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Moscow Defense BriefYour Professional Guide Inside # 2, 2011

TroubledWaters

# 2, 2011 Moscow Defense Brief 1

#2 (24), 2011

PUBLISHER

CAST Director & PublisherRuslan Pukhov

Editor-in-Chief Mikhail Barabanov

Advisory EditorsKonstantin Makienko

Alexey Pokolyavin

ResearchersRuslan Aliev

Polina Temerina

Dmitry Vasiliev

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Cover Photo: K-433 Svyatoy Georgiy Pobedonosets (Project 667BDR)

nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine at the Russian Pacific Fleet base

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Photo by: Vadim Savitsky

© Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, 2011

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CONTENTSDefense IndustriesMedium-term Prospects for MiG Corporation After Interim MMRCA Competition Results 2

Russian Helicopter Industry: Up and Away 4

Arms TradeExports of Russian Fighter Jets in 1999-2010 8

International RelationsGeorgian Lesson for Libya 13

Global SecurityMissile Defense: Old Problem, No New Solution 15

Armed ForcesReform of the Russian Navy in 2008-2011 18

Facts & FiguresIncidents Involving Russian Submarines in 1992-2010 23

Our Authors 28

Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies

# 2, 2011 Moscow Defense Brief2Medium-term Prospects for MiG Corporation After Interim

MMRCA Competition Results

Defense Industries

Medium-term Prospects for MiG Corporation After Interim MMRCA Competition ResultsKonstantin Makienko

The Russian MiG-35 fighter jet has failed to make it to the short list of the Indian MMRCA fighter tender, raising

questions about the future of its maker, the Russian Aircraft Corporation MiG.

In the short term, the company’s situation is clear. It has an Indian contract for 29 carrier-based MiG-29K fighters, a Burmese contract for 16 MiG-29B/SE fighters, and a Syrian contract for 24 MiG-29M2 jets – a total of 69 aircraft for delivery by 2013-2014.

In the medium term, however, the corporation’s fortunes will most likely depend primarily on the carrier-based MiG-29K, which RSK MiG is offering to the Russian and foreign navies. The future of the MiG-35, the company’s other major project, is now in doubt following India’s decision. It is still not clear whether any MiG-35 jets will be bought by the Russian MoD under the 2011-2020 State Armament Program (GPV-2020) adopted last December. It seems more likely that the Russian Air Force will take its custom to MiG’s main rival, Sukhoi. Plans have been announced for the procurement of at least 96 Su-35 tactical fighters, up to 100 Su-34 frontal bombers, 50-70 T-50 fifth-generation fighters and even 30 Su-30MKI jets adapted for the Russian Air Force. As for the MiG products, the only official announcement made so far is that the Russian Navy wants to place an order for 26 MiG-29K horizontal take-off carrier-based fighters. There is also a good chance that the company will attract more foreign custom for the MiG-29K, in addition to the 45 units already ordered by India. In the medium term, therefore, RSK MiG’s fortunes will depend on a single niche product. Nevertheless, given the company’s fairly limited production capacity, even relatively small contracts from the Russian or foreign navies will be enough to keep it in business over the coming decade.

Demand for carrier-based fighters in BIC countriesThere have been interesting changes over the past few years in the leading world powers’ plans for their aircraft-carrying fleets. The traditional leaders in this area have announced

cuts to their aircraft carrier programs. The US defense secretary, Robert Gates, has said that America has too many carriers. All the other navies with an aircraft-carrying capability currently have only one operational carrier in service.

Due to financial constraints, the UK will probably have to limit itself to building only one Queen Elizabeth class carrier instead of the previously announced two. The French Navy also operates only Charles de Gaulle carrier, and has to get by without an aircraft carrying capability whenever the ship is out of service for repairs.

This trend is probably going to strengthen amid continuing financial problems in the United States and Europe. Of all the developed countries, only Japan is likely to make a decision by 2020 on building or buying new aircraft carriers or carrier-capable ships with horizontal take-off fighters. These plans will depend primarily on the progress of China’s aircraft carrier program.

Meanwhile, a number of fast-growing Asian and Latin American nations also want to acquire aircraft carrier capability. By 2020 India will have at least two carriers – the Russian-built Vikramaditya (ex-Admiral Gorshkov) and an indigenously built IAC (ADS) class ship. Indian national defense industry projects tend to be excruciatingly slow. Nevertheless, it is quite likely that the Indian Navy will eventually have two IAC (ADS) ships rather than one, bringing the number of its aircraft carriers to three.

It is therefore reasonable to expect that in addition to the 45 MiG-29K jets already on order, the Indian Navy will buy another 20-25 at the very least.

China ramped up the pace of its aircraft carrier program in 2005. At Dalian the Chinese are converting the Varyag, an old Soviet-built aircraft-carrying cruiser they have bought incomplete from Ukraine, into a training center for sailors and naval pilots. In Wuhan they have built a full-scale carrier simulator, which will probably be used as a test bed for their future aircraft carrier’s systems. China has already expressed clear interest in Russian-built or jointly developed carrier based aircraft. By 2020 Beijing is likely to announce (or even bring to completion) a program to build an aircraft-carrying ship similar to the Soviet Project 11435 design.

# 2, 2011 Moscow Defense Brief 3Medium-term Prospects for MiG Corporation After Interim

MMRCA Competition Results

Defense Industries

Finally, Brazil is also growing rapidly (though not quite as rapidly as China or India), and has obvious naval ambitions. It has already bought several Scorpene-class diesel-electric submarines from France and hopes to start building its first indigenously developed nuclear sub in 2016. It is very likely that Brazil will also launch an aircraft carrier program in the coming decade. It will use Sao Paulo (ex-Foch), an old carrier it has bought from France, to train naval personnel and pilots. But the country is more likely to opt for French or American carrier technology, so the MiG-29K will not land any Brazilian contracts. Depending on the outcome of Brazil’s FX-3 tender the choice will be made between the Rafale M, the F-18E/F or even the F-35.

The bottom line is, by 2020 the three BIC countries will acquire (or be on the verge of acquiring) new or upgraded aircraft carrying ships.

Southeast-Asian reaction to China’s ascendanceChina’s astounding economic, industrial, technological and military ascendance will become the main factor informing the Southeast-Asian countries’ plans for their defense capability. Indeed, that factor has already begun to take effect. A case in point is Vietnam, whose Navy has always consisted of small coastal patrol boats. Now the country is buying frigates and large numbers of submarines. It has already signed a contract with Russia for as many as six Project 636M

diesel-electric subs, clearly intending to create a whole new branch of its Navy – a very ambitious, complex and expensive task. In the past decade the country has made great efforts to improve its technological and military capability. In the early 2000s the Vietnamese army was buying about U$100m worth of weaponry from Russia every year. By the middle of the past decade that figure had increased to U$300m, and hit the U$1bn mark in 2010. Most of that money has been spent on the Navy, which has bought two Gepard 3.9 class light frigates, 12 Project 12418 light guided missile corvettes, several Bastion-P coastal defense missile systems and the already mentioned six Project 636 submarines. If this trend continues, it is not unimaginable that by the end of this decade Vietnam, as well as Malaysia and Indonesia, will start seriously thinking about aircraft carriers. At this point let us recall that back in 1996 Thailand bought the Chakri Naruebet, a small aircraft-carrying warship – although the ship is still not fit for combat duty. If Vietnam and possibly Malaysia manage to sustain their current growth rates, both countries will be able to afford small Italian- or Spanish-made aircraft-carrying ships, up to 20,000-25,000 tonnes in size and capable of carrying up to 10 horizontal take-off fighters. Their choice might well fall on the MiG-29K, which is affordable and not too complex for the Southeast Asian navies to operate and maintain. But if the MiG-29K is to remain competitive, its maker will have to offer extensive upgrade options, including active phased array radars, better engines and measures to reduce the fighter’s radar, visual and infrared profile.

# 2, 2011 Moscow Defense Brief4

Defense Industries

Russian Helicopter Industry: Up and Away

Russian Helicopter Industry: Up and AwayMikhail Barabanov

The Russian helicopter industry is in rude health, contrasting sharply with many other defense industry

branches and the languishing civilian aircraft makers. Many defense companies are still undergoing painful

restructuring, and only seven civilian aircraft were delivered in 2010. Meanwhile, helicopter output hit a 15-year high in 2010. The JSC Vertolety Rossii (Russian Helicopters) holding company, formed as part of the Oboronprom corporation in 2006, delivered 214 helicopters of all types – three times the 2003 figure and a 150 per cent increase on 2006 (see Table 1). The company’s revenues reached U$ 2.2 bn, a 110 per cent rise on 2006. Its margins remain at a healthy 10-12 per cent.

Most of that growth had resulted from the long-awaited launch of mass production of new helicopter models for the MoD, as well as strong exports.

Vertolety Rossii owns the two leading Russian helicopter design bureaus (Mil and Kamov), the five biggest helicopter plants (in Kazan, Ulan-Ude, Rostov-on-Don, Arsenyev and Kumertau) and manufacturers of key components. The only independent Russian helicopter maker is Strela in Orenburg, which makes small numbers of the Ka-226 light helicopters.

In an effort to leverage all that growth, Vertolety Rossii had planned an IPO on the London and Moscow stock exchanges in 2011, hoping to attract some 500m dollars. The money was to be used to pay off debts and to finance the compulsory buy-out of the minority stakes in its subsidiaries still owned by other investors. But in May those plans were postponed indefinitely as the share offer was undersubscribed. Potential investors are wary since the company, which began operations as a single entity only as recently as 2007, is still very young. There is also a certain amount of caution about the future of the Russian aerospace industry as a whole.

Vertolety Rossii is clearly one of the most successful of the Russian defense industry corporations created over the

past decade. But it has fallen foul of the general reputation of the Russian aerospace sector, which still requires serious reforms. Nevertheless, the company is one of the first Russian industrial groups to have begun reaping substantial dividends from the rapidly growing MoD spending and the ambitious new weapons procurement programs.

Russian MoD procurementAfter almost a quarter of a century of testing and polishing, the new-generation Mi-28 and Ka-50/52 attack helicopters have finally begun to arrive en mass to the Russian armed forces. The scale of the Mi-28N production program is unprecedented for post-Soviet Russia. Essentially, this is the first new mass-produced Russian military helicopter since the 1980s. In 2005 the MoD signed a nine-year contract for 67 Mi-28N helicopters; 38 were made at the Rostvertol plant in Rostov-on-Don in the five years to 2010, including 15 helicopters in 2010 alone. In 2009 first deliveries of the Mi-28N were made to combat troops stationed in the North Caucasus. In the autumn of 2010 the MoD signed another contract for an additional 30 helicopters to be delivered by 2015, for a total of 97. This means that the production levels achieved in 2010 are set to remain unchanged or even increase. It is safe to expect that Rostvertol will be delivering 14-15 helicopters every year in 2011-2014. Meanwhile, the new 2011-2020 State Armament Program (GPV-2020) has set the target for Mi-28N procurement at 260 helicopters, so production is set to increase after 2014, once new contracts have been signed.

In 2010 the Progress company based in Arsenyev delivered the first four mass-produced Ka-52 helicopters to the Russian Air Force. Five pre-production helicopters and prototypes were made in 2008-2009. The four helicopters delivered in 2010 were built under a 2009 MoD contract for

Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 (projection)

2012 (projection)

Helicopters delivered 72 75 83 94 104 169 183 214 260 300

Source: Vertolety Rossii

Table 1. Deliveries by Vertolety Rossii subsidiaries in 2003-2012

# 2, 2011 Moscow Defense Brief 5Russian Helicopter Industry:

Up and Away

Defense Industries

36 helicopters. The target for 2011 is for Progress to deliver another 10 helicopters, and maintain that level in 2012-2013. The MoD is expected to buy a total of 120 Ka-52 helicopters under the GPV-2020 program. A modified Ka-52 version and a separate naval version are now in development; up to 30 naval helicopters could be made for the Russian Navy.

In 2009-2010 the Kazan helicopter plant delivered the first 10 Ansat-U light training helicopters to the Russian Air Force. Finally, production of the Mi-8 transports, the workhorse of the Russian Army Aviation, resumed in 2008 after a long pause at the plants in Kazan and Ulan-Ude. The modifications now in production are the Mi-8MTV and Mi-8AMTSh. Hundreds are expected to be delivered in the coming years, including more than 50 in 2011.

Several other models will enter mass production in 2011, including the new Mi-35M attack helicopters, the Ka-226 light helicopters, and the Ka-31 AEW naval helicopters. The first six of the 22 Mi-35M helicopters under a 2009 contract will be delivered by Rostvertol in 2011. The Ka-31 (which was previously made only for exports) and the Ka-226 will be made in Kumertau. Also in 2011 Rostvertol is expected to resume production of the Mi-26 heavy military transports.

In 2009 the MoD took delivery of 33 military helicopters from the Russian defense industry. In 2010 the figure was 37, with a sharp rise to 109 expected in 2011, according to official statements (see Table 2).

The growth reflects the beginning of deliveries under the GPV-2020 program. So far, there have been no problems with the program’s financing. Procurement of new helicopters is one of the top priorities of the program, which fully reflects global military trends. About a thousand helicopters should be delivered to the Russian Air Force by 2020, including 400 in 2011-2015. An additional 100 helicopters will be delivered by 2020 to the Russian Navy. The GPV-2020 also includes mass production of heavily modified versions of the existing helicopters, such as the Mi-28N (the Mi-28MN

modification should be launched in 2015) and the Ka-52 attack helicopters, the naval Ka-27M and Ka-29M versions and a carrier-based version of the Ka-52. There are also plans to launch production of the multirole Ka-60 helicopter and the Mi-383 transport.

Vertolety Rossii already has preliminary commitments from the MoD for at least 100 military helicopters by 2012. Negotiations between the two on long-term contracts for delivery by 2018 are nearly completed. Several were signed in the first half of 2011. It has been reported that contracts for 100 new Ka-60 helicopters for the Army Aviation’s special task forces, for delivery by 2020, and a number of other deals are also in the pipeline.

The estimate of deliveries for the Russian Air Force in 2011-2020 includes 220 Mi-28N helicopters, 120 Ka-52, 40 Mi-35M, 26 Mi-26, 100 Ka-60 and 30 Ka-226 helicopters, up to 70 Ansat and up to 500 Mi-8 helicopters. Deliveries for the Russian Navy over the same period are expected to include 70 Ka-27M and Ka-29M helicopters, up to 30 Ka-52 and up to 20 Ka-226 units, plus a certain number of the Ka-31.

ExportsExports, the second pillar underpinning the rapid growth of the Russian helicopter industry, still outstripped domestic deliveries in 2010. The situation is expected to change in 2011, once the large MoD contracts start to take effect. Nevertheless, Russian helicopter exports have also shown very respectable growth in recent years. In 2010 deliveries on export contracts were up 30 per cent, thanks largely to the continuing popularity of the industry’s best-selling Mi-8/Mi-17 series.

These powerful heavy-lifters are relatively cheap and easy to maintain, and still have a large military and civilian market in many parts of the globe. In recent years sales were

Model 2009 2010 2011 (projection)

Ansat-U 6 4 6

Ka-31 - - 2

Ka-52 3 4 10

Ka-226 - - 6

Mi-8 12 14 60

Mi-26 - - 4

Mi-28N 12 15 15

Mi-35M - - 6

Total 33 37 109

Compiled by CAST

Table 2. Helicopter deliveries to the Russian MoD in 2009-2011

# 2, 2011 Moscow Defense Brief6Russian Helicopter Industry:

Up and Away

Defense Industries

boosted by the military campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Mi-8/Mi-17 series has earned itself an excellent reputation during operations in these two countries. As a result, the Mi-17 has been chosen as the core model for the fairly large Iraqi and Afghan air forces, which are now being restored to their former strength. The Afghan deliveries are financed by the Pentagon, which signed a contract for 21 Mi-17 units in early 2011. India has signed two large contracts for a total of 139 Mi-17s. China also remains a large customer. The Mi-17 is also entering new markets; contracts have recently been signed with Argentina, Bolivia, Thailand and Kenya.

Meanwhile, the venerable Mi-24/Mi-35 is having something of a renaissance on the world markets. Exports of the newly built Mi-35P and Mi-35M attack helicopters are on the rise. Brazil has bought 12; Azerbaijan signed a contract for 24 in 2010. Total exports could well reach 100 units. Russia has also begun to offer the Mi-28N and the Ka-52 to foreign customers. The first export contract for 12 Mi-28N helicopters was announced in early 2011. The buyer has not been named, but it may be Kazakhstan.

Russia also continues to export the Mi-26T, the world’s heaviest transport helicopter, and commercial modifications of the Ka-32. The industry is making Ka-28 ASW and the Ka-31 AEW naval helicopters for India and China. It is hoped that the Ka-226 and the Ansat light helicopters will also attract foreign buyers.

ProspectsIn an effort to keep the Russian helicopter industry competitive Vertolety Rossii has stepped up the development of new models and upgrade options. Its R&D program until 2020-2025 enjoys generous government support. In April the Russian Ministry of Industry and Trade submitted to the Prime Minister’s Office a draft of the state program for the Russian aerospace industry. The program includes the development of new helicopters, and sets an ambitions target for the wider industry to win 10 per cent of the world market in the civilian sector by 2025. The target for the defense sector is 14 per cent, and 15 per cent for the helicopter industry (the current figure is estimated by the ministry at 13 per cent). Some 5 trillion roubles (U$1.8bn) will be invested by the government into the aerospace sector by 2020 if the program is approved, a tenfold rise on the previous decade.

In the civilian segment Vertolety Rossii aims to launch by 2015 a deeply upgraded version of the Mi-17 helicopter (designated as the Mi-171M), a version of the Ka-226 helicopter fitted with French engines (Ka-226T), an upgraded version of the Mi-34 light helicopter with a turbine engine replacing the old piston engine (Mi-34S2), the new

Ka-62 helicopter (a civilian version of the Ka-60) and the new Mi 38. The Ka-62 and the Mi-38 have already entered the trials program. There are also plans to launch the assembly of the AgustaWestland AW139 medium helicopter in Russia.

By 2020 the company is planning to develop and launch mass production of three new commercial models: the AHL heavy transport (based on the Mi-46 design), a medium helicopter weighting up to 4.5 tonnes (based on the Mi-54 design) and a light helicopter weighing under 2.5 tonnes.

In the military segment, by 2015 Vertolety Rossii will launch production of the modified versions of the Mi-28N (designated as Mi-28MN) and the Ka-52 attack helicopters; a carrier-based version of the Ka-52; revamped Ka-27M and Ka-29M naval helicopters; and the new Ka-60 multirole helicopter. By 2020 the company wants to develop and test the new Ka-65 future naval helicopter (with coaxial rotors); a deep upgrade of the Mi-26 heavy transport (designated as the Mi-26M); the Mi-383 transport (military version of the Mi-38); and an unmanned helicopter system.

A special priority is the program to develop a radically new advanced high-speed helicopter (Perspektivnyi Skorostnoi Vertolyot – PSV project) with a pusher-type propeller. Vertolety Rossii itself says the design will be a “breakthrough”. Similar designs are now being developed in the United States (the experimental X2 and the S-97 attack helicopter design by Sikorsky) and in Europe (the experimental X3 and the X4 design by Eurocopter). In Russia this new technology is viewed as a chance to achieve a major breakthrough in the helicopter industry. Early designs have already been proposed by both Mil (Mi-X1) and Kamov (Ka-92). One of them will be chosen by Vertolety Rossii for further development later in 2011. The Russian Ministry of Industry and Trade is expected to finance work on the early designs to the tune of 400m roubles (U$14m) this year. Later on spending on the program will be ramped up to about 4bn roubles (U$140m) over the next three years.

The PSV program envisages two types of commercial high-speed helicopters to be developed by 2020 (a medium and a light version), as well as a high-speed attack helicopter (“assault helicopter system” or “fifth-generation attack helicopter”).

There are doubts about the feasibility of some of Vertolety Rossii’s projects. The market for models such as the Ka-60/62, Mi-38 or Mi-34S2 may be far too small, so their commercial success is uncertain. The future light and medium helicopter projects also seem very difficult to pull off. The AHL heavy transport project may prove too costly, unless foreign partners are brought in. But the PSV project, which the company regards as one of its top priorities, looks quite promising.

The helicopter industry is one of the few Russian industries that are truly competitive internationally. Vertolety

# 2, 2011 Moscow Defense Brief 7Russian Helicopter Industry:

Up and Away

Defense Industries

Rossii seems in a good position to retain its competitive edge thanks to its large sales and generous government support. Delivering the 2010 annual report to the Russian Duma, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin said that government

financing of the Russian aerospace industry in 2009-2011 was over 270bn roubles (U$9bn), and that this financing had “facilitated progress in all the areas on which the future of our civilian and military aerospace industry depends”.


Arms Trade

Exports of Russian Fighter Jets in 1999-2010

Exports of Russian Fighter Jets in 1999-2010Konstantin Makienko

Russian arms exports have shown steady growth over the period of 1999-2010. One of the main engines of that

growth is fighter aircraft, especially the Su-27/Su-30 Flanker family. A total of 454 Su-27/30 fighter jets have been sold to foreign customers over the reported period (the figure includes Su-30MKI assembly kits supplied to India’s HAL corporation, but not includes surplus Russian Su-27 fighters transferred to Kazakhstan and Ethiopia). Sales of the various MiG-29 Fulcrum versions are estimated at a minimum of 177 units.

Su-27/30 exportsWavesThere have been two big waves of Su-27/30 contracts, one in 1999-2003, the other in 2006-2010, separated by a two-year lull in 2004-2005. During the first wave the two main buyers were India, which signed a contract in December 2000 for licensed assembly of 140 Su-30MKI fighters, and China,

which signed four contracts for a total of 128 Su-27/30 jets of various modifications. Malaysia bought 18 Su-30MKM jets in 2003. Vietnam and Indonesia bought four aircraft apiece, bringing the total 1999-2003 exports figure to 294 new Su-27/30 aircraft delivered to five countries.

The following two years brought no new contracts for heavy fighter jets. Indeed, in 2005 there were no deliveries of finished aircraft, either, though a small number of Su-30MKI assembly kits were shipped to India.

The second big wave of Su-30 contracts and deliveries came in 2006-2010. India once again became the largest buyer, after placing an order for 58 Su-30MKI aircraft. However, there were also three new buyers, so the geography of Su-30 exports has become much more diverse. Algeria signed a contract for 28 Su-30MKI(A) jets, then bought another 16 for a total of 44. Some 24 Su-30MK2 aircraft have been sold to Venezuela, and another 20 to Vietnam. In addition, small batches of Su-30 aircraft have been sold to Uganda (an estimated eight units), and Indonesia (six). Overall, a total of 160 Su-30 jets had been sold to six

Importer 1999-2003 2006-2010 Total

China 128 – 128

India 140 58 198

Algeria – 44 44

Venezuela – 24 24

Vietnam 4 20 24

Malaysia 18 – 18

Indonesia 4 6 10

Uganda – 8 8

Total 294 160 454

Table 1. Two waves of Su-27/30 contracts

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Contracts 66 140 38 24 26 0 0 52 64 0 8 36

Deliveries n.a. 18 38 39 35 38 0 4 40 28 27 n.a.

Table 2. Detailed yearly breakdown of Su-27/30 sales

# 2, 2011 Moscow Defense Brief 9Exports of Russian Fighter Jets

in 1999-2010

Arms Trade

countries in 2006-2010. The second wave of contracts has therefore been significantly smaller than the first one in 1999-2003, owing largely to the absence of any new Chinese custom or mega-deals such as the 2000 Indian contract. Nevertheless, for an expensive weapons category such as heavy fighter aircraft, average annual sales of 32 units per year is a very good result.

Exports geographyIndia has been the largest customer, having bought a total of 198 Su-30MKI aircraft. It is followed by China (128 units), Algeria (44), Venezuela and Vietnam (24 apiece), Malaysia (18), Indonesia (10) and Uganda (an estimated eight aircraft). For more details about the contracts see Tables 3-6.

Contract Date Value Deliveries Notes

1 Licensed assembly of 140 Su-30MKI fighters

December 2000 About 4bn dollars

2004-2014 Includes transfer of license and assembly kits to India’s HAL corporation

2 18 Su-30MKI April 2007 About 800m dollars

16 units in 2007, two units in 2009

Trade-in of 18 Su-30K fighters delivered in 1997 and 1999*

3 40 Su-30MKI October 2007 1.6bn dollars 2008-2010An estimated 4 units in 2008, 4 units in 2009 and up to 10-12 units in 2010

The contract is for 20 finished aircraft and 20 assembly kits

198 Su-30MKI* – Initially the plan was to upgrade 18 Indian Su-30K aircraft supplied by Russia back in 1997 (8 units delivered under a 1996 contract) and 1999 (10 units delivered under a 1998 contract) to Su-30MKI Mk3 specification. But it was later decided that such an upgrade, which would involve the refurbishment of the entire aircraft, complete replacement of all onboard equipment and engines, and even changes to the airframe (installation of frontal horizontal fins) would be impractical. India and Russia eventually settled on a trade-in scheme, under which Russia would supply 18 Su-30MKI aircraft and buy back an equal number of the old Indian Su-30K fighters. Moscow had hoped to have the Su-30K’s, which had clocked in about 1,500 flight hours apiece, refurbished in Russia itself or in Belarus, and then sold on to the Middle East or the Horn of Africa. But so far no buyer has been found, and the aircraft are sitting mothballed in Irkutsk.

Table 3. Indian contracts for Su-30MKI fighters in 2000-2010

Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total for 2004-2010

Kits 4 5 13 12 10-12 18 (OAK report) 20 82-83* – No official information is available on the deliveries of assembly kits, apart from the data for 2009, when the OAK corporation officially announced the transfer of 18 kits. The figures in the table are a CAST estimate.

Table 4. Deliveries under the 2000 contract for 140 assembly kits*

Contract Contract date Units Value Deliveries Manufacturer Notes

1 Su-27UBK combat trainer

December 1999

28 800m dollars 8 units in 2000, 10 units in 2001, 10 units in 2002

Irkutsk Aviation Company (IAPO)

The deliveries were made to offset a Russian government debt to China

2 Su-30MKK multirole fighter

August 1999 38 1.8bn dollars 10 units in 2000, 28 units in 2001

Komsomolsk-upon-Amur Aviation Company (KnAAPO)

3 Su-30MKK multirole fighter

July 2001 38 1.8bn dollars 19 units in 2002, 19 units in 2003

KnAAPO

4 Su-30MK2 naval multirole fighter

2002 24 Abt. 1bn dollars

24 units in 2004 KnAAPO For the Chinese Navy

128 units 5.4bn dollars 2000-2004 KnAAPO and IAPO

Table 5. Chinese 1999-2004 contracts for Su-27/30 aircraft


Arms Trade


Importer Contract Date Value Deliveries Manufacturer Notes

Algeria 28 multirole Su-30MKI (A) fighters

March 2006 1.5bn dollars 6 units in 2007, 8 units in 2008, 14 units in 2009

Irkut corporation The initial schedule was: 8 units in 2007, 10 units in 2008 and another 10 in 2009

Algeria 16 Su-30MKI (A) March 2010 Estimated 0.8-0.9bn dollars.

Estimated 2011-2012 Irkut corporation Option for another 16 units to a 2006 contract for 28 Su-30MKI(A) fighters

Vietnam 4 Su-30MK2 Dec 2003 110m dollars 2004 KnAAPO

Vietnam 8 Su-30MK2 2009 320m dollars 2010-2011 KnAAPO

Vietnam 12 Su-30MK2 Feb 2010 Abt. 1bn dollars

No data, estimated 2012-213

KnAAPO

Venezuela 24 Su-30MK2V July 2006 Abt. 1bn dollars

4 units in 2006, 12 units in 2007, 8 units in 2009

KnAAPO

Malaysia 18 Su-30MKM May 2003 932m dollars 6 units in 2007, 6 units in 2008, 6 units in 2009

Irkut corporation

Indonesia 2 Su-27SK and 2 Su-30MKK

2003 192.8m dollars All 4 units in 2003 KnAAPO

Indonesia 3 Su-27SKM and 3 Su-30MK2

August 2007 335m dollars 2 Su-30MK2 in 2008, 1 Su-30MK2 in 2009, 3 Su-27SKMin 2010

KnAAPO

Uganda 8 Su-30MK2 March 2010 No data 4 in 2011, 4 in 2012

KnAAPO

Table 6. Su-27/30 sales to other customers

Importer Irkut KnAAPO

India 198 –

China – 128

Algeria 44 –

Venezuela – 24

Vietnam – 24

Malaysia 18 –

Indonesia – 10

Uganda – 8

Total 260 194

Table 7. Aircraft supplied by Irkut and KnAAPO


Arms Trade


Exports of MiG-29 fightersSales of the MiG-29 aircraft have not seen any pronounced peaks and troughs; still, it is possible to discern three separate waves.

The first wave, from 1999 to 2003, consisted of relatively small contracts signed with a number of poor Asian and African countries, such as Bangladesh, Eritrea, Sudan, Burma and Yemen. A total of 60 fighters were delivered (not including the upgrade of 2 Eritrean MiG-29 fighters to MiG-29SMT specification), worth a total of 1bn dollars. Revenues generated by those contracts had

enabled the manufacturer to develop the relatively modern MiG-29SMT multirole modification.

The second wave in 2004-2007 consisted of three contracts: carrier-based MiG-29K fighters to India, MiG-29SMT aircraft to Algeria and MiG-29M2 to Syria. These aircraft were relatively modern technology, which was reflected in the price of the contracts. The second wave marked the peak of the MiG corporation’s expansion in the foreign markets; it ended abruptly when the Algerian contract fell through. The company’s reputation and finances suffered a serious blow.

The first- and second-wave contracts and deliveries are listed in the Tables 8-9.

Importer Contract Date Value Deliveries

Bangladesh 6 MiG-29, 2 MiG-29UB

28.06.1999 115m dollars 4 in December 1999, 4 in February 2000

Eritrea 2 MiG-29 Unknown, presumably in early 2001

Unknown, presumably 30m dollars

2 MiG-29 in 2001

Eritrea 2 MiG-29SE Upgrade of 2 MiG-29 to MiG-29SMT specification

Unknown, presumably between 2001 and 2003

70m dollars 2 MiG-29SE in 2004, upgrade in 2005

Sudan 10 MiG-29, 2 MiG-29UB

2001 Unknown, presumably 140m dollars

3 in 2003, 9 in 2004

Burma 12 MiG-29, 2 MiG-29UB

June 2001 132m dollars 4 in 2001, 10 in 2002

Yemen 12 MiG-29B, 2 MiG-29UB

September 2001 420m dollars 14 in 2002

Yemen 6 MiG-29SMT and upgrade up to 14 of previously delivered MiG-29 to MiG-29SMT specification

2003 170m dollars 2 in 2004, 4 in 2005

Total 60 Over 1bn dollars

Table 8. First wave of MiG-29 contracts

Importer Contract Date Value Deliveries Notes

India 16 MiG-29K 20.01.2004 732m dollars 2009-2011 For the Vikramaditya aircraft carrier (the former Admiral Gorshkov)

Algeria 28 MiG-29SMT, 6 MiG-29UBT

March 2006 1.284bn dollars 2006-2007 After the delivery of 15 aircraft in 2006 and early 2007, the contract was put on hold at the initiative of the Algerian customer. In 2008 all 15 aircraft were returned to Russia

Syria 24 MiG-29M2 Presumably 2006 or 2007

1.0-1.02bn dollars (estimate)

Presumably after 2011


Table 9. Second wave of MiG-29 contracts

# 2, 2011 Moscow Defense Brief12Exports of Russian Fighter Jets

in 1999-2010

Arms Trade

The third wave began in 2009 and market MiG’s recovery from the Algerian fiasco. The first step back from the brink was the 2009 Burmese contract for 20 MiG-29 fighters, followed by the Indian Navy’s decision in 2010 to exercise an option for 29 MiG-29 aircraft. The worst of the Algerian crisis is now in the past. The company’s finances have stabilized. With its MiG-29K carrier-based fighter, a niche product that still attracts a lot of interest, the MiG

corporation can hope to retain its share of the markets for at least another 5-7 years.

As of Februar y 2011, the MiG corporation had outstanding orders for 73 fighter jets in its portfolio. It is also likely to secure the Russian Navy contract for another 26MiG-29K fighters, bringing the total backlog of orders to almost 100 units. That is enough to keep the company’s production capacity fully booked until 2013-2014.

Importer Contract Date Value Deliveries

Burma 10 MiG-29B, 6 MiG-29SE, 4 MiG-29UB

07.12.2009 412m euros 2011-2012

India 29 MiG-29K 12.03.2010 1.5bn dollars n/a


Table 10. Third wave. Back from the brink

# 2, 2011 Moscow Defense Brief 13Georgian Lesson for Libya

International Relations

Georgian Lesson for LibyaAnton Lavrov

The events in Libya, which NATO has had to get involved in since early 2011, are reminiscent of another recent

conflict, the Five Day War between Russia and Georgia in August 2008. Leaving aside the complex legal issues, it seems that Russia and the NATO allies have had to face similar tasks during these two conflicts. But their approaches have been very different – as have the results.

The most obvious parallels can be drawn between the events in the South Ossetian capital of Tskhinvali and the city of Misrata in Libya. Both of these rebel-controlled cities were besieged by “government” forces which used artillery, MRL systems, heavy armor and aviation. Misrata is linked to the outside world by a single vulnerable port road, Tskhinvali by a tunnel and a narrow mountain road. Shelling and fighting in the streets led to many casualties among civilians, forcing thousands to flee and triggering a humanitarian crisis. In Libya, as in Georgia, there was also a separate theater of combat action, which did not attract much attention. In Libya it was a large rebel-held area from Ajdabiya to Tobruk, with a much greater concentration of rebel forces than in Misrata. In Georgia, that area was Abkhazia.

The separatists in Abkhazia and Ossetia had received military support from extremely powerful outside forces, just as the Libyan rebels have. But the rapid success achieved by Russian troops in Georgia contrasts sharply with the protracted and floundering NATO operation in Libya.

The greatest difference is that Russia did not limit itself to protecting civilians in Tskhinvali (most of whom had Russian passports) with the help of air raids and covert operations. Tskhinvali’s vulnerability in the event of a Georgian attack had been well-known for a long time. The Russian government had considered various options for coming to the aid of the city. After studying the balance of forces and the situation on the ground several years ahead of the August 2008 events, Moscow had concluded that it would inevitably have to authorize a direct military intervention if the Georgian army were to attack the South Ossetian capital. That was seen as the only way to protect the city from the more numerous and far better trained and equipped Georgian government forces.

Thanks to the rapid deployment of more than 20,000 Russian ground troops in August 2008, the military phase of the conflict between Georgia and its separatist regions was over in less than five days. The Georgian army, which had as many or greater numbers as the Libyan government troops now have, was forced to retreat and end the shelling of South Ossetia. Fewer than 500 people were killed during the conflict,

and most of the 150,000 civilians from both sides who had fled the fighting were able to return to their homes fairly soon.

Even by Georgia’s own exaggerated count, the damage to the country’s infrastructure did not exceed 1bn dollars. The sea ports and the strategic BP-operated Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline resumed operation less than a month after the end of the fighting.

The military operation, which the Russian government had described as “forcing Georgia to peace”, had achieved its purpose. Russia’s decision to enter the war, and then to recognize the separatist territories, sign defense pacts with them and station large troop numbers there sent a very clear signal to Georgia that further attempts to resolve its separatist problem through the use of armed force would be unproductive.

As a result, the nationalist government of President Saakashvili has had to devote its energies to the peaceful development of its own country. Georgia has cut its rearmament programs and drastically reduced military spending. The Georgian MoD’s 2011 budget has shrunk by two-thirds compared to its 2008 peak. Exchanges of fire along the border between Georgia and South Ossetia, which were common up until August 2008, have stopped; they are no longer claiming civilian lives. International observers have been allowed into the conflict zone. The stabilization has paved the way for a large mine-clearing program involving international organizations. The conflict has effectively been frozen, which means that there is now hope for a political settlement at some point in the future.

Unlike the Russian operation in Georgia, the Western international coalition never intended even a limited ground operation when it decided to intervene in the civil war in Libya. The plan has always been to limit that intervention to air strikes and to the blockade of the Libyan coast.

The Western coalition expected that the air operation conducted by the world’s most capable air forces would be enough to break Colonel Gaddafi’s troops in fairly short order, and possibly to trigger the collapse of the regime as well.

But the results achieved so far by the Western coalition in Libya are comparable to the results achieved in Georgia by the Russian air raids, which have often been criticized as “ineffectual”. In Libya as well as in Georgia the airstrikes damaged the military infrastructure and restricted the movement of government troops. They also inflicted some casualties and destroyed armor, artillery and trucks. But neither in Georgia nor in Libya did they manage to put an end to the shelling of rebel-held cities or stop the fighting

# 2, 2011 Moscow Defense Brief14Georgian Lesson for Libya

International Relations

in the streets. In both countries the air raids have caused civilian casualties, even though the Western coalition has done all it could to avoid them by using only high-precision weapons. Such collateral damage is inevitable for as long as the protracted bombing campaign continues.

Even the NATO air forces have found it difficult to neutralize the mobile and powerful MRL systems. More than a month after the air operation began, and after thousands of sorties against the Gaddafi forces, rebel-held cities were still not safe from shelling. There is no doubt that the weaker and less technologically advanced Russian Air Force would not have coped with that task either, had Russia chosen to restrict itself to an air campaign in South Ossetia.

Israel faced a similar problem in 2006, when Hezbollah used numerous MLR systems against Israeli cities from Lebanese territory. Air raids alone had proved insufficient to stop the shelling, and Israel had to launch a large ground campaign to establish a buffer zone along its borders.

The half-hearted intervention in Libya by NATO and the international coalition, i.e. the decision not to risk a ground operation, has served only to equalize the forces of the two warring factions and thereby protract the conflict indefinitely.

There is no doubt that the continuing NATO air raids are slowly but surely sapping the strength and the morale of Colonel Gaddafi’s forces. In this war of attrition the Libyan government cannot win.

A month after the air campaign began, government troops were forced to abandon attempts to use armor against the rebels, because it was too vulnerable to the NATO air raids. After two months Gaddafi’s forces were weakened enough for the rebels to push them back from Misrata and secure that vitally important sea port.

This, and the end of the offensive by government forces in the east of the country, has enabled the coalition to declare that the purpose of the operation has been at least partially achieved, and that the civilians living in the rebel-held territories are now safe. Nevertheless, during the two months of the fighting for Misrata more than a thousand rebels and civilians (including the numerous seasonal workers from other countries) were killed, and thousands more injured.

There is no doubt that most of these losses could have been avoided had NATO launched a limited ground operation right from the start. A rapid deployment of even a small ground force, with massive air support, would have forced the Gaddafi troops to retreat from Misrata and to halt their attacks against the city and its port. A deployment of additional coalition forces would have been enough to create a buffer zone around Misrata to make it safe from shelling. Just as in Georgia, such an operation would have protected the civilians in the conflict zone and prevented a humanitarian catastrophe.

NATO ground troops would not even have to advance towards Tripoli or try to overthrow Gaddafi. It would have been

sufficient for them to separate the warring factions, thereby achieving a ceasefire and then handing the conflict zone over to UN or African Union peacekeepers. That would have frozen the conflict and laid the ground for a peaceful settlement.

Despite the limited success achieved by mid-May by the rebels with the support of the NATO air operation, the situation remains difficult. Libya is essentially facing the prospect of a protracted civil war, which could turn the country into another Somalia. The conflict will not be resolved unless a large number of foreign troops or peacekeepers are sent in.

At some point in the future the rebels will probably launch another offensive and try to take Tripoli. Such an offensive will mean fighting in the towns and cities that remain loyal to Gaddafi. That would put the civilians living there in harm’s way. If that happens, the primary objective of the NATO operation, i.e. protecting civilians in Libya, will be put into question.

The only thing that is worse than a military conflict is a protracted military conflict. The international coalition had decided not to risk a timely ground operation, which could have swiftly turned the tide of the war or ended it altogether. Now Libya is facing the prospect of becoming yet another hotspot and breeding ground for terrorism, of which there already is no shortage in Africa and the Middle East.

Meanwhile, the international coalition is still facing the danger of mission creep. In addition to the continuing air operation, it will have to support the militarily weak rebels by supplying weapons, ammunition, advisors and instructors. The use of special forces seems almost inevitable. What is more, as soon as the rebels become stronger thanks to foreign assistance, they are likely to try to take the rest of Libyan territory under their control, and thus trigger a new spiral of civil war. Such a war could turn out to be even bloodier than anything seen in Libya up until now, meaning that the international coalition will still have to send in ground troops in order to separate the warring factions.

All of this amply demonstrates that in this day and age the use of military force during an intervention must be swift, decisive and massive. That is precisely how Russia used force in August 2008, putting an end to the conflict on favorable terms, minimizing the political and humanitarian repercussions and bringing swift relief to the civilians. By their half-hearted, indecisive and limited intervention the Western countries are only protracting the war in Libya and worsening the plight of civilians in the country. Meanwhile, any political dividends they might have hoped to extract are becoming hard to discern as uncertainty grows about the country’s future.

In 1973 Henry Kissinger said to the then Israeli ambassador to the United States, Yitzhak Rabin: “When you use force it is better to use 30 per cent more than is necessary than five per cent less than is necessary”. In August 2008, Russia followed that advice. The West has ignored it in Libya.

# 2, 2011 Moscow Defense Brief 15Missile Defense:

Old Problem, No New Solution

Global Security

Missile Defense: Old Problem, No New SolutionAleksandr Stukalin, Kommersant publishing house

The signing of the New START treaty and US President Obama’s decision to review the previous administration’s

ballistic missile defense (BMD) plans had given rise to hopes that Russia and the United States could reach a compromise on this very sensitive issue. But after a year of fruitless “consultations” it is becoming obvious that the two sides’ positions on a new missile defense system for the 21st century are incompatible. The very idea of the Western and Russian missile defense systems being “interoperable” or “integrated” is facing a crisis. That crisis could well spill over into other areas of the strategic balance, as well as the two sides’ military doctrines and their relationship as a whole.

New problemsThe reasons for the incompatibility of Russia’s and

America’s positions on the new BMD and EuroBMD are twofold. On the one hand, Washington is convinced that new missile threats are real, or will become real in the very near future. It is determined to have in place a system that would guarantee protection from such threats. On the other hand, the Russian military and political leadership is certain that the new BMD system, including elements of EuroBMD, have the Russian strategic deterrence capability in the crosshairs. Both sides are making earnest and very public attempts to dissuade each other of their respective fundamental beliefs. It appears that these attempts have monopolized all the energies of the negotiators taking part in the ongoing “consultations”.

The arguments used by the Russian military leadership – i.e the General Staff and its key departments involved in the formulation of the Russian position at the negotiations – are especially interesting. Up until recently, voicing the Russian stance on the BMD issue was the remit of the president or senior Foreign Ministry officials. But in the past few months the generals have been increasingly talkative. It appears that the General Staff, rather than the political officialdom, is now formulating Russia’s stance at the 2010-2011 “consultations” on missile defense. The truth of that assumption was amply demonstrated in May 2011 during the open scientific and practical conference headlined “The Russian position on EuroBMD”. The event was attended by the head of the General Staff, Army General Nikolay Makarov; his deputy,

Col Gen Valeriy Gerasimov; the head of the Main Operational Directorate, Lt Gen Andrey Tretyakov; and the deputy head of the Main Intelligence Department (GRU), Lt Gen Vyacheslav Kondrashov.

Russian generals do not deny that the “potential threat from the south” really exists. But they insist that the threat is very vague and uncertain, and that it does not require any urgent countermeasures. Neither Iran nor North Korea has any delivery systems with sufficient range. Neither has any hope of acquiring them any time soon. That is the official position of the GRU, which has never made such public forecasts before. The Russian generals believe that creating long-range missiles will require many years and many test launches, which will not go unnoticed. When that happens, that will be the time to react, they say.

In terms of technology, no-one is saying that the first ICBM created by the “problem nations” will be on par with the Topol-M or the Trident II. These nations are developing technology that is fifty, forty or thirty years old. The intercontinental delivery means such technology can offer are simple, but reliable. From the military point of view, the argument that the threat is not urgent does not hold water. Once the problem nations have built their first ICBM, it will be too late to develop an BMD system in an effort to catch up with the situation. The best way to deal with threats is to anticipate and pre-empt them, not play catch-up.

But the Russian generals have got it into their heads that America’s new BMD system and its EuroBMD segment are aimed against the Russian ICBMs. All attempts to persuade them to the contrary are falling on deaf ears.

Ever since the first (now abandoned) plans were announced to station heavy silo-based GBI missile interceptors in Poland, the Russian generals have argued that these interceptor sites could become a serious threat to the Russian ICBMs stationed in the west of the country. It is true that the flight paths of the missiles heading from Bologoye or Kozelsk to the Eastern seaboard lie in the same general area, not directly over Poland but to the north of it. If official US information is to be believed, however, the location of the interceptor sites in Poland is a far better match for the flight paths originating in Iran, not Bologoye. In order to pose a threat to the Russian ICBMs, the GBIs stationed in Poland must be able to intercept missiles launched in their near vicinity. That requires either a lightning-fast response time

# 2, 2011 Moscow Defense Brief16Missile Defense:

Old Problem, No New Solution

Global Security

or enormous acceleration plus mind-boggling trajectory to catch up with the Topol ICBMs.

Such incredible specifications of the GBI interceptors (i.e. lighting-fast response time and the interceptor’s ability to reach any point of the threat missile’s trajectory with lighting speed) would mean that United States has achieved a technological breakthrough on par with the invention of the nuclear bomb. The GBIs have been abandoned – but now the same implausible specifications are being ascribed to the SM-3 missile interceptors, the core of the new-configuration EuroBMD system.

The real (rather than imaginary) capabilities of the proposed American BMD system still remain an open question. Washington is being quite honest about the projected numbers of interceptors - although the figures can of course change. The need for honesty here is explained by the budgetary and congressional procedures, the obligation to inform NATO partners, and the long-standing general principles of America’s defense policy. Moscow, meanwhile, has always accepted that in the currently proposed configuration and scope, the new American BMD system is a much better match for the Iranian type of threat. It will not be able to neutralize the entire Russian strategic deterrence capability, even once the Russian nuclear arsenal has shrunk to the size specified in the New START treaty, i.e. 700-800 delivery systems and 1,550 warheads. Countering that type of threat would require a far more complex BMD system, with thousands of interceptors and probably dozens of interceptor launch sites. The validity of these considerations has always been recognized in Moscow - but they have never been seen as proof that America’s missile defense system is not aimed against Russia.

Old thinkingThe Russian generals’ firm rejection of the very idea of an American missile defense system, in whichever shape or form, informs the entire Russian negotiating position. First, Moscow demands “legally binding guarantees” that the BMD system will not be aimed against Russia. And second, it proposes that a joint system should be built instead of a purely Western one, with each side responsible for countering missile threats in its own geographic sector.

The notion of unilateral “legally binding guarantees” seems to be a curious new invention by the Russian negotiators, since there are no historical precedents of such guarantees. Why didn’t Leonid Brezhnev simply ask America for “legally binding guarantees” that its nuclear missiles are not aimed against Russia? Why did he choose instead to spend all that time and effort on the strategic arms limitation talks? And what about Brezhnev’s own unilateral “legally binding guarantees”, given of his own free will to the world, that the

Soviet Union would never be the first country to use nuclear weapons? Why did the international community view such guarantees as nothing but an empty political declaration?

How exactly are the “guarantees” demanded by Russia supposed to work? Will Moscow be satisfied by a declaration that “the United States will never use its missile defense system against Russian missiles”? How much would such a declaration be worth, exactly? Even in peacetime the principles of sovereignty make it possible for any country to withdraw from any of its international commitments. In the event of war or a real and imminent threat, such guarantees are worth precisely zero. If, on the other hand, Moscow requires more specific commitments, with restrictions on the numbers, capability and geography of the interceptors, then it must understand that such guarantees cannot be issued unilaterally. By rights they should be part of a new treaty about a new missile defense system – but that is not the subject of the negotiations now under way.

Russia’s sectoral BMD proposal stems from its fears about the launch sites in Poland, as well as in the Baltic region and northern Europe in general. Moscow has already said officially that it would not really care about BMD sites in Romania. But it is becoming increasingly obvious that the region Russia wants to be assigned to its own sector of the proposed sectoral BMD system includes Poland, the Baltic states and Scandinavia. That poses a number of intractable problems. First, why exactly should the NATO member states in the region entrust their defense to Moscow? Russia may be a partner of the alliance, but it is not a member. Second, can these countries ever accept such an arrangement as sovereign states? And finally, will Russia actually have the technical capability to protect from missile threats the region it wants assigned to its sector?

The Daryal-type early warning radar in Gabala (Azerbaijan) is Russia’s first proposed contribution to the EuroBMD system. It must be said that the radar would be a valuable asset as it covers the southern areas where the potential missile threat might originate. The radar can be integrated into a joint BMD system – but for reasons of its original design and specifications, it will not actually be able to guide American or Russian interceptors to their targets. Theoretically, Russia could also contribute the Don-2N multirole surveillance station near Moscow. The station, which has a 360 degrees field of view, would have to be upgraded before it can be integrated into the joint BMD system. But the Don-2N is part of Russia’s own missile defense system that covers the area around Moscow, so it is not clear whether Russia would be prepared to share that vital facility in any capacity.

Be that as it may, there is nothing else Moscow could usefully contribute. It has an advanced Voronezh-DM early warning radar in Armavir, which many commentators include in the list of the proposed joint BMD system’s


Global Security

Missile Defense: Old Problem, No New Solution

potential Russian assets. But it is not at all clear whether that would be possible and, more importantly, necessary. According to open-source information, the edge of the Armavir radar’s field of view runs along the middle of the European continent from east to west. In the east the line runs from Armavir to the Black Sea coast of the Caucasus, then on to Turkey, Syria and further south. In other words, the radar’s field of view includes part of the Middle East, the Mediterranean and almost the whole of North Africa – but not Iran, which is shielded from the radar by the Caucasian Mountains. Another Voronezh-DM radar station now being built near Kaliningrad is even less useful, since it is directed towards Europe. In any event, all these radars can potentially be used as elements of a missile attack warning system, but not of an actual missile defense system.

The situation with interceptors and guidance radars is even less certain. After Russia specified the boundaries of the sector it wants to claim for itself in the proposed “sectoral” BMD system, the commander of the Russian Space Troops, Lt Gen Oleg Ostapenko, made a sensational statement. He insisted that Russia can defend that sector without actually stationing any of the interceptors or guidance radars on its territory. How exactly Russia is supposed to pull off such a feat is a mystery. All its existing BMD systems, both strategic (around Moscow) and tactical, are built on the opposite principle.

What little is known about the Russian missile defense efforts from official documents and open sources suggests that the available financing is woefully inadequate, given the monumental scale of the task. More information is available about the missile defense capabilities of the advanced S-500 SAM system now being developed. But it is not clear when

that system might be ready or how many units the Russian defense industry can realistically deliver. Given that Russia is still struggling with the less complex S-400 (SA-21) SAM system, the prospects for the S-500 do not look very rosy. The bottom line is that it is not clear what exactly Russia could contribute to the EuroBMD system, other than one or two early warning radars.

Another thing to consider is that Russia’s threats to station missiles near Kaliningrad or to start building intermediate range missiles again if America stations elements of its BMD system in Europe run counter to the very idea of joint missile defense. The crisis is compounded by the rhetoric which only serves to unnerve the opposite side even further. One way or another, both sides are demonstrating that they are not ready for meaningful cooperation on an issue which both of them have declared as vital. A return to the Cold War, or at the very least a major chill in the relations between Russia and the United States over the BMD crisis now seem a distinct possibility.

The obstinacy, suspiciousness and mistrust over missile defense contrast sharply with the spirit and letter of the New START treaty, which was a real breakthrough in terms of openness, compromise and mutual trust. It appears that the generals and the conservatives in the diplomatic community have been given too much say in the ongoing missile defense “consultations”. The talks urgently need a major political impulse at the highest level from both sides, similar to the impulse given to the New START talks at their final stages. Unless that happens, chances for meaningful progress are slim. Whether the meeting between Dmitry Medvedev and Barak Obama in Deauville has provided such an impulse will become clear in the coming months.


Armed Forces

Reform of the Russian Navy in 2008-2011

Reform of the Russian Navy in 2008-2011Dmitry Boltenkov

The Russian Army and Air Force underwent a radical reform in 2008-2011, with sweeping changes in the

structure of their units, a revamped command and control system and a new support and logistics setup. By contrast, the reform of the Russian Navy has proceeded at a much more deliberate pace.

The reshaping of the Navy into the New Look model has followed what has now become a traditional path. The MoD has aimed to bolster the Navy’s fighting ability by bringing its various units to 100 per cent of their full wartime strength in terms of manpower; entering into service new ships and submarines; offloading non-military assets, such as housing, to municipal authorities; outsourcing some jobs to civilian contractors, reducing the numbers of non-combat officers, and merging the existing units to save costs.

Navy command structureThe status of the Navy’s Commander and Main Staff remains uncertain since it is still unclear which of their current functions they will retain. It is very likely that the MoD will follow the model already used for the Army and the Air Force, i.e. limit the Navy Commander’s remit to strategic planning and development, monitoring of the shipbuilding programs, cooperation with research institutions, etc. It is not clear though who will command the Navy groups in the oceans, especially if said groups are put together from ships belonging to more than one Navy Fleet. In Soviet times such groups were commanded directly by the Main Navy Command. But that is probably the only argument in favor of leaving the command and control remit with the Main Navy Command. One proposal is to set up a separate Command for overseas operations.1 Be that as it may, the Navy’s main operational command body, the Central Navy Command Post, has already become part of the General Staff ’s united Central Command Post, along with the central command posts of all the other armed services.2

At this stage the structural reform of the Navy has consisted of subordinating the Navy Fleets to the newly created Operational Strategic Commands (i.e. the new Military Districts). The Northern and Baltic Fleets are now part of the Western Military District, the Black Sea Fleet and the Caspian Flotilla are part of the Southern Military District,

and the Eastern Military District has taken over the Pacific Fleet. The HQs of these districts now have Navy departments, which provide coordination between the fleets and the other forces commanded by the respective districts. As a result, there is now closer horizontal cohesion between the Army and Navy forces. But very little has changed for the structures subordinated to the fleet commands3; they still take their orders from the commanders of the fleets.

Reform of the Navy fleet formationsWhen the reform began, the size of the Russian Navy’s command bodies was not proportionate to the number of ships and submarines in service. The support and logistics services were also bloated.

The ongoing restructuring has aimed to reduce the headcount at the HQs (in the Northern Fleet, 15 per cent of officers and 17 per cent of civilian personnel have been made redundant4). The service in charge of upholding morale (the former political propaganda bodies inherited from Soviet times) also saw very serious cuts. The axe has fallen on the departments that do not directly contribute to the Navy’s fighting ability.5 Many non-combat servicemen have become civilian contractors. In the support and logistics services, many officers who have reached retirement age have been let go.

Overall, the ongoing reform of the Russian Navy has spared the ships and the frontline services (there is simply no room for cuts there), but slashed the oversized command structures and rear services.

Nevertheless, there has been some optimization of the Navy’s frontline units.

The 11th and 12th Submarine Squadrons of the Northern Fleet have become the new Submarine Command6.

The former detachments (Russian ‘divisions’, not ‘diviziya’) that hosted decommissioned nuclear-powered submarines awaiting their turn at the scrapyard (the 366th in Sovetskaya Gavan, the 304th in Vilyuchinsk and the 346th in Vidyaevo) have been disbanded because almost all those submarines have already been scrapped.

Following the bankruptcy of the Avangard Shipyard in Petrozavodsk, which used to build and repair minesweepers, the 94th ‘Division’ that hosted ships awaiting repairs at the plant has been disbanded.7


Armed Forces


The Vydyaevo base area has been downsized to become a coastal base of the 7th Submarine Division.

In late 2010 Aurora cruiser, which became a floating museum in St Petersburg in the early 20th century for its prominent role in the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, was formally decommissioned from the Russian Navy. All its crew, apart from the captain, are now civilians.

The 74th Submarine Division, which was made of boats awaiting repairs at the Nerpa Shipyard, has been disbanded.8 There have been cuts in the Navy engineering units.

The 269th Naval Aviation Communications Station has been reformatted to become part of the 301st Central Navy Communications Station.9

The HQ of the Leningrad Naval Base was relocated to Kronstadt in November 2008.

There have been a series of big cuts in the naval support and hydrographic fleets. A number of divisions have been downsized to become naval support groups, etc.

Reform of the support and logistics systemThe support and logistics units of the individual Fleets and the units taking orders directly from the Navy Command have also undergone substantial reforms. The primary objective was to rid the Navy of responsibilities that should by rights lie elsewhere, so that the central command could devote all its energies to bolstering the Navy’s fighting ability.

Each naval Fleet now has supply and logistics bases (SLBs) which provide the Russian Navy units with fuel, food, various equipment and hardware, and other supplies. These bases have subsumed all the former supply and logistics units of the Navy. There are now five SLBs: in St Petersburg, Astrakhan, Krymsk, Murmansk and Vladivostok.

Several arms and munitions bases have been merged.As part of the effort to rid the MoD of non-military

assets, the government has set up the JSC Oboronservis holding company, which has taken over the housing and utility assets and the heating and power plants which used to be on the Russian Navy’s balance books. Oboronservis has also assumed ownership of the naval communications equipment repair plants, munitions warehouses, and rocket and artillery equipment repair plants.

In late 2009 the 6th Arsenal of the Northern Fleet in Burmakovo was restructured and split into two parts: the No 81269 military unit and the JSC Repairs Center company. The military unit was left in charge of munitions, and the company took over maintenance, repairs and disposal of decommissioned weapons. The Northern Arsenal unit of the MoD (the former 2708th Torpedo Weapons and Ammunition Base) was restructured in March 2010 to become JSC Severnyy Arsenal company, and then incorporated into

JSC Oboronservis. Several construction units have been taken over by JSC Oboronstroy; the farms that previously belonged to the Navy by JSC Agroprom; the local electricity grids by Oboronenergo; the wholesale and retail trade departments of the fleets by Voentorg; the aircraft repair plants by JSC Aviaremont; and the car and truck repair plants by Spetsremont.

All these measures are expected to improve the Navy’s fighting ability and enable its combat units to focus on training. Nevertheless, such large-scale reorganizations always result in some early problems.

The reform has also affected the medical provision system. For example, the Baltic Fleet’s hospitals in Kaliningrad Region have been reorganized into a single medical center, the 1409th Navy Clinical Hospital. It includes the Main Hospital of the Baltic Fleet in Kaliningrad and its branches in Baltiysk and Chernyakhovsk.10

Another typical example is the former 412th Plant of the White Sea Naval Base, which was used for refueling nuclear propulsion reactors. The plant was disbanded on December 1, 2009; its nuclear activities have been taken over by the civilian Zvezdochka Ship Repair Center.11

The Navy’s training and education system has also undergone a radical reorganization. Its research institutes and schools have been merged into a territorially distributed Naval Academy Research and Training Center, which includes the Naval Academy itself, the Higher Special Officer Courses, five naval research institutes, three MoD research institutes (the 1st, the 24th and the 40th), the Nakhimov Naval School and the Kronstadt Naval Cadet Corps. The new center is now subordinated to the education and training department of the MoD rather than the Navy Command.12 The plan is to relocate the center’s HQ to Kronstadt at some point in the future.13

Plans for the naval FleetsProspects for further reform of the Russian Navy can be illustrated by the Black Sea and Pacific fleets.

In 2008 Russia adopted a special program to prioritize the development of the Black Sea Fleet. The decision was made in view of the general military-political situation in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, tense relations with Georgia, the need to provide security during the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi,14 the ongoing operation against piracy in the Indian Ocean, and other foreign policy considerations.

The bulk of the Black Sea Fleet ships are still seaworthy, but most belong in a museum and need to be replaced as a matter of priority. In October 2010 the government announced that the fleet will receive up to 18 new ships and boats by 2020, including nine frigates and six diesel-electric submarines.


Armed Forces


Meanwhile, the Pacific Fleet needs to be strengthened because of the growing global importance of the Asia Pacific region, continuing territorial claims against Russia by Japan, and the need to combat piracy in the Indian Ocean. The first in line for a refresh is the strategic component of the Pacific Fleet; several new Project 955 (Yuriy Dolgorukiy class) nuclear-powered missile submarines will enter service. It is also quite likely that the Mistral class amphibious assault ships for which the Russian MoD has placed an order in France will be assigned to the Pacific Fleet. It has been announced that Marshal Ustinov15 and Admiral Nakhimov16 guided missile cruisers, which currently serve with the Northern Fleet, will be transferred to the Pacific Fleet after repairs. As part of the overall effort to strengthen the Russian forces in the Southern Kuril Islands the MoD also plans to deploy a Bastion-P mobile coastal defense missiles battery there.17

Marines and Coastal TroopsThe Russian Navy’s Coastal Troops have been reformed and the remaining units brought to their full wartime strength. Several units have changed their status, including the former 61st (Northern Fleet) and 22nd (Kamchatka) Marines Brigades, which have become regiments but retained all of their manpower. The reason for the decision was the state of these units’ barracks and living quarters. At some point in the future the two regiments will become brigades once again.18 Meanwhile, the 810th Marines Regiment of the Black Sea Fleet has been brought up in size to a full brigade, gaining a lot of manpower in the process. Under the terms of the 1997 agreement with Ukraine on the stationing of the Russian armed forces on Ukrainian territory, the strength of the Black Sea Fleet’s marines and naval aviation units is limited to 1,987 people. But according to several recent reports, the number of the Black Sea Fleet’s marines stationed in Sevastopol is as high as 2,473 people.19

The Russian Navy’s only remaining marines division, the 55th, based in Vladivostok, has been formally downsized to become the 155th Marines Brigade – but its manpower has actually gone up.

The 77th Marines Brigade of the Caspian Flotilla has been disbanded (the brigade was created to take part in the counter-terrorism operation in the North Caucasus), but the bulk of it – two marines battalions in Astrakhan and Kaspiysk – have escaped cuts.

The Baltic Fleet’s Coastal Troops and Ground Forces in Kaliningrad Region have also undergone restructuring. All the skeleton-strength formations have been either disbanded or reorganized. The arms depots have ceased to exist; the weaponry they held has been used to equip the remaining units. As part of the program to create larger garrisons by 2012 the 336th Marines Brigade will be relocated to a new base

now being built in Baltiysk.20 The numerical strength of the brigade will increase from the current 2,500 servicemen to 4,000 by 2012.21

There have been serious changes in the personnel structure of the Navy’s marine and coastal troops. The units previously manned only by professional soldiers serving under contract now use conscripts as privates; only junior officer and sergeant positions are filled with professional soldiers. A case in point is the assault battalion of the Northern Fleet’s marines, which was manned only by professional soldiers. Now conscripts account for 70 per cent of its manpower.22

Many units have also received some new weapons. Several have taken delivery of new or upgraded BTR-80M and BTR-70M APCs, new trucks, small arms, communication instruments, and 120mm 2S9 Nona-S artillery systems. The MoD has also begun to rearm the Navy’s coastal defense missile and artillery units.23,24

Naval aviationEarly on during the reform the naval aviation and support units were reorganized into 13 airbases. Only the 279th Independent Ship-based Fighter Regiment (Su-33 aircraft) has retained its former status. Most of the new airbases were formed through merger within a single chain of command of all the units stationed at the same airfield.

During the second stage of the reform the airbases of each Fleet were merged into territorially integrated structures (“greater” airbases). To illustrate, all the naval aviation units of the Baltic Fleet have been merged into a single airbase with an HQ at the Chkalovskiy airfield.25 The former airbases now have the status of air groups. All the air defense units of the Baltic Fleet have been merged under the 3rd Aerospace Defense Brigade.

The MoD has formed a new naval aviation training center in Yeysk on the Azov Sea. The center has incorporated the former 859th Training Center and the 444th Combat Training Center in Ostrov. There are plans to build in Yeysk a analog of an aircraft carrier deck for naval pilots to practice take-offs and landings; the simulator will be similar to the NITKA training range in the Crimea.26

The initial plan of the reform included the transfer of several naval aviation and air defense units to the Air Force – but so far that has not been implemented. The idea was resurrected in the spring of 2011. It was said that naval missile-carrying long-range aviation units (Tu-22M3 aircraft), as well as naval attack (Su-24) and fighter aviation (Su-27 and MiG-31) units, apart from a single attack aviation unit stationed in the Crimea, will become part of the Air Force by the end of 2011.27 The MoD has even considered the feasibility of transferring the 279th


Armed Forces


Independent Ship-based Fighter Aviation Regiment to the Russian Air Force.

One of the top priorities for the naval aviation fleet refresh program is the Black Sea Fleet.28 But due to political reasons (i.e. the need to secure Ukraine’s consent) the implementation of these plans is likely to see long delays.

The naval aviation fleet refresh program includes the delivery over the coming decade of the first batch of the MiG-29K carrier-based fighters, as well as the Ka-27M, Ka-29M, Ka-31 and Ka-52 helicopters. The MoD has also launched the development of a new carrier-based helicopter, the Ka-65. But the current status of the programs to develop new patrol and submarine hunter aircraft is unclear. Meanwhile, the MoD has stepped up the Navy aircraft repair programs (for the Su-33, MiG-31 and Su-27 fighters and the Su-24M attack aircraft).

Shipbuilding and ship repairsThe bulk of the Russian Navy fleet is made of old Soviet

ships built in the late 1980s and early 1990s. There is only a handful of ships in service that were built after the fall of the former Soviet Union. The Russian Navy has essentially “skipped” a whole generation of warships.

The main problem now is to maintain the existing ships, most of which have already been in service for more than half of their allotted lifespan, until the new generation begins to arrive en masse. With timely upgrades and proper maintenance, the existing Soviet-designed ships still have many years of service left in them.

In late 2010 the government unveiled the new State Armament Program for 2011-2020 (GPV-2020). A very impressive 19 trillion roubles will be spent on buying new weaponry and hardware for the MoD, of which the Navy will account for 4.7 trillion.29 It has been announced that about 100 new warships and submarines of various classes will be built by 2020, including 20 subs, 15 frigates and 35 corvettes.30

Based on media reports, this is what it known about the program:

The core of the strategic naval forces will be made of eight new nuclear-powered missile subs Yuriy Dolgorukiy class (Project 955 and its modifications) armed with the Bulava SLBM.31

Up to 10 Project 855 (Severodv insk class and modifications) nuclear-powered attack submarines should enter service by 2020.32 They will be the last fourth-generation nuclear-powered submarines to be built for the Russian Navy. The development of the future fifth-generation attack subs has already been announced.33

Six Project 06363 (Novorossiysk class) diesel-electric submarines will be built for the Black Sea Fleet. The last two

Project 677 (St. Petersburg class) subs that have already been laid down will be completed. Once that is done, the Russian shipbuilders will launch production of new non-nuclear subs with AIP power plants (based on Project 677).34

Two series of frigates will be built; six Project 22350 ships (Admiral Flota Sovetskogo Soyuza Gorshkov class) to be built at the Severnaya Verf shipyards35, and six modified Project 11356 (Admiral Grigorovich class) frigates to be built at the Yantar shipyards. After that the MoD will probably launch an entirely new class of frigates.

Twelve Project 20381 and 20385 (Steregushchiy class) corvettes are to be built at the Severnaya Verf shipyards36 or the Amur Shipyards. The MoD is also expected to launch the development of a new corvette series; up to 22 are to be built by 2020.37 The contract is likely to be awarded to the Zelenodolskiy shipyards (which will also complete the Project 11611K Dagestan corvette now being built).

The MoD is likely to continue building Project 11711 (Admiral Gren class) large tank landing ships. Some kind of decision is also expected on the proposal to build two to four French-designed Mistral class amphibious assault ships; negotiations between Russia and France are still under way.

The repair and upgrade component of the GPV-2020 includes the refurbishment of the existing Project 1144 nuclear-powered guided missile battlecruisers; the Admiral Nakhimov is the first in line for refurbishment.38 The MoD will also upgrade its fleet of third-generation Project 971, 949A and 945 nuclear-powered submarines.

One interesting change is that each Fleet will now be assigned an individual shipyard to be in sole charge of that Fleet’s ship repair program. The ships belonging to the Northern Fleet, the Caspian Flotilla and the Novorossiysk Naval Base will be handled by the Zvezdochka Ship Repair Center company.39 The Baltic Fleet’s ships have been assigned to the Yantar Shipyard.40 In addition, there is now a special department within the central MoD that oversees these contracts, whereas previously that was the remit of the Navy’s technical department.

ConclusionThe reform of the Russian Navy is still a work in progress. It appears that the early reform plans have undergone a substantial transformation, and new changes are sure to be announced. But given the MoD’s gyrations over the transfer of the Navy HQ from Moscow to St Petersburg and the continuing uncertainty over the handover of naval aviation to the Air Force, it is safe to conclude that the government has no clear unanimous vision of the Navy reform. The reason for that is that the government is still trying to decide what kind of Navy Russia actually needs.


Armed Forces


1 http://www.flot.com/news/navy/?ELEMENT_ID=659952 http://www.otvazhnyy.ru/3 http://www.redstar.ru/2011/03/23_03/3_03.html4 http://twower.livejournal.com/520535.html5 It must be remembered, however, that efficiency is not everything; there are also long-standing Navy traditions that need to be taken

into consideration.6 murman.rfn.ru/rnews.html?id=8494917 http://www.ryadovoy.ru/forum/index.php?action=printpage;topic=1973.08 http://www.mbnews.ru/content/view/22586/9 http://www.esosedi.ru/onmap/us_vmf_mo_rf_v_ch_49383/5768796/index.html#lat=55738837&lng=37888337&z=17&v=3&mt=010 http://www.newkaliningrad.ru/news/community/k1194720.html11 http://www.proatom.ru/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=195912 http://www.navy.ru/news/navy/?ELEMENT_ID=6504713 http://nvo.ng.ru/forces/2009-06-26/4_Kronshtadt.html14 http://www.navy.ru/news/navy/?ELEMENT_ID=6696915 http://www.lenta.ru/news/2011/03/23/atlant/16 http://lenta.ru/news/2011/03/25/cruiser/17 http://lenta.ru/news/2011/03/01/bastion/18 http://www.echo.msk.ru/programs/voensovet/729189-echo/19 http://sannews.com.ua/2010/09/drugoj-chernomorskij-flot.html20 http://www.redstar.ru/2011/03/22_03/2_02.html21 http://www.klops.ru/news/Obschestvo/37376/V-2012-godu-morskie-pexotincy-Baltflota-pereedut-iz-kazarm-v-novye-doma.html22 http://www.redstar.ru/2010/11/24_11/5_03.html23 http://www.gostorgi.ru/2010/91/2010-10-14/91-46055.xml24 http://www.redstar.ru/2010/05/27_05/2_01.html25 http://www.redstar.ru/2010/10/13_10/2_02.html26 http://www.livekuban.ru/content/news/palubnaja-aviacija-prizemlitsja-v-ejske27 http://www.rian.ru/defense_safety/20110323/356933280.html28 Black Sea Fleet to receive 18 new ships // Interfax, October 26, 201029 http://www.redstar.ru/2010/12/15_12/1_01.html30 http://lenta.ru/news/2011/02/24/ships/31 http://www.redstar.ru/2011/03/17_03/1_04.html32 http://www.redstar.ru/2011/03/17_03/1_04.html33 http://www.arms-tass.su/?page=article&aid=93156&cid=2534 http://lenta.ru/news/2011/03/18/submarine/35 http://www.spbgid.ru/index.php?news=21313036 http://flotprom.ru/news/index.php?ELEMENT_ID=6549737 http://shipbuilding.ru/rus/news/russian/2011/03/10/Trosenko_dizain_100311/38 http://vpk.name/news/51959_modernizaciya_tyazhelogo_atomnogo_raketnogo_kreisera_admiral_nahimov_poka_ne_

nachalas__sevmash.html39 http://flotprom.ru/news/?ELEMENT_ID=6439340 http://www.shipyard-yantar.ru/docs/G_vpered/2011/06%2811%29.pdf


Facts & Figures

Incidents Involving Russian Submarines in 1992-2010

Incidents Involving Russian Submarines in 1992-2010Mikhail Lukin, Kommersant publishing house

Date Tactical number

Class Place of incident

Commander Description Ca-sual-ties

11 February 1992

K-276 945 (Sierra I) – nuclear-powered attack submarine

Kildinskiy Reach, Barents Sea

Captain 2nd Rank Igor Lokot

While rising to periscope depth, the sub collided with the USS Baton Rouge (SSN 689), which was sitting above it. The Russian submarine failed to detect the US sub using sonar equipment either before or after the collision. The K-276 sustained damage to its sail, periscopes and antennas. The repairs took 10 months to complete

0

29 May 1992 B-502 671PTMK (Victor III Mod) – nuclear-powered attack submarine

Severomorsk, Murmansk Oblast

Captain 1st Rank Vasily Melnik

While training at sea, weapons specialists noticed a fault with a high-pressure compressor in Compartment 1. Upon the sub’s return to base, Capt 1st Rank Konstantin Lyashkov, head of the division’s electrical and mechanical maintenance service, came on board. When the compressor was restarted, its buffer tank blew up, starting a fire. Five sailors were injured. Capt Lyashkov died on the way to hospital

1

27 September or 1 October 1992

Northern Fleet nuclear submarine

Barents Sea During a storm, there was a short circuit due to wear and tear on the fuse insulation in the main starboard electric board. Several compartments rapidly filled up with smoke. The sub was towed to base after an emergency reactor shutdown.

0

19 November 1992

K-18 667BDRM (Delta IV) – nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine

Motovsky Gulf, Barents Sea

Captain 1st Rank Andrey Bezkorovayny

During physical field measurements the submarine collided with an SFP-562 acoustic trials ship due to a maneuvering error

0

1992 Possibly K-477

667B (Delta I) – nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine

La Perouse strait

Collided with an underground rock at 20-25 knots, sustaining serious damage to the non-pressure hull

0

30 January 1993

Northern Fleet nuclear submarine

Polyarny, Murmansk Oblast

Fire on board while the submarine was sitting in a boatyard 0

20 March 1993

K-407 667BDRM (Delta IV)– nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine

Barents Sea, 120 miles north-east of the entrance to the Kola Bay

Captain 1st Rank Andrey Bulgakov

Collided with the USS Grayling (SSN 646) sub, which was tracking it during exercises, and sustained minor damage to the non-pressure hull

0

16 August 1993

K-461 Volk 971 (Akula) – nuclear-powered attack submarine

During the launch of the main power plant the crew mistakenly decided that the primary coolant circuit had sprung a leak. They triggered the emergency reactor shutdown system. Due to errors made by the crew a number of systems, including steam generators, were damaged

0

15 September 1993

Pacific Fleet nuclear submarine

Fokino, Primorsky Krai

A fire on board an inoperational submarine, in Compartment 2, which was being used as storage for paint cans. The compartment had to be flooded to put the fire out

0


Armed Forces





5 March 1994 B-123 705K (Alfa) – nuclear-powered attack submarine

Barents Sea The sub got trapped in the net of the Professor Klenov fishing trawler, which had strayed into a military training range. After careful maneuvering the sub managed to untangle itself from the net and resurface

0

23 March 1994

K-487 and B-138

667BDR (Delta III) – nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine and 671RTMK (Victor III Mod) – nuclear-powered attack submarine

Barents Sea Due to lack of coordination between the HQ and the two commanders, both subs were unaware of each other’s presence in the same area and failed to detect each other using sonar equipment. The B-138 collided with the K-487 while resurfacing

0

August 1994 B-305 671RTM (Victor III) – nuclear-powered attack submarine

The submarine surfaced and continued to proceed during a storm. A wave inundated the air inlet of the ventilation system, flooding an electric board. The resulting short circuit started a fire in the turbine compartment

0

30 November 1994

B-448 671RTMK (Victor III) – nuclear-powered attack submarine

Captain 1st Rank Michael Ivanisov

In a submerged position, water started leaking into Compartment 2 after the crew tried to use the DUK waste removal system (designed for ejecting solid waste while the sub is submerged). The fault was caused by plastic bags trapped under the front lid and on the ventilation valve of the DUK system

0

18 February 1995

B-534 945A (Sierra II) – nuclear-powered attack submarine

Bolshaya Lopatkina Guba, Barents Sea

Captain 1st Rank Alexey Shchurenko

While the submarine was trying to dock with its turbine already working in reverse direction, the captain erroneously gave the “Reverse” command, as a result of which the sub accelerated instead of slowing down and crashed into a sand bank, sustaining serious damage to the sonar dome and antenna

0

19 March 1995

B-401 877 (Kilo) – diesel-powered attack submarine

Fire in Compartment 4 during cleaning at the base as a result of oil-soaked wiping rags being placed on regeneration plates

0

26 April 1995 K-487 667BDR (Delta III) – nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine

While the sub was at sea the crew found that the primary cooling circuit of the rector was leaking coolant at the rate of 25-30 liters a day. The submarine returned to base, where technicians checked the reactor and said it was no longer safe to use. In 1998 the whole sumbarine was decommissioned

0

9 June 1995 B-255 671RTM (Victor III) – nuclear-powered attack submarine

Captain 1st Rank Victor Kvasov

While leaving the dock with its starboard shaft out of order, the sub, which had already shut down the propellers, bumped against a PD-18 floating dock, punching a hole in the dock’s ballast tank

0

December 1995


Captain 2nd Rank Sergey Spravtsev

Burst piping in a refrigeration unit used to cool down the navigation system resulted in freon gas leaking into the sub’s compartments. The crew managed to fix the rupture and vent the gas without resurfacing (the submarine was on combat duty)

0

September 1996

B-101 641 (Foxtrot) – diesel-electric attack submarine

Small Ulysses Bay, Primorsky Krai

The sub, which had been decommissioned in 1993 and was awaiting scrapping, sank by the pier wall

0

16 October 1996

K-331 Narval 971 (Akula) – nuclear-powered attack submarine

Northeastern Pacific, 700 miles from Kamchatka

Captain 1st Rank Igor Krylov

While the submarine was on combat duty the graphite seal of the propeller shaft sprang a leak; water started flooding the stern compartment. The leak was sealed, but because the main shaft was now out of order the submarine could not use the turbine. It surfaced and headed to base (Krasheninnikov Harbor in Kamchatka) using auxiliary propulsion units. It covered the 1,000-mile distance in 10 days, moving at a speed of 3-4 knots

0


Facts & Figures





29 May 1997 B-313 670 (Charlie I) – nuclear-powered cruise missile submarine

Krasheninnikov Bay, Kamchatka

The sub was moored at the pier awaiting scrapping after being decommissioned in 1992. It first took a nose-up angle, presumably after ice ruptured the stern tanks of the diving ballast, and then sank at the depth of about 20 meters after water started leaking into the pressure hull via the ventilation vents and the upper conning tower hatch. The sub was lifted only in October 1997 after four unsuccessful attempts

0

October 1997 K-419 Morzh 971 (Akula) – nuclear-powered attack submarine

Fire in the turbine compartment due to oil leaking onto steam pipe insulation. The fire was put out after the crew triggered the LOKh (submarine volumetric chemical fire suppression) system

0

29 November 1997

B-187 877 (Kilo) - diesel-electric attack submarine

Langkawi Island, Malaysia

Captain 2nd Rank Yuriy Vikhrov

The submarine, which had arrived in Malaysia to take part in the LIMA-97 international aerospace and naval exhibition, was mooring at a floating pier. The pier was not anchored properly and shifted when the sub nudged against it. As a result, the gangway that connected the pier to the shore fell into the water. Two people were standing on the gangway when it fell. One of them, a 63-year-old retired Malaysian captain, died after hitting the pier during his fall

1

26 January 1998

B-527 671RTM (Victor III) – nuclear-powered attack submarine

Zapadnaya Litsa Bay, Kola Peninsula

Captain 2nd Rank Viktor Bugruv

During the launch of the main power plant the peripheral compensating grill of the No 1 reactor failed to descend all the way down. As one of the crew members tried to remove the seal of an adjusting screw, water suddenly began to leak from the primary (radioactive) circuit of the reactor. Five people inhaled radioactive vapor. An hour later an emergency response squad sealed the leak and decontaminated the compartment. Six hours later Capt 3rd Rank Sergey Solovyev, head of the propulsion division, who was trying to remove the seal when the reactor sprang the leak, died in hospital from “cardiovascular failure and cardiac arrest”

1

5 May 1998 K-447 667B (Delta I) –nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine

Arctic Ocean Captain 1st Rank S. Safronov

While the submarine was on combat duty, during under-ice navigation, water started leaking into missile bay No 11. The crew managed to prevent a full-blown accident, the submarine returned to base (Okolnaya Bay)

0

11 September 1998

K-157 Vepr 971 (Akula) – nuclear-powered attack submarine

Village Skalisty, Kola Peninsula

Captain 2nd Rank Oleg Telushkin

Torpedo specialist Aleksandr Kuzminykh killed eight fellow crewmen, injured an officer, and barricaded himself in the bow (torpedo) compartment, threatening to blow up the ammunition but not making any specific demands. After almost 24 hours an assault team entered the compartment and found that Kuzminykh had been killed in the explosion of a regeneration cartridge

8

17 August 1999

B-336 Pskov 945A (Sierra II) – nuclear-powered attack submarine

Polyarny, Murmansk Oblast

Captain 1st Rank Igor Khripunov

The submarine was sitting in a boatyard dock when the LOKh (submarine volumetric chemical fire suppression) system went off in Compartment 1. The officer on duty, Capt 3rd Rank Vitaliy Voziyan was poisoned by freon vapor as he was inspecting the compartment and died of brain and lung edema

1

28 January 2000


Barents Sea A wave washed away the chief officer and the commander of the mine and torpedo service (BCh-3) as they were trying to cut a loose mooring line on the upper deck

2


Facts & Figures





12 August 2000

K-141 Kursk 949A (Oscar II) – nuclear-powered cruise missile submarine

Barents Sea Captain 1st Rank Gennadiy Lyachin

The submarine was taking part in an exercise of the Northern Fleet. Apart from the crew there was a group of officers from the division HQ and civilian specialists of the Dagdiesel plant on board. At 1128 an underwater explosion was detected in the area of the maneuvers, followed by another one two minutes later. A search and rescue operation was mounted after no communication was received from the sub for several hours. The following day the K-141 was found lying on the sea floor at the depth of 108 meters. Repeated attempts by the S&R team to enter the boat were unsuccessful. On August 21 the crew were officially pronounced dead. In October-November 2000 the bodies of 12 crew members were lifted to the surface in an operation involving Norwegian diving specialists. After the wreck was lifted to the surface, the government announced that the cause of the accident was detonation of the sub’s torpedo ammunition. It still remains unclear what really happened; dozens of versions have been proposed. The wreck was salvaged in October 2001 and scrapped

118

2001 B-495 671RT (Victor II) – nuclear-powered attack submarine

Ura Bay, Kola Peninsula

Fire in the turbine compartment caused by a faulty electric heater. The sub had been decommissioned in 1993

0

29 June 2002 K-104 675MK (Echo II Mod) – nuclear-powered cruise missile submarine

Pala Bay, Murmansk Oblast

The decommissioned submarine, which was sitting on keel blocks at the PD-63 floating dock of the No 10 ship repair yard took a portside list and bumped against the pontoon deck. The deck sustained serious damage

0

September 2002

K-84 Ekaterinburg

667BDRM (Delta IV) – nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine

White Sea Captain 1st Rank Andrey Pavlovskiy

A VVD-type valve burst during a trial run, one of the technicians was injured, the sub urgently returned to base

0

23 October 2002

B-22 675MKV (Echo II Mod) – nuclear-powered cruise missile submarine

Rosta, Murmansk Oblast

Fire in the dry dock as the submarine, which had been decommissioned in 1994, was being scrapped. The fire was caused by failure to take proper precautions during welding work

0

21 November 2002

Pacific Fleet nuclear submarine

Pavlovsk Bay, Primorsky Krai

Fire in Compartments 4 and 5 caused by faulty electric heaters. The sub was not operational at the time. The fire took close to 24 hours to put out

0

5 March 2003 B-336 Pskov 945A (Sierra II) – nuclear-powered attack submarine

Roslyakovo, Murmansk Oblast

Captain 1st Rank Igor Khripunov

The sub’s rubber skin caught fire during welding work at a floating dock of Ship Repair Yard No 82

0

30 August 2003

K-159 627A (November) – nuclear-powered attack submarine

Barents Sea, 3 miles north-west of the island Kildin

Captain 2nd Rank Sergey Lappa

The decommissioned nuclear submarine was being towed from a base in Gremikha to the Polyarnaya base for scrapping. Its nuclear reactor had been shut down. During a storm the pontoons welded to the rusty outer hull broke off. The sub sank at the depth of about 170 meters. One of the 10 towing team members was rescued after spending about 2 hours in icy water. The other nine were lost

9

7 January 2004

B-15 641 (Foxtrot) – diesel-electric attack submarine

Ulysses Bay, Primorsky Krai

The sub, which had been decommissioned in 1992, sank during an attempt to tow it through solid ice

0

14 October 2004

K-266 Orel 949A (Oscar II) – nuclear-powered cruise missile submarine

Motovsky Gulf, Barents Sea

The balancing tank at the bow blew up due to a faulty safety valve when the sub was submerged. Compartment 9 sustained serious damage

0

# 2, 2011 Moscow Defense Brief 27Incidents Involving Russian Submarines in 1992-2010




14 November 2004

K-223 Podolsk 667BDR (Delta III) – nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine

Vilyuchinsk, Kamchatka

Captain 1st Rank Andrey Khaydukov

Crew members were refilling the accumulator with water in Compartment 2. To that end water from Fresh Water Tank No 3 was being pumped into a refilling tank and then into the accumulator. Due to corrosion of the pressure reducer valve water was being pumped into the refilling tank at a much higher pressure than normal; the tank eventually blew up, throwing one of the crew members against a compartment wall. He later died of head injuries. Two other crew members sustained minor injuries

1

1 August 2005

B-298 671RTM (Victor III) – nuclear-powered attack submarine


Ignition of diesel fumes during welding work as the boat, which had been decommissioned in May 1998 and was being scrapped at the Zvezdochka plant. Two technicians were killed

2

4 August 2005

AS-28 1855 Priz – deep-water SAR submercible

Birch Bay, Kamchatka

Lieutenant Commander Vyacheslav Milashevskiy

The submersible, which had seven people on board, became trapped in cabling and nets as it tried to dismantle underwater sonar equipment on the sea floor. The submersible was lifted three days later after a rescue operation involving British specialists

0

12 April 2006 Pacific Fleet nuclear submarine

Vilyuchinsk, Kamchatka

Wiping rags caught fire during welding works in one of the compartments

0

7 September 2006

B-414 Daniil Moskovsky

671RTMK (Victor III Mod) – nuclear-powered attack submarine

Rybachiy peninsula, Barents Sea

Captain 1st Rank Vladimir Volkov

Fire in Compartment 6 (electromechanical equipment) caused by a short circuit. The fire triggered the reactor’s emergency shutdown. Warrant officer Rafim Shabanov and seaman Igor Etyuev died from carbon monoxide poisoning before they could put their oxygen masks on. The sub was towed to base

2

2 November 2006

K-317 Pantera 971 (Akula) – nuclear-powered attack submarine

Severodvinsk, Arkhangelsk Oblast

During repairs at the Severnoye Machine-Building Company wiping rags caught fire during welding works. The fire spread to the wooden deck and then cables in Compartment 3. The Compartment was sealed to starve the fire of oxygen, but during later reconnaissance seven people suffered fumes and freon poisoning

0

8 November 2008

K-152 Nerpa 971I (Akula Mod) – nuclear-powered attack submarine

Sea of Japan Captain 1st Rank Dmitriy Lavrentev

During sea trials the LOKh (submarine volumetric chemical fire suppression) system went off while the submarine was submerged, leading to mass poisoning which killed three crew members and 17 civilian specialists (there were more than 200 people on board). The main version is that the LOKh system was accidentally triggered by one of the crew members, with design faults contributing to the tragedy. Another factor that contributed to the high number of fatalities is that the freon in the LOKh system was contaminated by highly toxic ethylene tetrachloride

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25 March 2009

BS-411 Orenburg

09774 (Yankee-Stretch)– nuclear-powered submarine-submersibles carrier

The rubber skin caught fire during gas welding work as the vessel was being scrapped after decommissioning in 2004

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19 February 2010

K-480 Ak Bars 971 (Akula) – nuclear-powered attack submarine


Fire in the hold of Compartment 3 during gas cutting work as the submarine was being scrapped at the Zvezdochka plant. The fire took 15 hours to put out, the pressure hull had to be cut from the outside in the process

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Facts & Figures


Our AuthorsMikhail Barabanov. Graduated from the Moscow National University of Culture, then worked for the Moscow City Government. Editor-in-Chief of MDB since 2008. An expert on naval history and armaments.

Dmitry Boltenkov, a graduate of the Rostov State University, is a naval historian and independent navy analyst. He is also the author of an upcoming treatise on the history of the Soviet and Russian naval aviation.

Anton Lavrov. Graduated from the Tver State Technical University. An independent aviation analyst and one of the most prominent independent Russian researchers of the 2008 Russian-Georgian War.

Mikhail Lukin. Graduated in 1992 from Moscow State University with a degree in Journalism. In 1990 joined the Postfactum news agency as an editor. In 1993 became a staff member of the XX Century and the World think-tank, and in 1994–1997 worked as head of the information section in the National News Service. In 1997 became deputy director of the information center of the Kommersant Publishing House. Director of the information center of the Kommersant Publishing House since 2003.

Konstantin Makienko. Graduated from the Oriental Department of the Moscow National Institute for International Relations in 1995 and the French-Russian Masters’ School of Political Science and International Relations in 1996. He was head of a project on conventional armaments at the Center for Policy Studies in Russia (PIR-Center) in 1996-1997. Since September of 1997, he has been Deputy Director of CAST. He is the author of numerous articles on Russia’s military-technical cooperation with other countries.

Aleksandr Stukalin is a graduate of the Bauman Moscow State Technical University. Joined Kommersant, Russia’s leading broadsheet, in 1992 and became the newspaper’s editor-in-chief in 2004. Deputy editor-in-chief of the Russian Newsweek in 2005–2008. Deputy editor-in-chief of the Vedomosti newspaper in March-September 2008. Deputy editor-in-chief of Kommersant from October 2008 to date.

Moscow Defense Brief - WikiLeakswikileaks.org/gifiles/attach/175/175998_mdb_2_2011_sm.pdf ·...

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Transcript of Moscow Defense Brief - WikiLeakswikileaks.org/gifiles/attach/175/175998_mdb_2_2011_sm.pdf ·...