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Nicos Mouzelis: Sociological Theory: What Went Wrong? Diagnosis andRemedies. London and New York: Routledge, 1995.

Most sociologists would agree with Nicos Mouzelis, well-known sociologist at theLondon School of Economics, that something has gone wrong with sociologicaltheory. As things stand today, sociological theory represents one of the leastexciting fields in the discipline, and there are no signs that the situation is likelyto change within the next few years. So, what exactly did go wrong and whatneeds to be done? Let us first listen to Nicos Mouzelis in Sociological Theory:What Went Wrong?

According to Mouzelis, the natural point of departure for a discussion of thistype is the work of Talcott Parsons; indeed, what has happened in sociologicaltheory during the past few decades is referred to as post-Parsonian sociologicaltheory (p. 149). It was Parsons who really established sociological theory as alegitimate subdiscipline in sociology, we are told, and it is his attempt at grandtheory - functionalism in the form of the AGIL-system - that needs to bereconstructed. Functionalism should be non-teleological, Mouzelis says, and thefamous functional prerequisites can simply be seen as conditions of existence forthe social system.

But Parsons AGIL-theory, Mouzelis also argues, is not without seriousproblems, such as its neglect of concrete actors and its general incapacity toaddress the agency-structure problem. Post-Parsonian research has, however,produced a number of theories which can be used to amend Parsons theory andto build bridges between the many warring paradigms that exist today withinsociology. Mouzelis says that there is far too little communication between thesewarring camps, with anarchy and cacophony as a result (p. 149).

The main bulk of Sociological Theory: What Went Wrong? is devoted to ananalysis of different types of sociological theory which have emerged sinceroughly the 1960s, such as interpretative sociologies (Goffman, ethnomethodol-ogy, etc), postmodernism, rational choice theory, neo-functionalism, plus theworks of Norbert Elias, Pierre Bourdieu and Anthony Giddens. Goffman et al. arepraised for having understood microsociological action better than Parsons, butare criticized for failing to handle a number of problems, especially macrolevelaction. Postmodernism (including poststructuralism) gets a thrashing; and it isclear that the author does not have a very high opinion of Foucault, Baudrillardand similar thinkers. Rational choice theory (especially Coleman) is similarlyrejected - but because of its transhistorical character, armchair theorizing anddeductive reasoning. Neo-functionalism is rejected for the arbitrary manner inwhich it has tried to amend Parsons concept of the social system. Eliassfigurational sociology is criticized for its failure to solve the agency-structureproblem. Giddens and Bourdieu, Mouzelis says, both think that they have gonebeyond the subject-object distinction but have not done so at all. Still, bothBourdieu and Giddens have made fine contributions to sociological theory andthese can be of great value in the reconstruction of Parsonian theory. Habituscan, for example, be used to supplement Parsons role-theory, and Giddens ideason dualism are also very helpful.

Mouzelis comments on the works in recent sociological theory in a calm andreasonable manner, indicating at various points where one could develop oneconcept further, which concepts should be rejected, and the like. Especially at onepoint, however, he steps forward as a theorist in his own right, and this is whenhe criticizes Parsons for using the AGIL-system in a too mechanical fashion andthereby reifying sociological analysis. Instead of subdividing the four Parsoniansubsystems according to the AGIL-system, Mouzelis suggests, one shouldintroduce Marx into the analysis. If one incorporates Marxs ideas on technology,

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appropriation and ideology into the AGIL-system at this point, the argumentgoes, social systems theory becomes a much more realistic and creative tool thanit currently is. Mouzelis sums up his proposition in the following manner: Eachinstitutional subsystem must be conceptualized in terms of its technological,appropriative and ideological dimension: As t, a, i; G - t, a, i. etc. with tmeaning technology; a, appropriation; and i, ideology&dquo; (p. 95).

From this quick overview of Mouzelis book it should be clear that its authoris trying to operate as a kind of mediator between warring camps incontemporary sociology and to introduce a bit of reason into the currentdiscussion. If one accepts what is the major premise of this book - thatsociological theory of today should devote itself to a reconstruction of Parsonswork - Mouzeliss work would no doubt deserve praise; its author is eminentlyreasonable as well as a sharp thinker in general.

My problem with Mouzeliss book, however, is that I do not see why weshould take Parsons work as the point of departure for the attempt to reconstructtodays sociological theory (which clearly is in miserable shape). As opposed toMouzelis, I am, for example, quite distrustful of the idea that sociological theoryshould be a specialized subdiscipline in the way that Parsons wanted (e.g. p. 4).Most of what is valuable in sociological theory has not at all emerged out of such asubdiscipline but out of concrete studies, from Suicide and The Protestant Ethicand onwards. When I come across current works that are the products of thisspecialized subdiscipline, I generally find them to be of pretty low quality.Todays experts in sociological theory, it seems to me, often have a tendency tocreate pseudodebates, cite one another to death, and ignore what goes on in therest of sociology. To some extent even Mouzelis (whose own work on, for example,bureaucracy is of very high quality) falls into this trap by ignoring importantcontributions that have been made to sociological theory during the period hecovers. He, for example, does not mention networks theory or organization theory- two areas which are currently very dynamic and have been so for quite sometime. We similarly get discussions of Baudrillard and Foucault, while a numberof important sociologists (such as Stinchcombe and Granovetter) are not evenmentioned.

A second point on which I disagree with Mouzelis has to do with hisassessment of rational choice theory, which I think is fairly stereotypical andoccasionally even wrong. It is stereotypical in the sense that all the usualaccusations are made of rational choice theory, while none of its many virtues -such as conceptual clarity, methodological individualism and the primacy of theanalytical - are given their due. Mouzelis is also mistaken when he says thatColeman fails to establish a link between micro and macro or, more precisely,that Coleman makes this link, but in such a mechanical fashion - by simpleaggregation - that the whole thing is a failure (pp. 30-39). The fact, however, isthat Coleman is explicitly critical of simple aggregation and argues that theinteraction between individual actors leads to the formation of new socialconfigurations on the macrolevel (see especially Foundations of Social Theory,pp. 1-23). If one stops for a moment and reflects, it becomes clear that Colemansemphasis on how microbehaviour is transformed into macrostructures hasalways existed in rational choice theory, be it in a latent form (as in price theorywith its demand and supply schedules) or in a manifest form (as in Schellingsbrilliant work on micromotives and macrobehaviour).

My third and most serious disagreement with Mouzeliss argument has to dowith his very point of departure: the work of Parsons. I think that one of the greatmistakes in the current view of the history of post-World War II sociology hasbeen to assign such a central place to Talcott Parsons while ignoring morehealthy developments. With the latter expression I am especially thinking of

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Robert Merton, who is usually cast (for example in Mouzeliss book) as a muchless important figure than Parsons. As I see it, Merton is the major figure in post-World War II sociology, and it is his work - much more so than that of Parsons -which needs to be studied and reconstructed today. There are some great partsto Parsons work, but his main intellectual project - the idea of a social system, asconceptualized in terms of the AGIL-system - represents a failure and a deadend.Mertons project, on the other hand, is as fresh today as it was when it wasinitially conceptualized in the late 1940s: to create a middle-range sociologywhere the emphasis is on being close to empirical research and to constructuseful concepts that explain delimited areas of social life. In brief, Mouzelissquestion Sociological Theory: What Went Wrong? would, in my opinion, havereceived a more interesting answer if he had placed Mertons type of sociology atcentre stage, rather than that of Parsons.

ReferencesColeman, J. S. 1990. Foundations of Social Theory. Cambridge:Harvard University Press.

Richard SwedbergStockholm University