Monopsony In 2001, oil rig roughnecks accused their employers of illegally fixing their wages in...

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Monopsony In 2001, oil rig roughnecks accused their employers of illegally fixing their wages in secret meetings occurring over the 10 preceding years (Walsh, 2001). In other words, the oil rig companies were being accused of being a monopsony, acting as a single buyer of roughneck labor.

Transcript of Monopsony In 2001, oil rig roughnecks accused their employers of illegally fixing their wages in...

Monopsony

In 2001, oil rig roughnecks accused their employers of illegally fixing their wages in secret meetings occurring over the 10 preceding years (Walsh, 2001). In other words, the oil rig companies were being accused of being a monopsony, acting as a single buyer of roughneck labor.

Suppose the supply of roughnecks (RN) is:

๐‘ค=2.5+0.25 โˆ™๐ฟWhere w is their hourly wage and L is measured in thousands of roughnecks per hour.

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 1400.002.505.007.50

10.0012.5015.0017.5020.0022.5025.0027.5030.0032.5035.0037.5040.00

Wage($ per hour)

Labor (thousands per hour)

Supply

If we โ†‘ from 30 to 50 thousand,

Suppose the supply of roughnecks is:

๐‘ค=2.5+0.25 โˆ™๐ฟWhere w is their hourly wage and L is measured in thousands of roughnecks per hour.

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 1400.002.505.007.50

10.0012.5015.0017.5020.0022.5025.0027.5030.0032.5035.0037.5040.00

Wage($ per hour)

Labor (thousands per hour)

Supply

If we โ†‘ from 30 to 50 thousand, then TE on will โ†‘ by $450 thousand. The MC of will, on average be

Suppose the supply of roughnecks is:

๐‘ค=2.5+0.25 โˆ™๐ฟWhere w is their hourly wage and L is measured in thousands of roughnecks per hour.

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 1400.002.505.007.50

10.0012.5015.0017.5020.0022.5025.0027.5030.0032.5035.0037.5040.00

Wage($ per hour)

Labor (thousands per hour)

Supply

If we โ†‘ from 30 to 50 thousand, then TE on will โ†‘ by $450 thousand. The MC of will, on average be

Suppose the supply of roughnecks is:

๐‘ค=2.5+0.25 โˆ™๐ฟWhere w is their hourly wage and L is measured in thousands of roughnecks per hour.

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 1400.002.505.007.50

10.0012.5015.0017.5020.0022.5025.0027.5030.0032.5035.0037.5040.00

Wage($ per hour)

Labor (thousands per hour)

Supply

If we โ†‘ from 30 to 50 thousand, then TE on will โ†‘ by $450 thousand. The MC of will, on average be

MC

Alternative Derivation of the MC curve

Supply Curve:

๐‘‡๐ธ=๐‘ค โˆ™๐ฟยฟ (2.5+0.25 โˆ™๐ฟ) โˆ™๐ฟ

๐œ•๐‘‡๐ธ๐œ•๐ฟ

=2.5+(2 โˆ™ 0.25)โˆ™๐ฟ

๐‘š๐‘

Hence,

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 1400.002.505.007.50

10.0012.5015.0017.5020.0022.5025.0027.5030.0032.5035.0037.5040.00

Wage($ per hour)

Labor (thousands per hour)

Supply

MC

Suppose the demand for roughnecks (MRP) is:

๐‘ค=32.5 โˆ’ 0.25โˆ™๐ฟ

Demand=MRP

๐‘ค๐‘€

๐‘ค๐ถ

๐ฟ๐‘€ ๐ฟ๐ถ

Monopsonies pay lower wages and hire fewer workers than competitive markets

Oil rig roughnecks suspected that their employers were colluding by setting wages because wages โ€œbarely budged during labor shortages in 1997 and in 2000 after oil prices rose and drilling companies rushed to put idled rigs into productionโ€ (Walsh, 2001).

Lin, Chung-Cheng. 2002. โ€œThe Shortage of Registered Nurses in Monopsony: A New View from Efficiency Wage and Job-Hour Models, The American Economist , 46(1) Spring: 29-35

Principal Research Question:

What effect does increasing the minimum wage have on the price of restaurant meals?

Why is it important?

It tests whether the labor market for restaurant workers is competitive or monopsonistic.

โ€œOur findings suggest that employment remains unchanged, or sometimes rises slightly, as a result of increases in the minimum wage. This conclusion poses a stark challenge to the standard textbook model of the minimum wage.''

Wage

Supply

Demand=MRP

๐‘ค๐‘€๐‘–๐‘›

๐‘ค๐ถ

๐ฟ๐ถ

Illustrate the effect of the imposition of a minimum wage of labor and output markets, first assuming that both markets are competitive.

   Labor

Permanent Surplus

CompetitiveLabor Market

Price

S1

D

๐‘ƒ๐‘€๐‘–๐‘›๐‘ƒ๐ถ

๐‘„๐ถ

Quantity

Market for Restaurant Meals

S2

๐‘„๐‘€๐‘–๐‘›

Wage

Labor

Supply

MC

Demand=MRP

๐‘ค๐‘€

๐‘ค๐‘€๐‘–๐‘›

๐ฟ๐‘€

Illustrate the effect of the imposition of a minimum wage of labor and output markets, first assuming that both markets are competitive.

Wage

Labor

Supply

MC

Demand=MRP

๐‘ค๐‘€

๐‘ค๐‘€๐‘–๐‘›

๐ฟ๐‘€

Illustrate the effect of the imposition of a minimum wage of labor and output markets, first assuming that both markets are competitive.

Wage

Labor

Supply

MC

Demand=MRP

๐‘ค๐‘€

๐‘ค๐‘€๐‘–๐‘›

Illustrate the effect of the imposition of a minimum wage of labor and output markets, first assuming that both markets are competitive.

๐ฟ๐‘€๐‘–๐‘›๐ฟ๐‘€

Illustrate the effect of the imposition of a minimum wage of labor and output markets, first assuming that both markets are competitive.

MonopsonisticLabor Market

Price

S1

D

๐‘ƒ๐‘€๐‘–๐‘›

๐‘ƒ๐‘€

๐‘„๐‘€๐‘–๐‘›

Quantity

Market for Restaurant Meals

S2

๐‘„๐‘€

Wage

Labor

Supply

MC

Demand=MRP

๐‘ค๐‘€

๐‘ค๐‘€๐‘–๐‘›

๐ฟ๐‘€๐‘–๐‘›๐ฟ๐‘€

Aaronson, French and MacDonald (2008) estimate the relationship between minimum wages and restaurant prices to infer whether labor markets are competitive or monopsonistic.  

๐‘™๐‘›๐‘๐‘Ÿ , ๐‘  ,๐‘ฆ=๐›ฝ0+๐›ฝ1 ๐‘™๐‘›๐‘ค๐‘  ,๐‘ก๐‘š๐‘–๐‘›+๐›ฟ๐‘ +๐œ–๐‘Ÿ ,๐‘  ,๐‘ฆ

AFMโ€™s Empirical Model

๐‘™๐‘›๐‘ค๐‘Ž๐‘”๐‘’=๐›ผ0+๐›ผ1๐‘’๐‘‘๐‘ข๐‘๐‘Ž๐‘ก๐‘–๐‘œ๐‘›+๐œ€

% โˆ†๐‘ค๐‘Ž๐‘”๐‘’โˆ†๐‘’๐‘‘๐‘ข๐‘๐‘Ž๐‘ก๐‘œ๐‘–๐‘›

=100 โˆ™๐›ผ1

% โˆ†๐‘๐‘Ÿ๐‘–๐‘๐‘’% โˆ†๐‘ค๐‘€๐‘–๐‘› =๐›ฝ1

AFMโ€™s Data

BLS restaurant-level data for 3 years, 1995-1997

Fed increased from $4.25 to $5.15 over these years

๐‘™๐‘›๐‘๐‘Ÿ , ๐‘  ,๐‘ฆ ๐‘™๐‘›๐‘ค๐‘  , ๐‘ก๐‘š๐‘–๐‘›

โ€œWe find that a 10 percent increase in the minimum wage increases prices by roughly 0.7 percentโ€ (Aaronson, French and MacDonald, 2008, 697).

AFMโ€™s Principal Result

๏ฟฝฬ‚๏ฟฝ1=0.0713(0.014 )

% โˆ†๐‘๐‘Ÿ๐‘–๐‘๐‘’% โˆ†๐‘ค๐‘€๐‘–๐‘› โ‰ˆ 0.07

% โˆ†๐‘๐‘Ÿ๐‘–๐‘๐‘’=0.07 โˆ™ %โˆ†๐‘ค๐‘€๐‘–๐‘›

If 

๏ฟฝฬ‚๏ฟฝ1=0.0713(0.014 )

๏ฟฝฬ‚๏ฟฝ1=0.0713(0.014 )

๏ฟฝฬ‚๏ฟฝ1=0.0713(0.014 )

๏ฟฝฬ‚๏ฟฝ1=0.0713(0.014 )

๏ฟฝฬ‚๏ฟฝ1=0.0713(0.014 )

๏ฟฝฬ‚๏ฟฝ1=0.0713(0.014 )

๏ฟฝฬ‚๏ฟฝ1=0.0713(0.014 )

๏ฟฝฬ‚๏ฟฝ1=0.0713(0.014 )