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Political Science

Jalen Butler

Sponsoring Faculty Member: Dr. John Tures

More Money More Problems: NCAA Budgets and Scandals

IntroductionCollegiate athletics is one of the fastest growing industries in America,

and things do not seem to be slowing down. The host of HBO Real Sports, Bryant Gumble, has one of the most candid quotes about the NCAA’s business model. Gumbel says,” We have this multi-billion dollar collegiate sports indus-try; we have to figure out a way to fairly compensate those who are fueling that industry.” He also states, “What a great business model, you make billions and oh by the way you don’t have to pay the employees anything.” Gumbel sent shock waves around the country because he is a much esteemed sports anchor, and he took the contrarian perspective. The quote was aired on a 2011 Real Sports episode, but it is more relevant now than ever. This issue in colle-giate athletics has always seemed to be a sport industry related issue, but now it is becoming more and more political. The case being brought against the NCAA by Ed O’Bannon, a former UCLA basketball star could prove to be ground breaking in the collegiate athletic industry.

“Next week’s arguments in federal court will turn on a simple question - are those rules a violation of federal law? The case was brought by a former UCLA basketball star named Ed O’Bannon. A few years ago, O’Bannon was working at a Toyota dealership near Las Vegas. One day after work, he was hanging out at a friend’s house. His friend’s kid was playing this college basketball video game. And O’Bannon says one of the players in the video game looked really familiar” (Goldstein 2015).

The problem is this game was not out while O’Bannon was a collegiate athlete, but after he a retired from a brief pro career. On the game, O’Bannon was on an UCLA Legendary team that was composed of UCLA greats. It important to note that none of the players on the game, even the current college players, were named by their real names on the game. They were named by their position (first name) and their number (last name), with almost exact likeness, height, and weight. With that being said, it was very easy to distinguish who was the

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6’8, 225, bald headed, left handed player wearing the number 31 on the leg-endary UCLA team. O’Bannon would have never known that his likeness was being used if his friend’s kids were not playing the popular NCAA March Mad-ness video game. By the year 2013, all college football and basketball video games were discontinued. Again, I do not know how much more volatile this issue needs to become to be considered a “political issue.” However, there has been an addition to the O’Bannon case, which was filed in 2009, that could be even more ground breaking than O’Bannon’s issue. The Northwestern football team has decided to fight for the ability to unionize. It is only fitting for student athletes from one of the most prestigious institu-tions in the country to battle NCAA treatment.

“A National Labor Relations Board Regional Director recently found that scholarship football players from Northwestern University are “employees” under the National Labor Relations Act and ordered that an election be conducted so that eligible football players can vote whether to form a union. The authors of this article discuss the deci-sion and its implications” (D’Aquila and Rudolph 2014, 37).

NCAA athletes, as a whole, have become dissatisfied with the lack of rights and poor treatment they receive under the NCAA bylaws. Northwestern’s players are just the first ones to take a notable stand.

“‘We’re one step closer to a world where college athletes are not stuck with sports-related medical bills, do not lose their scholarships when they are injured, are not subject to unnecessary brain trauma and are given better opportunities to complete their degree,’ said former Northwestern quarterback Kain Colter, who helped lead the effort with the help of the United Steelworker” (ESPN 2014).

It is debatable whether college athletes deserve to be paid, but one thing for sure is they deserve to be treated better.

Theory In this paper, I hope to thoroughly discuss the institution that is col-

legiate athletics. The ground has been set for the corruption of the NCAA, but there needs to be a scientific backing behind my claims.

“Science starts and ends with theories. Although the term theory is used in a wide variety of ways, it could be defined as a set of empirical generalizations about a topic. A theory consists of very general state-ments about how some phenomenon, such as a voting decision, eco-

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nomic developments, or outbreaks of war, occurs” (Monroe 2000, 17).

Theories are the origin of the scientific process. As Monroe’s quote demon-strates, a theory plans to asses certain generalizations about a given topic. I plan on presenting a theory that suggest as strong connection between the profitability of collegiate athletics and corruption. It is important that I first present the relevance of this information. With winning being the top priority of NCAA athletic programs, it is more important than ever to recruit the best prospects. NCAA coaches are normally only given a three to five year win to show significant progress as a coach. With that being said, the high turnover rate of college coaches invites corruption. To assess this situation properly I must present his problem from the coach’s perspective. It is human nature to want stability, but the coaching profession does not offer much stability. The only way to ensure stability is to consistently win at a high-rate. This dilemma brings forth a conflict of interest. Does a coach do what is best for their families or conform to the presumed ethics of the coaching profession?

“In a positive or direct relationship between two variables, as one vari-able rises, the other tends to rise; for example, ‘The more education one has the greater one’s income.’” (Monroe 2000, 19). The hypothesis and variables should help your theories become narrower and precise. I believe there is a positive relationship between the profitability of collegiate athletics and the corruption in collegiate athletics. With that being said, my independent variable is the profitability of collegiate athletics and my dependent variable is the amount of corruption in collegiate athletics. “Independent variables are those presumed in the theory underlying the hypothesis to be the cause and dependent vari-ables are the effects or consequences, (Monroe 2000, 20).” If my theory is a cor-rect assumption, as the profitability of collegiate athletics increases, so should the level on corruption in collegiate athletics. Before I proceed any further, I must assess what each of my variables mean. Corruption, which is my depen-dent variable, in college athletics can take many forms, whether it is money or academic scandals. When people primarily think of corruption in college ath-letics, they primarily think of college players receiving unpermitted monetary benefits.

“Duke Coach Mike Krzyzewski made $9.7 million last year, according to USA Today. The people running around in the middle of the court - the players - are, of course, not getting paid. That’s because a long time ago, a bunch of colleges got together and said scholarships are fine, but paying athletes is against the rules” (Goldstein 2015).

This situation presented by Jacob Goldstein is another reason why corruption has become so prevalent. It is tough to explain to a college athlete why they

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receive no compensation and their coach is a millionaire. There is another per-spective that quote can be seen from. There are tons of coaches in the NCAA, but very few are making the kind of money that Coach Krzyzewski commands. “Cheating” can help a coach ascend to Coach K’s tax bracket. Profitability, my independent variable, will be based on how much money the NCAA makes as a whole. Also, I hope to find a way to determine how much more profitable win-ning is to an athletic program.

Hypothesis“A hypothesis is simply an empirical statement derived from a theory. The logic linking the two is that if a general theory is correct, then the more specific hypothesis derived from it ought to be true. Moreover, if the hypothesis is not confirmed by empirical observation, then our confidence in the general theory has increased. However, if a hypoth-esis is not confirmed, we must question the validity of the theory from which it was derived” (Monroe 2000, 18-19).

I hypothesize that there is a positive relationship between the profitability of collegiate athletics and the corruption in collegiate athletics. There should be a definitive difference between your independent and dependent variables. “Although the distinction is sometimes difficult to make, in most hypotheses it is apparent. The statement may include explicit language to that effect- for example, ‘cause’, ‘leads to’, or ‘results in’, (Monroe 2000, 20).” If my hypothesis is correct, the increased profitability of the NCAA should “lead to” more NCAA scandals. I briefly discussed my two variables, profitability and corruption, ear-lier but now I will go more in depth. In order to understand profitability, I must understand how the NCAA makes money. First, it is important to understand that the NCAA is a non-profit organization.

“The NCAA’s designation as a nonprofit association is based on how it uses money and not on how much revenue is generated. All but 4 percent of NCAA revenue is either returned directly to member con-ferences and institutions or used to support championships and pro-grams that benefit student-athletes” (NCAA.org 2014).

The most important question to answer is where the NCAA gets its money from.

“Most NCAA revenue (81 percent projected for 2012-13) comes from media rights, mostly from a $10.8 billion, 14-year agreement with CBS Sports and Turner Broadcasting for rights to the Division I Men’s Bas-ketball Championship. Most of the remaining revenue comes from

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NCAA championships, primarily ticket sales” (NCAA.org 2014).

This is the first major point of my paper. The majority of the NCAA’s revenue comes from the NCAA men’s basketball tournament TV contract. Regardless of the industry, big money contracts and profits invite unethical behavior, hence more NCAA scandals. This leads me into analyzing what these NCAA scandals are.

“‘There are many pressures on schools when it comes to recruitment because so much now hangs on winning, aside from just competing’ Eno said. Now there are so many financial issues tied up with the win-ning team. The stakes have risen to the point where some programs are willing to go way out of bounds to increase their leverage to win and fill the seats at football stadiums” (Goral 2004, 40).

Business author Tim Goral attempts to present how vital profits are to the NCAA and college athletic model. It is easy to forget that NCAA athletic programs are a business first! “At the heart of the problem is, of course, the fact that college sports have become big business for many schools, a business built on a sports economy that rivals that of Third World Countries” (Goral 2004, 42). How can you have an industry that rivals Third World Countries, but you cannot pay your workers?

“Many college athletes will one day move on to professional leagues, bringing prestige to their schools. Legally, these college stars can’t be paid for their services, but keeping them happy with other perks, says critics, and is at the root of the growing wave of college sports scan-dals” (Goral 2004, 45).

This quote describes the scandal issue in a nutshell. Corruption, which is my dependent variable, in college athletics can take many forms, whether it is money or academic scandals.

Who Governs the Governing? The NCAA is the organization that runs majority of the collegiate ath-letic programs; the other organizations are the NAIA and NJCAA. This brings up a political question that is relevant in almost every sector. Who regulates the regulators? John Mack, who was the former chief executive of the investment bank Morgan Stanley, has one of the most relevant quotes on the topic.

“‘We cannot control ourselves. You have to step in and control [Wall Street].’ Those were the words of John Mack speaking in New York in

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November 2009 (to audible gasps). Congress obliged Mr. Mack by pro-ducing the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of July 2010” (Ferguson 2014, 59).

Mack understands in a business full of money hunger employees, it is very tough to govern from within. How can you expect people who earn a living through Wall Street to govern Wall Street ethically? It is human nature to act upon what is in your best interest. The “business model” of the NCAA is very similar to Wall Street. The NCAA student-athletes would be very similar to stock holder in that fashion. The major difference is that I do not expect the NCAA to admit that they cannot properly govern their institutions. The only way to get the necessary change is to have the government govern the governing body of every sector, as they have done with Wall Street. With the O’Bannon and Northwestern cases pending, the NCAA will get some much needed govern-ment intervention sooner than later.

Profits go beyond Dollars The benefits the institutions in the NCAA receive from athletics go far beyond the monetary profits they receive.

“Of course, there are many colleges that use their athletes as core marketers of the university. If not for college basketball players, think about how much more money Gonzaga University would need to spend on building name recognition to prospective students not lo-cated on the West Coast” (Edelman 2014).

Gonzaga University has become a basketball powerhouse that is relevant in the national picture yearly. I am sure that people outside of the West Coast are not familiar with that school aside from its basketball program. Another example of this “free promotion” is Boise State University. Boise State is a yearly, BCS bowl threat that is widely known for its blue turf. Again, how many people are aware of Boise State University aside from its football team? There is a per-spective I would like to take that puts this issue into prospective. Who are the first alumnus you think of from North Carolina and Florida State University? From my prospective, I would think of Michael Jordan (UNC) and Jameis Win-ston (FSU). Athletics are arguably the most talked about facet of an academic institution.

“The year that Boston College quarterback Doug Flutie won the Heis-man Trophy as the nation’s outstanding college football player, Bos-ton College’s undergraduate admissions increased by 25 points and its average SAT score of admitted freshmen skyrocketed by 110 points”

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(Edelman 2014).

Critics might argue that this is just a coincidence, but I am sure that there is probably a similar increase at FSU during the Jameis Winston area. There is no disputing that these institutions receive free promotion, it is just a matter of where and how much free promotion they receive.

What is the NCAA? Before examining the flaws in this system, it is important to know the actual “purpose” of the NCAA.

“The National Collegiate Athletic Association is a membership-driven organization dedicated to safeguarding the well-being of student-athletes and equipping them with the skills to succeed on the playing field, in the classroom and throughout life” (NCAA.org 2015).

The NCAA is broken down in to three Divisions: Division 1, Division 2, and Divi-sion 3, with Division 1 being the largest, most talent-rich and profitable. Divi-sion 1 is the division of concern because it is the easily the most profitable and visible. A common misconception about how the NCAA is how the governing body works.

“Our governance structure consists of legislative bodies – made up of volunteers from our member schools – that govern each division, as well as a group of committees that set association-wide policy. These committees manage topics affecting sports rules, championships, health and safety, matters impacting women in athletics and oppor-tunities for minorities” (NCAA.org 2015).

The NCAA does have officials that are not directly tied to NCAA institutions, but the rules and legislature is decided on by a body of members of intuitions like athletic directors and coaches. The highest body of the NCAA is the Executive Committee.

“The Executive Committee is our highest governing body, bringing together presidents and chancellors from each division to discuss is-sues important to the entire NCAA membership. All association-wide governing bodies are charged with upholding and advancing the As-sociation’s core values of fairness, safety and equal opportunity for all student-athletes” (NCAA.org 2015).

This clearly describes the structure of the NCAA. “American universities have

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crafted an appealing image of ‘student-athletes.’ Kids go to school while play-ing sports on the side. They build character while representing their schools. Everyone gains.” The NCAA and their member institutions want to give off the image that they have the best interest of their students in mind, but it is obvi-ous that this is not the case. The NCAA is a “non-profit” business!

RevenueThe revenue earned by the NCAA is the most debatable aspect of this

issue. Normally, the only college athletic programs which earn positive revenue are football and men’s basketball. This is the point that critics of paying players present. They question how you can pay player when only two sports earn positive revenue. But it is important to note that positive revenue is only the surface of this complex issue.

“At the Division I level, the NCAA operates much like any other profes-sional sports league. The NCAA annually produces nearly $11 Billion in revenue from the operation of college sports — more than the es-timated league totals for the National Basketball Association and the National Hockey League” (Edelman 2014).

The NCAA is more profitable than the NBA and NHL, but they do not pay their players. The University of Alabama is the perfect example of this issue. “Mean-while the University of Alabama reported $143.3 million in athletic revenues last year — more than the revenues of each of 30 NHL teams, and 25 of the 30 NBA teams.” With that being said, the University of Alabama is one of the most profitable athletic organizations in the country but their players are not paid. There are many “excuses” the NCAA uses for not paying athletes, for example Title IX of the Patty T. Mink Equal Opportunity in Education Act.

“The NCAA’s leaders have no shortage of excuses to defend their ac-tions, and seek to maintain the status quo. The NCAA’s newest excuse against improving the working conditions of college athletes is that Title IX of the Patty T. Mink Equal Opportunity in Education Act would prevent any arrangement that would lead for greater net compensa-tion for male student-athletes” (Edelman 2014).

This is not a relevant excuse if you assess NCAA athletic programs as regular businesses. Yes, there might be an issue because most male and women sports do not make a profit. In business, is there a command monetary standard for stock owners in the same sector? No, profits are determined by how profitable your business has become.

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Academic Scholarship vs Athletic ScholarshipThere is a common misconception, in my opinion, that athletic scholarships and academic scholarships are on the same level. As a former Division 3 basket-ball player, I understand this issue more than most. First, a student athlete will miss a ton of class while playing a collegiate sport. “By contrast, the student-athletes who devote on average more than 40 hours per week to their sport are not even provided with the full value of a college educational experience.” A student athlete spends more to time playing their sport than people spend at their full-time jobs, not to mention school work. But here is the difference between a Division 3 and Division 1 basketball player. Division 3 athletics are very lax, by comparison. For example, I have had the time to hold a part time job, double major, and work an internship, while being a collegiate athlete. On the other hand, Division 1 athletes have a very stringent schedule that is often times predetermined. Also, Division 1 athletes are often times swayed into ma-jors that limit you in the workplace.

“In theory, a college degree could act as a career back-up given the paucity of professional opportunities, but the “student-athletes” most likely to focus on sports are least likely to graduate, especially with a useful degree after majoring in “eligibility,” as Duderstadt put it” (Edel-man 2014).

The major difference between Division 1 and 3 basketball players is that D1 players receive full scholarships, while D3 players receive only academic aid. Who would you say had the better academic experience? A person receiving a Division 1 academic scholarship would have all the academic perks I received plus extra free time. With an academic scholarship, a student could have a quality internship and or a job, while working on an education. What income could a Division 1 athlete receive, since players are not paid for play? The critics want to suggest the value of education, but I question whether athletes will receive the same education as their peers with academic scholarships.

“This year, the NCAA scheduled its Division I football championship on a Monday night in early January, overlapping with Florida State foot-ball players’ first day of spring semester classes. Similarly, the NCAA men’s basketball tournament will likely force at least some student-athletes to miss more than six days of spring classes” (Edelman 2014).

Are these athletes really receiving the same education as their peers?

New SlavesIt is common knowledge that the NCAA profits of the athletes, but it is impor-

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tant to exam to what extent. Former-LSU basketball coach Dale Brown has a candid quote that puts this issue into perspective.

“Economist Andy Schwarz told Nocera that ‘Economically, a big chunk of that money really does belong to the players.’ Former LSU basket-ball coach Dale Brown opined: ‘Look at the money we make off pre-dominantly poor black kids. We’re the whoremasters.’ Schools claim they can’t afford to pay students, but they could redistribute existing revenue. Nocera suggested paying coaches less” (Bandow 2012).

Coach’s Brown basically presents the idea that NCAA has been “pimp-ing” underprivileged athletes that they cannot “afford” to pay. It is important to note that admitting an additional student, an athlete, does not really cost an institution much money.

“There are other beneficiaries of ‘student-athletics.’ Argued sports journalist Robert Lipsyte; ‘The true madness of March is the millions of dollars—generated by the kids who touch the ball—that goes mostly to the advertising hustlers, television suits, arena operators, conces-sion hawkers, athletic gear manufacturers and retailers, university ad-ministrators, coaches and sports media noisemakers’” (Bandow 2012).

There are so many people profiting off of athletes, except the athlete. And the NCAA does a great job of making sure it stays that way.

“Nevertheless, the NCAA works overtime to ensure that kids enjoy no extra benefits, even, for instance, discounts for tattoos in exchange for autographs. It doesn’t matter if “student-athletes” come from broken and impoverished families, and have no money or educational future. Need help supporting an impecunious mother or getting home for a funeral? Fuggetabout it! Noted Nocera: ‘Any student athlete who ac-cepts an unapproved, free hamburger from a coach, or even a fan, is in violation of NCAA rules,’” (Edelman 2014).

For example, Georgia star running back Todd Gurley was suspended for profiting off of his own likeness. He was punished for signing his own au-tograph. Gurley did nothing that was detrimental to the NCAA or the Univer-sity of Georgia, but he received a severe punishment for his actions. Does the NCAA really have the athletes’ best interests at heart or do they only seek to control them?

College Athletics or Farm Systems?It has come to a point where it is tough to distinguish the difference

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between a college athletic programs and minor league farm teams.

“Pro teams also like the existing system. Universities act as a quasi-farm system, discovering talent, training players, and highlighting performance for free. In contrast to baseball and hockey, professional basketball and football franchises enjoy the help of others to turn immature, self-interested, and undeveloped teenagers into effective team players” (Bandow 2012).

The Kentucky men’s basketball program is the perfect example of this problem in action. The NBA has rules in place that prevents high school seniors from entering the draft until players are one year removed from High School. With that being said, Kentucky coach, John Calipari, has mainstreamed the “one and done concept”. He gets talented freshman every year that only plan on playing college basketball for one year before heading pro. After the end of the 2014-2015 season, Coach Calipari had three freshman, three sophomores, and a junior leave college early for the NBA draft. There is also another route players have explored. Since you only have to be one year removed from high school basketball, players have been going overseas to earn money before eventually heading to the NBA.

“Yes, players get scholarships, though the latter is not an expendi-ture for the university. The marginal education, for the most athletic students most interested in a pro career, college sports is indentured servitude, forcing them to work for an education they don’t want. A university education is not a benefit but an opportunity cost, a four-year loss of paid playing time” (Bandow 2012).

It is very interesting to look at a college degree as an “opportunity cost” for these future professional athletes. Most of these athletes could care less about a college degree, and their “rigorous” course load tells the story. Some of these athletes have been known to load up with PE and activity course, and they normally do not attend class after the season is over. I must note that there is a clause at some colleges that allow professional athletes to come back to school finish their degree. As time passes, the more college athletic pro-grams are beginning to look like farm systems.

NCAA Revenue and ScandalsThe variables used have already been discussed, but this section of

the paper will breakdown the exact numbers. The research design is very clear, use the exact numbers then look for a correlation. When discussing the profit-ability, the independent variable, of the NCAA, the data being used is the yearly

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revenue for FBS and FCS athletic programs. The numbers span back from 2004 until 2012.

Median Total Revenue 2004-2012 (via NCAA.org) http://www.ncaapubli-cations.com/productdownloads/2012RevExp.pdf

Next, the NCAA has listed the total number of NCAA violations from the years spanning 2004 to 2012. The information was received via the NCAA website, but I charted this information by year including the college and violation type. NCAA Violations Chart 2004-2012 (via NCAA.org) https://web1.ncaa.org/LSDBi/exec/miSearch

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Year School Scandal Type

2012 University of Tennessee (Knox-ville)

Recruiting Violations

2012 Eastern Michigan University NCAA Practice Violations2012 Texas Southern University Impermissible Participation2012 University of Central Florida Recruiting Violations2012 Pepperdine University Eligibility Violations2012 University of South Carolina

(Columbia)Impermissible Participation

2012 Baylor University Recruiting Violations and Failure to Monitor

2012 University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill)

Academic Fraud and Impermis-sible Benefits

2012 Radford University Extra Benefits2012 University of Nebraska (Lin-

coln)Extra Benefits

2011 Ohio State University Extra Benefits2011 University of Oklahoma Extra Benefits2011 University of Cincinnati Recruiting Violations2011 Boise State University Impermissible Benefits2011 University of Tennessee (Knox-

ville)False Information and Recruiting Violations

2011 Louisiana State University Impermissible Benefits2011 Georgia Institute of Technol-

ogyVarious NCAA Violations

2011 West Virginia University NCAA Practice Violations2011 East Carolina University Academic Fraud and Impermis-

sible Benefits2011 Samford University Financial Aid Violations2011 Arkansas State University Eligibility Violations2011 University of California, Berke-

leyRecruiting Violations

2011 University of Connecticut Recruiting Violations2011 Texas Tech University Recruiting Violations2010 Arizona State University Recruiting Violations2010 University of Michigan Unethical Conduct and Failure to

Monitor2010 Princeton University Impermissible Educational Expens-

es2010 University of Tennessee (Chat-

tanooga)Recruiting Violations

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2010 Morehead State University Impermissible Benefits2010 University of Arizona Impermissible Benefits and Failure

to Monitor2010 Ball State University Practice Violations2010 University of San Francisco Impermissible Financial Aid2010 University of Southern Califor-

niaRecruiting Violations

2010 University of Texas, Pan Ameri-can

Recruiting Violations

2010 Indiana University- Purdue University at (Indianapolis)

Eligibility Violations

2010 University of Nevada, Reno Extra Benefits2010 University of Central Florida Recruiting Violations2010 Georgia Southern University Unethical Conduct and Failure to

Monitor2009 College of the Holy Cross Recruiting Violations2009 University of Richmond Recruiting Violations2009 Georgetown University Extra Benefits and Failure to Moni-

tor2009 University of Memphis Recruiting Violations2009 Southeast Missouri State Uni-

versityExtra Benefits

2009 University of New Hampshire Recruiting Violations2009 University of Alabama Impermissible Benefits2009 University of South Alabama Impermissible Financial Aid2009 Northeastern University Recruiting Violations2009 Florida State University Academic Fraud and Impermis-

sible Benefits2009 Abilene Christian University Failure to Monitor2009 Eastern Washington University Practice Violations2009 University of Albany Recruiting Violations2009 Coastal Carolina University Financial Aid Violations2009 Alabama State University Recruiting Violations and Extra

Benefits2009 Indiana University (Blooming-

ton)Failure to Adhere to Penlties

2008 University of New Mexico Extra Benefits2008 Texas Southern University Impermissible Benefits and Finan-

cial Aid Violations2008 Southeast Missouri State Uni-

versityRecruiting Violations

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2008 Middle Tennessee State Uni-versity

Eligibility Violations

2008 Florida International Univer-sity

Financial Aid Violations and Lack of Institutional Control

2008 Brigham Young University Extra Benefits and Failure to Moni-tor

2008 Long Beach State University Impermissible Benefits and Failure to Monitor

2008 Texas Christian University Recruiting Violations2008 Prairie View A&M Extra Benefits and Lack of Institu-

tional Control2007 University of Arkansas (Fay-

etteville)Recruiting Violations and Failure to Monitor

2007 Ball State University Extra Financial Aid and Extra Ben-efits

2007 Purdue University Academic Fraud and Unethical Be-havior

2007 University of Oklahoma Extra Benefits and Failure to Moni-tor

2007 University of Colorado (Boul-der)

Practice Violations

2007 Temple University Eligibility Violations2007 West Virginia University Recruiting Violations and Unethi-

cal Conduct2007 University of Louisiana at La-

fayetteEligibility Violations and Failure to Monitor

2007 McNeese State University Academic Fraud and Impermis-sible Benefits

2006 University of Iowa Admissions Fraud2006 University of Kansas Impermissible Benefits and Aca-

demic Fraud2006 Northern Illinois University Extra Benefits2006 Alcorn State University Practice Violations and Lack of In-

stitutional Control2006 University of Oklahoma Recruiting Violations2006 Bradley University Extra Benefits2006 Savannah State University Lack of Compliance2006 St. John's University (New

York)Impermissible Benefits

2006 California State University, Fresno

Recruiting Violations

2006 Ohio State University Academic Fraud, Extra benefits, and Recruiting Violations

2006 Florida A&M University Eligibility Violations2006 Weber State University Eligibility Violations and Failure to

Monitor

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2005 Georgia Institute of Technol-ogy

Extra Benefits and Failure to Moni-tor

2005 University of South Carolina (Columbia)

Impermissible Benefits and Uneth-ical Conduct

2005 Arizona State University Impermissible Benefits and Finan-cial Aid Violations

2005 University of Illinois-Cham-paign

Extra Benefits

2005 University of Memphis Eligibility Violations and Failure to Monitor

2005 Texas Christian University Extra Benefits and Academic Fraud2005 Florida International Univer-

sityPractice Violations and Failure to Monitor

2005 Baylor University Impermissible Benefits and Uneth-ical Conduct

2005 Nicholls State University Extra Benefits and Unethical Con-duct

2005 Stony Brook University Violations of NCAA Bylaws2005 Texas State University Impermissible Financial Aid and

Failure to Monitor2004 University of Missouri, Colum-

biaRecruiting Violations and Extra Benefits

2004 Mississippi State University Recruiting Violations2004 University of Washington Recruiting Violations and Gam-

bling2004 University of Louisiana at

MonroeViolations of NCAA Regulations and Unethical Conduct

2004 Stetson University Recruiting Violations and Extra Benefits

2004 University of Georgia Recruiting Violations, Extra Ben-efits, and Academic Fraud

2004 Villanova University Recruiting Violations and Extra Benefits

2004 University of Oregon Eligibility Violations and Failure to Monitor

2004 Auburn University Recruiting Violations2004 Gardner-Webb University Recruiting Violations, Extra Ben-

efits, and Unethical Conduct2004 St. Bonaventure University Extra Benefits and Lack of Institu-

tional Control

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There are a few things that need to be addressed to further under-stand the data I chose, and to understand NCAA’s revenue. First, you might wonder why basketball and football are the only college sports mentioned heavily in this NCAA paper. The reason is that basketball and football are the only sports that make a profit. What does this mean? This means all of the other NCAA sports cost an athletic department money, instead of making money. The focus on the first chart is on the revenue discrepancies between the sports. The data validates the idea that football and basketball are the most valuable college sports. The next chart shows the differences in profitability between men, women, and coed sports. An argument against “pay for play” has been that women athletic team need to get paid as well. The data shows that no women’s athletic is even profitable. Both charts show the data from the final year of my study, 2012.

NCAA FBS Generate Revenues and Expenses by Sport 2012 (via NCAA.org)http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/2012RevExp.pdf

NCAA Summary of Revenues and Expenses 2012 (via NCAA.org)http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/2012RevExp.pdf

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Test ResultsThe first piece of data that I researched was the number of NCAA viola-

tions. There were a total of 106 Division 1 NCAA violations, between the years 2004 and 2012. The chart below shows the yearly breakdown of NCAA viola-tions. And the corresponding table below it shows analyzes the data from the NCAA violations chart.

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StatisticsNumber of NCAA ViolationsN Valid 9

Missing 0Mean 11.78Std. Deviation 2.438Sum 106

The average number of NCAA violations per year was 11.78.The next piece of data that was assessed is the data comparing the

profitability of the FBS and FBS divisions of the NCAA. The chart below shows a breakdown of the yearly revenue earnings from FBS and FCS. And the corre-sponding table below it shows analyzes the data from the revenue chart.

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StatisticsMedian Total

Revenue FBS $Median Total

Revenue FCS $N Valid 9 9

Missing 0 0Mean 41978222.22 11279111.11Std. Deviation 9362973.870 2135061.559Sum 377804000 101512000

The average yearly revenue for the FBS and FCS divisions are $41,978,222.22 (FBS) and $11,279,111.11 (FCS) respectively. Also, the FBS made a total of $377,804,000 during that time period, while the FCS division made $101,512,000.

The test results showed a finding contrary to those that I expected. Anybody who knows anything about the collegiate athletics industry would suggest that there is some relationship between the profitability of the NCAA and the amount of NCAA (scandals) violations committed yearly. I hypothe-sized that there would be would be a positive relationship between these two variables. I predicted that as the NCAA became more profitable, there would be an increase in the amount of NCAA violations. The chart below compares the yearly totals of my two variables. And the table below that shows the analy-sis of my variables.

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NCAA Violations vs Total Revenue Year Number of

ViolationsMedian Total Revenue (FBS) in $

Median Total Revenue (FCS) in $

2012 10 55,976,000 13,761,0002011 14 52,715,000 13,425,0002010 14 48,298,000 13,189,0002009 16 45,698,000 12,111,0002008 9 41,088,000 12,080,0002007 9 37,566,000 10,527,0002006 12 35,400,000 9,642,0002005 11 32,849,000 9,007,0002004 11 28,214,000 7,770,000

CorrelationsNumber Of Violations

Median To-tal Revenue

FBS $

Me-dian Total Revenue

FCS $Number Of Violations

Pearson Correlation 1 .327 .291Sig. (2-tailed) .390 .448N 9 9 9

Median Total Revenue FBS $

Pearson Correlation .327 1 .971**Sig. (2-tailed) .390 .000N 9 9 9

Median Total Revenue FCS $

Pearson Correlation .291 .971** 1Sig. (2-tailed) .448 .000N 9 9 9

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

To understand this table correctly, there must be a clear understand-ing of how the Pearson Correlation works. “Pearson’s r assumes that there are two interval variables. Its range is from -1 to +1. It is a measure of association, that is, of the strength of the relationship. Essentially, it measures how closely the case points cluster around the regression line” (Monroe 2000, 144). My vari-ables have a Pearson’s r of .327 for FBS budgets and scandals, and .291 for FCS budgets and scandals, but both correlations have an insignificant positive re-lationship.

First, it is important to mention that the both sides of the NCAA, FBS and FCS, are seeing a yearly increase in revenue. So, there is a positive relation-ship between the increases in both of these divisions. With that being said, as the FBS increases in revenue, the FCS should see an increase in revenue as well. On the other hand, there is no verifiable trend for the NCAA violations. The number of NCAA violations was its lowest during the middle years of 2008 and 2009. The most noteworthy piece of information comes from the year 2008

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to 2009. This is the year of the largest increase of FBS revenue totals. On top of that, this is also the year with the highest jump of NCAA violations. Although this seems like valuable information, as a whole there is not enough informa-tion to conclude that there is a significant relationship between these vari-ables. Even though there is a positive relationship between my two variables, their relationship is not significant enough.

Conclusion First, there was an insignificant positive relationship between my variables. I hypothesized that there would be a positive relationship between the profitability of the NCAA and the number of NCAA violations (scandals) committed. Anybody with any knowledge about the “big business” of college athletics would have suggested a similar hypothesize. Critics of my argument might believe that this disproves my claims, but this is far from the truth. First, the data that I analyzed was incomplete. The NCAA website does not show their revenue data beyond the year 2004; as a result, I could only analyze data from 2004 to 2012. The NCAA scandal data went back as far as the 1950s, but this is irrelevant without the corresponding revenue data. The NCAA understands that people, like myself, would want to use this data to criticize their “business model,” so it is easy to see why the website’s data is minimal. The NCAA does have their own “research” section where they analyze commonly asked ques-tions. But it does not take a rocket scientist to see that this data is manipulated. The NCAA uses the “research” section to paint themselves as the good guys in these issues. They also show data that presents the idea that their institution is in good standing. As the USA Today’s research shows, the NCAA does have a fast growing problem.

“The review finds that 53 of the 120 universities in the NCAA’s top competitive level, the Bowl Subdivision, were found by the Division I Committee on Infractions to have committed major rules violations from 2001 to 2010. That number appears to have held largely constant from the previous two decades, but the 2000s show that the number of colleges that committed serious violations of the association’s aca-demic rules nearly doubled, to 15 from eight in the 1990s” (Lederman 2011).

USA Today reported that the NCAA’s number of serious violations of the association’s academic rules has nearly doubled from the 1990s to the 2000s. This does not mention the dozens of other NCAA violations that are prominent. The NCAA has a ton of issues that will make headway soon, espe-cially after O’Bannon case. Again, let’s not forget that the NCAA is a “non-profit” organization. The

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biggest loser in this deal is the student-athletes. I would agree with Niall Fergu-son link of corruption of the NCAA to life on the Serengeti.

“There, our institutions recall the wildlife if the Serengeti, the ‘endless plains’ of northern Tanzania and Southern Kenya. Some of us are wil-debeest, grazing as we move in the herd. Other of us (rather fewer) are predators. I am afraid there are some scavengers and parasites, too. Likewise, in civil society, we form our groups and bands rather in the way that chimpanzees and baboons do. Like the clubs we humans used to be so fond of joining, a baboon troop has its rules and hierar-chies” (Ferguson 2014, 16-17).

As Ferguson suggest, there are institutions in our society that could be compared to life on the Serengeti. The elites, the NCAA, could be seen as the predators that prey on “weaker” animals, the student-athletes. “The elites” are in a position of influence that dictates life for the student-athletes. There are many people who make money off the NCAA’s student athletes; those who make such money off players are the scavengers and parasites. With that be-ing said, America cannot make the proper steps to improve the structure of the NCAA without holding those in control accountable. But my last statement might change, because as the Northwestern players and Ed O’Bannon show, the “grazing wildebeest” will not be taken advantage of any longer without a fight.

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Works Cited Doug Bandow (2012) “End College Sports Indentured Servitude: Pay “Student Athletes””. Sports Forbes. http://www.forbes.com/sites/ dougbandow/2012/02/21/end-college-sports-indentured-servitude- pay-student-athletes/ (Accessed May 2015)Barbara J. D’Aquila and Margaret Rudolph (2014). “NLRB Director Finds Scholarship Athletes are Employees.” Employee Relations Law Journal, 40(2), 37-44. http://eds.b.ebscohost.com/eds/pdfviewer/ pdfviewer?sid=8c667875-f825-4990-bfbc-ce524a7425a7%40session mgr198&vid=4&hid=113 (Accessed May 2015) ESPN 2014 “NU players cast secret ballots”. ESPN.com. http://espn.go.com/ chicago/college-football/story/_/id/10837584/northwestern-wild cats-players-vote-whether-form-first-union-college-athletes (Accessed May 2015)Mark Edelman (2014) “21 Reasons Why Student-Athletes Are Employees And Should Be Allowed To Unionize”. Sports Forbes. http://www. forbes.com/sites/marcedelman/2014/01/30/21-reasons-why-stu dent-athletes-are-employees-and-should-be-allowed-to-unionize/ (Accessed May 2015)Mark Edelman (2014) “How NCAA Greed Has Led To A Student-Athlete Uprising”. Sports Forbes. http://www.forbes.com/sites/marcedel man/2014/02/11/how-ncaa-greed-has-led-to-a-student-athlete-up rising/ (Accessed May 2015)Niall Ferguson (2013). The Great Degeneration: How Institutions Decay and Economies Die. New York, NY: Penguin PublishingJacob Goldstein (2015). Does NCAA Ban On Paying Student Athletes Violate Federal Law?. Morning Edition (NPR), http://eds.a.ebscohost.com/ eds/detail/detail?sid=bb9a9218 (Accessed May 2015)Tim Goral (2004). At All COSTS. University Business, 7(5), 40-51. http:// eds.b.ebscohost.com/eds/detail/detail?sid=5c5223a9-d57a-48f6- ac75-e355a8267b64%40sessionmgr115&vid=0&hid=117&bdata=Jn NpdGU9Z (Accessed 2015)Doug Lederman (2011) “Revenues and Expenses 2004-2012”. USAToday. com. http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/college/2011-02-07- ncaa-infractions_N.htm (Accessed May 2015Alan Monroe (2000). Essentials of Political Science Research. Boulder, Colorado: Westview PressNCAA “Governance “. NCAA.org. http://www.ncaa.org/about/what-we-do/gov ernance (Accessed May 2015)NCAA “Revenues and Expenses 2004-2012”. NCAA.org. http://www.ncaapubli cations.com/productdownloads/2012RevExp.pdf (Accessed May 2015)