MORAL MATURATION AND MORAL CONATION: A...

MORAL MATURATION AND MORALCONATION: A CAPACITY APPROACH TO

EXPLAINING MORAL THOUGHT AND ACTION

SEAN T. HANNAHWest Point–United States Military Academy

BRUCE J. AVOLIOUniversity of Washington

DOUGLAS R. MAYUniversity of Kansas

We set out to address a gap in the management literature by proposing a frameworkspecifying the component capacities organizational actors require to think and actmorally. We examine how moral maturation (i.e., moral identity, complexity, andmetacognitive ability) and moral conation (i.e., moral courage, efficacy, and owner-ship) enhance an individual’s moral cognition and propensity to take ethical action.We offer propositions to guide future research and discuss the implications of theproposed model for management theory and practice.

There is growing recognition that organiza-tions are operating in increasingly more com-plex and often global environments that inher-ently impose difficult moral challenges onorganization members (e.g., Donaldson, 2003;George, 2007; Hannah, Uhl-Bien, Avolio, & Ca-varretta, 2009a). This increased complexity isdue to a number of factors, including greaterscrutiny over individuals’ actions, more de-mands for transparency, the necessity for orga-nizations to work across competing governmen-tal and legal systems, expanded organizationalstakeholders with competing interests, and theneed to operate across different cultures thatconstitute diverse sets of values.

Paralleling a rise in the complexity of organi-zational challenges, popular belief suggeststhat the scope and scale of greed and malfea-sance in organizations are escalating (George,2007). In response to these trends, a growingnumber of organizations and governments areestablishing ethics offices and developing newethical policies and mandatory ethics training(Donaldson, 2003). As organizations strive to de-

velop the moral capacity of employees, the tim-ing seems propitious to offer a theoreticalframework examining what constitutes themoral capacity of individuals in the workplaceand how that capacity drives the way individu-als respond to ethical challenges. Conse-quently, our primary motivation for writing thisarticle is to offer a comprehensive and testabletheoretical framework to serve as the basis forguiding future research and practice concerningthe moral capacities needed to process a moralchallenge from recognition to action.

We suggest below that there is a need for anew and expanded theory of moral1 develop-ment that better explains how individuals con-sider and act on moral dilemmas and tempta-tions. Yet we realize our position will not beaccepted without challenge, since some may be-lieve the “gold standard” already exists in thewell-known cognitive development models ofJean Piaget (1965/1932), Lawrence Kohlberg(Kohlberg, 1981; Kohlberg & Candee, 1984), andJames Rest and colleagues (Rest, Narvaez, Be-beau, & Thoma, 1999; see also Rest, 1986, 1994).We build on these earlier theoretical frame-works in our proposed model by starting our

We thank Professor Jean-Philippe Bonardi and threeanonymous reviewers for their guidance and numerous im-portant recommendations to improve this manuscript. Wealso thank Professor James Campbell (Jim) Quick, who pro-vided valuable input on an early version of the paper.

1 In this article we treat the terms moral and ethical assynonyms.

� Academy of Management Review2011, Vol. 36, No. 4, 663–685.http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/amr.2010.0128

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discussion noting their strengths and limita-tions. We then proceed by proposing a new the-oretical moral capacity framework that can beused to examine how individuals process andrespond to moral problems, as well as by focus-ing on how those capacities can be developed.

First, in prior theory and research scholarshave focused on describing the processeswhereby individuals handle moral incidents,but they have not adequately explained the un-derlying capacities individuals require to effec-tively enact those processes. For example, Restand colleagues (1999) made extensive contribu-tions to the literature on moral psychology bydeveloping their four-component model. Thismodel identifies four “inner psychological pro-cesses [that] together give rise to outwardly ob-servable behavior” (1999: 101)—moral sensitiv-ity, moral judgment, moral motivation, andmoral action. These four processes have servedas an important organizing framework andstarting point for ethics research and practice.

To understand our intended theoretical contri-bution, however, it is important to make severaldistinctions between Rest et al.’s as well as oth-ers’ approach to examining ethical processesand our approach to exploring ethical capaci-ties. Rest et al. state that the moral sensitivityprocess, for example, entails steps such as “in-terpreting the situation, role-taking how variousactions would affect the parties concerned,imagining cause-effect chains of events, and be-ing aware that there is a moral problem when itexists” (1999: 101). Research has shown that in-dividuals vary in their level of proficiency re-garding each of these four processes (e.g., Be-beau, 2002). Yet prior research has notsufficiently examined the individual capacitiesthat explain the variance across individuals en-abling someone to effectively execute the stepsor actions related to these four processes. Basedon Rest et al.’s description of moral sensitivity,for example, we might ask, “What enables aperson to execute the steps in interpreting amoral challenge and then estimating cause andeffect chains better than another?” At the pres-ent time prior theory and research do not ade-quately address this or similar questions. Wetherefore set out here to identify the specificindividual capacities that help account for thelevel of variation across individuals in terms ofhow they process, formulate judgments about,and respond to moral challenges.

Second, previous theories have focused pri-marily on aspects of moral judgment while notadequately explaining the capacities needed tocarry those judgments through to intentions andactions. For example, while Kohlberg (1981) fo-cused exclusively on explaining the core as-pects of moral judgment, Rest et al.’s four-component model suggests that moraljudgments must also be preceded by moralawareness and followed by the formation ofintentions to act and then, ultimately, actionitself. Rest et al. conclude, however, that be-sides some “forays into studying Components3 and 4,” little work has been done to explainmoral motivation or intentions and moral ac-tion and that “we believe that the overall prog-ress in the larger enterprise of moral psychol-ogy can be viewed in terms of how wellresearch progresses in all four inner psycho-logical components leads to outwardly observ-able behavior” (1999: 102).

Third, prior research has highlighted the im-portance of individual differences in ethical pro-cessing, but that work has focused primarily ona limited set of stable individual traits. Treviño(1986), for example, proposed that locus of con-trol, ego strength, and field dependence wouldmoderate the linkage between ethical cognitionand behavior. Although these are all importantindividual stable traits that can be used to po-tentially explain ethical processing in part, wefocus on malleable individual capacities thatcan be developed to enhance one’s ethical cog-nition and behavior/actions.

Fourth, a useful practical model of moral ca-pacities must explain both moral cognition andmoral conation or the impetus to act. We definemoral conation as the capacity to generate re-sponsibility and motivation to take moral actionin the face of adversity and persevere throughchallenges. The theories of Kohlberg, Rest et al.,and others have focused largely on the cognitiveprocessing of moral dilemmas—those complexintellectual choices between right versus wrong,or right versus right. Such models do not ad-dress how individuals process moral tempta-tions (Monin, Pizarro, & Beer, 2007), where theyknow what is best but one personal value con-flicts with another. In this situation the individ-ual must have the adequate self-regulatory ca-pacity to resist one action in favor of anotheraction. A person may be tempted, for example, toparticipate in unethical acts performed by his or

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her group to achieve peer acceptance, requiringthe conation to resist such temptation and tostand up and take action against those whohave done the wrong thing.2

Fifth, more recent theories have been devel-oped that attempt to explain those capacitiesneeded by moral actors at specific stages ofprocessing a moral issue, such as Reynolds’(2008) theory of moral attentiveness. However,what is missing in the literature is a more inte-grated model of individual moral capacities thatcan fully explain how moral dilemmas arethought about and acted on across all four ofRest et al.’s processes. Supporting this need,Rest and colleagues note that “although mostresearchers would agree that there is much di-versity of constructs, processes, phenomena,and starting points for the psychology of moral-ity, the greater challenge is to formulate how allthese different parts fit together” (1999: 6).

In sum, our principle goal is to provide re-searchers with a conceptual framework that in-cludes the breadth of moral capacities requiredby moral actors to think about and act on amoral dilemma. Specifically, our proposedmodel seeks to achieve the following objectives:(1) to provide an organizing structure for an ex-panded set of constructs required to be devel-oped in moral actors, while also explaining therelationships and processes linking these con-structs; (2) to recognize both the processes moralactors must use and the underlying capacitiesthey require to effectively enact those processes;and (3) to use what we have learned from thefirst two objectives to facilitate assessment anddevelopment by offering measurable and mal-leable constructs for future research and prac-tice in this area.

In developing the proposed model, we exam-ined relevant frameworks from clinical, social,and developmental psychology and neurosci-ence, as well as leadership, organizational be-havior, and ethics. We assessed where eachframework’s boundary ended in contributing toour understanding of moral capacity and whereanother framework with compatible logic be-gan. We believe that our contribution to moral/ethical theory and practice involves advancinga broader “enterprise” approach, as called for

by Rest et al. (1999), that accounts for the capac-ities needed for ethical awareness and decisionmaking, as well as the conation to followthrough with action.

TOWARD AN EXPANDED MODEL OFMORAL CAPACITIES

Measuring attitudes and judgments in gen-eral (Ajzen, 1991), as well as ethical judgmentsin particular (Bebeau, 2002; Blasi, 1980; Treviño &Youngblood, 1990), has generated relativelyweak relationships in predicting actual ethicalbehavior. Despite this fact, Reynolds (2006) notesthat ethics research has tended to focus predom-inantly on ethical judgment models versus eth-ical behavior, which is a trend that is also evi-dent in recent literature reviews (O’Fallon &Butterfield, 2005; Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe,2008; Treviño, Weaver, & Reynolds, 2006). Thistrend has persisted even though Rest et al. (1999:101) reported that the Defining Issues Test(DIT)—the most commonly used measure of cog-nitive moral judgment capacity—typically onlyexplains approximately 20 percent of the vari-ance in actual ethical behavior.

Kohlberg (1981, 1986) based his model of cog-nitive moral development on the work of Piaget(1965/1932) and proposed that moral develop-ment is a maturation process that unfolds acrossthe lifespan in six stages, whereby more com-plex “mental operations” related to the logic ofmorality are developed. Kohlberg originally at-tempted to explain overall moral developmentas stemming from cognitive development but, inresponse to critics (e.g., Gilligan, 1982), in laterwork narrowed the boundaries of his develop-mental theory to only apply to moral judgmentsdealing with justice issues.3

In arguing for a “neo-Kohlbergian approach,”Rest and colleagues (1999) suggested that be-yond the limitations of solely focusing on jus-tice, Kohlberg’s theory and scoring system wastoo “macro-moral” in that it addressed abstract

2 For parsimony we use “dilemma” from here on to repre-sent all moral problems, predicaments, and temptations.

3 Kohlberg states that “the research programme of myselfand my Harvard colleagues has moved from restricting thestudy of morality to the study of moral development to re-stricting it to the study of moral judgment . . . to restricting itto the form or cognitive-structural stage of moral judgmentas embodied in judgments of justice”; he further states thathe does not imply that “these restrictions should guide allfruitful moral psychology research” (Kohlberg, 1986: 499).

2011 665Hannah, Avolio, and May

aspects of society (e.g., societal norms of justice)versus the more commonly faced moral rela-tions between individuals, friends, groups, andorganizations. Rest et al. (1999) noted that theo-ries need to take these more relevant, frequent,and typically more complex moral issues intoaccount.

Rest et al. (1999) also argued against the “hardstages” associated with development recom-mended by Kohlberg, basing their model in-stead on the concept of cognitive schemas. Theauthors noted that Kohlberg’s theory only ad-dressed component 2 (moral judgment) of theirfour-component model. Yet despite this criticismof Kohlberg’s work, Rest and colleagues’ ownwork focused largely on component 2, develop-ing and validating the DIT, which purports tomeasure levels of moral schema developmentusing hypothetical moral judgment exercises.Thus, while the models of Kohlberg and Rest etal. foremost attempt to address one aspect(schema development) of the cognitive capaci-ties that individuals need to recognize andjudge moral issues, they do not help explain theself-regulatory capacities that promote how anindividual engages his or her full cognitive ca-pacities in a given moral dilemma. Nor do thosemodels attempt to explain why one person will

stand up and act in the face of adversity whileanother person of equal cognitive capacity willfail to act morally (Bandura, 1991).

Therefore, we set out to extend this prior the-ory and research by first identifying personalcapacities related to both moral thought andconduct. Next, we examine how they operate asdeterminants that influence an individual’smoral behavior.

Overview of the Model’s Core Components

We provide an overview of the components,presented in Figure 1, constituting moral matu-ration and conation, and in subsequent sectionswe provide more in-depth analysis of each com-ponent. At the base of the model is a depiction ofthe four psychological processes as proposed byRest et al. (1999). Moral sensitivity includes pro-cesses related to being aware of a moral prob-lem, interpreting the situation, and identifyingvarious options to address the problem. Moraljudgment concerns processes taken to deter-mine what action is the most proper to pursue.Moral motivation entails processes geared to-ward gaining commitment to a given action andthe weight assigned to specific moral valuesover other values. Finally, moral action involves

FIGURE 1Framework for Moral Maturation and Moral Conation

Moralaction

Moralmotivation

Moralsensitivity

Moraljudgment

Moral cognition processes Moral conation processes

P6 P7 P8P5P1 P2 P3P4P5

Experience, reflection, and feedback

Moral conation capacities

Moralownership

Moralcourage

Moralcomplexity

Moralidentity

Moralefficacy

Meta-cognitive

ability

Moral maturation capacities


persistence in a moral task, overcoming fatigueand various temptations and challenges to takethe appropriate action.

While some of these four component labelsread akin to developed capacities, Rest et al.have defined them as psychological processesrelated to sequencing or addressing a moraldilemma. Indeed, the four components were firstdeveloped to categorize ethics theories andserve as a “heuristic tool in conceptualizing thepsychology of morality as a whole” (Rest et al.,1999: 101). Yet while serving as a valuable heu-ristic, we believe this framework suffers fromsome important gaps. The moral motivationcomponent, for example, denotes a psychologi-cal process where commitment to action is gen-erated but does not specify what individual dif-ferences drive that process or the level ofcommitment needed to behave in a moral man-ner. We therefore seek to advance Rest’s work(1986, 1994) by articulating the moral capacitiesdisplayed in the upper half of Figure 1 that canserve to explain why individuals are more orless inclined and able to effectively executethose four processes.

To organize our proposed model, we groupRest et al.’s components of moral sensitivity andmoral judgment into moral cognition processessince they both entail the awareness and pro-cessing of information pertaining to moral is-sues. Further, we group the moral motivationand moral action components into what we termmoral conation processes since they both entailthe tendency for and the practice of moral be-havior.

Similarly, we use the category labels moralmaturation and moral conation to group the sixmoral capacities of our model for ease of con-ceptualization and description. We are not, how-ever, proposing higher-order latent constructs.Accordingly, we first define each capacity andthen offer individual propositions related toeach of the six capacities in our model.

As shown in the upper portion of Figure 1, wesuggest that the three constructs labeled moralmaturation capacities are critical in drivingmoral cognition processes. We define moralmaturation as the capacity to elaborate and ef-fectively attend to, store, retrieve, process, andmake meaning of morally relevant information.Next, we suggest that the three constructs la-beled moral conation capacities are critical indriving moral motivational processes. We ear-

lier defined moral conation as the capacity togenerate responsibility and motivation to takemoral action in the face of adversity and perse-vere through challenges.

Dynamics of the Model

Before proceeding, it is important to clarifythree aspects of our theoretical framework. First,we propose that each capacity is necessary butnot sufficient for moral decision making andbehavior. High levels of moral complexity, forexample, must be accompanied by sufficientmetacognitive ability to process complex moralknowledge, along with a moral identity guidedby self-regulation and processing that achievesa desired moral outcome.

Second, our propositions suggest that moralmaturation capacities will primarily drive moralcognitive processes, while moral conation ca-pacities will primarily drive moral motivationalor conative processes. Yet we also consider inour discussion of the proposed model that thesecapacities may also have some influence onother stages of Rest et al.’s four-componentmodel of moral decision making. Most notably,as shown in Figure 1, we explicitly propose thatmoral identity is unique in that it will drive bothmoral cognition and one’s motivation orconation to act. For example, an individual whohas a very highly developed sense of moralidentity will more likely exhibit ethical behav-iors that are more in line with his or her moralidentity, thus enhancing the individual’s moralconation to act (e.g., Aquino & Reed, 2002; Blasi,1993; Weaver, 2006). However, we also note thatthe judgments made and actions taken may alsovary across different moral issues and domains,even where the individual has a highly devel-oped moral identity.

Finally, as suggested by the shaded dottedline “Experience, reflection, and feedback” inFigure 1, we propose that these six capacitiesare all open to development, which goes beyondearlier literature primarily focusing on identify-ing stable traits and attributes that may influ-ence moral judgments and actions. Conse-quently, we provide in our discussion somepreliminary suggestions on how these capaci-ties could best be measured and developed tohelp initiate and guide future research in thisarea.


In order to provide sufficient space to fullydefine the six capacities included in our model,we do not spend a great deal of time focusing oncontextual factors that might influence these re-spective capacities. However, we fully recognizethat the context, including the characteristics,culture, and climate of the organization(Treviño, 1986; Treviño & Youngblood, 1990), andother factors, such as leadership (Brown,Treviño, & Harrison, 2005; Mayer, Kuenzi, Green-baum, Bardes, & Salvador, 2009), are also impor-tant elements that could significantly influenceindividual moral processing, motivation, andbehaviors. We highlight some of these contex-tual factors that should be included in futureresearch in the discussion section.

MORAL MATURATION

Understanding what constitutes moral matu-ration requires greater refinement, beyond Kohl-berg’s (1981) specific stage model of cognitivemoral development and Rest et al.’s three levelsof cognitive development (i.e., personal interest,maintaining norms, and postconventional). Restet al. recognized the coarseness of their ap-proach, noting, “We recognize that the cognitivestructures we talk about are somewhere be-tween cognitive development stages and socialschemas” (1999: 185). To refine Rest et al.’sstages we incorporate theories of cognitive com-plexity (e.g., Streufert & Nogami, 1989), therebydecomposing individuals’ mental representa-tions of moral knowledge into more refined as-pects of content and structure to help better ex-plain what constitutes cognitive moralmaturation (e.g., Street, Douglas, Geiger, & Mar-tinko, 2001).

Complexity of Moral Representations

We know that individuals are more or lesscomplex in their mental representations of var-ious domains of knowledge based on theirbreadth of experience and learning across thelife span (Bandura, 1991; Schroder, Driver, &Streufert, 1967; Streufert & Nogami, 1989), includ-ing in different moral domains (Narvaez, 2010;Swanson & Hill, 1993). Here we use the termdomain to mean a specific area of ethics (e.g.,accounting ethics, medical ethics, military eth-ics, or parenting ethics). Individuals can havemore or less complex representations of each

knowledge domain, depending on their level ofdevelopment. Greater complexity in a given do-main is composed of highly differentiated andrichly connected mental representations thatthe individual can call on to allow him or her toprocess information in greater depth and withmore elaboration (Rafaeli-Mor & Steinberg, 2002;Streufert & Nogami, 1989). For example, Be-beau’s (2002) work in the dental profession sug-gests that dentists will have varying levels ofcomplexity associated with dental ethics. Fur-ther, a dentist may have low levels of moralcomplexity in other domains, such as account-ing ethics or, more generally, biomedical ethics,lacking adequate knowledge in those areas ofethics to process and apply information to agiven dilemma with depth and elaboration.

Moral complexity is a critical moral capacitybecause the distinctive dimensions individualsuse to organize and make meaning of the worldstrongly influence how they make decisions andbehave within a specific domain (Rafaeli-Mor &Steinberg, 2002; Streufert & Nogami, 1989). Allother things being equal, more cognitively com-plex individuals process information more thor-oughly because they have more categories todiscriminate among information received intheir environment and are more able to see com-monalities and connections among those cate-gories (Schroder et al., 1967; Streufert & Nogami,1989). This led Hannah, Lester, and Vogelgesang(2005) to propose that rich moral representationswill help individuals achieve greater coherencewhen processing complex moral dilemmas.Greater moral complexity provides a larger andmore developed set of prototypes with which toprocess moral information, and these prototypesare drawn on during either controlled or auto-matic processing of ethical challenges/incidents(see Reynolds, 2006; Sonenshein, 2007). There-fore, the concept of moral complexity underpinswhat Werhane (1999) calls “moral imagination,”or the ability to understand the various dimen-sions of moral dilemmas and develop variousmoral “realities” to consider and with which tocreate imaginative solutions. This occurs be-cause more cognitively complex individuals arebetter able to acquire and make sense of com-peting information, while spending more timeinterpreting a broader range of information tohelp resolve dilemmas (e.g., Bower & Hilgard,1981; Dollinger, 1984). Indeed, in their work withadolescents, Swanson and Hill (1993) found that


richer moral knowledge predicted higher moralreasoning. Narvaez (2010) suggests that morecomplex moral actors will also have greater“negative expertise” in that they will know whatactions not to take when facing a moral di-lemma.

Beyond enhancing the processing of moraljudgments, moral complexity should also en-hance moral sensitivity (i.e., stage 1 of Rest etal.’s four-stage model). Reynolds notes that indi-viduals differ from one another in moral atten-tiveness, which he proposes enables greatersensitivity to moral issues, and he calls for fu-ture research to determine the “origins of moralattentiveness” (2008: 1039). In response to Reyn-olds call, we suggest that moral complexity is acentral antecedent to moral attentiveness be-cause individuals have a heightened propensityto attend to information that is consistent withtheir mental representations, while discountingincongruent information (Dutton & Jackson,1987). This suggests that the more distinct inter-nal dimensions or prototypes people possess toperceive “moral cues,” the more likely and ablethey will be to perceive and attend to moralindicators, when present.

Moral judgments are also inherently contex-tualized. Groups, organizations, and societiesseek to function on a shared set of values (Victor& Cullen, 1988), and yet those values vary, per-haps extensively, across different collectives(Margolis & Phillips, 1999; Shweder, 1991). Evenwhen individuals agree on sets of values ormoral standards, the meanings and applica-tions of those standards are often contentious(Sonenshein, 2007). Given this equivocality, wedo not offer prescriptions as to any specificknowledge content comprising moral complex-ity as being more or less “moral”—only thatgreater complexity in a given moral domain(s)will drive more elaborate moral judgments con-cerning that domain. We define elaborate moraljudgment as the extent to which an individualdifferentiates and integrates moral information.

Moral complexity, therefore, incorporates richknowledge content representative of the moral-ity of a given culture or social group. With this inmind, we suggest that our proposed model canbe generalized across cultures and organiza-tions yet needs to be further specified withinany given culture by incorporating the virtues,norms, and mores of that culture to determinewhat constitutes moral, immoral, or even amoral

complex knowledge (Margolis & Phillips, 1999;Shweder, 1991). In sum, the extent to which indi-viduals possess moral complexity in a givendomain will enhance their level of moral sensi-tivity and ability to differentiate and integrate(i.e., elaborate) moral information in that do-main, particularly since people tend to use thehighest stages of cognitive development avail-able to them when processing moral dilemmas,if ample motivation exists (Treviño, 1992). Thisleads to our first proposition.

Proposition 1: Higher (lower) levels ofcomplexity in a specific domain(s) ofmoral knowledge will be associatedwith higher (lower) levels of (a) moralsensitivity and (b) elaborative moraljudgments in that domain(s).

Metacognitive Ability

The next moral maturation capacity in ourmodel is metacognitive ability. We include thiscapacity to explain the variance in individualability to use moral complexity to enhancemoral cognition (Metcalfe & Shimamura, 1994;Narvaez, 2010). We propose that moral complex-ity provides a deeper understanding of whatconstitutes moral maturation, thus going be-yond the general conceptualizations of Kohl-berg’s or Rest et al.’s stages. A high level ofcomplexity is, however, like fuel without an en-gine to process that fuel. Street et al. (2001) arguethat individuals also need the capacity or “en-gine” to deeply process complex moral knowl-edge. As with other constructs in our proposedmodel, we focus on metacognitive ability as adeveloped capacity underlying such depth ofprocessing (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), and we sug-gest some techniques to measure and developthis construct.

Metacognitive ability is composed of monitor-ing and regulating cognitive processes, thusserving both self-referential and executive con-trol functions (Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009; Met-calfe & Shimamura, 1994), which are critical formoral cognition. Metacognitive ability has beenshown to be related to yet distinct from generalintelligence or cognitive ability (see Dunlosky &Metcalfe, 2009, and Veenman & Elshout, 1999).Recent neuroscience research has shown thatthese general and more specific cognitive abil-


ities each draw from different neural capacities(e.g., Jausovec, 2008).

Overall intelligence or cognitive ability refersto the general capacity to reason and solveproblems, which is distinct from the ability toregulate and control cognition as these reason-ing processes unfold (Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009;Metcalfe & Shimamura, 1994). Indeed, researchhas shown that as an individual gains expertisein a certain domain, the individual’s metacogni-tive ability gets progressively more tailored toprocessing information in that domain. Conse-quently, over time, the direct influence of gen-eral intellectual ability diminishes as an indi-vidual acquires expertise in a domain, while theimpact of metacognition increases on how thatindividual processes information (Veenman &Elshout, 1999). This suggests that at higher lev-els of development, moral cognitive functioningwill be guided less by some general moral in-telligence and more by metacognitive abilitythat has been tailored to various areas of priormoral experiences—with that metacognitiveability drawing on underlying complex moralknowledge developed within specific domains(i.e., moral complexity).

We suggest that by acquiring higher levels ofmoral metacognitive ability, individuals willalso enhance their moral sensitivity and moraljudgment. This is because complex moral dilem-mas require the capacity to select from, access,and modify moral knowledge and to apply elab-orative reasoning to the specific moral dilemmabeing confronted in order for an individual toachieve a sense of logical coherence. Metacog-nitive ability provides the executive controlfunctions over these processes, determiningwhat is attended to and recalled by an individ-ual (Metcalfe & Shimamura, 1994), along withthe selection and employment of mental proto-types (Reynolds, 2008; Sonenshein, 2007) usedduring ethical decision making. Prior researchindicates that these metacognitive processescan become so tailored and habituated that theybecome automated and triggered by cues in thecontext (e.g., Gollwitzer & Schaal, 1998; Metcalfe& Shimamura, 1994). Where these metacognitiveabilities have become habituated, we expect tosee a greater use of automatic moral processingof ethical dilemmas.

Separating moral complexity from an individ-ual’s ability to process that complexity via meta-cognition helps explain individual differences

in the use of moral capacity when judging moralissues (Thoma, Rest, & Davidson, 1991). This dis-tinction may also be particularly useful in ex-plaining how individuals process ethical issuesthat force them to address multiple competingvalues. For example, higher levels of metacog-nitive ability would enhance the monitoring andcontrol over what information is being used inmaking a judgment, assessments of that infor-mation’s accuracy, influences of emotions orcompeting values on judgment, and whether allpossible aspects of a moral dilemma have beenconsidered. This leads to our next proposition.

Proposition 2: Higher (lower) levels ofmoral metacognitive ability will beassociated with higher (lower) levelsof (a) moral sensitivity and (b) elabo-rative moral judgments.

Moral Identity

Another limitation of Rest’s (1986, 1994) andKohlberg’s (1981) models is that they focus onmoral domain knowledge in determining whatconstitutes cognitive moral development (justiceconcepts in the case of Kohlberg, as noted ear-lier). Yet research has shown that in addition toknowledge of concepts of morality, individuals’knowledge about themselves as moral actors(i.e., moral identity) is also critical in drivingboth moral cognition and moral conation (e.g.,Aquino, Freeman, Reed, Lim, & Felps, 2009). Thisis because self-identity consists of the most acces-sible and elaborate knowledge structures individ-uals hold (Hannah, Woolfolk, & Lord, 2009b; Kihl-strom, Beer, & Klein, 2003) and, thus, imposes astrong influence on how individuals regulatethought and control behavior (Carver & Scheier,1998; Lord & Brown, 2004). Therefore, identity can-not be separated from moral processing, particu-larly since moral and immoral actions all influ-ence one’s self-evaluations (e.g., “Am I a goodperson?”) and sense of self-consistency (e.g.,“What ethical action is most in line with my be-liefs about myself?”).

The self-regulatory functions provided bymoral identity are critical in rounding out andmore fully explaining what constitutes moralmaturation. Moral complexity and metacogni-tive ability combined provide a richer elabora-tion of moral knowledge, yet these processesmust be guided by self-regulatory standards


used when processing moral incidents/events(Carver & Scheier, 1998; Lord & Brown, 2004). Forexample, highly complex individuals mightcome up with ways to justify moral disengage-ment if such rich processing is not guided byself-standards.

We are certainly not the first to propose thatmoral identity is critical to moral processingand behavior (e.g., Aquino & Reed, 2002; Blasi,1993; Weaver, 2006). For example, Reynolds andCeranic (2007) demonstrated that moral identityis an important construct in helping to explainthe link between moral judgments and behavior.Here we suggest that prior work on moral iden-tity can be expanded in three specific ways.First, instead of conceptualizing moral identityin isolation, we integrate moral identity withother interrelated capacities of moral matura-tion and link moral identity to Rest et al.’s four-component model.

Second, we approach moral identity as com-posed of more than self-descriptive moral traits.Aquino and Reed’s (2002) construct of moralidentity, for example, includes nine Kantian-likemoral traits, including caring, compassionate,fair, friendly, generous, helpful, hardworking,honest, and kind. Identity, however, is thought toinclude not only traits but other dynamic struc-tures, including roles, goals and motivation, af-fect, and autobiographical narratives, alongwith other components (Hill & Roberts, 2010;Lord, Hannah, & Jennings, 2011). We thereforeconceptualize moral identity as a more complexstructure.

Third, we propose that moral identity is not asingular identity structure but is multifacetedand represented across various identities (Han-nah et al., 2009b). We therefore incorporate self-complexity theory (e.g., Linville, 1987; Woolfolk,Gara, Allen, & Beaver, 2004) with moral identitytheory to help explain the multifaceted nature ofmoral identity. We believe that this third contri-bution is critical if we are to understand whymoral behavior varies across situations in theworkplace, which is a question that largely hasbeen unanswered in the literature (Hardy &Carlo, 2005).

Prior theories of moral identity have focusedon the content associated with an individual’sself-concept (i.e., how people see themselves asa moral being/actor) and have operationalizedmoral identity by asking participants to respondto the extent various traits apply to their overall

global identity. This approach has explicitly as-sumed that (1) individuals possess a unifiedmoral identity that is distinct from other identi-ties they hold, (2) this moral identity can be moreor less central to individuals’ overall identity,and (3) situations influence how accessible orsalient this moral identity is at any point in time(see Aquino et al., 2009).

As we suggested above, we believe that thereare important alternative ways of conceptualiz-ing moral identity that move beyond viewing itas a unified concept, and we use self-complex-ity theory to support our position (e.g., Hannahet al., 2009b; Linville, 1987). Consequently, wesuggest that moral identity is not a separateintact identity, any more than “sociable” is aseparate identity. Instead, self-complexity the-ory suggests that identity content (e.g., moralor sociable) is instead structured across thevarious subidentities that make up a person’smultifaceted identity. These subidentities arelargely based on social roles, such as parentor team leader, and are developed as actorsperform these roles over time (Markus & Wurf,1987). This suggests that each social role willbe composed of different forms and levels ofmoral identity content. Specifically, we pro-pose that the content of moral identity consistsof self-knowledge components (e.g., “What do Istand for?” or “What are my core beliefs?”) andevaluative components (e.g., “Am I a moralperson?” or “How well do I stand up for mybeliefs?”) and their associated sets of goals,affect, self-regulatory plans, etc., whereasstructure refers to how such content is orga-nized and categorized across the social rolescomposing one’s overall identity (Woolfolk etal., 2004).

One’s overall self-identity is thus elaborateand differentiated, actually being more of anassemblage of selves rather than a unifiedwhole (Markus & Wurf, 1987). For example, onecan see oneself as highly truthful in one’s roleas a team leader, but less so in one’s secondaryrole as a company media spokesperson. Moralidentity can thus be defined and measured asmore or less complex based on how rich anddifferentiated it is as structured across individ-uals’ self-identities (Hannah et al., 2009b; Lord etal., 2011). For instance, in a self-complexitystudy Woolfolk et al. (2004) demonstrated thatethics-related attributes, such as honest, selfish,scornful, admirable, bad, dependable, and dis-


honest, were represented to greater and lesserextents across participants’ various subidenti-ties. Further, emerging research has demon-strated that individuals’ preferences and valueschange when separate subidentities are primed(LeBoeuf, Shafir, & Bayuk, 2010). For example,Reicher and Levine (1994) showed that when ascientist versus a student identity was primed,individuals had more favorable attitudes to-ward practices such as animal vivisection. To-gether, this research suggests that a self-complexity approach will offer a more refinedunderstanding of the multifaceted moral iden-tity, and thereby variance in moral thought andbehavior across situations and social roles.

Moral identity and the unity of the self. Acomplex, differentiated moral identity, however,does not suggest individuals are devoid of corevalues or consistency in their self-identity. Asdiscussed earlier, individuals’ level of complex-ity is represented both by their differentiationand integration of knowledge—in this case self-knowledge. Taking this position helps to ex-plain how one can differ as a moral actor acrossvarious roles (i.e., differentiation) yet at thesame time understand one’s consistency or lackthereof across those roles based on certain coreattributes (i.e., integration). Concerning integra-tion, greater moral identity complexity wouldtherefore be associated with what has beencalled “self-unity,” defined as “the extent towhich self-beliefs (e.g. perceived personal attri-butes) are clearly and confidently defined, inter-nally consistent, and stable” (Campbell et al.,1996: 141).

Using justice as an example, a person mayidentify him/herself as being a fair individualacross a broad range of social roles. These rolescould then “roll up” and contribute to a moreintegrated or generalized aspect of self-identityas a just person (Hannah et al., 2009b; Hill &Roberts, 2010). This same person, however, maybe more differentiated across subidentitiesbased on other aspects of moral identity. Theconcept of unity thus provides an underlyingbasis for what Aquino et al. (2009) and othershave called the “centrality of moral identity.”We suggest that unity is not a separate identityas proposed by Aquino et al. but, rather, is thethe extent to which select moral content is rep-resented centrally across aspects of one’s self-identity, and therefore highly salient. Impor-tantly, applying self-complexity and related

measures to moral identity will allow research-ers to assess both differentiation and integra-tion/unity, as well as the concomitant effects ofeach on the moral behaviors enacted.

Aspects of moral identity held with higher lev-els of unity are especially critical in drivingmoral cognition and conation, in that we knowthat individuals have higher self-awareness formore core and salient aspects of the self (Setter-lund & Niedenthal, 1993). Higher salience alsoincreases moral sensitivity and attentivenessand the rapid processing of moral dilemmasthat match patterns or prototypes familiar to anindividual (Reynolds, 2008). We also know fromresearch on self-verification (Swann, 1983) andcybernetic self-regulatory processes (e.g.,Carver & Scheier, 1998; Lord & Brown, 2004) thatpeople are motivated to behave in ways consis-tent with salient core self-attributes. This sort ofconsistency allows them to maintain the integ-rity of their self-concept and, thus, createsconation for self-congruent behavior (Verplan-ken & Holland, 2002). Consistent with this re-search, Stahlberg, Peterson, and Dauenheimer(1999) demonstrated that in areas where peoplehave high self-unity, they tend toward self-verifying motives to confirm their existing self-beliefs in order to establish stability in “whothey are,” whereas in areas of lower unity, theyare more likely to lean toward self-enhancingmotives.

Because ethical dilemmas typically presentindividuals with competing values and choices,this combined research suggests that in areaswhere the self is less “invested” (i.e., low unity),individuals may be more likely to swing to othervalues and perhaps away from taking moralaction. This suggests that organizations maywant to develop high levels of unity across theirmembers’ respective subidentities for those crit-ical core organizational values where they wantto ensure that their members will make “theright” decision when facing difficult choices.

Moral identity and self-complexity. Aquino etal. (2009) conceptualized individuals as possess-ing a single global moral identity more or lesscentral to their overall identity, and that varioussituations influence how accessible this moralidentity is at any point in time. Building on thiswork, a self-complexity approach is, we believe,a more refined approach that considers bothmoral content and structure, proposing that in-dividuals possess both integration (i.e., unity)


and differentiation of moral content across theself (see LeBoeuf et al., 2010; Reicher & Levine,1994; Woolfolk et al., 2004). With this theoreticalframework, the influence of moral identity onmoral cognition and conation would be basedon (1) what subset of an individual’s identity(e.g., a social role) is activated in a given situa-tion and (2) what moral content that subset con-tains. Instead of asking, “How active is one’sglobal moral identity?” as suggested by priorresearch (e.g., Aquino et al., 2009), we ask,“Which identity is activated and what is theunique moral makeup of that identity?”

This approach may better explain cross-situational variability in moral thought and ac-tion through assessing the activation of specificmoral content in the working self-concept(Markus & Wurf, 1987). Because the self-conceptis a vast and manifold structure, only a subset ofidentity is activated at any one point in time.This portion—the working self-concept—in-cludes aspects of identity and associated cogni-tive, affective, and motivational componentsthat are activated in a specific situation andthat drive thoughts and behaviors in that situa-tion (Lord et al., 2011). For example, the identityof “self as parent” may have highly salient andaccessible content associated with role model-ing and discipline, which guides a parent toclosely regulate his or her own behavior (e.g.,control the use of profanity) and to quickly dis-cipline a child for even the slight use of profan-ity. Conversely, the individual’s identity as “selfas coworker” may include less emphasis on be-ing a moral disciplinarian. When the coworkerrole is active during the workday, the individualmay be much less sensitive to moral issues re-lated to coworker behavior. This difference inmoral sensitivity may impact not only moraljudgments at work but also the motivation to actonce a judgment is reached. The net result is acoworker who might allow his or her own andother coworkers’ behavior to degenerate belowa level that would not be tolerated as a parent.Consequently, examining both the content andstructure of moral identity can provide a deeperunderstanding of moral thought and behaviorwithin and between the various roles that indi-viduals maintain as part of their personal andwork identities.

This discussion of moral identity and self-complexity suggests that (1) the assemblage(content and structure) of moral identity can be

defined as more or less complex, and (2) themakeup of that identity will influence moralcognition and conation through the activation ofvarious working selves across contexts. We nowsuggest that (3) a more complex moral identitywill provide a broader base of moral contentthat individuals may draw from. Based on thediscussion of cognitive differentiation presentedearlier, more complex individuals can better tai-lor their working self across a broader range ofsituations (Hannah et al., 2009b; Lord et al., 2011;Rafaeli-Mor & Steinberg, 2002). This aligns withYearley’s discussion of virtue ethics: “I do notact benevolently in order to be benevolent or tobe seen as benevolent by myself or others. . . . Iact benevolently because the situation I face fitsa description of a situation that elicits my be-nevolence” (1990: 14). In sum, individuals’ moralcontent will vary in levels of complexity—thatis, differentiation and integration/unity acrossdifferent social roles. The structure and contentof moral identity will therefore influence its ac-tivation and extent of influence in the workingself, and thereby drive moral cognition andconation. In summarizing this research on moralidentity, we propose the following.

Proposition 3: Higher (lower) overalllevels of moral identity complexitywill be associated with higher (lower)levels of (a) moral sensitivity and (b)elaborative moral judgments acrosssituations.

Proposition 4: Higher (lower) levels ofmoral complexity in the activatedworking self will be associated withhigher (lower) levels of (a) moral sen-sitivity and (b) elaborative moral judg-ments within that situation.

Proposition 5: Dimensions of moralidentity with higher (lower) levels ofunity will be related to higher (lower)levels of (a) moral sensitivity, (b) elab-orative moral judgments, (c) moralmotivation, and (d) moral action con-cordant with those core dimensions.

MORAL CONATION

As noted by Rest et al. (1999) and others (e.g.,Thoma et al., 1991), the processes of moral moti-vation and moral action, and more so the capac-


ities that produce such conation, have not beenadequately developed in the literature. Thislack of attention is surprising, given researchdemonstrating relatively weak relationships be-tween ethical judgments and ethical behaviors(Bebeau, 2002; Blasi, 1980; Treviño & Young-blood, 1990). This gap points to the importance ofthe moral conation capacities depicted in Fig-ure 1. Advancing a model of moral capacity foruse in dynamic organizations where individualsface competing values will require identifyingand developing the factors that underlie thetransference of moral judgments into action. Webuild the construct of moral conation drawingfrom literature on (1) human agency, psycholog-ical ownership, and engagement (e.g., Bandura,1991, 1999; May, Gilson, & Harter, 2004; Pierce,Kostova, & Dirks, 2003); (2) self- and means effi-cacy (e.g., Bandura, 1997; Eden, 2001); and (3)courage (e.g., Gould, 2005; Kidder, 2003). We pro-pose that these three constructs are distinct yetsupport each other. Affirming our position, Oss-wald, Greitemeyer, Fischer, and Frey state that“before a person can act with moral courage,s/he has to perceive an incident as a situation ofmoral courage, s/he has to take responsibility[i.e., moral ownership] and has to feel competent[i.e., moral efficacy] to act” (2009: 98).

Moral Ownership

Kohlberg and Candee (1984) proposed that asense of responsibility must first be formed be-fore people will initiate dedicated moral action.Jones and Ryan’s (1997, 1998) moral approbationmodel suggests that individuals attribute theirlevel of responsibility for taking moral action us-ing their various referent groups as standards.This attribution is based on assessments of theseverity of the consequences, moral certainty,degree of complicity, and extent of pressurefrom organizational factors. Individuals willthen act if their level of anticipated approbationfrom their referent group exceeds their desiredlevel of approbation. This suggests that, unlikethe influence of stable traits, such as locus ofcontrol on moral processing (Treviño, 1986),moral approbation will vary across situations asone’s reference group and other factors change.

To represent this sense of ownership, we pro-pose a construct of moral ownership, which, wesuggest, will create unique causations or con-tingencies in this psychological approbation

process through an internally driven orientationfor moral action. Pierce et al. (2003) propose thatindividuals hold varying levels of psychologicalownership for various aspects of their environ-ment, or what they call “targets.” They definepsychological ownership as “the state in whichindividuals feel as though the target of owner-ship or a piece of that target is theirs” (2003: 86).While not yet applied to ethics, we put forth inour model a specific form of moral ownership wedefine as the extent to which members feel asense of psychological responsibility over theethical nature of their own actions, those of oth-ers around them, their organization, or anothercollective. This “other collective” could be agroup, a club, or even a society.

Like the other moral conation constructs, wesuggest moral ownership is state-like, varyingacross “targets” and contexts. Unlike generalbeliefs about the extent to which individualscan control the general events in their life, asreflected in concepts like locus of control(Treviño, 1986), individuals will vary in the ex-tent they want to or feel a sense of responsibilityto take ethical action in a given situation andnot others (Bandura, 1991, 1999).

Bandura’s (1991, 1999) theory of moral agencyis helpful in identifying the underlying psycho-logical mechanisms that create (or reduce) asense of moral ownership across contexts. Ban-dura defines agency as the capacity to exercisecontrol over the nature and quality of one’s life.As the central organizing principle of social cog-nitive theory, agency reflects individuals’ en-gagement in their experiences. Bandura arguesthat interactions occur between the person (e.g.,cognition, identity, and affect), his/her behavior,and his/her environment. Through these interac-tions, people can be producers as well as prod-ucts of their environments. However, Bandura(1991, 1999) suggests that individuals may use“moral disengagement” techniques, such as dif-fusing responsibility to or attributing blame toothers, or discounting the extent of harm asso-ciated with their behavior, in order to psycho-logically disengage from their actions andthereby maintain a positive self-image. Tenbrun-sel and Messick (2004) make a similar argument,noting that individuals may employ strategiesof self-deception during the omission of ethicalor commission of unethical acts so as to deceivethemselves into believing that their ethical prin-ciples are still being upheld. We suggest that


higher levels of moral ownership will combatthese tendencies.

Bandura (1991) suggests that people vary inhow much they practice four aspects of agency:(1) intentionality—the extent to which acts ofagency are done intentionally, (2) forethought—the extent to which agents anticipate likely con-sequences of actions and select courses of ac-tion that produce desired outcomes and avoiddetrimental ones, (3) self-reactiveness—the levelof ability to self-motivate and self-regulate toachieve goals, and (4) self-reflectiveness—thelevel of ability to reflect on the adequacy ofone’s thoughts and actions. While these theoret-ical processes have not been adequately stud-ied empirically, they do provide a basis for un-derstanding the underlying psychologicalprocesses that may drive moral ownership aswe have defined it in this article. We suggestthat moral ownership represents individuals’sense of responsibility for and impetus to standup and act to influence morality in their currentenvironment. A lack of moral ownership wouldlikely predict various negative outcomes, suchas a failure to act when moral action is needed,or more subtle forms of poor organizational cit-izenship, such as social loafing.

In sum, moral ownership will prompt conationto act since those with higher levels of owner-ship are simply less able to turn a blind eye.This is consistent with the findings of Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, and Hepp (2009), who showedthat some individuals demonstrate a proscrip-tive morality (avoid doing bad) while othershave a prescriptive focus (seek to do good). In asimilar line of research, Ryan and Riordan (2000)showed that some people seek to avoid blamewhile others seek to earn praise through takingmoral action. Moral ownership may help ex-plain these motivational profiles, since wewould expect high levels of ownership to spon-sor prescriptive motivation and action. Thisleads to our next proposition.

Proposition 6: Higher (lower) levels ofmoral ownership will be associatedwith higher (lower) levels of (a) moralmotivation and (b) moral action.

Moral Efficacy

One can make a sound moral judgment andfeel ownership to act to address a moral inci-

dent but still remain inactive because of a lackof confidence, thus lowering moral conation. Forexample, an individual may feel that he or sheshould confront someone who has behaved un-ethically, but then not feel capable of doing soeffectively. Moral efficacy has been recognizedas an important factor in potentially addressingthis gap in whether individuals will act ethi-cally (Hannah et al., 2005; May, Chan, Hodges, &Avolio, 2003). We define moral efficacy as anindividual’s belief in his or her capabilities toorganize and mobilize the motivation, cognitiveresources, means, and courses of action neededto attain moral performance, within a givenmoral domain, while persisting in the face ofmoral adversity. This definition draws on com-ponents of both means efficacy (Eden, 2001) andself-efficacy (Bandura, 1997), which are bothmalleable and open to development.

Bandura and Eden both argue that self- (Ban-dura) and means (Eden) efficacy are contextual-ized and, thus, domain specific, which is whatdistinguishes these constructs from the globaland decontextualized construct of general effi-cacy (Chen, Gully, & Eden, 2001). In this case adomain merely represents a defined area forwhich individuals may have greater or lesserlevels of confidence, such as leader efficacy(Hannah, Avolio, Luthans, & Harms, 2008). Moralefficacy specifies the domain of moral action,which may be quite distinct from a person’s ef-ficacy for other domains, such as leading othersor public speaking.

Metaanalytical research has demonstratedthe influential role of self-efficacy in driving hu-man intentions and behaviors (see Stajkovic &Luthans, 1998). Applicable to one’s capacity formoral conation, social and empathetic efficacypromote prosocial behavior, as evidenced byhigher levels of helpfulness, cooperation, andsharing (Bandura, 1991). Further, based on find-ings that perceived behavioral control (a form ofefficacy beliefs) helps to explain the intention-behavior linkage, we propose that moral effi-cacy will similarly create conation to act ethi-cally in line with intentions (Ajzen, 1991). This isconsistent with Treviño’s (1986) suggestion thatego strength is a critical link between ethicaljudgments and action. While ego strength is astable individual-difference construct relative tothe more malleable construct of self-efficacy, itprovides a similar self-regulatory function in


promoting conviction to one’s actions (Rest,1986).

Based on the work of Bandura (1997), we sug-gest that moral efficacy is composed of bothmagnitude (the level of difficulty one expects tosuccessfully perform in a given moral situation)and strength (the extent of certainty one has inone’s ability to perform to that level of difficulty).Further, we link moral efficacy to earlier discus-sions of self-complexity and the activation of atailored moral working-self. This is becauseself-efficacy is not simply an assessment ofone’s skills but, rather, of what one can do withthose skills in a given situation (Bandura, 1997),thereby influencing moral action in that andonly that situation. This suggests individualshold varying levels of moral efficacy across dif-ferent aspects of their self-identity (e.g., efficacyas a leader to discuss ethical issues with theirgroup as opposed to a peer), creating some vari-ability in choices and behavior.

Linking moral efficacy to self-concept unity,discussed earlier, we propose that through re-peated successful experiences regarding moralaction, moral efficacy can be generalized acrossa broader set of moral contexts over time. Thus,we believe that moral efficacy, built through awide span of rich personal mastery and model-ing/vicarious experiences, would continuouslygeneralize across a widening expanse of moraltasks and contexts (Bandura, 1997).

Eden made an important distinction betweenone’s internal (self-efficacy) and external(means efficacy) sources of efficacy beliefs. Add-ing to our discussion above, means efficacy rep-resents individuals’ beliefs in the quality andutility of the individuals, tools, methods, andprocedures available for task performance in agiven context. Research has shown that the ef-fects of means efficacy can be isolated fromthose of self-efficacy (Eden & Sulimani, 2002).These external resources can include imple-ments (e.g., equipment and computers), otherpersons (e.g., coworkers, followers, and supervi-sors), or bureaucratic means for accomplishingwork (e.g., policies, procedures, and processes).We suggest that both sources of efficacy arenecessary to fully explain moral conation. Spe-cifically, individuals must believe they not onlyhave the personal capability to address a spe-cific moral issue (e.g., to disclose unethical ac-counting practices) but that supporting meansare available to allow them to act successfully

(e.g., peer/leader support or whistle-blower re-porting systems and protection). Because orga-nizations offer varying levels of promotion andsupport for ethical behavior (Victor & Cullen,1988), we propose that moral efficacy will bemaximized when both self and means compo-nents are high. The effects of moral efficacy onmoral conation lead to our next proposition.

Proposition 7: Higher (lower) levels ofmoral efficacy will be associated withhigher (lower) levels of (a) moral mo-tivation and (b) moral action.

Moral Courage

The final capacity underlying moral conationdepicted in Figure 1 is moral courage. Hannah,Avolio, and Walumbwa define moral courage inthe workplace as

1) a malleable character strength, that 2) providesthe requisite conation needed to commit to per-sonal moral principles, 3) under conditions wherethe actor is aware of the objective danger in-volved in supporting those principles, 4) that en-ables the willing endurance of that danger, 5) inorder to act ethically or resist pressure to actunethically as required to maintain those princi-ples (2011: 560).

Overcoming threat and perhaps fear for thesake of morals, virtue, or a higher purpose isinherent in definitions of courage (Gould, 2005;Kidder, 2003). Otherwise, action to overcome aperceived threat can be considered self-servingor foolhardy.

Moral courage has been proposed as a criticalfactor in promoting ethical behavior in organi-zation members (Verschoor, 2003), and in an ini-tial field test Hannah et al. (2011) linked moralcourage to externally rated ethical and proso-cial behaviors. Describing moral courage,Sekerka, Bagozzi, and Charnigo state that“strength of will is needed to face and resolveethical challenges and to confront barriers thatmay inhibit the ability to proceed toward rightaction,” and, therefore, moral courage is “a qual-ity or attribute necessary for ethical behavior inorganizational settings” (2009: 566). Researchhas differentiated moral courage from otherforms of courage, such as physical or socialcourage (Rate, Clarke, Lindsay, & Sternberg,2007; Woodard & Pury, 2007). Yet, as noted byHannah and Avolio (2010), empirical work onmoral courage is nascent and has not been ad-


equately integrated with other aspects of moralpsychology, such as we have proposed in Fig-ure 1, nor integrated with the processes in Restet al.’s four-component model.

Providing this integration is important, sincewe propose that the three components of moralconation are mutually supporting. Individualsmay feel responsibility to act (i.e., have moralownership) and believe that they have the ca-pacity to do so (i.e., have moral efficacy), yet stillhave insufficient courage to overcome the threatthey face and to act. Moral ownership, efficacy,and courage, thus, are each necessary yet notsufficient. Supporting this position, Osswald etal. (2009) have noted that feelings of responsibil-ity and competence are required to supportmoral courage. Similarly, in their model of gen-eral courage (not necessarily moral courage),Hannah, Sweeney, and Lester (2010) proposethat both self- and means efficacy are requiredto reinforce one to act with courage. This is inpart because courage is often relative to expe-rienced fear, and negative emotions such as fearoccur when individuals assess that a giventhreat exceeds their perceived ability to facethat threat (Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 1985).Moral efficacy would thus bolster perceived ca-pability, and hence moral courage, all workingtogether to produce higher levels of moralconation.

Finally, consistent with the concept of differ-entiation and integration/unity presented ear-lier, individuals will possess greater or lesseramounts of courage across identity subdimen-sions. For example, a person may have moremoral courage in his or her role as a leader thanas a follower. He or she will then demonstrategreater moral courage when the leader role isactive (e.g., confronting a follower) than whenthe follower role is active (e.g., confronting his orher own senior leader). Thus, moral courage,like moral efficacy, is contextualized and do-main specific. Yet Shepela et al. (1999) have sug-gested that moral courage related to certain val-ues can be core to a person (what we havedefined as high unity) and therefore especiallypowerful in prompting moral courage across abroader set of domains. This leads to our finalproposition.

Proposition 8: Higher (lower) levels ofmoral courage will be associated with

higher (lower) (a) moral motivationand (b) moral action.

DISCUSSION

The comprehensive framework shown in Fig-ure 1 has implications for theory, methods, andpractice. The model offers new approaches fordefining and measuring moral capacities andcan generate new lines of research to predictethical thoughts and behaviors in organizations.

Implications for Theory

As stated earlier, Rest et al. (1999) reportedthat moral judgment as measured by the DITtypically only explains about 20 percent of thevariance in actual ethical behavior. These au-thors note the need to develop models that bet-ter explain the entire ethical process and thatalthough “there is much diversity of constructs,processes, phenomena, and starting points forthe psychology of morality, the greater chal-lenge is to formulate how all these differentparts fit together” (1999: 6). We have made oneattempt to circumscribe such an integratedframework, identifying developed capacities re-lated to each of Rest’s (1986) four stages. Impor-tant to promoting future research, we demon-strate how each component in our model can beoperationalized and measured.

Benefits of a complexity approach. A primarycontribution of our model is the incorporation oftheories of cognitive complexity and self-complexity throughout the model. While Kohl-berg’s interview process and Rest’s ethical di-lemma exercises are meant to denote generallevels of development in logic or moral sche-mas, these techniques are abstract, focus onlyon moral judgment, and do not recognize theimportant role of identity and accompanyingself-regulatory functions in explaining an indi-vidual’s moral capacity to take action.

Below we show how complexity can be mea-sured more directly than by Kohlberg’s or Rest’stechniques through schema mapping, Q-sorttasks, self-complexity matrices, and other tech-niques. Employing such techniques will refineour measurements and understanding of whatconstitutes moral complexity. Further, a self-complexity approach will allow researchers toextend beyond current “global” measures ofmoral identity, moral efficacy, and moral cour-


age and, instead, to compartmentalize mea-sures to explore how higher or lower levels ofthese constructs are represented across differ-ent aspects of self-identity. Such an approachshould increase the predictive validity of mea-sures, as well as explore within-person varianceacross situations as individuals’ working selvesare activated or suppressed (Markus & Wurf,1987). Further, these techniques will allow re-searchers to mathematically express the level ofinclusion of various moral attributes across self-identities and, therefore, the level of unity eachparticipant has related to attributes of interestto researchers (e.g., a certain set of moral val-ues). These measures of unity can thus be usedto predict self-concordant ethical behaviors.

Contribution of moral conation. We believeour framing of the moral conation constructs offersnew insights into the transference of moral judg-ments, through intentions, into action. Discus-sions of moral courage date to antiquity, and itis the most theoretically developed of the threemoral conation capacities. Yet the study ofmoral courage in organizational contexts hasbeen limited (Hannah & Avolio, 2010; Sekerka etal., 2009). Further, we are not aware of any priorwork on the construct of moral ownership in theliterature and have noted only limited theoreti-cal development regarding moral efficacy (e.g.,Hannah et al., 2005; May et al., 2003).

Prior theorizing of moral efficacy has also failedto incorporate how contextual factors influencean individual’s level of moral efficacy to act. Toaddress this gap, we have included means effi-cacy in our construct definition. Finally, we haveintegrated the moral conation constructs andargued that moral ownership, efficacy, andcourage each provide necessary yet not suffi-cient contributions to moral conation and, thus,should be studied and developed together.

Operationalizing Moral Maturation

One criticism of Kohlberg’s stages of devel-opment has been the requirement for inter-views and the subjectivity associated with in-terpretations and coding of participantresponses. Furthermore, both Kohlberg’s inter-view and Rest et al.’s (1999) written scenarioresponse technique in the DIT utilize stan-dardized ethical dilemmas that neglect thecontextualized nature of moral knowledge wepresented earlier. If we are to develop a

deeper understanding of individuals’ moralmaturation, we must measure moral identityand complexity along with associated meta-cognitive abilities whenever possible withindomains, and then test their effects when in-dividuals are confronted with moral dilemmaswithin and between those domains. Rest etal.’s scenarios, such as the “Heinz” dilemma(regarding whether the target individualshould steal a drug his wife needs from apharmacist), address the broad, abstract rea-soning of cases most would never face, versusthe more common concrete and complex situ-ations individuals face in organizational life.

Further, the DIT purports to measure cognitivemoral development (CMD) levels by having par-ticipants read scenarios and then rate and rankvarious standardized decision criteria based onthe importance of those criteria in making adecision. Each of those criteria is designated aspersonal interest, maintaining order, or postcon-ventional reasoning levels. Thus, the more im-portance an individual ascribes to items associ-ated with postconventional reasoning, thehigher that individual will score on postconven-tional CMD. One weakness of this system is thatthe DIT ostensibly is a recognition task, whereparticipants can read and select items represent-ing decision criteria that they may never haveeven thought of on their own if not prompted bythe responses given in the measure.

We believe levels of moral cognitive complex-ity can be determined through more direct meth-ods by using schema mapping (also known ascognitive or causal mapping) techniques to as-sess individuals’ concepts of morality (i.e.,knowledge content), as well as the structurewith which they store that content. Schema map-ping has been used successfully to assess otherareas of individuals’ knowledge structures inorganizational research (e.g., Eden, Ackermann,& Cropper, 1992; Markoczy & Goldberg, 1995).This technique has also been used to map ethicalschemas of journalists (Lind, Rarick, & Swenson-Lepper, 1997).

Based on the work of Schroder et al. (1967),complexity integration and differentiation canalso be measured using thematic apperceptiontests, such as picture story exercises (Baker-Brown et al., 1992; Tetlock, Peterson, & Berry,1993), where open-ended responses are exter-nally rated for levels of complexity by trainedcoders. These techniques, however, would need


to be modified to focus on moral content. Fur-ther, there are recent advances in neurosciencethat may enable researchers to assess complex-ity through brain mapping techniques. For ex-ample, a measure called “coherence” deter-mines how differentiated the human brain iseither at rest or while processing tasks and maybe one metric that can be used to assess howindividuals process moral tasks (see Thatcher,North, & Biver, 2008).

Adopting a self-complexity approach to exam-ining moral identity will also require a funda-mentally different approach to measurementthan the current single-survey techniques com-monly used. Moral self-complexity can be as-sessed by having participants produce the var-ious key roles of their identity (e.g., “self as teamleader” or “self as coworker”) in free-responseformats, or by using roles as designated by theresearcher, and then by sorting ethical attri-butes of interest to the researcher (e.g., values ortraits) as to whether, and the extent to which,each attribute applies to each role using theQ-sort technique of Linville (1987) or the surveyformat used by Woolfolk et al. (2004). Regardlessof the technique used, data can then be format-ted into a matrix (self-aspects or roles � attri-butes). Once compiled, the h-statistic (Scott,1969) can then be used to analyze the complexityof the matrix.

The h-statistic represents an index of the num-ber of independent dimensions underlying anyset of attribute ratings. Such matrices can alsoilluminate what moral attributes are repre-sented across a breadth of social roles, denotingwhat we discussed above as constituting self-concept unity. Finally, measurement methodsfor metacognitive ability also exist in the edu-cation literature that could be modified to as-sess participants’ knowledge and regulation ofmoral cognition (Baker & Cerro, 2000; Dunlosky& Metcalfe, 2009).

In sum, having the ability to measure thesecomponents allows researchers not only to testour proposed theory but also to measure moralmaturation over time. In combination, we hopeto advance both the science and practice asso-ciated with moral capacity development.

Operationalizing Moral Conation

Unlike the more complicated constructs ofmoral maturation, the constructs of moral

conation lend themselves more readily to surveymethodology and self- and other reports. Han-nah and Avolio (2010) recently developed a newmultidimensional measure representing thethree components of moral conation, based onprior work on psychological ownership (VanDyne & Pierce, 2004), self-efficacy (Bandura,1997), and moral courage (Gould, 2005; Kidder,2003). They tested this three-factor measure andfound across two studies that moral ownership,moral efficacy, and moral courage are discrim-inant constructs yet share variance in that theyform a higher-order construct. Their initialmodel testing supports our theorizing that thecomponents of moral conation are each neces-sary yet not sufficient. Sekerka et al. (2009) alsohas conducted an initial validation of an orga-nizational moral courage measure.

Based on the tenets of self-complexity theorypresented earlier, moral ownership, courage,and efficacy will be represented in varied formsand levels across one’s self-identity. Therefore,we suggest that researchers assess these con-structs of moral conation across different as-pects of participants’ self-identity. This can bedone by presenting respondents with separatescales (e.g., moral courage) for each of their var-ious relevant social roles, preferably separatingeach survey administration across time to re-duce carryover effects. For example, survey itemstems for a moral efficacy measure might ask,“When leading my top management team Ican. . . ” and, on a second version, “When work-ing with my peers I can. . . .” Responses fromvarious roles can then be collapsed into a ma-trix to assess dispersion of moral efficacy acrossroles, allowing researchers to investigate theeffects of moral efficacy across contexts basedon individuals’ efficacy magnitude and strengthassociated with each context. The differentia-tion of moral efficacy across the self-identity canalso be assessed using the h-statistic based onthis matrix, as described previously. Similarmethods can be used for assessing each moralconation construct.

Implications for Practice

We believe that we have offered a set of con-structs associated with moral maturation andmoral conation that addresses the capacitiesneeded across all stages of ethical processing,from the stage of sensitivity through to action.


These capacities are both malleable and mea-surable and can thus be used for selection pur-poses and to implement and assess moral de-velopment interventions over time in thoseorganizations seeking to enhance the moral ca-pacity of their members.4 We briefly introducesome methods for developing each capacity inFigure 1 simply to highlight the model’s utilityand to encourage future research on moral ca-pacity development.

Developing moral maturation capacity. Moralcomplexity can foremost be developed throughsocial learning, including rich personal masteryor vicarious experiences in specific domains.Other authors have similarly noted the power ofsocial learning in ethical decision making basedon moral approbation, where individuals learnthe response consequences of ethical actions(Jones & Ryan, 1998). The development of moralmaturation occurs as exposure to moral experi-ences and conflicts triggers the development ofnew associations between concepts held in anindividual’s mental representations, thereby en-hancing the individual’s level of complexity(Street et al., 2001; Walker, 1983; Young & Wasser-man, 2005). In a training setting moral complexitycan be developed through moral discourse, in-cluding (1) teaching cognitive moral reasoningskills (e.g., logic, role-taking, or justice concepts),(2) instructing and facilitating group reasoningthrough exercises and case analysis, and (3) dis-cussing ethics in practical applied areas an indi-vidual may face (e.g., dentistry, journalism, medi-cine; Bebeau, 2002; Hartwell, 1995). For example, areview of twenty-three ethics programs reportedby Rest and Thoma (1986) showed that those usinggroup moral dilemma discussions had an average.41 effect size in raising levels of cognitive moraldevelopment versus .09 for those without moraldiscussion.

We believe that moral metacognitive abilitycan be developed through teaching techniquesto process moral dilemmas through deeper self-reflection (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Setterlund &Niedenthal, 1993) and practicing executive con-trol over moral processing (Metcalfe & Shima-mura, 1994). Example executive control “drills”could include guiding questions, such as

“Which of your core beliefs are at stake?” “Howcentral are those values to you?” and/or “Howare your emotions influencing your thoughtsand behaviors right now?” Further, teachingskills to methodically review moral issuesthrough multiple perspectives—for example, de-ontological (rules, duties, or norms), teleological(utilitarian, consequence, or goal-based), or val-ues-based reasoning—would force individualsto access and “exercise” various moral sche-mata, enhancing their level of moral complexityand metacognitive moral processing ability.

Finally, moral identity can be particularly de-veloped through exposure to moral role modelsthat provide an ideal to strive for, and it servesto motivate and guide others’ development (Lord& Brown, 2004; Mayer et al., 2009). Research hasalso shown that dialogue with others at higherlevels of CMD promotes moral development byoffering the individual new perspectives withwhich to think about ethical issues (Dukerich,Nichols, Elm, & Volrath, 1990).

Developing moral conation capacity. Based onthe work of Bandura (1991, 1999), we believe thatorganizations can heighten moral ownership by(1) placing issues in humanistic terms, (2) dis-couraging euphemisms and sanitizing lan-guage (e.g., “collateral damage”), (3) encourag-ing responsibility, (4) making salient theinjurious effects of potential actions, and (5) lim-iting attribution of blame to or dehumanizationof victims. This is consistent with previous eth-ics research specifying the important role ofhighlighting the consequences of one’s behav-iors to increase moral engagement (e.g., Ferrell& Gresham, 1985; Hunt & Vitell, 1986). This isalso consistent with Jones’s (1991) theory ofmoral intensity, which has shown that peoplebecome more morally engaged by raising theperceived “intensity” associated with an ethicaldilemma (cf. Butterfield, Treviño, & Weaver,2000; Watley & May, 2004). Similarly, Jones andRyan (1998) have proposed that organizationscan reinforce ethical behavior by raising theperceived severity of consequences, moral cer-tainty, degree of complicity, and pressure tocomply.

Organizational reward and control systemsmay also enhance moral ownership (Treviño,Brown, & Pincus-Hartman, 2003). These systemscan signal what is valued in organizations, andresearch has shown that although individualsmay initially comply with norms for strategic

4 We recognize that some organizations may be ambiva-lent about or even condone their members’ unethical acts orthat they do not otherwise want to invest the time andresources in developing members’ moral capacity.


self-presentation, over time, such norms cancause identity changes that can impact the in-dividual’s sense of responsibility to take moralaction (e.g., Tice, 1992). If not properly alignedwith moral action, however, such reward sys-tems may create a negative pressure to complywith unethical actions (Jones & Ryan, 1998).

Through social learning where successfulmoral performance is achieved, individualswill not only build greater moral complexity butalso the confidence to enact similar approachesto address future ethical challenges (Bandura,1997). Ethical role models can also reinforce ob-servers’ efficacy, as well as the collective effi-cacy of the group, to act morally over time (Ban-dura, 2002). This may be one mechanismexplaining how ethical leadership can diffuse toothers throughout an organization (Mayer et al.,2009). Hannah et al. (2011) demonstrate that lead-ers who are seen as being authentic can bolsterfollowers’ moral courage and subsequent ethi-cal and prosocial behaviors. They theorize thatauthentic leaders serve as moral exemplars andalso establish transparent climates that encour-age followers to openly espouse their valuesand to act in line with those values coura-geously. Further, training programs have re-cently shown some success in developing moralcourage through teaching behavior routines(i.e., scripts) individuals can use when facingthreats (e.g., Jonas, Boos, & Brandstätter, 2007;Osswald et al., 2009). Finally, Walker and Hen-ning (2004) suggest that moral exemplars canhave a contagion effect on others such that ob-servers come to believe they, too, have the cour-age to successfully meet similar threats.

Boundaries and Future Research

For the sake of parsimony, we have focused onthe individual level in developing our model inorder to detail the component processes thatunderlie individual moral maturation and moralconation. We suggest, however, that the modelmay be applied as a multilevel framework toexplain how groups and organizations developa higher “moral perspective.” For example, self-efficacy and collective efficacy are reciprocaland entrained (Bandura, 1997). The constructsassociated with this model lend themselves toinvestigation of how individual developmentcan extend to collective development throughsocial learning and influence processes, similar

to the effects of a leader’s efficacy in bolsteringthe collective leadership efficacy of his or hergroup (Hannah et al., 2008). Since knowledge canbe distributed across members of a group andcombined through social interaction as neededto enhance group processing (Kozlowski & Ilgen,2006), even moral complexity might be concep-tualized and measured as a multilevel con-struct.

Repeatedly throughout this article we havenoted that aspects of moral maturation andmoral conation should be tailored to specificcontexts. This is because different contexts,such as national or organizational cultures,have different social mores (Margolis & Phillips,1999; Shweder, 1991), and culture influences eth-ical processing (see Kish-Gephart, Harrison, &Treviño, 2010; Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe, 2008).We believe our model can be tailored to specificcultures (e.g., by measuring complexity basedon particular cultural mores). Yet our proposedmodel is not context neutral. Researchers shouldassess how cultural contingencies and con-straints influence the predictions associatedwith our model (see Treviño et al., 2006).

CONCLUSION

We propose that rates of unethical behaviorcan be decreased and virtuous behavior in or-ganizations increased through the developmentof moral capacity—what we have conceptual-ized as moral maturation and moral conation. Inproposing the current model, we hope we haveprovided a clearer line of sight to the capacitiesunderlying moral development and have pro-vided propositions and measurement ap-proaches to promote future research.

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Sean T. Hannah ([email protected]) is a U.S. Army Colonel and the director ofthe Center for the Army Profession and Ethic at West Point–United States MilitaryAcademy. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Nebraska–Lincoln. His researchinterests include leadership development, moral development, and self-identity.

Bruce J. Avolio ([email protected]) is the Marion B. Ingersoll Professor and the executivedirector of the Center for Leadership and Strategic Thinking in the Michael FosterSchool of Business, University of Washington. He received his Ph.D. from the Univer-sity of Akron. His current interests are in the areas of leadership development anddistributed strategic leadership.

Douglas R. May ([email protected]) is professor and codirector of the InternationalCenter for Ethics in Business, University of Kansas. He received his Ph.D. from theUniversity of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. His research interests include the rela-tions between moral efficacy, moral courage, moral meaningfulness, and constructivemoral behaviors in the workplace.


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