Moscow and the Birth of Bangladesh

8/3/2019 Moscow and the Birth of Bangladesh

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Moscow and the Birth of BangladeshAuthor(s): Vijay Sen BudhrajReviewed work(s):Source: Asian Survey, Vol. 13, No. 5 (May, 1973), pp. 482-495Published by: University of California PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2642797 .

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MOSCOW ANDTHEBIRTHOF BANGLADESH/Vijay enBudhraj

whatevereking nd Islamabadmaysay,' it is wrong o assert hatSovietRussia had a handin thedismembermentf Pakistan. ndeed, heweight fevidence uggestshatMoscow ought opreventhethirdndia-PakistanWar which ed to Pakistan'sbreakup.From theverystart heSovietgovernmentad tried obring ometo themilitaryunta n Islama-bad theneedfor eeking political olution othecomplicatedituationnEast Pakistan, elievinghat hiswas theonlywaytokeepPakistanunited,to maintain eace andtocheck he nterferencef Peking ndWashingtonina region lose o theUSSR.SOVIET REACTION TO THE OUTBREAK OF CIVIL WAR

lNo doubtthe situationwas complicated. he general lection, eld inDecember1970, clearlyrevealed he existence f,to quote ZulfikarAliBhutto,twomajority arties" n Pakistan, ne inthe easternwingwheretheAwami eague (AL) had secured 67 of 169 EastPakistan eats nthe313-memberationalAssemblyndtheother nWestPakistanwhere hePakistan eople'sParty PPP) had secured 8 of144WestPakistan eats.Whentoward heend ofMarch 1971 themilitaryunta arrested heikhMujiburRahman, utlawed heAL, and launched military perationnEastPakistan ocrush hemovementordemocracyndautonomy,heALannouncedhe stablishmentf a sovereign,ndependentepublic fBang-ladesh.Inresponseothis ituation,ovieteaders ouldsaythat hey ad knownthatreligious nitywould ultimatelyroveto be illusory,oreven in thelate 1940sSoviet ndologists ad denouncedhepartition lan. They hadargued hat ritishmperialismrovoked eligiousmassacresnd usedthemas an excuse ordividing he ountrynd that hedivision f ndia wasnosolutionothe ommunal roblem.n theearly 950s they escribed akis-tan as an "artificial"tate, geographical bsurditywith ts two wings

'On December 10, 1971,PekingReview rguedthat"with the backing of Soviet re-visionistsocial-imperialism,he Indian reactionaries nvaded Pakistan . . . to imposethe puppet regime of the so-called Bangla Desh' so as to . . .annex East Pakistan."(Vol. XIV, No. 50), p. 12. Z. A. Bhuttostated in the SecurityCouncil thatMoscowwas a "partyto Pakistan's dismemberment"nd that India was "arrogantenoughtodefythe will of the GeneralAssembly"because it stood on "the shoulders of a bigpower," he USSR. S/PV. 1611,December12,1971.482


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VIJAY SEN BUDHRAJ 483separated y a thousandmilesofIndianterritory.talindubbed heveryconcept f Pakistan primitive"ndN. S. KhrushcheveldthatWesternimperialismadmadethe "twoHindustan tates"bitter nemies.Duringhis visitto India in 1955,the Soviet eader said in Srinagar hathe wasconvincedhat whenpassions... calmeddown," hepeoplewouldregretthe"artificial ivision f India." But in the1960s,whenPekinghumbledNewDelhi n theHimalayas, heSovietsbeganto improveheirrelationswith akistan.2Moreover,n 1971theSovietshad to consider he trategicimplicationsf civilwar"in the mmediateicinityf theUSSR" againstthebackgroundftheir eep nvolvementn theregion,heSino-Soviet is-pute ndrivalry,hina'seffortsopromoteubversionnWestBengalandNagaland, ndWashington'sttemptso improvetsrelations ithPeking.It is importantonote hat incethe1965warbetweenndia andPakistan,theSoviets ad beendevisingmeans obring he"two blood brothers"onthe ubcontinentloser ogethers a meansofensuringtability,eace andsecurityndreducinghe nfluencef outside owersntheregionnordertosafeguardMoscow's outheasternlank.WhenthePakistani roopswentinto ctionn East Pakistan, ensofthousands f terrifiedast Pakistanispourednto ndia.Sincemost efugees ereHindus, twas feared hat hesubcontinentightwitnessherenewal ftheHindu-Muslimiots f1947,which ould have underminedndia's stability, bstructedts rapid andorderlyrogress,nddestroyedll Soviethopesof nvolvingoth ndia andPakistannMoscow's ecuritylansfortheregion.Thatwasnot ll.SinceallSoviet ttemptsoweanPakistan romWashing-tonandPekinghad beenunsuccessfulndsinceGeneralYahyaKhan hadrefusedn1969toaccept he ovietplanforregional conomic ooperationbetweenndia,Pakistan,ranandAfghanistanalthough fewweeks arlierhehadcommittedimself o supportt), theSoviet eaders ookedforwardtothe stablishmentf a democraticovernmentnPakistan, elieving hatsuch governmentould ursue differentolicy. utthe rmyrack-downinEastPakistan ashed ll Soviethopesof an early eturnocivilian ule nPakistan.Somethingad tobe donetorestore ormalcynEastPakistan. hepeo-pleof ndia, speciallyfpoliticallyensitiveWestBengal, ondemnedrmyatrocitiesnEast Pakistan nd demanded hat heir overnmenthoulddosomethingostop hereign fterror. ccordingly,nMarch31 the ndianParliamentalleduponall countriesopersuadePakistan ostop"the ys-tematicecimationfpeoplewhich mountsogenocide."Moreover,t as-sured the75million eopleofEastBengal .. thewhole-heartedympathyandsupportfthepeopleof ndia."13

2For details, see this author's "The Evolutionof Russia's Pakistan Policy," TheAustralianJournalof Politics and History,December 1971 (Vol. XVI, No. 3), pp.343-360.'For theresolution's ulltext, ee Bangla Desh Documents (New Delhi, Ministry fExternalAffairs,971),p. 672.


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484 MOSCOW AND THE BIRTH OF BANGLADESHThe Sovietgovernmentespondedo the ndianappeal immediately.nbehalf f hePresidium ftheSupreme ovietof theUSSR, President od-gornywarned resident ahyaKhan onApril2 that continuationfre-

pressivemeasures nd bloodshed n East Pakistanwill,undoubtedly,nlymake he olution f theproblemmoredifficult"nd could"do greatharmtothevital nterestsf theentire eopleofPakistan."He consideredthis"duty" o appeal to thePresident fPakistan to stop the bloodshed ndrepression"nd toturn tomethodsf a peaceful ettlement"n the nterestof "preservingeace in the area." He showedhis sympathy ortheALleaderswhenhespokeofthem shaving received uch onvincingupportfromheoverwhelming ajority." ut est hisfriendlydvicebe regardedas interferencen Pakistan's nternal ffairs,he SovietPresidenttated:Inappealingoyouweareguided y hegenerallyecognizedumani-tarian rinciplesecordedn heUniversaleclarationfHuman ightsandby oncernor hewelfaref hefriendlyeople fPakistan.4

Three hings houldbe notedhere.Theemphasis nandconcern or theentire eopleof Pakistan" mentionedwice) in theSovietmessage ndi-catedthatMoscowwasonthe ide of the tatus uo-it didnotwantPaki-stan'sbreakup. econd, hereferenceo "peace in thearea" revealed hatMoscowthoughthatpoliticalchaos and fighting ithinPakistancouldoverflownd escalate nto a warbetweenndia and Pakistan-a situationMoscowwasdeterminedoprevent.hird, he ppealreflectedovietRus-sia's deepconcern or heregion.Itappears hatMoscowwasoftheview hat hePakistanGovernmentasdivided n the"toughpolicy" ssue.A Sovietwriter lamed"a groupofarmy awks" or heuseofforcendseemed o mplyhatwhen he hawks"threateneda coup if thegovernmentompromised ith he eastern rov-ince," President ahya Khan was led to crush hepopularmovementyforce farms.Commentingn somereportsntheWesternresswhich re-dicted hebreakup fPakistan,he oviet pokesman bserved hat hiswaswhat"certain mperialistircles"hopedand that theimperialists ouldnotbeaverse otaking dvantage f he ituationn Pakistan ofurtherheirselfish,eo-colonialistims."5Finally, e assertedhatwhileEastPakistanileadershad certainconomic rievances,ncethesewereredressedhetwowings, espite heir ultural ifferences,ould work ogether orthe pros-perity f hewhole fPakistan.This approach ervedMoscow's nterestsn severalways. First, ny en-couragementothe ecessionist ovementouldhave eopardizedMoscow's'For full textof PresidentPodgorny'smessage, see "Message fromN. V. Podgornyto the President of Pakistan,"CurrentDigest of the Soviet Press (hereafterCDSP),May 4, 1971 (Vol. XXIII, No. 14), pp. 35-36 (fromPravda, April 4, 1971), "SovietUnion & the Struggleof the Bangla Desh People," SovietReview (supplement), Jan-uary18, 72 (Vol. IX,No. 3), pp.8-9.'A. Ulansky, The Events nPakistan,"New Times,No. 15, April1971,p. 9.


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VIJAY SEN BUDHRAJ 485presencen Islamabad. econd,other reatpowerswith nterestsn there-gion stood olidly ehind heWestPakistani eneralsn order o counter-balancewhat hey elieved o be Soviet nfluencen New Delhi. As a rela-tively atisfied ower,Moscowwas neither repared or was in a positionto take herisk f reating new tate. hird, hebreakup f Pakistan ouldhavethrownheentire ubcontinentntochaos and spreadthegermsofsecession otherestofPakistan ndpossibly o India. The Chinesewouldhavebenefitedhemost rom uch a situation.

It is not mpliedhere thatMoscowwanted he continuationfmilitaryrule nPakistan.tverymuchwished hegeneralsoretire rom olitics,otransferower otherepresentativesfthepeople. tssympathyor heALwasunderstandable.fter ll thisparty ad won a majority f seats ntheNationalAssembly,ts ocioeconomic rogramwasin Moscow's yes pro-gressive,"ts leaderswereagainstPakistan'smembershipn SEATO andCENTO andstoodfor lose inks, conomic ndcultural, ith ndia. As theSoviets alculated, akistan-thewholeof t-ruled bytheAL couldbetterserve heir olicy bjectivesn theregion.To returnoPresident odgorny'smessage, hough residentahyaKhanassuredMoscow hathewould tart alks withnational epresentativele-mentsn EastPakistan t the arliest pportunity,""e had no intentionfopening egotiations ith heAL leaders.As thebrutalityfthe army n-creased,many ntellectualsoined the ranks of secessionists. isaffectioneven pread oBengalidiplomatsn Pakistanmissions broad.MostBengaliswere onvinced hattheir urvival epended n full ndependence. anytook o arms and organized hemselvesntothe Mukti ahini (liberationforce) nd severalmillion led cross heborder oIndia toescapethe rmyterror.

The nflux f omany efugeesnto ndiaand the tories fgenocide heybrought ith hem,ndthe stablishmentfBangladesh iplomatic issionsinCalcutta nd NewDelhi inApril1971 allworsened herelations etweenIndia ndPakistan.Moscow earedhat he ndiraGandhi overnmentouldnotbe able to postpone or ongwhat hepeopledemanded: ecognitionfBangladeshnd large-scalemilitary ssistance o theMuktiBahini. t wascertain hat ecognition ould ead to warbetween ndia and Pakistan.ASoviet nalyst, herefore,autioned hatthe ontinuingloodshednEastPakistan s doing erious armnotonlyo thevital nterestsf hePakistani eople, ut lso to the auseofpeace n Asiaandthroughoutheworld.7

6"Pakistan s DeterminedottoAllowAnyCountryo Interferen Pakistan's n.ternal ffairs,"eking eview, pril 6,1971 Vol.XIV,No.16), pp.8-9..I. Ratnikov,Internationalotes: Crisisand Its Consequences,"DSP, June 1,1971Vol.XXIII,No.18), p.28 (fromravda,May1,1971).


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486 MOSCOW AND THE BIRTH OF BANGLADESHTHE ATTITUDE OF PEKING AND WASHINGTON

The"hawks" n Pakistan, owever, erenot n a moodtoopen negotia-tionswith heelected epresentativesf thepeople,regarded s "traitors"and"inferior"Muslims. he standof Peking ndWashingtonn thecivilwar trengthenedhehandsofthosewho were gainst political ettlement.In a message o President ahya Khan,PrimeMinister houEn-laistatedthatwhatwas happeningn Pakistanwas "purely he internal ffair fPakistan" nd thatonly"a handful fpersons"wanted to sabotagetheunificationf Pakistan."He did notmissthe opportunityo denounce isrivals n theregion, orhe alleged hatbothMoscowandWashingtonadbeen"carryingutgross nterferencen the nternalffairsfPakistan yexploitinghe nternalroblemsfyour ountry."inally, e assured slama-bad that

should he ndian xpansionists.. launch ggressiongainst akistan,theChinese overnment.. will, s always,irmlyupporthePakistanGovernmentndpeople n theiruststruggleo safeguardtate ov-ereigntyndnationalndependence.8Though hemilitaryunta ostall moral uthorityo rule East Pakistanwhen t failedto abide bythe results f a freeelection nd launched tssuppressionampaignn theregion, heNixonadministrationefused otake public tand gainst hemassacre fcivilianpopulationnd didnottakethenecessary tepsto effectivelyalt all its arms sales to Pakistan.Washingtons alsoreportedohavewarned ndia thatncasePekinghelpedIslamabadn a warwithndia,New Delhishouldnot ount nU.S. support.Moscow, n itspart ndunder hese ircumstances,idnotwantwar at all.Generalwar nthe ubcontinentouldhavebeendisastrous rom heSovietpoint f view. twouldhave weakened oth ndia andPakistan, rolongedmilitaryule nPakistan, trengthenedherightistorcesn India and fur-ther ncreased slamabad'sdependence n Pekingand Washington.Whatwasworse,Moscow ouldnot ount nWashington'supportopreventheinvolvementfChina na new ndia-Pakistan ar.Thiswasa new ituation,for n the1965war theU.S. and USSR hadwarned ekingnottointervenein the onflict.zvestia ommentator. VasinunderstandablydvisedbothIndia andPakistan n identical erms omakeeffortsoprevent "furtheraggravationfthe ituation"nthe ndiansubcontinent.9

THE INDO-SOVIET SECURITY PACTAll this mboldened akistan othreatenndiawithwar. Islamabadve-hementlyccused ndia of underminingakistan's ntegrityhrough ub-8Radio Pakistan broadcastPrimeMinisterChou En-lai's message on April 11, 1971.Themessagehas been printednJ.A. Naik, India, Russia, China and Bangla Desh (NewDelhi, S. Chand,1972) as appendix5, pp. 133-34.'"Russia Also Takes toDelhi-PindiParityFormula,"Sunday Standard (New Delhi),July 1,1971.


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VIJAY SEN BUDHRAJ 487version nd supporting he liberation truggle. resident ahya Khan'sutterancesrew ncreasinglyellicose.He publiclytated hat akistanwasvery earto warwithndia andthat twouldnotbe alone.As the ituationworsened,hetwo sides alerted heir rontier orces.There was no doubtthat ndia trainedndsupplied heMuktiBahiniforceswith rms ndam-munition n thehopethat heywouldbe able to drive hePakistani orcesoutofEastPakistan.Moreover,n India itwas beingargued hat ookingafterevenmillion efugeesampered evelopmentndwasmore xpensivethanwar,which ppeared o be theonly olution o settle heBangladeshproblemnce andfor ll.Finally, everal ndianpolitical arties ndmanyCongresseaders emandedhe mmediateecognitionfBangladesh.twasevidenthat ecognitionouldgreatlyncrease ension ndcould eadtowar.

A wayoutappeared obetomake tclear to Pakistannd its alliesthat,if attacked,ndiawouldnotbe aloneeither. heSoviets,herefore,astenedto offero ndiaa treatyesignedoassureNew Delhi of oviethelp ncaseanycountryhreatenedtssecurity. he 'SovietForeignMinister rrivedinIndiaonAugust andthenextdaythe wo ountriesuttheir ignaturestoa twenty-yearreaty hosedetailshad apparentlyeenworked utmuchearlier.Article X ofthetreatyerved s a warning o Pakistan hat f itattackedndia,Moscow houldnotbe expectedoremain eutral.To saythis s nottosuggest hat s ofAugust theKremlin bandonedthepost-Tashkentolicyoftreatingndia and Pakistan like.The Sovietshad nvitedslamabadn1969to oinits ollectiveecurityrrangementndtheinvitation ad not beenwithdrawn.akistancould still oin. It wasreportedhat bout his ime a non-aggressionactbetweenheUSSR andPakistan"was"mooted ninformeduartersn Islamabad,"10utprobablythehawksnthemilitaryuntacouldnotbe wonover.Again, he oviet mbassadoroPakistan ouldhavereferredothe ointstatementssuedonthe onclusion f hevisit fthe ovietForeignMinistertoIndia whereintwasemphasized hat he reaty asnotdirectedgainstanyone.Additionally,ecouldhavepointed utthat he oint tatementidnotrefero EastPakistan s EastBengal, houghhis s what ndia desiredandwas the erm he ndianParliamentadused nitsresolutionfMarch31.Though he reaty elped n defusingheexplosive ituationor he imebeing,refugeesontinuedo pour nto ndia.Moscowwas convincedhatthe ituationn both idesof he ndia-Pakistanorder ouldbecomenormalonlyf therefugeeseturnedome ndthat herefugees ouldnotgo backtill hegeneralsransferredower othosenwhom hepeopleofEast Paki-stanhadfaith. heSovietgovernment,herefore,ontinuedoadvisePresi-dent ahyaKhan toseeka political olution."--'0ZubeidaMustafa, USSR and IndianAction n Pakistan,"PakistanHorizon,fourthquarter 971 (Vol. XXIV, No. 4), p. 65."D. Volsky nd A. Usvatov, War on theIndian Subcontinent,"New Times,No. 50,December 971,p. 8.


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488 MOSCOW AND THE BIRTH OF BANGLADESHPakistan ouldnotdisregardompletelyoviet dvice; particularlyincetheWestern owers lsohad beenadvising-though ot s forcefully,pen-ly nor learly-Islamabad orespecthefundamentalights f thepeopleof

East Pakistan.The Western ressand politicalobserverswere generallysympatheticoward hepeopleof East Pakistan,denounced he atrocitiescommittedythePakistan rmy nd strongly rged slamabad to createconditions hichwouldpermitherefugeesoreturn.The resultwas that President ahya Khan assuredthe communityfnations ndthepeopleof Pakistan hathe was committedo establishingdemocracyn hiscountry.nkeepingwithhispledge o restore ivilian ule,he announcednAugust 1 the ppointmentfDr. A.M. Malikas governorofEastPakistan. r. MalikappointedomeEast Pakistanis s membersfhis cabinet. he Presidentlso proclaimed general mnesty,ppealed totherefugeeso return omeand announcedheholding f fresh lections(by-elections)n East Pakistan o fill he78 NationalAssemblynd 193East PakistanAssemblyeatsmade vacantbythedisqualificationfthoseAL members howere lleged ohave"takenpart n theanti-nationalc-tivity."It was common nowledgehat heMalikgovernmentouldnot nspireconfidencemong hepeople.Thegovernor,hough BengaliMuslim,wasconsidered Quisling ymost ast Pakistanis. n fact, henewgovernmenthadthe upport fa smallminorityfcollaborators-Muslimsfnon-Ben-gali originwho had settledn East Pakistan ince 1947 and someBengaliconservativesho had been discreditedntheDecember 970election. herefugeesouldnot rustuchpeople ndalmost ll of hem efusedoreturnhome.EFFORTS TO 'PERSUADE FOREIGN GOVERNMENTSTO PRESSURE YAHYA

For ndia, hefinancialndsocialburdenmposed y uch largenumberofrefugees as unbearable.t wanted heSoviets o use theirnfluencenIslamabadfor apolitical ettlement.rimeMinisterndiraGandhiherselfvisitedMoscow oward heend ofSeptember971 to seekSoviethelpfor-theolution ftherefugee roblem. hough he ndianpressclaimed hatshewas successfulinbringinghe ovietUnion oa position loser oIndiaonBangladesh,"'12heKremlin tillmaintained neutral osture. ne mustrememberhat inceMarch1971 ndia hadbeencalling ast Pakistan EastBengal."But nthe ext fthe oint tatementssued t the nd ofthe ndianPrimeMinister's isit o the USSR, the term East Pakistan"was used,13evidentlyndeferenceo Pakistan's ensitivities. hatwasmore mportant,'the oviet rimeMinisteroldMrs.Gandhi hat heconflictnEastPakistanwas"an internalroblemof akistan," hattwasfor hepeopleofPakistan""Major Shift n Soviet Policyon Bangla Desh," Timesof ndia, September 0, 1971.1""Joint oviet-Indian tatetment," ew Times,No. 41, October1971, p. 7. Also see"Joint Soviet-Indian tatement,"CDSP, October 26, 1971 (Vol. XXIII, No. 39), pp.10-11 from ravda, zvestia, eptember 0, 1971).


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VIJAY SEN BUDHRAJ 489to decide "what sortofpolitical ecurity hey houldhave" and that thestrugglef thepeoplehadtogo on in Pakistan erritory."14Moscow thus autioned ndia against eeking militaryolution ftheBangladesh ssue, nd made t clear hat he ndo-Sovietreaty idnotmeanSovietbacking fthe iberationmovement.he Sovietsdid notwish osayanything hichwas likely o damageSovietrelationswith slamabadbe-yondrepair. hisexplains hefact hat, nlike omeof theWestern owers,the Kremlin id not suspend conomic id to Pakistan. f therewas anydoubt nthis oint,twas removedythe oviet-Algerianoint ommuniqueofOctober , 1971,whichproclaimedMoscow's"respect orthenationalunity ndterritorialntegrityf both ndia and Pakistan."'15 oreover,Soviet ommentatoralledfor settlementased bothonthe"will and in-terests" f theEastPakistanis ndon "respect orPakistan's erritorialn-tegrity."'6 neother eason or his ovietposturemaywellhavebeen thattheKremlinwas not prepared o displease tsArab friendswhobackedIslamabad and who wereopposed o thedismembermentfPakistan, helargestMuslim tate n the world. ncidentally,venmost ndian Muslimsdid notfavor hebreakup fPakistan.Still notheractorouldbethat he ituationnEastPakistan ad notyetcrystallized.he liberationorces ould notmatch heresources fthePaki-stangovernmentndtheir it-and-runactics ad notdislodged hePakistanarmy rom ny trategicosition. he July-AugustainsoftheMukti ahiniseemed ohavebeenwiped utby themilitaryperations f he rmy ollow-ing the rainy eason. The Bangladesh eaders n India and elsewhere adstill o demonstrateheir trengthn thebattlefieldowarrant ttentionromthe nternationalommunitynd to justify heirdemand hat hey e con-sidered herealrepresentativesf thepeopleof EastPakistan.Most mportantly,t was held nMoscow hat f WestPakistan greed oletEastPakistanhave substantial utonomy, akistan ould stillremainsingle olitical nit, ndnothing ouldhave pleased heSovietsmore hana united akistanwith heikhMujiburRahman s PrimeMinister. or theSheikh ppeared oMoscow heNehruofPakistan-a votary f non-align-ment, ecularism,ocialism nd democracy.t is apparent hatfor Sovietmilitarytrategists,estPakistanwas more mportanthanEast Pakistan.They could not gnore he strategicocationofWest Pakistanwhere heUnited tateshadonceoperated n intelligenceasenotfarfrom heUSSR,and whichwas now inkedwithChinaby tworoads-the old Silk Routere-openednAugust 970 and theKarakoramHighway ompletedn January1971. Moscowvisualized definite ecrease n Chinese nd American n-fluencen Pakistanwhen ower assed nto hehands f heAL, themajorityparty fPakistan. tthereforeenewedtseffortsosecure herelease ftheSheikhndin thebeginning f October largenumber f Sovietpublicor-

14"Major Shift n SovietPolicyonBangla Desh," Timesof ndia, September 0, 1971.15"Soviet-Algerian Statement," ew Times,No. 42,October1971,p. 37.16A.Ulansky, The Tragedy f East Pakistan," bid.,pp. 13-15.


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490 MOSCOW AND THE BIRTH OF BANGLADESHganizationsemanded is release nd alsothat f"'other opular eaders fEastPakistan."The resolutionsassed by theseorganizationsondemned"the cts f errorndviolence" nd "thepersecutionfprogressiveoliticalleaders."'7It is notwithoutignificancehat he Soviet eadersdiscussed hesitua-tionon the ubcontinenthen hey isitedCanada andFrance n October1971. n hisspeechnParis,Brezhnev rged henecessityf finding politi-cal solutiono theproblem. nd n Ottawa, heSovietPrimeMinister oldCanadianM.P.s and Senators hatduring isvisit o Iranthe SovietPresi-dent addemanded f President ahyaKhan (on October 5) therestora-tionofdemocracyn EastPakistan,hefreeingftheSheikh nd arrange-ments or hereturn ftherefugees romndia. Radio Pakistan, owever,claimed hatduring istalkswithPresident ahya Khan,theSovietPresi-denthad "expressedheSovietUnion'skeen nterestn theunity nd in-tegrityfPakistan."'8 o besure, heunity fPakistan ouldbe maintainedifthemilitaryunta stepped side in favor f theelected epresentativesfthe eople. heKremlinven entNikolaiFirybbin, SovietDeputy oreignMinister,o Delhireportedlyopersuade heAL leaders toaccept utonomyforBangladeshwithin singlePakistan."'19Ataboutthis ime, nOctober 4,PrimeMinisterndiraGandhibeganher our f sixWestern apitalswhich resumably ad Moscow'sblessings.Since theNixon administrationppeared o be almostwholly ut of stepwith he American ressand public opinionon this ssue,Moscow hopedthatthe Indian Prime Ministerwould succeed n persuading he UnitedStates oprevailuponPakistan o release he Sheikh nd switch rom e-pression o negotiationnd reconciliation.Meanwhile,he ituationnthe ndo-Pakistaniorder ad again becometense. he two ides accused ach other fborder iolations. Soviet om-mentatoreminded oth ndia and Pakistan f the ragic nd harmful on-sequences fthe1965 war. He argued hat nPakistan thad "led to infla-tion nd a rise n prices"which ggravated the people'sdiscontent ithcapitalist xploitationnd feudal yranny."ven thedemand or utonomyinEast Pakistan nd the victory f theAL in theDecember 970 electionwereconsidered o be "a consequence f" the 1965 war. He played downPresident ahya Khan's threats f war and blamed irresponsiblend ad-venturisticlements"nPakistan orwhipping p warhysteria.ignificantly,he also stated hat n ndia "the eaders freactionarynd communal artiesand organizations" ere rying to capitalize n the developmentsn EastPakistan ndtherefugee roblems," mployed ultra-patrioticlogans ..tofanreligious trife" nd impart a dangerous motional haracter o the

"For fulltexts of "Statementsof Soviet Public Organisations," ee supplementtoSovietReview,January 8, 1972 (Vol. IX, No. 3), pp. 19-24.18"Mr.KosyginWorriedby Pakistan," The Times (London), October21, 1971 and"Yahya MeetsPodgorny," heStatesman NewDelhi), October17,1971.""'KremlinEnvoyMeets Leaders of Bangla Desh," The Times (London), October25,1971.


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VIJAY SEN BUDHRAJ 491tension etween eighbouringountries." oth India and Pakistanwere,therefore,dvised o "displayrestraintnd statesmanship,nd bridlethe'hawks'and the hauvinists.

This analysis tronglyndicates hatMoscow was deeply ommittedopreserving akistan'sunity nd to treatingndia and Pakistan like.Ap-parently, he Soviets still hopedthatWashingtonwouldcooperatewithMoscow, s itdid during he1965war, n persuadingslamabadto aban-don thepolicy f confrontation.ad the wo uperpowers cted nconcert,Islamrabad ight ave been pressurednto coming o termswiththeim-prisonedeaders nd Pakistanwouldhavethusremained singlepoliticalunit.POLICY CHANGE IN MOSCOWIn theearly part of November, woevents onvincedMoscowthatthe"hawks"had come to control he militaryunta n Islamabad.First, ftermoving is troops nd armor oward orward ositionnSeptember-Octoberonthepretextfan exercise, resident ahya Khandespatchedhethreechiefs f taffoPeking nNovember.Themissionwas edbyZ.A.Bhutto,who, t maybe recalled, ad denounced heTashkentgreements a greatbetrayal.Moreover, e was party o President ahya Khan's decision ocrush hemovementor utonomyndrestorationfcivilian ule nMarch.Uponhis returnfromeking, . A. Bhutto laimed hat hinawould upportPakistan f an armed onflictccurred. rimeMinister osygin oncludedthat theforces f an anti-popular ilitary ictatorship"ad "joined rankswith xternal ggressive ircleshostile o the peoples ofHindustan."21twas held nMoscow hat there ouldbe no peace on the ubcontinenthilethe slamabadforceswere running muck n East Pakistani owns."22Second,Prime Minister ndira Gandhi'svisit to the United Statesre-mainedunproductive. eporting n the Gandhi-Nixonmeeting, ravdaquoted n American ommentatoro say that the wo eaders ailed o agreeonmeasures o mitigate hepresent ifficultiesn the ndiansubcontinent."It also stated hat he USA gave no indication f tsreadiness o influenceGeneralYahya Khan n favor f a political ettlement"n East Pakistan.23In otherwords according o theSoviets, he American residentwas notprepared o use his nfluencend authorityo secure he releaseof SheikhMujiburRahman. incebothMoscow nd NewDelhiconsideredhe heikh'srelease hefirsttep oward political ettlementnd thereturn f therefu-gees, heonly option pen to themwas to wishthe iberation orces arlyand speedy uccess.And by this time the guerilla nd liberation orces

20I.Borisov,DarkSkiesover he ndian ubcontinent,"ew Times,No.44, October1971, p. 10-12.21"Pakistan'shutto sks forUnderstanding,"DSP, April12, 1972 (Vol. XXIV,No.11), p.2 (fromravda,March 8,1972).22D.Volsky, NowThattheGunsAreSilent,"NewTimes,No. 52,December 971,p.9.28"U.S.Attitudenhelpful,aysPravda," unday tandard NewDelhi),November7,1971.


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492 MOSCOW AND THE BIRTH OF BANGLADESHhad increased heir trengtho about100,000and the newsagenciesre-ported itter ightingetween hem nd regularPakistani rmyunits ndifferentarts fEast Pakistan. henewsfrom ast Pakistanwasvery adfor hemilitaryunta.Theremayhave been twomorereasonsfor he change n Sovietpolicy.First, s theSoviets urveyedhescene,they alculated hat heChinese,even f theywished, ouldperhaps o littleto ave East Pakistan or heirprotegeow hat hemountain asses ntheHimalayaswould oonbe closedbysnow.Second, heflow f Soviet armsto India had continued ndthetop-rankingovietdiplomaticndmilitary fficials,ho visitedNew Delhitowardheend ofOctober,were onvincedhat ndia was in a position odestroyhewarmachine fthe anti-popular ilitaryictatorship"n EastPakistanwith heKremlin's iplomaticupport.TheshiftnSovietpolicywas reflectedntheSovietpresswhichbecameovertlyritical f Islamabad's olicy n East Pakistan nd expressivenddemonstrativen its support orthe iberation orces.tbegantohighlightthe ctivitiesndgainsoftheMukti ahiniknowing ullwell hat he ibera-tionforces ad their ases in and receivedweaponsfrom ndia. In the ec-ond weekofNovember n article nNewTimesblamed slamabadfor en-sion on the ubcontinent.he author lso stated hat he"Dacca Cabinet"wascomposed hieflyf members f theparties which ufferedcrushingdefeat"nthe1970 electionndthat t enjoyed neitheruthorityorsup-port mong hepopulation fEast Pakistan."He describedhe teps akenbythemilitaryuntato restore ormalcynEastPakistan s "half-measuresor rather smoke-screenortheauthorities' nwillingnesso workfor arealpolitical ettlement."It is importantonote hat he ndian presshadmade omewhatimilar bservations hen hese tepswere aken n thebe-ginning f September.)All this ed theSovietanalyst oconclude hat herefugee roblemwasno longer n "internalffair" f Pakistan.Moreover,he approvinglyuotedThe New YorkTimes of October 8) to assert hat"the unprecedentedlowof destitute efugees" onstituted,in effect,bloodless ggressiongainst ndia."24WhilepreviouslyheSoviet bserversad beenplaying own he caleofdisaster nd invariably uoted the Indian or Western resswhile givingfigures,woSoviet nalysts bservedn November hat heyhad seen withtheir wn yes he flood fhumanmiseryhathas swept enmillion eopleover nto ndia."More mportantly,hey mphasizedhefact hat herewasno truthn thePakistani laim hat ll the conditions or he returnof herefugeesadbeenprovided nd that housandswere afely eturningomeeveryday.25

24A. Ulanksy, Indian Subcontinent:Roots of the Crisis," New Times, No. 46, No-vember1971, pp. 7-8. Also see "HindustanNeeds Peace," CDSP, December 14, 1971(Vol. XXIII, No. 46), pp. 20-21 fromzvestia,November 6, 1971).25V. Simonovand A. Shalnev,"The Tragedyof the Refugees," New Times,No. 49,December 1971,p. 11.


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VIJAY SEN BUDHRAJ 493THE THIRD INDIA-PAKISTANWAR

In thevery ature fthings,heWestPakistan roops ould notmaintaintheir uthorityna hostile nvironmentor ong.They oulddestroyMuktiBahinipocketsnbigcities, ot n villages, speciallynthevillages longthe ndianborder s theguerrilla orces ould always eekshelter crossthefrontiern India. To destroy uerrilla ases,Pakistanbegan shellingIndianborder illages nd towns.n retaliation,ndiantroopswere uthor-ized onNovember 1 tocross ntoEast Pakistan.Two days aterPakistandeclared national mergencynd President ahy.aKhansaid thathe ex-pected o be "off n a warwithin endays."Pravda stronglyondemnedPakistan's ggressiveosture, lamed reactionaryorces"nPakistan ndabroad for ggravatingakistaniiIndianelationsnd forgiving hem hecharacter f an internationalonflict."X26ignificantly,t did notmentiongrowingndianmilitary ressure longtheborder f East Pakistan;theneutral osture ad evidentlyeen abandoned.iOnDecemberPakistan aunched irandgroundttacks ll along ndia'sWesternorderndportrayedhe onflicts a warbetweenMuslim akistanandHindu ndia.Moscowdid notagreewith hisassessment.t heldthatthepeople fEast Pakistan adrisen ot gainst heirMuslim o-religionistsin WestPakistan, utagainst hemilitary lique oppressing othpartsofPakistan,gainst theWestPakistanimilitaryligarchy,"ndthat akistanwasresponsibleorescalatingheconflict.alleduponto liveup to provi-sionsof the ndo-Sovietreaty,he Kremlinmovedalongseveral ines. twasof theviewthat he nterestsfthepeopleofEast Pakistan nd of thestabilityfthe area wouldbe best erved yan Indianvictoryn thewar.But ndia couldrepel ggressionn theWest ndhelpMuktiBahinioachieveits im,providedWashingtonrPekingorboth and theSecurity ouncildid not ntervenen theconflict. ccordingly,ovietdiplomacywas di-rectedokeep he onflictocalized.On December , aTassstatementarnedallpowers okeepoutof he onflict.tobserved hat he ovietUnion toodfor the peediestnding f thebloodshed ndfora political ettlementnEast Pakistan."27 The Kremlin hus inkedthe nding of hewar withpolitical ettlementn East Pakistan.Second,theSovietspresumably al-culated hat heU.S. wouldnot ntervene ilitarilyn theconflictandtheSovietgovernmentas determinedo opposeChinese ntervention.heSoviet mbassadorn NewDelhi,N. M. Pegov, s reportedohaveassuredIndiathatn caseofa Chinesettack cross heHimalayas, heSovietUnionwould tart iversionaryction n Sinkiang.28t was a risky enture, utMoscow ouldnotaffordo let down tsally n theregion.Dr. HenryKis-

26"Internationalising Issue: USSR Opposed," The Hindu (Madras), November29,1971.Also see "Pravda CriticisesPak Repression n East Bengal," The Hindu, Novem-ber22,1971.27For ull textof the Tass statement,ee SovietReview,supplement, . 17, pp. 12-13.28VinodGupta,AndersonPapers: A Study of Nixon's Blackmail of India (Delhi,IndianSchoolSupplyDepot, 1972), p. 126.


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494 MOSCOW AND THE BIRTH OF BANGLADESHsinger's isits oPekingnJulyndOctober ndPresident ixon'sproposedvisit oPeking reated hefearofSino-Americanollusion nd made tallthemorenecessaryorMoscow o demonstrateo itsnon-Communistlliesthat heKremlin ouldnot llow tself obe browbeaten yPeking r Wash-ington.Anywavering uring ndia's moment f perilmight ave causedserious oubtsnMoscow'sother on-Communistllies about hedependa-bility fSoviet upport o them.Third, n theSecurity ouncilMoscow entunqualified upport o theliberation ovementnd proposed hat herepresentativesof hismovementbegiven hearing. he Sovietdelegate ointed ut hat hedeteriorationnthesituation id not occur onlyon 3 December, hat heSecurity ouncilshouldnot close its eyes to whathad been takingplace in East Pakistansince thebeginningof 1971 or "to reality and . . . actual state of affairs."Heproposed resolution hich uggested political ettlementn EastPaki-stan ndwhich alleduponPakistan oorder tstroopsn East Pakistan tocease all acts ofviolence."The resolutionhowedbothrealism nd an un-derstandingfthebasic ssues nvolved,ut s expected hen heresolutionwasput to the vote on December ) China voted gainst, he USSR andPoland nfavor nd therest bstained.Between ecember and21,when heSecurity ouncildebated he on-flict, he oviet tand emainedonsistent. oscow asta negative ote hreetimes o block"one-sided"U.S. or U.S.-sponsored esolutions nd cham-pioned heright fself-determinationf thepeopleofEast Pakistan.Mean-while, he ndian roopswith he ctive upportofMukti ahini nd thepeo-ple reached heoutskirts f Dacca. But the Sovietdelegation ssured heSecurity ouncil hat ndia wouldwithdrawts troops rom astPakistanifPakistandid thesame. He arguedthat n order o achievean effectivepolitical ettlementowermust e transferredo thosewho won a majorityattheDecember 970elections."inally, e emphasizedhat nly he lectedrepresentativesf thepeople could"create onditions orthereturn f allEastPakistan efugees romndia" andnot hePakistanmilitaryuthorities.Evidently, oscowwanted ndia toundertaken Bangladeshwhat slama-bad shouldhave done: transfer fpower o the elected epresentativesfthepeople.Moreover,t did notwantndia to broaden rprolong ostilitiesin theWest o teachPakistan lesson.Such a movewouldhaveprovokedbothPeking ndWashington-asituationheKremlinwas determinedoprevent. he FirstSoviet DeputyForeignMinister,who arrived n NewDelhi onDecember 2, twicepostponed is departure orMoscow, erhapsin order oimpresspon ndia thedesirabilityfkeepinghe onflictntheWest imited.He leftNew Delhi onlyafter hePakistani rmyhad sur-rendered n Dacca (on December 6) and the day Pakistan greedto acease-firentheWest n response o an Indian proposal.To sumup,theoutcome f theThird ndia-PakistanWar and the birth

2S/PV. 1615, ecember5,1971.


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VIJAY SEN BUDHRAJ 495of Bangladesh ouldbe described s greatvictories or Sovietdiplomacy.The Kremlin eckoned hat he iming f thewar was unfavorableo Chinaandthat ekingwouldnot ntervene ilitarilyomatter owvehementlytsrepresentativesenounced ndia and Moscow'srolein the conflict.t alsocalculated hat akistan's blackdeeds" nthe asternwinghadbeen owellandwidely ublicized ndcondemnedytheAmerican ress, eadingU.S.SenatorsSenator dwardKennedyndSenator rankChurchharged hePakistaniswith ommittingenocide),three ormer .S. ambassadors oIndia,a largebodyofintellectuals,cademicians, eligiouseaders, ocialworkers, ommonwealtharliamentariansnd East Pakistani tudents, ip-lomats nd intellectualsbroadthat heNixonadministrationouldnotbein a position o end anything ore han ts diplomaticupport o Pakistanat theUnitedNations, articularlyincethemajor NATO allies oftheU.S.had expressed heir ympathiesor hepeopleof East Pakistan. inally, heKremlin ealized hat hepeopleof East Pakistanwanted ompletendepen.dence nd that ndiawas strong nough opushback Pakistan ntheWestanddestroyslamabad'swar machine n theEast.Thesecalculations roved obe correct. he Sovietgovernmentaswellsatisfied ith he utcome fthewar: themilitary egime n Islamabadwasswept utofpower, oron December 0 GeneralYahya Khan transferredpower o the eaderofthemajority arty n whatwas left fPakistan, ul.fikarAli Bhutto;Pakistan'smilitarymachinehad beenhumbled, rippledanddemoralized; he egally lected epresentativesfEastPakistanmovedtheBangladesh overnmento Dacca on December 2; and SovietprestigeinIndiaandBangladesh ad risen kyhigh.Ofcourse,Moscowhadtopaya pricefor hesegains,for hetruncatedPakistan eld heKremlinesponsibleor tsdismembermentith heresultthat ollowinghewar Soviet-Pakistanielations tood t a low ebb.Whenpassions almdown nd Pakistani nalystsmake an objective tudy fthebreakup f their ountry,owever,heymaynotblameMoscow s much sthemilitary ictatorshipor the atePakistanmet nDecember 971. Presi-dentBhutto dmittedhiswhenhe said onJune 7, 1972,that he"power-drunk"militaryunta "plunged ur people nto hewarand involved s inan intolerableurrendernd lost us halfour country."Moreover, hefactthatWestPakistan's olitical eaders nd bureaucracyacitly upportedhereign f errornthe astern inghad convinced hepeopleofEast Pakistanthat heirhonorand survival emanded ompletendependence. ad theUnited tatesoinedhandswith he ovietUnion, s itdid n1965, n keepingPeking ut fthe ndia-.Pakistanonflictndhad tcooperated ithMoscowduring he arly tages f thecivilwar n effectivelyersuading heYahyaregime o step aside in favorof the egally lected epresentativesf thepeople,heThirdndia-Pakistan armight avebeenpreventedndthe wowings f Pakistan ould gain havea common overnment.VIJAY SEN BUDHRAJ is Reader in Political Science, KurukshetraUniversity, uruk-shetra, aryana, ndia.

Moscow and the Birth of Bangladesh

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