Monitoring of October 1 2012 Parliamentary Elections Final Report

8/22/2019 Monitoring of October 1 2012 Parliamentary Elections Final Report

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INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR FAIR ELECTIONS

AND DEMOCRACY (ISFED)

MONITORING OF OCTOBER 1ST,

2012 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

FINAL REPORT

2013

TBILISI


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ISFED election program for 2012 was carried out with the financial support of the United States Agency for International

Development (USAID), National Democratic Institute (NDI), European Union (EU), East West Management Institutes project

Policy, Advocacy and Civil Society Development in Georgia (EWMI G-PAC), National Endowment for Democracy (NED),

Open Society Georgia Foundation (OSGF), and Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida). The contents

of this publication belong solely to the International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy and do not necessarily reflect

the views of NDI, NED, EWMI, OSGF, Sida, USAID, the United States Government or the European Union.

Report prepared By: Nino Lomjaria

Nino Rizhamadze

Tamar Bartaia

Elene Nizharadze

Mikheil Benidze


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Contents

I. About the Monitoring Mission .......................................................................................................................... 4II. Key Findings .......................................................................................................................................................... 5

III. Political Context .................................................................................................................................................... 8

IV. Election Laws ..................................................................................................................................................... 9

V. The Inter-Agency Task Force for Free and Fair Elections ..................................................................... 13

VI. The State Audit Office ...................................................................................................................................... 14

VII. Voter Lists ............................................................................................................................................................ 15

VIII. Election Administration ..................................................................................................................................... 16

The Central Election Commission .............................................................................................................. 16

District and Precinct Election Commissions............................................................................................. 19

IX. Pre-Election Monitoring..................................................................................................................................... 21

Methodology ..................................................................................................................................................... 21

Key violations in the pre-election period.................................................................................................. 22

Media environment in the pre-election period ........................................................................................ 29

Monitoring of public meetings held by political parties in the pre-election period ...................... 30

X. Election Day ......................................................................................................................................................... 32

Monitoring Mission ......................................................................................................................................... 32

Monitoring Methodology................................................................................................................................ 32

Results of PVT Monitoring .......................................................................................................................... 33

Election Day Violations and Complaints................................................................................................... 37

XI. Post Election Period ........................................................................................................................................... 39

Complaints and lawsuits filed with district and precinct election commissions

and court .............................................................................................................................................................. 39

Other important post-election developments ............................................................................................ 42

XII. Conclusions and Recommendations............................................................................................................... 43


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I. About the Monitoring Mission

The present report outlines results of monitoring of

the October 1, 2012 Parliamentary Elections carried

out by the International Society for Fair Elections

and Democracy.

During the 2012 parliamentary elections ISFED, as

a monitoring organization with one of the largest

observation networks, was actively involved in pre-election monitoring as well as the monitoring on

the Election Day and post-elections. The monitoring

was carried out by ISFED by utilization of new

methods innovative technologies. The complete

monitoring entailed the following three key stages:

1. Pre-election monitoring was conducted

throughout the period of six months prior

to the elections1 by means of73 long-term

observers of ISFED in all election districts

of Georgia. Length of the monitoring and

use of effective methodology made it possi-

ble to analyze the pre-election process in a

comprehensive and objective manner. The

pre-election monitoring focused on issues

including use of government resources, ac-tivities of the election administrations and

political parties, formation of voter lists,

pressure, and threats on political grounds

and vote buying.

2. The Election Day monitoring was carried

out in 902 election precincts, including par-

allel vote tabulation (PVT) at 600 electionprecincts. In addition to randomly selected

election precincts ISFED also observer302

election precincts through short-term observ-

ers. Together with LTOs the Election Day

monitoring mission was composed of 78

mobile teams, 73 district observers, 15 law-

yers, 15 cameramen and 2 observers sta-tioned at the Central Election Commission

(CEC). The Election Day monitoring had

three key components opening and setting

up of election precinct, voting and vote

counting.

3. Post-election monitoring was carried out by

ISFED by means of73 district observers,15 lawyers and 2 monitors at the CEC.

ISFED monitored activities of the election

administration, consideration of complaints

at district election commissions (DECs) and

the process of vote tabulation.

1 ISFED carried out pre-election monitoring from April 1, 2012 through September 30, 2012


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II. Key Findings

The pre-election period was marked by high political competition between the ruling political force and the

opposition coalition. Due to the tense political background, there was a lack of pre-election campaigning

focused on discussion of election programs and thematic debate. Rather, the pre-election campaign involved

plentiful use of compromising information, multiple violations of law, active use of hate speech, violent and

aggressive clashes.

It seemed that there was a competition between the state and the opposition, as opposed to political parties,

which was caused by absence of a boundary line between the ruling party and the governments adminis-

trative function.

The nature and dynamics of pre-election violations was changing as the election processes entered their activephase. At the beginning of the monitoring in April-May, dismissals from work on political grounds were most

frequent. Later, as the elections approached, number of facts that involved use of government resources,

violence on political grounds, physical clashes and use of administrative sanctions/imprisonment on political

grounds increased. Pre-election violations were reported in almost all regions of Georgia. ISFED included

hundreds of facts of pre-election violation in its reports.

In the run up of the parliamentary elections, the new Election Code was adopted and fundamental changes

were made in the organic law of Georgia on Political Union of Citizens. Further, a number of amendments

were made to the Constitution of Georgia, the Criminal Code and the Code of Administrative Offences of

Georgia.

Although adoption of the new Election Code was a step forward for improving access to media, realization

of passive election rights, promotion of gender participation, procedures for reviewing election disputes, it

failed to remedy fundamental gaps in the existing election system, related to abuse of administrative

resources, ensuring transparency of staffing of election administrations.

New regulations introduced in the law on Political Union of Citizens have proved to be the mostproblematic. Although they increased transparency of party funding, set up an independent body to control

party funding, introduced audit standards, established annual donations and spending threshold, the law

contained certain problematic provisions that was expressly criticized by the civil society. Initial formulation

of the law jeopardized freedom of expression and the right to property, limited civil and political activities

and provided unequal playing field. Prohibitions placed by the law were frequently unreasonable and

sanctions were disproportionate.

As a result of active involvement of member organizations of the It Affects You Too campaign, significant

improvements were made to the law; in particular, norms that jeopardized right to property, freedom of

expression and civil activities were removed. Nevertheless, we believe that it still did not define competencies


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and procedures applicable to the work of body that

controls party funding. Rather, it granted broad

discretion to the latter, posing a threat of selective

application of law.

In the run up of the parliamentary elections, a

number of new institutes were created, including

the Inter-Agency Task Force (IATF) whose work

is commendable as unlike other agencies its efforts

were more focused on responding to and preventing

violations in pre-election period. As a result of the

work of the task force, number of dismissals onpolitical grounds was reduced in public sector. Fur-

ther, we believe that the IATF played a positive

role in pre-election period in diffusing violence.

Most of the claims have been raised about the work

of the State Audit Service delegated with party

funding regulatory function. While studying finan-

cial activities of political subjects and their support-

ers, the Service instituted unsubstantiated legal pros-

ecution and imposed high, disproportionate sanc-tions.

On frequent occasions, the Audit Service selectively

reacted to certain actions undertaken by the ruling

and opposition parties, suggesting their loyalty to

the United National Movement and excessive strict-ness towards opposition parties.

Owing to the work of the Voter List Verification

Commission (VLVC) information about voters abroad,

deceased persons and persons not living at registra-

tion addresses was more accurate than in previous

elections. Nevertheless, a decision to return voters

removed from registration and voters whose regis-tration had been annulled back to the voter list,

which unprecedentedly increased number of voters

on the list and left room for illegal manipulation

with these voters on the Election Day.

The work of the election administration and the

CEC in particular, is commendable in terms of

transparency and administration of elections. Inter-ested parties had access to election information,

facilitated by the CEC website. Improving the web-

site design greatly simplified search of information.

The fact that under the CEC initiative and with the

involvement of civil society, guidelines were elab-

orated for members of election commissions, ob-

servers, media and political party proxies, whichfacilitated interpretation of election law and its uni-

form application.

Nevertheless, certain decisions of the CEC were

perceived as politically motivated. In particular,

assignation of a ballot paper number to the Geor-

gian Dream as well as the decision prohibiting

photo and video recording on the Election Day atthe polling station. Further, ISFED believes that the


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CEC failed to inform voters living abroad about registration procedures and therefore, it is possible than

many of them refrained from registration at the election precinct.

During the pre-election period media was rather diverse. Television, press, radio and Internet provided access

to variety of information. The problem was that citizens of Georgia and particularly those living in the

regions lacked equal access to all media outlets and in particular, to outlets criticizing the government. The

problem was mostly caused by the fact that majority of cable companies refused to carry broadcasters known

for their criticism of the government.

After the Parliament of Georgia adopted the so-called must carry and must offer regulations for the Election

Code, access to media known for its criticism was greatly improved throughout Georgia as the official pre-

election campaign commenced.

During the pre-election period, interference with journalistic activities was often reported. ISFED identified

dozens of cases that involved hindering of journalists, exerting pressure against them and subjecting them to

violence. The violence mostly targeted representatives of media outlets that were known for their criticism

of the government. Such acts of violence were ineffectively investigated or not investigated at all.

Mostly the Election Day had no significant flaws; however, one important deficiency was that voters often

found someone had already signed along their names beforehand. This frequently hindered voter participation.

Further, at 6% of polling stations violations of inking procedures were reported. The principle of secret ballotwas observed at 98% of polling stations, a significant improvement from the 2008 parliamentary elections.

Notably, vote counting was duly administered at most of the election precincts, with the only exception of

several precincts in Khashuri Election District, where drawing up of protocols was delayed with no reason

until the appearance of Special Forces at these precincts, which eventually lead to the annulment of polling

results at these precincts.

Throughout the course of the elections and during the post-election period, ISFEDs observers acted on total

of223 violations at district and precinct election commissions. Most of the complaints were filed over allegedrestriction of observers rights; agitation at polling stations; signatures made on the list beforehand, instead

of actual voters; voting with wrong documents; violations in casting of lots, marking and vote counting.

The process of examining election complaints was administered in a transparent manner. Interested parties

were able to attend election commission/court sessions and participate in the process. Nevertheless, decisions

delivered by election commissions rejecting claims mostly lacked proper substantiation. Further, election

administration often refused to resort to its own power to investigate under its own initiative and eliminate

polling day violations. As to courts, they often lacked objectivity and failed to examine evidence in acomprehensive and thorough manner before delivering decisions.


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In this light, it is safe to say that notwithstanding a rather problematic pre-election period, the elections were

conducted, first of all owing to high voter turnout on the Election Day and maximum transparency of polling

and vote count processes. Citizens of Georgia were able to express their will, which was duly reflected in

election summary protocols.

III. Political Context

A heightened interest in the 2012 parliamentary elections was caused by several important factors; in

particular, pursuant to the 2010 Constitutional amendments Georgia is switching to a new model of

governance that will come into effect after the president-elect of Georgia takes an oath of office in 2013.

Parliament will be further reinforced as presidential authorities will be reduced.

Active preparations for the 2012 parliamentary elections started as early as on September 17, 2012, by

promulgation of the draft Election Code. On October 7, 2011, Bidzina Ivansihvili made a public statement

about the establishment of a political team and his political goals, followed by sharp intensification of

political processes. It is safe to say that pre-election period in the run up of the 2012 parliamentary elections

lasted for a year. Throughout this time, various actors including the parliament, political parties, media outlets

and election monitoring organizations got actively engaged in the process of adoption of new election

regulations, improvement of media environment and verification of voter lists as early as one year in advance.

Unlike previous parliamentary elections, the 2012 elections featured two political subjects of relatively equal

force the United National Movement on the one hand and the coalition Georgian Dream on the other. The

latter brought together the following six political parties: Georgian Dream Democratic Georgia, Irakli

Alasania Free Democrats, Industry Will Save Georgia, National Forum, Conservative Party, and Republican

Party.

Both political forces had a great number of supporters in public. Further, unlike other opposition forces they

had an important financial advantage. In particular, the United National Movement, the ruling party, had

access to government resources and there were cases when it utilized the resources for political campaigning2.On the other hand, the coalition Georgian Dream created around businessman Bidzina Ivanishvili, had access

to huge financial resources.

The 2012 parliamentary elections were special due several additional institutes set up that took over important

part of the CEC functions. In particular, for the first time the Election Code of Georgia mandated creation

2 ISFEDs pre-election monitoring reports are available at http://isfed.ge/pdf/2012_Parliamentary_Elections_pre-

election_monitoring_findings_ENG.pdf; http://isfed.ge/pdf/2012-06-15-report-en.pdf; http://www.isfed.ge/pdf/ISFED_report_3ENG.pdf http://isfed.ge/pdf/20120-08-20-report-eng.pdf; http://www.isfed.ge/pdf/ISFED%20

Fifth%20Interim%20Report%20ENG.pdf


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2 ISFEDs pre-election monitoring reports are available at http://isfed.ge/pdf/2012_Parliamentary_Elections_pre-elec-

tion_monitoring_findings_ENG.pdf; http://isfed.ge/pdf/2012-06-15-report-en.pdf; http://www.isfed.ge/pdf/ISFED_report_3ENG.pdf

http://isfed.ge/pdf/20120-08-20-report-eng.pdf; http://www.isfed.ge/pdf/ISFED%20Fifth% 20Interim%20Report%20ENG.pdf3 Information about the IATF is available at http://www.nsc.gov.ge/eng/elections2012.php4 Please see the official website of the SAO: http://sao.ge/?action=page&p_id=6&lang=eng5 Please see the official website of the VLVC: http://sia.gov.ge/6 Para.1, Article 49 of the Constitution of Georgia7

Article 1044

of the Constitution of Georgia8 Para.2, Article 49 of the Constitution of Georgia, para.1, Article 111 of the Organic Law of Georgia Election Code of

Georgia

of the Inter-Agency Task Force for Free and Fair Elections. 3 This way, the function of financial

monitoring of parties was now delegated to the State Audit Offices (formerly known as the Chamber of

Control), Party Financial Monitoring Service. 4 The function of verifying voter lists was passed on to the

Voter List Verification Commission (VLVC)5

. The VLVC was manned by equal number of representativesof the ruling party, opposition and NGOs.

IV. Election Laws

Applicable election laws for the 2012 parliamentary elections included the Constitution of Georgia, the

Election Code of Georgia, the Law on Political Union of Citizens, the Criminal Code of Georgia, the Code

of Administrative Offences, etc. Notably, adoption of new election regulations was a continuous process that

started as early as one year prior to the elections.

The Constitution of Georgia

There were two key new regulations introduced in the Constitution of Georgia in May 2012 in the run up

of the 2012 parliamentary elections; in particular,

Number of majoritarian MPs was reduced from 75 to 73, whereas the number of proportional MPs

was increased from 75 to 77; 6

In addition to citizens of Georgia, persons who have reached certain age and were born in Georgia,

have been living permanently in Georgia for the last five years and have a citizenship of an EU-

member state now have the right to vote in presidential and parliamentary elections up until January

1, 2014; 7

Minimum age for passive election right was reduced from 25 to 21 8.


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The Election Code of Georgia

Based on the agreement signed between the political parties, the parliament of Georgia presented draft

Election Code in September 2011 for consideration, which, except for several positive new regulations, did

not offer any other essential changes to improve the election environment. In particular, the new ElectionCode did not offer regulation of important and problematic issues related to observance of the principle of

vote equality, raising barrier for majoritarian elections, introducing tight regulations for the use of government

resources.

On December 27, 2011, the parliament of Georgia adopted the new Election Code, although the process of

amending the Code lasted through July 2012. The new Election Code stipulated the following important new

regulations:

The circle of officials who are not prohibited from pre-election campaigning (engaging in agitation)

has been broadened; in particular, Gamgebelis have been granted the status of a political official 9;

The Voter List Verification Commission (VLVC) took over responsibility of verifying and publishing

voter lists from the CEC; 10

Changes were made in the timeframe for considering election disputes; in particular, the deadline for

appealing in higher election commission was extended but the time for consideration of a complaint

by court was reduced; 11

Prisoners convicted for less grave crimes under the Criminal Code of Georgia have been granted with

the right to vote in elections; 12

Independent candidates nominated by initiative groups have been allowed to run in elections; 13

Video surveillance at polling stations has been prohibited;

An inter-agency task force was set up with the Security Council of Georgia on July 1 of the election

year, for the purpose of preventing and responding to violations of election laws of Georgia by public

servants. 14

9 Para.2z5 of the Organic Law of Georgia Election Code of Georgia10 See Chapter VI for detailed information about the commission11 Para.2, Article 77 of the Organic Law of Georgia Election Code of Georgia12 Less grave crime is a crime committed intentionally or a reckless crime subject to maximum punishment of five-year

imprisonment under the Criminal Code13 Para.1c, Article 116 of the Organic Law of Georgia Election Code of Georgia14 See Chapter V for information about the commission


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Higher standards of transparency were pro-

vided for international monitoring organiza-

tions; 15

Agitation in polling stations on the PollingDay was prohibited; 16

Must carry and must offer regulations were

enacted in pre-election period, which ensured

voters access to pluralistic information.17

Despite the fact that the new Election Code was an

improvement for access to media, realization of

passive election right, promotion of gender partici-pation, procedures for consideration of election dis-

putes, it failed to address problematic issues related

to the existing election system, abuse of administra-

tive resources, ensuring transparency of staffing elec-

tion administrations and their activities. Further,

from a technical point of view the Election Code

became more systemic.

The Law on Political Union of Citizens

On December 12, 2011, a draft law on amendments

and supplements to the law of Georgia on Political

Union of Citizens was initiated in the parliament of

Georgia.

Although it improved transparency of party fund-

ing, the draft law contained regulations that were

flawed and ambiguous and were sharply criticized

by civil society.

In consideration of some of the recommendations

of international and domestic organizations, the law

envisaged setting up of an independent regulatory

agency for party funding, established standards of

financial audit of parties, maximum amount of do-

nations, maximum amount of spending per year.

ISFED together with its partner NGOs harshly crit-

icized the new regulations, as it believed that the

law jeopardized freedom of expression and the right

to property and placed restrictions on civil and

political activities, creating unequal playing field

for political parties. We have highlighted that the

restrictions were frequently unreasonable, sanctions

disproportionate. 18 Further,

With a demand to make changes to the law, civil

sector that included most part of NGOs and media

organizations, launched a large-scale protest cam-

paign It Affects You Too19, where ISFED was

actively involved.

15 Para.5, Article 39 of the Organic Law of Georgia Organic Law of Georgia Election Code of Georgia16 Para.9, Article 45 of the Organic Law of Georgia Election Code of Georgia17

Paras.17-21, Article 51 of the Organic Law of Georgia Election Code of Georgia18 Full statement is available at http://www.isfed.ge/pdf/Joint_Party_Finance-January_27_2012.pdf19 Information about the campaign is available at http://esshengexeba.ge/?page=9&menuid=9&lang=1


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20 Alternative legal proposal submitted by It Affects You Too campaign to the Parliament of Georgia is available at http:/

/esshengekheba.ge/contentimage/ganc/20120228-14507-1ds47h9-0.pdf

As a result of active involvement of the It Affects You Too member organizations, the law was significantly

improved; in particular, individual provisions that jeopardized the right to property, freedom of expression and

civil activities were removed. Nevertheless, we believe that it failed to determine the purview of the

regulatory agency in a comprehensive manner or the rule of its operations and delegated it with unlimiteddiscretion for financial monitoring of parties, which posing the risk of its selective application.

The Criminal Code

New regulations were also introduced in prima Article 164 of the Criminal Code of Georgia regulating vote

buying during official election campaigning.

The amendment was first formulated in a way that a voter who received or requested a monetary or any

other present from a political party or a person related to a political party in a direct or indirect manner,would be sentenced to three years of imprisonment or ordered to pay fine as punishment. Further, the voter

concerned would be imposed with a liability notwithstanding the worth of property received or requested.

The legislative amendment prohibited vote buying not only during the pre-election campaign but at any given

time. Further, criminal liability would apply not only to the person who offered material goods or services

to a voter for political purposes but also to a citizen who accepted or requested the offer. The law

prescribed a three-year imprisonment as a sanction for committing the crime.

The foregoing new regulations introduced in the Criminal Code were fundamentally unacceptable to us. We

believed that it provided unreasonable restrictions that could have affected any citizen. Ambiguity of the

provisions posed a great risk for their inconsistent and selective implementation. Further, it did not envisage

any legal liability for funding activities with an effect of vote buying from state or municipal budgets.

The campaign It Affects You Too offered alternative formulation of Article 164 1 to the Parliament of

Georgia20, which was taken into account in part. Eventually, due to the active involvement of the campaign

members, the regulations were modified in a way that criminal liability would be imposed on voters for

knowingly receiving material benefit. Further, it was specified that transfer of a gift would be considered vote

buying if it was done for election purposes.


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21 Information about the IATF is available at http://www.nsc.gov.ge/eng/elections2012.php22 The IATF issued total of 12 recommendations in the run up of the 2012 parliamentary elections. For a complete list of

its recommendations please see http://www.nsc.gov.ge/eng/elections2012.php?typ=1#start23 Recommendation about dismissals from work is available at http://www.nsc.gov.ge/eng/elections2012.php?typ=1&cp=2#start24 Recommendation about termination of social benefits is available at http://www.nsc.gov.ge/eng/elections2012.php?typ=1&cp=2#start

V. Inter-Agency Task Force for Free and Fair Elections

For the purpose of identifying and preventing abuse of administrative resources by public servants under the

Election Code of Georgia, the Inter-Agency Task Force for Free and Fair Elections was set up under the

National Security Council of Georgia on May 18, 2012.21 Members of the IATF included deputy ministers

of Justice, Finance, Regional Development and Infrastructure, Foreign Affairs, and the Deputy Secretary

National Security Council. Later deputy ministers of Education and Science, and Labor, Health and Social

Affairs also joined the IATF members.

Within the scope of its activities the IATF was holding meetings with local and international organizations,

observers, political parties/election subjects and other stakeholders. The meetings were held in a constructive

environment.

Throughout the course of the pre-election monitoring, ISFED updated the IATF about violations of election

laws on a systematic basis. The IATF in its turn was actively involved in the process of examination of pre-

election violations and provided subsequent recommendations in response to these violations.

Based on the trends identified in pre-election period, the IATF issued recommendations for political parties,

media outlets, ministries and various public agencies on a number of occasions. The recommendations were

mostly timely and adequate; 22 however, violations could not always be effectively prevented in time.

The IATF issued total of 12 recommendations, including

IATF recommendation to public agencies forelimination of dismissals on political basis23 the

ISFEDs monitoring illustrates that after issuance of the recommendation on May 31, 2012 by the

IATF, number of dismissals on political grounds was reduced; however, such facts could not be fully

prevented, possibly due to the fact that the IATFs purview covers only public sector. Regrettably,

dismissals on alleged political grounds in private sector fell beyond the IATFs focus.

IATF Recommendation to the Ministry of Labor, Healthcare, and Social Protection about suspension

of reevaluations of persons registered in the database of the socially vulnerable24

aftermonitoring organizations reported termination of social aid benefits on political grounds, the IATF

called on the Ministry to study the decisions of the Social Service Agency about terminating social

aid deemed controversial by NGOs and political parties. Further, the IATF called on the Ministry to


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25 During the monitoring ISFED reported five cases of termination/suspension of social benefits on alleged political grounds.

After examining grounds for the termination/suspension by the IATF, social benefits were restored to Mevlud Shushanash-

vili and Irma Petriashvili26 Recommendation about holding public rallies in a peaceful environment is available at http://www.nsc.gov.ge/eng/

elections2012.php27 See Chapter IV for more information about the new regulations28

Under the June 22, 2012 amendments to the Law on Chamber of Control, the agency was renamed to the State AuditOffice

29 Statement of It Affects You Too is available at http://esshengekheba.ge/?lang=1&menuid=9&id=198

suspendfor the duration of the electoral periodreevaluations of social aid benefits for citizens

already receiving them; 25

IATF recommendation for the law enforcement authorities and political parties to ensure that

public rallies are held peacefully26

the recommendation called on the law enforcement authoritiesto ensure that protest rallies were held with minimum risks of physical clash between participants.

We believe that the IATFs work was positive, as unlike other agencies it was much more focused on

responding to and preventing violations in pre-election period. As a result of the IATFs work, number of

dismissals from public service on political grounds was reduced; further, we believe that the IATF played a

positive role in diffusing acts of violence in pre-election period.

VI. State Audit Service

On December 27, 2011, pursuant to the amendments to the Law on Political Union of Citizens27, the authority

of financial monitoring of parties was transferred to the Chamber of Control of Georgia (afterwards renamed

as the State Audit Office). 28 Fundamental amendments to the law delegated the SAO with broad authority,

without any legal mechanisms for curbing its power. Therefore, instead of improving the election environ-

ment, the work of SAOs financial monitoring service of parties resembled selective application of justice.

The work of the financial monitoring service was harshly criticized from the beginning by monitoringorganizations. Violations reported during obtaining of statements from citizens in March 2012 are particularly

notable, as the process involved abuse of dignity of citizens, exerting moral and psychological pressure

against them, disregarding their procedural rights and limiting journalistic activities. After the members of the

It Affects You Too campaign harshly criticized the work of the SAO29 and called on the financial monitoring

service to abide by law in its activities, the situation was relatively improved to a certain extent, the

process of questioning citizens followed applicable legal standards.


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While studying financial activities of political subjects and their supporters, the SAO instituted unsubstanti-

ated legal prosecution30 against individuals and imposed high, disproportionate sanctions. 31

State agencies and the SAO in particular, selectively reacted to certain actions undertaken by the ruling and

opposition parties, suggesting their loyalty to the United National Movement and excessive strictness towardsopposition parties. 32

VII. Voter Lists

Pursuant to the second paragraph of the June 27, 2011agreement reached between the ruling and several

opposition parties on making of legal amendments, a special commission for verification of voter lists was

to be set up. The commission would be manned by representatives of the authorities, opposition and NGOs.

On October 13, 2011, Article 12918 was inserted in the Election Code of Georgia concerning verification of

voter lists in the run up of the 2012 parliamentary elections. It was determined that a commission set up

under the executive order would ensure verification of voter lists throughout Georgia until July 1, 2012.

Thus, an independent agency, the Voter List Verification Commission (VLVC) was tasked with verifying

voter lists for the 2012 parliamentary elections. The VLVC was manned in observance of the parity principle

and its members included representatives of the authorities, opposition and NGOs (seven members from

each). The VLVC Chairperson was elected according to the Election Code requirements, out of the opposition

members of the VLVC. The legal framework of the work of the VLVC consisted of applicable norms of the

Election Code and the VLVC regulations initiated by the VLVC and adopted by the president of Georgia.

30 The decision to impound satellite dish antennas of a tele-communications company Global Contact Consulting and Maestro

TV can be qualified as unjustified legal prosecution and unfounded application of financial sanctions, similar to finding

of Bidzina Ivanishvili on charges of making an illegal donation to Global Contact Consulting. Analysis of these casesshows that proceedings fell short of standards of transparency, objectivity and comprehensive examination of evidence

31 Fining of employees of Cartu Bank Irakli Beria, Nato Khaindrava, Nodar Javakhishvili, Ia Gamtsemlidze, Davit

Galuashvili on charges of making donations in favor of a public movement Georgian Dream; fining of Bidzina

Ivanishvili and Kakha Kaladze for withdrawing cash from their personal accounts, when total amount of fine exceeded

GEL 37 million; fining of Bidzina Giorgobiani for making a donation in favor of Komagi Foundation32 27 persons who made donations in favor of the UNM the total amount of which was GEL 651 440, were also registered

in the database of the socially vulnerable. The SAO deemed only five of them as violators of the law and applied to court

seeking impounding of their property; for absence of evidence the SAO did not deem a celebratory dinner hosted byMajoritarian MP of Tetristskaro Davit Bejuashvili as violation of law; the SAO fined a member of Sakrebulo with GEL

7920 for distributing sheep and wine among the population of Rustavi in celebration of Easter


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Under Article 2 of the Regulations, it is the key

function of the VLVC to ensure verification of

voter lists throughout Georgia for the 2012 parlia-

mentary elections. This triggered particular interestof public in the work of the VLVC.

Work of the VLVC was transparent and focused on

cooperation with political parties and monitoring

organizations. ISFED monitored all stages of the

work of the VLVC, including 10 000 visits of the

VLVC members by means of direct monitoring.

ISFED believes that the VLVC succeeded in veri-

fying information about voters abroad, deceased

voters and voters that do not reside at their places

of registration, which was an improvement from

previous elections. Nevertheless, the decision to

return voters removed from registration and voters

whose registration had been annulled back to the

voter list, increased number of voters on the list33

and left room for illegal manipulation with these

voters on the Election Day. 34

VIII. Election Administration

ISFED has been monitoring all 73 election district

and election precincts within them starting from

August 1, 2012, when the commencement of offi-

cial pre-election campaign was announced.

The Central Election Commission

Under the new Election Code for the 2012 parlia-

mentary elections, the scope of the CECs regulato-

ry activities was narrowed down and limited to

administration of elections. In particular, it was no

longer tasked with verification of voter lists and

monitoring of party finances. After an inter-agency

state commission undertook the functions of regu-

lating the use of government resources, the CECs

role became even more passive in this regard.

Neither did the CEC carry out media monitoring

for the elections about coverage of election subjects

by media outlets; rather, the function was fully

undertaken by government and media organizations.

ISFED believes that the work of the CEC has been

improved from technical point of view. Its website

was improved, making search much easier for vot-

ers and other interested persons.

Further, we commend the fact that under the CECs

initiative and with the involvement of civil organi-

zations, detailed and more flexible guidelines on

election procedures were elaborated, not only for

members of the election commissions but for mon-

itors, media and political parties as well. Further,

the guidelines were available to international com-

munity as well as ethnic minorities.

33 Owing to the work of the VLVC, number of voters increased up to 3 669 88734 ISFEDs corresponding statement is available at http://www.isfed.ge/pdf/2012_09_29.pdf


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The CEC launched a large-scale voter awareness campaign. Under the initiative of the CEC, an educational film

focusing on election-related procedures was produced and aired on various TV companies on a regular basis.

The VLVC actively partnered with local and international organizations, political subjects, by organizing

meetings and sessions with them, and providing access to public information. The process of examiningvarious issues and making decisions during the CEC meetings was transparent.

Nevertheless, certain decisions of the CEC were perceived as politically motivated. In particular, assignation

of a ballot paper number to the Georgian Dream as well as the decision prohibiting photo and video

recording on the Election Day at the polling station. 35 Further, ISFED believes that the CEC failed to inform

voters living abroad about registration procedures and therefore, it is possible than many of them refrained

from registration at the election precinct. 36

Memorandum on the use of administrative resources on August 16, 2012, a memorandum ofunderstanding (MOU) was signed between seven local NGOs37 (one of which was ISFED), the IATF within

the Security Council and the CEC. 38 The MOU contains interpretation of stipulations of the Election Code

about use of government resources. The parties agreed during administrative and court proceedings they will

be guided by interpretations outlined by the MOU.

The Code of Ethics for officers of the election administration on March 9, 2012, the CEC approved

a resolution on the adoption of the Code of Ethics for officers of the election administration #14/2012. 39 The

Code determined key principles of the work of the election administration officers, violation of which wouldresult in imposition of disciplinary liability as prescribed by the Georgian legislation. We believe that when

commenting on the statement of ISFED and Georgian Young Lawyers Association (in the statement the

organizations expressed their position on the replacement of representatives of the election subject UNM-

More Benefit to the People in a number of DECs and the resolution of the CEC Secretary), the CEC ignored

stipulations of the Code of Ethics to to express its opinions by relaying substantiated criticism in a tactful

35 ISFEDs opinion about restriction of photo and video shooting at polling stations is available at http://www.isfed.ge/pdf/

2012-09-25.pdf36 There were reports during pre-election period that voters could register with precincts set up abroad only after registration

with consular office, which was untrue. The CEC made a statement to clarify the issue only several days prior to

expiration of the time for registration37 The MOU was signed by the following NGOs: the International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy, Georgian

Young Lawyers Association, Transparency International Georgia, New Generation New Initiative, Elections and

Political Technologies Research Center, Center for the Development of Civil Society and Democracy, International Center

for Civil Culture38

Full text of the memorandum on use of government resources is available at http://cesko.ge/files/2012/MoU.pdf39 The Code of Ethics for election administration officers is available at https://matsne.gov.ge/index.php?option=

com_ldmssearch&view=docView&id=1608029&lang=ge


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manner, by making incorrect comments and saying

that opinions expressed by the NGOs was unpro-

fessional. 40

Resolution of the CEC specifying procedures ofphoto and video shooting at polling stations on

September 24, 2012, 7 days prior to the elections,

the CEC adopted a resolution 42/2012 specifying

procedures of photo and video shooting at polling

stations from opening of the polling stations through

drawing up of summary protocols by the election

commissions.

ISFED and other partner NGOs believe that thedocument placed unjustified prohibitions on the right

of observers and media representatives to be present

at a polling station at any time on the Polling Day,

their right to a free movement a the premises of the

election precinct and to observe all stages of poll-

ing freely, without any restrictions and from any

place, as guaranteed by the Election Code of Geor-

gia.41

Notably, the resolution was adopted 7 daysprior to the election, without allowing adequate

time for keeping PECs, observers and media repre-

sentatives duly informed.

ISFED, GYLA and Media Club of Georgia filed an

administrative complaint with the Board of Admin-

istrative Cases of Tbilisi City Court on September

26, 2012, seeking annulment of the resolution.

However, both the city court and the appellatecourt rejected the claim for being groundless.

Registration of Political Subjects

Total of 41 political unions applied to the CEC for

their right to participate in the October 1, 2012

Parliamentary Elections. After documents submitted

by the applicants were verified by the CEC and all

gaps were remedied, total of 14 political parties and

two election blocs were registered for the parlia-

mentary elections.

The CEC registered the following political subjects

for the 2012 parliamentary elections:

40

Response of the CEC to the statement of the NGOs is available at http://www.cesko.ge/index.php?lang_id=GEO&sec_id=13&info_id=10943

41 Statement of the NGOs is available at http://www.isfed.ge/pdf/2012-10-07.pdf


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The process of registration of parties at the CEC was quite open and transparent. Determination of the

number ofBidzina Ivanishvili Georgian Dreamon ballot papers was rather controversial. The election bloc

had been using number 7 in its campaigning; nevertheless, the CEC assigned number 41 based on casting

of lots. Number 7 that the bloc was going to use in the elections belonged to one of the members of the

bloc, Conservative Party. The latter had been assigned the number for 2008 parliamentary elections. Althoughat the 2010 municipal elections the CEC allowed election blocs to use a number of one of its members, it

interpreted the same stipulation of the law in a different way for the 2012 parliamentary elections and

resorted to casting of lots for determining the number for the bloc Bidzina Ivanishvili Georgian Dream.

The CEC explained that it had adopted a resolution on procedures regulating the use of election ballot

number by election blocs; however, this time it did not consider the possibility of adopting a resolution due

to the lack of political readiness to adopt a new resolution.

Despite political protest, no further legal actions were taken with regards to the dispute.

District and Precinct Election Commissions

Observation of staffing and work of precinct and district election commissions was one of the important

components of the election monitoring carried out by ISFED. In frames of the election administration

monitoring, ISFEDs long-term observers (LTOs) attended meetings held at district and precinct election

commissions, monitoring whether the election commissions observed election procedures and timeframes

stipulated by election laws.

The monitoring showed that the DECs acted in compliance to procedures and timeframes stipulated by theElection Code by publishing by August 12, 2012, election precinct numbers, PEC addresses, telephone (fax)

numbers and other information by means of various media outlets, including press. DECs mostly published

information on public notices boards and local media.

The monitoring also showed that interested individuals could easily attend meetings of DECs and PECs.

Initial meetings of precinct election commissions were held in compliance to stipulations of the law on

August 26, 27 and 28.42

Starting from August 1 through October 31, 2012, observers of ISFED and GYLA carried out a jointmonitoring of staffing of precinct election commissions in all election districts of Georgia. To study the

process, the organizations carried out a statistical research of randomly and representatively selected 396

election precincts. Further, they also monitored enforcement of the Code of Ethics of election administration

officers, as well as any violations of the election laws and subsequent legal proceedings.

The study showed that initial meetings of precinct election commissions throughout the country were held in

observance of stipulations of the law on August 16, 27 and 28, 2012. 43

42 Held no later than 34 days prior to the Election Day, under para.2, Article 21 of the Election Code43 Held no later than 34 days prior to the Election Day, under para.2, Article 21 of the Election Code


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Gender balance: research of information about PEC members showed that in 5075 members elected by

DECs and appointed by political parties, women accounted for 64,3%, men 35,7%. Gender analysis of

members elected to PEC offices showed that there were equal numbers of chairmen and chairwomen (50%).

In deputy PEC chairpersons, women accounted for 60%, men 40%, whereas most of the PEC secretaries

were women (80,3%) while men accounted for only 19,3%.

The research showed the following trend in party affiliation of PEC secretaries:

a) Political Union European Democrats - 35,9%;

b) Political Union Christian Democratic Movement - 25,7%;

c) Christian Democratic Peoples Party - 18,6%;

d) Industry Will Save Georgia - 6,5%;e) Conservative Party - 5,5%;

f) Labor Party - 1,3%.

In 6,5% of cases PEC secretaries were elected out of the members elected by the DEC. 44

With regards to relevant experience and qualification in elections, the research showed that The research

revealed that out of the members of the election administration elected by the District Election Commission

only 17,4% had a certificate of an election administration officer, whereas the remaining 82,6% did not havethe certificate; however, analysis of PECs showed that 47,5% had at least one member elected by the DEC

who had a certificate of an election administration officer. 83,3% of members of target PECs (both PEC-

elected and party appointed) about whom we could obtain information had some experience, whereas the

remaining 16,7% has no experience.

Conflict of Interests: Qualitative and quantitative analysis of target 396 precincts randomly selected

throughout Georgia revealed 52 facts allegedly involving conflict of interests in 12,6% of precincts. The

reasons of alleged conflict of interests revealed by the research were family ties between PEC members as

well as subordination at permanent workplace - e.g. when a teacher and a school principal, both membersof the same PEC, are working at the same school. Further, in similar cases it does not matter whether a

teacher is subordinated to the principal in frames of the commission due to the latters status, i.e. whether

the teacher is a member and the principal is the chairperson of the PEC. Subordination at permanent

workplace is an important factor notwithstanding their positions at the PEC, which may have an adverse

impact on impartial work of the commission.

44

Under para.19, Article 25 of the Election Code, If no candidate for secretary of the PEC is nominated as defined by thisArticle, secretary of the PEC shall be elected from the members of commission by a majority of the total number of the

commission; any two members of the commission are authorized to nominate a candidate


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The monitoring revealed 75 persons who had been

imposed with disciplinary liability during 2010

municipal elections and were re-elected as PEC

members by DECs for the 2012 parliamentary elec-

tions. Majority of these person (33) were elected as

PEC members in Khobi DEC; 16 were elected in

Kutaisi DEC, nine in Kobuleti DEC, six in Batumi

DEC, four in Shuakhevi DEC, three in Chughureti

DEC and one in each of the DECs of Krtsanisi,

Tskaltubo, Rustavi and Tsalenjikha. In majority of

cases these persons were appointed as members of

PECs that they served in 2010 elections. GYLA

and ISFED provided the information about 75 mem-

bers of PECs who had previously been imposed

with administrative liability to the Central Elections

Commission of Georgia.

IX. Pre-Election Monitoring Methodology

ISFED carried out pre-election monitoring through

73 LTOs for the period of 6 months, throughout all

election districts of Georgia. There were two stages

of monitoring that can be divided into unofficial

and official pre-election periods.

Although official pre-election period is launched

after scheduling of the elections, in view of the fact

that the characteristics of a pre-election campaign

were evident earlier, ISFED launched monitoring of

pre-election processes on April 1, 2012. From April

1through July 31, 2012, ISFED monitored election

processes as part of unofficial election campaign,

whereas official pre-election campaign was moni-tored from August 1 up until the Election Day.

LTOs were monitoring the pre-election period by

means of specially designed electronic question-

naires. Prior to the launch of the monitoring, 73

LTOs of ISFED underwent two-day training in two

stages in pre-election monitoring and reporting meth-

odology.

To obtain comprehensive and thorough information,

ISFED identified concrete issues and designed mech-

anisms for obtaining information throughout the

monitoring. The monitoring mostly focused on is-

sues including

Abuse of administrative resources;

Vote buying, threats/pressure;

Violence and physical assault;

Interference with political activities;

Dismissals from work on political grounds;

Public meetings of political parties;

Promises made by election subjects;

The work of the election administration.


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ISFEDs LTOs received information from adminis-

trative agencies by means of requesting access to

public information, as well as from political parties,

media outlets and citizens. Further, they consistent-

ly attended and monitored meetings of political

parties and local self-government agencies, course

of these meetings and promises made to voters by

election subjects.

Key violations in the pre-election period

In frames of the pre-election monitoring, ISFED

published five interim reports on a monthly basis45

and a number of statements46.

Throughout the six-month pre-election monitoring,

ISFED reported multiple violations of election laws,

criminal offences and other types of violations. In

addition to studying the violations, ISFED also

called on the authorities to take efficient steps for

eliminating and preventing violations.

Scale of incidents reported by ISFED in pre-

election period according to their geographic scope:

Nature and dynamics of pre-election violations

was changing as the election processes entered their

active phase. At the beginning of the monitoring in

April-May, dismissals from work on political grounds

were most frequent. Later, as the elections ap-

proached, number of facts that involved use of

government resources, violence on political grounds,

physical clashes and use of administrative sanc-

tions/imprisonment on political grounds increased.

Pre-election violations were reported in almost all

regions of Georgia. Various types of violations

mostly prevailed in Gori, Kaspi, Dedoplistskaro,

Gurjaani, Akhmeta, Kutaisi and Batumi districts.47

The chart below illustrates the number of viola-

tions reported by ISFEDs LTOs from April 1 to

September 30, 2012:

Abuse of Government Resources

When identifying abuse of government resources,

ISFEDs LTOs mostly focused on the following

aspects: use of buildings/edifices funded from the

45 Pre-election monitoring reports are available at http://www.isfed.ge/eng/elections/reports/46 http://isfed.ge/pdf/2012-09-27(1).pdf47 Information about violations reported by ISFED in pre-election period is available at the elections portal http://

electionsportal.ge/en/incidents/map/pre-election/?source=1.1&category=all


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23

48 Although use of government resources is prohibited during official pre-election campaign only, ISFED reported all cases

that involved abuse of the resources both during official and unofficial pre-election campaigning49 See the map illustrating abuse of government resources reported by ISFED: http://electionsportal.ge/en/incidents/map/pre-

election/?source=1.1&category=3.0

state or municipal budgets, material goods, budget

programs and projects for the benefit of a political

party; involvement of public servants in pre-election

campaign/agitation.

Throughout the pre-election monitoring, ISFEDs

observers reported 73 cases that involved abuse of

government resources.

The map below illustrates geographic scope of

abuse of administrative resources reported by

ISFED in pre-election period:

Involvement of public servants and mostly, repre-

sentatives of local self-governments and law en-

forcement authorities in pre-election campaigning

and agitation meetings was the most common form

of abuse of government resources. Frequently, pub-

lic servants themselves acted as oppressors and/orwere engaged in physical assaults.48

In parallel to electoral processes entering their active

phase, the trend of individuals with different political

beliefs and opinions attending public meetings held

by the coalition Georgian Dream was revealed, in-

cluding Gamgebelis, public servants and trustees of

different communities or territorial agencies. Local

self-government officials were particularly active in

terms of interference with the political activities.

They also pressured local population which in addi-

tion to interference with political activities also amounts

to abuse of government resources. 49

Cases of abuse of government resources particularlyincreased as elections approached. Majority of the

violations were reported in Gurjaani, Sighnaghi,

Dedoplistskaro, Gori, Kaspi, Ozurgeti and Tkibuli

districts.

The chart below illustrates monthly dynamics of

abuse of government resources reported by IS-

FED:


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50 http://electionsportal.ge/ge/incidents/map/pre-election/?source=1.1&category=1.0

Politically Motivated Threats/Pressure

In alleged cases of politically motivated pressure,

LTOs reported facts including:

Threats made/pressure exerted against vot-

ers, party supporters, activists, commission

members, private property owners on polit-

ical grounds;

Use of mechanisms of violence against po-

litical opponents, their supporters and vot-

ers.

In frames of the monitoring, total of53 cases of

making threats/exerting pressure were reported.

The chart below illustrates geographic scope and

scale of facts of exerting pressure on political

grounds, as reported by ISFED in pre-election

period:

The monitoring showed that frequently mechanisms

of threats/pressures were used against citizens, po-

litical activists or individual entrepreneurs. Public

servants from municipal self-governments and law

enforcement authorities frequently threatened politi-

cally active citizens and mostly supporters of the

coalition Georgian Dream. Threats were made about

dismissal, termination of social benefits, etc., moti-

vated by various political activities of citizens, in-

cluding collection of voter signatures for various

purposes, attending opposition party meetings, re-

fusing to attend events held by the authorities,

participating in rallies.

Politically motivated pressure and threats frequently

also amounted to abuse of government resources.Public servants exerted pressure by abusing their

official power. Such violations were reported in

almost all regions of Georgia and particularly in

Gurjaani, Dedoplistskaro, Gori, Kaspi, Kutaisi,

Chokhatauri and Lanchkhuti district. 50

The chart below illustrates dynamics of political-

ly motivated cases of pressure/threats:

Dismissal from Work on Alleged Political Grounds

Dismissal from work on political grounds was one

of the most problematic issues during the pre-


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election environment. During monitoring ISFED

reported total of37 dismissals from work on polit-

ical grounds.

The map below illustrates geographic scope ofdismissals from work on political grounds re-

ported by ISFED during pre-election period:

Sympathy towards the Georgian Dream was most

frequently cited as the motive for dismissals from

work. Apparently, employees found political senti-ments of their employees and their activities in

favor of opposition party unacceptable. Employees

were most often dismissed from work on political

grounds in educational institutes and local self-

governments. Violations were particularly evident in

the regions of Kakheti and Imereti.51

ISFED was updating on a periodic basis the IATFwith reports of these violations, for the purpose of

taking further actions. After examining and verify-

ing ISFEDs reports, six persons were reinstated to

work.52 In remaining other cases, reinstatement was

impossible.


dismissals from work on political grounds:

The chart below illustrates dismissals from work

reported by ISFED according to individual pro-

fessions:

51 See the map illustrating dismissals from work in pre-election period reported by ISFED at http://electionsportal.ge/en/

incidents/map/pre-election/?source=1.1&category=1.152 However, one of them refused to accept the job as he was not reinstated to his previous position but rather, was offered

an alternative job


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Violence/Physical Confrontation

In addition to other important matters, one of the

most pressing issues of the pre-election period was

frequent physical confrontations on political grounds.There were instances when a political dispute be-

tween persons with different political affiliation turned

into a clash and harsh violence. Opposing sides

frequently involved representatives of the Georgian

Dream and the UNM. Acts of physical violence

mostly occurred against supporters of the Georgian

Dream. However, there were individual acts of

violence against UNM representatives.53

Total of48 cases of physical confrontation on politi-

cal grounds was reported throughout monitoring in

Sighnaghi, Gurjaani, Sagarejo, Kaspi, Gori, Tbilisi,

Rustavi, Borjomi, Ninotsminda, Mestia, Samtredia,

Ozrugeti, Lanchkhuti, Kutaisi, Tskaltubo and Khobi.54

The map below illustrates geographic scope of the

acts of physical confrontation on political groundsreported by ISFED during pre-election period:

Growing of pre-election campaign into violence was

mostly caused by the law enforcements failure to

act. As frequency of acts of violence increased, the

IATF elaborated a recommendation, calling on the

law enforcement authorities to ensure that public

rallies are held under peaceful circumstances, in a

way that that allows keeping a distance betweenpersons with different opinions, so that risks of

physical confrontation are reduced. Regrettably, the

recommendation proved to be unsuccessful in pre-

venting physical confrontation on political grounds.

More importantly, frequency of such facts was in-

creased in August-September, with passive role of

the law enforcement authorities remaining to be a

problem. Frequently they failed to act on violationsin a timely manner and mostly arrested activists of

the Georgian Dream. Notably, court ordered dispro-

portionate sanctions against arrested individuals. The

monitoring revealed a trend in which court resorted

to maximum measure of administrative liability

administrative imprisonment - against arrested ac-

tivists of the coalition Georgian Dream, whereas it

resorted to minimum period of administrative im-prisonment against UNM supporters.


acts physical confrontation:

53 ISFEDs statement on acts of physical confrontation is available at http://isfed.ge/pdf/2012-09-27(1).pdf54 Map illustrating incidents that involved physical confrontation is available at http://electionsportal.ge/en/incidents/map/pre-

election/?source=1.1&category=1.5


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Interference in Political Activities

One of the most important trends revealed in pre-

election period was interference in political activi-

ties. For instance, meetings held by the coalitionGeorgian Dream were attended by people holding

different political views and opinion, including Gamge-

belis, public servants, representatives of different

communities and territorial agencies. Representa-

tives of municipal authorities were particularly ac-

tive in interference of political activities and exert-

ed pressure on local population. Further, there were

instances of interference in political activities by

hindering spreading of agitation proclamations, dam-

aging/destroying agitation materials, etc. Total of

32 violations were reported by ISFED throughout

monitoring mostly in Kakheti, Imereti and Shida

Kartli regions55.

The map below illustrates geographic scope ofthe acts of interference in political activities re-

ported by ISFED during pre-election period:

Acts of interference in political activities showed

signs of crime envisaged by Article 166 of the

Criminal Code of Georgia. In particular, frequently

interference in political activities was perpetrated

by violence, threats of violence or abuse of official

power.


interference in political activities:

Measures of administrative liability used against

political activists

Administrative arrests on political grounds particu-

larly prevailed in August-September. Out of the

total of 21 cases, majority was reported in Gori,

Kaspi, Gurjaani, Dedoplistskaro, Sagarejo and Rustavi

districts. 56


using measures of administrative liability report-

ed by ISFED during pre-election period:

55 Interference in political activities: http://electionsportal.ge/en/incidents/map/pre-election/?source=1.1&category=1.756 ISFEDs statement about arrests on political grounds is available at http://isfed.ge/pdf/2012-09-27(1).pdf


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Administrative detainees mostly included activists

or supporters of opposition parties, even if they had

not initiated physical confrontation. In late Septem-

ber frequency of using administrative imprisonment

as sanction against political party supporters was

unprecedentedly increased. Around 34 activists were

imprisoned on administrative charges, whereas more

than 15 persons were sentenced to administrative

sanction. Political activists were arrested by law

enforcement authorities on charges of hooliganism

and/or disobedience to lawful orders of the police.

Charges frequently lacked due substantiation. Fur-

ther, almost all of the cases involved violation of

mandatory human rights standards by failure of the

authorities to explain grounds of the arrest or to

provide access to a lawyer.


use of administrative measures against political

activists:

Vote Buying

ISFED reported 12 cases that showed signs of vote

buying throughout the monitoring.

The map below illustrates geographic scope ofalleged vote buying reported by ISFED during

pre-election period:

These trends mostly entailed transferring of or prom-

ising to transfer various types of gifts to voters by

political subjects or their representatives. Vote buy-ing was perpetrated both by the Georgian Dream57

57 Statement of NGOs about Komagi Foundation is available at http://www.isfed.ge/pdf NGO_Statem-

ent_on_the_Creation_of_the_Charity_Foundation_Komagi_May15_2012_geo.pdf Further, five young men were arrested in

Kutaisi on charges of vote buying by the coalition Georgian Dream. Information obtained by ISFED is available in the

third interim report of pre-election monitoring, p.19; http://www.isfed.ge/pdf/ISFED_report_3ENG.pdf


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29

as well as the UNM representatives. 58 ISFEDs

report also contained alleged facts of vote buying59

by Christian-Democratic Movement as well. 60

The chart below illustrates monthly dynamics ofvote buying:

Interference in the work of NGOs

During pre-election monitoring, ISFED reported 7

cases where the organizations observers were sub-

jected to pressure. These incidents occurred in Lanch-

khuti, Khobi, Oni, Kaspi and Kharagauli districts.61

Particularly severe forms of interference in the workof NGOs were reported in Lanchkhuti and Kharagauli

municipalities. Lanchkhuti Municipality Gamgebeli

grossly interfered in the work of observers. While

communicating with ISFEDs coordinator, he tried

to interfere in and criticized her work. Head of the

department, where ISFEDs observer is employed,

tried to dismiss her.62 Similar case was reported in

Kharagauli district, where ISFEDs LTO was threat-

ened with dismissal due to the fact that her em-

ployer deemed her work as political activity.

Media Environment in Pre-Election Period

Interference in Journalistic Reporting

During the pre-election period, ISFED identified 23

cases that involved interference with journalistic

reporting and subjecting journalists to pressure/threats63,

including 10 cases that showed signs of physical

assault. In most of the cases, violence was exerted

against representatives of Maestro TV and TV9companies, Info 9 media outlet and other regional

media.


interference in journalistic reporting reported by

ISFED during pre-election period:

58 See third interim report of ISFED, p.20. http://www.isfed.ge/pdf/ISFED_report_3ENG.pdf59 Photo material available at https://www.facebook.com/media/set/?set=a.370145629715437.87957.174947139235288&type=160 See ISFEDs fifth interim report, pp.14-15 http://www.isfed.ge/pdf/ISFED%20Fifth%20Interim%20Report%20ENG.pdf61 Detailed information about interference in activities of ISFEDs LTO is available at http://electionsportal.ge/en/incidents/

map/pre-election/?source=1.1&category=4.062 Special statement on pressure exerted against LTO in Lanchkhuti available at http://www.isfed.ge/pdf/2012-07-23.pdf63 http://electionsportal.ge/en/incidents/map/pre-election/?source=1.1&category=4.0


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interference in journalistic reporting:

Must carry & Must offer

During the pre-election period media was rather

diverse. Television, press, radio and Internet provid-

ed access to variety of information. The problem

was that citizens of Georgia and particularly those

living in the regions lacked equal access to all

media outlets and in particular, to outlets criticizing

the government. The problem was mostly caused bythe fact that majority of cable companies refused to

carry broadcasters known for their criticism of the

government.

Transferring of satellite dish antennas and related

equipment to citizens of Georgia by Maestro TV

and Global Compact Consulting under preferential

terms for the purpose of broadening coverage zoneresulted in impounding by court of the equipment

imported and stored by both companies in Georgia,

while equipment that had already been sold was

deemed vote buying. In this light, it is safe to say

that media environment did not provide equal op-

portunities for election subjects. To address the

issue, on May 7, 2012, members of the It Affects

You Too campaign submitted legal proposals to the

parliament of Georgia enacting must carry and

must offer regulations. In particular, all cable pro-

vider systems were obligated to carry all generalbroadcasters that have corresponding license up until

the Election Day. Cable operators were also obli-

gated to carry the TV channels available to at least

20% of the Georgian population. Broadcasters in

return were prohibited from refusing cable provider

systems to carry their channel.

After the Parliament of Georgia adopted the so-

called must carry and must offer regulations for the

Election Code, access to media known for its crit-

icism was greatly improved throughout Georgia as

the official pre-election campaign commenced. En-

actment of the law was welcomed by the It Affects

You Too campaign. However, it suggested that theregulations also apply beyond the Election Day.

Monitoring of public meetings held by parties

during pre-election period

Throughout the pre-election period ISFED was closely

monitoring public meetings held by political/elec-

tion subjects and pre-election promises voiced at

these meetings.

The monitoring shows that most of the public meet-

ings in pre-election period were held by the coali-

tion Georgian Dream and the United National Move-

ment. The New Rights and the Christian Democrat-

ic Movement were also active in this respect.


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The chart below illustrates statistics of public

meetings monitored by ISFED from April 1 up

until the Election Day:

In addition to monitoring public meetings held by

political parties, ISFED was also registering elec-

tion promises made to voters during these meetings.

Key promises voiced by the coalition GeorgianDream:

Development of agriculture

Opening of agricultural extension centers in

all municipalities

Setting up a billion dollar fund for agricul-

ture and improving infrastructure

Increasing salaries for teachers

Universal insurance that will cover all types

of surgeries

Creation of jobs.

Key promises voiced by the UNM

Tackling social problems

Tackling the problem of gasification

Tackling the problem of employment

New insurance packages for citizens of

Georgia

New rural programs

Tackling unemployment.

Key promises voiced by the New Rights

300% increase of rural budget

Setting up a Rural Bank for farmers and

providing the population of rural areas with

universal access to agriculture insurance

Providing access to agricultural equipment

Reducing prices of fuel and pesticides;

Improving access to drinking water

Universal access to healthcare and educa-

tion.

Key promises voiced by the Christian Democrat-

ic Movement

Providing employment opportunities for theyouth

Tackling the gasification problem

Improving infrastructure in highland regions

Improving access to irrigation and drinking

water


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X. The Election Day

Monitoring Mission

ISFEDs monitoring mission for the October 1,

2012 Parliamentary Elections was composed of1271

accredited and trained observers distributed among

precinct, district and central election commissions.

ISFED observed total of 902 election precincts

throughout 73 election districts of Georgia. Out of

902 short-term observers, 600 were dislocated at

randomly selected election precincts. In addition to

randomly selected precincts, ISFED also monitored

302 election precincts, including special precinctsset up at penitentiary facilities and military units. In

implementing its monitoring mission, in addition to

short-term observers ISFED also utilized 73 district

observers, 78 mobile teams, two observers at the

CEC, 15 lawyers and 15 operators.

During the first stage of preparations for the Election

Day, with the help of foreign experts ISFED designed

a methodology, the system of reporting and commu-

nication, database, forms of monitoring, instructions,

guidelines and other election materials. During the

second stage of preparations, ISFED selected 22 train-

ers and conducted the following trainings:

57 trainings for short-term observers

4 trainings for 73 district observers

4 trainings for 73 mobile teams

Training for 15 lawyers

Training for 15 hot-line operators

ISFED selected members of the Election Day mon-

itoring mission based on results of testing that

training participants had undergone.

Monitoring Methodology

ISFED monitored the Election Day at 600 election

precincts by utilizing Parallel Vote Tabulation (PVT),

a leading methodology of election observation. Ob-

servers had been distributed among 73 statistically

sound, representative and randomly selected elec-

tion districts.

Utilization of the PVT Methodology on the Elec-

tion Day allowed ISFED to

Collect and analyze the quantitative and

qualitative information from randomly se-

lected precincts;

Evaluate the whole process of elections in a

systemic and impartial manner, including

opening, voting, closing, vote count and

tabulation;

Receive fact-based reports to act on for

improving the process;

Uncover flaws/violations during opening of

precincts, polling and vote count;

Generalize the information received from

randomly selected precincts throughout thecountry;


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Verify official results for proportional elections;64

On September 26, ISFED conducted a complete simulation of the PVT for testing observers, operators, the

database, communication and SMS reporting system. Throughout the one-hour long simulation, 97% of

observers carried out reporting successfully.

There were two centers operating at the central office on the Election Day PVT SMS center and the

incidents center.

Notably, for the first time in Georgian for 2012 parliamentary elections ISFED carried out reporting by means

of the system of SMS reporting. Throughout the day information received from observers by text messages

was gathered in a software program and verified by operators when needed. Verified reports were processed

and analyzed by a group of experts.

Any violation monitored at election precincts or districts on the Election Day was reported to the incidents

center comprised by 15 lawyers. Observers took further actions after consulting with the lawyers. Verified

and processed information was recorded by lawyers in the incidents database, entailing not only violation

reports but also information about complaints filed with election precincts and districts.

After reports received from incidents and SMS centers were processed, five complaints were filed on the

Election Day over the course of elections, trends identified, violations observed and results, of which public

was updated by means of the website and press-conferences.

On the Election Day ISFED held the following 5 press-conferences:

I 01.10.12, at 10:00 opening/setting up a precinct

II 01.10.12, at 13:30 polling process/activities during the period of 12 hours

III 01.10.12, at 18:30 polling process/ activities during the period of 17 hours

IV 01.10.12, at 22:30 polling process/closing of precincts

V 02.10.12, at 11:00 vote count/results

Results of PVT Monitoring

Opening of Precincts

Most of the election precincts were opened on time on the Election Day. There were no large-scale violations

in this respect.

64 Randomly selected election precincts are representative for the whole country and therefore, results reflected only the

national elections


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In 77.2% cases, slight flaws were reported with respect to opening and setting up of20.3% election

precincts. Opening of 2.5% election precincts was carried out in violation of applicable legal

procedures.

91% of election precincts were ready to receive first voter at 08:00am, same as in 2008 parliamen-tary elections.

The Voting Procedures

Based on the analysis of PVT results, it is safe to conclude that the polling was conducted mostly in a

peaceful environment with only isolated incidents reported. At most of the precincts polling was carried out

in abidance with applicable legal procedures. Polling started on time throughout the country and voters were

able to freely express their will. By first half of the day, a high voter turnout was reported at most of the

precincts throughout Tbilisi, resulting in lines outside election precincts; however, no chaos or disturbances

were reported. Although there were many people at entrances of polling stations, overcrowding inside stations

was reported only at 3% of election precincts.

Based on the analysis of reports received from PVT election precincts showed that

At 6% of polling stations marking p

Monitoring of October 1 2012 Parliamentary Elections Final Report

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