Montenegro By Bojan Baća & Kenneth Morrison

Capital: Podgorica

Population: 622,781

GNI/capita, PPP: $17,870

Source: World Bank World Development Indicators.

Nations in Transit Ratings and Averaged Scores

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

National Democratic

Governance 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.50

Electoral Process 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50

Civil Society 2.75 2.75 2.75 2.75 2.75 2.75 2.75 2.75 2.75 2.75

Independent Media 3.75 4.00 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50

Local Democratic

Governance 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.50 3.50 3.50

Judicial Framework

and Independence 4.25 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00

Corruption 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 4.75 4.75

Democracy Score 3.79 3.79 3.82 3.82 3.82 3.86 3.89 3.93 3.89 3.93

NOTE: The ratings reflect the consensus of Freedom House, its academic advisers, and the author(s) of this report.

If consensus cannot be reached, Freedom House is responsible for the final ratings. The ratings are based on a

scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest level of democratic progress and 7 the lowest. The Democracy

Score is an average of ratings for the categories tracked in a given year. The opinions expressed in this report are

those of the author(s).

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In 2017, Montenegro became a full member of the NATO alliance and made more progress towards

membership in the European Union (EU). Internally, however, the country’s political crisis continued,

with the opposition continuing their partial boycott of the parliament. This ongoing crisis, as well

as persisting tensions between the opposition and the government fueled by antagonism over the

October 2015 protests and 2016 parliamentary elections, characterized the political scene in the

country in 2017. Milo Djukanović’s departure in late 2016 may have resulted in a temporary easing of

tensions, but has done little or nothing to improve relations between the government and the opposition.

As Chairman of the Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) he retains significant control over the party

and he played a significant role in their local election campaigns in 2017. Moreover, throughout the

year speculation grew that Djukanović will return to run as a candidate for the presidency in

2018–despite his having previously ruled out the possibility, stating that the DPS had sufficiently

strong candidates for the role–has continued to enflame tensions.

Looming large in the background has been the judicial proceedings of those accused of

organizing a coup planned for the evening of the parliamentary elections on October 24, 2016. The

accused include members of the opposition Democratic Front (DF), who argue that the judicial process

is flawed and the case fabricated by the ruling DPS. In December 2016, Montenegro issued warrants

for two Russian citizens allegedly involved in the plot, though they have not been apprehended by

Russian authorities. The court case began in earnest in June 2017, and continued throughout the year,

generating significant public interest. In October, a key cooperating witness in the case, Aleksander

Sindjelić, claimed that the DF leadership had not only concocted the coup attempt but had travelled to

Moscow on several occasions to generate support for this endeavor–accusations that the DF vehemently

denied.

Despite Jean Claude Juncker’s statement in September that no Western Balkan country would

join the European Union (EU) before 2025, the European Commission (EC) president suggested that

Serbia and Montenegro would most likely be the first to join in this timeframe. Despite the many

challenges facing Brussels and the questionable appetite among EU member states for further

expansion (particularly while the EU deals with the ongoing Brexit negotiations), Montenegro remained

on track, and made modest progress, towards EU membership. Four new chapters of the acquis were

opened in 2017, while one, Chapter 30 (External Relations), was provisionally closed in June.

Montenegro continued to face significant challenges in meeting EU standards, but work has been

done to address the deficit in capacity required to do so effectively.

Montenegro joined the NATO alliance in June. Though membership in NATO was a divisive

issue, it provided tangible evidence of the government’s ongoing commitment to wider Euro-Atlantic

integration. United States Vice President Mike Pence visited Podgorica to welcome Montenegro into

the alliance in August. Pence is the highest-ranking US official to visit Montenegro since the

establishment of diplomatic relations between Montenegro and the US in 1905, and his visit was

viewed by the Montenegrin government as a solid endorsement of Montenegro’s Euro-Atlantic path

and a cementing of the strategic partnership between the two countries. Though operating in a difficult environment, civil society organizations (CSOs) continued to

play a vital role in Montenegro’s public space, with their work, though subject to resistance, being

relatively impactful. Their contribution to improving the functioning and transparency of state

institutions, helping the state fight corruption and organized crime, and bolstering the integrity of

electoral processes remained of great importance.

While diverse for a country with such a small population, Montenegro’s media landscape

remained deeply polarized. This was particularly evident in daily reporting and interpretations of

political events. The public broadcaster, Radio Television Montenegro (RTCG), faced significant

internal flux and private media organizations continued to struggle financially as circulation figures

dropped and advertising revenues decreased. Journalists–particularly those working for independent media–claimed that their working environment remained difficult. Attacks on journalists continued

to be evident throughout 2017, while critics of the government, particularly those critical of the

current DPS Chairman Milo Djukanović or his family, often became targets of expensive libel suits.

Corruption remained a problematic area and was regarded as such by Montenegrin citizens,

though the Montenegrin government has made progress in some key areas. While a number of laws have

been passed that should facilitate corruption prosecutions, the appropriate implementation of these laws

was problematic. Furthermore, there was little progress on the prosecution of high-level corruption cases.

Score Changes:

• National Democratic Governance rating declined from 4.25 to 4.50 due to the opposition’s

continued boycott of parliament, which called into question the legitimacy and functioning of

the government.

As a result, Montenegro’s Democracy Score declined from 3.89 to 3.93.

Outlook for 2018: Broadly, Montenegro has continued on the course of economic and political

development, though it remains a relatively fragile economy with high levels of public debt and

ongoing challenges with corruption and organized crime. Now that Montenegro is a full NATO

member, the government’s key objective will continue to be EU accession. Montenegro has made

moderate but steady progress towards EU membership; the country’s institutional capacity continues

to improve and investment in the country is relatively buoyant.

However, Montenegro remains in the grip of an internal political crisis that shows little sign of

abating. While the opposition may return to parliament, there seems little possibility the government

will meet the opposition’s demands to hold fresh parliamentary elections by the spring of 2018. In

the meantime, the opposition will continue to refuse to recognize the results of the October 2016

elections, and while they have signaled a return to parliament, the DF has stated that they will continue

protests while two of their leading members face criminal prosecution for their alleged involvement

in the “state coup” (the trial for which will conclude in 2018). A continuation of the febrile political

landscape will be detrimental to further democratic consolidation, while the ongoing trial will provide a

strong test for the credibility of the Montenegrin judiciary.

Political tensions could further rise if Milo Djukanović runs in the presidential elections in

April 2018. It is unlikely that the opposition would respond positively to a situation where Djukanović

was president (or even another DPS stalwart such as Milica Pejanović-Djurišić) and Duško Marković

prime minister. Local elections in Berane and Ulcinj in February 2018 should provide an insight into

how successful their campaigns in those municipalities have been in preparation for crucial local

elections in Podgorica. In the context of the presidential elections, the opposition remains rather

fragmented and is unlikely to support a single or joint candidate (as they did in the case of Miodrag

Lekićin in 2013). At least two independent candidates, Dragan Hajduković and Djorđije Blazić, will also

contest the election.

National Democratic Governance

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

4.25 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.25

• The results of the October 2016 election and the subsequent formation of the government meant

that the DPS has been in power since Montenegro’s first multi-party elections in 1990. The new

government elected in October 2016 and led by Prime Minister Duško Marković settled-in despite

the opposition’s continuing boycott and demands for a re-run of the October 2016 parliamentary

election. Relations between the government and the opposition, particularly the Democratic Front

(DF), were poor, with little sign of immediate improvement. The opposition boycotted the

subsequent inauguration of the new government in the city of Cetinje in December 2016 and

announced that they would not return to parliament until new elections were scheduled. This

boycott was maintained throughout most of 2017, despite appeals by the EU for opposition parties

to return to parliament.1 However, in December the DF indicated that they may end their boycott

and return to parliament in January 2018. This shift resulted from a failure to form a joint platform

with other opposition parties. The DF had called upon them to jointly organize protests, but the

failure to reach an agreement led to the DF’s proposed return to parliament.2

• In policy terms, the new government was one of continuity, though Duško Marković’s government

comprised many new and relatively unknown figures. He was flanked by three Deputy Prime

Ministers: Milutin Simović, Zoran Pazin, and Rafet Husović, while the former Dean of the Faculty

of Political Sciences at the University of Montenegro, Srdjan Darmanović, became Foreign

Minister; Dragan Sekulić became the Minister of Economy; Sanja Damjanović became Minister

of Science; and Darko Radunović became Minister of Finance.3 Most were uncontroversial

appointments, though Radunović’s was something of a surprise. The former head of Prva Banka

(which is owned by Milo Djukanović’s brother, Aleksander), Radunović led a bank that has been

at the center of a number of financial scandals.4

• The issue of NATO membership dominated domestic politics in the first six months of 2017,

with the opposition continuing to insist upon a referendum to determine whether Montenegro should

join the alliance; they argued that such a plebiscite should take place on March 24, the 18th

anniversary of the NATO bombing of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999. The

government, though concerned about the comments about the future of the NATO alliance by

United States (US) President Donald Trump, countered that parliament would resolve the issue

without recourse to a referendum.5

• In the midst of the opposition’s agitation for a referendum, details of the alleged ‘state coup’

began to emerge. In February, the British newspaper The Daily Telegraph published further

allegations of Russian involvement in the failed coup attempt, citing unnamed sources within the

British government.6

• In March, the US Senate approved Montenegro as a full NATO member, paving the way for

the country to formally join the alliance in June. Though NATO membership was a divisive issue, it provided tangible evidence of the government’s ongoing commitment to wider Euro-Atlantic

integration. US Vice President Mike Pence visited Podgorica in August to affirm US commitment

to NATO and to welcome Montenegro into the alliance. Pence is the highest-ranking US official

to visit Montenegro since the establishment of diplomatic relations between Montenegro and the US

in 1905, and his visit was viewed by the Montenegrin government as a solid endorsement of the

country’s Euro-Atlantic path and a cementing of the strategic partnership between the two countries.7

Electoral Processes

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50

• Delegates of the unicameral 81-seat national parliament are elected by secret ballot, in a single

nationwide constituency, under a proportional closed-list system and for a maximum four-year

term. The 2011 Law on the Election of Councilors and Representatives stipulates that lists

representing minority groups (less than 15 percent of the population) can gain up to three seats

each–provided that they obtain a minimum of 0.7 percent of the vote for Albanians and Bosniaks

and 0.35 percent for Croats.8

• The reform of this law in 2014 led to the creation of a centralized electoral register and biometric

voter identification to prevent electoral fraud. The reforms also required that 25 percent of

candidates should be from a less-represented gender, in addition to the mandatory 30 percent quota

for either gender introduced in the 2011 reforms.9

• There were no parliamentary or presidential elections in Montenegro in 2017, though local

elections were held in the opštine (municipalities) of Nikšić on 12 March, Herceg-Novi on May 7,

and in Cetinje, Mojkovac, Tuzi, and Petnjica on November 26. Local elections will take place in

Berane, Podgorica, Ulcinj and in nine other municipalities in the course of 2018.

• Despite having prepared their campaigns for the March local elections in Nikšić, the opposition

announced that it would boycott the vote after the government revealed that two DP lawmakers,

Andrija Mandić and Milan Knežević, would be stripped of their immunity and arrested for their

alleged involvement in the October 2016 attempt.10 The turnout in Nikšić was consequently low

at 45 percent, and with no opposition to contest the election, the DPS won 80 percent of the seats

in the municipal assembly, with the Social Democrats (SD) winning 8 percent. Veselin Grbović of

the DPS was elected mayor of the city as the DF candidate, Miodrag “Daka” Davidović, had

withdrawn from the contest.11

• The elections in Herceg-Novi were, however, contested by all parties and the DPS emerged with

the largest share of the vote. They won 31 percent of votes, followed by Aleksa Bečić’s Democratic

Montenegro (DCG) with 24 percent, and the Democratic Front with 11 percent. Stevan Katić of the

DCG was subsequently elected mayor of the town. 12

• Local elections took place in Cetinje, Mojkovac, Tuzi and Petnjica on November 26. The DPS won

majorities in both Mojkovac (the birthplace of the Montenegrin Prime Minister, Duško Marković)

and Petnjica, but failed to win overall majorities in Cetinje and Tuzi. The elections were marked by

controversy and claims of vote-buying and attacks upon members of party officials and activists.

• In Cetinje, the civic movement United Reform Action (URA) claimed that DPS activists attacked

their representatives. Opposition activists further claimed that they had identified locations in

Cetinje where the DPS were “purchasing votes”. DPS activists, conversely, claimed they had been

attacked by Democratic Montenegro (DCG) activists. Tensions remained high throughout the day

and it later emerged that Montenegro’s “Special Anti-Terrorist Unit” (SAJ) had been deployed in

Cetinje as a “preventative measure”.13 URA also submitted complaints to the Constitutional Court

and to the Prosecutor’s Office, as well as to the OSCE and EU delegations and various embassies,

over what they alleged was clear evidence of electoral abuse in Mojkovac.14

• Presidential elections are also scheduled for 2018, to determine the successor to the current

Montenegrin President, Filip Vujanović (DPS), who has served the maximum of two terms

allowed by the constitution. The date was still to be confirmed by year’s end, but will be no later

than early April 2018, which marks the end of Vujanović’s term in office. There was significant

speculation that Milo Djukanović would return to run as a candidate for the presidency in 2018, but he has ruled presidential ambitions for 2018, stating that the DPS had sufficiently strong candidates

for the role and that the party’s candidate would be confirmed by November–though no candidate had been announced by December 31.15

Civil Society

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

2.75 2.75 2.75 2.75 2.75 2.75 2.75 2.75 2.75 2.75

• In 2017, antagonism between the non-government sector and the government became so heightened

that DPS Chairman Milo Djukanović called civil society organizations’ (CSOs) critical role of the

government as akin to “parapolitical organizations”, whose ultimate goal was to topple the DPS.16

Broadly, the government’s tone towards criticism emanating from civil society appeared

progressively combative.

• Civil society organizations continued to play a vital and visible role in Montenegro’s public space

during the year, with their work often being highly impactful. Their contribution to improving

the functioning and transparency of state institutions, helping the state fight corruption and

organized crime, and bolstering the integrity of electoral processes has been particularly

important, and in recent years their investigative work shed light on a number of corruption cases.

In the absence of effective political opposition, CSOs and independent media–often through joint

projects–played an important role in holding the government to account.

• The number of registered civil society organizations, including domestic and branch offices of

foreign CSOs, is high for such a small country. The Ministry of Public Administration recorded

4,213 registered associations, 153 foundations, and 115 foreign CSOs as of January 2017.17 It is,

however, unclear how many of these organizations were actually active during the year. CSOs

generally function in a climate that allows them to conduct their operations, though the 2016

European Commission (EC) Progress Report cautioned that the continuation of smear campaigns

and intimidation attempts against CSO activists remained a matter of concern.18 The public funding

of CSOs continued to present a challenge for their further development and for the sustainability of

the entire non-government sector.19

• The key legislation governing the civil sector is the 2012 Law on Non-Governmental Organizations.

The law regulates procedures for the registration of CSOs, as well as the requirements for

management bodies and other aspects of CSO operation. CSOs generally “enjoy the freedoms and

legal guarantees necessary to carry out their work without political or institutional interference”.20

• The strongest CSOs, generally based in the Montenegrin capital Podgorica, tend to be influential

hybrid advocacy organizations–focusing predominantly on issues of corruption, transparency,

accountability, human rights, civil society development, and environmental protection. Smaller

CSOs are often locally-oriented and work in the areas of culture, art, formal and informal education,

agriculture and rural development, social and health care, and protection of cultural heritage.

• The CSO landscape, like that of the media, remained polarized in 2017, with some demonstrably

close to the DPS and the government, and others highly critical of them. This polarization is

paralleled in Montenegro’s two major trade union associations, with the official Confederation of

Trade Unions of Montenegro essentially coopted by the state, and the Union of Free Trade Unions

remaining relatively independent, often openly fighting against labor policies and legislation reforms

that go against workers’ interests.21

• Overall, CSOs continued to play a vital role in democratization processes in Montenegro throughout

the year, monitoring and offering expertize to state institutions in issues related to the country’s

Europeanization process. Experts from the non-government sector were included in working groups

for negotiations with the EU, as well as in legislative processes on numerous issues.22 In addition,

CSOs often served as brokers between civil society and the state, occasionally creating mechanisms

for ordinary people to influence decision-makers outside the parameters of party-political

structures.23

• Funding remained a key challenge in the process of further development of the civil sector, since only 0.3 percent of the annual state budget is allocated to financing of CSOs–a sum the civil sector

regards as insufficient.24 In 2017, about a third of ministries did not plan cooperation with civil sector in some key areas of public interests–namely, internal affairs, public finance, foreign affairs,

science, sustainable development and tourism, and public administration.25 This can be interpreted

as a sign of growing lack of cooperation between the government and non-government sector.26

• Several CSOs have alleged that the government’s draft “Strategy for the Improvement of

Environment for the Functioning of Non-Governmental Organizations, 2018–2020” does not

provide clear strategic guidelines for the role of the government in this area, while being ambiguous

with regard to a clear strategy or mechanisms for the sustainable development of the civil sector.

Overall, most CSOs agreed that the draft strategy does not meet the needs of the sector and does

not improve the current relationship between CSOs and the government.27

• Throughout the first half of the 2017, waves of demonstrations occurred in Podgorica. The so-called

Protests of Mothers saw hundreds of legally-defined “mothers of three or more children”

protesting in front of the Montenegrin parliament, imploring the government to reverse its

decision to reduce state aid for them.28 A law guaranteeing lifetime cover for the mothers of three

and more children was adopted ahead of the election in October 2016, but in January 2017 the

government decided to cut this aid by 25 percent in a move designed to bolster fiscal stability.

The protests lasted, with some interruptions, from mid-February29 to early December.30 Several

dozen mothers participated in a hunger strike.31 However, the government remained steadfast in its

refusal to roll back the reduction of state aid and by the end of March the protests gradually

dissipated, with only occasional protests taking place thereafter.32

• The Montenegro Pride march, organized by the CSO Queer Montenegro, was held in Podgorica in

September. It was the fifth such event in Montenegro and although previous demonstrations–

including the inaugural pride march in 2013–were marred by instances of violence, the September

parade passed without incident.33 However, the LGBT community remained one of the most

vulnerable social groups in Montenegro in 2017, despite general improvements.

Independent Media

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

3.75 4.00 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50

• Despite the small size of the Montenegrin media market, a variety of independent media outlets

operate in the country. Circulation rates of print media are, however, falling. The government does

not explicitly censor media outlets, but indirect censorship exists nevertheless. Media coverage

often tends to be partisan and combative. In 2007, the Montenegrin constitution confirmed freedom

of the press as a legal right, and this right was reaffirmed in the decriminalization of defamation in

2012. Montenegro’s media scene remained fragmented and combative during 2017, and political

divisions were clearly reflected in the media landscape.

• After almost three decades of DPS control, the management of the public broadcaster Radio-

Television Montenegro (RTCG), with the support of its Council (board), asserted greater

independence from the DPS. After a lengthy process, RTCG appointed a new director, Andrija

Kadija, in March. Kadija, an experienced journalist who tended to distance herself from political

disputes, had been acting interim director since April 2016, whereupon she replaced Radojka

Rutović. The opposition had criticized Rutović as a mouthpiece of the ruling DPS, and all

opposition parties had demanded Rutović’s resignation ahead of the October 2016 parliamentary

elections.34 Kadija’s editorial position appeared more balanced than her predecessor.35

• In October, however, the government attempted to wrestle control of RTCG back from its now

independent Council through an Agency for Prevention of Corruption (ASK) investigation of board

members’ alleged conflicts of interest–though strong opposition to the investigation prevented the

DPS from recovering control of the public broadcaster.36 CSOs and opposition political parties

roundly criticized this move as “politically motivated”. The US Embassy in Podgorica supported

the government’s critics by declaring its support for “an independent and responsible media” over

Twitter.37 Moreover, the US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and Eurasia, Brian Hoyt Yee, criticized the DPS action as one that would “limit media freedoms”, further warning that

the government’s credibility would be undermined if the editorial freedom of RTCG was not

preserved.38

• However, after a series of anonymous reports to the ASK–which mainly pinpointed the most active

members of the RTCG’s Council and the Agency for Electronic Media (AEM)– the Administrative

Board of the Parliament of Montenegro started an initiative aimed at dismissing members of the

aforementioned councils. Thereafter, the government succeeded in dismissing two members of the

RTCG Council and one member of the AEM.39 Those who were relieved of their duties announced

that they intended to challenge in court what they argued was a series of unlawful decisions made

by parliament.

• The instability within RTCG was reflected elsewhere. Independent (private) media outlets

continued to struggle financially as circulation figures dropped and advertising revenues decreased.

Journalists, particularly those working for media critical of the government, claimed that their

working environment remains problematic.40

• One of the key features of Montenegro’s media scene in 2017 was its highly polarized character,

evident in the media’s daily reporting and their divergent interpretations of the same political events

and developments. Such polarization manifested in the manner in which different media outlets

have reported the investigation and trial of those accused of plotting the October 2016 coup.41

• The concentration of media ownership in Montenegro in the hands of three owners raises questions

over the plurality of media and the quality of reporting in general.42 Montenegro has four daily

newspapers: Pobjeda and Dnevne novine are progovernment (and owned by the government’s

strategic partner, Petros Sthatis’s Media Nea), while Vijesti (owned by four Montenegrin founders,

the Austrian media company Styria Medien, and Media Development Loan Fund (MDLF), which

was founded by George Soros) and Dan (owned by Jumedia Mont) are critical of the government.

In addition to these newspapers, the weekly independent magazine, Monitor (owned, effectively,

by Miodrag Perović), is also critical of the government. The circulation of these papers remains

unknown, as newspapers do not make circulation figures public, but insiders often state that it has

been declining each year. Vijesti remained the most popular and influential media outlet in

Montenegro during the year.43

• Attacks on journalists, both verbal and physical, continue to be a matter of concern. In April,

Reporters without Borders published their World Media Freedom Index, in which Montenegrin

press freedom was rated the second worst in the Balkans, behind only Macedonia.44 According to

official statistics, since 2014, 33 attacks on journalists in Montenegro were recorded,45 while 90

percent of cases remained unresolved by year’s end.46

• In September, Vladimir Otašević, a journalist for the pro-opposition newspaper Dan, claimed that

he had been threatened by Velizar Marković, the brother of the Montenegrin Prime Minister, Duško

Marković.47 This was the most recent of a series of threats and intimidation directed at journalists.

In November, in a landmark case, investigative journalist Tufik Softić–who was seriously injured

in a violent attack in 2007 in Berane and survived an attempted 2013 bomb attack due to the

publication of an article detailing the activities of a criminal group involved in drug trafficking–

was awarded €7,000 ($8,600) for the harm caused by the Montenegrin authorities’ failure to

effectively investigate the two violent attacks aimed at silencing him. The Basic Court in Podgorica

found that there was a “lack of an effective investigation into attacks on a journalist”, noting,

furthermore, that the authorities had not acted expeditiously enough in hearing the testimony of the

victim, interviewing suspects, and collecting evidence.48

• In 2017 there were six reported attacks–predominantly verbal threats–against journalists. CSOs

were vocal in their condemnation of the government for failing to substantially penalize the

aggressors.49 Overall, threats to journalists continued to be a matter of concern.

• The ever-present potential for expensive defamation suits to occur remained a key feature of the

Montenegrin media landscape in 2017, a context that led to self-censorship among journalists.

While defamation was effectively decriminalized in 2012, journalists still face the possibility of

being sued in civil suits by those who feel “offended” or “hurt”’ by their work, which, in turn,

disincentivizes journalists from targeting powerful actors.

• In September, the independent daily Vijesti proposed a dialogue to the government in the form of a round-table so that representative of all political parties could air their views on how to over

overcome a year-long institutional and political crisis. However, this call for internal dialogue between all political subjects in the country was failure.50 The Prime Minister, Duško Marković,

refused the invitation and instead argued that the crisis should be resolved on a formal basis, through

and within political institutions.

Local Democratic Governance

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50

• The Constitution of Montenegro recognizes the opština (municipality) as the basic form of local

governance and administration. Since 2014, there have been 23 municipalities in Montenegro. The

administrative capital Podgorica–which also has two urban municipalities–and the

historical/honorary capital Cetinje have special legal status. The Union of Municipalities (UOM)

of Montenegro is the national association that coordinates the organization, work, and functioning

of local governments.51 In 2017, the UOM created a comprehensive document covering and listing

all competencies and tasks of local self-governments.52

• In practice, most local self-government units in Montenegro suffer from chronic financial,

organizational, transparency and accountability problems and shortcomings.53 For instance, in

2017, seven municipalities–Cetinje, Bijelo Polje, Kolašin, Plav, Mojkovac, Rožaje and

Andrijevica–were significantly late with the payment of new tax obligations to the state and thus

violated agreements with the government.54 Moreover, eight municipalities failed to adopt a budget

for 2017 within the legally prescribed timeframe.55 Most municipalities in Montenegro have an

excessive number of employees, often lacking necessary professional skills, so the government

adopted new legislation aimed at improving this situation.56 In the past three years number of

employees in local self-governments has, for example, risen by approximately 400 positions.57

• Overall, the work of municipalities remained some way from meeting the criteria for good

governance and there continued to be a need for strengthening the transparency, efficiency, and

accountability of local self-government units. Public decision-making, especially within

municipalities, remained below the satisfactory level.58

Judicial Framework and Independence

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.50 3.50 3.50

• Judicial reforms in Montenegro have been ongoing for 17 years and, broadly, Montenegro’s judicial

system continued to endeavor to improve the transparency of its work in 2017. The “Strategy for

the Reform of the Judiciary, 2014–2018” consists of numerous measures geared toward the

improvement of transparency, openness, and accountability in the judicial system. International

organizations and local CSOs, in addition to reporting on judicial reform by national media, have

contributed to the judiciary’s increasing openness. The judiciary’s willingness to adopt greater

transparency in its operation was evident not least by the statements of senior judges. However,

throughout 2017, the consistent implementation of these proclaimed principles remained a key

challenge.

• The Regional Index of Openness demonstrated that, in comparison with neighboring countries,

Montenegro’s judiciary fared relatively well, particularly with regard to meeting public

expectations on openness of the judicial system.59 While, on average, courts in the region meet 48

percent–and prosecutors’ offices, 40 percent–of performance indicators, Montenegrin courts and

prosecutors’ offices fulfill around 75 percent of indicators of openness.60

• Looming large (and a test of the independence and effectiveness of the judiciary) has been the so-

called trial of the century of those alleged to have been involved in organizing a coup on the

evening of the parliamentary elections on October 24, 2016.61 Doubt has been cast on the credibility

of the judiciary and judicial independence in 2017 due to the process, led by the special state

prosecutor, against the suspects of the alleged October 2016 coup d’état plot (a number of whom

are opposition party leaders).

• Those accused include members of the opposition Democratic Front (DF), such as Andrija Mandić

and Milan Knežević, who argue that the judicial process is flawed and the case fabricated and

aimed against Montenegro’s Serbs by the ruling Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS).62 In

December 2016, Montenegro issued warrants for two Russian citizens, Eduard Shirokov and

Vladimir Popov, allegedly involved in the plot, though they had not been apprehended by the end

of 2017. Court proceedings began in June 2017 and continued throughout the year, generating

significant interest within the public sphere. In October, the key prosecution witness in the case,

Serbian citizen Aleksander Sinđelić, who was originally accused of involvement before agreeing

to testify against his co-conspirators, claimed that the DF leadership had organized the coup attempt

and had travelled to Russia on several occasions to generate support for this endeavor, accusations

that the DF vehemently rejected.63 Some doubt remained regarding the official version of events.

• On paper, Montenegro’s constitution guarantees permanent tenure and functional immunity for

judges, implying a certain professional respect for judicial offices. However, the handling of “the

trial of the century” has severely shaken public trust in the judiciary, which fell by eight percentage

points to 45 percent in 2017.64 Namely, while independent media and CSOs tended to ridicule the

process, public broadcasts of the trial have also brought into question of the competence of judges,

prosecutors, and the entire judiciary.65

Corruption

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 4.75 4.75

• Montenegro has made incremental advances in tackling corruption, though it remained one of the

key challenges for the government in 2017, particularly in the context of addressing Chapter 23 and

24 of the EU accession process. Little progress has been made with regard to ongoing high-profile

cases of corruption and no new major cases were brought forward in 2017, despite prominent CSOs

constantly reminding the government that corruption continues to be a major issue at the local,

regional, and national levels. Overall, the Montenegrin authorities failed to achieve much progress

prosecuting cases of high and mid-level corruption throughout the year.

• In August 2016, the government adopted a “Public Administration Reform Strategy”, which is to

be implemented by 2020. The “Law on the Prevention of Corruption” came into force in January

2016, which aimed to identify and prevent conflicts of interest, set limits on political party and

campaign financing, and regulate lobbying. However, despite these incremental advances,

approximately two-thirds of Montenegrin citizens continued to view corruption as an important

issue.66

• In a highly politicized public administration, recruitment and promotion of civil servants, for

example, remained “clientelistic” in that it provides of a pool of “safe votes” for the DPS.67

Additionally, a lack of court proceedings related to corruption in seven sensitive areas identified as

particularly vulnerable to corruption (public procurement, privatization, urban planning, education,

health care, local government, and the police) have contributed to what is perceived as a negative

situation.68

• No data exists on the implementation of local anticorruption action plans, public campaigns aimed

at promoting the code of conduct of public officials are not conducted, and citizens rarely report

instances of corruption to state bodies.69

• One persistent problem in 2017 was the severely flawed implementations of new anticorruption

regulations, producing modest results, despite the adoption of anticorruption laws and a number of

by-laws. According the CSO MANS, a “survey of international organizations show[s] that no major

progress in the fight against corruption has been made.”70 Moreover, while the legal framework

proposes the protection of whistleblowers, there is little protection in practice.

• Another key problem in 2017 was the lack of progress in preventing conflicts of interest and the

illicit enrichment of public officials.71 The number of public officials accused and prosecuted for

these issues remained very low, and the penalties imposed did not inhibit any future violations of

the law. The work of the Agency for Prevention of Corruption (ASK) remained barely transparent

and the results of its endeavors were somewhat modest.72 CSOs and the opposition therefore viewed

the ASK as an institution under DPS control.

• An additional corruption-related issue was control of electoral campaign financing (transparency of

which should be guaranteed by the Law on the Prevention of Corruption). Important information

on the financing of political parties was not publicly available by the end of the year,73 while only

part of the data on the financing of political parties and election campaigns was made freely

available to the public.

AUTHORS:

Kenneth Morrison is a Professor of Modern Southeast History at De Montfort University and Visiting

Professor at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE).

Bojan Baća is a doctoral candidate in the Graduate Program in Sociology and a research fellow at the

Global Digital Citizenship Lab at York University, Canada. His latest work on Montenegro was

published in academic journals such as Antipode and Europe-Asia Studies, as well as in two edited

volumes: Changing Youth Values in Southeast Europe: Beyond Ethnicity (Routledge, 2017) and The

Democratic Potential of Emerging Social Movements in Southeastern Europe (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung,

2017).

1 “Hahn in Montenegro: Unsustainable that the entire opposition boycotts parliament”, European Western

Balkans, 9 December 2017, https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2016/12/09/hahn-in-montenegro-

unsustainable-that-the-entire-opposition-boycotts-parliament/ 2 “Montenegro’s Opposition Parliament Boycott Starts to Fray”, Balkan Insight, 13 December 2017,

http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/boycott-of-montenegrin-parliament-starts-to-fray-12-13-2017 3 “I nova Cronogorska vlada Euroatlanski orijentišana” [New Montenegro government of a Euroatlantic

orientation], RTCG, 31 November 2016, http://www.rtcg.me/vijesti/politika/149047/i-nova-cg-vlada-

euroatlantski-orjentisana.html 4 “Djukanović’s Montenegro a Family Business”, MANS,

https://www.reportingproject.net/underground/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=6&Itemid=19 5 Dusica Tomovic, “Anti-NATO Groups Demand Referendum in Montenegro”, Balkan Insight, 10 February

2017, http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/opposition-activists-demand-nato-referendum-in-montenegro-

02-09-2017 6 Ben Farmer, “Russia plotted to overthrow Montenegro's government by assassinating Prime Minister Milo

Djukanovic last year, according to senior Whitehall sources”, Daily Telegraph, 19 February 2017,

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/02/18/russias-deadly-plot-overthrow-montenegros-government-

assassinating/ 7 “Istorijska posjeta američkog potpredsjednika: Počast Crnoj Gori i ograničavanje ruskog uticaja” [Historic

visit of the American vice president: Honoring Montenegro and limiting Russian influence], portalanalitika.ma,

1 August 2017, http://www.portalanalitika.me/clanak/276502/istorijska-posjeta-americkog-potpredsjednika-

pocast-crnoj-gori-i-ogranicavanje-ruskog-uticaja 8 Law on Elections of Councilors and Representatives, Legislation Online,

http://legislationline.org/download/action/download/id/4191/file/Montenegro_Law_on_elections_of_councillors

_and_representatives_1998_am2011_en.pdf 9 Ibid. 10 “DF Nikšić: Bojkot je uspio, sad svi zajedno na proteste!” [DF Nikšić: The boycott succeeded, now everyone

to the protest!], Vijesti, 13 March 2017, http://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/df-niksic-bojkot-je-uspio-sad-svi-zajedno-

na-proteste-928699 11 “Izbori u Nikšiću ne važe ako predsjednike zaboli glava” [Elections in Nikšić do not count if the presidents

are shaking their heads], Vjesti, 22 February 2017, http://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/izbori-u-niksicu-ne-vaze-ako-

predsjednike-zaboli-glava-925694 12 “POBJEDA OPOZICIJE Podaci na 100%: DPS 12 mandata, Demokrate 9, DF 4...” [Triumph of Opposition:

Data at 100 percent: DPS 12 mandates, Democrats 9 DF 4], Vjesti, 7 May 2017,

http://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/pobjeda-opozicije-podaci-na-100-dps-12-mandata-demokrate-9-df-4-936814 13 “SAJ ‘preventivno’ na Cetinju, ali ne kažu zbog čega” [SAJ “preventive” in Cetinje, but they do not say why],

Vijesti, 5 December 2017, http://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/saj-preventivno-na-cetinju-ali-ne-kazu-zbog-cega-

966212 14 “Trouglovi, kvadratići…: Ovakosu glasači DPS i SD glasali u Mojkovcu” [Triangles, squares… This is how

DPS and SD voted in Mojkovac], Vijesti, 2 December 2017, http://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/trouglovi-kvadratici-

ovako-su-glasaci-dps-i-sd-glasali-u-mojkovcu-965727 15 “Đukanović ne žele na predsjedničke izbore: DPS ima više dobrih kandidata” [Đukanović does not want to

stand in the presidential elections: DPS has several good candidates], Vijesti, 20 October 2017,

http://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/dukanovic-ne-zeli-na-predsjednicke-izbore-dps-ima-vise-dobrih-kandidata-959419 16 “Civilni sektor: Đukanović nam šalje ‘jastrebove’” [Civil sector: Đukanović sends us “hawks”], Vijesti, 25

November 2017, http://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/civilni-sektor-dukanovic-nam-salje-jastrebove-964652 17 “Montenegro”, 2016 CSO Sustainability Index for Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia, USAID,

https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/CSOSI_Report_7-28-17.pdf, p 169 18 Montenegro 2016 Report, European Commission https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-

enlargement/sites/near/files/pdf/key_documents/2016/20161109_report_montenegro.pdf 19 “Montenegro”, 2016 CSO Sustainability Index for Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia, USAID,

https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/CSOSI_Report_7-28-17.pdf, pp 172-173 20 “Montenegro”, 2016 CSO Sustainability Index for Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia, USAID,

https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/CSOSI_Report_7-28-17.pdf, p 170 21 “USSCG opominje: Prekovremeni rad postaje praksa” [USSCG warns: Overtime work is becoming normal

practice], Vijesti, 2 November 2017, http://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/usscg-opominje-prekovremeni-rad-postaje-

praksa-961291 22 “Montenegro”, 2016 CSO Sustainability Index for Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia, USAID,

https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/CSOSI_Report_7-28-17.pdf, p. 173–174. 23 Bojan Baća, “Civil Society Against the Party-State? The Curious Case of Social Movements in Montenegro”,

in The Democratic Potential of Emerging Social Movements in Southeastern Europe, edited by Jasmin

Mujanović, Sarajevo: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2017 http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/sarajevo/13781-

20171201.pdf, pp. 36–37. 24 “Nedovoljno novca za projekte NVO, štetu će imati i građani Crne Gore” [Insufficient money for NGO

projects, citizens of Montenegro will also suffer], Vijesti, 28 May 2017, http://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/novakovic-

nedovoljno-novca-za-projekte-nvo-stetu-ce-imati-i-gradani-crne-gore-939799 25 “Trećina ministarstava ne planira da izdvoji novac za projekte NVO” [A third of ministries do not plan to

allocate money for NGO projects], Vijesti, 24 October 2017, http://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/institut-alternativa-

trecina-ministarstava-ne-planira-da-izdvoji-novac-za-projekte-nvo-960039 26 “Vlada nastavila negativan trend odnosa prema nevladinom sektoru” [The government continued the negative

trend towards the non-governmental sector], Vijesti, 4 December 2017, http://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/novakovic-

vlada-nastavila-negativan-trend-odnosa-prema-nevladinom-sektoru-965967 27 “Strategija za NVO ne sadrži jasne pravce djelovanja Vlade” [The NGO strategy does not contain clear

directions for the government], Vijesti, 24 October 2017, http://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/crnvo- strategija-za-nvo-

ne-sadrzi-jasne-pravce-djelovanja-vlade-960031 28 “Montenegrin Mothers Threaten ‘Radical’ Action Over Benefit Cut”, Balkan Insight, 14 March 2017,

http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/montenegrin-mothers-threaten-radical-action-over-benefit-cut-03-13-

2017 29 “Policija majkama oduzela pa vratila šatore i ćebad” [Police took away mothers and restored tents and

blankets], Vijesti, 16 February 2017, http://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/policija-majkama-oduzela-pa-vratila-satore-i-

cebad-924877 30 “Savković: Markoviću, majke su tempirane bombe” [Savković: To Markoviću, mothers are time bombs],

Vijesti, 2 December 2017, http://www.vijesti.me/tv/savkovic-markovicu-majke-su-tempirane-bombe-965770 31 “Majke legle ispred Skupštine: Štrajk glađu!” [Mothers in front of the Assembly: Hunger strike!], Vijesti, 14

March 2017, http://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/majke-legle-ispred-skupstine-strajk-gladu-928806 32 “Majke prekinule štrajk glađu, ali ne i protest” [Mothers end hunger strike, but not their protest], Café del

Montenegro, 24 March 2017, https://www.cdm.me/drustvo/majke-prekinule-strajk-gladu-ali-ne-protest/ 33 “Povorka ponosa u Podgorici održana bez ijednog incidenta” [Pride held in Podgorica without any incidents],

Portal Analitika, 23 September 2017, http://www.portalanalitika.me/clanak/281282/arhiv 34 “Uslovi su odlazak Krivokapića i Rutović” [Conditions are the departures of Krivokapić and Rutović], Vijesti,

31 March 2016, http://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/uslovi-su-odlazak-krivokapica-i-rutovic-881618 35 “Kadija: Prvo ću intervjuisati kandidate, pa izabrati direktora TVCG” [Kadija: First I will interview the

candidates, then choose the director of TVCG], Portal Analitika, 26 May 2017,

http://portalanalitika.me/clanak/270030/kadija-prvo-cu-intervjuisati-kandidate-pa-izabrati-direktora-tvcg 36 “Nezavisni mediji ključni za Crnu Goru” [Independent media are key to Montenegro], Dan, 13 October 2017,

http://www.dan.co.me/?nivo=3&rubrika=Drustvo&clanak=618788&datum=2017-10-13 37 “Podrška nezavisnim i odgovornim medijima” [Support independent and responsible media], RTCG, 12

October 2017, http://www.rtcg.me/vijesti/drustvo/181008/podrska-nezavisnim-i-odgovornim-medijima.html 38 “Vladi minus ako ne spasi RTCG od DPS-a” [A minus for the government if RTCG is not saved from DPS], Vijesti, 9 January 2018, http://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/vladi-minus-ako-ne-spasi-rtcg-od-dps-a-970820 39 “Slučaj Luiđa Škrelje: DPS-ov selektor” [The case of Luiđa Škrelje: DPS’s selector], Monitor, 22 December

2017, http://www.monitor.co.me/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=8141:sluaj-luia-krelje-dps-

ov-selektor&catid=5809:broj-1418&Itemid=7221 40 “Zastrašivanje medija: Crna Gora među pet zemalja koja pritvara novinare” [Media frustration: Montenegro

among the five countries that pressure journalists], Vijesti, 21 April 2017,

http://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/zastrasivanje-medija-crna-gora-medu-pet-zemalja-koja-pritvara-novinare-934499;

“Ovo su poruke žrtava kršenja ljudskih prava u Crnoj Gori” [These are messages of victims of human rights

violations in Montenegro], Vijesti, 9 December 2017, http://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/ovo-su-poruke-zrtava-

krsenja-ljudskih-prava-u-crnoj-gori-966750 41 See Nations in Transit: Montenegro Report 2017, pp. 12-13,

https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Montenegro.pdf 42 “Dupli aršini za vladine partnere i nezavisne medije” [Double arches for government partners and independent

media], Vijesti, 1 April 2017, http://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/dupli-arsini-za-vladine-partnere-i-nezavisne-medije-

931672 43 “Bez konkurencije: Portal Vijesti obara rekorde!” [No competition: Portal Vijesti is setting records!], Vijesti,

7 October 2017, http://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/bez-konkurencije-portal-vijesti-obara-rekorde-957576 44 See Reporters without Borders, “Montenegro”, https://www.rsf.org/en/montenegro 45 “Crna Gora: Od 2014. zabeleženo 33 napada na novinare” [Montenegro: Since 2014, 33 attacks on journalists

have been reported], Blic, 14 Jun 2017, http://www.blic.rs/vesti/svet/crna-gora-od-2014-zabelezeno-33-napada-

na-novinare/35smlbs 46 “DPN Crne Gore: 90 posto napada na novinare neriješeno” [DPN of Montenegro: 90 percent of attacks on

journalists are unresolved], Slobodna Evropa, 2 November 2017,

https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/28831273.html 47 “Montenegrin journalist threatened,” Committee to Protect Journalists, 13 September 2017,

https://cpj.org/2017/09/montenegrin-journalist-threatened.php 48 “Journalist wins landmark case on Montenegrin authorities’ failure to investigate attacks”, Media Legal

Defense Initiative, 2 November 2017, https://www.mediadefence.org/news/journalist-wins-landmark-case-

montenegrin-authorities%E2%80%99-failure-investigate-attacks 49 “Vlada da pokaže suštinsku, a ne formalnu spremnost kažnjavanja napada na novinare” [Government must

substantive and not formal interest in punishing attacks on journalists], Vijesti, 2 November 2017,

http://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/vlada-da-pokaze-sustinsku-a-ne-formalnu-spremnost-kaznjavanja-napada-na-novinare-

961364 50 “Ivanović nudio javni dijalog, ne posredovanje” [Ivanović offers public dialogue, not mediation], Vijesti, 12

October 2017, http://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/ivanovic-nudio-javni-dijalog-ne-posredovanje-958269 51 “About the Union of Municipalities of Montenegro”, Union of Municipalities of Montenegro,

http://uom.me/en/about-the-union/ 52 “Popis nadležnosti i poslova lokalne samouprave” [List of competencies and tasks of local self-government],

Union of Municipalities of Montenegro, http://uom.me/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Popis-nadleznosti_jun-

2017.pdf 53 “Transparentnost lokalnih transfera: koliko troši moj grad?” [Transparency of Local Transfers: How Much

Does My City Spend?], Media Institute Alternativa, July 2017, http://media.institut-

alternativa.org/2017/07/transparentnost-lokalnih-transfera.pdf 54 “Opštine kasne sa plaćanjem poreza: najgore na Cetinju, najbolji Šavnik” [Municipalities are late with taxes:

the worst in Cetinje, the best in Šavnik], Bankar.me, 27 September 2017,

http://www.bankar.me/2017/09/27/opstine-kasne-sa-placanjem-poreza-najgore-na-cetinju-najbolji-savnik/ 55 “Dio opština bez budžeta za 2017” [Some municipalities without budgets for 2017], CDT, 6 February 2017,

https://www.cdtmn.org/2017/02/06/dio-opstina-bez-budzeta-za-2017/ 56 “Pribilović: Unaprjeđenje profesionalnosti i odgovornost lokalne samouprave” [Pribilović: Improving the

professionalism and responsibility of local self-government], Vijesti, 14 December 2017,

http://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/pribilovic-unaprjedenje-profesionalnosti-i-odgovornost-lokalne-samouprave-

967543 57 “Infografik: Broj zaposlenih na lokalnom nivou” [Infographic: Number of employees at the local level],

Institut Alternativa, 21 February 2018, http://institut-alternativa.org/infografik-broj-zaposlenih-na-lokalnom-

nivou/ 58 “Analysis of Openness of Local Self-Government in Montenegro and Region”, Center for Democratic

Transition, May 2017, http://www.en.cdtmn.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Analysis-of-openness-of-LSG.pdf 59 In the Regional Index of Openness more than one hundred indicators measure four dimensions of openness:

transparency, accessibility, integrity, and awareness. See “Openness of Judicial Bodies in the Region and

Montenegro,” Center for Democratic Transition, June 2017, http://www.en.cdtmn.org/dobroupravljanje/du-analize/openness-of-judicial-bodies-in-the-region-and-montenegro/ 60 “Openness of Judicial Bodies in the Region and Montenegro,” Center for Democratic Transition, June 2017,

http://www.en.cdtmn.org/dobroupravljanje/du-analize/openness-of-judicial-bodies-in-the-region-and-

montenegro/ 61 “Nastavlja se ‘suđenje vijeka’” [“Trial of the century” continues], Radio Slobodna Evropa, 19 July 2017,

https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/crna-gora-sudjenje-drzavni-udar/28624461.html

62 “‘Suđenje za državni udar je politički montiran proces. Počeo je lov na Srbe u Crnoj Gori’” [The state-run

trial is a politically contrived process. The hunt for Serbs has begun], Blic, 9 October 2017,

http://www.blic.rs/vesti/svet/sudenje-za-drzavni-udar-je-politicki-montiran-proces-poceo-je-lov-na-srbe-u-

crnoj/vsdzqrj 63 “Sinđelić: Edi mi rekao da ima snimke gdje lideri DF uzimaju pare i traže oružje” [Sinđelić: Edi told me he

had footage where DF leaders are taking money and seeking weapons], Vijesti, 2 December 2017,

http://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/sindelic-edi-mi-rekao-da-ima-snimke-gdje-lideri-df-uzimaju-pare-i-traze-oruzje-

966230 64 “Osam odsto niže: Opalo povjerenje građana u pravosudni sistem” [Eight percent lower: Citizens confidence in

the judicial system decreased], Vijesti, 25 May 2017, http://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/osam-odsto-nize-opalo-

povjerenje-gradana-u-pravosudni-sistem-939959 65 “‘Državni udar’ ogolio crnogorsko pravosuđe” [“A powerful blow” to Montenegro’s justice system], Café del

Montenegro, 27 September 2017, https://www.cdm.me/hronika/ga-drzavni-udar-ogolio-crnogorsko-pravosude/ 66 “CEDEM: Skoro dvije trećine građana smatra da je korupcija izražen problem u Crnoj Gori” [CEDEM:

Almost two-thirds of citizens believe that corruption is a problem in Montenegro], Vijesti, 11 July 2017,

http://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/cedem-skoro-dvije-trecine-gradana-smatra-da-je-korupcija-izrazen-problem-u-

crnoj-gori-946104 67 Dejan Milovac, “Montenegro: Democratic Deficits Persist Instead of Progressing Euro–Atlantic Integration”,

Sudosteuropa Mitteilungen, 2016, 56:1. 68 “Treći izvještaj o sprovođenju akcionog plana za Poglavlje 23” [Third report on the implementation of the

action plan for Chapter 23], MANS, December 2017, http://www.mans.co.me/wp-

content/uploads/2017/12/Nacrt3izvjestajaAP23.pdf, p. 80. 69 “Korupcija jača od crnogorskih institucija” [Corruption strengthens from Montenegrin institutions], Radio

Slobodna Evropa, 3 March 2017, https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/crna-gora-korupcija/28346887.html 70 “Report on Implementation of Action Plan for Chapter 23”, MANS, February 2017

http://www.mans.co.me/en/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/AP23ENGfin.pdf, p. 37 71 “Treći izvještaj o sprovođenju akcionog plana za Poglavlje 23” [Third report on the implementation of the

action plan for Chapter 23], MANS, December 2017, http://www.mans.co.me/wp-

content/uploads/2017/12/Nacrt3izvjestajaAP23.pdf, p, 7. 72 “Treći izvještaj o sprovođenju akcionog plana za Poglavlje 23” [Third report on the implementation of the

action plan for Chapter 23], MANS, December 2017, http://www.mans.co.me/wp-

content/uploads/2017/12/Nacrt3izvjestajaAP23.pdf, p. 52. 73 “Preporuke za unpređenje zakonodavnog okvira za izbore” [Recommendations for enhancing the legislative

framework for elections], Center for Democratic Transition, October 2017, https://www.cdtmn.org/wp-

content/uploads/2017/10/Policy_Preporuke-za-unapre%C4%91enje-zakonodavnog-okvira_26.10.2017.pdf