Moreau on EXTG

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    1. As a reminder of the context within which Exercise Trillium Guard was conducted the national

    objectives for this important pre-operation training event are provided:

    a. Integration of security, protection and safety measures necessary to support the G8-G20


    b. Within an integrated all-hazards approach and whole-of-government response framework, the

    exercise program was to provide all participating organizations with the ability to become

    familiar with, practice, test and confirm operational capabilities and Management and

    Coordination arrangements for the four interdependent emergency management based


    i. Prevention and Mitigation

    eliminate or reduce the impacts and risks;

    mitigate the impact of security and safety related incidents;

    ii. Preparedness. Ready to respond and manage consequences;

    iii. Response. Respond during or immediately following security and safety related

    incidents; and

    iv. Recovery. Restore or repair conditions to an acceptable level.

    2. Exercise Trillium Guardian was a "Tier 1" exercise and the second of two national level exercises

    intended to assist organizations to achieve the required level of readiness to deliver safe and secure G8

    and G20 Summits.


    3. The aim of Exercise Trillium Guardian is to confirm a functional integrated command and

    coordination structure with effective information and intelligence sharing in support of the Canadian

    national security and emergency management framework for the Summits.

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    6. The TGconfirmation effort was focused by the four overarching confirmation themes:

    a. Command and control (C2),

    b. Planning,

    c. Coordination and

    d. Communications (including public affairs).

    7. In the preparations for TG, the team analyzed the planned scenario events against this thematic

    framework in order to determine those that could be expected to be "high payoff" for our purposes.

    The result was that while all events would be followed, particular attention would be paid to the Barn

    Exploitation and food contamination scenarios, the Toronto protests, the Westin evacuation, the

    highway blockages and the air incursions.


    8. As the Exercise TG Confirmation Team representative inside Public Safety Canada's GOC my.

    primary mandate was the same as the entire Team, to focus on the seams in terms of Command and

    control, planning, coordination, information flow, and communications. In addition, I elected to add the

    aspect of Information Management and Situational Awareness given the GOe's mandate.

    9. In order to maximize the training opportunity presented by Exercise TG, I was asked, where it

    made sense to do so, to provide feedback and observations on issues internal to the GOe. I focused my

    observations on the following functional areas:

    a. GOC Command and control;

    b. Integration of the planning function;

    c. GOC operations;

    d. GOe's enabling tools; and

    e. Information Management & Situational Awareness.


    10. Many of the organizations and individuals involved in Exercise TG where fresh from having just

    completed a major operation with the recent conclusion of the Vancouver 2010 Olympics and'-

    Paralympics Winter Games. It became very clear that a significant number of Departments and Agencies

    under estimated the political dimension of a short duration, high visibility event such as the upcoming

    G8/G20 Summit. This was not the case for the GOe. The political dimension introduced a pull for

    information to the top not present to the same extent during The Vancouver Winter Games despite the

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    12. Planning Function. The planning function at the National level was not exercised during Exercise

    TG. Most planning activities were isolated to SMO and the Security Forces. The Thallium/terrorism

    threat scenario could have triggered a planning cycle at the National Level to manage the deployment of

    mitigation measures and develop a consequence management plan in cooperation with SMO and

    Security Forces in the event the threat did materialize. However, the ability to trigger such a planning


    a. Observations. Collaborative planning and exchanges of plans between

    organizations are the key areas requiring better definition and cooperation in

    advance of the Summit.

    i. Collaborative Planning. In general the roles and responsibilities regarding pre-event

    planning are well understood. However the same degree of clarity did not seem to

    apply regarding the conduct of emergency planning during an actual event. The

    roles and responsibilities for planning appeared to be especially blurred in the area

    of consequence management and planning related to immediate or emerging

    potential threat/risk for the purpose of mitigation or response. No planning cycles

    where initiated during Exercise TG. This may be due to the fact that required

    planning thresholds were never met due to lack of information. However,

    discussions surrounding the requirement to plan in support of ADM EMC and DM

    SAChighlighted the need for a better collaborative planning environment to be

    created between agencies. Consideration should be given to the activation of an

    event specific planning group involving representation from all required

    Government departments. Using the Liaison Officers present inside the GOC may

    not provide the level of organizational knowledge and expertise necessary to

    develop mitigation, consequence management or response options in support of

    the Government. In addition, conflict could arise with the Liaison Officers primary

    role. Presently planning appeared to occur in isolation, back in respective

    Departments and Agencies without the benefit of a centrally managed and

    coordinated planning effort. The GOC Plans & Logisitcs Group appears to be ideally

    suited to lead, manage and coordinate this whole of Government Planning effort

    during an event.

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    b. Information Silos The graphic below illustrate the current flollJ of informatio:r

    from various Federal Departments and Agencies and the GOC In general the

    information flows in silos With some lateral sharing bet\\'een agencies has required.

    Some of that Information flows thought the GOC but the more senSitive information

    appears to flow upward to the ADM level or equivalent at each parent organIZation

    byoasslng the GOC entirely Critical information is not laterally shared until groups such

    as DM SAC and ADM EMC meet.

    ( Need for Information Sharing. What is clearly miSSing is a forum, most l ikely at

    the DG Level. where all relevant ,nformation is shared, classified or not. In order to

    generate the situational awareness and assessment of the impact of the threat required

    to support the deCISion making process of ADM EMC and DM SAC The Olembershlp to

    thIS group must be flexible and tailor made to the nature of the event. A similar group

    already exists to deal with Cyber event and could be adopted for other events and

    emergencies involving National Security. Their role would be to:

    I. Share all pertinent information regardless of the senSitivity or claSSification.

    II. Establish Situational Awareness for ADM EMC and DM SAC

    Iii. Assess the risk of releasing some claSSified ane sensitive informJ~ion in order to

    inform the planning and decision making process to generate J timely responsc.

    v Asscss impact of threat and risks to a specific operation.

    v. Gui de tre planning cycle.

    v, Prepare advice for ADM EMC and D M SAC

    Vii Approved a sanitized situation report for release to wider audience for

    SituationJI awareness.


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    Risk Based Information Sharing. The difficulty experience during

    Exercise TG surrounding the release and sharing of sensitive but critical

    information does not appear to be unique to Exercise TG but have occurred at various

    levels during recent real operations and events. This situation highlights the

    requirement to establish a clear mechanism to share classified and sensitive information

    in a timely manner in order to inform the decision-making process, the situational

    awareness process, the planning process and the threat-risk assessment process. The

    flow of less sensitive information into the GOCseems to work well

    when considering the reiease

    and sharing of National Security, Law Enforcement or otherwise sensitive


    i. Protecting the chain of evidence

    ii. Protecting the source of the information

    iii. Operationai Security

    Iv. Operational requirements (need to plan and execute a timely response)


    14. Although the provisions of observations regarding the internal procedures and processes of the

    GOCwere not the primary focus of the Confirmation Team, it was felt that providing such was feedback

    was desired and welcome. The observations presented below are a result of discussions with GOC

    members, Liaison Officers and Management as well as my own.

    15. Command and Control. During discussions with both GOC Staff and Liaison Officers, the issue

    of lack of clarity on the Command and Control inside the GOCwas raised on several occasions. People

    felt that they were not sure who was in charge during a given shift. The Command and Control

    arrangements might be clear to those who have been around the GOClong enough but this is not the

    case for others. Some are under the impressions the SARAhas the lead while others believe the Director

    of the GOCis the lead. In order to clarify the C2 arrangements inside the GOC,I offer the following


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    a. Clearly Display inside the GOC who is the Senior Manager on duty along with the roster

    for each shift.

    b. Include, if not already done, in the GOCtraining for Liaison Officers and new GOCStaff asection on the GOCCommand and Control.

    c. Other option would be to keep both DGand DOGout of the minute by minute oversight

    of the GOCOperations to act as the Bridge between PSCADM's Office, ADM EMC and

    GOe. This would allow them to provide guidance and direction on strategic information

    requirements, SA products and decision support products (Info Briefs, Decision Briefs,

    Threat/Risk Assessments).

    d. The leadership for each shift would come from the four directors. This approach may

    be problematic because two of the directors (Cyber and Pians/Logisitcs) have very

    specific duties and depending on the event being dealt with may have to focus on

    coordinating their group's activity.

    16. Planning function. This may have been exercise artificiality but the role of the Planning

    Group did not seem to be well understood within the GOCand amongst the Liaison Officers. The graphic

    below articulates my current understanding of the roles and responsibilities of the various elements of

    the GOCincluding the relationship between them. In summary:

    a. GOC's Watch Team(s) main role is to monitor and warning as well as to manage the

    flow of information in and out of the GOe.

    b. SARA main role is the assess information and to produce Situational Awareness and

    Intelligence Products. Their role is to answer the SOWHAT and assessthe impact of

    events and situations. Their products are essential to inform and support both the

    planning process and decision-making process.

    c. Plans & Logistics Group is responsible for emergency, contingency and long terms

    planning. Their role is to provide response options based on the SA, impact assessments

    and information provided by GOC/SARA.While SARAputs together the Info Brief, the

    Plans & Logistics Group should be responsible to produce the Decision Brief and any

    documents required to articulate a whole of Government Response. Comments. The

    Plans & Logisicts Group must be better linked in with SARAduring the Threat, Situation

    and Impact assessment stage in order to initiate a planning cycle early. Criteria and

    triggers to initiate an emergency or contingency planning cycle must be clearly

    articulate and the required planning guidance must be provided by the GOe Senior


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    Figure 2 - GOC Functional Model

    Other Government Departmen:;'.{l""and Agencies

    Other Canadia.'H

    Internatio~";"" ,,.,,,



    GoeMonitoring & Warning-- .0>";'




    (Self contained capability)

    (VBER Monitoring & Warning




    Conduct Event Specific

    Advanced Planning

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    e. Integrated Incident Management System System (log, event templates, geo productsl.

    Currently the GOC uses a version of the ETeam Incident Management Software as well as aseparate application called the Canadian Common Operating Picture. ETeam is mainly used

    as a log for day to day or event specific. The accessto the Canadian Common Operating

    Picture is limited and only a handful of people are training to use it. The GOCshould

    investigate Fully Integrated Incident Management Applications capable of integrating the

    following tasks:

    i. Communications lOG;

    ii. Incident/event response templates and checklists;

    iii. Dashboard capability to track status of tasks;

    iv. Geomatics products;

    v. Capability to maintain a Common Operating Picture;

    vi. Links to Standard Operating Procedures;

    vii. Capacity to rapidly package the information to create an event SA page; and

    viii. Handover brief function to faCilitate shift changes.

    f, Requirement for Regular Staff Updates Briefs. During Exercise TG, I noticed that the only

    formal briefings for the GOCStaff and Liaison Officers occurred at shift change. This may be

    sufficient during a slow pace operation or event but may not be sufficient to maintain GOC

    Staff SA during a more complex and dynamic event. The GOCshould consider implementing

    a GOCStaff Update Brief to take place either at a set interval or when something significant

    has occurred requiring the synchronization of the Team. The proposed standard template is

    as follows:

    i. Situation update to focus on incidents closed or solved since last brief;

    ii. Current situation update to focus on key events and activities actively monitored by

    the GOCto include latest development of interest;

    iii. Update on status of key GOC actions taken or on going (Assessment being produced

    by SARA,Decision Brief for ADM EMC, RFIstatus);

    iv. Assign new tasks as required or adjust previously assigned tasks;

    v. Confirm timelines for next deliverables (SITUATION REPORT,DECISIONBRIEF,INFO


    vi. Round table; and

    vii. Confirm timing for next update.

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    18. GOCOperations. Overall the processes and procedures witnessed during Exercise TG worked

    well and seemed well understood by most. The following observations are provided in areas where

    some improvements could be made to enhance existing capabilities and overall effectiveness of the


    a. Clear Battle Rhythm. This point was mentioned under enhancements to internal SA but

    clearly displaying the GOC's Battle Rhythm for all to see would enhance awareness of

    key timings essential for the smooth operation of the GOC;

    b. More structure in shift change brief. All the shift change or morning brief I witnessed

    focused heavily on reviewing the RFIMatrix or did not appear to follow a set agenda. I

    suggest that a structured approach to shift change briefs be implemented in order to

    make sure all pertinent information is covered in a logical manner to facilitate a

    smooth transition from one team to the other. The structure of the shift handover brief

    would be very similar to the GOCStaff Update Brief:

    Situation update to focus the past 8 or 12 hours depending on shift duration;

    Update on status of key GOCactions taken or on going to complete a smooth

    handover of actions in progress or to be initiated by the incoming team;

    Confirm timelines for next deliverables (SITUATION REPORT.DECISIONBRIEF.INFO


    Confirm new RFlsor request for specific products;

    Confirm key events to occur during the next shift; and

    Break off to individual work station to complete individual handover.

    Formal SOPsto bring in ODG lO. In at least one occasion, I witnessed a liaison Officer

    from Transport Canada who had no idea of her role inside the GOc. The responsibility to

    prepare the liaison Officer is shared between the individual own Department and the

    GOc. I am assuming that clear guidance has been communicated to all Departments and

    Agencies required to provide a liaison Officer to the GOC. I will limit my observations to

    the reception and integration of the liaison Officers in the GOc. The integration of

    liaison Officers into the GOCshould go through four stages:








    i. Selection and training by own Department and Agency

    ii. Training and GOCfamiliarization training provided by GOCon a cyclical basisiii. Administrative Reception upon activation (Should cover access control, computer

    password, assignment of a work stations, shift schedule, phone number and feeding


    iv. Operational Reception once the GOCadministrative reception is completed, the liaison

    Officer is handed over to a pre-designated member of SARAwho will than brief the

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    Liaison Officer on GOCOperations such as Battle Rhythm, LO responsibilities,

    contribution to deliverable, Situation update, shift hand over procedures before allowing

    them to sit at a desk. Preferably this should coincide with a regular shift handover but

    during activation the process may have to be repeated with each Liaison Officer

    depending on their level of familiarity and previous exposures to GOC Operations

    19. .overall Exercise TG was very successful. The observations and comments contained in this

    report are aimed at improving already mature and well established process and procedures. Going

    forward, the most pressing issue to address, because of its potential negative impact on the

    effectiveness and timeliness of a whole of government response,

    Solving this issue is critical for the GOe's

    ability to effectively carry out its mandate, on behalf of the Government of Canada, to generate and

    maintain situational awareness in support of both planning and decision-making required for the timely

    deployment of risk mitigation measures and implementation of response plans.

    Prepared by

    (original signed by)

    Richard Moreau

    Moreau Emergency Management Consulting Corp

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