Mozg Armii

Boris Shaposhnikov, author ofMozg Armii, in 1929, year of thepublication of the book’s last volume.

Mozg Armii (Russian: Мозг армии), in English TheBrain of the Army, is a three-volume military theorybook published between 1927 and 1929.[1] It is the mostimportant work of Boris Shaposhnikov, a Soviet militarycommander then in command of theMoscowmilitary re-gion. Mozg Armii gained a wide popularity throughout theRed Army, and Shaposhnikov himself was held in highregard by Joseph Stalin.[2]

1 The author

Main article: Boris Shaposhnikov

Boris Shaposhnikov had been, before the Russian Rev-olution, a graduate of the Imperial Nicholas MilitaryAcademy (1910) and then a colonel. Unusually for some-one with such a background, he supported the revolutionand rejoined the Red Army in 1918. As such, when theRed Army was in its early years, he was one of the few

officers to have had formal military training. As earlyas May 1918, he seems to have had an important role inthe Soviet Operations Branch, then in its infancy.[3] Hewas a member of the Red Army General Staff from 1921to 1925, and also had a role as Joseph Stalin's militarymentor.[3]

2 Main theories inMozg Armii

2.1 “Mobilization is the opium of war”

A mobilization scene in Germany on August 1, 1914, the day ofthe German declaration of war on Russia and two days beforeGermany declared war on France (August 3).

"Mobilization is the opium of war” is the title of one ofthe book’s chapters. In it, Shaposhnikov draws mainlyfrom the experience of World War I and the efforts allbelligerents made to mobilize as quickly as possible inorder first to try and crush the enemy before he himselfhad been able to mobilize, then to sustain a prolonged wareffort. According to Shaposhnikov, the next war would beas long and intense as World War I had been, and wouldrequire several mobilizations throughout.[1]

Shaposhnikov also presented mobilization as being a dan-gerous yet essential measure. On the one hand, he af-firmed that governments had to be mindful of the fact thatto mobilize was in itself a step towards a full-blown con-flict: he underlined the fact that, just before World WarI began, mobilization by a country had been tantamountto a declaration of war, as neighbouring countries reactedto such a threat with mobilizations of their own. On theother hand, an early mobilization allowed for reinforc-ing the lines of defense, whereas delays in mobilization

1

2 2 MAIN THEORIES IN MOZG ARMII

heightened the risk of having to face a fully mobilizedenemy army with understrength forces.[1]

In Shaposhnikov’s eyes, this and the effort required tosustain a total war, as demonstrated during World WarI, pointed to the importance of “pre-mobilization” mea-sures. The drafting of millions of servicemen, and es-pecially, according to Shaposhnikov, the conversion ofa country’s economy to a war economy, took time andshould not be improvised on the go. But, so as not to raisethe alarm in neighbouring countries, “pre-mobilization”should, according to Shaposhnikov, consist of as muchmeasures as could be taken to prepare for the actual mo-bilization, but all the while keeping them secret.[1]

2.2 The integral military leader: FranzConrad von Hötzendorf as a model

Count Conrad von Hötzendorf, Shaposhnikov’s model of a goodChief of the General Staff.

Regarding military command, Shaposhnikov supportedthe ideas that one of his colleagues, Alexander Andreye-vich Svechin, had already formulated in a book entitledStrategy (first published in 1926). The main idea here wasthat leadership had to be “integral": it could not be whollyentrusted to any single individual, because, in Svechin’swords, the commander in chief “does not have all powerover the entire state” and “giving full power to a chosenmilitary leader is an obsolete formula which never re-

flected any kind of reality”. For Svechin, the conduct ofa war had to be assumed by the entire state.[1]

For Shaposhnikov, who approved of this and quotedSvechin heavily,[1] the main and ideal model for such an“integral” General Staff was that of the Austro-HungarianEmpire during World War I,[1] and specifically, the staffof Count Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf (the Austro-Hungarian Army's Chief of the General Staff from 1914to 1916).[4]

According to Shaposhnikov, the cardinal virtue of Con-rad was that under him, there was a real teamwork amongthe General Staff. Shaposhnikov praised Conrad’s closerelations with his operations chief; he also commendedConrad on his encouraging his subordinates to show ini-tiative, his view of strategy as being subordined to poli-tics (see below), and his lack of reluctance in delegatingauthority.[4]

Shaposhnikov also attributed a range of personal virtuesto Conrad, among which “boldness and strength of char-acter”, “energy and initiative”, “independence”, and hisworkaholism (virtues Shaposhnikov compared to these ofNapoleon Bonaparte). However, in line with the Marxistview of history, Shaposhnikov rejected any kind of GreatMan theory in warfare and stressed the importance ofcollective work. For him, this view was supported byCarl von Clausewitz's (see above quote) and Conrad’s ownwritings.[4] Ironically, Conrad had been badly defeated in1916 by Russian General Alexei Brusilov, who, like Sha-poshnikov, joined the Red Army after the Revolution.

2.3 Subordination of strategy to politics

Another central reference to Clausewitz inMozg Armii isto the famous clausewitzian idea that “war is a continua-tion of politics by other means”. Shaposhnikov approvedof this, and stressed that military planning in general, andmobilization in particular (see above), had to be made ac-cording to political imperatives.[5]

While he was not at the time a member of the CommunistParty of the Soviet Union, Shaposhnikov was, in MozgArmii, in favour of a politically engaged General Staff,acting as directed by the Party. In his definition of “pol-itics” as pertaining to the conduct of war, Shaposhnikovincluded the idea of class struggle – both at a worldwideand at a national scale (within each belligerent country).[5]

Conrad von Hötzendorf, the main role model in MozgArmii (see above), was also described as a politicallysavvy general by Shaposhnikov, and specifically, as onewhose ideas were quite in accordance with these ofMarxism. For instance, he noted that Conrad favouredthe equality of all nationalities within the armed forces,without discriminations. Shaposhnikov even went so faras to say that Conrad was in favour of a mass “People’sArmy”, which was in contradiction with Conrad’s ownwritings.[4]

3

First edition of Clausewitz’s OnWar (1832), an important refer-ence inMozg Armii.

3 Reception and influence

In contrast with Alexander Andreyevich Svechin's Strat-egy, one of Shaposhnikov’s inspirations and references(see above), Mozg Armii was very well received and hada lasting influence. Mozg Armii was quoted as an impor-tant text by nearly all Soviet military theorists andmilitaryhistorians; as late as the 1990s, it was still included as atextbook in the curriculum of the General StaffAcademy.Thus, Mozg Armii can be seen as a landmark in Sovietmilitary theory and doctrine on the organization of theRed Army's General Staff.[1]

4 References[1] Kokoshin, Andrei Afansʹevich (1998, 1999). Soviet

strategic thought, 1917–91. Cambridge, Mass.: BelferCenter for Science and International Affairs. Check datevalues in: |date= (help)

[2] Corvisier, André; Childs, John (1994) [1988]. “Shaposh-nikov, Boris Mikhailovich”. A dictionary of military his-tory and the art of war. Neilson, Keith. Oxford (UK),Cambridge (Mass.): Blackwell Publishing.

[3] Erickson, John (1984) [1962]. The Soviet high command:a military-political history, 1918–1941 (Third ed.). Lon-don, Portland (Oregon): Frank Class Publishers.

[4] Sondhaus, Lawrence (2000). Franz Conrad von Hötzen-dorf: architect of the apocalypse. Studies in Central Eu-ropean Histories. Boston: Humanities Press (Brill Aca-demic Publishers).

[5] Frank, Willard C.; Gillette, Philip S. (1992). Soviet mili-tary doctrine fromLenin to Gorbachev, 1915–1991. West-port: Greenwood Press.

4 5 TEXT AND IMAGE SOURCES, CONTRIBUTORS, AND LICENSES

5 Text and image sources, contributors, and licenses

5.1 Text• Mozg Armii Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mozg%20Armii?oldid=635720299 Contributors: Pavel Vozenilek, Koavf, JHMM13,Hmains, Chris the speller, Yasst8, Alþykkr, Ohconfucius, Ser Amantio di Nicolao, Iridescent, Aldis90, Nick Number, Hydro, Addbot,Yobot, AustralianRupert, BG19bot, BattyBot, Monkbot and Anonymous: 2

5.2 Images• File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_183-25684-0004,_I._Weltkrieg,_Mobilmachung.jpg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/a2/Bundesarchiv_Bild_183-25684-0004%2C_I._Weltkrieg%2C_Mobilmachung.jpg License: CC BY-SA 3.0 de Contribu-tors: This image was provided to Wikimedia Commons by the German Federal Archive (Deutsches Bundesarchiv) as part of a cooperationproject. The German Federal Archive guarantees an authentic representation only using the originals (negative and/or positive), resp. thedigitalization of the originals as provided by the Digital Image Archive. Original artist: Unknown

• File:Hoetzendorf_Franz_Graf_conrad.jpg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/a9/Hoetzendorf_Franz_Graf_conrad.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: http://crowland.uw.hu/images/csata/caporetto.htmlhttp://www.thefullwiki.org/Count_Franz_Conrad_von_H%C3%B6tzendorfhttp://www.qwiki.com/q/#!/Count_Franz_Conrad_von_H%C3%B6tzendorfhttp://oc.encydia.com/ca/Franz_Conrad_von_H%C3%B6tzendorfhttp://degroteoorlog.blogspot.com/2011/03/broesilov-offensief.htmlhttp://www.iltasanomat.fi/kotimaa/Mannerheimin%206%20vihollista/art-1288363475002.html Original artist: Unknown

• File:Shaposhnikov1929.jpg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/55/Shaposhnikov1929.jpg License: Public do-main Contributors: Transferred from ru.wikipediaOriginal artist: Unknown Original uploader was Just at ru.wikipedia

• File:Vomkriege.jpg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/a6/Vomkriege.jpg License: Public domain Contributors:? Original artist: ?

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