN HOUSING INC.

Plaintiffs,v.UNITED STATES of AMERICA et al.. *A N- irp C )-:", 0Defendants -r\ y TU m *and r 5 -T- Ukiipzc,. -4 r"-

t n * ~ .Christopher-Earl: Strunk in esse. 593 Vanderbilt Avenue 03--3 C % 2 r~t m- #281 Brooklyn., New York 11238 0 0Q c * 4-(845)901-6767 Email: chris@,strunk.ws g 2 3-PETITIONER'S CONSOLIDATED REPLY DECLARATION IN SUPPORTOF THE NOTICE OF MOTION TO INTERVENE AS A EX-RELATORINTERVENER-DEFENDANT U .S.A. C ITIZEN ANDSTATE OF NEW YORK CITIZEN.

I, Christopher-Earl: Strunk in esse. declare and say under penalty of perjury with- -- -.- - .- - -- -- --- -- - - - -

28 USC 81746:1. Declarant is petitioner herein requesting Court permission to allow this

consolidated reply declaration in support of the notice of motion to intervene as an


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ex-relator intervener-defendant U.S.A. Citizen and State of New York Citizen to

the memorandum of law in opposition to motion for intervention filed February 9,

2010 by Defendants local counsel F. Franklin Amanat Assistant United States

Attorney for BENTON J. CAMPBELL United States Attorney for the Eastern

District of New York (See Exhibit G), and consolidated because Plaintiffs on

February 9, 2010 filed a response join in and incorporate by reference

Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion of Non-Party

Christopher Strunk, except to the extent to which Defendants characterize the legal

question before the Court in this litigation as "whether Congress has the

constitutional authority to enact appropriations legislation which temporarily

suspends ACORN'S access to federal funding while a government-wide

investigation takes place." (See Exhibit H).

2. That this reply declaration adds additional Exhibits as a continuation ofChristopher-Earl: Strunk in esse Affidavit in support of the notice of motion to

intervene as a ex-relator intervener-defendant U.S.A. citizen and State of New

York citizen with Exhibits A through F.

3. Declarants preliminary statement of the controlling facts in reply that aregermane to the disposition of not only this matter of intervention but are material

facts that may decide the entire case; that as such the following material facts

require a dismissal of the complaint, and or short of immediate dismissal, the


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transfer of this case with 28 USC 1407 to the proper venue and jurisdiction of the

U.S. District Court in Washington District of Columbia where all the void ab initio

actions of Barack Hussein Obama occur(ed) to endorse the Continuing Resolution

(CR) 163 and Mini-bus Bill and all others, are hereby challenged as actions that

must be deemed void ab initio, not only as to the CR 163 and Mini-Bus Bill too;

and that Chief Judge Lamberth is notified by the letter (See Exhibit I);

4. Further, because there is the Quo Warranto matter before the HonorableRoyce C. Lamberth Chief Judge of the United States Court of the District of

Columbia in Taitz v Obama DCD 10-cv-00151, in which Declarant filed a motion

to intervene therein (See Exhibit J with Sub-exhibits 1 through 4) with the

request to transfer and consolidate Declarants Quo Warranto Verified Complaint

by severing the matter from Strunk v U.S. Department of State et al. DCD 08-cv-

2234 presently before Distinct Judge Richard J. Leon; and

5. Further, where-in both 10-cv-00151 and 08-cv-2234, Declarant onapplication is an ex-relator requesting a declaratory judgment on the facts

presented without need for any discovery on the question of first impression on

admission by Barack Hussein Obama, that He is not a natural born citizen because

he has dual allegiance at birth is ineligible to hold the office of the President of the

United States (POTUS); and by the fact of Obamas own admission has Dual

Allegiance at Birth with a British Citizen Father and an American Citizen Mother


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on August 4, 1961, notwithstanding where he was born is not material per se

nevertheless with the fact of Dual Allegiance is ineligible for office of POTUS.

6. That Declarant on January 23, 2009 duly fired Barack Hussein Obama fromthe POTUS Trustee / Administrator use of Declarants Power of Attorney as

shown as Exhibit J sub-exhibit 1, and that Declarant is the only person in the

Country duly entitled to refer to Barack Hussein Obama as the Usurper, which

he is.

7. Further because the Usurper signed the Bills in question both are null andvoid therefore there is no bill of attainder per se - there is no case;

8. Further because Congress has delegated the Executive administrativeauthority to review payment of Plaintiffs several Contracts such administrative

process take precedence before this court has jurisdiction to review a complaint per

se if at all; and further

9. Further, because the Usurper by his actions threw the Plaintiffs under the busso to speak by endorsing the bill(s), rather than doing nothing by a pocket veto,

Congress must rely upon the delegated authority over said contracts for executive

administrative review accordingly until the process is exhausted.

10.Furthermore, this Court has no jurisdiction to hear the Quo Warranto matterwith the request for a declaratory judgment that may only be done in Washington

District of Columbia by the controlling statute.


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11.That the foregoing facts are dispositive and essential to resolve the matterherein in which Declarant replies with denials to the several Defendants Local

Counsel contentions that Petitioners affidavit is difficult to follow and denies the

allegations by which Mr. Amanat wrongly alleges without specificity that

Petitioners affidavit quote ..contains a good deal of immaterial, impertinent, or

scandalous matter, as if Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f) is to apply and that it does not

except insofar as Mr. Amanat's own statement to be stricken instead.

12.Declarant agrees that because he has righteously sued the federalgovernment in the active case Strunk v. US DOS et al. DCD 08-cv-2234 is where

Declarant was injured by Eric Holder directly, and [who] is hostile to Declarant;

thereby impacting Taitz v Obama DCD 10-cv-00151 and in Strunk v US DOC

Bureau of Census et al. DCD 09-cv-1295, Strunk v. The New York Province of the

Society of Jesus et al. DCD 09-cv-1249, Strunk v US Department of Interior et al.

10-cv-0066, wherein the U.S. Attorney of District of Columbia represents each of

those defendants as also thereafter effectsACORN et al. v. U.S.A. et al. EDNY 09-

cv-4888 (NG) and colors Strunk v. Paterson et al. NYS Supreme Court in Kings

County Index no.: 08-29642 before the Honorable New York Supreme Court

Justice David I. Schmidt.

13. That in the matter Strunk v. Paterson et al. NYS Supreme Court in KingsCounty Index no.: 08-29642 before the Honorable New York Supreme Court


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Justice David I. Schmidt in the hearing for a protective order on November 24,

2009 wherein Declarants Exhibit D the Court reporter swear she lost the

transcript, but after a complaint was filed with the Court Administration found

the transcript on January 26, 2010 (See Exhibit K); and wherein the transcript

Declarant refers to the Corporation which is in fact the ACORN Plaintiffs herein.

14. That Declarant denies that Eric Holder has ever been involved in any othercase involving Declarant except those listed above.

15.That Declarant denies being an abusive filer in this or any other Court, andthat every case I have ever been involved with since 1995 is in good faith with the

respective court in which Declarant commenced litigation against federal and state

agencies and other persons.

16.That Declarant contends that Judge Ross is predisposed to a bias towardsDeclarant in all the cases assigned to her because she was once an employee of

General Motors that is controlled by the Knights of the Sovereign Military Order

of Malta (SMOM) and, in which Judge Ross unreasonably dismissed all Strunks

claims under 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B), alleging that the facts alleged rise to the

level of the irrational or the wholly incredible . . . and that there is no legal theory

on which he may rely. Strunk v. CIA, No. 08-CV-1196 (ARR/LB) (E.D.N.Y.

Mar. 27, 2008) (docket no. 4). See also Thomas v. Federal Reserve Bank, No. 07-

CV-1171 (ARR/LB) (E.D.N.Y. May 29, 2007) (dismissing Strunks complaint as


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frivolous and denying IFP status for purposes of appeal); Strunk v. United States

Postal Service, No. 08-CV-1744 (ARR/LB) (E.D.N.Y. May 9 and June 13, 2008)

(same), affd, No. 08-3242-cv, 2010 WL Strunk v. New York State Bd. of Elec., No.

08-CV-4289 (ARR/LB) (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2008); Declarant is not responsible for

the bias of a Judge who must recuse when favoring the Freemasons and SMOM.

17.As for the case Fitzgerald v. Kellner, No. 02-CV-926 (NAM/RFT), 2006 2/WL 3489051 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2006) Declarant was represented by an attorney

initially therein; and thereafter, upon an unusual error by Judge Mordue after years

was restored to the calendar, and wherein the matter complained of originally was

transformed to include very arcane New York Election LawLock-box matters, and

allegations made by other Plaintiffs therein other than Declarant.

18.Declarants history as a litigant has nothing whatsoever to do with theintervention in the matter before the Court, Mr. Amanat defends this friendly suit.

19.Declarant denies any alleged abuse and disrespect of the courts andparticularly his continued efforts to intervene were done for sound reasons that

were based upon more than generalized grievances, and accomplished the purposes

for which intervention was intended.

20.That based upon information and belief Declarant recognizes the Fact thatHer Honor was selected as a Rhodes Scholar during the time when the Rhodes

Round-Table was an old boys club before the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 in the


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United Kingdom was done away with along with another Act of Parliament tochange theRhodes'will extended selection criteria in 1977to include womenmeritoriously selected, and such is a testimonial to Judge Gershon's capabilitiesand recognition by the Jesuits and Illuminati they want Her Honor on the bench inSecond Circuit rather than as a plaintiffs attorney able to challenge the status quo.

21 That based upon the foregoing especially the material facts of paragraphs 3through 10that will resolve the case herein, Declarant has an interest relating to thesubject of this action, is so situated that without intervention the disposition of thepresent action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect hisinterests; has shown that his interest, such as it is, is not adequately represented byexisting parties; that permissive intervention should be granted.

CONCLUSIONINREPLYFor the foregoing reasons, Declarant's motion to intervene as a defendant in thecase, whether as of right or by permission, should be granted along with the reliefrequested, along with other and different relief that the Court deems necessary.

16 2010ated: February - ,Brooklyn New York

~%T6topher-~arl:Strunk in esse593 Vanderbilt Avenue #281Brooklyn, New York 11238Email: [email protected]


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Christopher-Earl: Strunk In Esse DECLARATION IN SUPPORT OF

THE NOTICE OF MOTION TO INTERVENE AS A EX-RELATOR

INTERVENER-DEFENDANT U.S.A. CITIZEN AND

STATE OF NEW YORK CITIZEN.

Exhibit G


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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTEASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

ASSOCIATION OF COMMUNITY

ORGANIZATIONS FOR REFORM NOW,INC., et al.,

Plaintiffs,v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.,

Defendants.

))

)) No. 09-CV-4888 (NG/LB))) (Gershon, J.)) (Bloom, M.J.)))))

NOTICE TOPRO SE

LITIGANT PURSUANT TO LOCAL CIVIL RULE 7.1(C)

To: Christopher Earl Strunk,pro se593 Vanderbilt Avenue, Apt. 281Brooklyn, NY [email protected]

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Local Civil Rule 7.1(c) provides that In cases involving

apro se litigant, counsel shall, when serving a memorandum of law (or other submissions to

the Court), provide the pro se litigant (but not other counsel or the Court) with printed

copies of decisions cited therein that are unreported or reported exclusively on computerized

databases. Pursuant to said rule, Defendants hereby provide you with printed copies of the

following unreported decisions which are cited in Defendants Memorandum of Law:

Fitzgerald v. Kellner, No. 02-CV-926 (NAM/RFT), 2006 WL 3489051 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2006)

Green Party of New York State v. New York State Bd. of Elec. , No. 02-CV-6465 (JG/SMG)(E.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2003)

State Comm. of Indep. v. Berman, No. 03 Civ.4123 JSR, 2003 WL 22801908 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.21, 2003)

Strunk v. CIA, No. 08-CV-1196 (ARR/LB) (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2008)
mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]


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NOTICE PU RSUAN T TO L.C.R. 7.1(c)

ACORN v. United States, No. 09-CV-4888 (NG/LB) 2

Strunk v. Department of Housing & Urban Devt, No. 99-CV-6840 (NG/MDG) (E.D.N.Y.Apr. 3, 2001)

Strunk v. New York State Bd. of Elec., No. 08-CV-4289 (ARR/LB) (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2008)

Strunk v. New York State Ins. Fund, No. 02-CV-1273 (NG/LB) (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2002)

Strunk v. United States House of Representatives, No. 99-CV-2168 (NG/MDG) (E.D.N.Y.June 13, 2002)

Strunk v. United States Postal Service, No. 08-CV-1744 (ARR/LB) (E.D.N.Y. May 9 and June13, 2008)

Strunk v. United States Postal Service, No. 08-3242-cv, 2010 WL 227651 (2d Cir. Jan. 19,2010)

Thomas v. Federal Reserve Bank, No. 07-CV-1171 (ARR/LB) (E.D.N.Y. May 29, 2007)

Torres v. New York State Bd. of Elec., No. 04-CV-1129 (JG/SMG) (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 2006)

We have not included in this disclosure copies of cases reported in the Federal

Appendix which are cited in Defendants Memorandum. Should you not have access to that

reporter and wish to receive copies of any of the cases reported therein which are cited in

Defendants Memorandum, please contact the undersigned, who will arrange for printed

copies of the cases to be provided to you.

Dated: Brooklyn, New York BENTONJ.CAMPBELLFebruary 9, 2010 United States Attorney

Eastern District of New York271 Cadman Plaza EastBrooklyn, NY 11201-1820

By: /s/ {FILED ELECTRONICALLY}F.FRANKLINAMANAT (FA6117)Assistant United States AttorneyEastern District of New York(718) [email protected]


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Dated: Washington, D.C. TONYWESTFebruary 9, 2010 Assistant Attorney General

Civil Division

IAN HEATH GERSHENGORN

Deputy Assistant Attorney General

MICHAEL SITCOV,Trial AttorneyPETERD.LEARY,Trial AttorneyBRADLEYH.COHEN,Trial AttorneyU.S. Department of JusticeCivil Division, Federal Programs Branch20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Room 7322P.O. Box 883Washington, DC 20044

(202) [email protected]

Attorneys for Defendants

* * * ELECTRONICALLY FILED WITHOUT ATTACHMENTS * * *


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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, F. Franklin Amanat, hereby certify under penalties of perjury that on this 9th dayof February, 2010, I did cause true and correct copies of the above and foregoing instrument,Notice to Pro Se Litigant Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7.1(c), to be served in the manner

indicated below on the following persons:

BY FIRST CLASS MAIL (w/ ATTACHMENTS)AND BY EMAIL (w/o ATTACHMENTS)

Christopher Earl Strunk,pro se593 Vanderbilt Avenue, Apt. 281Brooklyn, NY [email protected]

BY ECF NOTIFICATION AND BY EMAIL(w/o ATTACHMENTS)

Darius Charney, Esq.Center for Constitutional [email protected]

By: /s/ {FILED ELECTRONICALLY}

F.FRANKLINAMANAT (FA6117)Assistant United States AttorneyEastern District of New York(718) 254-6024
mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]


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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTEASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

ASSOCIATION OF COMMUNITY

ORGANIZATIONS FOR REFORM NOW,INC., et al.,

Plaintiffs,v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.,

Defendants.

))

)) No. 09-CV-4888 (NG/LB))) (Gershon, J.)) (Bloom, M.J.)))))

DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OF

LAW

IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION OF NON-PARTYCHRISTOPHERSTRUNKFORINTERVENTION PURSUANT TO FED.R.CIV.P.24

TONYWEST BENTONJ.CAMPBELLAssistant Attorney General United States Attorney Civil Division Eastern District of New York

IAN HEATH GERSHENGORNDeputy Assistant Attorney General

MICHAEL SITCOV F.FRANKLINAMANAT (FA6117)PETERD.LEARY Assistant United States AttorneyBRADLEYH.COHEN 271 Cadman Plaza EastTrial Attorneys Brooklyn, NY 11201-1820United States Department of Justice (718) 254-6024Civil Division, Federal Programs Branch [email protected] Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Room 7322P.O. Box 883Washington, D.C. 20044


February 9, 2010


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MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FORINTERVENTIONACORN v. United States, No. 09-CV-4888 (NG/LB) 1

PRELIMINARYSTATEMENT

Christopher Strunk, apro se non-party to this action, is a frequent filer in this and

other federal courts. The vast majority of the proceedings he has initiated, whether by

complaint or by motion to intervene, have been dismissed as frivolous. On January 10, 2010,

he filed a Notice of Motion to Intervene as a Ex-Relator Intervener-Defendant U.S.A. Citizen

and State of New York Citizen, accompanied by a 14-page affidavit in support. While this

affidavit is difficult to follow and contains a good deal of immaterial, impertinent, or

scandalous matter, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f), its gist appears to be that Strunk wishes to intervene

because he does not have confidence that the governmental defendants will adequately

defend against ACORNs challenges to the constitutionality of the funding suspension

provisions at issue and because he wants to move to dismiss the complaint.

Strunks motion should be denied as without merit. It meets neither the

requirements for intervention as of right, Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a), nor the requirements for

permissive intervention. Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b).

BACKGROUND

1. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This case originated on November 12, 2009, when plaintiffs ACORN et al. filed a

complaint asserting a constitutional challenge on bill of attainder, due process, and First

Amendment grounds to section 163 of Division B of Pub. L. No. 111-68, the Continuing

Appropriations Resolution, 2010 (reported at 123 Stat. 2023, 2053 (2009) and hereinafter cited

as Section 163"). See Complaint, docket no. 1. On December 11, 2009, this Court entered an


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Opinion and Order (docket nos. 9 and 10, hereinafter Preliminary Injunction Order)

granting ACORNs motion for a preliminary injunction and barring the government from

enforcing Section 163. The government filed a notice of appeal from this decision on

December 16, 2009, and on the same day moved this Court for reconsideration of the

Preliminary Injunction Order. See docket nos. 11 and 12.

On December 15, 2009 the day before the government filed its notice of appeal

and motion for reconsideration the parties received copies of correspondence sent to the

Court bypro se movant Strunk. This correspondence, which was docketed on December 22

as no. 23, purported to request a premotion conference in anticipation of Strunks filing a

motion for intervention; according to the letter, Strunk wished to intervene as a defendant

in the case so that he could appeal from the Preliminary Injunction Order. The government

responded to Strunks letter on December 21 (docket no. 22), asking the Court to deny

Strunks request for a premotion conference, chiefly on the grounds that any motion for

intervention would be frivolous, and that Strunks intervention was in any event unnecessary

because the government had itself noticed an appeal from the Preliminary Injunction Order.

On December 22, 2009, the Court heard argument (see docket nos. 18, 26) on the

governments motion for reconsideration of the Preliminary Injunction Order, as well as on

ACORNs cross-motion (see docket no. 15) to expand the Preliminary Injunction Order to

enjoin five provisions in FY2010 appropriations acts which were enacted after the filing of the


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In a Memorandu m and Order en tered that same date, the Court denied both the governments1/

motion for reconsideration and ACO RNs cross-motion to modify and directed the parties to file new pleadings

and motions. See docket no. 24.


initial complaint. Strunk was present at the December 22 hearing. The Court informed1/

Strunk that, because he ispro se, he is not required to request a premotion conference under

the relevant Individual Practice Rules and could proceed to file a motion to intervene in the

case should he desire. The Court reminded Strunk, however, that even as apro se litigant he

must comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including Rule 11, and admonished

Strunk to be aware of his obligations under those Rules should he choose to file any motion.

On January 20, 2010, Strunk filed a motion to intervene in this case as a defendant,

along with an affidavit in support. By that time, ACORN had filed an amended and second

amended complaint, as well as a motion for preliminary and permanent injunction and for

a declaratory judgment. See docket nos. 19, 28, 29, 33. The government had, in the

meantime, filed a motion to vacate the Preliminary Injunction Order, and it has since moved

to dismiss the second amended complaint or in the alternative for summary judgment. See

docket nos. 25, 31, 38, 39. The Court directed the parties to respond to Strunks intervention

motion by February 9. See docket no. 35.

2. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

As best as can be discerned, Strunks purpose in seeking to intervene is to move

to dismiss plaintiffs complaint on a variety of grounds and possibly also to implead the State

of New York as a party. Strunk Decl. 17. The factual basis for Strunks motion to intervene

is not entirely clear. Although his Affidavit in support of his motion to intervene is largely


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unintelligible, Paragraphs 4 through 7 and 9 through 12 appear to set forth summaries of the

litigation Strunk has brought in various courts, with paragraph 4 containing a notation to the

effect that the present case is a related case to Strunks other litigation.

In paragraph 8, Strunk seems to allege that ACORN has maintained close partisan

political dealing with the State Senator against whom Strunk campaigned in 2008 and that

ACORN engaged in illegal lobbying efforts which he believes should be investigated by the

Kings County District Attorney. He also alleges in paragraphs 11 and 12 that ACORN is the

subject of an election law case he is pursuing in Kings County State Supreme Court by

virtue of that organizations close dealing with the Brooklyn Democratic Party et al. In

paragraphs 13 and 14, Strunk cryptically repeats his allegations regarding ACORNs

involvement in unlawful lobbying activities before various State agencies and entities.

The crux of Strunks intervention claim appears to be set forth in paragraph 15 of

his Affidavit. There, he seems to express the view that the governmental defendants have

secretly conspired with ACORN and its affiliates to continue a flow of government funds to

ACORN notwithstanding the suspension provisions; this circumstance, he states, precludes

his trust in the defendants to adequately defend the challenged provisions and puts him, as

a citizen of the United States and of New York who has previously litigated claims that were

opposed to ACORNs interests, in a superior position to defend the challenged statutes:

Affirmant has an interest relating to the property or transaction that isthe subject of the action in that the Usurper Barack Hussein Obamasimpropriety as the prior attorney to ACORN and its affiliates inaffiliation with SEIU and crony Eric Holder, who are all part of acontinuing enterprise that have maliciously orchestrated a friendlyconstitutional tort herein to: circumvent due administrative process


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under existing contracts, pre-empt public fiduciary duty to performsubstantive due process and oversight required under statutes . . . .

Strunk Aff. 15(b). He argues that his interest is not adequately represented by the existing

parties because the Usurpers Attorney General and or his agents have not vigorously

represented U.S.A. Citizen, the State of New York Citizen or any other States citizen of the

several states . . . in that the necessary Affirmative defense to the Complaint and counter

claims have not been entered into the record. Id. 15(d). Elsewhere, he seems to suggest

that because he has sued the federal government in other cases (and lost), he was injured

by Eric Holder directly, [who] is hostile to Affirmant; and therefore, his agents, no matter

how great an assistant attorney general they may otherwise be, cant possibly represent my

interests herein. Id. 21.

Strunk is a frequent filer in this and other Courts, with a long history of

commencing litigation against federal and state agencies. The vast majority of his

proceedings have been dismissed as frivolous. PACER shows at least 27 cases involving

Strunk in the last ten years, at least ten of which have been in this District. In one recent

case, Judge Ross dismissed the bulk of Strunks claims under 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B), finding

that the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible . . . and that

there is no legal theory on which he may rely. Strunk v. CIA, No. 08-CV-1196 (ARR/LB)

(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2008) (docket no. 4). See also Thomas v. Federal Reserve Bank, No. 07-CV-

1171 (ARR/LB) (E.D.N.Y. May 29, 2007) (dismissing Strunks complaint as frivolous and

denying IFP status for purposes of appeal); Strunk v. United States Postal Service, No. 08-CV-

1744 (ARR/LB) (E.D.N.Y. May 9 and June 13, 2008) (same), affd, No. 08-3242-cv, 2010 WL


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See also Fitzgerald v. Kellner, No. 02-CV-926 (NAM/RFT), 2006 W L 3489051 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 1,2/

2006) (dismissing com plaint brought by Strunk under Rule 8 because, inter alia, it was prolix, confusing, and

placed too heavy a burden on defendants and the Co urt to discern the claims plaintiffs asserted).


227651 (2d Cir. Jan. 19, 2010); Strunk v. New York State Bd. of Elec., No. 08-CV-4289 (ARR/LB)

(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2008) (same).2/

Indeed, your Honor repeatedly dismissed Strunks seriatim motions as frivolous,

and ultimately dismissed the complaint as devoid of merit, in Strunk v. United States House

of Representatives, No. 99-CV-2168 (NG/MDG) (E.D.N.Y. June 13, 2002), affd, 68 Fed. Appx.

233 (2d Cir. June 23, 2003) (The District Court properly dismissed Strunk's third amended

complaint and properly denied his motion to file a fourth amended complaint, as his

complaint was unintelligible and his claims indiscernible. In each of his complaints, Strunk

asserted violations of several federal statutes and eleven constitutional amendments, without

explaining what conduct constituted the violations, which defendants violated which statutes

or amendments, or how the alleged violations harmed him.). See also Strunk v. Department

of Housing & Urban Devt, No. 99-CV-6840 (NG/MDG) (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 2001) (sua sponte

dismissing claims for failure to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 8); Strunk v. New York State Ins.

Fund, No. 02-CV-1273 (NG/LB) (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2002) (sua sponte dismissing complaint as

frivolous under 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2) and denying IFP status for purposes of appeal), affd,

47 Fed. Appx. 611 (2d Cir. 2002).

Strunk has also filed motions to intervene in a number of other cases. Two such

motions in this Court have been denied as frivolous. See, e.g., Torres v. New York State Bd.

of Elec., No. 04-CV-1129 (JG/SMG) (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 2006) (denying motion to intervene, and


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subsequently (on Feb. 13, 2007), denying IFP status for Strunks appeal), affd, 300 Fed. Appx.

106 (2d Cir. Nov. 19, 2008); Green Party of New York State v. New York State Bd. of Elec., No.

02-CV-6465 (JG/SMG) (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2003) (same). Another motion to intervene filed by

Strunk was rejected by a three-judge district court in part because it would cause undue

distraction, delay and prejudice to the parties and to the Court in the adjudication of the

underlying cases. Rodriguez v. Pataki, 211 F.R.D. 215, 219 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (three judge court).

Strunks appeal from the denial of his motion to intervene in another case was rejected

because he allege[d] little more than an abstract interest in the democratic process in New

York State and failed to show a direct, substantial, and legally protectable interest in the

litigation. Person v. New York State Bd. of Elec., 467 F.3d 141, 144 (2d Cir. 2006). See also

Kunz v. New York State Commn on Judicial Misconduct, 155 Fed. Appx. 21, 22 (2d Cir. Nov.

8, 2005) (rejecting Strunks appeal from denial of motion to intervene because Strunk

asserted only a general interest in the efficient regulation of judicial conduct); Strunk v. Green

Party of New York State, 144 Fed. Appx. 917 (2d Cir. Oct. 5, 2005); State Comm. of Indep. v.

Berman, No. 03 Civ.4123 JSR, 2003 WL 22801908 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2003) (denying Strunks

motion to intervene).

ARGUMENT

I. STANDARD FORINTERVENTION

Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24, a non-party may be allowed to intervene as a party in an

existing lawsuit, either as of right or by permission. Intervention as of right is governed by

Rule 24(a), which provides that, unless a right to intervene is unconditionally granted by


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federal statute, a non-party has no right to intervene in a case as a plaintiff or defendant

unless it shows that (1) its motion to intervene was timely filed; (2) it has an interest relating

to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action; (3) it is so situated that

without intervention the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede

its ability to protect its interest; and (4) its interest is not adequately represented by existing

parties. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a); Butler, Fitzgerald & Potter v. Sequa Corp., 250 F.3d 171, 176

(2d Cir. 2001). All four parts of the test must be satisfied to qualify for intervention as of

right. Washington Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Massachusetts Municipal Wholesale Elec. Co., 922 F.2d

92, 96 (2d Cir. 1990); accordDAmato v. Deutsche Bank, 236 F.3d 78, 84 (2d Cir. 2001) (Denial

of the motion to intervene is proper if any of these requirements is not met); United States

v. New York, 820 F.2d 554, 556 (2d Cir. 1987). The moving party has the burden of

demonstrating its entitlement to intervene. Seils v. Rochester City Sch. Dist., 199 F.R.D. 506,

509 (W.D.N.Y. 2001).

Permissive intervention is governed by Rule 24(b), which provides that, unless a

right to intervene is conditionally granted by federal statute, a court may not exercise its

discretion to permit a non-party to intervene in an action unless the non-party shows that

its claim or defense . . . shares with the main action a common question of law or fact. Fed.

R. Civ. P. 24(b)(1)(B). The district court has broad discretion to deny an applicants motion

for intervention under Rule 24(b). Seils, 199 F.R.D. at 512 (citation omitted). In exercising

this discretion, the court shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or

prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties. Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(3). The


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Court also may consider the nature and extent of the intervenors interests, whether the

intervenors participation will contribute to a just and equitable adjudication of the issues,

and whether the intervenors [interests] are adequately represented by the parties of record.

Sharif v. New York State Educ. Dept, 709 F. Supp. 365, 369 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (citation omitted);

Seils, 199 F.R.D. at 513.

II. STRUNK MAYNOT INTERVENE AS OF RIGHT.

Strunk cannot satisfy the second, third, or fourth requirements of Rule 24(a) for

of right intervention. Because he must satisfy all four requirements to prevail, his motion

must be denied. See DAmato, 236 F.3d at 84; United States v. New York, 820 F.2d at 556.

A. Strunk Has No Interest Relating to the Subject of This Action.

The second requirement of Rule 24(a) is that he must demonstrate an interest

relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a);

Butler, Fitzgerald & Potter, 250 F.3d at 176. The transaction that is the subject of the present

action is the appropriations legislation passed by Congress in the fall of 2009 which

suspended the flow of federal funds to ACORN and its affiliated organizations pending the

completion of a government-wide investigation. Strunk has failed to demonstrate, whether

in his Affidavit or otherwise, anybona fide individualized interest relating to this legislation.

For example, he nowhere alleges that he has ever been involved in any way with federal

funding for ACORN, that he has ever had a contract with ACORN or with the federal

government, that he has ever competed with ACORN for the receipt of federal funds, or that


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The Supreme C ourt has not resolved the question whether a party seeking to intervene under3/

Rule 24(a) m ust satisfy the requirements of Article III of the Constitution. SeeDiamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54,

68-69 (1986) (citing cases from Courts of Appeals for the Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and District of ColumbiaCircuits). And the Second Circuit has held that a prospective intervenor need not satisfy Article III standing

requirements m erely to participate in district court proceedings. United States Postal Serv. v. Brennan, 579 F.2d

188, 190 (2d Cir. 1978). Nevertheless, an intervenors interest must be direct, substantial, and legally

protectable. New York News, Inc. v. Kheel, 972 F.2d 482, 486 (2d Cir. 1992) (citation and quotation omitted).

Strunk cannot satisfy this requirement because he has no m ore than a generalized interest in this matter that

could be shared by any citizen. Cf.Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm . to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 220-21 (1974).


he had any involvement in the enactment of the funding suspension legislation that is

currently under challenge.

As best as can be ascertained from his Affidavit, the interest on which he relies is

his desire to move to dismiss plaintiffs complaint on a variety of grounds and possibly also

to implead the State of New York as a party essentially, to ensure that the suspension

provisions remain in force and that funding to ACORN does not resume. Strunk Decl. 17.

He also expresses an inchoate wish that ACORN be prosecuted in some fashion, by some

governmental authority, for its alleged bad acts. Id. 15(b). However, in order to claim a

judicially cognizable injury in fact, an intervenor must have a direct stake in the outcome

of a litigation rather than a mere interest in the problem. Schulz v. Williams, 44 F.3d 48, 52

(2d Cir. 1994) (quotes and citations omitted); see also Brennan v. New York City Bd. of Educ.,

260 F.3d 123, 128 (2d Cir. 2001) ([F]or an interest to be cognizable under Rule 24(a)(2), it

must be direct, substantial, and legally protectable.). A general desire, as a citizen, to ensure

or to promote compliance with constitutional requirements, or to procure the prosecution

of bad actors, is a plainly insufficient interest to support intervention as of right. See, e.g.,

United States v. Peoples Benefit Life Ins. Co., 271 F.3d 411, 415 (2d Cir. 2001); Washington Elec.

Coop., 922 F.2d at 97.3/


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Accordingly, his motion to intervene should be de nied. In addition, to the extent Strunks interest in

intervening consists of a desire to ap peal from the Preliminary Injunction Orde r, he cannot satisfy the standing

requirements of Article III: To maintain standing to appeal, an intervenor mus t have suffered an injury in fact

that is fairly traceable to the challenged action a nd that is likely to b e redressed by the relief requested. Schulz

v. Williams , 44 F.3d 48, 52 (2d Cir. 1994).


In fact, Strunks efforts to intervene in other cases have repeatedly been rejected

on this very ground. See, e.g., Person, 467 F.3d at 144(Strunks appeal from the denial of his

motion to intervene rejected because he allege[d] little more than an abstract interest in the

democratic process in New York State); Kunz, 155 Fed. Appx. at 22 (rejecting Strunks appeal

from denial of motion to intervene because Strunk asserted only a general interest in the

efficient regulation of judicial conduct).

Any interests which may be discerned from Strunks Affidavit with respect to

ACORN are entirely collateral to the present litigation and therefore cannot be said to relate

to the transaction that is the subject of the action. See Rodriguez, 211 F.R.D. at 218 (Mr.

Strunk does not have a stake in these claims. Mr. Strunks challenge arises from an entirely

different (even if difficult to discern) legal theory which embraces alleged violations of the

Immigration and Naturalization Act . . . . While Mr. Strunk may have a global interest in

election issues, he has alleged little or no interest in the Constitutional and Voting Rights Act

claims raised in this case.). Strunk therefore cannot satisfy the second requirement of Rule

24(a), and his motion for intervention as of right should be denied.


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B. Strunk is Not So Situated that Without Intervention the Dispositionof the Present Action May as a Practical Matter Impair or Impede HisAbility to Protect His Interests.

Nor can Strunk satisfy the third requirement of Rule 24(a). As noted above, Strunk

is an extremely litigious individual who has filed numerous lawsuits in this and other courts.

Strunk attempts to argue in his Affidavit that the present litigation is somehow vaguely

related to his other cases (see Strunk Aff. 4-7, 9-12), but he has failed to explain how this

Courts disposition of the question before it whether Congress has the constitutional

authority to enact appropriations legislation which temporarily suspends ACORNs access

to federal funding while a government-wide investigation takes place could possibly impair

or impede his ability to protect or pursue whatever interests he believes he is advancing with

his other cases. Nor has he articulated how this Courts disposition of that legal issue could

as a practical matter affect his electoral ambitions or the pursuit of his political agenda.

Strunk fares no better with his opaque allegations that he is somehow injured by

virtue of ACORNs alleged close partisan political dealings with the Brooklyn Democratic

Party or with the State Senator against whom he campaigned in 2008, or by ACORNs alleged

involvement in illegal lobbying efforts. See Strunk Aff. 8, 11, 12, 13, 14. These allegations

have nothing to do with ACORNs receipt of the federal funding that was suspended by the

legislation at issue here. If Strunk was genuinely injured by ACORNs activities in this regard,

the injury would have taken place regardless of whether ACORN received federal funding,

and the disposition of the present litigation would in no way impede Strunks ability to

pursue available remedies for such injuries in the appropriate fora. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 211


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F.R.D. at 218 (Mr. Strunk also fails to identify any interest of his that might be impaired by

the disposition of this action. Since the issues do not coincide, whatever the outcome of this

litigation, Mr. Strunk is free to bring an independent action. As noted, Mr. Strunk is already

party to a number of other election cases.).

C. Strunk Has Not Shown that His Interest, Such as It Is, Is NotAdequately Represented by Existing Parties.

Strunks motion for intervention as of right is equally doomed under the fourth

prong of Rule 24(a). Strunk essentially argues that he does not trust the governmental

defendants to fully defend the constitutionality of the funding suspension provisions because

of an alleged secret conspiracy between the government and ACORN that has its genesis in

the Presidents alleged former relationship with that organization. Strunk Aff. 15(b), 15(d).

He also seems to suggest that because he has sued the federal government in other cases (and

lost), he cannot rely on the Department of Justice to represent his interests. Id. 21. Even

if these arguments were not patently predicated on fanciful and fantastic speculation, they

would border on folly given the considerable lengths to which the government has already

gone to defend the constitutionality of the challenged statutes including its notice of appeal

from the Preliminary Injunction Order, its motion to vacate that order, and its motion to

dismiss the Second Amended Complaint or in the alternative for summary judgment.

Indeed, it is obvious that Strunks participation in the suit is not remotely necessary, because

the government has shown itself more than willing and able to respond to plaintiffs claims.


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Because Strunk has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating an entitlement to

intervene, his motion under Rule 24(a) must be denied. Seils, 199 F.R.D. at 509.

III. PERMISSIVE INTERVENTION SHOULD BE DENIED.

A court may not exercise its discretion to permit a non-party to intervene in an

action unless the non-party shows that its claim or defense . . . shares with the main action

a common question of law or fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(1)(B). As elaborated in Part II,

Strunk has failed to intelligibly articulate any legitimate, individualized claim or defense

relating to ACORN, much less one which shares a common question of law or fact with this

case. On this ground alone, his claim for permissive intervention must be denied.

Moreover, in exercising its broad discretion under Rule 24(b), a court considers

the nature and extent of the intervenors interests, . . . and whether the intervenors

[interests] are adequately represented by the parties of record. Sharif v. New York State

Educ. Dept, 709 F. Supp. 365, 369 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (citation omitted); Seils, 199 F.R.D. at 513.

The arguments set forth in Part II with respect to why intervention as of right should be

denied thus apply with equal force to permissive intervention: Strunks interests, if any, are

vague, generalized, and collateral, and he has no basis to argue that those interests (such as

they are) are not adequately represented by the parties of record.

Permissive intervention also implicates whether the intervention will unduly delay

or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(3), or,

put otherwise, whether the intervenors participation will contribute to a just and equitable

adjudication of the issues. Sharif, 709 F. Supp. at 369. Setting aside the arguments already


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made above, a cursory perusal of Strunks submission demonstrates why permissive

intervention is not conducive to a just and equitable adjudication of the important issues in

this case. Strunks affidavit is largely unintelligible, and it contains a good deal of

immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter that should be stricken under Fed. R. Civ.

P. 12(f), such as repeated inappropriate references to the President of the United States as the

Usurper. Many of the factual allegations in the affidavit, in addition to being wholly

irrelevant to the issues before the Court, are wildly speculative and grounded either in absurd

conspiracy theories or in Strunks political agenda. Strunk in no wise suggests that he

possesses factual evidence, not otherwise available to the parties, that would aid the Court

in its disposition of the legal issues before it; nor does he advance a single non-frivolous legal

theory that the Court must address in order to assess the claims and defenses of the parties.

Strunks history as a litigant who has repeatedly filed baseless court cases should

also be considered by the Court as it assesses whether to exercise its discretion in favor of

permissive intervention. The vast majority of his proceedings have been dismissed as

frivolous, courts often having found that his allegations rise to the level of the irrational or

the wholly incredible . . . and that there is no legal theory on which he may rely. Strunk v.

CIA, No. 08-CV-1196 (ARR/LB) (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2008) (docket no. 4). His motion and

supporting affidavit in this case are equally irrational and incredible, and fail to articulate any

viable legal theory. Like his submission in this case, his complaints have repeatedly been

characterized as unintelligible, his claims indiscernible. Strunk v. United States House of

Representatives, 68 Fed. Appx. 233 (2d Cir. June 23, 2003). Moreover, his motions for


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intervention have almost uniformly been rejectedas frivolous, courts observing that his

participation in the cases would, as it would here, cause undue distraction, delay and

prejudice to the parties and to the Court. Rodriguez, 211 F.R.D. at 219. Strunks repeated

abuse and disrespect of the courts and particularly his continued efforts to intervene in

cases based on generalized grievances, even after having been told by other courts that such

grievances are not sufficient to support intervention does not warrant an exercise of

permissive discretion in his favor.

Far from contributing to a just and equitable adjudication of the issues in this case,

Strunks intervention would be likely to distract both the Court and the parties with frivolous

and tendentious litigation over collateral and inconsequential matters. It should be denied.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Strunks motion to intervene as a defendant in the case,

whether as of right or by permission, should be denied.

Dated: Brooklyn, New York BENTONJ.CAMPBELLFebruary 9, 2010 United States Attorney

Eastern District of New York271 Cadman Plaza EastBrooklyn, NY 11201-1820

By: /s/ {FILED ELECTRONICALLY}F.FRANKLINAMANAT (FA6117)Assistant United States AttorneyEastern District of New York


... (continued)
mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]


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Dated: Washington, D.C. TONYWESTFebruary 9, 2010 Assistant Attorney General

Civil Division

IAN HEATH GERSHENGORN

Deputy Assistant Attorney General

MICHAEL SITCOV,Trial AttorneyPETERD.LEARY,Trial AttorneyBRADLEYH.COHEN,Trial AttorneyU.S. Department of JusticeCivil Division, Federal Programs Branch20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Room 7322P.O. Box 883Washington, DC 20044


Attorneys for Defendants


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I, F. Franklin Amanat, hereby certify under penalties of perjury that on this 9th dayof February, 2010, I did cause true and correct copies of the above and foregoing instrument,Defendants Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion of Non-Party Christopher

Strunkfor Intervention Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 24, to be served in the manner indicatedbelow on the following persons:

BY FIRST CLASS MAIL AND BY EMAIL

Christopher Earl Strunk,pro se593 Vanderbilt Avenue, Apt. 281Brooklyn, NY [email protected]

BY ECF NOTIFICATION AND BY EMAIL

Darius Charney, Esq.Center for Constitutional [email protected]

By: /s/ {FILED ELECTRONICALLY}F.FRANKLINAMANAT

Assistant United States AttorneyEastern District of New York(718) 254-6024


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Exhibit H


36/133

UNlTEDSTATESDISTRICT COURTEA!XERN DKlWCL''OF NEW YORK

ASSOCIATION OFCOMMUNITYORGANIZATIONS FORREFORMNOW;ACORN INSTITUTE,MC.; nd ClVILACnUNNUMBERMHANY MANAGFMENT,INC,WaNEW YORKACORN HOUSING COMPANY,INC, m ~ @ w

. -. ,PlainaifEsversus

- . . -.,;%&%% 3 q -< , **..-&++ . - - . .~ & A T E S G FMERICA; +" -- + - -SHAUNDONOVAN, Secretaryof theDepartmentof Housing and Urban Development;PETER ORSZAG, h t o r ,Officeof Management andBudget;TIMOTHYGEITHNER, SecretaryoftheDepartment ofTreasury of theUnited States;LISA B. JACKSON, Administrator of the EnvbmentalProtectionAgency, GARY LOCKE, erretary ofCommerce; nd ROBERTGATES, SecretaryofDe6mse

Defendants

PLATNTIFWSMEMORANDUM OF LAW INOPPOSITION TOMOTION OF NON-PARTY CHRISTOPHERSTRUNK TO NTERVENEPURSUANTTO F.RC.P. 24

Plaintiffs herebyjoin in and incorporateby refixmceDefendants' Memorandum ofLaw'----.-g?&-Or.-* -in Oppositibn to Motion ofNm-Party ChristopheiS ~ 0 1 1 P u r s w u t d oFed.RCiv.P. 24 @kt # 40), except o the extenttowhichDefendantschamcterhthe legalquestion before the Court in this litigationas "whether Congresshas the constitutional authorityto enact appropriations legislation which temporarilysuspendsACORN'Sacoess to federalfunding while a government-wide investigationtakesplace." SeeDefi' Mem.@kt # 40) at 12.Plaintiffs submit that Defendants' descriptionof the legal questionbefbre this Court severely


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rnischaracterizes the nature of theACORN fundingbanswhich Plain- are chalIenging in thisaction as well as the relationshipbetween such bans and government investigations o f ACORNandACORN-affiliatdorganhatiom.Dated: New York, New YorkFebruary 9,2010

Respectfullysubmitted,Center forConstitutionalRights

By:---a --

DariusCharney (DC1619)William Quigley (Legal Director)666 Broadway, 7th FloorNew York, NY 10012Tel.: (2 12)614-6475; (2 12) 614-6427Fax: (2 12) 614-6499CCRCboperatingAttorneysJules Lobel (admitted inNY & this courtJL8780)3900Forbes AvenuePittsburgh, PA 15260Goodman& Hurwitz, P.C.William Goodman (admitted in NY &this courtWG1241)Julie H. Hurwitz1394East JeffersonDetroib wchigaq48207313.567.6170Arthur Z. Schwartz (A252683)275 Seventh AvenueNew York, NY 10001


38/133

CERTIFICATEOF SERVICEI, Darius Chamey, hereby certify under penalty of perjury that on this day ofFebruary, 2010, I did cause true and correct copies of the aboveand foregoing to

instrument, Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion of Non-PartyChristopherStrunk to Intervene Pursuant toF.R.C.P. 4, to be sewed in a mannerindicated below on the following persons:

BY FIRSTCLASSMAILAND EMAILChristopherEarl Stnmk, pro se539 VanderbiltAve, Apt 281Brooklyn,NY [email protected]

-- .- -up -BY ECFNOTIFICATIONF.Franklin Arnanat .AssistantUnited StatesAttorneyEasternDistrict ofNew Yo*firanklin.amanat@,usdoi.~ov

PeterLearyU.S.Department of JusticeCivil DivisionFederal Programs Branchpeter.leary@doi .nov

kb*Chamey w.u - wCenter for ConstitutionalRights666 Broadway, 7 FloorNew York, 10012(2 12)614-6475dcharney@,,ccriustice.org


39/133


40/133





Exhibit I


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Christopher-Earl: Stnmk in esse593Vanderbilt Avenue #28 1Brooklyn, New York 11238Email: [email protected] 1-6767

The Honorable Royce C. LamberthUnited States District Chief Judge for theU.S. District for the District of Columbia333 Constitution Avenue,NW,Washington, DC 20001 Re: Taitz v. Obama DCD 10-cv-0015 1 and related caseStrunk v. DOS et aI. DCD 08-c~-2234RJL)Subject: Request for permission to transfer with the 28 USC81407The Multidistrict matter ACORN et al. v. U.S.A. et d.EDNY 09-cv-4888 (NG)with demand for Quo Warrantoinquest of Barack Hussein Obama (a.k.a Barry Soetoro).The Honorable Chief JudgeLamberth,

I am the Petitioner, Christopher-Earl: Strunk inesse, with the pending motion tointervene herein as a ex-relator Plaintiff from the related case before U.S. District Judge RichardJ. Leon. Judge Leon ordered a stay of discovery pending a decision on my Quo Warrantodemand for an inquest of multi-allegiance facts associated with the August 4,1961 birth ofBarack Hussein Obama Jr., a.k.a. Barry Soetoro (the Usurper).and make this statement underpenalty ofperjury pursuant to 28 USC $1746. Declarant is self-represented in the above civilactions on-going in Washington District of Columbia, and hereby request permission to transferwith the 28 USC $1407 the matter ACORN et al. v. U.S.A. et al. EDNY 09-cv-4888 presentlybefore Judge Nina Gershon when my Motion to intervene there is decided by that Court in thatas I argue there on January 23,2009 I duly fired the Defendant Obama because He is unqualifiedto act with mypower of attorney because He has dual allegiance at birth by his own admissionand his actions are void ab initio; and therefore, with dual allegiance ineligible to hold the officeof President according to U.S. Constitution ArticleIT Section 1, is nota natural-born-citizenwithout two U.S. Citizen parents on his birth August 4, 1961. Of importance to the Plaintiffherein, I concur with an expedited inquest schedule requested by Dr.Taitz on facts filed beforethis Court that prove the Defendant has committed a fraud that personally injured She and me.I am familiar with the facts associated with the referenced cases as eacharerelated and subject to the transfer here as an urgent matter of National Security before this Courtand that theU.S. Government has argued that anyQuo Warranto be done in Washington Districtof Columbia and I urge herein applieswith a Multi-district Judicial Panel accordingly. A copy ofthis request has been sent toCounsels and Court in both case

Date: February&, 2010Brooklyn New Yorkcc: Judge R i c b d 4. L hJudge Nina Gershon . .


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United States District Courts

Eastern District of New York In Case ACORN et al. v. U.S.A. et al. EDNY 09-cv-4888Washington District of Columbia In Case Taitz v. Obama DCD 10-cv-00151

Washington District of Columbia In Case Strunk v. DOS et al. DCD 08-cv-2234


On February 17, 2010, I, Christopher Earl Strunk, declare and certify under penalty of perjury

pursuant to 28 USC 1746: That I caused the service of Nine (9) copies of the Christopher-Earl:

Strunk in esse Request for permission to transfer with the 28 USC 1407 The Multidistrict matterACORN et al. v. U.S.A. et al. EDNY 09-cv-4888 (NG) declared February 16, 2010, with exhibits

annexed and that each set was placed in a sealed folder properly addressed with proper postage for

United States Postal Service Delivery by mail upon:

The Honorable Nina Gershon

United States District Judge for the

U.S.D.C. for the Eastern District of New York225 Cadman Plaza East

Brooklyn New York 11207

The Honorable Richard J. Leon

United States District Judge for the

U.S. District for the District of Columbia333 Constitution Avenue, NW, Room 6315,

Washington, DC 20001

Dr. Orly Taitz, D.D.S.

29839 Santa Margarita Parkway, STE 100

Rancho Santa Margarita CA 92688

Darius Charney, Esq. Center for

Constitutional Rights 666 Broadway, 7thFloor New York, NY 10012

Peter D. Leary USAAG Department of Justice

20 Massachusetts Avenue, NW Room 7322Washington, DC 20530

Andrew Cuomo New York State Attorney

General 120 Broadway 24th Floor New York

New York 10271

Channing Philips, the U.S. Attorney

c/o Wynne P. Kelly, AUSA

Office of the U.S. Attorney for theWashington District of Columbia

555 4th St., N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20530

Eric Holder, U.S. Attorney General

c/o Brigham John Bowen, AUSA

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE20 Massachusetts Avenue, NWWashington, DC 20530

Barack Hussein Obama in esse

c/o The White House

1600 Pennsylvania Avenue NWWashington, DC 20500

I do declare and certify under penalty of perjury:

Dated: February ____, 2010

Brooklyn New York _____________________________

Christopher-Earl: Strunk in esse

593 Vanderbilt Avenue #281

Brooklyn, New York 11238

Email: [email protected] Ph: 845-901-6767


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Exhibit J


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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COU RTFOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUM BIA

............................................................... XDr. Orly Taitz, PRO S E 2 9 8 3 9 Santa Margarita Parkway, STE 100 5Rancho Santa ~ a rg a r it a A 9 2 6 8 8 Tel: (949) 6 8 3 - 5 4 1 1; Fax (949) 7 6 6 - 7 6 0 3 Civil Action: 10-CV-00151E-Mail: dr [email protected] (RCL)Plaintiff, v. Barack Hussein Obama,

C/OThe White House 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue,N.W. 8Washington, District of Columbia 2 0 5 0 0 Defendant. i- -

CHRISTOPHER-EARL: STRUNK IN ESSE NOTICE OF MO TION TO INTERV ENEAS A EX-RELATOR INTERVENER -PLAINTIFF.PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that upon the annexed affidavit of Christopher-Earl :Strunk, bySpecial-Appearance, affirmed January 29,20 10 will move this Court to intervene as a ex-relatorintervener-plaintiff before Chief District Judge Royce C. Lemberth at time afforded by theCourt if necessary at the United States Courthouse, at 333 Constitution AvenueNW WashingtonDistrict of Columbia, on the day and month in 2010, at a time and courtroom designated by thecourt, or as soon thereafter as counsel can be heard.

Dated: J a n u a r y ,9 2010Brooklyn New Y or iBrooklyn, New York 11238Email: [email protected] 1-6767Christopher-Earl: StrunkO in esse

cc: listing of service to follow


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The Honorable Richard J. LeonUnited States District Judge for the

U.S. District for the District of Columbia

333 Constitution Avenue, NW, Room 6315,Washington, DC 20001

Dr. Orly Taitz, D.D.S.

29839 Santa Margarita Parkway, STE 100


Channing Philips, the U.S. Attorney

c/o Wynne P. Kelly, AUSAOffice of the U.S. Attorney for theWashington District of Columbia

555 4th St., N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20530

Eric Holder, U.S. Attorney General

c/o Brigham John Bowen, AUSAU.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE20 Massachusetts Avenue, NW


Barack Hussein Obama in esse

c/o The White House1600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW



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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

---------------------------------------------------------------x

Dr. Orly Taitz, PRO SE 29839 Santa Margarita Parkway, STE 100


Tel: (949) 683-5411; Fax (949) 766-7603 Civil Action: 10-CV-00151

E-Mail: dr [email protected] (RCL)

Plaintiff, and

Christopher-Earl: Strunk in esse, AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT

593 Vanderbilt Avenue - #281 Brooklyn., New York 11238 OF INTERVENTION AS A

(845) 901-6767 Email: [email protected] EX-RELATOR-PLAINTIFF

Ex-relator-Intervener-Plaintiff.

IN THE QUO WARRANTO

v.

PETITION FOR WRIT

Barack Hussein Obama, c/o The White House OF MANDAMUS

1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, District of Columbia 20500

Defendant.

--------------------------------------------------------x

STATE OF NEW YORK )

) ss.:

COUNTY OF KINGS )

I, ChristopherEarl: Strunk in esse, being duly sworn, depose and say:

1. Affirmant place for service is 593 Vanderbilt Avenue #281 Brooklyn,

New York 11238 with telephone 845-901-6767 and email; [email protected].


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2. Affirmant files this Affidavit in support of the Notice of Motion to

Intervene as an Ex-relator Intervener-Plaintiff with FRCvP Rule 19(a)(1)

and 24(2)

.

3. That Affirmant is a required party herein and whose joinder will not

deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction; and that Affirmant claims an

1 FRCvP Rule 19. Required Joinder of Parties. (a) Persons Required to Be Joined if

Feasible. (1) Required Party. A person who is subject to service of process and whose

joinder will not deprive the court of subject-matter jurisdiction must be joined as a party if:

(A) in that person's absence, the court cannot accord complete relief among existingparties; or (B) that person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is

so situated that disposing of the action in the person's absence may: (i) as a practical

matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect the interest; or (ii) leave anexisting party subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise

inconsistent obligations because of the interest.

(2) Joinder by Court Order. If a person has not been joined as required, the courtmust order that the person be made a party. A person who refuses to join as a plaintiff

may be made either a defendant or, in a proper case, an involuntary plaintiff.

(3) Venue. If a joined party objects to venue and the joinder would make venueimproper, the court must dismiss that party.

2 FRCvP Rule 24. Intervention

(a) Intervention of Right. On timely motion, the court must permit anyone to

intervene who: (1) is given an unconditional right to intervene by a federal statute; or(2) claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the

action, and is so situated that disposing of the action may as a practical matter impairor impede the movant's ability to protect its interest, unless existing parties adequately

represent that interest.

(b) Permissive Intervention. (1) In General. On timely motion, the court maypermit anyone to intervene who: (A) is given a conditional right to intervene by a

federal statute; or (B) has a claim or defense that shares with the main action a

common question of law or fact. (2) By a Government Officer or Agency. On timely

motion, the court may permit a federal or state governmental officer or agency tointervene if a party's claim or defense is based on: (A) a statute or executive order

administered by the officer or agency; or (B) any regulation, order, requirement, oragreement issued or made under the statute or executive order. (3) Delay or Prejudice.

In exercising its discretion, the court must consider whether the intervention will

unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the original parties' rights.

(c) Notice and Pleading Required. A motion to intervene must be served on the

parties as provided in Rule 5. The motion must state the grounds for intervention and

be accompanied by a pleading that sets out the claim or defense for which interventionis sought.


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interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that disposing of the

action in the person's absence may: (i) as a practical matter impair or impede

Affirmants ability to protect the interest; and or (ii) leave Dr. Taitz as an existing

party subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise

inconsistent obligations because of the interest.

4. Affirmant is an ex-relator Plaintiff with 28 USC 1345 (3) seeking to

recover the Office of the President of the United States (POTUS) for Joseph Biden,

now is President of the U.S. Senate. in which this Court has jurisdiction with 28

USC 1343(4)

, based upon Defendants intent 28 USC 1344(5)

, 28 USC 1357(6)

,

3 1345. United States as plaintiff - Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, the

district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions, suits or proceedings commenced

by the United States, or by any agency or officer thereof expressly authorized to sue by Act of

Congress.4 1343. Civil rights and elective franchise. (a) The district courts shall have original

jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any person: (1) To recoverdamages for injury to his person or property, or because of the deprivation of any right orprivilege of a citizen of the United States, by any act done in furtherance of any conspiracy

mentioned in section 1985 of Title 42; (2) To recover damages from any person who fails to

prevent or to aid in preventing any wrongs mentioned in section 1985 of Title 42 which he had

knowledge were about to occur and power to prevent; (3) To redress the deprivation, undercolor of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or

immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing

for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States; (4) Torecover damages or to secure equitable or other relief under any Act of Congress providing for

the protection of civil rights, including the right to vote.

(b) For purposes of this section (1) the District of Columbia shall be considered to bea State; and (2) any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be

considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.5

1344. Election disputes. The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil actionto recover possession of any office, except that of elector of President or Vice President, United

States Senator, Representative in or delegate to Congress, or member of a state legislature,

authorized by law to be commenced, where in it appears that the sole question touching the title

to office arises out of denial of the right to vote, to any citizen offering to vote, on account ofrace, color or previous condition of servitude.


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28 USC 1361(7)

, 42 USC 1985(8)

with related law accordingly and District of

The jurisdiction under this section shall extend only so far as to determine the rights ofthe parties to office by reason of the denial of the right, guaranteed by the Constitution of the

United States and secured by any law, to enforce the right of citizens of the United States to votein all the States.6

1357. Injuries under Federal laws. The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of anycivil action commenced by any person to recover damages for any injury to his person or

property on account of any act done by him, under any Act of Congress, for the protection or

collection of any of the revenues, or to enforce the right of citizens of the United States to vote inany State.7 1361. Action to compel an officer of the United States to perform his duty. The district

courts shall have original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to compel anofficer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the

plaintiff.

8 1985. Conspiracy to interfere with civil rights. (1)Preventing officer from performingduties. If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire to prevent, by force,intimidation, or threat, any person from accepting or holding any office, trust, or place of

confidence under the United States, or from discharging any duties thereof; or to induce by like

means any officer of the United States to leave any State, district, or place, where his duties as anofficer are required to be performed, or to injure him in his person or property on account of his

lawful discharge of the duties of his office, or while engaged in the lawful discharge thereof, orto injure his property so as to molest, interrupt, hinder, or impede him in the discharge of his

official duties; (2)Obstructing justice; intimidating party, witness, or juror . If two or more

persons in any State or Territory conspire to deter, by force, intimidation, or threat, any party orwitness in any court of the United States from attending such court, or from testifying to any

matter pending therein, freely, fully, and truthfully, or to injure such party or witness in hisperson or property on account of his having so attended or testified, or to influence the verdict,presentment, or indictment of any grand or petit juror in any such court, or to injure such juror in

his person or property on account of any verdict, presentment, or indictment lawfully assented to

by him, or of his being or having been such juror; or if two or more persons conspire for the

purpose of impeding, hindering, obstructing, or defeating, in any manner, the due course ofjustice in any State or Territory, with intent to deny to any citizen the equal protection of the

laws, or to injure him or his property for lawfully enforcing, or attempting to enforce, the right of

any person, or class of persons, to the equal protection of the laws; (3)Depriving persons of

rights or privileges. If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise

on the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either directly or

indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equalprivileges and immunities under the laws; or for the purpose of preventing or hindering the

constituted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing to all persons within

such State or Territory the equal protection of the laws; or if two or more persons conspire toprevent by force, intimidation, or threat, any citizen who is lawfully entitled to vote, from giving

his support or advocacy in a legal manner, toward or in favor of the election of any lawfully

qualified person as an elector for President or Vice President, or as a Member of Congress of the

United States; or to injure any citizen in person or property on account of such support oradvocacy; in any case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more persons engaged


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Columbia Code (DCC) Chapters 35(See Endnotes)

and 37(See Endnotes)

with related law

in its entirety, and the U.S. Constitution in its entirety especially emphasizing

Article 2 Section 1(9)

and Article 7 Amendment 25(10)

specifically, and

therein do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby

another is injured in his person or property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or

privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived may have an action forthe recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of

the conspirators.

9 Section 1. The executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.

He shall hold his office during the term of four years, and, together with the Vice President,

chosen for the same term, be elected, as follows:Clause 1. Each state shall appoint, in such manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a

number of electors, equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives to which the

State may be entitled in the Congress: but no Senator or Representative, or person holding an

office of trust or profit under the United States, shall be appointed an elector.Clause 2. The electors shall meet in their respective states, and vote by ballot for two

persons, of whom one at least shall not be an inhabitant of the same state with themselves. Andthey shall make a list of all the persons voted for, and of the number of votes for each; which list

they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of the government of the United States,

directed to the President of the Senate. The President of the Senate shall, in the presence of theSenate and House of Representatives, open all the certificates, and the votes shall then be

counted. The person having the greatest number of votes shall be the President, if such numberbe a majority of the whole number of electors appointed; and if there be more than one who havesuch majority, and have an equal number of votes, then the House of Representatives shall

immediately choose by ballot one of them for President; and if no person have a majority, then

from the five highest on the list the said House shall in like manner choose the President. But in

choosing the President, the votes shall be taken by States, the representation from each statehaving one vote; A quorum for this purpose shall consist of a member or members from two

thirds of the states, and a majority of all the states shall be necessary to a choice. In every case,

after the choice of the President, the person having the greatest number

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