Masters of Studies in Diplomatic Studies

Roles of Non-State Actors in the Global

Convergence

Dissertation Submitted for the Master of Studies in

Diplomatic Studies

University of Oxford

By

Candidate number 591960

Kellogg College

Hilary Term 2015

Word Count: 15, 287

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ABSTRACT

Dissertation Title: Roles of Non-State Actors in the Global Convergence

Candidate No.: 591960

Degree: Masters of Studies in Diplomatic Studies

Submission: Hillary Term 2015

This dissertation explores the relationship between non-state actors (NSAs) and

the global convergence. NSAs originate primarily from the business sector and

the people sector, whereas the global convergence is understood as the coming

together of the world politically, economically and culturally. This dissertation

aims to provide the reader with an insight into how NSAs, despite being relatively

new players, can play a positive role on the world stage, which is converging due

to globalisation. Two case studies, on the United Nations Climate Change

negotiations and the Association of South-East Asian Nations, are selected to

cover differing circumstances – “top down-bottom up” and “East-West” – to find

out how NSAs have been functioning in these contexts. The key finding is that

NSAs are complementing, instead of replacing, governments in the global

convergence due to the different nature of their existence and that they will

continue to fulfil that interstitial space. They have been aiding the convergence

process through trust building in the political space, asset management in the

economic space and facilitation of global ownership in the cultural space; while

using innovation, information and connectivity as catalysts.

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CONTENT PAGE

ABSTRACT  ...............................................................................................................  4  

CONTENT  PAGE  .......................................................................................................  5  

INTRODUCTION  ......................................................................................................  7  

Objective .............................................................................................................. 10

Road Map ............................................................................................................ 11

LITERATURE  REVIEW  .............................................................................................  12  

The Global Convergence ..................................................................................... 12

Political Convergence ...................................................................................... 13

Economic Convergence ................................................................................... 16

Cultural Convergence ...................................................................................... 21

Non-State Actors and their roles ......................................................................... 26

CASE  STUDIES  .......................................................................................................  32  

Case Study 1: The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

and the Kyoto Protocol ........................................................................................ 32

Introduction ...................................................................................................... 32

Process ............................................................................................................ 33

The Kyoto Protocol .......................................................................................... 33

Recent Developments ...................................................................................... 34

Non-State Actors in the Climate Negotiations .................................................. 35

Non-State Actors in the Political Convergence ................................................ 36

Non-State Actors in the Economic Convergence ............................................. 41

Non-State Actors in the Cultural Convergence ................................................ 46

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Case Study 2: Association of South-East Asian Nations as part of South-east

Asia’s Integration Efforts ...................................................................................... 50

Introduction ...................................................................................................... 50

Recent Developments ...................................................................................... 51

Non-State Actors in ASEAN ............................................................................. 52

Non-State Actors in Political Convergence ...................................................... 55

Non-State Actors in Economic Convergence ................................................... 56

Non-State Actors in Cultural Convergence ...................................................... 57

DISCUSSION  ..........................................................................................................  60  

Trust Building in Political Convergence ............................................................... 60

Asset Management in Economic Convergence ................................................... 62

Common Ownership in Cultural Convergence .................................................... 63

Innovation, Information and Connectivity as Catalysts ........................................ 64

Varying Circumstances ........................................................................................ 65

Caveats and Considerations of Dissertation ....................................................... 66

CONCLUSION  ........................................................................................................  68  

REFERENCES  AND  BIBLIOGRAPHY  .........................................................................  69  

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INTRODUCTION

The concept of global convergence has predominately been theorised within the

economic space, where the focus has traditionally been on the narrowing income

gap between the global rich and the global poor. However, this phenomenon

exists in other domains as well, such as cultural influences and political ideals.

Early evidence of such confluences can be dated back as early as when different

communities and civilisations come into contact with one another in an attempt to

integrate their own interests to build empires. Examples include the formation of

the Chinese Dynasty, the medieval Respublica Christiana and even the ancient

Roman Empire (Keen, 1991). These events, held before the 1648 Treaty of

Westphalia, often occurred at the expense of unavoidable bloodshed.

The advancement of connectivity technologies, coupled with its low costs, has

increased the intensity of globalisation in modern times, and accelerated the

convergence at an unprecedented rate. In the post-Westphalia era, the world

stage, consisting of states as primary actors, has significantly lowered the

interests and increased the barriers of waging war among nations for the same

phenomenon, thus avoiding unnecessary carnage of pre-modern times.

However, the concepts of statehood and sovereignty also pose limitations in

responses to the increasingly transnational nature of the challenges that we face

now. Therefore, as an emerging new player on the world stage, non-state actors

(NSAs) exist to fulfil the ineludible gaps presented in the respective domains of

the global convergence.

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This dissertation uses a framework whereby the global convergence refers to

three main closely linked areas: political convergence, between national and

international policies; economic convergence, between haves and the have-nots;

and cultural convergence, between the values of the East and West. The NSAs

are divided into two sectors: the private sector, made up representatives from

businesses and industries, ranging from small-medium enterprises (SMEs) to

Multinational Corporations (MNCs); and the people sector, made up by

representatives of like-minded individuals and community groups that identify

themselves in a range of terms such as movements, non-governmental

organisations (NGOs), civil society organisations (CSOs), and non-profit

organisations (NPOs).

In the political domain, Professor Kishore Mahbubani (2014) provided an analogy

that likens the world to a boat with 193 cabins and 193 captains elected by their

respective crew. Despite growing global economic convergence, there is hitherto

no similarly rapid convergence in the political arena to tackle transnational issues,

such as providing public goods, services and addressing transboundary

problems. This means that policies will be increasingly similar as it is shaped by

global agendas, negotiated at international platforms that will require a non-

invasive dynamics between countries. Therefore, states will need to learn how to

strike a balance between national and international interests, and be relieved of

the fear of losing out to one another.

In the economic domain, while there is an increased recognition of a global

economy and the corresponding increase in interdependency, richer and poorer

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nations are facing their own set of challenges in closing up their internal wealth

gaps. More often than not, policymakers implement policies that benefit their

state alone, neglecting the potential wider externalities of their policies. This is

because they are often bound by the desires of their electorates. However,

countries and their policymakers will have to start rethinking about these

externalities when they make national fiscal policy decisions, for instance. The

way to bridge this is changing regulations to allow better capital flow,

technological transfers and capacity building between developed and developing

countries.

In the cultural domain, converging ideas and believes can be argued to have

begun as soon as two groups of entity come together to interact. Ideas are

shared and influence how people think and live. In the modern normative, since

the invention of media vehicles such as newspapers, radios, televisions, and the

Internet, they have enabled such interactions and sharing of information in a

globalised manner. The struggle here is the ability for groups, communities and

especially states to retain their sense of unique individuality, while embracing the

unavoidably pluralistic space of differing interests but shared resources. This part

of the global convergence can be argued the most important but at the same time

complex as it has the ability to influence the other two parts with the

advancement of technology, which shifts the power from states to the masses

(Keohane & Nye, 1987).

Since Westphalia, power and authority in international relations were considered

to have rested with states. But with the shift of power induced by the Information

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age (Castell, 2011), the status quo has come under much empirical and

theoretical scrutiny. Nonetheless, this does not mean that states will eventually

be replaced; they could continue to play their roles albeit in a more crowded

global stage with the proliferation of non-state Actors (NSAs). NSAs, on the other

hand, have been performing seemingly random, fragmented and isolated

functions – such as providing an alternative voice for the people, addressing the

asymmetrical information between states, providing ground-up solutions and

even setting global agenda – in addressing the transnational challenges of the

modern converging world. However, through the case studies, this dissertation

argues that these functions have an underlying vector towards closing the

inexorable diminishing gaps of the political, economic and cultural convergences:

facilitating trust building, enabling better assets management and enabling

ownership of global citizenry respectively. Therefore, this dissertation argues that

it is crucial for states and NSAs to work together to smoothen the global

convergence process.

Objective

This dissertation aims to study the unique role that NSAs fulfil in the context of

the global convergence. Focusing on climate negotiations and the Association of

South-East Asian Nations as case studies, the roles of these NSAs in the

process will be identified. The analysis will be based on political, economic and

cultural considerations.

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This dissertation argues that the existence of NSAs does not replace the function

of states, but is necessary to ensure the political, economic and cultural

convergences. Two case studies will be used to highlight the supportive roles of

NSAs within the global convergence.

This study is significant because it will enable diplomats to be clearer about the

roles that NSAs play without feeling either threatened by their existence, nor

compelled to suppress their efforts. It will enable policymakers to instead be more

inclined to engage these new actors of the global stage in a more structured

manner, leading towards more constructive diplomacy outcomes.

Road  Map  

 

This dissertation proceeds as follows: the next chapter reviews existing scholarly

work, providing an understanding to readers about the global convergence and

the functions of NSAs. The third chapter includes two case studies that cover the

different aspects of convergence when placed in different set of circumstances.

The following chapter provides an in-depth discussion of key findings on the roles

of NSAs. Finally, this dissertation concludes by outlining areas of further study.

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LITERATURE REVIEW

 

The Global Convergence

Today, there is an unambiguous positive correlation between globalisation and

convergence (Williamson, 1996). What is meant by globalisation? It is something

whose presence can be both seen and felt everywhere; in the Modern normative,

it can be said to be a phenomenon of interdependency, which is being further

catalysed through a higher density of readily-available connectivity. It should be

understood as an interactive and integrative process, instead of an end state, of

people, companies, governments and people, driven predominately by

international trade and investment (Stoudmann, 2006). Technically, it is nothing

new (Keohane & Nye, 2000) and can be dated back to the times where the Silk

Road connected Europe and Asia in the Pre-Modern normative. The main

difference between then and now is the intensity of integration, thanks to the

advent of connectivity technologies (Held et al., 1999). Globalisation can be

argued to have become a threat to the Westphalian system, given that the latter

was a framework of governance with the principles of statehood and sovereignty

at its core (Goksel, 2012).

Scholars have been studying convergence even before the recent wave of

globalisation (Eyestone, 1977). The convergence theory has its roots in the

functionalist perspective, which assumes that societies have certain requirements

that must be met if they are to survive and operate effectively. It states that as

societies become increasingly industrialized, they begin to resemble other

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industrialized societies. That is, they converge towards other forms of social

organisation. The convergence theory argues that the world is increasingly

becoming more alike generally in three domains: politically, economically and

culturally. Political convergence pivots discussions around how national policies

across states will increasingly become more similar to each other, and expects

that there will be a set of universal regulation of sort, leading to a global

governance system (Drezner, 2001). Economic convergence looks primarily at

the disparity between developing and developed nations. Finally, cultural

convergence looks at how values and aspirations (Werther, 1996) are becoming

increasingly similar.

Essentially, one can view globalisation as one large complex mechanism that

facilitates political, economic and cultural exchanges. In the past two decades, it

has exponentially increased in its intensity due to the evolution of connectivity

technologies. Given this backdrop, convergence is happening faster than before

and states will need to deal with it. The changing normative is also forcing states

to relearn how they should function and deal with various dilemmas surfacing in

world politics. Hence, there is an increasing need to learn how to manage

international and national interests, especially among states.

Political Convergence

Political convergence can be further broken into two types. First, it is manifested

by different states formulating increasingly similar policies. Second, it appears

that there have been changes to the overall world system, which some have

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termed the new world order. The two are intrinsically linked but can be taken

apart to be analysed separately.

Looking at national policies alone, there is an implicit assumption that they are

growing alike in terms of their structure, process and performance due to

globalisation (Kerr, 1983), which brought about more capital fluidity and mobility

(Sassen, 1998). In a mercantilist system, state policy is increasingly being

influenced by capital flow mobility. This means that the autonomy and power to

make decisions are increasingly eroded away from states with vested interest to

control their own economies (Drezner, 2001), causing anxieties to people from

the bottom all the way to the top. The underlying concern is the “race to the

Bottom” hypothesis (Kahler, 1998). It is believed that states are increasingly

inclined to implement policies that will benefit the business sector through the

reduction of trade barriers for fear of capital outflow. Companies, especially

international ones, will move their investments to states with governmental

policies that profit them most. This extends to the possibility that that states would

overlook the welfare of their people and environmental protection, among many

other priorities, to please the private sector. The argument against this hypothesis

is that it does not take into consideration other factors that states will look into

when making policies, such as citizen voting (Swire, 1996).

On the other hand, it is plausible that regulations become more stringent and are

primarily driven by voices of the people through epistemic communities (Alder

and Haas, 1992; Cross, 2013) and egalitarian political movements (Weiss et al.,

1977), to which states tend to listen when formulating national policies. Apart

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from bottom-up voices, states do have other considerations to take into account,

and these can be looked at as “peer pressure” of other states at international

negotiations, including that of nuclear disarmament and human rights On such

international platforms, states like to project themselves as being “cooperative”,

and therefore will be more inclined to fit into that mould which often comes with

needing to implement more regulations.

Therefore, there is a struggle between policies that make regulations less vs

more stringent. This struggle between the two sides will happen more in the

future as states try to find which best fits their interest. On one hand, there are

increasing numbers of economic policies that reduce barriers to trade, with the

establishment of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) as an international

platform that further aids the push for such deregulations. Yet there are also

increasing numbers of policies that states have agreed upon to better regulate

labour conditions, environmental protection and consumer interest. These

regulations are also further propelled forward at international negotiation

platforms such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

(UNFCCC). The overarching concern is not just which of the two motivations is

more important, rather, it is how to balance national interests with international

interests (Rajput, 2013).

The overall system is commonly referred to as “Global Governance” by many

scholars since the early 1950s. Here, the convergence is looking at how the end

game or new world order will be like in terms on the function of states and their

interaction with one another (Finkelstein, 1995). But in order to see an end game,

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two questions must be answered: whose interest will it serve? And how will the

structure look like?

Instead of looking at global governance as the overall system that governs

everything in the world like how the European Union (EU) is like for Europe, we

can look at it more as a phenomenon. Global governance aims to address issues

where states alone cannot solve, such as environmental degradation, resource

scarcity, terrorism or any problems that are trans-boundary by nature. This is

because there should be enough common interest, both collectively and

individually, to bring countries together and work towards a solution. However,

because the current global governance architecture is one of fragmentation

(Biermann et al., 2009), there may be times where the individual interests

outweigh the collective and lead to its failure. Fragmentation is bound to exist in

any form of global governance structures; the only difference is their intensity.

The structure, process and mechanism of how the world system works will have

a direct impact on the legitimacy of any international treaties that come out of it,

and eventually affecting how national policies will be formulated (Koenig-

Archibugi & Zürn, 2006).

Economic Convergence

In the economic domain, an unanswered key question is why some countries still

live in extreme poverty despite unprecedented global economic growth. It is

important to note that overall global economic growth is different from economic

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convergence. Economic growth looks at the growth of the global economy as a

whole. On the other hand, economic convergence is essentially about the catch-

up effect between states; specifically, whether the income gap between the rich

and the poor is increasing or decreasing. This can be understood as the sigma-

convergence (Williamson, 1996). There are growth theories on how the

convergence is going to happen, also known as beta-convergence (Sala-i-Martin,

1996), which essentially looks at how growth of economies between developed

and developing nations is closing up.

Ongoing debates over the past couple of decades centre on whether there is

(beta) convergence. The majority consensus is that the income gap is closing,

provided that certain conditions must first be met. This is also known as

conditional beta-convergence. First, countries will have to be in an open economy

allowing free trade to happen (Sachs et al., 1995). Second, there must be

adequate backwardness and capital potential in developing countries

(Gerschenkron, 1962). Third, developed countries have to experience diminishing

returns (Solow, 1956). As the world system changes to be more open and almost

all major developing countries of the world have satisfied the earlier conditions,

there is a shift towards an unconditional (beta) convergence, or absolute

convergence (Korotayev et al., 2011).

States need to leverage on globalisation and the changing normative to maximize

their benefits to create an eventual economic convergence of equal wealth for

every human being on the planet. While it is very utopian to expect this, it is

something that all states will have to aspire towards in the face of the irreversible

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and increasing intensity of globalisation. It is important to understand who gains

and who loses in order to have appropriate policy responses. The egalitarian

predictions of the simplest neoclassical models of trade and growth are well

known and easy to explain, as they follow from entirely standard assumptions on

technology alone and fail to recognise other factors that exist which will hinder

the flow of capital from the rich to the poor, also known as the Lucas Paradox

(Lucas, 1990).

Apart from technology, the other reasons as to why there has been evidence of

failure in capital flow from the rich to the poor can generally be divided into two

categories; namely those that are “fundamentals” and ones that are deemed

under the frame of “International Marketing Imperfection” (Alfaro et al., 2008)

“Fundamentals” refer to three reasons that affect countries fundamentally. First is

the issue of human capital. It is important to note that this is not constant and

there are differences in labour quality or human capital across countries. The

second is governmental policies. This refers to the policies implemented by

governments to regulate the flow of capital such as taxes and incentives. Finally,

the institutional structure available in the country helps governs its state and its

various interactions within.

“International Marketing Imperfection” highlights the flaws of the current free

market system and how these hinder the flow of capital. This can perhaps be

viewed upon as external factors. First, it is Asymmetric Information. It highlights

the notion that there is unfair access to information of states before any deals are

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agreed upon or struck. This often leads to action that are less than ideal,

sometimes immoral, in order to gain advantage over the other. Second, is the

Sovereign Risk involved. This is where the uncertainty and even possibility of

countries have a defaulting on their commitments.

States play a huge role in economic convergence by enacting regulations and

policies for the betterment of their people. It has been suggested that

governments should prioritise the implementation of policies aimed at

strengthening the protection of property rights, reducing corruption, and

increasing government stability, bureaucratic quality, and improving law and

order if they seek to increase capital in-flows to poor countries.

The previous United Nations (UN) Secretary-General, Mr Kofi Annan, initiated the

Millennium Development Goals (MDG) at the turn of the millennium, with its

number one priority of eradicating extreme poverty. And as we draw nearer to the

due date in 2015, recent reports by the UN have shown evidence that the world

has come together to help reduce extreme poverty by half, amounting to about

700 million people (United Nations, 2014). These reports also showed that the

number of undernourished people has declined, and that more children across

the world are gaining access to basic primary school education. These efforts are

not only evidence that there is overall economic growth, but suggest that income

gap among nations is closing, especially after 1990 (Molina and Purser, 2010).

This is also a sign of political will by states to make the world a better place for

all. But these states’ efforts, at both national and international levels, to further

bridge the wealth gap are not without their own challenges.

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Economic progress is something that states will always need to look into when

implementing policies. Apart from the aforementioned factors, the other challenge

is that states no longer truly possess economic sovereignty. Sovereignty is not an

economic notion as it is sometimes made out to be. The expression “economic

sovereignty” is a conflation of two different concepts that are best kept separate.

A better term might be “economic autonomy”. Economic autonomy is the notion

that a country’s economy is insulated from foreign economic influence,

involvement, or control. This may or may not be desirable in any particular case.

Rather than speak of the decline or loss of “economic sovereignty” it would be

more to the point to speak of the difficulties that independent governments face in

trying to pursue nationalistic economic policies, especially in our era of

globalisation (Quiggin, 2001). Take for example the case of Canada and the

United States. The former has the sovereign authority to issue and manage its

own currency, while the latter does not have the authority to do that in Canada.

However, for Canada (and presumably for all states in similar circumstances of

economic interdependence), that right is a bit hollow. The Canadian government

does not have much room for manoeuvre, because although monetary policy is

set in Canada, the value of the Canadian dollar is heavily dependent on

American monetary policy and on international currency markets. Hence although

Canada has the right to its own currency, it has limited power or capacity to

determine the value of that currency. Like almost all countries connected to the

global network, Canada is a sovereign state but does not possess full economic

autonomy.

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Cultural Convergence

Cultural convergence in this dissertation refers to societal evolution and social

dynamics of people in the face of globalisation. On top of that, it is also looking at

how different views of the pluralistic world seem to be coming together

(Tomlinson, 1999). Of the three forms of convergence, this is perhaps the most

complex to understand, given the wide spectrum of humanism. It is essentially

trying to address the ideas, customs and social behaviour of a society. The

media, both traditional mainstream channels and the newer social media ones,

and connectivity technologies can be looked upon as catalysts that help the

spread of information and cultures across the world. Thus, the outcome is one

that will shape the way people think and live (Grewal, 2008). While there are

proponents that note the coming together of culture, there are others who believe

the world is on a divergent path. The key contests or discussions of the cultural

convergence largely revolve around two areas; first, between the east and the

west (Yamazaki, 1996); and second, between local and global. By recognising

cultural convergence, or a lack thereof, it will enable states to respond aptly with

necessary policies and measures to either address concerns or leverage trends

that will be to their advantage. This is increasingly important in a flattening world

(Friedman, 2006). It is a space where states should, or have already been,

harnessing benefits from through the use of soft power (Nye, 2004).

First, discussions around “East” and “West” can be said to begin in the West

(Robison, 1996). There, it can be divided into two phases, starting with the

European and subsequently the Americans. The earlier phase grew from

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exploration of resources to feed growing empires. This can be thought as the

beginning of colonialism. While there are several historical accounts of violence

and slavery during this process, the Europeans did promote the spread of their

culture to the allegedly backward societies (Hobsbawm, 1989). Its imperialism

lasted about over 300 years. The region’s gradual demise happened during the

two World Wars, which had significant negative impact on the European powers

and deflated its ability to continue reigning over its foreign territories. Then came

the time of the Americans, especially so after the Second World War which

secured its position as the superpower of the world. It began a time of U.S.

hegemony, especially so regarding its cultures and way of life for the rest of the

world. Among the many ways to describe it, the ones that are commonly used are

“Americanization” (Moffett, 1907) or “McDonaldization” (George Ritzer, 1983).

This is present in various areas such as fashion trends, family values, business

marketing, and even political ideals. Because of the success it had during the

Second World War, and the graceful decline of Europe, the United States

became the beacon that everyone not only look up to, but also work towards in

the hope to achieve the same “American Dream”, that is to become better, richer

and more liberal (Adams, 1931).

However, this dominance of western influence began to wane with the rise of

Asia powers, which is clearly in tandem with its growing economy (Mahbubani,

2014) in a postcolonial era, particularly ones in the East. This first began with the

growth of the four Asian tiger economies, sometimes referred to as “The Asian

Miracle” in the 1960s (Nelson & Pack, 1999), and the rest of Asia, especially

India and China (Meredith, 2008). Apart from bringing economic prosperity, these

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countries influenced the world with their cultural methods and way of life. Despite

the critics that some of China’s values led to its failure to compete with the

western powers earlier in the 20th century (Lin, 2011), Confucianism was

subsequently attributed to have a significant influence to the region and used as

the basis to explain the success of the Asian tigers and China. The first Prime

Minister of Singapore has also actively advocated Asian values as an alternative

to western culture in Asia (DuBois, 2011).

One could generalise that the West brings with it the rational, scientific, logical

school of thoughts, outer-world dependent, individually focused, success or

achievement driven, always challenging fundamentals of the status quo and

ethically principled just to name a few (Russell, 1967). Whereas the East brings

the idea of cosmological unity, circular view of the universe, cyclic development,

inner-world dependent, collectivism, spirituality, virtue driven, less inclined to

introduce radical changes and winning inside one’s self (Osborne and Van Loon,

2000). While both seem very diverging, they stemmed from the same eventual

outcome in mind that is people can have a better and richer life. Through the

catalysts such as the belief systems of the two general cultures, they have begun

to influence each other. Despite the stark difference in nature between the two,

instead of leaning towards either, there are evidences to suggest a third path,

which is the integration of the two. This is often first reflected in activities that

people and even art pieces produced in this time.

Second, on the argument between local and global, and in some literature it is

brought up as nationalism against globalism or internationalism (Pieterse, 2009).

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Here, we will look into two aspects of the local-global discussions. The first one

lies in terms of the ideals and the second is in terms of physical resources.

With regards to the local-global ideas, it is argued that the Western world heavily

influenced the global ideas that currently are in existence. One of the key reasons

that this is the case is because they did dominate the global stage first, and can

be attributed to be the primary architect that laid the foundation for a globalised

world. However, this is increasingly changing as the Eastern values are seen to

be influencing the West, perhaps due to sheer statistics since it does have a

much larger population (Christiansen & Hedetoft, 2004). Apart from dominated by

the East-West culture dilemma, the key discussion revolves around that of

businesses and trade such as fashion, manufacturing and even food. Because of

the competitive advantage economy environment we have created, we have

access to many international products right to our doorsteps. We recognise some

of these brands by supporting them through our dollars on the basis that we

assume where they are from determines the quality of their outputs. There may

be some truth when it comes to more exquisite and precise equipment, but for

the rest, it always comes from makes the most profitable sense to businesses.

Proponents for more protectionism argued that because of choices to shop on an

international market place, we encourage the private sector to externalise their

true costs (Ruggie, 1994). Apart from that, another compelling reasons for the

growing support of people to purchase more local and regional products, is the

interest to encourage creativity and talents from their very own backyard. This

could also be seen as the community or group implicitly wanting to share their

own culture to the outside world through such avenues (Otmazgin, 2005).

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With regard to the local-global distribution of physical resources, the genesis of

the argument began about thirty years ago over an economic-centred article on

“The Tragedy of the Commons” (Hardin, 1968). It is essentially speaking of the

limited resources that the planet has, and the taken-for-granted common public

facilities that we use. The discussion began in view of anticipating further human

population growth by William Forster Lloyd (1833) and the concerns that may

arise pertaining to the consuming nature of human. It argues that humans are

inclined to be self-serving by nature and when there is a common space or

shared resources, everyone will do their best to maximise what they can get out

of it instead of dutifully respecting other uses of it. Harbin discussed further that

this is a problem that cannot be solved by technology, but rather, a deeper

change is needed in terms of human values or ideas of morality. Although his

work was met with various criticisms (Ostrom et all, 1999), it sparked a series of

discussion on what it means to be able to grow sustainability on this planet as a

global village. The dilemmas of the commons continue in modern times for a

variety of resource problems in today’s society such as water, forestry, fishery,

and energy (Kopelman et al., 2002).

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Non-State Actors and their roles

Building on the principles of the 1648 Westphalia Agreement, and learning from

the two World Wars that ended with the long-standing Cold War, the traditional

form of danger between states – in terms of waging war for resources – is almost

non-existent. In this normative, large numbers of states may have given up the

impulse to invade one another, but belligerent states still exist in various parts of

the world, requiring on-going state diplomacy. Intensifying globalisation has

radically altered the world stage, especially the nature of nation-states actors,

and their modes of relating to each other (Giddens, 2002). States, bounded by

the principles of non-interference and sovereignty, have begun to face challenges

in dealing with the new world’s problems. With globalisation, problems now

transcend national boundaries – from the environment to terrorism to financial

risk – and require the participation of NSAs. The information revolution has

rendered a whole host of NSAs capable of undertaking collective action and thus

undermining the power of states (Mathews, 2000).

A key characteristic of NSAs is that they comprise a diverse group of individuals,

groups, communities and organisations. They can be seen as being collective

ground-up movements that represent different voices and interests. Hence, they

do not have a leader for the whole movement, much less a constituency to

officially report to (Dany, 2013). In this respect, NSAs can be said to lack

legitimacy and accountability to some extent. The same argument made by

opponents for a larger world stage to believe that NSAs’ role should be

downplayed, and even be restricted in any decision-making processes. However,

  27  

the truth of the matter is that they already have this power and influence, be it

outside or within the processes that states have created (Arts, 2003). Their

importance will also continue to grow in the face of the increased

interdependency of states and its people. The increased connectivity and wider

world view has given birth to the idea that apart from states, people have also

begun to identify themselves beyond their nationality, but also as part of a larger

community of like-minded individuals in the global space. This requires the

recognition of “Global Citizenship”. More individuals are increasingly becoming

aware and are able to draw the link between their actions and the impact they

have on the world, and vice versa. With technological improvements offering

greater connectivity, accessibility and capacity, this number will only continue to

grow.

The existence of NSAs can also be looked upon as a shift of power and authority

away from states. This does not mean that the role of states have diminished to

mere provider of infrastructure and public goods required by businesses

(Strange, 1999; Ohmae, 1990). Instead, what needs to be recognised is that their

role is changing, perhaps even deepening in some areas (Mathews, 1997), such

as ensuring security, on a global stage that now has other actors as well.

Despite the diversity of interests and causes, NSAs can principally be divided into

two types (Higgot et al., 2000). The first type comprises the private sector, or

corporations. These include multi-national companies (MNCs), trans-national

companies (TNCs) and even collective small and medium enterprises (SMEs).

This group of NSAs came about with the increased economic interdependency

  28  

that has been created over the years since the beginning of the Modern

normative. This group is always looking at ways to work with governments to

bring about win-win situations for economic growth. This can be seen through the

increased amount of Public-Private Partnerships established since the early

1990s (Rosenau, 2000). They represent the interests of the private sector and

can be seen to have great influence in the governing of the global economy.

The second type comprises the people sector. It is made up of non-governmental

organisations (NGOs), both local and international, as well as communities of

like-minded individuals. First coined in a 1945 UN document, the term NGO was

borne out of the need to identify the different participating stakeholders and

allocating their respective rights (Alger, 2002). Since the term is vaguely defined

due to several contesting views, it is more important to look at the roles that they

play. They can be found functioning to influence both bottom-up initiatives and

top-down policies. On the ground, they are often involved in development work

and sometimes looked upon as the extended arms and legs of governments.

They usually focus on resolving matters on the ground when states do not, either

because the latter are unwilling, unable or cannot be seen to be doing certain

things. At the highest level, they serve as voices for oppressed people by

surfacing their concerns directly to decision-makers.

More than half a century ago, NSAs have been seen to fulfil various different

functions, but seem almost incoherent, making it difficult to be understood and

managed. Yet, they have proved to be yielding varying results in their respective

fields, all vectored towards the betterment of human society. As such, NSAs are

  29  

a collective force to be reckoned with, and states should embrace and learn to

work with them. The following list describes some of the functions that NSAs

have been playing since their existence.

Voice

Any state’s governing system, whether socialist or democratic, will never be able

to aptly and fully represent its citizens. Even with the absence of corruption, there

will always be groups of people or communities that fall through the cracks, either

consciously or unconsciously. It is here that NSAs bring unheard, silenced or

forgotten voices to the attention of policymakers. This is done both at the national

and international level through lobbying, campaigning, negotiations, advocacies

and dialogues (O’Dwyer, et al., 2005).

Proxy

Due to political reasons, there are times where states cannot be too close with

another or certain groups. This may at times impede the chances of allowing

deals or agreements to be struck. This is where NSAs can function as proxies to

deliver certain messages to the other party because they are usually not bounded

by political positions. The primary condition for this to occur is that both the

state(s) and the NSA(s) involved share common objectives (SImbi and Thom,

2005).

Influence

  30  

The people sector has a clear collective influence on governments and

businesses, beginning with the need to first acknowledge that individually, each

of them is a citizen as well as a consumer. As a citizen of their country, they get

to vote for their government which best represents their interests. As consumers,

they too vote, but with their money, on the kind of products and companies that

they support. Herein lies the opportunity for NSAs to help provide information and

create space for like-minded individuals to come together and influence their

support through collective action. In a way, NSAs can be said to have the ability

to modify human behaviour (Clark, 1995).

Assistance

NSAs can serve as the extended arms and legs of states, which are limited by

resources to aid in the implementation of policies at the national level. This can

be seen actively done so in the development work. Even in the case of foreign

assistance from developed countries, NSAs can help to fine-tune implementation

strategies to best-fit local circumstances (van Deveer and Dabelko, 2001).

Lead

Being non-partisan, most NSAs are not bounded by the same limitations of state

governments or politicians and are hence perfectly poised to champion utopian

ideas. Perhaps the most successful example of NSAs in leading the charge at the

  31  

global level is the establishment of the Human Rights Council under the auspices

of the UN as well as in ASEAN (Gough and Shackley, 2001).

Accountability

States represent their people, which also mean they must be accountable to their

citizens for their national and international commitments. Therefore, one of the

important roles that NSAs play is to ensure the government keep to what they

have promised. A commonly used term of this function by many literatures is that

of a “watch dog”. The accountability also extends to policies that are yet to be

committed whereby they can work to ensure their respective constituency’s

interests is being taken into prior consideration. NSAs can then be also looked

upon as having the ability to create and set standards (Mercer, 2002).

Inform

One of the most glaring problems of the global capitalist system is asymmetrical

information. In a time of information overload, it is important to identify the ones

which are relevant and, more importantly, credible. This does not imply that all

information produced by NSAs is credible, but it does at the very least provide

additional perspective for states to consider. At some international negotiations,

NSAs plays an important role in aiding those developing countries that may not

have enough resources and capacity to keep track of developments to avoid any

disadvantage (Rothkopf, 1998).

  32  

CASE STUDIES

The two case studies, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate

Change (UNFCCC), as well as the Association of South-East Asian Nations

(ASEAN), are looked upon as processes that can be seen as products and

enablers of the converging world. The UNFCCC and KP cover a more global

scheme of things, consisting of a wider number of states, and could also be

deemed as a concept brought about by the Western world. On the other hand,

ASEAN is more of an Eastern product, trying to cope in its own way with its wide

diversity. By studying both processes, it gives us a wider coverage and hopefully

insights on the roles of NSAs in the converging space.

Case Study 1: The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate

Change and the Kyoto Protocol

Introduction

Signed in 1992, the UNFCCC is a non-binding international environmental

agreement that brings countries together under a framework to be kept abreast

on climate change matters and explore cooperative efforts to limit the average

global temperature increase. Although does not bind countries to commitments, it

was brilliantly crafted to be a platform that allows negotiations towards protocols

that would be legally binding down the road. As of 2014, the treaty was ratified

  33  

by 196 countries and is the platform with the broadest legitimacy to discuss and

forge international climate policies.

The UNFCCC is chosen as a case study because it is the contemporary process

most heavily invested by all states and has brought together a wide range of

NSAs, which is unparalleled by any environmental conference of this century.

Process

Like most other UN processes, the UNFCCC is based on consensus and

primarily recognises states as key players and decision-makers in negotiating a

global climate deal. This deal essentially aims to address mitigation efforts of

man’s impact on further global warming and adaptive measures for countries to

cope with the already-changing climate. Despite not having the same level of

recognition that of states (or Parties), NSAs are recognised as an integral part of

the process and are given access to the negotiation grounds. As in most

multilateral environmental agreements, participation of NSAs is achieved through

the granting of ‘observer organisation’ status to NGOs (Chagas, 2009), allowing

these entities to influence the negotiation process, promote transparency and

accountability within the limits imposed by the treaty regime.

The Kyoto Protocol

  34  

Building on the principles of the Convention, the most well-known binding

document of the UNFCCC is the Kyoto Protocol (KP). The KP was the type of

eventual outcome that the Convention founders initially imagined. It essentially

helped operationalise the Convention by committing industrialised countries in

stabilising their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The KP is heavily focused on

the mitigation obligations of developed countries, recognising that they are largely

responsible for the current high levels of GHG emissions in the atmosphere.

The KP has two key components. First, it commits developed nations (or Annex-1

countries) to reduce GHG emissions. This means that they are only permitted to

emit a limited amount carbon dioxide (CO2). Thus, this makes permitted carbon

emissions a scarce commodity. Second, it contains flexible-market-mechanisms

that allow the trading of carbon emissions. Therefore, in addition to domestic

efforts, countries can trade extra emission targets through such mechanisms to

meet their commitments. The concurrent benefit of the KP is that it aims to

catalyse green investment and technological transfers towards developing

countries to stabilise global GHG emissions to a safe level.

The KP has two commitment periods. Period one is from 2008 to 2012 and

period two is from 2013 to 2020.

Recent Developments

The most significant environmental conference, COP15, was held in Copenhagen

in 2009. The significance of the event was that it was meant to have concluded

  35  

the discussion for a global agreement for further commitments from Annex 1

nations in its second commitment period, and also a post-KP global agreement.

Eventually, the second commitment period was only barely agreed upon by

December 2011.

Negotiations for a post 2020 agreement continued under the pressure of NSAs,

especially the scientific community, as policymakers began to put together a new

protocol to deal with the worsening climate. Established at COP 17 in Durban, the

Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP)

began creating an agreement that will hopefully be ratified by all Parties. Known

as “the 2015 agreement”, this will be due in 2015 in Paris. In 2013, Governments

decided that there is an important need to identify and explore options that can

meet their commitments of keeping the global average temperature below 2ºC

above pre-industrial levels. This is also known as “the Pre-2020 ambition”

(UNFCCC, 2014).

Non-State Actors in the Climate Negotiations

Despite not being endowed with any formal legal personality under public

international law, NSAs have been playing increasingly important roles in the

development of multilateral environmental regimes such as the Convention, the

KP and the current ADP development. Under the auspices of the UNFCCC,

NSAs are recognised and admitted with the status of “Observer Organisations”.

In the early days of the climate change negotiation process, business- and

industry-related NGOs and environmental NGOs were particularly active and

  36  

initiated systematic channels of communications with the Secretariat and the

Parties. This resulted in the acknowledgment of them as “constituencies”, with

their respective focal points. At current, there are a total of nine constituencies

and over 1,600 accredited observer organisations (UNFCCC, 2014) to the

Secretariat.

Non-State Actors in the Political Convergence

Prior to publication of the IPCC’s first report in 1990 and the 1992 signing of the

Convention, scientists and academics were the people who produced this

eventual outcome was that was made up of. In 1979, the first World Climate

Conference (WCC) was held by the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) in

Geneva. It was, in essence, a scientific conference that looked at magnitude and

impact of the climate change. This led to the creation of the Intergovernmental

Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 1988, which subsequently alerted the world,

especially governments, on the pressing need to have the world working together

to stabilise human’s impact on climate change. Hence, the political convergence

in the domain of climate change was, in essence, brought about by NSAs. But in

this segment, how NSAs has done so in terms of the implementation of policies

will be analysed.

First, in terms of implementing seemingly similar policies across nations,

especially between industrialised and industrialising countries, convergence and

divergence can be seen to be happening concurrently. At the broader level, given

the increase in scientific evidence and consensus among them, there is a

  37  

trajectory towards the aim of keeping climate change and the negative impacts it

will have on humankind at bay. In that sense, a converging end goal was laid.

There is little contest and has been fundamental rationale behind the existence of

the negotiation platform.

However, the challenge here resides in the details on how states plan to achieve

the common goal of a safe and healthy environment together. The inclusion of

“Common but Differentiated Responsibility (CBDR)” principle is a cornerstone

concept that not only recognises the unique circumstances of each state’s

capability to deal with climate change, especially highlighting the historical

responsibilities of Annex-1 countries, which seems fair and just for all. The

underlying message could also be understood as that there are countries that do

not want to be deprived of the same kind of opportunities as those before them to

grow economically.

The NSAs of the climate process in the early 1990s, mainly made up of

organisations that associated themselves either with ENGOs or BINGOs, started

by pushing for a global protocol that would be fair to everyone. With mitigation as

its primary means to stabilise the impacts of climate change, their key priority was

getting industrialised nations to sign a legally-binding agreement with hard caps

on their emissions based on their historical obligations. Through lobbying, the

sharing of scientific information and even corridor dialogues, they played an

important role for successfully brokering the KP by addressing concerns of

policymakers, especially that of economic prosperity.

  38  

Following the KP agreement in 1997, the ENGOs began to assume another role

of holding Annex-1 Parties that ratified KP accountable to their pledges back in

their home countries, but also continued to champion further commitments. This

is not only on behalf of the people, but can also be seen as on behalf of

developing countries to see to it that resources, technologies and capacities are

transferred across to aid them in their development with minimal carbon

emissions. For Non Annex-1 countries, the approach that the NSAs had was

slightly different. With the understanding that these nations may not have the

same historical obligations or resource capability, a strong focus was placed on

knowledge sharing and capacity building. While doing so, the NSAs continued to

soft lobby for some sort of voluntary commitments based on the expected

emissions trajectory. They had to address the concerns of developing nations

that a low carbon future pathway will not disadvantage their growth and wealth.

The convergence-divergence approach to resolve the climate problem seemed to

work when it started, and there were high hopes that the KP can successfully

address the concerns. Regretfully, subsequent assessment reports by the IPCC

have shown that the anthropogenic situation has worsened. One of the causation

is that the amount of emission is that the commitments to achieve these by the

developed nations were too little, too slow. Hence, the climatic impact has

already been kicked into motion. The second reason is that the exponential

growth of the other developing countries, such as East Asian countries, which did

not have any targets and have already, surpassed the amount of emissions by

the Annex-1 nations since 1990.

  39  

This began to add pressure to both Annex-1 and non Annex-1 countries to take

more acute measures, both in terms of mitigation and adaptation. In terms of

mitigation commitments, the traditional argument is that energy consumption is

closely tied to economic growth, which historically means more carbon

emissions. Developing countries, especially Brazil, Russia, India, China and

South Africa (BRICS), view this as an attempt of continued U.S hegemony in the

21st century. In terms of adaptation measures, those at risks and least prepared

are largely from developing countries; thus, expectations were set on Annex-1

countries to also contribute resources such as technologies, capacity building

and finances. The urgency of the matter rocked the boat of the negotiations and

dynamics between states, for the fear of losing out, being taking advantage of,

and being exploited. This leads to mistrust and lead to uninformed decisions that

jeopardise the negotiations.

Hence, NSAs, especially the people sector, can be seen actively championing

governments and bridging trust through various means including the following:

conducting complementary research efforts and presenting results to

governments; piloting grassroots solutions; conducting capacity-building

sessions; using media to amplify the voices of those who are affected; bridging

resources; campaigning on national and global scales; and providing moral and

social incentives.

Essentially, the broad stroke of converging policies for climate change is kept true

since everyone is working towards a common goal through the logic of collective

actions (Gang, 2007). This means that policies will definitely be similar in nature

  40  

with some variants depending on the country’s circumstances in terms of

resource and capacity. The additional factor of time, or rather the lack of it,

created additional fear and tension among states to negotiate further can only be

addressed by NSAs, because of its nationality neutrality position, and its interest

in the common global cause.

Second, regarding an international management system because of political

convergence, the climate change negotiations and their processes have been

positioned to be a pilot on how global governance can work (Figueres, 2012).

However, like any global governance system, fragmentation exists (Biermann,

2009). This is evident from the climate talks since the beginning. Factions of

nations have been pulling in different directions mainly due to the fear of losing

out in terms of their international competitiveness should one State or group

adopt a more stringent policies comparing to another. NSAs can also be seen to

be part of the fragmentation due to mixed interests within their own highly diverse

domain. Some wanted more extreme ways of hastening the time of getting things

done because the system has failed, whereas some believed otherwise. This

continued to be a tussle to a point that at COP15 in Copenhagen, there were

speculation that the negotiations will not only fail, but lead to the disintegration of

the climate change platform.

A recent paper by Nasiritousi and colleagues (2014) carried out surveys with 524

valid respondents from COP17 and COP18 to understand the role of NSAs on

global governance. They showed that NSAs are perceived to play a crucially

important role in global governance by a serving set of governance activities.

  41  

They identified ten distinct functions - influencing agenda, influencing decisions,

proposing solutions, providing information and expertise, evaluating

consequences, mitigation action, adaptation action, raising awareness,

representing public opinion and finally, representing the marginalised – that NSAs

has been playing to facilitate environmental governance.

These ten functions have actually helped to bring decision makers together to

focus on the common interest and provide alternative of how states can work

together on pilot projects and initiatives on the ground. These efforts, collectively,

will in turn facilitate the goodwill and relationship among decision-makers at the

international stage.

Non-State Actors in the Economic Convergence

The Convention and the Protocol were created to steer the world towards solving

the climate problem. It would be naïve to think that there were no underlying

economic motivations for states to do so. In his thoroughly comprehensive 2006

Stern Review, Sir Nicholas Stern highlighted climate change as the widest-

ranging market failure the world has ever seen and that world will eventually need

to pay for the devastating economic repercussions or costs associated with

global warming. Though critically reviewed (Byatt et al., 2006), it has become a

baseline document for states to use and understand how it may impact them, and

for NSAs to lobby for further actions in solving the climate crisis.

  42  

Economic convergence in the climate change movement largely revolved around

the issue of climate financing and its implementation. The focus here will be on

the KP’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), Reducing Emissions from

Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD or REDD+) and the recently-

established Global Climate Fund (GCF).

The first way of transferring financing from the developed to developing countries

can be considered to have begun within the formation of KP and its market-based

mechanism. Under the KP (UNFCCC, 1998), there are three clearly defined

“flexible mechanisms” that can be used by Annex-1 countries to meet their

emission commitments. These are the International Emissions Trading (IET), the

Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and the Joint Implementation (JI). Only

the CDM was designed to encourage production of emission reductions in non-

Annex I Parties. This also presented itself as a huge opportunity for developing

countries to not only gain wealth, but also hopefully access to resources,

capacities and technologies to leapfrog their industrialisation phase and put in

sufficient adaptation measures to the changes brought about by global warming.

By 2007, over 2,500 projects were registered and hopes have been high that

CDM is the leading vehicle in transferring private finance to mitigation projects in

developing world.

There are several primary challenges in implementing the CDM projects. First,

the project has to prove that it is “additional” (i.e., that its implementation is due

to its receipt of extra carbon credit income from the CDM). Any project registered

under the CDM that would have been built anyway, without carbon credit income,

  43  

allows an industrialized country to emit more than their targets, without causing

any changes on the ground where the project is located. In reality, non-additional

projects are going forward under the CDM on a large scale. Researchers

estimate the proportion of CDM projects that are truly additional to be only a

fraction of the market. Hence, this opens up opportunities for fraud to occur, in

which on-going projects claim to be otherwise. Stricter rules by NSAs are

proposed, but the problem still prevails. Second, it has proven to be difficult to

aptly price emissions so that countries will cut their emissions. Depending on the

pricing, there are times where it is cheaper for Annex-1 countries to buy carbon

credits instead of finding ways to cut their own emissions, paving conditions for

corruptions to occur, and also defeating the purpose of creating a low carbon

future altogether. The European economic crisis in the late 2000s also created

another problem where there is hardly any demand for emission credits, possibly

contributing to KP’s second commitment that was watered down with weakened

targets. The third challenge pertains to the projects’ actual implementation.

Specifically, the proposed projects on paper often differ on what is actually

happening on the ground. In 2007, the journal ‘Climate Change’ did an

investigation on the CDM and found out that the projects implemented contradicts

its mandate on sustainable development. In fact, one of the worst projects is

Campos Novos, an 880 MW dam in Brazil. The project involved violent

suppression of protests and the displacement of 750 families without the

compensation promised to them being made (Bozmoski et al., 2008).

Recognising that forest degradation and deforestation accounts for about 17 –

20% of GHG emissions (Fearnside, 2000), the idea to pay developing countries

  44  

to protect their forests was brought up for discussion in as part of the CDM

discussion. However, such projects were eventually dropped because of

administrative challenges and disagreements on how should the carbon credits

should be allocated. Efforts on this eventually took on their own form and were

named Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD,

and subsequently REDD+) through the active lobbying of the Coalition for

Rainforest Nation (CfRN), an intergovernmental organisation in response to what

many perceived to be a failure to address a major source of global greenhouse

gas emissions.

Because of the multilevel governance nature of REDD and the nature of

relationship between states and NSAs in tropical forest nations, REDD comes

with potential challenges such as definition of forest, land tenure issues,

compensation schemes and stakeholders engagements. And these issues with

REDD largely affects the indigenous people (Schroeder, 2010). One classic

example of a country facing implementation challenges is Indonesia, the largest

REDD project approved till date (The Guardian, 2013). The most significant

challenge is the regulations on tenure that is causing various unwanted conflicts

between the indigenous people, the government (both central and local), and

private investors. In this respect, several international NSAs such as the World

Resources Institute (WRI), Greenpeace, and Flora & Fauna International (FFI),

along with local organisations such as WALHI, Sawit Watch and TuK Indonesia,

are working to resolve the matter. Funding from the Norwegian government has

also been halted until some of the deliverables have been met. With reforms

within the Indonesian government resulting in the dissolution of its REDD+

  45  

Agency and merger between the Ministry of Forestry and Ministry of

Environment, the progress of this project seems to be in limbo.

With the increasing demand by countries severely affected and will be affected by

the anthropogenic impacts of climate change, an alternative form of climate

financing was needed. After much lobbying by developing countries along with

NSAs, a global fund was proposed, which became a beacon of hope in the

negotiations despite the general failure at Copenhagen. Named the GCF, it was

established in the 2010 UNCCC with a clear mandate of its governing instrument

the year after. Finally, in 2014, the Global Climate Fund was officially launched in

Peru with USD $10 billion of start-up funds with the remaining USD $100 billion

per annum by the year 2020 (GCF, 2014).

Still considered to be in its infancy, NSAs from both the private and people

sectors are being actively brought into the process. First, one would notice the

heavy focus placed on the role of private sector and how the initial fund for GCF

should help to rake in more capital from businesses and industries to support

climate mitigation and adaptation efforts. Second, with respect to participation of

people sector NSAs, it can be said to be weak due to the exclusion of such

requirement in the founding documents (Godoy, 2013). But the nature of NSAs is

that it is more of a proactive group of people, hence self-organised groups and

alliances such as Climate & Development Knowledge Network have begun to

proactively approach the GCF to offer assistance. NGOs have been actively

pushing for more stakeholder participation in view that the GCF is moving into the

  46  

crucial phase of designing policies and distributing resources, especially with

regard to the controversial debate over the Private Sector Facility.

In all the financing made available to transfer technology and resources to the

less affluent countries, the ability for these nations to maximise these

opportunities resides with their ability to better regulate their existing assets, and

minimise the opportunities for fraud to occur. And it is in this space that NSAs are

working with states to sort out the necessary mediation measures.

Non-State Actors in the Cultural Convergence

Perhaps the best way to describe this is the public messaging and awareness

level on the issue of climate change. Has the world been coming together to

agree that climate change is happening? Is mankind responsible? Will it affect

individuals? What can individuals do about it? These are some of the questions

that have to be addressed in order to determine if the views, ideas, practices and

behaviours are on converging path.

Early in the 1990s, climate change and global warming was perceived by most to

be an abstract issue. This is something that policymakers and small communities

or groups of like-minded individuals were interested in. From then to the mid-

2000s, there were still large array of contestation on climate change issues by

sceptics and denials. However, the science has largely addressed most, if not all,

of the concerns of the latter (Oreskes, 2007).

  47  

In 2006, the former US Vice-President, Mr Al Gore, launched the movie ‘An

Inconvenient Truth’. This movie can be attributed to have kicked off the global

climate movement, or at least catalysed it. Following that, a slew of campaigns

and activities were carried out by various NSAs, especially the NGOs, to actively

raise public awareness on the issue, in hope that there will enough pressure on

governments towards agreeing to a global climate deal. These happened through

the mobilisation of the social and mainstream media, harnessing high profiled

individuals’ celebrity power and influence, empowering individuals to propagate

climate messages by running capacity-building sessions, as well as

collaborations between international and local NGOs to help push the climate

agenda forward. Al Gore too continued to actively champion the cause through

the creation of The Climate Reality Project.

The private sector has also played a huge role in looking for solutions through

technology to combat climate change. MNCs can be seen leading the role by

coming together in a coalition to look into their own processes and explore ways

to not only cut their emissions, but also their energy consumption. This is perhaps

driven by sound business logic as it saves companies money that adds to their

annual bottom line. This same logic is the reason why more SMEs are doing the

same. Social enterprises have also look at this as an opportunity to make profits

by providing practical and financially sustainable solutions for developing

countries. One good example is Nuru Energy that provides energy to many parts

of Africa and helped create jobs for the local communities.

  48  

There is also a significant increase in partnership between the people and private

sector to co-run campaigns. This breaks away from the traditional mould or ideas

that one must choose either the environment or economics alone. In fact, it is

widely believe that the climate crisis presented itself not only a challenge, but

also an opportunity for early investment to happen in order to change the way the

world works, towards one that is of a local carbon future. A proponent of this that

is actively positioning himself to drive the change is Sir Richard Branson, who

founded the ‘Carbon War Room’ initiative to do that.

Despite the failure in the political process of the climate negotiations in

Copenhagen back in 2009, the influence and capacity built up on the ground has

gain enough momentum that the social fabric itself because the safety net. Both

the private and people sector, disappointed by the negotiation outcome, went off

to find their own ways to resolve the problems. This includes piloting more

projects and innovation ideas, but more importantly, worked in partnership to

scale up those that are already successful.

For whatever reasons and motivations behind both State and NSAs, the climate

movement can be considered as probably the largest and most successful

environmental movement in the twenty-first century. Despite it is not one that is

totally homogenous, but it is largely pointing towards the right direction because

of the increases sense of planetary common ownership. The issue of East-West

influence has not been a major problem for the convergence and neither is the

local-global ideological contest. While the earlier is addressed by scientific

evidence globally, the later is given an opportunity to be creative in addressing

  49  

the climate issue. It allows both global and local approaches and messaging in

order to reach out to a wider audience and have them relate to the trans-

boundary problem.

The scientific and academic community continues to work to find relevant

evidence to disprove denials and sceptics, but also keep the world abreast of the

climatic impact. The NGOs and businesses sector too continues to spread

awareness and explore solutions on both large and small scales. And at the

international policy level, the negotiations continues but at the very least, there is

much stronger political will. As the aim towards a concluding climate deal beyond

the year 2020 is due in 2015, both developing and developed countries are

stepping forward with their own contributions and establishing national level

institutional framework to support a legally-binding and ambitious outcome (Ban,

2014).

  50  

Case Study 2: Association of South-East Asian Nations as part of

South-east Asia’s Integration Efforts

Introduction

To overcome the common fear of communism and to achieve robust economic

growth (Eccleston et al., 1998), regional South-east Asian state representatives

came together to inaugurate the entity of ASEAN on 8 August 1967. It started

with five founding nations – Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and

Thailand – and is now ten members strong, comprising all South-east Asian

countries except Timor Leste.

The bloc faced three key challenges since its formation. First, how could it

maintain sovereignty and autonomy not only from the rest of the world, but also

from each other, despite wanting to integrate as a region? Second, how should it

achieve cultural integration of the people despite their diverse backgrounds and

histories? For the region to succeed, it should not be only at the political level,

people on the ground must feel for it as well in order to create a market for

growth. Third, how could it sustain collective economic growth as a bloc?

Fortunately, there has been good progress in addressing these issues. This was

made possible because of the “ASEAN Way”, a unifying move based on the

ideals of non-interference, informality, minimal institutionalisation, consultation

and consensus, non-use of force and non-confrontation under the 1976 Treaty of

Amity and Cooperation in South-east Asia.

  51  

ASEAN is chosen as a case study because the region is home to very diverse

economic circumstances, cultural heritage and political inclinations (Henderson,

2014). The focus here is not so much on NSAs’ involvement in an IGO, but rather

on how they complement each other’s efforts in the regional converging space.

The region’s success should not be taken for granted: although the integration

process may have been long, slow and not quite there yet, but it is definitely one

that has been underrated based on several international media’s skewed

depictions. In recent decades, there is a growing number of NSAs in the region

(Igarashi, 2011) and it is interesting to examine what are the kind of roles they

have been playing to enable the economic, social and political convergence.

Recent Developments

Building an integrated community remains a primary goal in order to successfully

address the three aforementioned concerns. Hence, ASEAN has created a

number of top-down initiatives including an ASEAN Charter, an ASEAN Identity

campaign and several Ministerial level meetings addressing specific issues such

as the environment, education and trade. All these separate efforts were

eventually consolidated into a larger framework called the Initiative for ASEAN

Integration (IAI), launched in 2000, to help the newer members (Cambodia, Laos,

Myanmar, Vietnam) better integrate economically, thus narrowing the

development gap between them and the original members (ASEAN, 2014).

The IAI consists of three key pillars. First, as one of ASEAN’s three pillars, the

ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) aims to "implement economic integration

  52  

initiatives" to create a single market across ASEAN nations. Second, the ASEAN

Political-Security Community (APSC) aims to create a community that portrays

the following characteristics: a rules-based community of shared values and

norms; a cohesive, peaceful, stable and resilient region with shared responsibility

for comprehensive security; and a dynamic and outward-looking region in an

increasingly integrated and interdependent world. Third, the ASEAN Socio-

Cultural Community (ASCC) focuses on human development, social welfare and

protection, social justice and rights to ensure environmental sustainability, build

the ASEAN identity, and more importantly, narrow the development gap among

nations (ASEAN, 2011).

These three pillars of the IAI each have a blueprint that aims to accelerate the

integration process.

Non-State Actors in ASEAN

While ASEAN as a regional bloc have begun its integration efforts since 1967,

this could not be said the same for the work of its NSAs. Since its inception,

efforts for change and growth have been more of a top-down process, and one

that has received long-standing criticisms of being elitist and lacking political

inclusiveness (Chavez, 2006). This took a turn in 1997, during the regional

financial crisis, when the idea of having a “People Centred” ASEAN was made

public as part of its review of its Vision 2020 plans. This triggered a series of

discussions both at the political level as well as among CSOs on what is to

  53  

become of the Association going forward: how will this idea be integrated in its

current process and how will this translate into implementation?

However, the idea that people should participate in ASEAN decision-making

processes is not new and had already emerged among prominent figures within

the elite ASEAN circle as early as in the 1980s. One of the founding fathers of

ASEAN, Dr Adam Malik, once stated, “the shaping of a future of peace, friendship

and cooperation is far too important to be left to government and government

officials... [as such, there is a need for] ever-expanding involvement and

participation of the people” (Alatas, 2001). This led to a series of discussions

among academia and policymakers on the possibility of forming a group of

thinkers to provide constructive recommendations to decision makers. With the

support of several like-minded individuals and think tanks, ASEAN-ISIS was

officially launched in June 1988. ASEAN-ISIS became integral in opening up

doors for further NSA engagements.

At the moment, the recognised platform of involvement between NSAs and

ASEAN is limited to two main vehicles with three stakeholder groups.

The two vehicles are the ASEAN People’s Assembly (APA) and ASEAN Civil

Society Conference (ACSC). The APA was created through the recommendation

of ASEAN-ISIS in 1995 to have an “…assembly of people of ASEAN”, which led

to the first session held in 2000 to bring CSOs together and meet up to provide

insights to policymakers in a parallel dialogue. However, participants in APA felt

that the discussion was not enough and felt the need for broader engagements

  54  

with more CSOs and therefore piloted the first round of ACSC in 2005. The first

ACSC was expected to only meet once, but due the success and the

contributions it has to the ASEAN Ministers, it was given a new lease of life and

recognised by ASEAN and carried on running as an annual conference; it is

incorporated in the Vientiane Action Program (VAP) signed during the 2004

ASEAN Summit. Essentially, the APA can be looked as a top-down driven

engagement platform, whereas the ACSC is a bottom-up initiative (Chandra,

1999).

The three stakeholder groups are the community, consisting of community

representatives such as NGOs, CSOs, NPOs and loose community alliances;

businesses, comprising representatives from the business, industries and

coalitions such as the ASEAN Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ASEAN-

CCI) and ASEAN Business Advisory Council (ABAC); and individuals.

The third group can be said to be unique to the region. There is no formal or

inclusive process, but rather it is brought forward through word of mouth and

acknowledged by the larger community. These individuals, when brought

together, are bestowed the title the Eminent Persons Group (EPG). Comprising

of highly distinguished and well-respected citizens from ASEAN member

countries, the EPG was first set up to examine and provide practical

recommendations in the formation of an ASEAN Charter. They are made up of

individuals from diverse background such as CSOs, industry, politics and

academia.

  55  

Non-State Actors in Political Convergence

Even with the recent opening up of Myanmar, political convergence in the form of

a regional system like that of the EU is still far from being a reality. However,

there are interests still to evolve in its own way and as such, the ASEAN Inter-

Parliamentary Assembly (AIPA) was established in 1977. However, the only way

to influence or participate how it will turn out can only be done so within the two

official vehicles recognised by the Association, the APA and ACSC.

Hence, the political convergence in ASEAN is limited to the convergence of

policies driven by common issues. This is part of an on-going effort to build trust

among each other at the highest level. The existences of NSAs are still

considered relatively young and inexperienced in comparison to the wider

international community. This is largely due to the impression that ASEAN is

weak and has minimal impact to the policy formation of the nations involved, and

also that the Association was a very closed door platform that does not allow

such participation. However, despite their fragmented approach in providing

complementary studies, research and campaigning, they have had relative

success in influencing the states through ASEAN and nationally in their own

countries. This in turn has prompted the growth of NSAs role in the region (Aviel,

1999). Also, with the increased level of education and creation of liberty spaces

(Gerard, 2014), there are now more local and regional organisations stepping

forward to influence the shaping of the common policies.

  56  

Non-State Actors in Economic Convergence

Economic integration and growth is the heart and soul of ASEAN since its

founding days. Upon independence from the control of their respective colonial

powers and foreign influences, the region thirsted for growth and for the level of

success seen in the west for the betterment of its people. Therefore, economic

convergence here could be looked as a collective bloc trying to catch up

economically with the rest of the world.

In this respect, when taking a deeper look into the various policies formulated by

the governments at ASEAN level, one will notice that the involvement of NSAs,

especially that of the business and industries have actually begun much earlier.

An example of such interaction is the involvement of the business sector in many

of ASEAN’s economic integration initiatives, which resulted in the establishment

of the ASEAN-CCI in 1972. The ASEAN-CCI became an important space through

which the business community channels inputs and concerns on regional

economic issues to ASEAN and the eventual creation of the ASEAN Free Trade

Area (AFTA) in the early 1990s (Bowles, 1997). Following the surge of trade

liberalisation in the mid-1980s, the ASEAN business community began to realise

the increasing production diversity and complementary nature of ASEAN

economies, resulting from the process of industrialization and the operations of

TNCs in the region.

After the remaining five South-east Asian countries joined ASEAN, there were

concerns over a slowdown of overall economic growth and a widening wealth gap

  57  

of between member countries. The gap is most noticeable between two groups:

the front-runners, also known as the ASEAN6 – Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia,

Singapore, the Philippines and Thailand; and the rest, also known as CLMV –

Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam. A recent study showed that despite the

CLMV joining the Association later, overall growth was achieved, and economic

convergence between the two groups was happening (Ismail, 2004). Much of this

success is attributed to the formation of the AFTA.

Non-State Actors in Cultural Convergence

Quoting Prof Kishore Mahbubani, “The Asia-Pacific region is developing a unique

'corporate culture' on regional security: an unusual blend of East and West. It

combines both Western concepts (for example, of national sovereignty as well as

regional organisation) and Eastern attitudes on managing differences. The best

current model is found in South-East Asia.” (1995). Despite his optimism, this

dissertation argues that it is not fully true.

Cultural convergence in South-east Asia exists in two manners. First, in the top-

down manner, ASEAN states are finding ways to work together towards a

common interest. Second, the bottom-up domain largely refers to the larger

community integration and a sense of belonging and ownership.

Mahbubahni’s claim is somewhat true. The ASEAN Way is being attributed with

the success of the culture of resolving disputes and advancing security co-

operation in the region (Acharya, 1998). But policymakers, in the interest of

  58  

positive pubic messaging to provide assurance for foreign investment, sometimes

overstate the ASEAN Way. The second form, which is one that involves the

larger community, can be considered to be their Achilles heel (Low, 2004). The

failure of the later integration will lead to the eventual economic stagnation

without a regional free market space, and eventually also poses as a security

threat.

In many ways, the interest to create a better integration in order to facilitate trade

is what compelled member states to begin their engagements with NSAs. With

the advantage of a more globalised world and access to technological

connectivity, CSOs in the region has mushroomed despite the various political

regimes that may impede their formation (Olds, 1999). The success of the

region’s policies in providing primary and secondary education has also helped

catalyse this growth in CSOs numbers. These CSOs, with their respective causes

and issues, are no longer interested in merely engagement work through the

given channels alone. They are beginning to fulfil other roles such as on-the-

ground development work and capacity building, with or without governmental

support or endorsement. The issues that they champion are often transboundary

by nature and affect the region collectively. Such example includes the

development of the Mekong River and the transboundary haze problem. These

efforts can be seen as ways to get the people in the region to build ownership of

the region by working together.

These CSOs, however, are also facing their own challenges. The idea of CSOs is

more of a Western notion that is about not taking the current social normative

  59  

without understanding. This concept is not prevalent in the East Asian culture.

Hence, they are also going through a process of self-discovery on how they

should function by integrating values and approaches from both sides. This will

also cascade down the approaches they have in terms of how they influence

policies and the people they impact.

Therefore, Mahbubani’s claim of the model example of an East-West hybrid

society in South-east Asia is one that is still work in progress.

  60  

DISCUSSION

Building on the assumption that globalisation is inevitable and convergence will

build a better society for all, this dissertation argues that NSAs play a crucial role

in ensuring this happens in the most inclusive manner possible. The two case

studies selected complement each other by covering the different aspects of the

convergence: Western-influenced versus Eastern-influenced; global platform

versus regional platform.

This discussion points the various functions of NSAs can be grouped together

and viewed as the role they will play in the respective convergences in different

circumstances. Their differences are in terms of the intensity, which is affected by

three primary catalysts.

Trust Building in Political Convergence

Political convergence is primarily impeded by the ability to trust. The fear of each

other, whether in terms of losing out economically or bruising of national pride, is

perhaps natural, especially when the parties do not have any prior relationships.

This is evident in the failed climate negotiations at Copenhagen, and in ASEAN,

the basis of creating the ASEAN Way approach (Koga, 2010). However, for

political convergence to happen, this needs to be overcome. Both case studies

demonstrate that the NSAs are doing that, through their respective means.

  61  

Trust building is required in three different relationships. First, it is required

among states. States are still the de facto key players at negotiations at the

global or regional scale, and the fear of disadvantaging their own countries is

holding them back. This is where one will notice NSAs are able to bring

governments together in a bilateral discussion. By building capacity, NSAs also

ensure that states will not be hampered by asymmetrical information when

entering into agreements. This is commonly seen at the climate negotiations

between Chinese and American through the NGOs.

Next, trust is necessary between states and NSAs. This is, to a large extent,

being taken for granted at the international level since NSAs are given an official

status after years of lobbying. As the second case study shows, however, the

existence of NSAs is not the norm for East Asia. Nonetheless, the founding group

of NSAs and their involvement in ASEAN have been relatively successful through

the creation APA under the EPG’s recommendation, which eventually led to

ACSC, and continues to grow in strength. It is not to say that there is no need for

further relationship building between states and NSAs on the international

platform, it just means it would be easier. In fact, because of the efforts by the

NGOs on climate change, the UNFCCC created a platform called the

“Momentum for Change” initiative in 2011 not only to recognise the good works of

NSAs, by allowing them to further their work (IISD, 2011). By building trust

between states and NSAs, governments can leverage on the reach of NSAs, and

NSAs will be empowered to know that their opinions and suggestions will be

taken into consideration in policy formulation.

  62  

Finally, trust is paramount between the state and its citizens. While states may be

the official representative of their citizens on the various negotiation platforms,

they may not necessarily have the full support of their people. Even in the ideal

situation of a truly democratic nation, there will always be opposing views from

some sections of the citizenry. For states whose political selection process is less

transparent, there is even less faith in the government. No amount of public

funding can truly reach out to all sectors of the community and the people and

this is where the role of NSAs becomes crucial. As NSAs are typically driven by

the bottom-up, states can engage them as proxies to build relationship with its

people. However, it should be noted that there must still be on-going efforts by

states to engage directly with its citizens.

Asset Management in Economic Convergence

Economic convergence allows less affluent nations to catch up with the affluent

ones. Regardless of the kind of policies made, the conditions to diminish the

wealth gap reside in the management of their assets. These assets refer to

human capital and natural resources.

Human capital – Instead of waiting for things to happen or for foreign aid to

arrive, modifications such as pro-active capacity building or knowledge

acquisition efforts can boost human capital. First, states could upgrade the

overall education level of their workforce, which would better equip workers to

handle more complex jobs. Second, states could enable an environment that

allows transfer of technical knowledge from the more advanced nations to less

  63  

advanced nations. This will also result in a secondary benefit of people stepping

up and creating their own set of solutions to boost economic growth.

Natural resources – Reforms here refer to the type of legislation in place to

govern how resources can be used. Such legislation should protect the local

people and the environment, but at the same time, enable an environment to

create a competitive advantage for the country in the global stage. A clear

example of how NSAs is aiding the management of natural resources is the

REDD+ project partnership between Indonesia and Norway, where NGOs are

helping to resolve the land tenure issues.

In both case studies, it was shown that there is a need to better manage the

resources of developing countries to avoid issues of fraud, corruption and even

exploitation of their assets. By functioning as watchdogs, speaking up for the

marginalised, running capacity building workshops and conducting field research,

NSAs are actively helping to create conditions for economic convergence.

Common Ownership in Cultural Convergence

The end product of cultural convergence allows for differences to be embraced. It

does not mean that everyone should believe in the same ideas, virtues or think

alike. Rather, people would become more knowledgeable of each other’s culture

and be tolerant to each other’s differences while focusing on the common things

that are shared across different cultures. Building this kind of diverging-

converging cultural convergence will require two levels of approach.

  64  

First, it starts with having self-identification, which is the fundamental question of

who makes us, us. This will require community groups to bring those of a similar

culture together and assist the self-discovery of individuals. But this must be done

in moderation without allowing one to think that its own culture is superior.

Keeping a person rooted is important when integrating with others.

Second, people will need to focus on shared commonalities, despite having

different cultural histories. This is also important in terms of recognising that each

of us hold a citizenship of this planet, recognising resources are limited so as not

to fall into the “tragedy of the commons”.

Innovation, Information and Connectivity as Catalysts

Cutting across the three spheres of convergence, three vehicles that will better

enable NSAs are identified.

Innovation – In an increasingly complex world, which has been increasingly

flattened due to technological advancement, things are no longer as clear-cut as

it was before between what is right or wrong. There is an increasing number of

ways through which ideologies are fused together, whether East-West, Local-

Global, or even North-South. It requires innovation to take into account various

considerations and come up with some sort of compromise. This will greatly aid

negotiations and even the implementation of policies and projects.

  65  

Information – Perhaps a more apt description should be “accurate & relevant

information”. We are living in an age of the Information Revolution. But the days

of empowering individuals with information are now transitioning into ones that

are disempowering due to information overload. It is not so much just about

churning reports and that hoping someone happens to read them; rather, it is

about taking the information and processing it, and make it relevant to the

stakeholder that one is engaging.

Connectivity – The most obvious is virtual connectivity, given the current

technological advancement. However, connectivity must include human-to-

human interactivity. The ability to successfully bridge the gap in the various

convergences requires the human touch, a person and a face to relate with and

to speak to.

 

Varying Circumstances

 The climate negotiations, being held at the global platform, is one that is heavily

influenced by the culture of the west and liberalism. This provides pre-existing

fertile conditions for NSAs to come together very early in the process. In contrast,

ASEAN, with a more conservative nature of East Asia, suffers from social

stratification, which implicitly becomes a barrier for the formation of community-

groups to challenge the status quo of state leaders. Despite these differences,

the presence of NSAs can be seen to be increasingly playing a more proactive

role in view of globalisation and the shift of power to the masses. The approach

  66  

of the NSAs may continue to differ in both circumstances; one that is more liberal

in characteristics may opt for a higher profiled public facing engagement for

change, while the other may prefer a lower key closed-door manner, in coming

together for constructive discussion, strategising and even implementing of plans

with states.

Caveats and Considerations of Dissertation

 A main limitation of this dissertation is the simplification of conditions due to a

lack of space. Therefore, it is important to highlight some of caveats and

consideration that readers must be aware in the argument that is put forward in

this research.

First, the focus of this paper favours the constructive types of NSAs and avoids

ones that are more destructive in nature, such as terrorist groups and criminal

organisations.

Second, this dissertation has omitted the media and intergovernmental

organisations (IGOs). Instead, they are re-classified as tools and platforms,

respectively, to allow NSAs to better fulfil their role in the global convergence.

And finally, because of the broad nature of the proposed topic, there are some

gaps that the paper did not address, such as the complex characteristics of the

global convergence. Instead, the paper attempts to put in place an artificial

structure to better guide the reader of this paper.

  67  

Further research and analysis should be done within the domains of NSAs, given

their extremely diverse interest; the inter-linkages of the three convergences,

given their complex nature; and the pre-conditions of the global convergence, to

better complement the findings of this paper and provide a more holistic

understanding of the subject.

  68  

CONCLUSION

This dissertation began with articulating the fundamental understanding of the

global stage, on how and why statehood and sovereignty is not only crucial now,

but also in the new world order. As part of the transition towards a new

normative, states as actors have been shown to succeed in addressing some

aspects of the global challenges, but failing in others. Perhaps the most

successful credit that states can claim is the education of their people to become

more informed and providing them the opportunity to be exposed to different

cultures and societies beyond their own. This result in the mix and mash of ideas,

catalysed through technology, which helped propel an alternative form of coming

together and voicing of opinions – that is, through NSAs.

Though not bestowed with the same level of recognition as states in negotiation

platforms, NSAs are increasingly playing a collectively huge role on this global

stage. It is a role that they have created for themselves without replacing states.

These are also roles that states will never be able to replace given the nature of

its existence.

In conclusion, it is crucial and imminent for states and NSAs to work together in

their respective domains, to close up the current gaps in the global convergence

to avoid unnecessary resistance of a future for the common good.

  69  

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