International Mediation and Deep Disagreement

Course: Research Paper Argumentation

Instructor: dhr. dr. Bart Garssen

University of Amsterdam

MA Communication and Information Studies: Discourse and Argumentation Studies

January 29, 2016

Author: Martina Mori

St. No. 11106409

minamartori@gmail.com

+39 3385995138

Word Count: 5398

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International Mediation and Deep Disagreement

Table of contents:

1. Introduction................................................................................................................ p. 3

2. International mediation as an argumentative practice: the Camp David Accords..... p. 4

3. Deep disagreement: an obstacle to the international mediation process.................. p. 10

4. Conclusions...............................................................................................................p. 13

References................................................................................................................ p. 14

Appendix: annex to Camp David framework agreements (exchanges of letters).... p. 16

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1. Introduction

This research paper focuses on international mediation as a communicative context in

which argumentation takes places, and on the argumentative phenomenon of deep

disagreement, which can represent a serious obstacle to the rational resolution of a difference

of opinion between two parties, in general, and between two nations, in particular.

I will tackle this problem in the argumentative context of international mediation, which can

be seen as a genre of communicative activity having some characteristics in common with

both mediation and negotiation, described by van Eemeren (2010: 143) as the prototypical

implementations of the problem-solving and the diplomatic communicative domain

respectively.

Due to the practical value of the communicative activities involving two countries who

want to end the conflict they are engaged in, it is very important to find out the possible ways

to overcome the hurdles which can arise in international mediation. Among them, deep

disagreement is definitely a huge problem to surmount, and it is very important for the

mediator to identify what can be the origin of the deep disagreement existing between the

parties. This is the first step the mediator has to take in order to be able to use, in a later stage,

the most apt tactic to maneuver strategically the disputants in order to settle the dispute, and to

eventually achieve the ambitious goal of finding a mutually agreed resolution of the conflict.

Thus, the goal of this paper is to answer the research question:

What is the cause of a deep disagreement between the disputants in international mediation?

In order to give an answer to this question, and figure out what are the kind of

structural problems which can bring about deep disagreement between the disputants in this

specific context, I will first go into the communicative situation in international mediation.

In chapter 2 I will discuss some papers written by Jacob Bercovitch, Sara Greco Morasso, and

by Daniela Muraru, who gives a characterization of this particular communicative practice as

an argumentative activity type starting from the theoretical background of pragma-dialectics. I

will also give an argumentative characterization of the Camp David Accords in 1978 (reason

of the choice and available sources) as an illustrative example of a concrete speech event of

the communicative activity type of international mediation. In chapter 3, I will describe the

argumentative phenomenon of deep disagreement, concentrating on the aspects which are

relevant to the argumentative context of international mediation, and in particular to the Camp

David Accords. Finally, I will draw some conclusions by answering the research question, on

the basis of the proposed relationship between international mediation and deep disagreement.

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2. International mediation as an argumentative practice: the Camp David Accords

For the sake of an accurate description of the communicative context of international

mediation, it is sensible to start defining the notion of international mediation.

As explained by Greco Morasso (2012: 1), what is characteristic of mediation is that during

the communicative process the mediator helps the parties to assume an 'argumentative

attitude', stimulating them to discuss reasonably, in order to transform their conflicting

relationship into a concerted effort to find a win-win solution to the dispute. Therefore, the

ideal and practical goal of mediation is the resolution of the conflict at issue, and mediation is

conceived by Greco Morasso (2012: 2) as a “reasonable approach to conflict”. The mediator

always intervenes as a neutral and impartial third party and he/she is never allowed to advance

standpoints or arguments in favour of a particular outcome.

Similarly, Bercovitch (1991a: 18, 2004: 1) broadly defines mediation as a voluntary

procedure the disputants decide to turn to in order to settle their conflict or resolve their basic

differences, so as a “process of conflict management, related to but distinct from the parties'

own negotiations, where those in conflict seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help

from, an outsider (whether an individual, an organization, a group, or a state) to change their

perceptions or behavior, [...] without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of

the law”. Bercovitch asserts that mediation “is non-evaluative and non-judgmental and it is

particularly suited to the reality of international relations” (2004: 2). He claims that

international mediation, where international refers to a communication between the

representatives of two countries, is a heterogeneous and “effective way of dealing with

differences between antagonistic states” (1991b: 3), and that the mediator, who is not directly

involved in the dispute, “becomes in effect another negotiating party, an extension of the

conflict system” (1991b: 4). One of the central issue Bercovitch addresses in his articles is

that “mediation is, and can only be, context specific” (1991b: 6), meaning that the influence

the mediator can have on the communicative situation, and thus on the outcome of the

process, depends on the nature of the dispute and of the relationship between the disputing

parties. Bercovitch defines mediation as partly or fully successful (1991a: 20) “when it is

credited with making a great difference to or for settling a dispute”, and he identifies some

conditions under which international mediation can be successful, namely (1991b: 4) “a

genuine motivation by the parties to settle their conflict and a commitment to do so through

mediation, moderate levels of conflict, initiating mediation at a propitious or 'ripe' moment,

and an appropriate constellation of mediators' qualities and resources”. This requisites are the

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starting points for what he calls the 'contingency approach' (1991a: 19) to international

disputes (any “organized and continuous armed conflict between two states which resulted in

at least 100 fatalities”), in which he proposes a model to evaluate the outcomes of mediation

according to the “interrelationships between contextual and process variables”. Bercovitch

describes the latter as the nature of the activities and the strategies of the mediator to affect the

parties' behaviour, and the contextual variables as corresponding to the nature of the parties,

the nature of the dispute, and the nature of the mediator.

Before going into Muraru's characterization of international mediation as a

communicative activity type, which in turn refers to the pragma-dialectical theory of

argumentation, I will apply Bercovitch's contingency model, concentrating only on the

contextual variables, to the well-known international mediation activities that took place at

Camp David, the country retreat of the then President of the United States Jimmy Carter.

The thirteen-days secret and tense negotiations that led to the Camp David Accords were

signed at the White House on 17 September 1978 by the Egyptian President Mohamed Anwar

El Sadat and the Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, witnessed by President Carter.

The need for an international mediation originated from the critical situation in the Middle

East, resulting from the Arab-Israeli Wars (1948, 1956, 1967, 1973). In particular, the conflict

between Egypt and Israel stemmed from the control over the Suez Canal, nationalized by

Egypt in 1956, and from the territories occupied by Israel in the Six-Day War (1967). Among

them there was also the Sinai Peninsula that caused in 1973 the Yom-Kippur War between

Egypt and Israel, with however no change in the borders of that territory, that remained under

Israeli occupation. This problematic context in the Middle East could not avoid to influence,

and to be influenced by, the macro-context of the Cold War (1947-1991) between the global

superpowers (United States and Sovietic Union), that were engaged in a perennial

confrontation to be the most powerful entity in the post-WWII world. Israel had gravitated

towards the American sphere of influence since the Sixties, while Egypt and the Arab world

were 'friends' of the USSR. This element is a hint of the political and economic interests that

the US had regarding this area, which caused the involvement of the US in the Arab-Israeli

negotiations regarding the issue of occupied territories (Sinai, Gaza, West Bank, Golan

Heights and Arab Jerusalem) and the Suez Canal. Indeed, it already appears evident from this

analysis that playing the role of the mediator in this conflict was not exactly a walkover.

However, the Camp David Accords are considered an example of successful international

mediation, since Egypt and Israel signed two agreements: A Framework for the Conclusion of

a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel, and A Framework for Peace in the Middle East.

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These framework agreements (both accompanied by clarifying 'side-letters', in the Appendix)

had very different content, and context, how I will demonstrate by applying Bercovitch

contingency approach to understand this international mediation.

The first contextual variable to consider is the nature of the parties, which are different

for the two signed agreements. While Egypt and Israel were present at the negotiations, the

countries of the Middle East (PLO, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq) were not represented by any

recognized leader of the Palestinian territories, and the absence of the Palestinian was the

reason of the condemnation of the agreement regarding the peace in the Middle East by the

United Nations. As Bercovitch claims (1991a: 21), “conflict management by third parties can

occur only between adversaries that have well-defined and legitimate identities. […] The

more clearly identifiable and united the parties are, the greater are the chances of a successful

mediation”. In fact, the framework agreement for peace in the Middle East wanted to keep the

peace in that area, with recognized boundaries, and provided that the West Bank and the Gaza

Strip would have had an autonomous self-governing authority after the withdrawal of Israeli

armed force from occupied territories. Moreover, together with the framework agreement,

some 'associated principles” were included as applicable to peace treaties between Israel and

its neighbours (Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon). However, these goals, that should have

coincide with the implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 242,

were never achieved. In addition, the city of Jerusalem was excluded from the agreement.

Therefore, it can be claimed that the nature of the parties in the Israel-Palestinian dispute, and

the fact that the adversaries had been engaged in previous conflicts, has not “enhanced the

probability of successful mediation” (Bercovitch, 1991b: 21). The second framework

agreement, which led to the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel in 1979, can be definitely

considered as a more successful outcome of international mediation. An important collateral

result was that Egypt was the first Arab state to officially recognize the state of Israel. The

agreement provided for the withdraw of Israeli troops and settlers from Sinai, in return for the

freedom of passage of Israeli ships through the Suez Canal. In this case, the prior relationship

between the parties did not have such a negative influence on the outcome, mainly because

the disputants could directly benefit from the mediator's efforts.

The second contextual variable in Bercovitch's contingency model is the nature of the

dispute, widely considered as the most influential factor in the outcome of every mediation

process (Bercovitch, 1991a: 22). Among the considerable aspects of the nature of

international disputes there are the duration of the conflict, the intensity (in number of

fatalities), and the kinds of issues involved.

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The timing of mediation seemed to be effective for Camp David, as it followed “some 'test of

strength' between the disputants” (1991a: 22). Although the Arab-Israeli conflict was already

very protracted and intense (over 10000 casualties), mediation was accepted by Egypt and

Israel, and it was successful to some degree, perhaps also because they were rewarded for

their diplomatic efforts with annual subsidies of several billion dollars by the United States,

who by using this 'directive strategy' (Bercovitch, 2004: 3) obtained that Egypt entered in the

American sphere of influence. But what really defines the nature of the dispute is the type of

issue which triggered off the conflict, or better, the perception the parties have of the issue,

which “is a key factor in determining whether or not to accept a mediation initiative and in

influencing whether it will have much success. Issues in conflict refer to underlying causes of

a dispute. They may not always be clear” (1991a:23). The Arab-Israeli conflict is mainly a

'security dispute', which is “over frontiers, borders, and territories” (1991a: 24). However,

these conflict involves also ideological issues “over the nature of a political system, basic

values, or beliefs” (1991a:24), where the ancestral hostility between the Islamic and the

Jewish culture and religion can be traced. As a matter of fact, the issue about the Sinai

territory was resolved with the compromise of Suez Canal, but the issue of West Bank and

Gaza, territories much more related to the Zionist movement, was only formally agreed upon,

and the issue on Jerusalem was neither part of the framework agreement for peace in the

Middle-East. The Camp David Accords are in this sense the perfect example of Bercovitch's

pattern, as he stated “The chances for successful mediation are enhanced considerably when

the issues in dispute are issues of security or independence. When the issues in dispute are

defined as honor, existence, or ideology, the chances of successful mediation are reduced

substantially” (1991a:25).

Besides the nature of the parties and the nature of the dispute, also the nature of the

mediator plays a fundamental role in the third-party management of international conflicts.

In our case, both Begin and Sadat had invested much to reach agreement since the latter's

ground-breaking had visit in Israel, which is considered to have been the first step to

negotiate. Despite this, Jimmy Carter, who was representing the United States at Camp David,

made the difference, and it can be noticed by only reading the letters (in the Appendix). The

United States, represented by his officials (Secretary of State, Ambassador, President), had

started the mediation process with bilateral negotiations with both Israel and Egypt, and later

acted as a go-between for the two countries. In Camp David, Carter used a micro shuttle

diplomacy, going from Sadat's cabin to Begin's one, and helping to avoid the stalemate, the

impasse created on the tenth day by the issue of the Israeli settlement withdrawal from the

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Sinai and the status of the West Bank. Carter's proposed compromise, accepted by the parties,

was to concede the issue of West Bank to Begin, and the issue of Sinai to Sadat. In fact,

“effective mediation depends not only on the mediator's knowledge and skill about conflict

and conflict management, but also on his/her prestige and authority, originality of ideas,

access to resources, and ability to act unobtrusively” (1991a:25), and Carter possessed all the

qualities that permitted him to stimulate the parties to discuss reasonably and to highlight the

issues on which the parties agreed. The influence Carter had on the mediation process was

due to the fact that he was perceived as a reasonable, trustworthy, and credible interlocutor by

the disputants, and their confidence in the mediator was enhanced as he was “seen by both

sides as an impartial yet skilled participant in the process” (1991a:25). Bercovitch expanded

on the issue of impartiality, claiming that the “mediator has to be seen as a participant in a

conflictual decision-making system” (1991a:28), and that the “traditional emphasis on

impartiality stems from the failure to recognize mediation as a structural extension of bilateral

bargaining and negotiation. […] The mediator's task is primarily one of reframing and

persuasion” (1991a: 26). For this reason, “effective mediation in international relations is

related more to resources than to impartiality” (1991a: 26), and this surely can be applied to

Carter's mediation at Camp David.

The aspect of mediator's neutrality is of central importance also in the extended

pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation (van Eemeren, 2010), where the taxonomy of the

genres of communicative activity distinguishes between mediation and negotiation, described

as prototypical implementations of the problem-solving and the diplomatic communicative

domain respectively. A problem of classification can emerge when talking about the

communicative activity type of 'peace talks', represented here by the concrete speech event of

Camp David Accords.

Peace talks are considered by van Eemeren (2010: 143) as an activity type of

negotiation, notwithstanding the fact that there is a mediator, because they “start from an

initial situation that is better described as a conflict of interest than as an ordinary difference

of opinion” (2010: 149). He states that Camp David peace talk are sometimes classified as an

event of mediation, but for him that context required “the mediator to have a completely

different set of qualifications than the usual ones in mediation: those of being neutral and

disinterested” (2010: 143, note 32).

However, it is difficult to ignore the fact that there was indeed a mediator, and that Camp

David is taken worldwide as a successful example of international 'mediation'. It is undeniable

that the macro-context of that communicative situation required President Carter to use some

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diplomatic negotiation, but in mediation, as pointed out by Muraru (2010a: 2), “the disputants

have to resort to a third party, who, acting as a neutral facilitator of the discussion process,

guides the parties in their more or less cooperative search for a solution”. Specifically, “as a

facilitator of communication, the mediator has the role of helping the parties to agree on

reaching the negotiating phase” (2010a: 3). Thus, “mediation involves negotiation, but not

necessarily the other way round” (2010b: 232).

In addition, Muraru claims that international mediation, just like negotiation, “can be

characterised as a moderately institutionalised activity type, due to the diplomatic relations

and practices the parties are engaged in” (2010b: 235), and specifically because “it involves

an interaction between representative of states, guided by some fixed set of values and

particular norms of behaviour, which are culturally bound” (2010b: 231). By saying that

mediation has specific institutionalised setting and constraints, she contradicts van Eemeren's

claim that the genre (not the communicative activity type) of mediation “is only weakly

institutionalized” (2010: 148), which is voluntary and non-binding.

It seems to me that international mediation, or at least the Camp David case, can be

considered as a hybrid genre of communicative activity, between mediation and negotiation,

in which the former is predominant because of the presence of a third party despite the search

for compromise as a solution for the conflict of interest. It cannot be ignored that in any

international mediation there is always a mediator, a third participant who represents in that

context both the mutual effort made by two nations to enter into dialogue with each other in

order to resolve their disagreement, and the fact that the mediation is necessary because they

cannot resolve their difference of opinion by themselves. Even van Eemeren (2010: 144)

admits that “certain communicative activity types may even prototypically involve the

activation of more genres of conventionalized communicative practices”.

The Camp David Accords can be then considered as a concrete instantiation of both

'peace talks' and 'international mediations' activity types, conceiving them as mixed types of

communicative practices with characteristics of both mediation and negotiation.

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3. Deep disagreement: an obstacle to the international mediation process

Robert J. Fogelin, an informal logician whose article “The Logic of Deep

Disagreements” (1985) marked an important milestone in the approach to this argumentative

phenomenon, and who elicited many reactions among argumentation scholars, talks about

"broadly shared believes and preferences [...] that [...] lie in the background, unmentioned.

They guide the discussion, but they are not the subject of it" (2005: 5). In Fogelin's view,

these shared beliefs structure the argumentative exchange, which without them is not defined

as 'normal', is pointless and impossible to resolve by arguing in a rational way. This type of

argument is generated by conflicts between 'framework propositions', between different, or

even opposite, systems of ideas and beliefs which shape the argumentative discussion, and it

is immune to normal criticisms and common appeals to facts (e.g. on abortion). In addition,

Fogelin claims that surfacing the systems of background propositions and discuss them

directly would be the ideal solution, but he also asserts that, in the reality of argumentative

discussions, no rational procedures can be used to resolve deep disagreements. The parties can

reach agreement on facts, but still disagree on moral issues and hierarchies of values; and

being their arguments conceived within their personal framework of commitments, the

inevitable result is the impossibility of resolving their deep disagreement by holding a rational

argumentative discussion. In short, Fogelin thinks that deep disagreements cannot be resolved

through rational argumentation, and that trying to argue in presence of a deep disagreement

would be pointless, a violation of the efficiency rule of the communication principle.

It can appear that in presence of a deep disagreement there are too few common

starting points to arrive at a resolution of an international conflict. Nevertheless, it has to be

considered the fact that, when there is mediation, an explicit effort has already been made by

the parties to resolve the disagreement that caused their conflict and is the object of the

international mediation process. Even though the international mediation can be suggested by

external players for reasons of peacekeeping, like in Camp David, every mediation is never

forced and always voluntary. That is why we suppose that the parties should want to come to a

rational resolution of the dispute, no matter how deep it is.

David Zarefsky also points out the importance of the consensus on starting points,

stating that “productive disagreement must be grounded in agreement” (2012: 77), but he

claims that since deep disagreement is "prevalent and consequential" (2012:79), ('prevalent'

because of the growing religious fundamentalism linked to the personal and cultural identity,

and 'consequential' because of the following authoritarian policies) argumentation scholars

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should explore new means to surmount it, adopting a point of view that is less logical and

more rhetorical, as already suggested by Nola Heidlebaugh (2001).

In the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation, the agreement on starting points

taking place in the opening stage is fundamental for any critical discussion to develop in a

productive way. Thus, for the success of the whole communicative process, it is necessary that

the two disputants who participate in an international mediation process agree on the

procedural and material starting points. It is sensible to claim that the framework propositions

Fogelin refers to can be compared to the material starting points in the opening stage of the

pragma-dialectical model for a critical discussion, which being both normative and

descriptive, admits some possible derailments, i. e. the fallacies. However, it can happen in

the argumentative reality that the actual discussion deviates from the model in other ways, for

example in cases of deep disagreements, that risk to block the discussion at the confrontation

stage, without possibility of a rational resolution. Van Eemeren (2010: 1) claims that “Even in

the extreme case of the seemingly irresolvable controversies known as 'deep disagreements'

the parties usually go through the motions of trying to resolve a difference of opinion on the

merits, if only to give the impression of being reasonable to a third party consisting of

outsiders”. Also Greco Morasso is optimistic (2012: 4) when she says that a true deep

disagreement is not really possible, because the parties must share in the opening stage at least

the common ground of human nature.

Interestingly, Manfred Kraus (2012: 92) analyses the preconditions under which the

argumentative phenomenon he calls 'polemic argument', which “shows no noticeable attempt

at resolving the basic dissent by rational means, but consists in nothing but repeated

contradiction and gainsaying”, is likely to occur. Deep disagreements, which is seen by Kraus

as a precondition of the polemic argument, “typically arise from a lack of of common ground

between arguers”. Moreover, he claims that “one of the major sources for such a lack and

hence for cognitive breaks and deep disagreement is the diversity of the cultural backgrounds

of the individual arguers, a problem that rapidly gains in importance in our increasingly

multicultural societies, in which conflicting groups with different world-views share the same

space”. In the case of Camp David, Kraus' considerations can be easily applied to the issue of

Jerusalem, which is excluded from the agreement, and so it is still part of the deep

disagreement, just because is conceived by Begin as “one city indivisible, the capital of the

State of Israel” (Appendix, p. 3), while Sadat had proposed a division of the city in two parts

(Arab Jerusalem and Jewish Jerusalem). This examples shows the importance of the context

of international mediation in case of deep disagreement, where the mediator has a very special

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role in the resolution process, as he is not personally involved, and his precise task is to help

the participants to find a solution, which could be very demanding in such cases.

The Arab-Israeli conflict can be analysed also an 'intractable conflict', a term used by

Bercovitch (2004: 4) to characterise “long, drawn out and intense” conflicts. He asserts that

intractable conflicts “are driven by antagonists with a strong sense of identity, grievance of

some sort (economic or political), and a desire to use violence to change the status quo”.

Importantly, he adds that “mediation offers the possibility of a jointly acceptable outcome

without giving in on one's core values and beliefs” (2004: 7).

The notion of 'belief' is analysed by Freeman (2012: 67,68) as “a habit which develops

under the stimulation of various experiences” which “allows us to infer the conclusion from

the premise” and causes “different inferential belief-habits”. Freeman claims that “To be able

to infer a conclusion from a premise is to recognize that the premise or what it expresses has a

certain meaning. Different persons then will recognize meaning differently and interpret

situations differently” (2012: 68). In this sense, argumentation in general and mediation in

particular, can represent an opportunity to come into contact not only with the other's view,

but also to deepen the awareness of one's own view. In Freeman's words (2012: 73) “entering

such a dialogue may lead to a deeper understanding of one's world view and a more

commitment to it”. The wilfulness of the mediation process should guarantee what for

Freeman is a necessary condition for cross-cultural communication, namely that “the

participants must be genuinely open to valuing reasonableness” (2012: 74). In this sense,

international mediation per se offers a genuine possibility to peacefully overcome deep

disagreement through a deep understanding of the other's point of view.

In fact, also Bercovitch highlights that “mediation offers the most promising approach to

managing intractable conflicts”(2004: 1). He adds that “mediation is an effective and useful

way of dealing with intractable conflicts. This is not to suggest that every intractable conflict

can be mediated. Many conflicts are just too intense, the parties too entrenched and the

behaviour just too violent for any mediator to achieve very much” (2004:6). Then, the

mediation in intractable conflicts requires “acute psychological understanding of the parties'

feelings and grievances” (2004:6). It is my view that the notion of 'intractable conflict' can be

related to that one of 'deep disagreement', and that both can be applied to the Camp David

international mediation, as it involves some starting points that have to do with the political,

economic, and mostly cultural and religious backgrounds, related to the core values and

beliefs of both Israel and Egypt. The objective of the mediator is to find an agreement

between them, as a first step to a solution to the Palestinian problem of occupied territories.

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4. Conclusions

The aim of this research paper was to answer the question:

What is the cause of a deep disagreement between the disputants in international mediation?

I described deep disagreement as an argumentative phenomenon which can be characterized

as the problematic lack of agreement on common starting points that normally takes place in

the opening stage of the ideal model of a critical discussion, and allows the rational resolution

of the difference of opinion between the participants. It immediately appears clear that deep

disagreement represents a major argumentative problem also in contexts of international

mediation, as the two conflicting countries hopefully want to come to a mutually accepted

arrangement in the concluding stage. If the adversaries don't share any starting point, it is

much more probable that the mediator will only provisionally settle the dispute, instead of

resolving, even partly, the difference of opinion which was the origin of the international

conflict.

International mediation has been characterised as a communicative activity type having some

specific features, in particular that it is a voluntary process in which a third party represents a

real possibility to overcome deep disagreement, in search of an agreement on material starting

points in the opening stage, after the manifestation of this problem in the confrontation stage.

Sometimes, what leads two nations to be involved in international mediation are their cultural,

religious and socio-economic disputes, which in the worst possible scenario are caused by a

deep disagreement between the disputants, an inevitable communicative gap which is caused

by the lack of common ground, of a shared commitments set, that requires an international

mediation process in order to have a possibility of being bridged. In the context of Camp

David Accords, agreement has been reached on the Sinai and the Suez Canal thank to the

mediator, while the disagreement on occupied territories (Arab Jerusalem, West Bank, and

Golan) has not been solved. The cause of this deep disagreement, and of this argumentative

phenomenon in general, can be found in the difference in starting points of Egypt and Israel,

having these two nations a big cultural diversity, which, as suggested by several authors, can

be the cause of religious, political and ethical conflicting core values and beliefs.

Certainly, it is necessary that the mediator is aware of the cultural diversity that brings about

the deep disagreement between the parties, in order to help them to make it explicit, and to

overcome the impasse, by trying to use a more rhetorical than logical approach, considering

two nations' people as the audience of the international mediation, since they will be affected

by the outcome of the process, and they will judge their representatives' reasonableness.

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References

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Springer, Dordrecht, 2012.

Visited websites:

– Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (January 2016) “Camp David Accords”

http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/peace/guide/pages/camp%20david

%20accords.aspx

– Jimmy Carter Presidential Library and Museum (January 2016) “Camp David

Accords” http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/campdavid/index.phtml

– Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia (January 2016) “Camp David Accords”

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Camp_David_Accords

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Appendix

Annex to the Framework Agreements: Exchanges of Letters

All letters from Mr. Carter are dated September 22, 1978, all the other letters are dated September 17, 1978.

Prime Minister Begin to President Carter

The President Camp David Thurmont, Maryland

September 17, 1978

Dear Mr. President:

I have the honor to inform you that during two weeks after my return home I will submit a motion before Israel's Parliament (the Knesset) to decide on the following question:

If during the negotiations to conclude a peace treaty between Israel and Egypt all outstanding issues are agreed upon, "are you in favor of the removal of the Israeli settlers from the northern and southern Sinai areas or are you in favor of keeping the aforementioned settlers in those areas?"

The vote, Mr. President, on this issue will be completely free from the usual Parliamentary Party discipline to the effect that although the coalition is being now supported by 70 members out of 120, every member of the Knesset, as I believe, both of the Government and the Opposition benches will be enabled to vote in accordance with his own conscience.

Sincerely yours,Menachem Begin

President Sadat to President Carter

His Excellency Jimmy CarterPresident of the United States

September 17, 1978

Dear Mr. President:

In connection with the "Framework for a Settlement in Sinai" to be signed tonight, I would like to reaffirm the position of the Arab Republic of Egypt with respect to the settlements:

1. All Israeli settlers must be withdrawn from Sinai according to a timetable within the period specified for the implementation of the peace treaty.

2. Agreement by the Israeli Government and its constitutional institutions to this basic principle is therefore a prerequisite to starting peace negotiations for concluding a peace treaty.

3. If Israel fails to meet this commitment, the "framework" shall be void and invalid.

Sincerely,Mohamed Anwar El Sadat

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President Carter to President Sadat

His Excellency Anwar Al-Sadat President of the Arab Republic of Egypt

September 22, 1978

Dear Mr. President:

I transmit herewith a copy of a letter to me from Prime Minister Begin setting forth how he proposes to present the issue of the Sinai settlements to the Knesset for the latter's decision.

In this connection, I understand from your letter that Knesset approval to withdraw all Israeli settlers from Sinai according to a timetable within the period specified for the implementation of the peace treaty is a prerequisite to any negotiations on a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel.

Sincerely,Jimmy Carter

Enclosure: Letter from Prime Minister Begin

President Carter to Prime Minister Begin

His Excellency Menachem Begin Prime Minister of Israel

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I have received your letter of September 17, 1978, describing how you intend to place the question of the future of Israeli settlements in Sinai before the Knesset for its decision.

Enclosed is a copy of President Sadat's letter to me on this subject.

Sincerely,Jimmy Carter

Enclosure: Letter from President Sadat

President Sadat to President Carter

His Excellency Jimmy Carter President of the United States

Dear Mr. President:

I am writing you to reaffirm the position of the Arab Republic of Egypt with respect to Jerusalem.

1. Arab Jerusalem is an integral part of the West Bank. Legal and historical Arab rights in the city must be respected and restored.

2. Arab Jerusalem should be under Arab sovereignty.

3. The Palestinian inhabitants of Arab Jerusalem are entitled to exercise their legitimate national rights, being part of the Palestinian People in the West Bank.

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4. Relevant Security Council resolutions, particularly Resolutions 242 and 267, must be applied with regard to Jerusalem. All the measures taken by Israel to alter the status of the City are null and void and should be rescinded.

5. All peoples must have free access to the City and enjoy the free exercises of worship and the right to visit and transit to the holy places without distinction or discrimination.

6. The holy places of each faith may be placed under the administration and control of their representatives.

7. Essential functions in the City should be undivided and a joint municipal council composed of an equal number of Arab and Israeli members can supervise the carrying out of these functions. In this way, the city shall be undivided.

Sincerely,Mohamed Anwar El Sadat

President Carter to President Sadat

His ExcellencyAnwar al-Sadat President of the Arab Republic of EgyptCairo

Dear Mr. President:

I have received your letter of September 17, 1978, setting forth the Egyptian position on Jerusalem. I am transmitting a copy of that letter to Prime Minister Begin for his information.

The position of the United States on Jerusalem remains as stated by Ambassador Goldberg in the United Nations General Assembly on July 14, 1967, and subsequently by Ambassador Yost in the United Nations Security Council on July 1, 1969.

Sincerely,Jimmy Carter

Prime Minister Begin to President Carter

The PresidentCamp DavidThurmont, Maryland

17 September 1978

Dear Mr. President:

I have the honor to inform you, Mr. President, that on 28 June 1967 - Israel's parliament (The Knesset) promulgated and adopted a law to the effect: "the Government is empowered by a decree to apply the law, the jurisdiction and administration of the State to any part of Eretz Israel (Land of Israel - Palestine), as stated in that decree."

On the basis of this law, the government of Israel decreed in July 1967 that Jerusalem is one city indivisible, the capital of the State of Israel.

Sincerely,Menachem Begin

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President Sadat to President Carter

His Excellency Jimmy Carter President of the United States The White House Washington, D.C.

September 17, 1978

Dear Mr. President:

In connection with the "Framework for Peace in the Middle East," I am writing you this letter to inform you of the position of the Arab Republic of Egypt, with respect to the implementation of the comprehensive settlement.

To ensure the implementation of the provisions related to the West Bank and Gaza and in order to safeguard the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, Egypt will be prepared to assume the Arab role emanating from these provisions, following consultations with Jordan and the representatives of the Palestinian people.

Sincerely,Mohamed Anwar El Sadat

President Carter to Prime Minister Begin

His Excellency Menachem Begin Prime Minister of Israel

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I hereby acknowledge that you have informed me as follows:

1. In each paragraph of the Agreed Framework Document the expressions "Palestinians" or "Palestinian People" are being and will be construed and understood by you as "Palestinian Arabs."

2. In each paragraph in which the expression "West Bank" appears it is being, and will be, understood by the Government of Israel as Judea and Samaria.

Sincerely,Jimmy Carter

Reference (January 2016):

http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/campdavid/letters.phtml

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