Motivation in a Social Context: Coordinating Personal and Shared … · 2016-03-18 · ences...

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Motivation in a Social Context:Coordinating Personal andShared Goal Pursuits With OthersA. Fishbach1 and J. SteinmetzUniversity of Chicago, Chicago, IL, United States1Corresponding author: E-mail: [email protected]

Y. TuUniversity of Florida, Gainesville, FL, United States

Contents

1. Introduction
2 2. Individuals Pursuing Individual Goals 4
2.1 Pursuing Goals With Information on Others
4 2.1.1 Conformity 4 2.1.2 Divergence 7 2.1.3 Conforming to Preferences, Diverging From Actions 8 2.1.4 Implications for Vicarious Satiation 11 2.1.5 Implications for Influence of Role Models 13
2.2 Pursuing Goals in the Presence of Others
14 2.2.1 Shared Reality: Tuning to Others’ Expectations 15 2.2.2 Others Augment Perceived Impact of Actions 17 2.2.3 Others Support Goal Pursuit 20
3. Individuals Pursuing Group Goals
22 3.1 Pursuing Goals for the Self and Others 22
3.1.1 Interpersonal Closeness and Jointly Maximizing Choice
23 3.1.2 Implications for Infringement of Intellectual Property 25
3.2 Pursuing Goals With Others
27 3.2.1 Inspiration Versus Loafing: A Matter of Self-construal 28 3.2.2 Responding to Others’ Completed and Missing Actions 29 3.2.3 Motivation to Contribute: Express Support Versus Make a Difference 34
4. Conclusion
36 References 37
Advances in Motivation Science, Volume 3ISSN 2215-0919http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/bs.adms.2015.12.005

© 2016 Elsevier Inc.All rights reserved. 1 j

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/bs.adms.2015.12.005

2 A. Fishbach et al.

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Abstract

This article reviews research on motivation in a social context. We first explore pursuit ofpersonal goals and how information on others, as well as the presence of others, influ-ences motivation. We next explore pursuit of group goals, including pursuit of goalsalone for the self and others, and pursuit of shared goals together with others. Acrossthese various domains, we identify coordination as the underlying principle for pursu-ing goals in a social context. We show that individuals’ tendency to coordinate theiractions with others leads to a variety of phenomena, including conformity, divergence,shared reality, jointly maximizing choice, and highlighting versus balancing groupactions. We further show that coordination increases with interpersonal closenessbut is not limited to close friends.

1. INTRODUCTION

We accomplish our important life goals, as well as daily mundanetasks, in the presence of others who may help, inspire, observe, or, at times,hinder our pursuits. Indeed, our friends, colleagues, family members, andeven strangers are often on our mind or are physically present as we gothrough our daily tasks. These individuals can influence goal pursuit by theirmere presence (Bond & Titus, 1983; Hardin & Higgins, 1996; Latané,1981). Other times, they provide feedback (Ashford, Blatt, & Walle,2003; Crommelinck & Anseel, 2013; Finkelstein & Fishbach, 2012),monitor (Fishbach & Trope, 2005; Na & Paternoster, 2012; Tucker &Anders, 2001), serve as role models (Lockwood, Jordan, & Kunda, 2002;Lockwood & Kunda, 1997), or directly participate in goal pursuit. Andnaturally, these individuals can also sway us from our goals (John & Norton,2013; Linardi & McConnell, 2011). Thus, others may encourage us to pro-crastinate on a task, neglect our health (eg, overeat, drink), and relax ourmoral standards (eg, cheat; Christakis & Fowler, 2007; Carrell, Hoekstra,& West, 2011).

Recognizing the social context in which goal pursuit takes place, weexplore how people coordinate the pursuit of their personal goals as well astheir shared goals with others. We define coordination rather broadly, tocapture the selection of one’s actions in relation to others’ actions and out-comes, in order to achieve an overarching organization for the collective.For example, whether a person chooses to walk in the same or the oppositedirection as another, we could consider her behavior as coordination to theextent that she considered the collective actions of the group. Coordinationcan be a response to others’ actions, evaluations, or mere presence, and does

Motivation in a Social Context 3

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not require that others are actively trying to influence the person. Wefurther explore coordination in people’s pursuit of their own personal goals,goals that they share with others (eg, supporting one’s family), and goals thatthey share and pursue with others (ie, shared goals, such as team work).Thus, we explore coordination in making choices for the self, for theteam, and with the team.

Whereas traditional research on self-regulation has focused on individ-uals working individually to achieve their individual goals (Higgins, 1987;Carver & Scheier, 1998; Gollwitzer, 1999; Kuhl & Beckmann, 1985),more recent research has shifted focus toward exploring motivation in a so-cial context. For example, recent research explores how people support andhinder each other’s goal pursuits (Finkel, Fitzsimons, & vanDellen, 2015;Shah, 2003). The underlying assumption in research exploring social con-texts is that interpersonal closeness and, in particular, the experience ofconnection or “selfeother overlap” matters. People’s identity is definedby their relationships with other individuals or groups (Markus & Kitayama,1991; Tajfel, 1972; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987).Indeed, as people become closer, they use the pronoun “we” instead of“(s)he and I” to refer to the self and the other in conversation (Agnew,Rusbult, van Lange, & Langston, 1998; Cialdini et al., 1976; Dovidio,Piliavin, Gaertner, Schroeder, & Clark, 1991; Fiedler, Semin, & Koppetsch,1991). The closer people are to others, the more likely they are to coordi-nate with others’ goal pursuit. For instance, people feel they share a part ofclose others’ actions and thus feel depleted by others’ efforts (Ackerman,Goldstein, Shapiro, & Bargh, 2009) or satiated by others’ goal completion(McCulloch, Fitzsimons, Chua, & Albarracín, 2011).

We propose that the principle of coordination underlies people’s goalpursuit in social contexts. We explore how coordination affects severalmotivational phenomena. We start with contexts in which individuals pur-sue their own, individual goals (Section 2). First, we look at how informa-tion on other people and their behaviors can affect the way individualspursue their own personal goals (Section 2.1). According to the principleof coordination, we expect people to coordinate with others by adoptingtheir preferences, yet to choose different actions. We also explore howand when people vicariously satiate on others’ actions and how they respondto role models’ actions. Second, we investigate how individuals pursue theirpersonal goals in the mere presence of others (Section 2.2). Coordinationwith others leads in these cases to the establishment of a common shared re-ality, as people orient their representations to what they believe are others’


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representation. In addition, the presence of others causes people to changetheir perception of their own behavior to see it as more meaningful, andto perceive support from others for their goal pursuits.

Next, we move to exploring coordination when pursuing goals for theself and others (i.e., group goals, Section 3). In Section 3.1, we explore how,in close relationships, people wish to maximize the total benefits for thegroup, even at the cost of uneven distribution of benefits and havingsome group members suffer. This effect of interpersonal closeness on maxi-mizing total benefits further leads people to feel more comfortable with mildviolations of copyrights by the in-group member than by the out-groupmember. Moving to situations in which people pursue goals with (insteadof for) others (Section 3.2), we explore whether the way in which peopleconstrue their self and their relation to others (ie, self-construal) influencestheir tendency to put more or less effort into their shared goals with others.We propose that interdependent people may work harder toward sharedthan toward personal goal, but the opposite is true for independent people.In addition, we explore coordination of contributions to a shared goal,showing how information on others’ existing and missing contributions in-fluences one’s own contributions to a shared goal. We summarize our prop-ositions in Table 1.

2. INDIVIDUALS PURSUING INDIVIDUAL GOALS

Part 1 explores the impact of the social context on pursuing personalgoals. We ask how people incorporate information on others into their de-cisions to pursue their own goals.

2.1 Pursuing Goals With Information on OthersTo the extent that information on others influences an individual’s personalgoal pursuit, two opposite patterns of coordination between others and theself are possible: conformity and divergence. Conformity refers to behavioralmatching; the individual pursues actions similar to others’. Divergence refersto a pattern of coordination by which a person intentionally aspires tochoose different actions than others to complement what others say, do,or have.

2.1.1 ConformityWhen pursuing their goals, people typically have a rich social context full ofinformation of others’ behavior and choices. For instance, people see what

Table 1 List of propositionsIndividuals pursuing individual goals

a. Pursuing goals withinformation onothers

1. Both conformity and divergence increase withinterpersonal closeness.

2. People conform to close others’ preferences anddiverge from close others’ actions.

3. People satiate on others’ food consumption.4. Individual role models’ actions influence

behavior more than group role models’ actions.b. Pursuing goals in the

presence of others1. People tune their perceptions and actions to

others’ expectations (“shared reality”).2. The mere presence of others augments the

perceived impact of one’s goal actions.3. The presence of others supports goal pursuit.

Individuals pursuing group goals

a. Pursuing goals forthe self and others

1. Interpersonal closeness increases preference forjointly maximizing choices, even at the cost ofgreater inequality between group members.

2. People are more tolerant of mild violations of thein-group’s (vs The out-group’s) intellectualproperty.

b. Pursuing goals withothers

1. Self-construal effects: Interdependence isassociated with working harder in the presence ofothers; independence is associated with socialloafing in the presence of others.

2. Individuals respond to others’ completed andmissing actions similarly to how they respond totheir own completed and missing actions:a. Uncommitted individuals evaluate the

group’s commitment and follow others’actions; committed individuals evaluate thegroup’s progress and compensate for others’lack of actions.

b. Individuals identifying lowly with othergroup members evaluate the group’s goalcommitment and follow others’ actions;individuals identifying highly with othermembers evaluate the group’s progress andcompensate for others’ lack of action.

3. A higher proportion of group members wouldrespond to a message on expressing commitment(vs make progress); however, the averagecontribution amount would be larger in responseto a message emphasizing progress(vs commitment).


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others choose to study, the food other people eat, and which clothes otherswear. This social context influences people’s choices (Bearden & Etzel,1982; Cohen, 2003; Fishbach, Henderson, & Koo, 2011; Latane & Darley,1968). Research in psychology, economics, business, and public policyshows that people generally coordinate their attitudes and behavior withthe information on others’ attitudes and behaviors, in a way that engendersconformity, that is, behavioral matching. In this way, people’s attitudes andbehaviors are aligned and positively reinforce each other (Asch, 1956;Goldstein, Cialdini, & Griskevicius, 2008; Hornstein, Fisch, & Holmes,1968; Milgram, Bickman, & Berkowitz, 1969; Sherif, 1936). For example,people mimic others’ food choices (Cai, Chen, & Fang, 2009; McFerran,Dahl, Fitzsimons, & Morales, 2010), environmental decisions (Allcott,2011; Goldstein et al., 2008), and prosocial behaviors (Frey & Meier,2004; Gerber & Rogers, 2009). Such conformity in attitudes and behavioris common not only between close others. People also conform to in-groupmembers in larger settings, for example, those in an online community(Chen, Wang, & Xie, 2011; Salganik, Dodds, & Watts, 2006).

Why do people conform so readily to others? First of all, others’ judg-ments and behaviors have normative value (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). Con-forming to others typically provides a number of social benefits, such associal approval and social affiliation (Lakin & Chartrand, 2003), whereaslack of conformity might engender social penalties such as disapproval fromothers (Griskevicius, Goldstein, Mortensen, Cialdini, & Kenrick, 2006).Normative conformity does not stem from an acknowledgment that othersrealized some truth to which the individual adheres. Instead, the individualmay completely reject the idea that others are correct and nonetheless adhereto their behavior to receive some social benefits. For example, a person mayadhere to the present fashion even if she or he privately rejects the notion thatthis year’s fashion looks better than last year’s fashion.

Aside from having normative value, others’ judgments and behaviors canalso carry informational value and thereby lead to conformity. Especially inuncertain situations, others’ attitudes and behavior can inform an individualof what is appropriate or generally wise to do (eg, the wisdom of the crowd;Simmons, Nelson, Galak, & Frederick, 2011; Surowiecki, 2005). Thus, in-dividuals believe they can improve their decisions by relying on informationfrom others, because others presumably have information on the true valueof options (Baron, Vandello, & Brunsman, 1996; Levine, Higgins, & Choi,2000). Moreover, averaging estimates from multiple sources often improvesaccuracy, regardless of whether these estimates come from expert


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judgments, naïve group members’ judgments, or using advice to modifypersonal judgments. In these cases, relying on others’ estimates and doingsome sort of mental combination between judgments (including oneown) improves accuracy (Larrick, Mannes, & Soll, 2011).

But whereas conformity benefits the individual by entailing socialapproval and by providing greater informational value, conformity is prev-alent in many different decision contexts because people tend to adopt closeothers’ attitudes as their own. When people feel they too think like theirgroup members, they follow group members’ lead and conform. Underthese situations, the motivation to conform stems from individuals’ sensethat they are united and should thus think and act as a single person. Hence,they desire to coordinate by mimicking each other.

2.1.2 DivergenceSocial influence does not always take the form of conformity or behavioralmatching. Rather, individuals often choose to diverge from the group’sopinions or actions, because they wish to complement what others say ordo. Indeed, for groups working together, complementary behavior mightoften be more appropriate than having group members conform to(ie, mimic) each other (Fiske, 2000). For example, people in a group discus-sion should express different positions to enrich the group discussion ratherthan all take the same position, and families divide household chores ratherthan have all members pursue the same task.

We define complementarity as a pattern of coordination wherebydifferent people choose different actions for the greater benefit of the entiregroup. For example, people choose complementary actions when workingon different segments of a project instead of everyone working together onall segments (ie, the division of labor; Becker & Murphy, 1992; Sinha &Cusumano, 1991), or when mastering complementary information(Wegner, Erber, & Raymond, 1991). For example, Wegner et al. (1991)found that individuals in close relationships better recall information thanimpromptu pairs comprised of strangers, because the natural pairs intuitivelydistribute the workload between their partner and themselves.

Whereas division of labor might be expected for group goals, people alsofollow similar principles in pursuit of their personal goals, where such apattern of coordination through complementary actions seems less useful.For example, people choose to wear different clothes, buy different furni-ture, and order different entrées than those around them. They do soeven though they are not explicitly holding a group goal of maximizing


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the diversity in clothing, furniture, or foods (assuming they do not share thefood). That is, even though each person is presumably only concerned withhis or her own goal (eg, to look professional wearing the appropriate attire),they coordinate with others such that they make complementary choices.

Part of the reason people choose complementary actions to others inpursuit of personal goals is that people experience others’ actions and theconsequences of these actions as if they were their own. Indeed, peoplementally share what close others say and do, because the selfeother bound-ary is often less than clear-cut (Aron, Aron, Tudor, & Nelson, 1991; Brewer& Gardner, 1996; Burger, Messian, Patel, del Prado, & Anderson, 2004;Cialdini, Brown, Lewis, Luce, & Neuberg, 1997; Kelley & Thibaut,1978). Individuals can experience others’ emotions, evaluations, andactions, as well as the consequences of these actions, as their own (Maneret al., 2002; Monin, Norton, Cooper, & Hogg, 2004). For example, peoplefeel lonely upon seeing another person being socially excluded (ie, vicariousostracism; Wesselmann, Bagg, & Williams, 2009), and fall prey to others’sunk costs (ie, vicarious entrapment; Gunia, Sivanathan, & Galinsky,2009). Further, people experience cognitive dissonance from others’inconsistencies (Norton, Monin, Cooper, & Hogg, 2003), feel depletedby others’ efforts (Ackerman et al., 2009), satiated by others’ goal comple-tion (McCulloch et al., 2011), and experience others’ moral credentials astheir own (Kouchaki, 2011). Following from these findings is our observa-tion that people often choose complementary actions to others’ actions,because people feel that if others have acted, they have acted too.

Of course, divergence does not always reflect coordination. At othertimes, divergence occurs because people wish to be different. A desire tobe different, or unique, has often been studied as a personality variableand important individual differences have been identified, with some indi-viduals seeking more uniqueness than others (Brewer, 1991; Chan, Berger,& Van Boven, 2012; Schumpe & Erb, 2015; Snyder & Fromkin, 1977,2012). In addition, certain situations promote more uniqueness-seekingbehavior (eg, feeling proud of one’s achievements, Huang, Dong, &Mukhopadhyay, 2014; mating motives, Griskevicius et al., 2006). A desireto be unique reflects social influence just as much as making complementarychoices; however, the underlying motivation is not coordination.

2.1.3 Conforming to Preferences, Diverging From ActionsThe assumption that people mentally share what others say (ie, attitudes andpreferences) and have done (ie, action) has implications for when we should


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expect coordination to result in conformity versus complementarity. Specif-ically, when sharing a preference or attitude, individuals adopt others’“words” as their own and we should expect conformity, such that peopleexpress similar views to those in their immediate environment. By contrast,when sharing an action, individuals feel that they, in a way, acted too, andthey are expected to diverge by choosing complementary actions. In thisway, mental sharing implies that when people learn about others’ prefer-ences, they will like the target items more, but when they learn about others’actions, they will feel less compelled to perform the same actions “again.”This response occurs because the expression of different preferences resultsin (undesirable) internal inconsistency, whereas the expression of differentactions results in (desirable) variety. In other words, when others’ actionsare mentally shared, social influence is less likely to take the form of confor-mity and more likely to induce complementary decisions.

Tu and Fishbach (2015a) tested whether individuals conform less to in-formation on others’ choices when these choices convey action, or areaccompanied by action, than when these choices only convey preference(“the words-speak-louder effect”). They limited their investigation to freelychosen actions, such that an action always implied a preference (ie, nomandatory, imposed actions), and they compared a choice that reflected apreference only (eg, liking something) with a choice that reflected a prefer-ence plus action (eg, liking something and getting it too). When comparingthese conditions, the researchers observed more conformity in the prefer-ence-only conditions.

For example, in one of their studies, pairs of participants evaluated chew-ing gum. In the preference condition, the first person of the pair chose oneof two flavors of gum based on which one they liked better, without actuallyeating the gum. In the action condition, the first person of the pair chose theflavor of gum they wanted to taste and actually chewed it. The researcherswere interested in the behavior of the second person of the pair. Pure con-formity would predict the second person is likely to mimic the first person’sstated preference and his or her actual consumption by choosing the sameflavor. However, if the stated preference leads to greater conformity, butthe actual consumption leads to greater complementarity, the second personmight conform in the preference condition but choose the other flavor inthe action condition. In support of this hypothesis, the second person wasless likely to conform (ie, choose the same flavor) when the first person actu-ally tasted the gum (action condition), compared to when he or she hadmerely indicated a preference for a flavor (preference condition).


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Another study (Tu & Fishbach, 2015a) more directly tested the assump-tion that people show less conformity to others’ actions than preferencesbecause they seek complementary actions. Participants in this study wererun in pairs and took turns choosing between green and a blue luggagetags that were either framed as complementing each other (ie, “these arematching colors”) or as contradicting each other (ie, “these are not matchingcolors”). Results showed that when the colors were said to complementeach other, the majority of the participants chose the same luggage tag astheir partner “indicated he or she preferred” (preference condition) butonly a minority chose the same tag that their partner “chose to have” (actioncondition), which suggests greater conformity to preference than action. Incontrast, when the colors were said to contradict each other, the authorsfound no effect for the first person’s choice on the participants’ choice(Fig. 1). Thus, people want to enrich their experience by choosing differ-ently; however, if the options contradict each other, they gain little from“owning” them both, and the principles of coordination and complemen-tary choice will not guide their behavior.

Tu and Fishbach (2015a) further provided evidence for mental sharing asthe underlying cause for the words-speak-louder effect. Thus, they foundpeople (falsely) “recall” greater past consumption of items that others have

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Figure 1 Conformity to a study partner’s preference versus action when the choiceoptions appear complementary versus contradictory. Participants diverge from others’actions more than preference only when the options are complementary. Reprintedfrom Tu, Y., & Fishbach, A. (2015). Words speak louder: conforming to preferences morethan actions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 109, 193e209. Copyright(2015), with permission from American Psychological Association.


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had versus items that others have indicated they prefer. For example, uponlearning that others frequently consume (vs strongly like) a specific breakfastfood, participants remembered consuming this food more recently and morefrequently. Moreover, people mentally share close others’ actions more thandistant others’ actions; for example, people feel they share the traits of theirsignificant others, in-group members, or those with whom they identify,more than distant others (Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992; Goldstein &Cialdini, 2007; Norton et al., 2003; Smith, Coats, & Walling, 1999; Smith& Henry, 1996). Because mental sharing underlies these effects, individualsconform less to the actions than the preferences of close others (friends,in-group members), compared with distant others. With close others, peo-ple are more likely to feel they have “done” these actions too, so that theseactions do not need to be repeated.

2.1.4 Implications for Vicarious SatiationA preference for complementary actions has specific implications for foodconsumption, where experiencing others’ food consumption as one’s ownmight lead to vicarious satiation and desiring something else. Vicarioussatiation occurs whendin the presence of alternative foodsda temporaryreduction occurs in the desire to consume foods others eat. Research onvicarious satiation accordingly shows people coordinate their actions notonly to cover more diverse experiences (as an expression of complemen-tarity) but also because people experience satiation and feel that others’consumption is, to some extent, their own consumption (Tu & Fishbach,2015b).

Specifically, satiation manifests itself as a temporary reduction in desire;therefore, people postpone consuming a food item when another close per-son has just consumed it, as if they have just consumed it themselves. In astudy that explored this possibility, Tu and Fishbach (2015b) assigned oneperson in a pair (participant 1) to either eat one flavor of candy and evaluateit (consumption condition) or evaluate the package design without eating(nonconsumption condition). They then gave the second participant inthe pair (participant 2) both flavors to eat and observed the order in which(s)he ate them. They found that participants were less likely to first eat theflavor the other person got if the other person ate it (consumption condi-tion) than not (nonconsumption condition).

Satiation further results in variety seeking; therefore, people choose toconsume a different food than what they observed others consume, as if theyhave had that food too. For example, in one study (Tu & Fishbach, 2015b),


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participants watched a video of a person either eating (consumption condi-tion) or counting (nonconsumption condition) a large or a small number ofM&Ms. Half of them were further asked to mimic the person by either eatingor counting M&Ms. Next, everyone was offered a choice of a parting gift:(more) M&Ms or a different gift (other food or office supply). The researchersfound that watching another person eat M&Ms had similar effects to actuallyeating them: both groups were less likely to chooseM&Ms (ie, sought variety)if they ate/watched someone eat a large number of M&Ms than if they ate/watched someone eat a small number of M&Ms.

Other studies (Tu & Fishbach, 2015b) documented greater vicarious sati-ation for features that are directly related to sensations, such as flavor, and aretherefore more satiable than features that are not related to sensations, such asbrand or nutritional function (Cabanac, 1971; Inman, 2001; Johnson &Vickers, 1993). Specifically, vicarious satiation was stronger when subjectshad an opportunity to choose a different flavor than what their study partnerhad chosen (eg, choosing between chocolate vs vanilla), compared to whenthey had an opportunity to choose food with a different nutritional function(eg, choosing between “high protein” vs “heart health”; Fig. 2).

Importantly, whereas vicarious satiation and physiological satiation sharecommonalities, physiological satiation as a result of food consumption sup-presses the eating goal in almost all contexts, whereas watching another

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person eat in addition to satiating typically activates the goal to eat (goal conta-gion; Aarts, Gollwitzer, & Hassin 2004; Stroebe, van Koeningsbruggen,Papies, & Aarts, 2013). Therefore, observing others consume food generallyleads to a greater desire to eat something. However, the desire is greater fordifferent food offerings and lower for the specific food the observed personate. When no other food offerings are available, people desire what theywatch others consume.

2.1.5 Implications for Influence of Role ModelsThe patterns of coordinationdconformity versus divergencedfurther in-fluence how people respond to role models. Typically, people admire andlook up to role models for inspiration on how to follow in their footsteps(Lockwood, 2006; Lockwood & Kunda, 1997). And people report feelingmore optimistic and hopeful about goal attainment as a result of exposureto role models (Collins, 1996; Taylor & Lobel, 1989; Van den Borne, Pruyn,& Van den Heuvel, 1987). For instance, people follow the careers of greatathletes like Michael Jordan to find inspiration for their own athletic pur-suits. But we are interested in whether people can feel vicarious goalcompletion when their role models have accomplished something, andwhether people will subsequently relax their own efforts when thinkingabout the actions of these role models.

Role models often come in one of two forms: an individual role model(eg, Einstein) and a group of role models (eg, physics professors). Becausepeople perceive greater overlap (Schwarz & Bless, 2007) and fuzzier bound-aries (F€orster, Liberman, & Kuschel, 2008) between themselves and a groupthan between themselves and an extreme exemplar, they might be morelikely to experience the group’s (vs individual’s) actions as if they have “actedtoo.” The result is that people conform to an admired role model yet diverge(or conform less) from a group of admired role models.

To explore the effects of role models on individuals’ goal pursuit, partic-ipants in one study (Tu & Fishbach, 2015c) read about the health behavior ofa group that many people consider role models (ie, athletes in general), orthey read about the health behavior of a specific athlete (ie, the baseballplayer Derek Jeter). The group of athletes should allow participants to feelgreater overlap of the self and the group (Aron et al., 1991) compared toa particular athlete. People might feel they do not have much in commonwith one particular athlete, but athletes in general should offer moreroom for identification and perceived overlap for people. Thus, the greaterthe perceived selfeother overlap, the more people feel that if the others have


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completed the goal, they themselves have also somewhat completed the goaland can relax their efforts. Building on this reasoning, Tu and Fishbach(2015c) measured participants’ own health-related behavior (ie, taking un-healthy candy) after having read about the healthy behavior of a group ofathletes versus one particular athlete. In line with the hypotheses, afterlearning about the healthy behavior of a group of role models (greaterselfeother overlap and thus greater vicarious goal completion), participantsrelaxed their own efforts on the health goal and, specifically, took more un-healthy candy, compared to those who learned about the healthy behaviorof a specific athlete (ie, exemplar).

Importantly, if people feel greater overlap with a group of role models(vs an exemplar), they should not only conform less to the group’s(vs exemplar’s) actions, but should further conform more to the group’s(vs exemplar’s) recommendation or attitude. Such a result would be consis-tent with the notion described above that experiencing others’ attitudes asone’s own results in conformity, yet experiencing others’ behaviors asone’s own results in divergence. Indeed, in another study, Tu and Fishbach(2015c) found greater conformity to fitness advice (attitude) from a group ofHollywood stars than the same advice from a specific Hollywood star (BradPitt for men, Natalie Portman for women). However, when the emphasiswas on the role models’ actions, stating they were already pursuing thefitness advice, participants conformed more to the individual star than thegroup of stars.

Taken together, the research reviewed here suggests coordination canresult in either conformity or divergence. One important variable thatdetermines the direction of the influence is the focus on what others sayversus do. Because individuals often adopt others’ views and actions as theirown, they tend to conform to others’ views yet feel more liberated to pursuedifferent actions because they did it (or ate it) too. This finding has implica-tions for how people respond to role models.

2.2 Pursuing Goals in the Presence of OthersThe previous section explored situations in which individuals pursue theirpersonal goals with information on how others pursue their own (similar)goals. In those situations, the question was how much individuals conformversus diverge. Here, we explore coordination on a more basic level of socialinfluence, where others are present but do not pursue any goals. Thequestion of how the presence of others influences self-regulation is one ofthe oldest question in the history of social psychological research


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(Triplett, 1898), with research on social facilitation showing the presence ofobservers increases effort investment and improves performance (Ringel-mann’s classical experiments of rope-pulling in groups versus alone in1913, cf. Kravitz & Martin, 1986; Zajonc & Sales, 1966). Moving beyondclassic research, more recent research explored how the presence of othersresults in the desire to establish a shared reality (Hardin & Higgins, 1996),that is, sharing and communicating similar thoughts and feelings about anobject or a situation. The presence of others has also been shown to influ-ence basic human experiences (eg, tastes, Boothby, Clark, & Bargh,2014), as well as the perceived impact of one’s goal actions. In addition,research has explored how others (eg, friends, family members, and col-leagues) support goal pursuit in situations in which they do not pursue theindividual’s goals, yet they support him or her.

2.2.1 Shared Reality: Tuning to Others’ ExpectationsHumans constantly try to make sense of others’ thoughts and intentions, anability that humans share with other primates (Marticorena, Ruiz, Mukerji,Goddu, & Santos, 2011; Phillips, Barnes, Mahajan, Yamaguchi, & Santos,2009). Other people’s thoughts and intentions are obviously highly relevantfor cooperation and collaboration on common goals. But research suggeststhat merely thinking about other people’s thoughts, feelings, and intentionsmay also affect how people pursue their own personal goals. Because peoplefeel their identities and goals overlap with other people’s identities and goals,they align their thoughts and perceptions with others to be able to establish ashared reality.

The concept of a shared reality captures the notion that humans have afundamental drive to share their inner states with others and to establish ashared understanding of the world together with others around them(Echterhoff, Higgins, & Levine, 2009; Hardin & Higgins, 1996). To createa shared reality with others, people first must communicate their inner states,beliefs, and thoughts about an object or situation to others. Only when otherpeople share similar states, beliefs, and thoughts about the same object or sit-uation can they share a reality. For example, two colleagues could both beupset at work. However, if one of the two is upset because of something hisor her boss said, and the other is upset because his or her car broke down,they do not share the same reality. Although both share similar emotions,these emotions do not result from the same object or situation. From thisexample, the importance of a shared reality for the pursuit of goals withothers becomes apparent. Both people might have the goal to regulate their


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emotions and to calm down, but they will not be able to help each otherbefore they have created a shared reality. They first need to share their innerstates and the reasons for these inner states before any interpersonal supportcan become effective. Similarly, even if both people are upset because of thesame comment from their boss, they will not have a shared reality if they donot communicate their feelings and thoughts, and thus will not have thecommon understanding that their boss’ comment is the reason for theirfeelings.

Sharing a reality with others fulfills several important purposes (Echterhoffet al., 2009): First, one’s feelings and thoughts are validated when othersexperience them too (Asch, 1956). Sharing a reality with others thus meanspeople’s own inner states feel more true, valid, and real when others sharethem. Second, a shared reality creates a bond between individuals that allowsthem to experience commonality (Abrams & Hogg, 1990; Clark & Kashima,2007; Levine & Higgins, 2001). The experience of sharing the same realitycan thus lay the foundation for cooperation and goal pursuit with others(Van Ginkel & van Knippenberg, 2008) and facilitate more effective negoti-ations (Swaab, Postmes, van Beest, & Spears, 2007; Thompson, 1991). Ashared reality with others can even intensify one’s goal pursuit (Carr &Walton, 2014; Shteynberg & Galinsky, 2011).

Importantly, by establishing a shared reality with others, individuals canmore efficiently coordinate their goal pursuit with others. A shared realitycan thus be the first step in the pursuit of goals with others, creating a com-mon ground on which to build. In one study, Echterhoff, Higgins, Kopietz,and Groll (2008) demonstrated the psychological functions of a shared real-ity. Specifically, participants learned a few ambiguous personal characteristicsabout a target person. They were asked to discuss their impression about thetarget with someone else (ie., the audience) who allegedly either liked ordisliked the target person. Importantly, the audience was either describedas an in-group member (to activate the goal to cooperate) or an out-groupmember (to lower the motivation to cooperate). Participants were thenasked to give their own description of the target person, and were askedagain about their impression a week later. The results showed participantstried to tune their description of the target to the attitude of the in-groupaudience to establish a shared reality: The participants described the targetmore positively when they thought the audience liked the target, comparedto when they thought the audience disliked the target. Participants did nottune their messages accordingly when the audience was an out-group, thusshowing less effort to create a shared reality. This phenomenon does not


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merely reflect differences in communication. When asked again about theirattitudes about the target a week later, participants who had tuned their mes-sage toward the in-group audience remembered more congruent character-istics about the target; that is, they remembered more positive aspects whenthey thought the audience liked the target, and more negative aspects whenthey thought the audience disliked the target. Thus, participants established ashared reality by sharing the audience’s evaluation. Because shared realityserves a function to create commonality with others and lay the foundationfor cooperation, the shared-reality effect was eliminated in the conditions inwhich participants communicated with an out-group member. With theout-group member, participants tuned their descriptions toward the attitudeof the audience, but their own assessment of the target was unaffected by theaudience’s opinion of the target.

Despite facilitating communication and cooperation with others, sharedreality does not always lead to positive outcomes. The more a group sharesthe same reality, the more prone the group may be to suboptimal decision-making based on groupthink and the neglect of alternative ideas (Stasser,1999; Sunstein & Hastie, 2014). Similarly, shared reality allows group mem-bers to more easily deceive each other, as has been shown even with pri-mates (Santos, Nissen, & Ferrugia, 2006). Finally, shared reality can alsobe an illusion, whereby people falsely believe others share their emotionsand thoughts (Keysar & Barr, 2002). In the above example, if one colleaguenotices the other person is also upset, she might assume the other person isalso upset because of the comment their boss made, without knowing theother person is upset because her car broke down. In this case, shared realityis an illusion that one person experiences, but this experience might still leadher to feel validated in her emotions and to feel more connected to the otherperson.

2.2.2 Others Augment Perceived Impact of ActionsEstablishing a shared reality may be one important part of coordinating goalpursuit. But the presence of others can affect one’s goal pursuit even morefundamentally. Some of the oldest studies in social psychology examinedthe effects of the presence of others on people’s behavior (Zajonc & Sales,1966). More specifically, observers influence people’s performance andbehavior via social facilitation and social inhibition (see Bond & Titus,1983; Latané, 1981). Even simple pictures of watching eyes can lead peopleto cheat less and be more generous (Haley & Fessler, 2005; Rigdon, Ishii,Watabe, & Kitayama, 2009). These studies explained the influence of


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observers on behavior in terms of impression management, arousal, or both(Blascovich, Mendes, Hunter, & Salomon, 1999; Cottrell, Wack, Sekerak,& Rittle, 1968).

More recent research moved from effects of the presence of observers onpeople’s outward behavior, to studying people’s perceptions of theirbehavior. Following from the principle of coordination, actions performedin the presence of others might carry more meaning for the individualbecause “we” observed the action. People might make inferences aboutthe thoughts of the observers and align their perceptions with the thoughtsof the observer. If observers only affect people’s outward behavior, but theirperceptions remained unaffected, observers might exert their social influ-ence via simple monitoring behavior (eg, people try harder when someoneis watching, because trying hard is normative and approved by others).However, if observers affect people’s perceptions of their own behavior,the presence of observers might lead people to experience a (potentially illu-sionary) shared reality with the observer. Thus, the presence of an observermight validate one’s own perceptions and make them seem magnified.

A first test of whether the presence of others affects people’s perceptionsof their own actions explores a special case of social presence: do somethingsimultaneously with another person. Simultaneous actions require greatercoordination with others. The alignment of people’s actions may leadthem to align their perceptions about these actions as well. People routinelyproject their inner states onto others (Van Boven & Loewenstein, 2003), sothat people might also project their evaluations of the simultaneous actiononto the other person, or the other people, and thus feel validated in theirevaluations. Indeed, research by Boothby et al. (2014) has shown that asimultaneous experience is intensified, even without communicating aboutthe experience. In their studies, when people ate chocolate simultaneouslywith another person, they liked it better than when they ate it in the pres-ence of another person, who was working on another task. Thus, tasting thechocolate simultaneously with another person intensified the taste. Possibly,participants might have experienced illusionary shared reality, which vali-dated their own liking of the chocolate. Interestingly, when people tastedbitter chocolate that tasted bad, they judged it to be less likeable whenthey tasted it simultaneously with another person than when that other per-son was present but doing something else (Boothby et al., 2014). Thus, thepositive experience of tasting pleasant chocolate was more intense whenanother person had the same experience simultaneously, and the negativeexperience of tasting bitter chocolate was more intense when someone


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else was having the same experience. In neither of these studies did peoplecommunicate with each other regarding their liking or disliking of the choc-olate. Instead, people might have inferred the other person who shared thesame experience also had the same thoughts and feelings, which in turnamplified their own thoughts and feelings. Following from the principleof coordination, the perception of a shared reality might have led partici-pants to align their judgments with the (assumed) judgments of others,and to feel validated.

To affect perceptions of one’s actions, pursuing actions simultaneouslymight not be necessary. The presence of an observer might be enough toactivate people’s tendency to establish a shared reality and to coordinate theirperceptions with others. More specifically, people might project their ownevaluations of their actions on the observer, which in turn augments theirperceptions. Note that whereas Boothby et al. (2014) found no effect forthe presence of others per se, the “others” in their experiment were notobserving the action. Observing, like co-acting, may still augment percep-tion. For example, when someone spills water while another person iswatching, he or she might be annoyed with him- or herself for beingclumsy, and might infer the observer thinks the same, which validates andincreases the initial perception of the clumsy action.

To test whether the presence of observers has an impact on how peopleperceive their own behavior, Steinmetz, Xu, Zhang, and Fishbach (2016)observed participants during different actions (eg, eating, taking a test).For example, in one study, all participants were asked to eat a smallsnack-size portion of chips. Some participants ate while a camera pointeddirectly at them, whereas control participants ate alone and unobserved.All participants ate the same amount of chips, but the observed participantsafterward reported they thought the portion they ate was larger, comparedto what the unobserved participants thought they themselves ate. Subjec-tively, the portion seemed bigger to observed participants, presumablybecause being observed made the action feel more meaningful.

Steinmetz et al. (2016) also investigated whether mistakes seem biggerwhen an observer witnesses them. In one study, participants took an allegedtest of their ability to detect fake smiles, during which they were eitherobserved (by another person sitting next to them) or were alone. All partic-ipants received the same amount of positive and negative feedback(ie, whether their answers were correct or incorrect) during the test. Afterthe test, in the observed condition, participants believed that they had gaineda higher number of points for correct answers and at the same time lost a


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higher number of points for incorrect answers, compared to what unob-served participants reported. Thus, observed participants magnify their gainsand their losses. These results suggest that observers can fundamentally affecthow people experience their own actions. Importantly, participants did notsimply try to give more favorable or desirable answers when they wereobserved. Instead, both their successes and their failures were magnifiedwhen someone had witnessed (and thus potentially validated) them.

Taken together, the research on effects of being observed shows howothers can, by their mere presence, affect individuals’ perceptions of theirown behavior. When observed, people can experience a shared realitywith the observer to the extent that their perception is augmented by the(inferred) perception of the observer. Thus, simply being watched by some-one triggers psychological processes that reflect coordination.

2.2.3 Others Support Goal PursuitThe presence of others can be more directly instrumental for goal pursuitwhen those others support goal pursuit. When coordinating with othersto pursue one’s goals, other people can, for instance, give valuable feedback.Through feedback, people help each other promote various pursuits, such asacademic, health, career, and relationship goals (Baker & McNulty, 2013;Fitzsimons & Bargh, 2003; Overall, Simpson, & Struthers, 2013). Onefunction of feedback is to inform individuals either of their level of commit-ment to a goal, or of their rate of progress toward a goal (Fishbach, Eyal, &Finkelstein, 2010; Fishbach, Koo, & Finkelstein, 2014). Positive feedbackincreases motivation when it signals commitment: The perception thatthe goal is valuable and expectancy of successful pursuit is high (Bandura,1991; Feather, 1982; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). Negative feedback, bycontrast, increases motivation when it signals lack of progress or insufficientresource investment (ie, the presence of discrepancy; Carver & Scheier,1998; Higgins, 1987). Thus, through feedback, people coordinate withothers their goal pursuit such that they adjust their commitment andperceived progress to motivate goal pursuit.

Whereas the content of the feedback is undoubtedly relevant, anotherimportant aspect is the source of the feedback. People might react differentlyto feedback depending on whether it comes from an acquaintance, a super-ordinate, or a friend. Whereas positive feedback might be provided easilyand might be received well regardless of the specific source, the provisionand reception of negative feedback might be more contingent on the rela-tionship between the feedback giver and receiver. The deeper and more


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stable the relationship between the feedback giver and receiver, the morenegative feedback might be given, for at least two reasons. First, the relation-ship might be perceived as strong enough to withstand negative exchanges(Feeney & Lemay, 2012). Second, the meaning of feedback depends on thedepth of the relationships. The same (negative) feedback signals lowcommitment in shallow relationships and lack of sufficient investment(or progress) in deep relationships. Because insufficient investment is moti-vating (and low commitment is not), one might expect that, as the relation-ship deepens, people might seek more negative feedback, give morenegative feedback, and respond more to negative feedback by engaging inbehavioral change.

In a test of the hypothesis that negative feedback is more prevalent inclose relationships, Finkelstein, Fishbach, and Tu (2016) asked participantsto think about a friend either by emphasizing the relationship as close (ie,thinking about their similarities) or by emphasizing the relationship asmore distant (ie, thinking about their differences). Then, participantsreported how much they would like to receive negative feedback fromthis person in order to improve their performance across several domains.Indeed, people were more willing to seek negative feedback from the personwhen they thought about the relationship as close (compared to distant).Other studies further demonstrated that people also gave more negativefeedback to close others and responded more to negative feedback by invest-ing resources in pursuing their goals (Finkelstein et al., 2016). Thus, thecloser their relationships with others, the more likely people were to endorsenegative feedback. Part of coordinating goal pursuit with others appears tobe seeking and using feedback from others, even when expecting it may beunpleasant.

Aside from providing feedback, a direct way in which others are instru-mental in the pursuit of one’s goals is by supporting goal pursuit (eg, givingpractical help, or emotional support). But does the pursuit of one’s goals alsoaffect the relationships that people have with others who help them? Peoplemight feel closer to others who support them in the pursuit of their goals.Thus, by deepening their relationships with others who are instrumentalfor their goals, people might be able to further facilitate coordination withothers and pursue their goals more effectively. Indeed, research has shownthat people differ in their appreciation of someone who helps them, depend-ing on how useful they perceive the help to be (Converse & Fishbach,2012). More specifically, people appreciate the helper more during goal pur-suit, and their appreciation drops after the goal has been reached. Similarly,


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people feel closer to someone who is instrumental in reaching an ongoinggoal, and in turn feel less close to the instrumental other when the goal iscompleted or nears completion (Fitzsimons & Fishbach, 2010). In one study,participants were asked to name close others who were either instrumentalfor a focal goal (ie, they made progress toward that goal easier) or who werenot instrumental for that goal (did not affect progress on the goal). Forinstance, a study partner can be instrumental for an academic-achievementgoal, but might not be instrumental for health goals. Participants werethen asked to think about the work ahead of them on that focal goal, orthey were asked to think about the progress that they had already made.When thinking about the work ahead, participants reported feeling closerto others who were instrumental for that goal. However, when thinkingabout the progress they have already made, participants did not feel closerto these instrumental others. Thus, pursuing one’s goals with the supportof others affects the relationships that people have with these others.Following the principle of coordination, people strengthen their relation-ships with those who support their ongoing goals.

3. INDIVIDUALS PURSUING GROUP GOALS

In this section, we move to situations in which people pursue goalsthat benefit a group. We distinguish between situations in which an individ-ual is pursuing a goal for a group (eg, an individual family member buyinggroceries for the family) and situations in which group members pursue ashared goal together (eg, a couple working together to achieve financial sta-bility). In the case of individuals working alone, we focus on how interper-sonal closeness leads to a preference for actions that benefit the group as awhole, with less concern over the distribution of these benefits betweengroup members. In the case of group members working together on a sharedgoal, we focus on the patterns of coordination between group members andhow they respond to others’ existing and missing actions.

3.1 Pursuing Goals for the Self and OthersPeople routinely pursue goals for the self and others, such as planning a fam-ily vacation, or making decisions on behalf of a group. In such situations,people need to coordinate their needs and preferences with others. Here,we explore the tension embedded in these situations between maximizingthe benefits for the group versus ensuring equal distribution of benefits.


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For example, the family member who plans a family vacation may choose adestination that some family members will love and others will somewhatlike, or a destination that every family member will somewhat like. Simi-larly, an employee working on a team may choose to make a decisionthat benefits him or her a lot and benefits the rest of the group a little, ora decision that benefits everyone a little. Using the principle of coordination,we explore the possibility that interpersonal closeness between group mem-bers increases the emphasis on joint benefits and maximizes the payoff forthe group as a whole, with less concern over the allocation of benefits (ie,“who gets what”). We further explore the circumstances under whichsuch a tendency to focus on total benefits in closer relationships results inmore willingness to take resources from close (vs distant) others as long asthe benefit for the taker is larger than the cost for the giver.

3.1.1 Interpersonal Closeness and Jointly Maximizing ChoiceThe extent to which people coordinate their efforts when pursuing goalsfor the self and others largely depends on how close people feel to theseothers. Interpersonal closeness has various facets, from the frequency anddiversity of interactions (Berscheid, Snyder, & Omoto, 1989) to anincreased liking of the relationship partner (Rubin, 1970). Much researchhas focused on the cognitive, overlapped mental representation of the selfand other (Aron et al., 1991), or “selfeother overlap,” as a way tooperationalize closeness. One way to think of selfeother overlap is in termsof two circlesdone representing the self and one representing the otherdthat overlap to different degrees, from not at all to completely. The closersomeone feels to a relationship partner, the more heavily overlapped circlesthey would choose to describe their relationship, revealing a greater degreeof perceived overlap between the self and the other. Thus, closeness blursthe boundary between self and other and makes people more likely to viewthe self and the other as overlapped entities that are each part of a selfeother collective (Aron et al., 1991).

Selfeother overlap has manifold consequences for goal pursuit. Themore people feel a part of a selfeother collective, the more they feel theyshare the desirable outcomes of close others, such as information, consump-tion, knowledge, moral credentials, and success (Kouchaki, 2011; Tesser,1988; Wegner, 1987; Wegner et al., 1991). Furthermore, when peoplefeel a part of a selfeother collective, giving to a close other can feel like giv-ing to the self (Aron et al., 1991; Batson et al., 1997; Cialdini et al., 1997;Clark, 1983; Jarymowicz, 1992).


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When making decisions for the group, greater closeness in turn entailsgreater emphasis on maximizing the total benefits for the selfeother collec-tive (the “joint pie”). This joint-pie focus could mean greater giving to aclose (as opposed to distant) other, whenever giving increases the total ben-efits: The receiver is getting more than what the giver is losing. But inter-personal closeness might also increase taking from a close other for thesame reason it increases givingda greater concern over the total benefitfor the selfeother collective. Specifically, people are more likely to takefrom a close rather than distant other when doing so can increase the totalresources for the selfeother collective. For example, people in a closer rela-tionship would be more comfortable changing their vacation destination toa place they themselves love when the other person likes the destination alittle (vs when they both like it a little), whereas people in less close relation-ships would be less likely to take the self-benefitting option. Such “friendlytaking”da preference for a self-benefiting allocation that also offers greaterbenefit in total in close relationshipsdwould be a stronger test for the notionthat people wish to maximize total benefit. Presumably, giving to a close(vs distant) other can either be motivated by greater concern for closerothers, or by greater concern with maximizing total benefits. By contrast,taking from a closer other when doing so increases the total benefits canonly be driven by concern with total benefits.

Research supporting the “friendly taking” hypothesis finds people takefrom their close friends more than from their distant friends, but onlywhen doing so increases the total benefit (Tu, Shaw, & Fishbach, 2016).When taking reduces the total benefit, people take less from closer others.For example, in one study, participants thought about one of their friends.To manipulate interpersonal closeness, participants focused their thoughtsabout this friend either in terms of a close collective (eg, “we”), or inmore distant, separate terms (eg, “he/she and I”). Participants then made achoice for themselves and this friend between two different packages ofchocolate truffles: Package “A”: “7 truffles for yourself and 3 truffles foryour friend (10 truffles in total)”; and Package “B”: “2 truffles for yourselfand 4 truffles for your friend (6 truffles in total).” Package A offered a greaterbenefit (ie, more truffles) for the self, as well as a higher total benefit (ie,more truffles in total). By contrast, Package B had more truffles for thefriend, but a lower total benefit. Consistent with the idea that people aremore likely to take from close others, more participants in the close thandistant condition chose the self-benefiting package.


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Other studies show that this effect emerged because close others weremore focused on the total amount of resources the self and the other receivedtogether. To test for traces of greater concern for the total benefit on thecognitive level, the researchers studied information acquisition and retention.In terms of information acquisition, they found that when the other person isclose rather than distant, people are more likely to acquire information aboutthe total benefit to aid their decision. In addition, when choosing for the selfand closer others, people may find information about the total benefit moresufficient for making the decision, and do not further acquire informationabout the specific allocation for the self and other. For example, in one study,participants chose between two “massage packages” for the self and either aclose or distant other. Participants read that for each package, three piecesof information were available: (1) the duration of massage for them, (2) theduration of massage for the friend, and (3) the total duration of massage forthem and the friend. The participants’ task was to choose which single pieceof information they wanted to reveal in order to choose between the pack-ages. As expected, those in closer relationship were more likely to chooseinformation on the total than those in more shallow relationship.

In terms of information retention, if people in closer relationships indeedfocus more on the total benefit when processing the choice options, theyshould retain the total-benefit information better and show better memoryfor it when unexpectedly tested later. Indeed, in a study that used a similarmassage-package scenario, with a choice between two packages that variedin the massage length for the self, the other, and the total length, participantswho were choosing for themselves and for a close (vs distant) friend dis-played better memory for the total massage time when unexpectedly askedto recall all details on the packages.

Other studies showed this effect is not driven by close friends’ intentionto reallocate the resource; people were taking more from a close friend evenwhen they had no opportunity to redistribute the resource. In addition,people were taking more from a close friend even when they had no oppor-tunity for future reciprocity. Moreover, because people also gave more toclose than distant others when they could increase the size of the pie bydoing so, anticipated forgiveness was unlikely to drive taking.

3.1.2 Implications for Infringement of Intellectual PropertyThe aforementioned analysis has implications for how people reason aboutunauthorized use of intellectual property. Infringement of intellectual prop-erty is on the rise in modern society as people have greater access to materials


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on the Web, including art (eg, music), science (eg, research papers), and soon. The temptation to use these materials without paying copyrights is large.After all, the benefit for the user is clear and the cost to the producer of thematerials is rather vague. At times, producers of materials are further criti-cized for charging people for their products. For example, drug companiesare often criticized for charging patients for research and development(R&D), particularly when these patients lack the economic resources tofund these development expenses (eg, the popular slogan “patents killpatients”).

According to the principle of coordination to maximize joint benefits,people are often hesitant to pay for intellectual property because they perceivea high cost for the self and a small benefit for the recipient. Hence, the indi-vidual paying for intellectual property might feel she reduced the total benefitfor the selfeother collective: she paid a high cost, and the owner of the prop-erty received a small benefit. By contrast, by this logic, infringement seemsmore economical for the collective because neither the user nor the ownerincurs a cost. For example, the person who paid for downloaded music deliv-ered some money to a large company (ie, a high cost for the self, a smallbenefit for the company). If, instead, she downloaded the music illegally, she-paid nothing and the company lost nothing (in her perception); thus, the jointpie is larger.

Based on the previous discussion, people are more likely to consider jointbenefits when in closer relationships, for example, when they considerviolating copyrights owned by their in-group. Thus, people should gener-ally be more comfortable violating copyrights laws for materials owned bythe in-group than for those owned by the out-group. Specifically, becausepeople are closer to their in-group, they are more likely to consider the totalbenefit for the group and for them; therefore, they will decide to use copy-righted materials without paying for them.

In a study that explored this possibility, Tu and Fishbach (2015d) askedparticipants to determine the fine for a student who violated copyright lawby either downloading academic materials produced by a unit in their ownuniversity or by a unit in another university. Although participants acknowl-edged violation in both cases, they assigned smaller fines for the person whoviolated the copyrights of his own institution, and reported that person hadsome sort of “shared ownership.” Other studies further show people aremore forgiving of copyright violations when the owner is an in-groupmember, but only as long as they perceive the harm to be minimal. Thatis, people do not wish to harm their in-group; only to the extent that the


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harm imposed by the individual user is seen as negligible (which is often thecase with copyrighted materials) will people be more likely to infringe onthe copyrights of their in-group than an out-group.

These findings have policy implications for decisions involving R&Dcosts in medical research. Indeed another study (Tu & Fishbach, 2015d) findspeople prefer that medical companies outsource their R&D costs to patientsin other countries. In other words, people prefer not to pay for medicalcompanies in their own country, but are more willing to pay for medicalcompanies in other countries. The reason is that people feel they mentallyshare the knowledge that was produced in their country by scientists thatare part of their society.

3.2 Pursuing Goals With OthersWe have reviewed low-level patterns of coordination in situations in whichcoordination is not necessary to complete a task. Moving to shared goalsdthose goals that a collection of individuals works together to achieve (eg,engaging in social movements, volunteering, generating ideas in team meet-ings, and playing team sports)dcoordination becomes a more central andnecessary part of goal pursuit. Hence, researchers and practitioners alikehave focused on how to improve coordination for shared goal pursuits.This research finds that coordinating efforts when pursuing shared goalsdoes not always work well. When collaborating with others on shared goals,a common phenomenon is social loafing: the tendency for individuals toexpend less effort when working collectively than when working individu-ally, which often undermines successful group work (Karau & Williams,1993; Latane, Williams, & Harkins, 1979). To prevent social loafing, pastresearch has shown, for instance, that holding people accountable forindividual contributions or giving people meaningful tasks can be effective(Williams, Harkins, & Latané, 1981; Williams & Karau, 1991).

In this section, we explore boundaries of social loafing and whethercircumstances exist in which joint goal pursuit can increase effort contribu-tion compared to individual goal pursuit. We suggest such a pattern ispossible for certain people (ie, interdependent self-construal) and for certainsituations (ie, when one’s actions have the potential to inspire others to act).We then explore two patterns of coordination in working with others on ashared goal: increasing effort in response to others’ missing contributionsversus in response to others’ existing contributions. Specifically, we askwhen group members coordinate by compensating for others’ lack of actionsand when they coordinate by following others’ actions. Finally, we explore


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two underlying motivations in working toward a group goal: expressingsupport via a symbolic contribution from a large number of group members,and making a difference via a substantial contribution from a few groupmembers.

3.2.1 Inspiration Versus Loafing: A Matter of Self-construalWhether social loafing occurs might depend on the individuals’ self-construal. Markus and Kitayama (1991) introduced this fundamentalpsychological dimension, which capitalizes on the distinction between anindependent self-construal, which means to define one’s identity primarilythrough one’s individual interests and behaviors, and an interdependentself-construal, which means to define one’s identity primarily throughone’s social roles and relationships. Variations in self-construal have beenshown to affect social perception and information processing in general.For example, independent individuals focus on a single target event andtend to disregard the target’s context (Lam, Buehler, McFarland, Ross, &Cheung, 2005), whereas interdependent individuals pay more attention tocontextual information (Kim, Grimm, & Markman, 2007; Konrath,Bushman, & Grove, 2009).

Because interdependent individuals tend to perceive stronger relation-ships in their environment in general, and between others and themselvesin particular, than independent individuals, interdependence might alsoreduce and even reverse social loafing. If interdependent individuals see theirbehavior as more related to other people’s behavior, they might feel theirloafing affects the group to a larger extent, such that their lack of action iscausing others not to act. The perception of mutual influence might furthermotivate these individuals to work harder in a group setting, because pre-sumably their actions are diagnostic of what others would do in a similarsituation.

By contrast, independent individuals might focus on their own behaviorand might neglect any influence that their own behavior might have onothers’ behavior and thereby on the group goal. For these individuals, thepresence of others suggests these others might pick up the slack and the in-dependent individuals can relax their efforts.

In line with this reasoning, Steinmetz and Fishbach (2016) demonstratedthat individuals who express an interdependent self-construal work harderwhen they are part of an alleged virtual group, compared to when theywork alone. However, independent individuals display the classic social-loafing effect, by which they work harder when they are alone compared


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to when they believe they are part of group. In one study, participants wereasked to give as many ideas as possible for the promotion of a protein bar. Inaddition, participants were told their answers would be combined withother people from their university (group condition) or would be countedindividually (alone condition). Interdependent participants gave more ideas(ie, worked harder) in the group condition than in the alone condition,whereas independent participants showed the opposite pattern and workedless in the group condition. These results suggest the pursuit of goals for theself and others is not only influenced by how close people feel to these otherpeople, but also by interindividual differences in how people construe theiridentity and their relationships to others. These differences in self-construalaffect whether people see the most benefit in coordinating their worktogether with others, or in pursuing goals in a primarily individual manner.

3.2.2 Responding to Others’ Completed and Missing ActionsPeople respond to others’ contributions and lack of contributions to a sharedgoal similarly to how they respond to their own existing and missing actionstoward their personal goals; hence, understanding how people organize theirown actions toward a personal goal can help shed light on the patterns ofcoordination with others (Fishbach et al., 2010, 2014; Koo & Fishbach,2008). Personal goals often involve a sequence of actions that unfold overtime (eg, career, health, or relationship goals). People choose their actionswith respect to other, completed or absent actions toward the same goals.Research on the dynamics of self-regulation explored the relationships be-tween several such actions toward the same goal (Fishbach & Dhar, 2005;Fishbach, Dhar, & Zhang, 2006; Fishbach & Zhang, 2008; Koo & Fishbach,2008; Zhang, Fishbach, & Dhar, 2007). This framework distinguishes be-tween pursuing a goal in a dynamic of highlightingdchoosing actionsthat reinforce previously selected actions (eg, conserve water andrecycle)dand pursuing the same goal in a dynamic of balancingdchoosingactions that compensate for other, missing actions (eg, do not conserve waterbut recycle). When people highlight a goal, they are more likely to attend toit in the present if they have attended to it in the past or plan to attend to it inthe future; in other words, they wish to display behavioral consistency. Bycontrast, when they balance, people are more likely to attend to a goal ifthey have not previously attended to it or have not planned to attend toit in the future.

Which pattern of coordination people follow and, specifically, whetheractions reinforce (highlighting) or substitute (balancing) each other depends


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on how pursuers interpret and represent their own actions. Research distin-guishes between two potential representations of actions: as expressingcommitment toward a desirable state and as making progress toward thisstate. In a commitment representation, people ponder whether a goal isworth pursuing. They infer from observing themselves pursuing that goalthat, indeed, the goal is important or enjoyable (hence valuable) and expec-tancy of attainment is high (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1974; Vroom, 1964). Thus,people infer commitment based on engagement (Arkes & Ayton, 1999;Bem, 1972; Cialdini, Trost, & Newsom, 1995; Higgins, 2006) and theyhighlight. By contrast, the focus on missing actions toward a goal under-mines commitment in these situations, because the individual infers he orshe cares less about that goal. In a progress representation, individualsmonitor their rate of progress toward a goal. They infer from completed ac-tions that their rate of progress is sufficient, and they infer from the lack ofactions the need for progress; hence, they balance (Carver & Scheier, 1990,1998; Heath, Larrick, & Wu, 1999; Higgins, 1987; Kivetz, Urminsky, &Zheng, 2006; Locke & Latham, 1990). Individuals who adopt a progressrepresentation of actions pursue a goal if they consider missing actions.

These representations of actionsdcommitment and progressdhaveopposite implications for people’s motivation to pursue their goals in thepresent. When actions signal a boost in commitment, attending to whatone has accomplished encourages goal-congruent actions more thanattending to what one has left undone, because completed actions increasecommitment. However, when actions signal progress has been made,attending to what one has left undone encourages goal-congruent actionsmore than attending to what one has accomplished, because missing actionssignal a need to progress.

Whether people represent their actions in terms of commitment (andhighlight) or progress (and balance) depends on the individual and thecontext. In particular, individuals’ preexisting commitment to a goal influ-ences the meaning they assign to goal-related actions and thus the relativeimpact of completed versus missing actions on motivation (Fishbach et al.,2006; Koo & Fishbach, 2008). For individuals with low commitment tothe goal (eg, a dieter who has just started dieting), goal actions signal an in-crease in commitment and spur further similar actions in a dynamic of high-lighting (eg, when the dieter chooses a healthy meal, he or she might feelmore committed and also buy more fruit). However, for individuals withhigh commitment (eg, a dieter who has been eating healthily for a longtime), the same action might signal progress has been made on the goals


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and efforts can be reduced in a dynamic of balancing (eg, this dieter feels thatafter having chosen a healthy meal, he or she deserves a dessert).

Because parallels exist in how people organize their own actions andhow they coordinate between their own and others’ actions, individualscan choose to balance for others’ lack of actions by contributing to a sharedgoal more if others have not, or individuals can highlight others’ actions bycontributing to a shared goal primarily if others have as well. Specifically,group members who are less committed to a shared goal (eg, new groupmembers) wish to assess whether the shared goal is worth pursuing. Others’prior contributions should increase their own contributions more thanmissing contributions, because these less-committed individuals are morelikely to infer from existing contributions that the goal is worth pursuing.Thus, less-committed group members follow (or highlight) other groupmembers’ actions. They increase contributions if others have contributed,and decrease contributions if others have not contributed. By contrast,highly committed group members wish to contribute to a shared goalmainly to facilitate progress; thus, they wish to assess others’ pace of prog-ress. Committed group members infer a need for progress from others’missing contributions more than others’ existing contributions. These indi-viduals increase their own contributions when they can compensate for (ie,balance out) others’ insufficient actions more so than if others havecontributed.

Koo and Fishbach (2008) demonstrated these patterns of coordinationwith other group members in the context of a campaign to support AIDSorphans. The solicited population included uncommitted supporters, whohad not contributed before (the “cold list”), as well as committed supporters,who had donated on a regular basis over the past year (the “hot list”). Theyall learned about the campaign goal (to raise 10 million Korean Won) andthat approximately half the money had already been raised. Some partici-pants received a solicitation letter that emphasized the glass half full (othergroup members had donated half; ie, other’s actions); the rest received aletter that emphasized the glass half empty (half was still missing; ie, others’lack of action). Among low-commitment people, an emphasis on existingcontributions increased donations more than an emphasis on missing contri-butions, because low-commitment individuals were highlighting others’actions. But among high-commitment individuals, an emphasis on missingcontributions increased donations more than an emphasis on existing contri-butions, because high-commitment individuals were balancing for others’lack of action (Fig. 3). This pattern is almost identical to the one observed

Figure 3 Charity contributions as a function of commitment (low: cold list vs high: hotlist) and focus on existing (to-date) versus missing (to-go) actions. Reprinted from Koo,M., & Fishbach, A. (2008). Dynamics of self-regulation: how (un)accomplished goal actionsaffect motivation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 94, 183e195. Copyright(2008), with permission from American Psychological Association.


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for personal goal pursuits (eg, deciding to buy fruit based on what one haseaten before; Koo & Fishbach, 2008).

In addition to goal commitment, group identification affects individuals’concerns with whether a shared goal is worth pursuing versus whether thepursuit is progressing at a sufficient pace. Thus, group identification affectsthe pattern of coordination with other group members (Fishbach et al.,2011). Group identification refers to a person’s readiness to consider herselfa member of a particular social group (Cameron, 2004; Tajfel & Turner,1979, 1986). The more individuals identify with a group, the more theyfeel part of the group (Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 2006;Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1997; McCauley, 2001); thus, they are less likelyto ask whether a shared goal is worth pursuing and are more likely to ques-tion whether the group has made sufficient progress.

Because of this impact of identification, an emphasis on others’ actionsshould increase contributions among low-group identifiers (who highlight),and an emphasis on other members’ lack of action should encourage high-group identifiers to increase their own contributions (they balance). In thisway, low identifiers mimic other group members’ actions (they contribute ifothers have) more than high identifiers, who contribute if others have not.

A study illustrating these effects used nominal groups in which partici-pants worked individually but assumed their unidentified input would becollapsed with other group members (Jackson & Williams, 1985). The


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specific group goal was to generate 50 promotion ideas for a protein cerealbar. The researchers manipulated identification by having participantspurportedly form a group with people who were socially close fellow stu-dents from their own university (high identification) or people fromdifferent academic institutes (low identification). Participants learned thatsome of the group members had already completed the study, and theframing of contributions by others (purportedly, 50%) was manipulated.Participants were informed either that those other group members hadcontributed about half of the ideasdglass half fulldor that half of the ideaswere missingdglass half emptydto meet the goal. This study found thatattending to existing (vs missing) contributions increased the perceived valueof the shared goal and, in turn, increased idea generation among lowidentifiersdthose who worked with socially distant others. By contrast,attending to remaining (vs completed) contributions increased the perceivedneed for progress, which in turn increased the number of generated ideasamong high identifiersdthose who worked with socially close others(Fig. 4).

Another study tested for the effects of identification with beneficiaries ofa group’s efforts, and documented similar effects to identification with othergroup members who contribute to a shared goal. That is, regardless of

Figure 4 Idea generation as a function of identification (low: socially distant others;high: socially close others) and focus on accumulated versus remaining contributions.Reprinted from Fishbach, A., Henderson, D.H., & Koo, M. (2011). Pursuing goals with others:group identification and motivation resulting from things done versus things left undone.Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 140, 520e534. Copyright (2011), withpermission from American Psychological Association.


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whether identification is with the contributors or the receivers, similarpatterns of coordination between group members emerge. Specifically,Fishbach et al. (2011) ran a campaign to help children in Kenya that wasestablished following a period of political riots. In the high-identificationcondition, the solicitation letter referred to the children in need as “Ourchildren,” whereas in the low-identification condition, the letter referredto them as the “Children in Kenya.” In addition, the solicitation letter eitheremphasized others’ actionsdthat others had thus far raised about half of themoneydor lack of actiondthat half of the money was missing. Asexpected, low identifiers (“Children in Kenya”) highlighted others’ actions:they gave more after reading that others had given half of the money versusthat half of the money was missing. By contrast, high identifiers (“Our chil-dren”) balanced for others’ lack of action: they gave more in response to amessage on missing (vs existing) contributions. These findings show peoplepursue their shared goals in similar ways to their individual goals. Whencoordinating with others, people make the same inferences about others’actions as they do about their own actions and show the same dynamicsof highlighting versus balancing.

The research described here sheds further light on the potential cause ofsocial loafing, by examining the circumstances under which individualscontribute to a goal primarily because they perceive that others do or donot contribute. Whenever individuals decrease their contributions if otherscontribute (and increase if others did not contribute) in a dynamic ofbalancing, we can refer to them as “free riders” because others’ contributionsjustify the individuals’ loafing. However, whenever individuals increasetheir contributions if others contribute (and decrease if others did notcontribute) in a dynamic of highlighting, we cannot refer to theseindividuals as free riders because free riding assumes the opposite patternof coordination, whereby the person loafs if others work. In the lattercase, loafing individuals are not free riding on others’ efforts, but ratherare following a perceived group norm of low commitment and hencelow contributions to the shared goal.

3.2.3 Motivation to Contribute: Express Support Versus Make aDifference

The aforementioned analysis has important implications for charitablegiving, which we address here. When giving to charity, coordination withothers is essential, because charities are based on the joint efforts of many in-dividuals. An individual who considers investing his or her resources into a


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certain charity has two important decisions to make: whether and howmuch to give. Research has distinguished between two types of motiva-tionsdexpress support for a social cause versus make a difference for that so-cial causedthat separately influence the decision of whether to give versusthe decision of how much to give (Koo, Fishbach, & Park, 2016). An appealto show support can speak to the less committed, who can express commit-ment by deciding to give to the cause. However, an appeal to make a dif-ference can motivate those who are already committed, and can signal tothem that more help is needed, which can lead them to give more.

Koo et al. (2016) conducted several field experiments to test whether theappeals to “express support” and “make a difference” tap into two differentmotivations in coordinating contributions to a shared goal. For example, inone study, visitors to a university Website were invited to write a message tochildren in poverty, and the university donated $0.01 per written characteron behalf of the visitors. Using this paradigm, lengthier messages wouldresult in larger donations. Participants were invited to either “expresssupport” or “make a difference,” or received a control (“help”) message.Results showed more people decided to participate in the express-supportappeal (compared to the make-a-difference appeal and the help appeal).However, those who did participate wrote lengthier messages in themake-a-difference appeal (compared to other appeals, Fig. 5).

Notably, whether to give and how much to give are often relateddecisions because more people are willing to spare small amounts than largeamounts. To test whether the effect of express-support appeals on the partic-ipation rate is orthogonal to the effect of make-a-difference appeals on theaverage contribution amount, another study measured the inferences ob-servers make based on participation rate versus donation amount. This studyshowed people infer the general support for a cause from the number ofcontributors but not from the size of the average contribution, and they inferthe interest in making a difference from the size of the average contributionbut not from the number of contributors. Specifically, when they read abouta high (vs low) participation rate, participants inferred donors give to showtheir support for a cause. However, participants did not make this inferencewhen they read about a high (vs low) average donation amount. Rather,they inferred a greater motivation to make an impact for a cause fromhigh (vs low) average donations and regardless of participation rate.

Taken together, these results show people have different notions of howto coordinate their goal pursuit with others, which can be activated bydifferent appeals. Whereas an appeal for initial support motivates the

Figure 5 Donation likelihood and donation amount as a function of express-supportversus control versus make-a-difference appeal.


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uncommitted, the already committed feel more motivated by appeals totheir ability to make a difference by doing more. Importantly, charitiesare wise to appeal to both committed and uncommitted donors, becausemany small initial contributions can help as much as fewer larger ones.This research shows the crucial nature of tailoring the messages to instillthe motivation to join efforts with others.

4. CONCLUSION

We explored the various ways in which the social context influencesgoal pursuit. We distinguished between social contexts in which individuals


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work on their personal goals and those contexts in which they work ongroup goals. With regard to personal goals, we distinguished between situ-ations in which others provide information and situations in which they aremerely present. With regard to group goals, we distinguished between situ-ations in which people work alone toward a group goal and situations inwhich they join forces with other group members to achieve a shared goal.

Our review focuses on coordination of goal pursuits; hence, we left outmuch of the research on social influence, which does not assume a motiva-tion to coordinate. In addition, this review is mainly focused on researchcoming from our lab, and we often left out other theories and findings.Rather than providing a comprehensive review of all the work on goalpursuit in a social context, our (more modest) goal was to demonstratethe principle of coordination across many, presumably only somewhatrelated phenomena. We argue that coordination can be strategic or not,can be required (or optional) to complete the task or not, and can be explicitor implicit. Coordination takes many facets. Yet, this simple principleexplains numerous motivational phenomena. By Occam’s razor, or thelaw of parsimony, the principle of coordination is thus a useful tool forunderstanding past research on social context and for making future predic-tions on how social contexts affect motivation.

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