Monday May 21 2012 - Top 10 risk and compliance management related news stories and world events...

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_____________________________________________________________ International Association of Risk and Compliance Professionals (IARCP)

www.risk-compliance-association.com

International Association of Risk and Compliance Professionals (IARCP)

1200 G Street NW Suite 800 Washington, DC 20005-6705 USA Tel: 202-449-9750 www.risk-compliance-association.com

Top 10 risk and compliance management related news stories and world events that (for better or for worse) shaped the week's

agenda, and what is next

George Lekatis President of the IARCP

Dear Member, This week was full of stress (tests). In the States, the Federal Reserve Board, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation issued final supervisory guidance regarding stress-testing practices at banking organizations with total consolidated assets of more than $10 billion. In Europe, the European Banking Authority (EBA) published two sets of

Guidelines on Stressed Value-At-Risk (Stressed VaR) and on the

Incremental Default and Migration Risk Charge (IRC) modelling

approaches employed by credit institutions using the Internal Model

Approach (IMA).

These Guidelines are seen as an important means of addressing

weaknesses in the regulatory capital framework and in the risk

management of financial institutions.

I studied both papers during and between flights, and I feel like I need

another stress test (a medical one).

I have also read the (very interesting) public financial disclosure report of

Barack Obama, and we will start from just that:

http://www.risk-compliance-association.com/

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Welcome to the Top 10 list.

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Agencies Finalize Large Bank Stress Testing Guidance The Federal Reserve Board, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation on Monday issued final supervisory guidance regarding stress-testing practices at banking organizations with total consolidated assets of more than $10 billion.

Guidelines on Stressed Value-At-Risk (Stressed VaR) and on the Incremental Default and Migration Risk Charge (IRC) 16 May 2012 The EBA published today two sets of Guidelines on Stressed Value-At-Risk (Stressed VaR) and on the Incremental Default and Migration Risk Charge (IRC) modelling approaches employed by credit institutions using the Internal Model Approach (IMA).

Models and tools for macroprudential analysis BCBS Working Papers No 21, May 2012 The Basel Committee's Research Task Force Transmission Channel project aimed at generating new research on various aspects of the credit channel linkages in the monetary transmission mechanism.

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The policy implications of transmission channels between the financial system and the real economy Policymakers have strengthened existing micro-prudential tools, such as bank-specific capital and liquidity requirements, and introduced new macro-prudential tools, such as countercyclical capital requirements, capital surcharges for systemically-important financial institutions, and loan-to-value caps to promote financial stability.

NIST Forensic Measurement Challenge May 14, 2012 Recently, NIST announced the availability of $2.5 million for funding criminal justice applications that use new scientific discoveries. Thirty-six proposals were received, and the judges found it difficult to narrow the choices.

Remarks by Assistant Secretary for Economic Policy Jan Eberly before the American Institute of Certified Accountants (AICPA)

Visiting important web sites

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We continue to see that Solvency II is “future rule” …

Joint Consultation Paper on the proposed response to the European Commission’s Call for Advice on the Fundamental Review of Financial Conglomerates Directive 14 May 2012

Market entry criteria revised for banking sector in Hong Kong The Banking Ordinance (Amendment of Seventh Schedule) Notice 2012, which seeks to update certain market entry criteria for the banking sector in Hong Kong, will be gazetted on Friday, 18 May 2012.

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Press Releases

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation

Office of the Comptroller of the Currency

For Immediate Release May 14, 2012

Agencies Finalize Large Bank Stress Testing Guidance The Federal Reserve Board, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation on Monday issued final supervisory guidance regarding stress-testing practices at banking organizations with total consolidated assets of more than $10 billion.

The guidance highlights the importance of stress testing at banking organizations as an ongoing risk management practice that supports a banking organization's forward-looking assessment of its risks and better equips it to address a range of adverse outcomes.

The recent financial crisis underscored the need for banking organizations to incorporate stress testing into their risk management practices, demonstrating that banking organizations unprepared for particularly adverse events and circumstances can suffer acute threats to their financial condition and viability.

This guidance builds upon previously issued supervisory guidance that discusses the uses and merits of stress testing in specific areas of risk management.

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The guidance outlines general principles for a satisfactory stress testing framework and describes various stress testing approaches and how stress testing should be used at various levels within an organization.

The guidance also discusses the importance of stress testing in capital and liquidity planning and the importance of strong internal governance and controls as part of an effective stress-testing framework.

The guidance does not implement the stress testing requirements in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) or in the Federal Reserve Board's capital plan rule that apply to certain companies, as those requirements have been or are being implemented through separate proposals by the respective agencies.

However, the agencies expect that banking organizations with total consolidated assets of more than $10 billion would follow the principles set forth in the guidance--as well as other relevant supervisory guidance--when conducting stress testing in accordance with the Dodd-Frank Act, the capital plan rule, and other statutory or regulatory requirements.

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY Office of the Comptroller of the Currency FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION Supervisory Guidance on Stress Testing for Banking Organizations with More Than $10 Billion In Total Consolidated Assets AGENCIES: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

(“Board” or “Federal Reserve”); Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”); Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Treasury (“OCC”).

ACTION: Final supervisory guidance.

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SUMMARY: The Board, FDIC and OCC, (collectively, the “agencies”)

are issuing this guidance, which outlines high-level principles for stress testing practices, applicable to all Federal Reserve-supervised, FDIC-supervised, and OCC-supervised banking organizations with more than $10 billion in total consolidated assets. The guidance highlights the importance of stress testing as an ongoing risk management practice that supports a banking organization’s forward-looking assessment of its risks and better equips the organization to address a range of adverse outcomes.

DATES: This guidance will become effective on July 23, 2012.

I. Background On June 15, 2011, the agencies requested public comment on joint proposed guidance on the use of stress testing as an ongoing risk management practice by banking organizations with more than $10 billion in total consolidated assets (the proposed guidance). The public comment period on the proposed guidance closed on July 29, 2011. The agencies are adopting the guidance in final form with certain modifications that are discussed below (the final guidance). As described below, this guidance does not apply to banking organizations with consolidated assets of $10 billion or less. All banking organizations should have the capacity to understand their risks and the potential impact of stressful events and circumstances on their financial condition. The agencies have previously highlighted the use of stress testing as a means to better understand the range of a banking organization’s potential risk exposures.

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The 2007- 2009 financial crisis further underscored the need for banking organizations to incorporate stress testing into their risk management, as banking organizations unprepared for stressful events and circumstances can suffer acute threats to their financial condition and viability. The final guidance is intended to be consistent with sound industry practices and with international supervisory standards. Building upon previously issued supervisory guidance that discusses the uses and merits of stress testing in specific areas of risk management, the final guidance provides principles that a banking organization should follow when conducting its stress testing activities. The guidance outlines broad principles for a satisfactory stress testing framework and describes the manner in which stress testing should be employed as an integral component of risk management that is applicable at various levels of aggregation within a banking organization and that contributes to capital and liquidity planning. While the guidance is not intended to provide detailed instructions for conducting stress testing for any particular risk or business area, the guidance describes several types of stress testing activities and how they may be most appropriately used by banking organizations subject to this guidance. The final guidance does not implement the stress testing requirements imposed by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) on financial companies regulated by the OCC, FDIC, or Board with total consolidated assets of more than $10 billion or by the Board’s capital plan rule on U.S. bank holding companies with total consolidated assets equal to or greater than $50 billion. The Dodd-Frank Act’s stress testing requirements are being implemented through separate notices of proposed rulemaking by the respective agencies. The Board issued the final capital plan rule on November 22, 2011.

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In light of these recent rulemaking efforts on stress testing, the guidance provides banking organizations with principles for conducting their stress testing activities to, among other things, ensure that those activities are adequately integrated into overall risk management. The agencies expect such companies would follow the principles set forth in the guidance – as well as other relevant supervisory guidance – when conducting stress testing in accordance with statutory or regulatory requirements.

II. Discussion of Comments on the Proposed Guidance The agencies received 17 comment letters on the proposed guidance. Commenters included financial trade associations, bank holding companies, financial advisory firms, and individuals. Commenters generally expressed support for the proposed guidance. However, several commenters recommended changes to, or clarification of, certain provisions of the proposed guidance, as discussed below. In response to these comments, the agencies have clarified the principles set forth in the guidance and modified the proposed guidance in certain respects as described in this section.

A. Scope of application The proposed guidance would have applied to all banking organizations supervised by the agencies with more than $10 billion in total consolidated assets. Specifically, - with respect to the OCC, these banking organizations would have

included national banking associations and federal branches and agencies;

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- with respect to the Board, these banking organizations would have included state member banks, bank holding companies, and all other institutions for which the Board is the primary federal supervisor;

- with respect to the FDIC, these banking organizations would have

included state nonmember banks and all other institutions for which the FDIC is the primary federal supervisor.

The proposed guidance indicated that a banking organization should develop and implement its stress testing framework in a manner commensurate with its size, complexity, business activities, and overall risk profile. Some commenters supported the total consolidated asset threshold (i.e., more than $10 billion), but others noted the importance and value of stress testing for smaller banking organizations. Consistent with the proposed guidance, no supervised banking organization with $10 billion or less in total consolidated assets is subject to this final guidance. The agencies believe that $10 billion is the appropriate threshold for the guidance based on the general complexity of firms above this size. However, the agencies note that previously issued supervisory guidance applicable to all supervised institutions discusses the use of stress testing as a tool in certain aspects of risk management—such as for commercial real estate concentrations, liquidity risk management, and interest-rate risk management. The agencies received two comments suggesting that the $10 billion total consolidated asset threshold be measured over a four quarter period in order to minimize the likelihood that temporary asset fluctuations would trigger application of the guidance. The agencies do not establish an asset calculation methodology in the final guidance; however, banking organizations with assets near the

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threshold should use reasonable judgment and consider, in conjunction with their primary federal supervisor as appropriate, whether they should consider preparing to follow the guidance. Three commenters expressed concern that foreign banking organizations (FBOs) are required to follow stress testing guidelines established by their home country supervisors and suggested that the agencies give consideration to those requirements. When developing the guidance, the agencies sought to ensure that it would not introduce inconsistencies with internationally agreed supervisory standards. The agencies recognize that an FBO’s U.S. operations are part of the FBO’s global enterprise subject to requirements of its home country. The agencies provided sufficient flexibility in the proposed guidance so that the guidance could apply to various types of organizations. In this final guidance, the agencies clarify that certain aspects of the guidance may not apply to U.S. branches and agencies of FBOs (such as the portions related to capital stress testing) or may apply differently (such as portions related to governance and controls). Supervisors will take these issues into consideration when evaluating the ability of U.S. offices of FBOs to meet the principles in the guidance. Two commenters expressed concern regarding the application of the proposed guidance to savings and loan holding companies (SLHCs). They suggested that the Board issue separate guidance for SLHCs, as these institutions would face a different set of stress testing assumptions and scenarios than banking organizations. The Board believes that the guidance is instructive to SLHCs to the same degree it is for bank holding companies. The Federal Reserve became the primary federal supervisor for

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SLHCs on July 21, 2011, after the agencies published the proposed guidance for public comment but before the end of the comment period. While the Board recognizes that certain differences do exist between bank holding companies and SLHCs, the Board believes the guidance contains flexibility adequate to accommodate the variations in size, complexity, business activities, and overall risk profile of all banking organizations that meet the asset threshold. Thus, the guidance anticipates that each banking organization, including each SLHC, would implement stress testing in a manner consistent with its own business and risk profile. Similarly, one commenter advocated that the OCC propose separate guidance on stress testing specifically tailored to savings associations. The OCC became the primary federal supervisor for federal savings associations on July 21, 2011. While the OCC recognizes that certain differences do exist between national banks and federal savings associations, the OCC notes that the final guidance contains flexibility adequate to accommodate the variations in size, complexity, business activities, and overall risk profile of all banking organizations that meet the asset threshold. Thus, it is also expected that each federal savings association would implement the guidance consistent with its own business and risk profile. Several commenters requested clarification on the linkage between the stress testing guidance and the stress testing requirements in the Dodd-Frank Act. In devising the guidance, the agencies endeavored to ensure that the proposed and final guidance is consistent with the stress testing requirements under the Dodd-Frank Act and believe that the principles set forth in the final guidance are useful when conducting the stress tests required under the Act.

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Notably, the final guidance was framed broadly to inform a banking organization’s use of stress testing in overall risk management, not just stress tests required under the Dodd-Frank Act. Dodd-Frank stress tests would generally be considered part of an organization’s overall stress testing framework as described in the stress testing guidance.

B. Stress Testing Principles As noted above, the proposed guidance identified and included a discussion of four key principles for a banking organization’s stress testing framework and related stress test results, namely that: (1) A banking organization’s stress testing framework should include activities and exercises that are tailored to and sufficiently capture the banking organization’s exposures, activities, and risks; (2) An effective stress testing framework employs multiple conceptually sound stress testing activities and approaches; (3) An effective stress testing framework is forward-looking and flexible; and (4) Stress test results should be clear, actionable, well supported, and inform decision-making. In the final guidance, the agencies have incorporated a fifth principle specifying that an organization’s stress testing framework should include strong governance and effective internal controls. The elements of the fifth principle had been set forth in section VI of the proposed guidance, and the fifth principle does not expand on this aspect of the proposed guidance. Rather, the agencies reorganized this discussion into a fifth principle

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in order to underscore the importance of governance and controls as a key element in a banking organization’s stress testing framework. As noted above, commenters were supportive of the principles-based approach and the notion that a banking organization’s stress testing framework should be implemented in a manner commensurate with factors such as the complexity and size of the organization. With more specific regard to the proposed principles, commenters suggested that the final guidance address the standardization of stress testing through the inclusion of common coefficients, models, or benchmarks. These commenters expressed concerns that banking organizations would implement the principles inconsistently and that standardization would help regulators conduct comparative analyses across firms. Another commenter suggested that the agencies prescribe more detailed and integrated stress testing between different entities or business units within an organization. The agencies did not modify the guidance in response to these comments. A key aspect of the guidance is to provide organizations flexibility on how they design their individual stress testing frameworks. Thus, each banking organization should design a specific stress testing framework to capture risks relevant to the organization. The agencies believe that prescribing standardized stress tests in this guidance would have its own inherent limitations and may not appropriately cover a banking organization’s material risks and activities. In addition, commenters suggested that the agencies mandate public release of stress testing results through the guidance.

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The agencies have considered these comments, but do not believe the final guidance is the appropriate place for such a requirement given its broader focus on banking organizations’ overall stress testing frameworks. The agencies note, however, that banking organizations may be required to disclose information about their stress tests pursuant to other statutory, regulatory, or supervisory requirements. A few commenters stated that a banking organization should explain and justify the stress testing methodologies it utilizes to its primary federal supervisor. The agencies note that supervisors will examine firms’ stress testing methodologies through the supervisory process. One commenter noted that the guidance should explicitly indicate that liabilities should be part of a banking organization’s stress testing activities; the agencies intended that stress testing activities would take an organization’s liabilities into account and have clarified this in the final guidance. Three commenters suggested that operational risk be specifically referenced in the guidance. In response, the agencies have clarified in the final guidance that operational risk should be among the risks considered by an organization’s stress testing framework. Another commenter expressed concern that the frequency of stress testing and communication of results might eventually desensitize senior management to them. The agencies believe that regular review of stress test results is useful – both during periods of economic downturn and benign periods – and have clarified that such review can help a banking organization track over time the impact of ongoing business activities, changes in exposures, varying economic conditions, and market movements on its financial

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condition. Aside from the inclusion of a fifth principle as described above, the agencies have otherwise adopted the proposed principles in the final guidance with only minor additional refinements.

C. Stress testing approaches and applications The proposed guidance described certain stress testing approaches and applications – scenario analysis, sensitivity analysis, enterprise-wide testing, and reverse stress testing – that a banking organization could consider using within its stress testing framework, as appropriate. The proposed guidance provided that each banking organization should apply these approaches and applications commensurate with its size, complexity, and business profile, and may not need to incorporate all of the details described in the guidance. Some commenters questioned the appropriate number and types of stress test approaches an organization should utilize. The agencies do not believe that specifying a number or particular types of approaches – including the number of scenarios – is appropriate in the guidance given the wide range of stress testing activities that different banking organizations may undertake. A banking organization should choose the approaches that appropriately consider the unique characteristics of that particular organization and the relevant risks it faces. The agencies expect that stress testing methodologies will evolve over time as banking organizations develop approaches that best capture their individual risk profiles. In addition, the proposed guidance described reverse stress testing as a tool that would allow a banking organization to assume a known adverse outcome, such as suffering a credit loss that causes it to breach a

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minimum regulatory capital ratio or suffering severe liquidity constraints making it unable to meet its obligations, and then deduce the types of events that could lead to such an outcome. This type of stress testing may help a banking organization to consider scenarios beyond its normal business expectations and see the impact of severe systemic effects on the banking organization. It also would allow a banking organization to challenge common assumptions about its performance and expected mitigation strategies. Three commenters expressed doubts regarding the effectiveness of reverse stress testing, as the approach could produce results of questionable value and captures unlikely, “extreme” scenarios. The agencies reiterate the value of reverse stress testing, as it helps a banking organization evaluate the combined effect of several types of extreme events and circumstances that might threaten the survival of the banking organization, even if in isolation each of the effects might be manageable. Another commenter expressed concern that the results of severe scenarios used for reverse stress testing would directly lead to a supervisory requirement to raise capital if the results of the approach were unfavorable to the organization. In addition, some commenters sought clarification that results would not be used by regulators to criticize banking organizations. As stated in the proposed guidance, a given stress test result will not necessarily lead to immediate action by a firm, and in some cases stress test results – including those from reverse stress tests – are most useful for the additional information they provide. In terms of supervisory responses to an organization’s stress testing activities, the agencies expect to consider a banking organization’s stress test results and the appropriateness of its overall stress testing framework, along with all other relevant information, in assessing a banking

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organization’s risk management practices, as well as its capital and liquidity adequacy. The guidance sets forth supervisory expectations for prudent risk management practices and a firm's decision not to follow the principles in this guidance will be examined as part of the supervisory process and may be cited as evidence of unsafe and unsound practices.

D. Stress testing for assessing adequacy of capital and liquidity Given the importance of capital and liquidity to a banking organization’s viability, stress testing should be applied to these two areas on a regular basis. Stress testing for capital and liquidity adequacy should be conducted in coordination with a banking organization’s overall business strategy and annual planning cycles. Results should be refreshed in the event of major strategic decisions, or other changes that can materially impact capital or liquidity. An effective stress testing framework should explore the potential for capital and liquidity problems to arise at the same time or exacerbate one another. A banking organization’s liquidity stress analysis should explore situations in which the banking organization may be operating with a capital position that exceeds regulatory minimums, but is nonetheless viewed within the financial markets or by its counterparties as being of questionable viability. For its capital and liquidity stress tests, a banking organization should articulate clearly its objectives for a post-stress outcome, for instance to remain a viable financial market participant that is able to meet its existing and prospective obligations and commitments.

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In response to comments received on the planning horizon for stress tests, the agencies clarified that while capital stress tests should generally be conducted with a horizon of at least two years, organizations should recognize that the effects of certain stress conditions could extend beyond that horizon. The agencies have also clarified, in response to comments, that consolidated stress tests should account for the fact that certain legal entities within the consolidated organization are required to meet regulatory capital requirements. A commenter requested clarification on whether capital and liquidity stress testing should be evaluated in unified or separate stress tests. The proposed guidance did not specify the precise manner in which capital and liquidity stress tests should be performed. The final guidance notes that assessing the potential interaction of capital and liquidity can be challenging and may not be possible within a single stress test, so a banking organization should explore several avenues to assess that interaction. In any case, the agencies believe that stress testing for both liquidity and capital adequacy should be an integral part of a banking organization’s stress testing framework.

E. Governance and controls As noted under the new fifth principle of the final guidance, a banking organization’s stress testing framework will be effective only if it is subject to strong governance and controls to ensure that the framework functions as intended. Strong governance and controls also help ensure that the framework contains core elements, from clearly defined stress testing objectives to recommended actions.

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Importantly, strong governance provides critical review of elements of the stress testing framework, especially regarding key assumptions, uncertainties, and limitations. A banking organization should ensure that the stress testing framework is not isolated within a banking organization’s risk management function, but is firmly integrated into business lines, capital and asset-liability committees, and other decision-making bodies. As part of their overall responsibilities, a banking organization’s board and senior management should establish a comprehensive, integrated and effective stress testing framework that fits into the broader risk management of the banking organization. Stress testing results should be used to inform the board about alignment of the banking organization’s risk profile with the board’s chosen risk appetite, as well as inform operating and strategic decisions. Stress testing results should be considered directly by the board and senior management for decisions relating to capital and liquidity adequacy. Senior management, in consultation with the board, should ensure that the stress testing framework includes a sufficient range of stress testing activities applied at the appropriate levels of the banking organization (i.e., not just one enterprise-wide stress test). Several commenters raised concerns regarding the proposed responsibilities of a banking organization’s board of directors with respect to stress tests and the framework. One commenter believed that the board of directors should not review all stress test results, but rather only those that were expected to have a material impact on the overall organization. Another commenter expressed the belief that the board of directors should be involved in providing direction and oversight regarding the banking organization’s stress testing framework, but that the board of

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directors should not be expected to be involved directly in more operational aspects of the framework. The agencies have modified the final guidance to clarify that senior management, not the board of directors, should have the primary responsibility for stress testing implementation and technical design. However, the agencies emphasize that a banking organization’s board of directors should be provided with information from senior management on stress testing developments (including the process to design tests and develop scenarios) and on stress testing results (including from individual tests, where material). As a general matter, the board of directors is also responsible for monitoring effectiveness of the overall framework, and using the results to inform their decision making process. In addition, the final guidance specifies that senior management should, in consultation with the board of directors, review stress testing activities and results with an appropriately critical eye to ensure that there is objective review and that the stress testing framework includes a sufficient range of stress testing activities applied at the appropriate levels of the banking organization. Finally, in response to comments, the agencies have clarified that a banking organization’s minimum annual review and assessment of the effectiveness of their stress testing framework should ensure that stress testing coverage is comprehensive, tests are relevant and current, methodologies are sound, and results are properly considered.

IV. Administrative Law Matters A. Paperwork Reduction Act Analysis In accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act (“PRA”) of 1995 the agencies reviewed the final guidance. The agencies may not conduct or sponsor, and an organization is not required to respond to, an information

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collection unless the information collection displays a currently valid OMB control number. While the guidance is not being adopted as a rule, the agencies determined that certain aspects of the guidance may constitute a collection of information and, therefore, believed it was helpful to publish a burden estimate with the guidance. In particular, the aspects of the guidance that may constitute an information collection are the provisions that state a banking organization should (i) Have a stress testing framework that includes clearly defined objectives, well-designed scenarios tailored to the banking organization’s business and risks, well-documented assumptions, conceptually sound methodologies to assess potential impact on the banking organization’s financial condition, informative management reports, and recommended actions based on stress test results; and (ii) Have policies and procedures for a stress testing framework. The agencies estimated that the above-described information collections included in the guidance would take respondents, on average, 260 hours each year. The frequency of information collection is estimated to be annual. Respondents are banking organizations with more than $10 billion in total consolidated assets, as defined in the guidance. The agencies received three comment letters regarding the paperwork burden of the guidance, stating that implementation will require a multiple of the 260 estimated hours. The agencies emphasize that the guidance does not implement the stress testing requirements imposed by the Dodd-Frank Act or the Board’s capital plan rule, and does not otherwise impose mandatory stress testing requirements.

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The burden of information collections associated with mandatory stress tests will be accounted for in the respective rules that implement those requirements. In addition, the agencies believe that in some respects, the information collection elements of this guidance augment certain expectations that already are in place relative to certain existing supervisory guidance. The burden estimates for this guidance take into consideration only those collections of information, such as documentation of policies and procedures and relevant reports, that are specific to this guidance. Based on these factors, the agencies believe the burden estimates included in the proposed guidance continue to be appropriate.

V. Final supervisory guidance The text of the final supervisory guidance is as follows:

Office of the Comptroller of the Currency Federal Reserve System Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation

Guidance on Stress Testing for Banking Organizations with Total Consolidated Assets of More Than $10 Billion I. Introduction All banking organizations should have the capacity to understand fully their risks and the potential impact of stressful events and circumstances on their financial condition. The U.S. federal banking agencies have previously highlighted the use of stress testing as a means to better understand the range of a banking organization’s potential risk exposures. The 2007-2009 financial crisis underscored the need for banking organizations to incorporate stress testing into their risk management practices, demonstrating that banking organizations unprepared for

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stressful events and circumstances can suffer acute threats to their financial condition and viability. The Federal Reserve, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (collectively, the “agencies”) are issuing this guidance to emphasize the importance of stress testing as an ongoing risk management practice that supports banking organizations’ forward-looking assessment of risks and better equips them to address a range of adverse outcomes. This joint guidance is applicable to all institutions supervised by the agencies with more than $10 billion in total consolidated assets. Specifically, with respect to the OCC, these banking organizations include national banking associations, federal savings associations, and federal branches and agencies; with respect to the Board, these banking organizations include state member banks, bank holding companies, savings and loan holding companies, and all other institutions for which the Federal Reserve is the primary federal supervisor; with respect to the FDIC, these banking organizations include state nonmember banks, state savings associations and insured branches of foreign banks. The guidance does not apply to any supervised institution below the designated asset threshold. Certain other existing supervisory guidance that applies to all supervised institutions discusses the use of stress testing as a tool in certain aspects of risk management, such as for commercial real estate concentrations, liquidity risk management, and interest-rate risk management. However, no institution at or below $10 billion in total consolidated assets is subject to this final guidance. Building upon previously issued supervisory guidance that discusses the uses and merits of stress testing in specific areas of risk management, this guidance provides broad principles a banking organization should follow in conducting its stress testing activities, such as ensuring that those activities fit into the organization’s overall risk management program.

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The guidance outlines broad principles for a satisfactory stress testing framework and describes the manner in which stress testing should be employed as an integral component of risk management that is applicable at various levels of aggregation within a banking organization, as well as for contributing to capital and liquidity planning. While the guidance is not intended to provide detailed instructions for conducting stress testing for any particular risk or business area, the document describes several types of stress testing activities and how they may be most appropriately used by banking organizations.

II. Overview of Stress Testing Framework For purposes of this guidance, stress testing refers to exercises used to conduct a forward looking assessment of the potential impact of various adverse events and circumstances on a banking organization. Stress testing occurs at various levels of aggregation, including on an enterprise-wide basis. As outlined in section IV, there are several approaches and applications for stress testing and a banking organization should consider the use of each in its stress testing framework. An effective stress testing framework provides a comprehensive, integrated, and forward looking set of activities for a banking organization to employ along with other practices in order to assist in the identification and measurement of its material risks and vulnerabilities, including those that may manifest themselves during stressful economic or financial environments, or arise from firm-specific adverse events. Such a framework should supplement other quantitative risk management practices, such as those that rely primarily on statistical estimates of risk or loss estimates based on historical data, as well as qualitative practices.

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In this manner, stress testing can assist in highlighting unidentified or under-assessed risk concentrations and interrelationships and their potential impact on the banking organization during times of stress. A banking organization should develop and implement its stress testing framework in a manner commensurate with its size, complexity, business activities, and overall risk profile. Its stress testing framework should include clearly defined objectives, well-designed scenarios tailored to the banking organization’s business and risks, well-documented assumptions, sound methodologies to assess potential impact on the banking organization’s financial condition, informative management reports, ongoing and effective review of stress testing processes, and recommended actions based on stress test results. Stress testing should incorporate the use of high-quality data and appropriate assumptions about the performance of the institution under stress to ensure that the outputs are credible and can be used to support decision-making. Importantly, a banking organization should have a sound governance and control infrastructure with objective, critical review to ensure the stress testing framework is functioning as intended. A stress testing framework should allow a banking organization to conduct consistent, repeatable exercises that focus on its material exposures, activities, risks, and strategies, and also conduct ad hoc scenarios as needed. The framework should consider the impact of both firm specific and systemic stress events and circumstances that are based on historical experience as well as on hypothetical occurrences that could have an adverse impact on a banking organization’s operations and financial condition. Banking organizations subject to this guidance should develop policies on reviewing and assessing the effectiveness of their stress

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testing frameworks, and use those policies at least annually to assess the effectiveness of their frameworks. Such assessments should help to ensure that stress testing coverage is comprehensive, tests are relevant and current, methodologies are sound, and results are properly considered.

III. General Stress Testing Principles A banking organization should develop and implement an effective stress testing framework as part of its broader risk management and governance processes. The framework should include several activities and exercises, and not just rely on any single test or type of test, since every stress test has limitations and relies on certain assumptions. The uses of a banking organization’s stress testing framework should include, but are not limited to, - augmenting risk identification and measurement;

- estimating business line revenues and losses and informing business

line strategies;

- identifying vulnerabilities, assessing the potential impact from those vulnerabilities, and identifying appropriate actions;

- assessing capital adequacy and enhancing capital planning; assessing

liquidity adequacy and informing contingency funding plans;

- contributing to strategic planning;

- enabling senior management to better integrate strategy, risk management, and capital and liquidity planning decisions; and assisting with recovery and resolution planning.

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This section describes general principles that a banking organization should apply in implementing such a framework.

Principle 1:

A banking organization’s stress testing framework should include activities and exercises that are tailored to and sufficiently capture the banking organization’s exposures, activities, and risks. An effective stress testing framework covers a banking organization’s full set of material exposures, activities, and risks, whether on or off the balance sheet, based on effective enterprise-wide risk identification and assessment. Risks addressed in a firm’s stress testing framework may include (but are not limited to) credit, market, operational, interest-rate, liquidity, country, and strategic risk. The framework should also address non-contractual sources of risks, such as those related to a banking organization’s reputation. Appropriate coverage is important as stress testing results could give a false sense of comfort if certain portfolios, exposures, liabilities, or business line activities are not included. Stress testing exercises should be part of a banking organization’s regular risk identification and measurement activities. For example, in assessing credit risk a banking organization should evaluate the potential impact of adverse outcomes, such as an economic downturn or declining asset values, on the condition of its borrowers and counterparties, and on the value of any supporting collateral. As another example, in assessing interest-rate risk, banking organizations should analyze the effects of significant interest rate shocks or other yield-curve movements.

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An effective stress testing framework should be applied at various levels in the banking organization, such as business line, portfolio, and risk type, as well as on an enterprise-wide basis. In many cases, stress testing may be more effective at business line and portfolio levels, as a higher level of aggregation may cloud or underestimate the potential impact of adverse outcomes on a banking organization’s financial condition. In some cases, stress testing can also be applied to individual exposures or instruments. Each stress test should be tailored to the relevant level of aggregation, capturing critical risk drivers, internal and external influences, and other key considerations at the relevant level. Stress testing should capture the interplay among different exposures, activities, and risks and their combined effects. While stress testing several types of risks or business lines simultaneously may prove operationally challenging, a banking organization should aim to identify common risk drivers across risk types and business lines that can adversely affect its financial condition. Accordingly, stress tests should provide a banking organization with the ability to identify potential concentrations – including those that may not be readily observable during benign periods and whose sensitivity to a common set of factors is apparent only during times of stress – and to assess the impact of identified concentrations of exposures, activities, and risks within and across portfolios and business lines and on the organization as a whole. Stress testing should be tailored to the banking organization’s idiosyncrasies and specific business mix and include all major business lines and significant individual counterparties. For example, a banking organization that is geographically concentrated may determine that a certain segment of its business may be more

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adversely affected by shocks to economic activity at the state or local level than by a severe national recession. On the other hand, if the banking organization has significant global operations, it should consider scenarios that have an international component and stress conditions that could affect the different aspects of its operations in different ways, as well as conditions that could adversely affect all of its operations at the same time. A banking organization should use its stress testing framework to determine whether exposures, activities, and risks under normal and stressed conditions are aligned with the banking organization’s risk appetite. A banking organization can use stress testing to help inform decisions about its strategic direction and/or risk appetite by better understanding the risks from its exposures or of engaging in certain business practices. For example, if a banking organization pursues a business strategy for a new or modified product, and the banking organization does not have long-standing experience with that product or lacks extensive data, the banking organization can use stress testing to identify the product’s potential downsides and unanticipated risks. Scenarios used in a banking organization’s stress tests should be relevant to the direction and strategy set by its board of directors, as well as sufficiently severe to be credible to internal and external stakeholders.

Principle 2:

An effective stress testing framework employs multiple conceptually sound stress testing activities and approaches. All measures of risk, including stress tests, have an element of uncertainty due to assumptions, limitations, and other factors associated with using past performance measures and forward-looking estimates.

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Banking organizations should, therefore, use multiple stress testing activities and approaches (consistent with section IV), and ensure that each is conceptually sound. Stress tests usually vary in design and complexity, including the number of factors employed and the degree of stress applied. A banking organization should ensure that the complexity of any given test does not undermine its integrity, usefulness, or clarity. In some cases, relatively simple tests can be very useful and informative. Additionally, effective stress testing relies on high-quality input data and information to produce credible outcomes. A banking organization should ensure that it has readily available data and other information for the types of stress tests it uses, including key variables that drive performance. In addition, a banking organization should have appropriate management information systems (MIS) and data processes that enable it to collect, sort, aggregate, and update data and other information efficiently and reliably within business lines and across the banking organization for use in stress testing. If certain data and information are not current or not available, or if proxies are used, a banking organization should analyze the stress test outputs with an understanding of those data limitations. A banking organization should also document the assumptions used in its stress tests and note the degree of uncertainty that may be incorporated into the tools used for stress testing. In some cases, it may be appropriate to present and analyze test results not just in terms of point estimates, but also including the potential margin of error or statistical uncertainty around the estimates.

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Furthermore, almost all stress tests, including well-developed quantitative tests supported by high-quality data, employ a certain amount of expert or business judgment, and the role and impact of such judgment should be clearly documented. In some cases, when credible data are lacking and more quantitative tests are operationally challenging or in the early stages of development, a banking organization may choose to employ more qualitatively based tests, provided that the tests are properly documented and their assumptions are transparent. Regardless of the type of stress tests used, a banking organization should understand and clearly document all assumptions, uncertainties, and limitations, and provide that information to users of the stress testing results.

Principle 3:

An effective stress testing framework is forward-looking and flexible. A stress testing framework should be sufficiently dynamic and flexible to incorporate changes in a banking organization’s on- and off-balance-sheet activities, portfolio composition, asset quality, operating environment, business strategy, and other risks that may arise over time from firm-specific events, macroeconomic and financial market developments, or some combination of these events. A banking organization should also ensure that its MIS are capable of incorporating relatively rapid changes in exposures, activities, and risks. While stress testing should utilize available historical information, a banking organization should look beyond assumptions based only on historical data and challenge conventional assumptions. A banking organization should ensure that it is not constrained by past experience and that it considers multiple scenarios, even scenarios that have not occurred in the recent past or during the banking organization’s history.

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For example, a banking organization should not assume that if it has suffered no or minimal losses in a certain business line or product that such a pattern will continue. Structural changes in customer, product, and financial markets can present unprecedented situations for a banking organization. A banking organization with any type of significant concentration can be particularly vulnerable to rapid changes in economic and financial conditions and should try to identify and better understand the impact of those vulnerabilities in advance. For example, the risks related to residential mortgages were underestimated for a number of years leading up to the 2007-2009 financial crisis by a large number of banking organizations, and those risks eventually affected the banking organizations in a variety of ways. Effective stress testing can help a banking organization identify any such concentrations and help understand the potential impact of several key aspects of the business being exposed to common drivers. Stress testing should be conducted over various relevant time horizons to adequately capture both conditions that may materialize in the near term and adverse situations that take longer to develop. For example, when a banking organization stress tests a portfolio for market and credit risks simultaneously, it should consider that certain credit risk losses may take longer to materialize than market risk losses, and also that the severity and speed of mark-to-market losses may create significant vulnerabilities for the firm, even if a more fundamental analysis of how realized losses may play out over time seems to show less threatening results. A banking organization should carefully consider the incremental and cumulative effects of stress conditions, particularly with respect to potential interactions among exposures, activities, and risks and possible second-order or “knock-on” effects.

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In addition to conducting formal, routine stress tests, a banking organization should have the flexibility to conduct new or ad hoc stress tests in a timely manner to address rapidly emerging risks. These less routine tests usually can be conducted in a short amount of time and may be simpler and less extensive than a banking organization’s more formal, regular tests. However, for its ad hoc tests a banking organization should still have the capacity to bring together approximated information on risks, exposures, and activities and assess their impact. More broadly, a banking organization should continue updating and maintaining its stress testing framework in light of new risks, better understanding of the banking organization’s exposures and activities, new stress testing techniques, and any changes in its operating structure and environment. A banking organization’s stress testing development should be iterative, with ongoing adjustments and refinements to better calibrate the tests to provide current and relevant information. Banking organizations should document the ongoing development of their stress testing practices.

Principle 4:

Stress test results should be clear, actionable, well supported, and inform decision-making. Stress testing should incorporate measures that adequately and effectively convey results of the impact of adverse outcomes. Such measures may include, for example, changes to asset values, accounting and economic profit and loss, revenue streams, liquidity levels, cash flows, regulatory capital, risk-weighted assets, the loan loss allowance, internal capital estimates, levels of problem assets, breaches in covenants or key trigger levels, or other relevant measures.

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Stress test measures should be tailored to the type of test and the particular level at which the test is applied (for example, at the business line or risk level). Some stress tests may require using a range of measures to evaluate the full impact of certain events, such as a severe systemic event. In addition, all stress test results should be accompanied by descriptive and qualitative information (such as key assumptions and limitations) to allow users to interpret the exercises in context. The analysis and the process should be well documented so that stress testing processes can be replicated if need be. A banking organization should regularly communicate stress test results to appropriate levels within the banking organization to foster dialogue around stress testing, keep the board of directors, management, and staff apprised, and to inform stress testing approaches, results, and decisions in other areas of the banking organization. A banking organization should maintain an internal summary of test results to document at a high level the range of its stress testing activities and outcomes, as well as proposed follow-up actions. Regular review of stress test results can be an important part of a banking organization’s ability over time to track the impact of ongoing business activities, changes in exposures, varying economic conditions, and market movements on its financial condition. In addition, management should review stress testing activities on a regular basis to determine, among other things, the validity of the assumptions, the severity of tests, the robustness of the estimates, the performance of any underlying models, and the stability and reasonableness of the results. Stress test results should inform analysis and decision-making related to business strategies, limits, risk profile, and other aspects of risk management, consistent with the banking organization’s established risk appetite.

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A banking organization should review the results of its various stress tests with the strengths and limitations of each test in mind (consistent with Principle 2), determines which results should be given greater or lesser weight, analyze the combined impact of its tests, and then evaluate potential courses of action based on that analysis. A banking organization may decide to maintain its current course based on test results; indeed, the results of highly severe stress tests need not always indicate that immediate action has to be taken. Wherever possible, benchmarking or other comparative analysis should be used to evaluate the stress testing results relative to other tools and measures – both internal and external to the banking organization – to provide proper context and a check on results.

Principle 5:

An organization’s stress testing framework should include strong governance and effective internal controls. Similar to other aspects of its risk management, a banking organization’s stress testing framework will be effective only if it is subject to strong governance and effective internal controls to ensure the framework is functioning as intended. Strong governance and effective internal controls help ensure that the framework contains core elements, from clearly defined stress testing objectives to recommended actions. Importantly, strong governance provides critical review of elements of the stress testing framework, especially regarding key assumptions, uncertainties, and limitations. A banking organization should ensure that the stress testing framework is not isolated within a banking organization’s risk management function, but is firmly integrated into business lines, capital and asset-liability committees, and other decision making bodies. Along those lines, the board of directors and senior management should play key roles in ensuring strong governance and controls.

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The extent and sophistication of a banking organization’s governance over its stress testing framework should align with the extent and sophistication of that framework. Additional details regarding governance and controls of an organization’s stress testing framework are outlined in section VI.

IV. Stress Testing Approaches and Applications This section discusses some general types of stress testing approaches and applications. For any type of stress test, banking organizations should indicate the specific purpose and the focus of the test. Defining the scope of a given stress test is also important, whether it applies at the portfolio, business line, risk type, or enterprise-wide level, or even just for an individual exposure or counterparty. Based on the purpose and scope of the test, different stress testing techniques are most useful. Thus, a banking organization should employ several approaches and applications; these might include scenario analysis, sensitivity analysis, enterprise-wide stress testing, and reverse stress testing. Consistent with Principle 1, banking organizations should apply these commensurate with their size, complexity, and business profile, and may not need to incorporate all of the details described below. Consistent with Principle 3, banking organizations should also recognize that stress testing approaches will evolve over time and they should update their practices as needed.

Scenario Analysis

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Scenario analysis refers to a type of stress testing in which a banking organization applies historical or hypothetical scenarios to assess the impact of various events and circumstances, including extreme ones. Scenarios usually involve some kind of coherent, logical narrative or “story” as to why certain events and circumstances can occur and in which combination and order, such as a severe recession, failure of a major counterparty, loss of major clients, natural or man-made disaster, localized economic downturn, disruptions in funding or capital markets, or a sudden change in interest rates brought about by unfavorable inflation developments. Scenario analysis can be applied at various levels of the banking organization, such as within individual business lines to help identify factors that could harm those business lines most. Stress scenarios should reflect a banking organization’s unique vulnerabilities to factors that affect its exposures, activities, and risks. For example, if a banking organization is concentrated in a particular line of business, such as commercial real estate or residential mortgage lending, it would be appropriate to explore the impact of a downturn in those particular market segments. Similarly, a banking organization with lending concentrations to oil and gas companies should include scenarios related to the energy sector. Other relevant factors to be considered in scenario analysis relate to operational, reputational and legal risks to a banking organization, such as significant events of fraud or litigation, or a situation when a banking organization feels compelled to provide support to an affiliate or provide other types of non-contractual support to avoid reputational damage. Scenarios should be internally consistent and portray realistic outcomes based on underlying relationships among variables, and should include only those mitigating developments that are consistent with the scenario.

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Additionally, a banking organization should consider the best manner to try to capture combinations of stressful events and circumstances, including second-order and “knock-on” effects. Ultimately, a banking organization should select and design multiple scenarios that are relevant to its profile and make intuitive sense, use enough scenarios to explore the range of potential outcomes, and ensure that the scenarios continue to be timely and relevant. A banking organization may apply scenario analysis within the context of its existing risk measurement tools (e.g., the impact of a severe decline in market prices on a banking organization’s value-at-risk (VaR) measure) or use it as an alternative, supplemental measure. For instance, a banking organization may use scenario analysis to measure the impact of a severe financial market disturbance and compare those results to what is produced by its VaR or other measures. This type of scenario analysis should account for known shortcomings of other risk measurement practices. For example, market risk VaR models generally assume liquid markets with known prices. Scenario analysis could shed light on the effects of a breakdown in liquidity and of valuation difficulties. One of the key challenges with scenario analysis is to translate a scenario into balance sheet impact, changes in risk measures, potential losses, or other measures of adverse financial impact, which would vary depending on the test design and the type of scenario used. For some aspects of scenario analysis, banking organizations may use econometric or similar types of analysis to estimate a relationship between some underlying factors or drivers and risk estimates or loss projections based on a given data set, and then extrapolate to see the impact of more severe inputs.

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Care should be taken not to make assumptions that relationships from benign or mildly adverse times will hold during more severe times or that estimating such relationships is relatively straightforward. For example, linear relationships between risk drivers and losses may become nonlinear during times of stress. In addition, organizations should recognize that there can be multiple permutations of outcomes from just a few key risk drivers.

Sensitivity Analysis

Sensitivity analysis refers to a banking organization’s assessment of its exposures, activities, and risks when certain variables, parameters, and inputs are “stressed” or “shocked.” A key goal of sensitivity analysis is to test the impact of assumptions on outcomes. Generally, sensitivity analysis differs from scenario analysis in that it involves changing variables, parameters, or inputs without an explicit underlying reason or narrative, in order to explore what occurs under a range of inputs and at extreme or highly adverse levels. In this type of analysis a banking organization may realize, for example, that a given relationship is much more difficult to estimate at extreme levels. A banking organization may apply sensitivity analysis at various levels of aggregation to estimate the impact from a change in one or more key variables. The results may help a banking organization better understand the range of outcomes from some of its models, such as developing a distribution of output based on a variety of extreme inputs.

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For example, a banking organization may choose to calculate a range of changes to a structured security’s overall value using a range of different assumptions about the performance and linkage of underlying cash flows. Sensitivity analysis should be conducted periodically due to potential changes in a banking organization’s exposures, activities, operating environment, or the relationship of variables to one another. Sensitivity analysis can also help to assess a combined impact on a banking organization of several variables, parameters, factors, or drivers. For example, a banking organization could better understand the impact on its credit losses from a combined increase in default rates and a decrease in collateral values. A banking organization could also explore the impact of highly adverse capitalization rates, declines in net operating income, and reductions in collateral when evaluating its risks from commercial real estate exposures. Sensitivity analysis can be especially useful because it is not necessarily accompanied by a particular narrative or scenario; that is, sensitivity analysis can provide banking organizations more flexibility to explore the impact of potential stresses that they may not be able to capture in designed scenarios. Furthermore, banking organizations may decide to conduct sensitivity analysis of their scenarios, i.e., choosing different levels or paths of variables to understand the sensitivities of choices made during scenario design. For instance, banking organizations may decide to apply a few different interest-rate paths for a given scenario.

Enterprise-Wide Stress Testing

Enterprise-wide stress testing is an application of stress testing that involves assessing the impact of certain specified scenarios on the

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banking organization as a whole, particularly with regard to capital and liquidity. As is the case with scenario analysis more generally, enterprise wide stress testing involves robust scenario design and effective translation of scenarios into measures of impact. Enterprise-wide stress tests can help a banking organization in its efforts to assess the impact of its full set of risks under adverse events and circumstances, but should be supplemented with other stress tests and other risk measurement tools given inherent limitations in capturing all risks and all adverse outcomes in one test. Scenario design for enterprise-wide stress testing involves developing scenarios that affect the banking organization as a whole that stem from macroeconomic, market-wide, and/or firm-specific events. These scenarios should incorporate the potential simultaneous occurrence of both firm-specific and macroeconomic and market-wide events, considering system-wide interactions and feedback effects. For example, price shocks may lead to significant portfolio losses, rising funding gaps, a ratings downgrade, and diminished access to funding. In general, it is a good practice to consult with a large set of individuals within the banking organization – in various business lines, research and risk areas – to gain a wide perspective on how enterprise wide scenarios should be designed and to ensure that the scenarios capture the relevant aspects of the banking organization’s business and risks. Banking organizations should also conduct scenarios of varying severity to gauge the relative impact. At least some scenarios should be of sufficient severity to challenge the viability of the banking organization, and should include instantaneous market shocks and stressful periods of extended duration (e.g., not just a one or two-quarter shock after which conditions return to normal).

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Selection of scenario variables is important for enterprise-wide tests, because these variables generally serve as the link between the overall narrative of the scenario and tangible impact on the banking organization as a whole. For instance, in aiming to capture the combined impact of a severe recession and a financial market downturn, a banking organization may choose a set of variables such as changes in gross domestic product (GDP), unemployment rate, interest rates, stock market levels, or home price levels. However, particularly when assessing the impact on the whole banking organization, using a large number of variables can make a test more cumbersome and complicated – so a banking organization may also benefit from simpler scenarios or from those with fewer variables. Banking organizations should balance the comprehensiveness of contributing variables and tractability of the exercise. As with scenario analysis generally, translating scenarios into tangible effects on the banking organization as a whole presents certain challenges. A banking organization should identify appropriate and meaningful mechanisms for translating scenarios into relevant internal risk parameters that provide a firm-wide view of risks and understanding of how these risks are translated into loss estimates. Not all business areas are equally affected by a given scenario, and problems in one business area can have effects on other units. However, for an enterprise-wide test, assumptions across business lines and risk areas should remain constant for the chosen scenario, since the objective is to see how the banking organization as a whole will be affected by a common scenario.

Reverse Stress Testing

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Reverse stress testing is a tool that allows a banking organization to assume a known adverse outcome, such as suffering a credit loss that breaches regulatory capital ratios or suffering severe liquidity constraints that render it unable to meet its obligations, and then deduce the types of events that could lead to such an outcome. This type of stress testing may help a banking organization to consider scenarios beyond its normal business expectations and see the impact of severe systemic effects on the banking organization. It also allows a banking organization to challenge common assumptions about its performance and expected mitigation strategies. Reverse stress testing helps to explore so-called “break the bank” situations, allowing a banking organization to set aside the issue of estimating the likelihood of severe events and to focus more on what kinds of events could threaten the viability of the banking organization. This type of stress testing also helps a banking organization evaluate the combined effect of several types of extreme events and circumstances that might threaten the survival of the banking organization, even if in isolation each of the effects might be manageable. For instance, reverse stress testing may help a banking organization recognize that a certain level of unemployment would have a severe impact on credit losses, that a market disturbance could create additional losses and result in rising funding costs, and that a firm-specific case of fraud would cause even further losses and reputational impact that could threaten a banking organization’s viability. In some cases, reverse stress tests could reveal to a banking organization that “breaking the bank” is not as remote an outcome as originally thought. Given the numerous potential threats to a banking organization’s viability, the organization should ensure that it focuses first on those scenarios that have the largest firm-wide impact, such as insolvency or

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illiquidity, but also on those that seem most imminent given the current environment. Focusing on the most prominent vulnerabilities helps a banking organization prioritize its choice of scenarios for reverse stress testing. However, a banking organization should also consider a wider range of possible scenarios that could jeopardize the viability of the banking organization, exploring what could represent potential blind spots. Reverse stress testing can highlight previously unacknowledged sources of risk that could be mitigated through enhanced risk management.

V. Stress Testing for Assessing the Adequacy of Capital and Liquidity There are many uses of stress testing within banking organizations. Prominent among these are stress tests designed to assess the adequacy of capital and liquidity. Given the importance of capital and liquidity to a banking organization’s viability, stress testing should be applied in these two areas in particular, including an evaluation of the interaction between capital and liquidity and the potential for both to become impaired at the same time. Depletions and shortages of capital or liquidity can cause a banking organization to no longer perform effectively as a financial intermediary, be viewed by its counterparties as no longer viable, become insolvent, or diminish its capacity to meet legal and financial obligations. A banking organization’s capital and liquidity stress testing should consider how losses, earnings, cash flows, capital, and liquidity would be affected in an environment in which multiple risks manifest themselves at the same time, for example, an increase in credit losses during an adverse interest-rate environment. Additionally, banking organizations should recognize that at the end

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of the time horizon considered by a given stress test, they may still have substantial residual risks or problem exposures that may continue to pressure capital and liquidity resources. Stress testing for capital and liquidity adequacy should be conducted in coordination with a banking organization’s overall strategy and annual planning cycles. Results should be refreshed in the event of major strategic decisions, or other decisions that can materially impact capital or liquidity. Banking organizations should conduct stress testing for capital and liquidity adequacy periodically.

Capital Stress Testing

Capital stress testing results can serve as a useful tool to support a banking organization’s capital planning and corporate governance. They may help a banking organization better understand its vulnerabilities and evaluate the impact of adverse outcomes on its capital position and ensure that the banking organization holds adequate capital given its business model, including the complexity of its activities and its risk profile. Capital stress testing complements a banking organization’s regulatory capital analysis by providing a forward-looking assessment of capital adequacy, usually with a forecast horizon of at least two years (with the recognition that the effects of certain stress conditions could extend beyond two years for some stress tests), and highlighting the potential adverse effects on capital levels and ratios from risks not fully captured in regulatory capital requirements. It should also be used to help a banking organization assess the quality and composition of capital and its ability to absorb losses.

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Stress testing can aid capital contingency planning by helping management identify exposures or risks in advance that would need to be reduced and actions that could be taken to bolster capital levels or otherwise maintain capital adequacy, as well as actions that in times of stress might not be possible – such as raising capital. Capital stress testing should include exercises that analyze the potential for changes in earnings, losses, reserves, and other potential effects on capital under a variety of stressful circumstances. Such testing should also capture any potential change in risk-weighted assets, the ability of capital to absorb losses, and any resulting impact on the banking organization’s capital ratios. It should include all relevant risk types and other factors that have a potential to affect capital adequacy, whether directly or indirectly, including firm-specific ones. A banking organization should also explore the potential for possible balance sheet expansion to put pressure on capital ratios and consider risk mitigation and capital preservation options, other than simply shrinking the balance sheet. Capital stress testing should assess the potential impact of a banking organization’s material subsidiaries suffering capital problems on their own – such as being unable to meet local country capital requirements – even if the consolidated banking organization is not encountering problems. Where material relative to the banking organization's capital, counterparty exposures should also be included in capital stress testing. Enterprise-wide stress testing, as described in section IV, should be an integral part of a banking organization’s capital stress testing. Such enterprise-wide testing should include proforma estimates of not only potential losses and resources available to absorb losses, but also

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potential planned capital actions (such as dividends or share repurchases) that would affect the banking organization’s capital position, including regulatory and other capital ratios. There should also be consideration of the impact on the banking organization’s allowance for loan and lease losses and other relevant financial metrics. Even with very effective enterprise-wide tests, banking organizations should use capital stress testing in conjunction with other internal approaches (in addition to regulatory measures) for assessing capital adequacy, such as those that rely primarily on statistical estimates of risk or loss estimates based on historical data.

Liquidity stress testing

A banking organization should also conduct stress testing for liquidity adequacy. Through such stress testing a banking organization can work to identify vulnerabilities related to liquidity adequacy in light of both firm-specific and market-wide stress events and circumstances. Effective stress testing helps a banking organization identify and quantify the depth, source, and degree of potential liquidity and funding strain and to analyze possible impacts on its cash flows, liquidity position, profitability, and other aspects of its financial condition over various time horizons. For example, stress testing can be used to explore potential funding shortfalls, shortages in liquid assets, the inability to issue debt, exposure to possible deposit outflows, volatility in short-term brokered deposits, sensitivity of funding to a ratings downgrade, and the impact of reduced collateral values on borrowing capacity at the Federal Home Loan Banks, the Federal Reserve discount window, or other secured wholesale funding sources. Liquidity stress testing should explore the potential impact of adverse

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developments that may affect market and asset liquidity, including the freezing up of credit and funding markets, and the corresponding impact on the banking organization. Such tests can also help identify the conditions under which balance sheets might expand, thus creating additional funding needs (e.g., through accelerated drawdowns on unfunded commitments). These tests also help determine whether the banking organization has a sufficient liquidity buffer to meet various types of future liquidity demands under stressful conditions. In this regard, liquidity stress testing should be an integral part of the development and maintenance of a banking organization’s contingency funding planning. Liquidity stress testing should include enterprise wide tests as discussed in section IV, but should also be applied, as appropriate, at lower levels of the banking organization, and in particular should account for regulatory or supervisory restrictions on inter-affiliate funding and asset transfers. As with capital stress testing, banking organizations may need to conduct liquidity stress tests at both the consolidated and subsidiary level. In undertaking enterprise-wide liquidity tests banking organizations should make realistic assumptions as to the implications of liquidity stresses in one part of the banking organization on other parts. An effective stress testing framework should explore the potential for capital and liquidity problems to arise at the same time or exacerbate one another. For example, a banking organization in a stressed liquidity position is often required to take actions that have a negative direct or indirect capital impact (e.g., selling assets at a loss or incurring funding costs at above market rates to meet funding needs).

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A banking organization’s liquidity stress analysis should explore situations in which the banking organization may be operating with a capital position that exceeds regulatory minimums, but is nonetheless viewed within the financial markets or by its counterparties as being of questionable viability. Assessing the potential interaction of capital and liquidity can be challenging and may not be possible within a single stress test, so organizations should explore several avenues to assess that interaction. As with other applications of stress testing, for its capital and liquidity stress tests, it is beneficial for a banking organization to articulate clearly its objectives for a post-stress outcome, for instance to remain a viable financial market participant that is able to meet its existing and prospective obligations and commitments. In such cases, banking organizations would have to consider which measures of financial condition would need to be met on a post-stress basis to secure the confidence of counterparties and market participants.

VI. Governance and Controls As noted under Principle 5, a banking organization’s stress testing framework will be effective only if it is subject to strong governance and controls to ensure the framework is functioning as intended. The extent and sophistication of a banking organization’s governance over its stress testing framework should align with the extent and sophistication of that framework. Governance over a banking organization’s stress testing framework rests with the banking organization’s board of directors and senior management. As part of their overall responsibilities, a banking organization’s board and senior management should establish a comprehensive, integrated and effective stress testing framework that fits into the broader risk

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management of the banking organization. While the board is ultimately responsible for ensuring that the banking organization has an effective stress testing framework, senior management generally has responsibility for implementing that framework. Senior management duties should include establishing adequate policies and procedures and ensuring compliance with those policies and procedures, assigning competent staff, overseeing stress test development and implementation, evaluating stress test results, reviewing any findings related to the functioning of stress test processes, and taking prompt remedial action where necessary. Senior management, directly and through relevant committees, also should be responsible for regularly reporting to the board on stress testing developments (including the process to design tests and develop scenarios) and on stress testing results (including from individual tests, where material), as well as on compliance with stress testing policy. Board members should actively evaluate and discuss this information, ensuring that the stress testing framework is in line with the banking organization’s risk appetite, overall strategy and business plans, and contingency plans, directing changes where appropriate. A banking organization should have written policies, approved and annually reviewed by the board, that direct and govern the implementation of the stress testing framework in a comprehensive manner. Policies, along with procedures to implement them, should:

Describe the overall purpose of stress testing activities;

Articulate consistent and sufficiently rigorous stress testing practices across the entire banking organization;

Indicate stress testing roles and responsibilities, including controls

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over external resources used for any part of stress testing (such as vendors and data providers);

Describe the frequency and priority with which stress testing activities should be conducted;

Indicate how stress test results are used, by whom, and outline

instances in which remedial actions should be taken; and

Be reviewed and updated as necessary to ensure that stress testing

practices remain appropriate and keep up to date with changes in market conditions, banking organization products and strategies, banking organization exposures and activities, the banking organization’s established risk appetite, and industry stress testing practices. A stress testing framework should incorporate validation or other type of independent review to ensure the integrity of stress testing processes and results, consistent with existing supervisory expectations. If a banking organization engages a third party vendor to support some or all of its stress testing activities, there should be appropriate controls in place to ensure that those externally developed systems and processes are sound, applied correctly, and appropriate for the banking organization’s risks, activities, and exposures. Additionally, senior management should be mindful of any potential inconsistencies, contradictions, or gaps among its stress tests and assess what actions should be taken as a result. Internal audit should also provide independent evaluation of the ongoing performance, integrity, and reliability of the stress testing framework. A banking organization should ensure that its stress tests are documented appropriately, including a description of the types of stress tests and methodologies used, key assumptions, results, and suggested actions. Senior management, in consultation with the board, should review stress testing activities and results with an appropriately critical eye and ensure

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that there is objective review of all stress testing processes. The results of stress testing analyses should facilitate decision-making by the board and senior management. Stress testing results should be used to inform the board about alignment of the banking organization’s risk profile with the board’s chosen risk appetite, as well as inform operating and strategic decisions. Stress testing results should be considered directly by the board and senior management for decisions relating to capital and liquidity adequacy, including capital contingency plans and contingency funding plans. Senior management, in consultation with the board, should ensure that the stress testing framework includes a sufficient range of stress testing activities applied at the appropriate levels of the banking organization (i.e., not just one enterprise-wide stress test). Sound governance also includes using stress testing to consider the effectiveness of a banking organization’s risk mitigation techniques for various risk types over their respective time horizons, such as to explore what could occur if expected mitigation techniques break down during stressful periods.

VII. Conclusion A banking organization should use the principles laid out in this guidance to develop, implement, and maintain an effective stress testing framework. Such a framework should be adequately tailored to the banking organization’s size, complexity, risks, exposures, and activities. A key purpose of stress testing is to explore various types of possible outcomes, including rare and extreme events and circumstances, assess their impact on the banking organization, and then evaluate the

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boundaries up to which the banking organization plans to be able to withstand such outcomes. Stress testing may be particularly valuable during benign periods when other measures may not indicate emerging risks. While stress testing can provide valuable information regarding potential future outcomes, similar to any other risk management tool it has limitations and cannot provide absolute certainty regarding the implications of assumed events and impacts. Furthermore, management should ensure that stress testing activities are not constrained to reflect past experiences, but instead consider a broad range of possibilities. No single stress test can accurately estimate the impact of all stressful events and circumstances; therefore, a banking organization should understand and account for stress testing limitations and uncertainties, and use stress tests in combination with other risk management tools to make informed risk management and business decisions.

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Guidelines on Stressed Value-At-Risk (Stressed VaR) and on the Incremental Default and Migration Risk Charge (IRC)

16 May 2012

The EBA published today two sets of Guidelines on Stressed

Value-At-Risk (Stressed VaR) and on the Incremental Default and

Migration Risk Charge (IRC) modelling approaches employed by credit

institutions using the Internal Model Approach (IMA).

These Guidelines are seen as an important means of addressing

weaknesses in the regulatory capital framework and in the risk

management of financial institutions.

Their objective is to contribute to a level playing field and to enhance

convergence of supervisory practices across the EU.

National competent authorities are expected to implement the provisions

set out in the Guidelines within six months after their publication.

After that date, the competent authorities must ensure that institutions

comply with the Guidelines effectively.

Guidelines on Stressed Value-At-Risk (Stressed VaR)

These Guidelines include provisions on Stressed VaR modelling by credit

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institutions using the Internal Model Approach for the calculation of the

required capital for market risk in the trading book.

The main provisions of the Guidelines relate to: - The identification and the review of the stressed period; - The Stressed VaR methodology; - The Use test.

Guidelines on the Incremental Default and Migration Risk Charge (IRC)

These Guidelines include provisions on the IRC modelling approaches

employed by credit institutions using the Internal Model Approach

(‘IMA’) for the calculation of the required capital for specific interest risk

in the trading book.

The incremental risk charge is intended to complement additional

standards being applied to the value-at-risk (VaR) modelling framework

in the trading book.

The main provisions of the Guidelines relate to: - The scope of application; Individual modelling of all aspects of the IRC approach - The interdependence between default and migration events; - The profit and losses (P&L) valuation including how ratings changes impact on market prices and on the computation of P&L; - The liquidity horizons; - The validation and use test for IRC models.

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Notes

1) According to the amendments of the Capital Requirements Directive

by Directive 2010/76/EU, entered into force on 31 December 2011, the

EBA is tasked with monitoring the range of practices in the area of

Stressed Value-at-Risk (Stressed VaR) and Incremental Default and

Migration Risk Charge (IRC) in the trading book.

The EBA shall draw up guidelines in order to ensure convergence of

supervisory practices.

2) In accordance with Article 16(3) of the EBA Regulation, Guidelines set

out the EBA’s view of appropriate supervisory practices within the

European System of Financial Supervision or of how Union law should be

applied in a particular area.

Competent authorities and financial market participants must make every

effort to comply with the guidelines.

Before the deadline indicated in the Guidelines, i.e 6 months from the

date of publication, Competent authorities must notify the EBA as to

whether they comply or intend to comply with these guidelines, or

otherwise with reasons for non-compliance.

The notifications shall be published on the EBA website.

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EBA Guidelines on Stressed Value At Risk (Stressed VaR)

16.05.2012

I. Executive Summary The amendments to the Capital Requirements Directive1 by Directive 2010/76/EU (CRD III) relate, among others, to Stressed Value-at-Risk (Stressed VaR) in the trading book. According to these amendments, the predecessor of the EBA, the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) is tasked with monitoring the range of practices in this area and drawing up guidelines in order to ensure convergence of supervisory practices. The amendments to the Capital Requirements Directive by Directive 2010/76/EU (CRD III) entered into force on 31 December 2011. Providing guidance on Stressed VaR modelling by credit institutions using the Internal Model Approach (‘IMA’) for the calculation of the required capital for market risk in the trading book, is seen as an important means of addressing weaknesses in the regulatory capital framework and in the risk management of financial institutions that contributed to the turmoil in global financial markets. It is also expected to reduce reliance on cyclical VaR-based capital estimates as well as to contribute to the development of a more robust financial system. The first chapter, on ‘Identification and validation of the stressed period’, elaborates on the value-at-risk model inputs calibrated to historical data from a continuous 12-month period of significant financial stress relevant to an institution’s portfolio and deals with i) The length of the stressed period, ii) The number of stressed periods to use for calibration,

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iii) The approach to identify the appropriate historical period and iv) The required documentation to support the approach used to identify the stressed period. The second chapter, on ‘Review of the stressed period’ provides guidance on the frequency and monitoring of a stressed period. The third chapter on ‘Stressed VaR methodology’ deals with i) Consistency issues between the VaR and Stressed VaR methodologies and ii) The use and validation of proxies in Stressed VaR modelling. The fourth and final chapter, entitled ‘Use tests’ specifies use test requirements. The Guidelines on Stressed VaR are expected to contribute to a level playing field among institutions and to enhance convergence of supervisory practices among the competent authorities across the EU. It is expected that the national competent authorities around the EU will implement the Guidelines by incorporating them within their supervisory procedures within six months after publication of the final guidelines. After that date, the competent authorities must ensure that institutions comply with the Guidelines effectively.

II. Background and Rationale The CRD III trading book amendments, including the requirement of Stressed Value at Risk (VaR) modelling for the calculation of the regulatory capital for market risk in the trading book, are the result of widespread international (G20, Basel, FSF) recognition in 2008 that further regulatory reform was needed to address weaknesses in the current regulatory capital framework and in the risk management of

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financial institutions that contributed to the turmoil in global financial markets. In January 2009, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) proposed supplementing the current VaR-based trading book framework with, among other measures, an incremental risk capital charge (IRC), which includes default risk as well as migration risk for unsecuritised credit products and a stressed value-at-risk requirement. As observed losses in banks' trading books during the financial crisis have been significantly higher than the minimum capital requirements under the Pillar 1 market risk rules, the BCBS proposed to enhance the framework through requiring banks to calculate, in addition to the current VaR, a stressed VaR taking into account a one-year observation period relating to significant losses. The additional stressed VaR requirement is expected to help reduce the pro-cyclicality of the minimum capital requirements for market risk. In the process of refining capital requirements for market risk, the BCBS conducted a quantitative impact study. In the summer of 2009, the Trading Book Group (TBG) investigated the impact of the provisions of the ‘Revisions to the Basel II market risk framework’ and of the ‘Guidelines for computing capital for incremental risk in the trading book’ consultation papers published in January 2009, focusing (generally) on big internationally-active banks with extensive trading activities. The amendments to the Capital Requirements Directive by Directive 2010/76/EU (CRD III) relating to Stressed VaR in the trading book are a direct transposition of the proposals from the BCBS in the EU context. The European Banking Authority is requested to monitor the range of practices in this area and to provide guidelines on Stressed VaR models. The objectives of these Guidelines on Stressed VaR are:

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I. To achieve a common understanding among the competent authorities across the EU on Stressed VaR modelling in order to enhance convergence of supervisory practices; II. To create more transparency for institutions when implementing Stressed VaR into the calculation of the required capital for market risk in the trading book and into their risk management practices; and III. To create a level playing field among institutions in this area. The guidelines presented in this paper do not aim to be a comprehensive set of rules, but rather to complement the new CRD provisions relating to Stressed VaR where additional guidance by the EBA was deemed necessary or appropriate. Given that the Guidelines discussed in this paper do not go beyond the provisions of the CRD but rather clarify how the rules are to be applied in practice a detailed assessment of the costs and benefits associated with them is not required. These costs and benefits are unlikely to be incremental to those identified in the EU Commission’s Impact Assessment accompanying its CRDIII proposal.

III. EBA Guidelines on Stressed VaR Status of these Guidelines 1. This document contains guidelines issued pursuant to Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/78/EC (‘the EBA Regulation’). In accordance with Article 16(3) of the EBA Regulation, competent authorities and financial market participants must make every effort to comply with the guidelines.

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2. Guidelines set out the EBA’s view of appropriate supervisory practices within the European System of Financial Supervision or of how Union law should be applied in a particular area. The EBA therefore expects all competent authorities and financial market participants to whom guidelines are addressed to comply. Competent authorities to whom guidelines apply should comply by incorporating them into their supervisory practices as appropriate (e.g. by amending their legal framework or their supervisory rules and/or guidance or supervisory processes), including where particular guidelines are directed primarily at institutions.

Notification Requirements 3. According to Article 16(3) of the EBA Regulation, competent authorities must notify the EBA as to whether they comply or intend to comply with these guidelines, or otherwise with reasons for non-compliance, by 16.07.2012. In the absence of any notification by this deadline, competent authorities will be considered by the EBA to be non-compliant. Notifications should be sent by submitting the form provided at Section V to [email protected] with the reference ‘EBA/GL/2012/2’. Notifications should be submitted by persons with appropriate authority to report compliance on behalf of their competent authorities. 4. The notification of competent authorities mentioned in the previous paragraph shall be published on the EBA website, as per article 16 of EBA Regulation.

Title I – Subject matter, Scope and Definitions 1. Subject matter These guidelines aim at achieving a common understanding among the competent authorities across the EU on Stressed Value at Risk (VaR)

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models in order to enhance convergence of supervisory practices in line with Annex V of Directive 2006/49/EC, as amended by Directive 2010/76/EU.

2. Scope and level of application 1. Competent authorities should require institutions to comply with the provisions laid down in these Guidelines on Stressed VaR. 2. These guidelines should apply to institutions using an Internal Model Approach (IMA) for the purpose of calculating the capital requirement for market risk in the trading book. 3. The guidelines apply to institutions at the level (solo and/or consolidated) on which the model is authorised to be used by the relevant competent authority, unless stated otherwise in these Guidelines.

3. Definitions In these guidelines the following definitions should apply: a. The term institutions should mean credit institutions and investment firms as set out in Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC. b. The term antithetic data under point 6 of these Guidelines should mean price movements which are considered relevant irrespective of their direction. c. The term de-meaning under point 10 of these Guidelines should mean a quantitative process to remove a trend from historical data. Depending on the positions and the size of the trend, not removing the drift from the historical data to simulate the price variations could generate mainly profitable scenarios and very few and limited losses. d. The term proxy under point 11 of these Guidelines should mean an observable variable or price taken from a liquid market that is used to

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substitute a variable that cannot be observed (or whose hypothetical price does not reflect real transactions from a deep two-way market) and thus cannot be accurately measured. Institutions use proxies both for valuation and risk measurement purposes. From a theoretical perspective three types of proxies can be identified: those applied in the valuation of instruments (which would affect the adequacy of VaR and Stressed VaR as capital measures); those used for VaR calculations (which would also be present in Stressed VaR metrics); and those affecting solely the Stressed VaR calculation.

Title II – Requirements regarding institutions’ Stressed VaR modelling - A. Identification and validation of the stressed period 4. Length of the stressed period 1. The requirement set out in the CRD that the historical data used to calibrate the Stressed VaR measure have to cover a continuous 12-month period, applies also where institutions identify a period which is shorter than 12 months but which is considered to be a significant stress event relevant to an institution’s portfolio. 2. The approach to be applied to identify the stressed period in order to meet the requirement of Paragraph 10a of Annex 5 of Directive 2006/49/EC as amended by Directive 2010/76/EU, to calculate a Stressed VaR measure calibrated to a continuous 12-month period of financial stress relevant to an institution’s portfolio, is the most material element determining the output of the model and is therefore subject to approval by the competent authorities.

5. Number of stressed periods to use for calibration 1. For the purposes of approval of the choice of the stressed period by institutions, a competent authority is the competent authority responsible

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for the exercise of supervision on a consolidated basis of this EU institution and, in the case of an internal model also recognised at a subsidiary’s level, the competent authority responsible for the exercise of supervision of this EU institution’s subsidiary. 2. When the competent authorities approve the stressed period defined at group level according to Article 37(2) of Directive 2006/49/EC referring to Article 129 of Directive 2006/48/EC, a single stressed period should only be required to be defined at group level. 3. As an exception from the above, the competent authorities should require an EU institution to determine a different stressed period at a subsidiary’s level if the stressed period defined for the group is not considered relevant to the subsidiary’s portfolio. Where a single group-wide stressed period is used in an institution that has a subsidiary with a locally approved VaR model, institutions should provide proof that this group-wide stressed period is relevant to the subsidiary’s portfolio.

6. The approach for identifying the appropriate historical period 1. In order to choose a historical period for calibration purposes, institutions should formulate a methodology for identifying a stressed period relevant to their current portfolios, based on one of the following two ways: i. judgement-based approaches; or

ii. formulaic approaches. 2. A judgement-based approach is one that does not use a detailed quantitative analysis to identify the precise period to use for calibration, but rather relies on a high-level analysis of the risks inherent in an institution’s current portfolio and past periods of stress related to those risk factors.

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Where this judgement-based approach is used by institutions, it should include quantitative elements of analysis. 3. A formulaic approach instead is one that applies, in addition to expert judgement, a more systematic quantitative analysis to identify the historical period representing a significant stress for an institution’s current portfolio. This more systematic approach could be employed in a number of ways: i. A risk-factor based approach: an institution identifies a restricted number of risk factors which are considered to be a relevant proxy for the movement in value of its portfolio.

The historical data for these risk factors can then be fully analysed to identify the most stressed period (for example, through identification of the period of highest volatility of the risk factors), in the historical data window.

ii. A VaR based approach: the historical period is identified by running either the full VaR model or an approximation over a historical period to identify the 12-month period which produces the highest resulting measure for the current portfolio. 4. This approach should be employed to determine a historical period that would provide a conservative capital outcome rather than just selecting the period of highest volatility. 5. While either approach may be used by institutions, the use of the formulaic approach, where possible, should be preferred for the identification of the historical period. 6. Institutions may also combine the above two approaches to limit the computational burden of the formulaic approach. This can be done by using the judgement-based approach to restrict the historical data periods to be considered in the formulaic approach.

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7. Irrespective of the approach used, institutions should provide evidence that the stressed period is relevant for their current portfolio and that they have considered a range of potential historical periods in their analyses. The institutions should also have to prove that the portfolio on which the identification of the stressed periods is based is representative of the institutions’ current portfolio, e.g. by applying the approach to identify the stressed period to other typical or previous portfolios. As an example, for many portfolios, a 12-month period relating to significant losses in 2007/2008 would adequately reflect a period of such stress, but, in addition to that, other periods relevant to the current portfolio should also be considered by institutions. 8. In all cases no weighting of historical data should be applied when determining the relevant historical period or when calibrating the Stressed VaR model, as the weighting of data in a stressed period would not result in a true reflection of the potential stressed losses that could occur for an institution’s portfolio. 9. Finally, competent authorities may require institutions to use antithetic data when calibrating the Stressed VaR model, especially where an institution’s portfolio is characterized by frequent position changes.

7. Documentation to support the approach used to identify the stressed period 1. Irrespective of the approach applied, institutions must produce robust documentation justifying the choice of approach made. This should in all cases include quantitative assessments to support the current choice of the historical period and its relevance for the current portfolio. This should also include documentation of the modelling of risk factors’ returns.

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2. Where institutions apply a formulaic approach to identify the stressed period the following issues should, as a minimum, be addressed in the related documentation: i. Justification for the choice of risk factors used if a risk-factor based approach is applied and where fewer than the modelled risk factors are selected. ii. Justification of any simplifications where a simplified VaR model is used to identify the historical period. 3. Where a formulaic approach is applied, which is based on a simplified VaR model, an institution should also provide adequate evidence that the simplified measure gives directionally the same VaR results as the full VaR model (and therefore is accurate in determining the most stressed period). This evidence should include empirical analysis. 4. Where a formulaic approach is applied, which aims at identifying the most volatile period for a set of risk factors, an institution should provide adequate evidence that a period of high volatility is a suitable proxy for a period in which the VaR measure would be high and that the lack of inclusion of correlations or other factors that would be reflected in the VaR measure does not result in rendering this proxy unsuitable.

B. Review of the stressed period 8. Frequency 1. The requirement of the CRD, for the review of the identified 12-month period of significant stress to be performed at least yearly by institutions, means that different circumstances, including a very high turnover in the trading book or specific trading strategies, may require a review of the stressed period with a higher frequency. 2. Any changes to the choice of the historical period following the outcome of the review of the stressed period should be communicated to

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the competent authority before the intended implementation date of the proposed changes.

9. Monitoring the stressed period 1. In addition to the above-mentioned regular review, an institution should have in place procedures which ensure, on an on-going basis, that the specified stressed period remains representative, including when ,market conditions or portfolio compositions have been subject to significant change. 2. In order to put in place sound procedures for the ongoing monitoring of the relevance of a stressed period, an institution should document the soundness of the implemented approach. Monitoring may be based on a variety of factors which may differ among institutions. Factors to be considered include changes in market conditions, in trading strategies or also in portfolio composition. These factors may be analysed by comparing them to changes in the allocation of market values or notionals, in risk factor loadings, in the level of VaR or sensitivities, in the repartition of VaR or sensitivities over portfolios and risk categories, in the P&L and back-testing results or also by the impact of newly approved products on the risk profile. 3. In addition to the above-mentioned procedures, monitoring of Stressed VaR relative to VaR should be performed on an on-going basis, because, while in theory, due to differences in parameterisation, Stressed VaR can exceptionally be smaller than VaR, also at inception, this should not structurally be the case. The ratio between Stressed VaR and VaR at the moment of identification of the relevant stressed period should be used as a reference value for ongoing monitoring.

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Significant decreases in the ratio should be considered as indications for a potential need for review of a stressed period. A ratio between Stressed VaR and VaR below one should be considered as a warning signal triggering a review of the stressed period.

C. Stressed VaR methodology 10. Consistency with VaR methodology 1. The Stressed VaR methodology should be based on the current VaR methodology, with specific techniques required, where applicable, in order to adjust the current VaR model into one that delivers a Stressed VaR measure. Any risk factor occurring in the VaR model should therefore be reflected in the Stressed VaR model. 2. With respect to standards used in both measures, and further to the ones prescribed by the Directive (e.g. the 99% confidence level), institutions may consider the use of ‘square root of time’ scaling to calculate a 10-day Stressed VaR measure. Nevertheless, given some known limitations of the scaling factor, an analysis to demonstrate that the assumptions underlying the use of the ‘square root of time’ rule are appropriate, should form part of the internal model validation process. 3. While the Stressed VaR model should share some of the current VaR standards, others may diverge due to explicit Directive requirements or to methodological incompatibilities related to the Stressed VaR concept. In particular, this is the case in the following areas:

(i) Length of the stressed Period

Given the length of the stressed period must be 12 months, any action to reduce or increase the stated stressed period based on the need for consistency between VaR and Stressed VaR should not be permitted.

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(ii) Back-testing requirement

The multiplication factor ms used for capital requirements should be at least 3 and be increased by an addend between 0 and 1 depending on the VaR backtesting results. Nevertheless, backtesting is not a requirement in itself for determining the Stressed VaR measure.

(iii) Periodicity of the Stressed VaR calculation As the CRD provides that the calculation of the Stressed VaR should be at least weekly, institutions may choose to compute the measure more frequently, for instance, daily, to coincide with the VaR periodicity. If, for example, institutions decide on a weekly Stressed VaR computation, and assuming a one-day Stressed VaR scaled up to 10 days, for the daily calculation of capital requirements based on internal models the following would apply:

a) The same Stressed VaR number would be used for 5 subsequent business days following the running of the Stressed VaR model; b) With respect to the calculation of the average Stressed VaR numbers during the preceding sixty business days, institutions should use the previous 12 Stressed VaR numbers to compute that average; c) An institution should be able to prove that, on the day of the week chosen for Stressed VaR calculation, its portfolio is representative of the portfolio held during the week and that the chosen portfolio does not lead to a systematical underestimation of the Stressed VaR numbers when computed weekly. For example, proof that the VaR is not systematically lower on the day of the week chosen for Stressed VaR calculation could be considered sufficient.

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4. Stressed VaR standards may diverge from VaR standards in other circumstances where there could be methodological incompatibilities between the current VaR and the Stressed VaR model. One example includes changes in the current VaR methodology that cannot be translated into the Stressed VaR measure and the use of local valuation (sensitivity analysis/proxies) as opposed to full revaluation, which is the preferred approach for Stressed VaR. 5. As a general rule, changes in an institution’s VaR model or VaR methodology should be reflected in changes to the model/methodology used to calculate the Stressed VaR charge. 6. Under exceptional circumstances, if an institution can demonstrate that it cannot incorporate enhancements to the current VaR methodology in the Stressed VaR, such situations should be documented and the institution should be able to demonstrate that the impact (for example, in terms of VaR or capital requirements) resulting from the current VaR developments which are not implemented in the Stressed VaR measure is limited. 7. Where sensitivities rather than full revaluation are used within a VaR model, the institution concerned should demonstrate that this approach is still appropriate for Stressed VaR where larger shocks are applied. A sensitivity-based approach for Stressed VaR may require that higher order derivatives/convexity are factored in. 8. Any revaluation ladders or spot/volatility matrices employed should be reviewed and extended to include the wider shocks in risk factors that occur in stressful scenarios. It is preferable that full revaluation be used for Stressed VaR with shocks applied simultaneously to all risk factors. 9. In terms of calibration to market data, the process of ‘de-meaning’ is not considered necessary for Stressed VaR. If there is a significant drift in market data, the use of antithetic data is preferable to ‘de-meaning’.

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10. The table below summarises the main issues described above concerning the level of consistency between the methodological aspects of the current VaR and Stressed VaR measure.

11. Estimation of proxies for Stressed VaR 1. Given that the data constraints that make necessary the use of proxies for VaR, become even more relevant for Stressed VaR and that it is expected that any proxies used in VaR will also be necessary for Stressed VaR, while additional ones may also be needed, whereas any new risk factor not present in the historical data should naturally require the use of a proxy for VaR calculation, but only on a ‘temporary’ basis (e.g. after one year there would be enough real information to complete a 12-month data series), the same proxy should be more ‘permanent’ for Stressed VaR purposes (due to the more constant nature of the historical time series). 2. If a risk factor is missing in the stressed period because it was not observable during that period (for example for a newly listed equity) the

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institution may use another risk factor (in this example, another equity from the same sector and with a similar risk and business profile) for which there is information available and for which a highly correlated behaviour with the factor that the institution is trying to capture can be demonstrated. Where these proxies are used, institutions should consider whether an assumption of 100% correlation between the risk factor and its proxy is appropriate. 3. Institutions may alternatively map the missing factor to another one similar in terms of volatility (though not necessarily correlated). If this approach is used, institutions should demonstrate that it is conservative and appropriate. 4. If a VaR model is enhanced by incorporating a risk factor, an institution should also incorporate it into its Stressed VaR calculations. In certain cases, this may mean reviewing the historical data series for the risk factors and introducing an appropriate proxy. For example where a new risk factor used for valuation purposes is incorporated into the VaR model as required under Annex V point 12 first Paragraph of Directive 2006/49/EC as amended by Directive 2010/76/EU. 5. In all cases, the use of these proxies, including simplifications and any omissions made, will only be acceptable provided they are well documented and their limitations are taken into account and addressed in the institution’s capital assessment.

12. Validation of proxies 1. Whereas validation of a proxy should be broadly performed in the same way for VaR and Stressed VaR, any proxy validated for the day-to-day VaR is not automatically acceptable for Stressed VaR.

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Proxies in use should be reviewed periodically to assess their adequacy and ensure that they provide a conservative outcome. 2. Regarding those proxies which might be used for Stressed VaR purposes only (for instance, due to lack of data in the selected period), an institution should ensure that the risk factor used as proxy is conservative.

13. Validation of model inputs/outputs 1. All qualitative standards defined for the control of consistency, accuracy and reliability of data sources of VaR also apply to Stressed VaR. 2. Underlyings for which institutions do not have a history of data complete enough to cover the reference period, should be shocked by approximation, using closely related underlyings (same market, similar structure and characteristics). Following the same process that has been approved for the institutions’ internal models, in order to ensure the quality of historical data used for the reference period, institutions should document the methodology followed for identifying and for proxying missing data. Institutions should also perform tests of the potential impact of the use of these proxies. 3. With a view to preserving arbitrage inequalities, institutions may need to apply data cleaning for Stressed VaR. Where this is the case, the removal of outliers from historical data series should be appropriately justified and documented, as it should not end up decreasing the magnitude of extreme events. 4. As Stressed VaR entails, by definition, the application of highly stressed scenarios to current market parameters, which may lead to incoherent market conditions (e.g. negative forward rates) more frequently than within a VaR computation, institutions should monitor the calibration failures that may materialise.

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Institutions using full revaluation when estimating their Stressed VaR may be more frequently confronted with those calibration failures than institutions not using full revaluation, not because failures will not happen, but because their methodology will not enable them to spot these calibration failures when they occur.

D. Use test 14. Use test 1. The Stressed VaR model should be subject to a use test through use of Stressed VaR output in risk management decisions. Stressed VaR output should be in place as a supplement to the risk management analysis based on the day-to-day output of a VaR model. The results of Stressed VaR should be monitored and reviewed periodically by senior management. 2. Where Stressed VaR outputs reveal particular vulnerability to a given set of circumstances, prompt steps should be taken to manage those risks appropriately.

Title III – Final Provisions and Implementation 15. Date of application Competent authorities should implement these Guidelines by incorporating them within their supervisory procedures within six months after publication of the final Guidelines. Thereafter, competent authorities should ensure that institutions comply with them effectively.

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IV. Accompanying documents a. Feedback on the public consultation and on the opinion of the BSG 1. The European Banking Authority (EBA) officially came into being on 1 January 2011 and has taken over all existing and ongoing tasks and responsibilities from the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS). 2. On 16 November 2011, the draft Guidelines on Stressed VaR were presented to the EBA’s Banking Stakeholder Group (BSG). The BSG provided broad comments and suggestions, to be considered by the EBA, when finalizing the Guidelines. 3. On 30 November 2011, the EBA submitted the draft Guidelines on Stressed Value at Risk (Stressed VaR) for public consultation. The consultation period ended on 15 January 2012. Ten responses were received. In addition, a public hearing was held on 13 December 2011 at the EBA’s premises in London, to allow interested parties to share their views with the EBA. 4. The responses to the consultation paper were generally positive and supportive of EBA’s work and required only some clarification; however, on some paragraphs in the consultation paper, the majority of the respondents disagreed or requested significant clarification. 5. A detailed account of the comments received and the EBA´s responses to them is provided in the feedback table below. The feedback table is divided between general remarks and specific comments received from respondents and includes a section with EBA’s point of view on them and the changes made in the final guidelines to address them.

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6. In some cases, several respondents made similar comments. In such cases, the comments, and EBA’s analysis of them are included in the section of the detailed part of this paper where EBA considers them most appropriate.

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Models and tools for macroprudential analysis BCBS Working Papers No 21, May 2012 The Basel Committee's Research Task Force Transmission Channel project aimed at generating new research on various aspects of the credit channel linkages in the monetary transmission mechanism. Under the credit channel view, financial intermediaries play a critical role in the allocation of credit in the economy. They are the primary source of credit for consumers and businesses that do not have direct access to capital markets. Among more traditional macroeconomic modelling approaches, the credit view is unique in its emphasis on the health of the financial sector as a critically important determinant of the efficacy of monetary policy.

The final products of the project are two working papers that summarise the findings of the many individual research projects that were undertaken and discussed in the course of the project.

The first working paper, Basel Committee Working Paper No 20, "The policy implications of transmission channels between the financial system and the real economy", analyses the link between the real economy and the financial sector, and channels through which the financial system may transmit instability to the real economy.

The second working paper, Basel Committee Working Paper No 21, "Models and tools for macroprudential analysis", focuses on the methodological progress and modelling advancements aimed at

http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs_wp21.pdf

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improving financial stability monitoring and the identification of systemic risk potential.

Because both working papers are summaries, they touch only briefly on the results and methods of the individual research papers that were developed during the course of the project.

Each working paper includes comprehensive references with information that will allow the interested reader to contact any of the individual authors and acquire the most up-to-date version of the research that was summarised in each of these working papers.

The Research Task Force Transmission Channels Project The Research Task Force Transmission Channel (RTF-TC) project was conceived before the onset of the recent global financial crisis. From the beginning, RTF-TC was intended to be a long-term project that would involve many RTF member institutions. The primary goal was to generate new research on various aspects of the credit channel linkages in the monetary transmission mechanism. Under the credit channel view, financial intermediaries play a critical role in the allocation of credit in the economy. They are the primary source of credit for consumers and businesses that do not have direct access to capital markets. Among more traditional macroeconomic modelling approaches, the credit view is unique in its emphasis on the health of the financial sector as a critically important determinant of the efficacy of monetary policy. Subsequent to the start of the RTF-TC, the onset of the global financial crisis focused policymakers’ attention on the health of the financial sector.

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While the RTF-TC did not anticipate the financial crisis, its work did progress as the financial crisis unfolded.

Many of the research papers produced in this project made use of new data and insights gained from the work that many RTF member institutions undertook during the course of the financial crisis.

Six workshops hosted by the Bank of Italy, by the Bank of France and the French Prudential Supervisory Authority, by the UK Financial Services Authority, by the Bank of Canada and the Canadian Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions, by the US Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and by the Central Bank of Norway provided venues to present innovative research studies, but also, importantly, to receive feedback from RTF member institution colleagues.

The research papers and findings produced by the RTF-TC are in most cases preliminary and still undergoing revision and refinement.

Still, RTF-TC research has produced many new insights and analysis that help us to better understand the linkages between the financial sector and real economy.

The work of the RTF-TC included detailed econometric analysis of credit data from many RTF member countries, theoretical modelling contributions, dynamic stochastic general equilibrium calibration exercises and experiments, and the investigation of new analytical approaches for financial stability monitoring and systemic risk analysis.

The results of these projects should help to inform macroprudential policy development.

The final products of the RTF-TC project are two working papers that summarise the findings of the many individual research projects that were undertaken and discussed in the course of the project.

The first working paper, Basel Committee Working Paper No 20, “The policy implications of transmission channels between the financial system and the real economy”, analyses the link between the real

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economy and the financial sector, and channels through which the financial system may transmit instability to the real economy.

The second working paper, Basel Committee Working Paper No 21, “Models and tools for macroprudential analysis”, focuses on the methodological progress and modelling advancements aimed at improving financial stability monitoring and the identification of systemic risk potential.



Paul Kupiec, FDIC and Chairman of the Basel Committee Research Task Force

Models and tools for macroprudential analysis Introduction The findings of the Research Task Force Transmission Channel (RTF-TC) project are reported in two summary papers.

The role that the financial system played in transmitting instability to the real sector of the economy is examined in the first report of the RTF-TC (Basel Committee Working Paper No 20).

This report focuses on the methodological progress and modelling advancements useful for improving the existing financial stability analytical framework – that is the framework to identify, assess and monitor systemic risk.

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Systemic risk is defined as the risk of disruptions in the provision of key financial services that can have serious consequences for the real economy.

The RTF-TC contributing member institutions conducted new research that was presented at international workshops organised by the group. This research allowed the group to study the interactions between the financial system and the real economy and, more generally, those interactions that have the potential for producing systemic risk.

The workshops facilitated communication among member institution researchers.

In summarising the findings of the group, this report acknowledges the joint contribution of the members of the group and of all the other participants at the workshops (both authors and discussants).

The Appendix lists the papers presented and the workshop participants.

We caution that this document is not a comprehensive literature review, but reflects the specific contributions and insights of the RTF-TC members.

This summary of the RTF-TC’s findings is organised into four sections.

Section 1 discusses analytical methods used to measure the impact of macro-financial shocks on the real economy.

This section includes studies that use dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models (Section 1.1) as well as studies that use more traditional macro stress testing methods (Section 1.2).

Section 2 discusses developments in modelling financial sector liquidity risk including the potential for contagion.

Section 3 discusses methods for measuring the potential for systemic risk.

Section 4 summarises RTF-TC studies that quantify bank behavioural responses to changing central bank and macroprudential policies and macroeconomic conditions.

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Each section includes a summary of the remaining gaps in the literature.

1. What are the impacts of a macro-financial shock on the financial sector and the real economy?

How should the transmission of a macro-financial shock on the banking sector, the macroeconomy, and the possible feedback between the two sectors be measured?

The recent global financial crisis highlighted some key features that need to be incorporated into operational macroprudential models. One feature models must take into account is the importance of the credit and maturity transformation mechanism that lies at the heart of banking. In normal times, banks fund themselves with short-term liquid contracts and invest in illiquid credit instruments with longer maturity duration. Financial sector shocks have the potential to disrupt the normal credit intermediation process and may result in a widespread curtailment of credit to bank dependent customers. A second important modelling feature identified by the crisis is the ability to account for interdependencies (both linear and non-linear) among key financial and macroeconomic variables and for feedback effects between the financial and real sectors.

Models should also account for the fact that, for a set of interconnected, highly leveraged financial institutions, systematic risk is likely to play a more important role than idiosyncratic risk.

These two modelling features, in addition to the lessons learned from the recent crisis, emphasised the need to build a model that can incorporate out-of-equilibrium dynamics, learning, herding behaviour, and contagion.

The RTF-TC research included studies using two different methods for macroprudential modelling that encompasses those aspects: dynamic

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stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models and traditional econometric macro stress testing models.

DSGE models are computable general equilibrium models built from microeconomic-consistent foundations.

These models are calibrated to mimic historical data patterns but are not estimated in the traditional econometric sense.

While DSGE models can be designed to include interesting behavioural features in their representative agents, they do not generate time-series forecasts.

DSGE models are instead designed to answer comparative static or “what if” exercises.

In contrast, traditional macroprudential stress testing methods rely on reduced form econometric model specifications that are estimated using historical data.

These models need not be linked to an underlying model of a rational optimising representative agent.

The ideal macro-financial model would incorporate features of both of these approaches, but the development of operational hybrid models is unlikely in the near term.

Additionally, an important challenge is that this ideal model cannot be overly complex.

Model results must be intuitive and their logic accessible for financial stability authorities to better understand the most important features of the transmission channels between the financial sector and the real economy during periods of extreme widespread stress.

At present, there is no single “best” approach for macroprudential modelling; the approach must be tailored to the data available and to the question at hand.

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1.1 Are dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models useful for understanding the channels of transmission of financial sector shocks?

Can they be used to quantify the impact of a financial sector shock on the real economy?

Can DSGE models help identify whether macro prudential regulations will attenuate or amplify a shock?

How do monetary and macroprudential policies interact?

Can DSGE models be used to optimise macro prudential regulation?

DSGE models are complex, non-linear systems of equations. Initially, DSGE models were developed in the Real Business Cycle literature. Enhanced DSGE models that included market imperfections and nominal rigidities were developed in the so-called New Neoclassical Synthesis which created models in which monetary policy is no longer neutral in the short run. DSGE models have three distinguishing features. First, they are constructed from microeconomic foundations assuming rational forward-looking optimising behaviour of individual economic agents. Secondly, DSGE models are constructed to be internally-consistent with their assumptions and can capture the behavioural interactions between households, firms, and policymakers. As such, DSGE models assume the existence of a stable equilibrium and the risks in these models are purely exogenous shocks that drive the

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economy temporarily away from the steady state to which it dynamically converges according to the optimising behaviour of the different agents. Thirdly, typical DSGE methods cannot easily incorporate irrationality, inefficient markets, and the formation of asset price bubbles. DSGE models can be used to analyse and understand the mechanisms through which exogenous shocks are transmitted to the real economy as the real economy adjusts towards a new equilibrium. In this capacity, DSGE models have been used to explain: (i) How macro variables react to aggregate shocks, either real (eg productivity, exogenous demand, etc) or monetary shocks, (ii) The transmission channels of different economic policies, and (iii) The role of different real and nominal rigidities that may be sources of the observed dynamics of the macroeconomy. In this context, systemic risk is represented by macroeconomic instability, which is originated either by a real or a financial exogenous shock, and is propagated through excessive lending and excessive GDP growth in booms, and vice versa in downturns. In the aftermath of the recent global financial crisis, DSGE models have been criticised for relying too heavily on the assumption of a perfectly competitive capital market. Indeed, under this assumption, the Modigliani-Miller (M-M) theorem holds, and models are incapable of capturing credit channel effects. Because these models lacked a realistic financial sector, they were of little use during the crisis. In this section, we discuss RTF-TC research efforts to attempt to include an accurate financial sector into a DSGE framework and how this

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research has made DSGE models more useful in answering questions regarding financial sector shocks and regulation. The original models of banking activities are too simplistic to use for policy analysis on the effects of capital regulation on credit intermediation. RTF-TC studies have attempted to improve existing models by developing a stylised model of the banking sector that recognises financial frictions on the borrowing and lending side and thereby including a role for bank capital. Micro-founded financial frictions are modelled by assuming imperfect information between lenders (interbank market or depositors) and borrowers (financial intermediaries). Credit contracts in the funding market for banks are not perfect, due to the possibility for banks to be impacted by shocks and the impossibility for their creditors to fully observe these shocks. In some cases, the modelling approach allows for banks to default in equilibrium, as well. Once the model includes financial frictions, there is a natural economic role for bank capital. Several papers analyse how frictions in the financial sector can influence the bank balance sheet and endogenously create an optimal bank capital structure. RTF-TC research uses bank capital to mitigate asymmetric information frictions between lenders and borrowers (financial intermediaries). This endogenous resolution of the agency problem results in constraints on banks’ leverage ratios and implies that equilibrium credit flows will depend on the banks’ equity positions. Any unexpected movement in asset prices – either endogenously, via demand for investment, or exogenously via a financial shock – will affect the banks’ balance sheet and risk premium.

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The shock will endogenously alter the demand for bank capital to attenuate the risk premium and the set of feedbacks that augment the initial change in investment and asset prices. Banks’ endogenous demand for capital also interacts with the interbank market in determining loan supply. In these models, the introduction of a binding regulatory constraint has important implications for the dynamics of the macroeconomic variables, because a costly trade-off arises between equity issuance and a decrease in lending. With these enhancements, DSGE models are better able to address fundamental policy issues, such as the overall importance of financial sector shocks in explaining the business cycle and the role of monetary policy and/ or prudential regulation to avoid or mitigate financial crises. For example, one RTF-TC study shows that, in the presence of financial frictions, aggressive interest rate cuts are required to offset adverse financial shocks. Another RTF-TC study uses an enhanced DSGE model to assess the interaction between monetary and macroprudential policies and the design of an optimal mix of these policies. A comparison of the effects of countercyclical capital requirements, maximum loan-to-value ratios, and maximum leverage ratios with traditional monetary policy instruments shows that countercyclical financial-sector regulation may prove useful in mitigating the business-cycle fluctuations in the aftermath of a technological or a monetary shock, but might as well have an amplification effect if the banks’ capital unexpectedly drops. Even though DSGE models cannot be used to examine the endogenous creation of bubbles, an RTF-TC study attempts to model how the economy is affected by the life cycle of bubbles.

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The results suggest that ownership of the over-valued asset is an important issue. The boom-bust cycle is strongly amplified when the asset experiencing the price bubble is held by banks, but the economy is much less affected if the bubble asset is held by unleveraged agents. Such research may help develop early warning indicators of dangerous bubbles, discussed further in Section 3, and an evaluation of credit conditions that may produce such bubbles. The findings of many of the RTF-TC DSGE studies are preliminary and subject to further refinement. The studies tend to each focus on a particular financial shock in isolation (eg a shock affecting borrowers’ net worth, asset prices, or banks’ capital). Depending on the type of financial shock considered, its consequences and the transmission mechanism can be very different. Second, and perhaps more fundamentally, the work of the RTF-TC group has highlighted a key issue that macroprudential analysts must resolve when using DSGE models for policy analysis: they must strike a balance between simplicity and transparency on the one hand, and reality and completeness on the other hand. Perhaps, the answer lies in the specific purpose for which the model is used in a given instance. In fact, when the focus is on the quantification of the impact of shocks and the role played by banking regulation, a rich framework is needed in order to incorporate meaningful behaviour of the financial system and feedback effects to the macroeconomy. Some of the research conducted by RTF-TC introduced a banking sector in a complicated manner which makes it difficult to fully understand the forces driving the interaction between the real and financial sectors.

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In contrast, if the aim is to understand the transmission channels between the real and the financial sectors, then simpler models appear to be more desirable. While the DSGE model findings reported in this summary are informative, further research and analysis is required. Since DSGE models assume forward-looking rational expectations equilibria, they must be modified to include some type of market or information imperfection before they can accommodate fads, bubbles or the market pricing imperfections that should be considered when analysing financial stability. Since the root causes of investment fads and market inefficiencies remain a mystery for the most part, there are potentially many ways that these features might be introduced into DSGE models and in some cases there is little empirical basis for the mechanism used to generate the financial sector inefficiency. More generally, such studies and the corresponding models, both theoretical and empirical, are but one input into regulatory (and monetary) policymaking, in conjunction with qualitative judgements and analysing trends in a broad range of data. The RTF-TC group has also highlighted several directions for future research on DSGE models: Appropriately enhanced, models can potentially be used to help assess the interactions (and the possible trade-offs) between macroprudential, monetary and fiscal policies, since all policies have a bearing on financial stability. There is a need for a formal normative (welfare) analysis. What are the costs of a macroprudential policy (eg increased bank capital requirements) and how are they distributed among different agents?

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Can we compare the transition costs with the potential benefits in terms of decreased swings in the business cycle?

Do we need to consider the accompanying fiscal policy? - The very nature of financial intermediation is to assume financial risk

due to balance sheet mismatch between assets and liabilities. The research of the RTF-TC group has modified and created models to incorporate a more accurate picture of the financial sector. However, maturity mismatch and the effects of market valuation on assets still need to be satisfactorily incorporated, especially since they represent an important aspect of the recent financial crisis. More generally, future research needs to focus on endogenising the systemic-risk exposures of banks.

- DSGE models can be useful for understanding the bank capital channel, but they are limited by their solution method. DSGE models equilibria are approximated around the model’s steady state and such solutions may become inaccurate when considering large deviations from the steady path. These models also require a unique equilibrium and thereby cannot encompass models with multiple equilibria that allow movements between equilibria. It is an open issue whether local solution methods are useful for studying financial (in)stability and whether they are capable of producing reliable quantitative information in case of financial turmoil.

- Disaggregated models of the economy that include different degrees

of borrower riskiness could help address questions such as: At any given moment, which sectors are at risk?

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How interdependent are the sectors (in other words, what is the correlation among sectors)? By contrast, current DSGE models only consider the net worth of the borrowers independently of the sector to which the borrowers belong and individual risks they might face. Several research papers of the RTF-TC group represent early attempts at including sectoral diversification and matching different degrees of riskiness in capital requirements. More generally, there are a number of features that could potentially be useful to add to DSGE models (diversity of entities in the system and their interactions, risk appetite and expectations) that could help policymakers understand complex quantitative questions. Still, more research is needed in this area.

1.2 How can traditional macro stress testing models (those using a suite-of-models approach) be improved to better measure the transmission and the lasting effects of a macro-financial shock?

Macro stress testing refers to a range of analytical models and tools that are used by central banks and supervisory agencies to assess financial sector vulnerabilities to severe but plausible scenarios of widespread exogenous shocks. For many central banks and supervisors, the practice of macro stress testing was introduced as part of the Financial Sector Assessment Programs conducted by the IMF and the World Bank. As such, macro stress tests can provide valuable information on the potential negative effects on the financial sector that are imposed by severe real sector shocks, and thus help policymakers assess the soundness of the financial system.

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Ideally, macro stress tests could allow bank supervisors to identify institutions whose current financial condition poses risks under alternative macroeconomic scenarios.

Central banks and supervisors typically use a suite of models and tools in a multi-stage process to conduct macro stress testing of credit risk. The first stage involves projecting the dynamic paths of key macroeconomic indicators (such as GDP, interest rates, and house prices) under a certain stress scenario. The projections normally use some combination of structural macroeconometric models, VAR models and vector error correction models, or some other statistical approach. In the second stage, a credit risk satellite model is estimated using either loan performance data (such as non-performing loans, loan loss provisions, or historical default rates) or micro-level data related to the default risk of the household and/or corporate sector. The satellite or auxiliary model is then used to link a measure of credit risk to the variables from the macroeconomic model and to map the external macroeconomic shocks to a bank’s asset quality shocks. Finally, the last stage involves estimating the impact of the asset quality shocks on a bank’s earnings and/or capital. One of the main limitations of traditional stress testing is that the satellite models that are used treat the macroeconomic variables as exogenous and ignore the feedback effects from a situation of distress in the banking system to the macroeconomy. In conducting macro stress tests, the statistical relationship between macroeconomic variables and indicators of the banks’ financial condition can change dramatically under stressed conditions. Therefore, if the focus is only on the conditional mean of a risk measure (as is typical of a traditional stress testing exercise), it can be an inadequate approach in assessing the impact of an aggregate shock.

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During periods of extreme stress, it is especially important to focus on unexpected losses in order to assess the tails of the loss distributions. The research of the RTF-TC group focused on the quantile regression (QR) method to address this issue. The QR approach focuses on the tail events of conditional risk indicator distributions. It allows for the possibility of extreme events leading to changes in the statistical relationships between the risk indicators and macroeconomic variables across the quantiles of the distribution of a given stress indicator and by doing so, provides a more complete picture of covariate effects. For example, a covariates relationship with a stress factor can differ substantially at lower and upper quantiles of a dependent variable compared to its relationship at its mean or median values. RTF-TC research showed that the QR approach is robust to extreme events and can also be used to construct density estimates and forecasts of real activity and financial stress and expected shortfall measures of systemic real risk and systemic financial risk. The QR approach produced more conservative results when compared with other approaches to modelling the macro-credit risk link. The method is very flexible and could have a variety of additional applications in the area of stress testing, such as forecasting interest income, fee income, profits, or loan loss provisions; or on probability of default (PD) estimates and loss-given-default (LGD) estimates which influence risk-weighted assets and capital adequacy ratios. To read the paper: http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs_wp21.htm

http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs_wp21.htm

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The policy implications of transmission channels between the financial system and the real economy BCBS Working Papers No 20, May 2012

The Basel Committee's Research Task Force Transmission Channel project aimed at generating new research on various aspects of the credit channel linkages in the monetary transmission mechanism.

Under the credit channel view, financial intermediaries play a critical role in the allocation of credit in the economy.

They are the primary source of credit for consumers and businesses that do not have direct access to capital markets.

Among more traditional macroeconomic modelling approaches, the credit view is unique in its emphasis on the health of the financial sector as a critically important determinant of the efficacy of monetary policy.

The final products of the project are two working papers that summarise the findings of the many individual research projects that were undertaken and discussed in the course of the project.

The first working paper, Basel Committee Working Paper No 20, "The policy implications of transmission channels between the financial system and the real economy", analyses the link between the real economy and the financial sector, and channels through which the financial system may transmit instability to the real economy.

The second working paper, Basel Committee Working Paper No 21, "Models and tools for macroprudential analysis", focuses on the

http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs_wp20.pdf

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methodological progress and modelling advancements aimed at improving financial stability monitoring and the identification of systemic risk potential.



The policy implications of transmission channels between the financial system and the real economy Introduction

The recent global financial crisis was a catalyst for regulatory change.

Policymakers have strengthened existing micro-prudential tools, such as bank-specific capital and liquidity requirements, and introduced new macro-prudential tools, such as countercyclical capital requirements, capital surcharges for systemically-important financial institutions, and loan-to-value caps to promote financial stability.

In addition, stress testing has taken on new importance both as a means for helping policymakers decide on a course of action and as a tool for communication.

At the same time, data emerging from the crisis provides new information about transmission channels between the financial system and the real economy.

For example, it is now obvious that economic models and analysis must account for the state of the financial system when forecasting the evolution of the macroeconomy.

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Moreover, the crisis has shown that linear approximations based on data from normal economic times fail in periods of financial sector stress.

Such issues highlight the need to improve our understanding of the role of the financial sector in the monetary transmission channel.

Over the past two years, a subgroup of the Research Task Force, the Transmission Channels (RTF-TC) project, has worked to produce original research that addresses questions and outstanding issues regarding the role the financial sector plays, both for economic growth and as a source of economic instability.

During this period, research has been presented by the contributing institutions at several international workshops.

These workshops have facilitated the communication of ideas and the interaction of researchers working on the relevant topics.

Many significant contributions have been made during this time.

This document summarises the group’s findings.

It is important to remember that most of this research is preliminary, and individual authors will continue to refine their analysis and conclusions.

So while we offer this summary of the group’s findings, we stress their preliminary nature, and caution against using these results to formulate policy without further research and supporting analysis.

Moreover, we caution that this document is not a comprehensive literature review, but reflects the specific contributions and insights of the RTF-TC members.

This report is designed as a reference document for policymakers, bank supervisors, and researchers alike and is organised around four topics:

(1) The interactions between bank credit, monetary policy and growth in the real economy;

(2) Costs and benefits of bank capital and liquidity regulation;

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(3) Bank risk taking and monetary policy;

(4) Asset price bubbles and cyclical properties of regulation.

For each of these topics, several key questions have been identified for discussion.

We conclude each section by highlighting the new issues and questions that have arisen and identify some remaining gaps in the literature.

1. The interactions between bank credit, monetary policy and growth in the real economy Brief summary of literature This section focuses on the interactions between credit, economic growth, the banking sector and the real economy. It is well-known that monetary policy affects the supply of bank credit. Halvorsen and Jacobsen (2009), Hammerlsland and Traee (2010) and Tabak et al (2010) all confirm that tighter monetary policy has a negative impact on bank lending. Moreover, this effect reflects at least in part a reduction in loan supply as shown by Ciccarelli et al (2010), Black and Rosen (2009), Jimenez et al (2010), Havro and Vale (2011) and Jimborean and Messonier (2010). The transmission channel of loan supply to the real economy is investigated in Hirataka et al (2010), Dedola and Lombardo (2009), Jimenez et al (2010), de Haas and van Horen (2010) and Black and Rosen (2009).

These papers find that bank balance sheet conditions greatly influence the transmission of shocks to the real economy as the health of bank balance sheets affects bank lending and the credit available to bank dependent borrowers.

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The efficacy of monetary policy may depend on market conditions. Havro and Vale (2011), Ciccarelli et al (2010), de Haas and van Horen (2010) and Boissay (2011) show that a drop in market liquidity weakens the credit channel of monetary policy and leads to a negative contribution to GDP.

Monnin and Jokipii (2010) find a positive link between measures of banking sector soundness and growth in the real economy.

Some RTF-TC research focused on understanding the impact of leverage and liquidity on the provision of credit. The evidence appears to be mixed.

Some authors do not find a clear direct effect of leverage on lending (Havro and Vale (2011)), while others provide evidence that better capitalised banks, to a varying degree, are more willing to lend (Berrospide and Edge (2010); Foglia et al (2010)).

Further evidence of the importance of bank health is provided by Francis and Osborne (2009) who show that banks with capital in excess of their own capital target lend more than their peers.

The impact of liquidity on the provision of credit appears to be similar. Banks with more liquid portfolios appear more willing to lend (Havro and Vale (2011)).

Based on findings by the RTF-TC, this section of the report addresses the following questions:

(1) How does monetary policy impact the credit channel?

(2) Do financial market conditions impact the credit channel?

(3) What is the relative importance of the bank lending and borrower balance sheet channels in the financial transmission mechanism?

(4) How do higher capital standards impact economic growth, credit availability and financial stability?

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(1) How does monetary policy impact the credit channel? Empirical studies have found evidence that increases in the central bank policy rate have a negative impact on bank lending. Examples of such papers using macroeconomic data include Halvorsen and Jacobsen (2009) and Hammerlsland and Traee (2010) which study both the UK and the Norwegian economies. Similarly, at the micro (bank) level, Tabak et al (2010) find that bank lending is reduced in response to an increase in the central bank policy rate in Brazil. While such an effect is consistent with the existence of credit channel influences on credit supply, these studies do not prove that credit channel effects are present since they do not identify whether the amount of credit changes because of a shift in credit supply or a change in credit demand. Several papers have tried to solve this identification problem. Ciccarelli et al (2010) use the confidential euro area Bank Lending Survey and the publicly-available US Senior Loan Officer Survey to disentangle the effects of loan supply from loan demand. They find loan supply to be more sensitive to monetary policy shocks than loan demand. Black and Rosen (2009) use bank-level data on extensions of business credit to examine how monetary policy affects aggregate loan supply. They examine the distribution of loans across firms of different sizes, the maturity structure of loan originations and the supply of loans from small and large banks. They find monetary policy affects aggregate loan supply by causing variation in the maturities of new originations, with the impact being at least as strong for large banks as for small banks.

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Jiménez et al (2010) use disaggregated data for analysing the bank lending channel and conclude that the provision of loans is significantly affected by tighter monetary policy. Havro and Vale (2011) as well as Jimborean and Mésonnier (2010) provide further evidence using Norwegian and French data, respectively. The empirical findings highlighted above suggest that at least part of the effect on bank lending from tighter monetary policy is supply driven, ie there is a bank lending channel for monetary policy.

(2) Do financial market conditions impact the credit channel? Financial market conditions appear to affect the strength of the credit channel. More specifically, a decrease in market liquidity weakens the credit channel of monetary policy and results in slower GDP growth for any given level of the policy rate. Even in the presence of very low interest rates, when market liquidity conditions are poor, credit availability is subdued as banks tighten lending standards, especially for uncollateralised borrowers. Recent theoretical models have considered the optimal policy responses to adverse financial shocks; such models suggest that aggressive easing of monetary policy is appropriate and that higher capitalised banking systems can attenuate this liquidity effect. Norwegian banks were not exposed to subprime-related assets, but they were affected by global market liquidity conditions.

Havro and Vale (2011) regard the aftermath of the Lehman crisis as an exogenous liquidity shock for the Norwegian banking system.

They find that, following the Lehman bankruptcy shock, Norwegian banks’ loan supply curve became considerably steeper and the traditional

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bank lending channel of monetary policy may not have been working in the crisis period.

In a related study, Ciccarelli et al (2010) show that during the recent financial crisis, liquidity problems had a strong negative impact on GDP growth by reducing loan supply to businesses.

The wholesale market plays a central role in determining market liquidity conditions.

Boissay (2011) argues theoretically that the wholesale financial market improves the allocation of liquidity inside the banking sector, but becomes fragile when available liquidity exceeds the liquidity absorption capacity of the economy.

This leads to a “crisis time” equilibrium that is characterised by deleveraging.

Monetary policies may have to adapt to reflect the condition of the financial sector.

De Fiore and Tristani (2009) develop a model that relaxes the assumption of frictionless financial markets and show that an aggressive easing of policy is an optimal response to adverse financial market shocks.

Similarly, using dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models with financial frictions, Dib (2010) finds that higher capital requirements can attenuate the real impact of financial shocks on the macroeconomy; and Tomura (2010) demonstrates that liquidity mismatches in bank balance sheets lead to an endogenous demand for bank capital to prevent bank runs.

In a financial crisis, bank behaviour can offset monetary policy stimulus. De Haas and van Horen (2010) examine how the global financial crisis prompted banks to tighten lending standards despite very low policy interest rates.

Using data on syndicated loans made to private borrowers in 65 countries over the period 2005–2009, they find tighter lending standards for

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uncollateralised loans, for loans to first-time borrowers and for financial-sector borrowers in developed countries.

Increases in borrower screening and monitoring were less evident for rated borrowers and for loans structured by well-known arrangers.

Analysis of counterparty exposures may help anticipate bank crisis behaviour.

Castrén and Kavonius (2009) use euro area flow-of-funds data to construct a sector-level network of bilateral balance sheet exposures, which they extend to risk-based balance sheets.

They find that bilateral cross-sector exposures are important channels through which financial

intermediaries affect borrowers in other sectors including the transmission of financial sector shocks.

(3) What is the relative importance of the bank lending and borrower balance sheet channels in the financial transmission mechanism? The evidence of the importance of bank capital positions for sustaining bank loan growth is mixed but the data supports the importance of household balance sheets as a factor limiting credit. Some studies find that well capitalised banks are more likely to grant credit and are less likely to limit credit. However, other studies find banks that are holding less capital are more willing to lend. On the borrower side of the equation, research shows that balance sheet conditions are the dominant credit channel affecting households. Households with weak balance sheets and credit performance are less likely to obtain credit from a bank.

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Bank capital conditions can affect the strength of the credit channel. Foglia et al (2010) use bank loan- and firm-level data to separate bank lending effects from borrower balance sheet effects in order to quantify how loan supply constraints affected real investment spending following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008.

They find that well capitalised banks with balanced maturity structures were less likely to ration credit.

Moreover, after the Lehman crisis, rationed firms tended to reduce investment spending by a greater amount than non-rationed firms.

Jiménez et al (2010) use an extensive dataset of business loan applications and originations to examine how lending is related to the balance sheet conditions of both the banks as well as the firms seeking credit.

They find that both of these balance sheets (banks’ and business’) play an important role in determining how changes in economic activity or short-term interest rates affect the extension of credit.

Unsurprisingly, well-capitalised firms were more likely to be granted credit than their more poorly-capitalised counterparts.

However, banks with less capital or liquidity (ie riskier banks) were more, not less, likely to make loans.

Avery et al (2010) use localised measures for bank health and household debt performance to examine how bank and borrower balance sheets affect local economic activity.

On the local level, bank capital had a stronger direct link to economic activity (unemployment rates) during the housing boom and bust period than during the previous decade.

However, this capital channel does not appear to operate through expanded household lending, a finding that may reflect that national lenders dominate US mortgage and consumer credit markets.

This is consistent with the idea that balance sheet conditions are the dominant credit channel affecting households and suggests that, at least

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at the local level, banks matter mainly for business spending, through commercial and industrial lending.

Theoretical models may help to explain the interaction between bank lending and borrower balance sheet channels that we observe in the data. Hirakata et al (2011) develop a DSGE model where financial intermediaries invest household savings with entrepreneurs.

In this model, shocks to borrower creditworthiness are propagated to the real economy through the revisions of credit contracts.

When the model is estimated using US data, the authors find that adverse shocks to financial intermediaries cause larger economic downturns than do shocks to entrepreneurs.

In another theoretical paper, Dedola and Lombardo (2009) model a two-country economic system with a financial accelerator and an endogenous portfolio choice to show how foreign exposures in the balance sheets of leveraged investors can propagate shocks across countries.

In this framework, financial sector shocks can cause large real sector shocks even with minimal balance sheet exposure to foreign risky assets (so long as asset market integration across borders generates an equalisation of external finance premia faced by leveraged investors).

In this scenario, a global flight to quality will yield similar (de-)leveraging, financial and macroeconomic dynamics across countries.

Bank lending shocks have important effects on real sector growth and volatility.

Halvorsen and Jacobsen (2009) find that bank lending shocks explain a substantial share of output gap variability in Norway and the UK from 1988 through 2009.

This period includes both the Norwegian banking crisis (1988–1993) and the more recent financial crisis in the UK.

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Using data for 18 OECD countries from 1981 through 2008, Monnin and Jokipii (2010) examine the relationship between banking sector stability and the real economy.

Using country-level indicators of financial sector health, they find a relationship between banking sector stability and the performance of the real economy.

In a related study, Jimborean and Mésonnier (2010) link French bank balance sheet characteristics to macroeconomic fluctuations and find that banking sector conditions matter more for real sector performance during crisis periods.

Moreover, since the results show that feedback effects tend to be largely driven by periods of instability, there are likely to be real economic benefits from well-executed macroprudential supervision.

Together these studies suggest several important ways through which financial sector problems magnified real sector volatility.

Bank capital and liquidity problems had adverse real consequences through reductions in credit supplied to businesses.

At the same time, the severe impairment of households’ balance sheets and the deterioration of their credit performance reduced the willingness of even healthy banks to lend to the household sector.

(4) How do higher capital standards impact economic growth, credit availability, and financial stability? Since the financial crisis, policymakers have focused on regulatory enhancements aimed at preventing future crises. Bank capital regulation has been at the forefront of discussions as a means to ensure the resilience of the global financial system. Despite the obvious benefits of increasing required capital, critics argue that stronger capital and liquidity regulations will reduce bank credit, stifle economic growth and reduce financial stability.

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In this section, we discuss the RTF-TC’s findings regarding bank capital, economic growth, credit availability, and financial stability.

(a) Bank capital and economic growth Bank capital and liquidity regulations must strike a balance between costs and benefits. Several papers presented at the RTF-TC workshops compare the costs and benefits associated with higher capital and/or liquidity requirements. For example, Francis and Osborne (2010) model the costs of additional capital as an increase in the wedge between lending and deposit rates and estimate the net economic benefits associated with a range of changes in prudential standards. In a related study, Kato et al (2010) show that the optimal level of bank capital varies considerably depending on the level of banks’ liquidity as well as macroeconomic conditions. The optimal level of bank capital may not be constant over the business cycle.

In addition to comparing costs and benefits associated with tighter regulations, Kato et al (2010) highlight the need for a countercyclical buffer to better prepare for prospective distress.

Repullo et al (2010) offer a specific proposal for a countercyclical capital buffer.

Christensen et al (2011) show that absent regulation, bank leverage fluctuates as the macroeconomic environment changes to accommodate the economy’s requirements for lending with the natural inertia in bank capital.

Regulation that limits, or directs, movements in leverage can thus importantly affect the propagating impact of bank capital.

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(b) Bank capital and credit availability When a bank faces a capital shock from losses or a change in regulation, it must consider the trade-off between the marginal costs of issuing equity and the marginal cost of cutting back on lending. Kiley and Sim (2010) model this trade-off. Banks respond to a shock through a mix of financial disintermediation and recapitalisation. Agur (2010) analyses the trade-off between financial stability and credit rationing that arises when capital requirements are increased and shows that with greater use of wholesale finance, capital requirements have a stronger impact on the real economy. This impact results from feedback effects between loan rates and funding rates. Since uninsured financiers – who represent wholesale investors – care about the risk of the bank they are lending to, higher loan rates lead to higher funding rates, which amplifies the impact of capital requirements. The empirical evidence on the effects of capital shocks on lending supports the theory.

Francis and Osborne (2010) use data on UK banks and show that better capitalised banks are more willing to supply loans.

This feature is especially true in times of crisis (Foglia et al (2010)). Coffinet et al (2010) use micro data on French banks to show that bank capital behaves in a procyclical manner especially when better quality capital is considered.

Darracq et al (2010) assess the effects of introducing risk-sensitive and more stringent capital requirements.

They show that a bank capital shock results in an increase in bank leverage which, in order for banks to re-establish their target leverage ratio, leads to an increase in banks’ loan-deposit margins.

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This is mainly driven by higher lending rates, which in turn lower loan demand and real activity.

They conclude that if banks have more time to adjust their activities and balance sheets to a new environment, they will tend to smooth the impact of the shock.

(c) Bank capital and financial stability In the aftermath of the recent financial crisis, much debate has been focused on new regulations that were introduced to preserve financial stability. In addition to the need to increase individual bank resilience, a consensus has emerged regarding the need to consider financial stability from a systemic perspective. Some papers studied by the working group estimate models of bank default probabilities as well as the probability of a financial crisis more generally. Osborne et al (2010) and Kato et al (2010) estimate probit/logit models of the probability of a financial crisis occurring. Capital and liquidity ratios are key determinants of the likelihood of a crisis with higher ratios being associated with a reduced probability. Higher capital and liquidity standards lower the probability of a crisis. Capital regulations may need to consider the potential for contagion. Gauthier, Lehar and Souissi (2010) estimate overall systemic risk by explicitly incorporating contagion externalities present in the financial system. They show that systemic capital allocations can differ substantially and are not directly related to bank size or individual bank default probability.

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Systemic capital allocation mechanisms are estimated to reduce default probabilities of individual banks as well as the probability of a systemic crisis by about 25%. Their results suggest that financial stability can be enhanced by implementing a systemic perspective on bank regulation.

New questions and issues that have arisen In assessing this strand of literature, some new questions and issues have arisen. What roles do the structures of the bank and the non-bank sectors play in the longer-term development of real estate booms? Evidence suggests that low interest rates were one of the key factors contributing to the leverage build up; however, competition between the un-regulated and regulated financial sectors may have contributed to risk taking in extending credit to riskier borrowers. How have credit market developments that increase the degree of lending beyond the banking sector affected linkages between the banking system and the real economy? Similarly, how do secular trends in bank credit extensions – such as shifts to asset-based lending in real estate boom periods – affect linkages between banks and the real economy during bust periods? Finally, an important dimension of the bank lending channel is the potential for a misallocation of resources in the real economy. Is there some way to quantify the real effects of bank lending in terms of types of investment spending occurring in the real sector of an economy and the attendant misallocation of resources associated with overbuilding in the residential real estate sector?

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Remaining gaps in the literature

Several important gaps remain in the literature studying the interaction between credit, growth, the banking sector and the real economy.

Evidence on the role of financial markets in the credit transmission channel of monetary policy remains scarce, while the role of market funding and securitisation should also be further researched.

In addition, in light of the vast amount of public funds injected into the financial system during the course of the financial crisis, the efficacy of public (vs private or market-based) capital injections remains relatively unexplored.

Such evidence could perhaps inform on the macroeconomic implications of loss absorbency that is provided using contingent capital or bail-in debt instruments to systemically important institutions.

Moreover, another interesting question is whether new regulations should account for government shareholders in the bank.

From a methodological point of view – regardless of the methodology used (ie VAR-type models, DSGE models, or theoretical models) – limited attention has been paid to nonlinearities and structural breaks.

For instance, the effect of Basel II inception or the specificity of downturn periods has only been scarcely investigated.

In light of the recent financial crisis, nonlinearities in relationships in crisis and non-crisis periods have emerged as a key gap in the research. More work is needed to understand differences between how credit channels work in both good and bad times.

In addition, there is little evidence on how the financial environment prior to a crisis affects the economic significance of a particular credit channel for economic activity.

Further work on these issues would also be fruitful.

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Additionally, more work needs to be done to identify shocks to loan supply that are due to changes in loan demand generated by future profit expectations.

Credit demand reflects expectations about future investment opportunities as asset values are inherently forward looking.

Thus lower asset values can change credit demand by affecting the balance sheets of banks and borrowers, but they may also signal lower expected future returns from holding the asset which may itself reduce the demand for credit.

Finally, more research is needed to understand how linkages between banking sector conditions and real sector activity are related to specific institutional and regulatory features of an economy.

2. Costs and benefits of bank capital and liquidity regulation Brief summary of literature Higher capital and liquidity requirements may generate social benefits by reducing the frequency and severity of banking crises and the accompanying loss of economic output, and may generate costs by impacting the price and availability of credit and other financial services, and thereby altering the level of investment and output in the economy. Schanz (2009), Schanz et al (2011), Barrell et al (2009) and Kato et al (2010) aim to quantify the overall costs and benefits of higher capital and/or liquidity standards. The results of these studies are broadly similar, although there are some quantitative differences, reflecting different assumptions about departures from the Modigliani-Miller (M-M) theorem, among other factors. In terms of the benefits that would result from tighter regulation, Barrell et al (2009) and Kato et al (2010) both find that higher standards should lower the probability of a financial crisis.

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In contrast, Schanz et al (2011) concludes that the results vary depending on the specific assumptions that are made in the model.

The thrust of the literature on the role of bank capital and liquidity is that more capital and liquidity will smooth credit availability over financial cycles, although whether this outcome can be achieved by imposing fixed requirements remains somewhat less clear.

This section considers the following questions:

(1) What are the costs and benefits of higher capital and liquidity requirements?

(2) What are the key differences between studies on the costs of increased capital requirements?

(3) What are the implications of these liquidity and credit supply findings for the Basel liquidity standards?

(4) Is it possible to quantify the benefits of tighter regulation?

(1) What are the costs and benefits of higher capital and liquidity requirements? Following the recent financial crisis, it has been widely recognised that in order to reduce the risk of future financial crises, both capital and liquidity buffers are needed to withstand shocks. Several papers shed light on the costs and benefits of stricter capital and liquidity regulations and provide significant insight into the new standards. The costs of higher capital and liquidity requirements are generated by the impact that higher requirements have on the price and the availability of credit, and the effect that this has on the level of investment and output in the economy.

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One of the benefits of higher capital and liquidity standards is a lower probability of a financial crisis and the associated reduction in the expected cost of such a crisis in terms of lost output.

The studies reviewed (Schanz et al (2011), Barrell et al (2009) and Kato et al (2010)) make varying assumptions about each of these elements, leading to somewhat different results in terms of the overall costs and benefits of the more robust standards.

Osborne et al (2010) enhance the UK Financial Services Authority/National Institute of Economic and Social Research (FSA/NIESR) modelling framework by including micro-foundations that generate individual bank responses to changes in prudential standards.

They also include alternative parameterisations of the macroeconomic costs and benefits used in the framework.

Macroeconomic costs associated with liquidity are refined using market and regulatory data (between 1999 and 2007) and integrated into the National Institute Global Econometric Model (NiGEM) framework and the model is modified to account for changes in the composition of regulatory capital.

The improved model has fewer type 1 errors (ie the failure to identify an observed crisis) and fewer type 2 errors (ie the false identification of a crisis).

This finding suggests that capital and liquidity requirements are both important for reducing the probability of and macroeconomic costs of a crisis.

(2) What are the key differences between studies on the costs of increased capital requirements? Bank capital is costly because of frictions in financial markets that lead to deviations from M-M, which would otherwise predict that higher equity capital would not increase banks’ funding costs.

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In the calculation of the costs, banks are assumed to pass on the extra funding costs from higher capital to borrowers by raising lending rates. This reduces the activities of borrowers, thereby resulting in a loss in GDP. The papers reviewed differ from each other in the assumptions that they adopt regarding the magnitude of the deviations from M-M, resulting in different estimates of the costs of higher capital requirements. To estimate the effects of costly bank capital, Schanz et al (2011) applies a range of assumptions about deviations from M-M to data on the cost of equity and debt in the UK.

The paper concludes that the curve showing the marginal benefits of higher capital ratios is quite steep at the intersection with all of the (horizontal) marginal cost estimates, so estimates of the “optimal” capital ratio do not vary much in the cost estimates.

Due to the challenges associated with achieving a definitive parameterisation of the relationship between capital ratios and the cost of credit, Barrell et al (2009) take an empirical approach using an estimate of the long-run relationship between the capital ratio and the cost of credit for the economy of the UK.

The parameters they estimate result in an impact of a one percentage point increase in the capital ratio of around 12–15 basis points.

Compared to the Schanz et al (2011) results, these represent a relatively conservative parameterisation.

The study by Kato et al (2010) uses a formula for welfare loss associated with capital requirements taken from van den Heuvel (2008).

Changes in the cost of bank credit will translate into changes in investment, consumption and GDP.

Schanz et al (2011) calculates the long-term impact of the increase in loan rates on GDP using a CES production function with increased firms’ cost of capital due to higher loan rates, whereas Kato et al (2010) and Barrell et

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al (2009) use in-house macroeconomic models for this element of the modelling.

The cost of higher liquidity is calculated by a “cost of carry” that is equal to the increase in the cost of credit required to offset the impact of holding a higher proportion of liquid assets with lower yield, such as cash and government bonds, on either return on equity (ROE) or return on assets (ROA).

(3) What are the implications of these liquidity and credit supply findings for the Basel liquidity standards? The effects of liquidity requirements may depend on monetary conditions. Much of the research considering the impact of higher liquidity standards on financial stability has been limited to empirical models of the probability of a financial crisis. Several recent studies have examined how liquidity conditions affect credit supply under tight monetary conditions. Among these, Jimenez et al (2011) finds that banks with more liquid assets tend to be more resilient to tight monetary policy and deteriorating economic conditions, while weaker banks tend to contract credit supply. These results may be explained by banks with stronger balance sheets being better able to raise funds during tight monetary conditions, consistent with the finding that higher liquidity is associated with a lower probability of a crisis (and, in the case of Schanz et al (2011), lower probability of individual banks defaulting). These findings are largely consistent with the traditional view of the bank lending channel. Banks with stronger liquidity positions are more likely to maintain lending, but this may not provide accurate guidance as to the potential impact of minimum liquidity standards.

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The beneficial impact of higher liquidity during stressed market conditions, together with the already existing literature on the bank lending channel seem to suggest that higher liquidity standards will smooth credit supply over financial cycles.

However, we should be cautious about drawing conclusions about liquidity requirements from results on the effect of liquidity conditions.

There are other factors which could explain the results with respect to liquidity conditions.

For example, banks that anticipate strong loan demand in the near future, or banks that have a lot of outstanding loan commitments may optimally decide to hold more liquid assets today in order to be ready for the moment the lending opportunities materialise, as in the traditional “pecking order” theory of corporate finance.

This could explain the observed correlation, but it does not mean that if banks are required to hold more liquid assets then they will automatically lend more, as they will not have the same investment opportunities.

Indeed, requiring higher liquid assets could reduce the supply of credit if it reduces the net present value of lending opportunities.

Consider as well the issue that a bank subjected to a regulatory requirement to hold a specified level of liquid assets may not be able to absorb shocks as well as one not subject to the requirement.

The former may be unable to sell its liquid assets because it would fall below the liquidity requirement.

In this manner, liquidity held by choice is distinct from liquidity held because of a requirement.

Another possibility recognises that banks may adjust their loans and liquidity to maintain a preferred balance.

Suppose exogenous factors could push liquid assets above banks’ desired level.

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The bank may respond by expanding credit to regain its desired balance with liquid assets.

Hence, the correlation between liquid asset holdings and credit supply could be just a short-run phenomenon (eg Francis and Osborne (2009) or Berrospide and Edge (2010)).

According to this view, higher liquidity standards could reduce credit supply by reducing the amount of excess liquid assets.

This view suggests that studies need to closely examine the reasons why some banks have higher liquidity ratios than others in order to be able to understand the effect of higher liquidity standards.

(4) Is it possible to quantify the benefits of tighter regulation? Estimates of the benefits of tighter regulation depend on whether empirical models incorporate non-linear terms to account for the potential imperfect substitutability between liquidity and capital. Papers by Barrell et al (2009) and Kato et al (2010) model the probability of a financial crisis based on historical data and using capital and liquidity measures as regressors. There are two significant differences between the studies. Barrell et al (2009) model only linear effects for the capital ratio and the liquidity ratio and this assumption can lead to corner solutions where it is optimal to hold either capital or liquidity, but not both. Kato et al (2010) identifies non-linear effects of capital and liquidity, which implies that capital and liquidity may be imperfect substitutes for each other, in the sense that higher capital is more effective in reducing the probability of a crisis if liquidity is high as well. The finding that capital and liquidity are mutually reinforcing may be interpreted as providing support for the introduction of international liquidity standards as a supplement to capital standards.

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Another important distinction is the use of different measures of liquidity. Whereas Barrell et al (2009) find a role for the ratio of liquid assets-to-total assets, Kato et al (2010) have the same finding but also find that higher liability-side liquidity (ie the extent to which firms rely on long-term debt) is also a key mitigant of the probability of crisis. Calculating the net benefits of higher standards means combining the estimates of the reduction in the likelihood of a crisis by the estimated cost of a financial crisis.

The difficulties for doing this are well described by Schanz et al (2011) who show both that a wide range of estimates are available, and that very different results can be obtained by varying the assumption of whether financial crises result in a permanent reduction in growth.

New questions and issues that have arisen The introduction of Basel III has generated substantial interest in understanding the economic consequences of enhanced prudential standards. Many of the costs and benefits associated with the new rules have been addressed in the literature discussed above. However, several new questions and issues have emerged.

The studies have looked at the potential impact of liquidity standards, which are now based on an internationally agreed standard. While the research suggests that banks with greater liquidity can better maintain lending over the cycle, there is a need for further research on how banks react to liquidity standards, the potential costs of such standards, and the potential impact on banks’ risk-taking. Analytical input will be needed to monitor and investigate how the new standards (the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) and the net stable funding

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ratio (NSFR)) work in practice to reduce the risk inherent in a bank and the banking sector. What are the likely behavioural effects of new capital and liquidity standards? In particular, what impact will higher standards have on banks’ risk-taking? Could the substantial increase in standards seen in Basel III result in a migration of risk to the nonbank sector, and if so, how can this be addressed? How do the costs and benefits of higher standards vary depending on economic and financial conditions? The papers by Schanz et al (2011) and Kato et al (2010) showed that variations in initial conditions had a large effect on the results in terms of optimal calibration of prudential policy and thus it will be important to understand what drives these differences, particularly in light of the increased focus on “macroprudential” policies. Indeed, the net benefits associated with Basel III implementation in each jurisdiction will likely depend on the economic and financial conditions before and during the transition period, which of course can vary across jurisdictions. How should feedback effects from the macroeconomy be evaluated, both in the context of whether there are steady-state or transitional costs of higher standards, and how shocks can be amplified by an undercapitalised banking system when standards are in some sense too low?

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Remaining gaps in the literature Together, the papers discussed above provide a useful clarification of the issues relating to bank capital and liquidity regulations, but several gaps in the literature remain. More work is needed to understand the nature of the costs of a financial crisis. In particular, is the effect on economic growth temporary or permanent? Is the loss due to the occurrence of a crisis recoverable? What determines the magnitude of a loss? Do output loss estimates need to be adjusted for the possibility that a financial crisis could potentially be caused by a slowdown of the economy, rather than the other way around? Moreover, it is still unclear how the probability of a crisis occurring would change when banks with different levels of capital and liquidity – even if the average of the banking sector as a whole is still the same – are interconnected within a certain jurisdiction and across jurisdictions. In addition, the extent to which banks would pass on the costs from stricter regulation to their borrowers remains unclear. To what extent would the effect come from increasing loan rates and to what extent by credit rationing? How does the impact change depending on the economic environment, the degree of competition in financial service markets, financial structure (the importance of indirect finance), and the size of the borrowers? Finally, even though a leverage ratio has been introduced as part of the Basel III package, most of the studies reviewed focus on risk-weighted capital ratios.

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In this context, it may be useful to further examine how and when these two different capital regulations might complement or contradict each other for reducing the risks posed to the financial system and the real economy. To read more: http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs_wp20.htm

http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs_wp20.htm

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NIST Forensic Measurement Challenge May 14, 2012 Recently, NIST announced the availability of $2.5 million for funding criminal justice applications that use new scientific discoveries. Thirty-six proposals were received, and the judges found it difficult to narrow the choices. However, the OLES Forensic Science Program and five outside experts thoroughly reviewed the proposals and selected five for immediate funding.

Rapid High Sensitivity DNA Extraction Using Direct Rapid Analysis Generating Extracted Nucleotides (DRAGEN) proposal by the Materials Measurement Laboratory;

Nuclear Forensic Reference Materials for Attribution of Urban Nuclear Terrorism proposal by the Physical Measurement Laboratory;

Proposal to establish a National Ballistics Evidence Search Engine (NBESE) based on 3D topography measurements on correlation cells, by the Physical Measurement Laboratory;

Metrics for Manipulation and Enhancement of Forensic Images proposal by the Information Technology Laboratory; and

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Production of Seized Drug Analysis Standards through Inkjet Printing Technology proposal by the Materials Measurement Laboratory.

The Information Technology Laboratory (ITL) at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). As one of the major research components of the National Institute of Standards and Technology, the Information Technology Laboratory (ITL) has the broad mission to promote U.S. innovation and industrial competitiveness by advancing measurement science, standards, and technology through research and development in information technology, mathematics, and statistics. Information technology is the acknowledged engine for national and regional economic growth. The push for its adoption in all sectors is overwhelming. The insertion of advanced technologies at national or global scales often disrupts established social processes and interacts with other complex societal systems in unpredictable ways. ITL researchers have developed detailed protocols and operational standards that mitigate anticipated discrepancies in their operation, and established assessment criteria and test data sets for validation of industrial products. Within NIST's traditional role as the overseer of the National Measurement System, ITL is addressing the hard problems in IT Measurement Research. ITL formulates metrics, tests, and tools for a wide range of subjects such as information complexity and comprehension, high confidence software, space-time coordinated mobile and wireless computing, as well as, issues of information quality, integrity, and usability.

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ITL has been charged to lead the nation in utilizing existing and emerging IT to meet national priorities that reflect the country's broad based social, economic, and political values and goals. Its extended charge continues under the Federal Information Security Management Act to develop cybersecurity standards, guidelines, and associated methods and techniques. Charged under other legislation, such as the USA PATRIOT Act and the Help America Vote Act, ITL is addressing the major challenges faced by the nation in the areas of homeland security and electronic voting. ITL seeks to scale new frontiers in Information Measurement Science to enable international social, economic, and political advancement by collaborating and partnering with industry, academia, and other NIST laboratories to advance science and engineering, setting standards and requirements for unique scientific instrumentation and experiments, data, and communications. In the past decade, advances in computing and communications technologies have unleashed the power of the Internet and forever changed the landscape for commerce and government. ITL has played an important role in facilitating this transformation and is engaged in preparing the nation for the next phase of the Information Revolution.

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Remarks by Assistant Secretary for Economic Policy Jan Eberly before the American Institute of Certified Accountants (AICPA) 5/18/2012

WASHINGTON - Thank you for inviting me to join you this morning to comment on the state of the U.S. economy. I had the pleasure of meeting your Board at the White House a few days ago, and appreciated their substantive and constructive engagement on issues of mutual interest. Chief among these, from my point of view, is our shared interest in meaningful measurement and transparency. As a user of economic data, I have a keen interest in the interpretation and quality of the economic data that the government and private entities provide to the public. The financial crisis made even more abundantly clear the importance of timely and accurate information to assess the state of the economy, financial markets, firms, and the global economy more generally. But we only know what we measure, and the conceptual and practical decisions that we make about what and how to measure are crucial. The more I work in policy and even more in the intense environment here in Washington, the importance of measuring “the number” becomes paramount. Especially in that setting, respect for measurement and a nuanced understanding of what we know and what we don’t is especially important, and it’s a fact that I try to reinforce every day.

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Turning to what the recent data are telling us about the U.S. economy today – In the last few months we’ve seen a general improvement in the tone of the incoming economic measures. On average, employment grew by 176,000 jobs per month in the three months through April, somewhat less than at the start of the year, but similar to the pace seen in the fourth quarter of last year, and a substantial pickup from the average monthly gains of about 130,000 during the second and third quarters of 2011. The unemployment rate has fallen a full percentage point since last August, from 9.1 percent to 8.1 percent and, while this is still too high, it represents a broad-based improvement across a wide variety of industries and demographic groups. This decline is largely a result of people leaving unemployment for employment, and is not a quirk of measurement nor driven by declining participation in the labor market. Overall, 4.2 million people have found jobs and rejoined the active labor force since the trough of the labor market in February 2010. Growth in the recovery has come largely from the private sector, whereas public sector employment, especially in state and local governments, has not contributed to growth in the way we typically see in the wake of a recession. The business sector has been a source of relative strength in the recovery to date, with over 30 percent growth in investment in equipment and software since the trough of the recession, a 17 percent increase in business fixed investment more broadly, an increase of 26 percent in exports, and an increase in corporate profits to a six-decade-high level of profitability.

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The initial improvements we are seeing in the labor market are a natural next step, as hopefully hiring will continue to follow the growth we have been seeing in both profits and investment. The household sector has yet to exhibit the kind of resilience we have started to see in businesses, in part because of the stubborn problems that still remain in residential real estate. On average, house prices have fallen by more than 30 percent from their 2006 peak; housing wealth has fallen by over $7 trillion. This has led to 11 million homeowners who owe more on their mortgages than their homes are worth, an amount totaling about $700 billion. However, some data in recent months suggest that the housing market is firming; for example, existing home sales have risen almost 5 percent over the last six months, and the recent report on the FHFA home price index and the CoreLogic price index for non-distressed sales showed the first year-over-year increases we have seen in home price measures in almost five years. Residential investment is usually an important contributor to economic recovery, but that has not been the case until very recently. In the fourth quarter of 2011, residential investment rose by 11.6 percent and contributed a quarter of a percentage point to GDP growth. Looking at the most recent quarter, real GDP continued to grow at a moderate pace in the first quarter of 2012, supported by a pickup in consumer spending, residential investment, and exports. Real GDP increased at a 2.2 percent annual rate in Q1, following a 3.0 percent gain in Q4. Real consumer spending accelerated, growing at its fastest pace in over a year.

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Growth of residential investment was the strongest since 2010 Q2 (when the home buyer tax credit was a factor), contributing four tenths of a percentage point to GDP growth. Export growth also picked up smartly, growing at a 5.4 percent annual rate. The slowdown in GDP growth between Q4 and Q1 was due primarily to easing business investment. Outlays for equipment and software moderated, and nonresidential structures spending declined. In addition, the pace of private inventory accumulation slowed sharply, and its contribution to growth fell to six tenths of a percentage point from 1.8 percentage points in Q4. As a measure of what is happening in the private U.S. economy, I find it helpful to look at private domestic final purchases (the sum of consumer spending, residential investment, and business fixed investment) – which takes out global sales, inventories, and government purchases, so that it just focuses on private demand in the U.S. This measure continued to grow at a solid 2¾ percent pace in Q1. The persistent strength of underlying private demand is a sign of continued improvement in economic fundamentals. However, continued cuts in public-sector spending remain a drag on economic activity. In Q4, government subtracted six tenths of a percentage point from real GDP growth (five tenths of a percentage point from federal, mainly due to a drop in defense outlays, and one tenth of a percentage point from state and local). Measures of both business and consumer confidence have improved notably over the past several months, and the Michigan Survey of consumer sentiment is now at its highest level since January 2008.

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The NFIB small business optimism index has increased in 7 of the past 8 months through April, to its highest level since February 2011. Even the housing sector is showing signs of improvement. Housing starts and home sales have trended higher in recent months. Record low mortgage rates, a historically high level of housing affordability, improving consumer and builder confidence, and a declining inventory of homes for sale are all positive signs, though still in an overall very challenging market. Although the economy is clearly in a better position now than a year ago, we still face many challenges. Household debt outstanding as a share of personal income currently stands at 113 percent (2011 Q4). That is down from a peak of 130 percent in 2007Q3 and is back to roughly the level of 2004, but there is still far to go in balance sheet adjustment. The U.S. economy also remains vulnerable to global economic conditions, particularly the situation in Europe. A slowdown in global growth is already underway. Economic growth in the world excluding the U.S. slowed to below 4 percent during 2011 from 5½ percent during 2010. Asia’s performance was generally better at 5¼ percent but that was down from growth of about 7½ percent over the four quarters of 2010. This slowdown has negative implications for U.S. exports, which have been a source of strength for the U.S. economy over the past two years. In addition, uncertainty about sovereign debt strains in Europe has already contributed to volatility in U.S. and global financial markets, and the risk of recession in the eurozone has increased, though this week the

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eurozone reported a flat growth rate for the first quarter, with relatively stronger growth in Europe compared to other weakened economies. The EU is an important trading partner, accounting for just over 20 percent of all U.S. exports. The euro area itself absorbs 15 percent of all U.S. exports – nearly as much as Canada, our largest trading partner. Most forecasters are anticipating moderate economic growth over the next several quarters. The May Blue Chip consensus of private forecasters expects real GDP to grow 2.3 percent over the four quarters of 2012, and 2.7 percent during 2013. Blue Chip forecasters are currently calling for the unemployment rate to average 8.0 percent by 2012 Q4, and decline gradually in 2013. We tend to focus on the high frequency data, looking to read the latest information and updates for hints of the future, but especially in a highly charged environment, the longer-run trend is an important balance and perspective. Looking back only a dozen years or so and comparing the last decade to recent experience, real GDP increased 19 percent between 1996 and 2000, an annual growth rate of 4.4 percent. Median family income, adjusted for inflation, gained 10 percent during this period. This was the fastest sustained growth in real median family income since the mid-1980s. Unemployment fell below 4 percent, while productivity growth was 2.8 percent per year between 1996 and 2000.

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When real income rises at the growth rate that prevailed in the late 1990s – 2.4 percent – median income doubles every 30 years, roughly each generation, and each generation has a materially improved standard of living compared to the previous one. When real income rises at the growth rate that prevailed in the mid 2000s, rising at 0.3 percent – even before the financial crisis and recession – it takes 230 years for income to double, which is almost 8 generations, or roughly the time from the birth of this country to where we are today. So in our focus on today’s issues and performance, we need to think about not only this month’s and this quarter’s growth rate, but also the long-run growth that will likely result from today’s decisions. An economy that can support measurable improvements in standards of living is one with productivity growth, driven by investments in human capital and education, research and innovation, and the infrastructure to support growth. Over our history we have faced immediate challenges and still built up human, innovative, and physical infrastructure. In the wake of wars, we initiated the high school movement and land-grant universities, polio vaccinations, food safety regulation built across many administrations – begun by Harry Truman’s 1947 signing of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act of 1947, and continuing to the Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974 (Ford) and the Food Quality Protection Act of 1996 (Clinton) – the National Park System, and the Eisenhower interstate highway system. These were all investments made knowing that they had potential long-run benefits, but without knowing how large or how lasting their legacy would be. As you know, we’ve been through a terrible crisis, and while the economy continues to improve, the legacy of the crisis is still wrenching for many families.

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We work on our numbers knowing that behind them are faces, and families, and stories that are summarized in our statistics but are not really distilled into those simple facts.

We know how important it is to respect the data, and to measure and model the best that we can.

The data tell compelling stories about what is happening today, but of course, even more compelling is our responsibility to the future generations whose own reading of the data will depend on the investments that we make now.

Thank you.

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Visiting important web sites

History

Federal regulations have been available for public comment for many years, but people used to have to visit a government reading room to provide comments. Today, the public can share opinions from anywhere on Regulations.gov. Regulations.gov removed the logistical barriers that made it difficult for a citizen to participate in the complex regulatory process, revolutionizing the way the public can participate in and impact Federal rules and regulations.

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We continue to see that Solvency II is “future rule” …

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Omnibus II Directive

The Solvency II Framework Directive (2009) on the financial position of insurance undertakings has had to be adapted in response to:

new architecture for its implementing measures introduced in the Lisbon Treaty (2009)

new financial supervision measures introduced in Regulation 1094/2010 establishing the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority.

These changes are implemented through the “Omnibus II directive”, currently in negotiations between Parliament and Council.

Implementing Measures

The Framework Directive is principles-based, and the detailed rules of the Solvency II regime will be contained in Implementing Measures adopted by the Commission, and covering about 40 important areas in the Framework Directive.

The Commission will propose implementing measures after Omnibus II directive enters into force.

http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32009L0138:EN:NOT

http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/index_en.htm

http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32010R1094:EN:NOT

http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32010R1094:EN:NOT

http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52011PC0008:EN:NOT



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Technical standards and guidelines

Technical standards:

- concern purely technical matters (no strategic decisions or policy choices)

- require the expertise of supervisory experts

- are adopted by the Commission based on drafts submitted by the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA).

Regulatory Technical Standards (RTS)

These are standards for the consistent harmonisation of rules in EU legislative acts.

Implementing Technical Standards (ITS)

These are standards for the uniform application of legally binding EU acts.

Areas to be covered, as proposed in the Omnibus II Directive, are:

uniform reporting templates

harmonised technical input to the standard formula

harmonised procedures and templates for cooperation

the exchange of information between supervisory authorities

Guidelines

The European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) can issue guidelines to supervisors and undertakings which is not legally binding, but companies or supervisors not complying will have to explain their reasons.

https://eiopa.europa.eu/

https://eiopa.europa.eu/

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Joint Consultation Paper on the proposed response to the European Commission’s Call for Advice on the Fundamental Review of Financial Conglomerates Directive 14 May 2012 The Joint Committee of the European Supervisory Authorities (EBA, EIOPA and ESMA) is launching today a three-month public consultation on the proposed response to the call for technical advice from the European Commission on the fundamental review of the Financial Conglomerates Directive (“the FICOD“). This consultation covers three broad areas where advice is sought by the European Commission: the scope of application, the group wide internal governance requirements and sanctions and supervisory empowerments under the FICOD.

In its proposed response, the Joint Committee issues a series of recommendations for the review of the FICOD, including the widening of the scope of supervision, addressing requirements and responsibilities to a designated entity within the financial conglomerate and the framework of supervisory powers provided by the FICOD.

Moreover, the Joint Committee will be providing later this year, a supervisory contribution to the wider fundamental review of the FICOD, which is being carried out by the European Commission.

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EBA, EIOPA and ESMA’s Joint Consultation Paper on its proposed response to the European Commission’s Call for Advice on the Fundamental Review of the Financial Conglomerates Directive

London, Frankfurt, Paris, 14 May 2012

1. Responding to this Consultation

The three European Supervisory Authorities, the European Banking Authority (EBA), the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) and the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) invite comments on all matters in this. Comments are most helpful if they:

- Respond to the question stated;

- Indicate the specific question to which the comment relates;

- Contain a clear rationale;

- Provide evidence to support the views expressed/ rationale proposed; and

- Describe any alternative regulatory choices EBA/EIOPA/ESMA should consider.

2. Executive Summary

1. The Joint Committee of the European Supervisory Authorities’ Sub Committee on Financial Conglomerates (JCFC) received a Call for Advice from the European Commission in April 2011 to look at the (A) scope of application, especially the inclusion of nonregulated entities

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(B) internal governance requirements and sanctions, and (C) supervisory empowerment of Directive 2002/87/EC on the supplementary supervision of credit institutions, insurance undertakings and investment firms in a financial conglomerate (FICOD). This advice shall contribute to the European Commission’s fundamental review of the FICOD, following the short technical review, resulting in Directive 2011/89/EU (hereafter FICOD12). 2. As a result of its analysis, the EBA, EIOPA and ESMA, hereinafter the ESAs, propose the following answers to the questions risen by the Commission in its fourth Call for Advice (hereinafter CfA): Question 1 CfA: What should be the perimeter of supervision, when a financial conglomerate is supervised on a group wide basis? 3. Recommendation 1: The Perimeter of supervision should be enlarged to ensure a more thorough group wide supervision and avoid possible regulatory arbitrage, by enhancing the groups of entities that can be included in the identification of a financial conglomerate. Accordingly the ESAs suggest to allow for a more consistent and broader identification of financial conglomerates to modify the definition of “financial sector” [according to Article 2 (8) FICOD] and/or the definition of “regulated entities” [according to Article 2 (4) FICOD]. Therefore, the definition of financial sector [Article 2 (8) FICOD] should be enlarged to include insurance ancillary services undertakings and all special purpose vehicles/entities to enable a broader identification of financial conglomerates, and to enable that the risks are appropriately captured. 4. The ESAs have assessed whether Institutions for occupational retirement provision (IORPs) should be included as part of a financial conglomerate and are mindful of the national specificities of IORPs.

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The ESAs welcome the views of the stakeholders on the following options: Option 1:

Include IORPs within the definition of “financial sector”, in a similar manner to the inclusion of Alternative Investment Fund Managers (AIFM) and Asset Management Companies (AMC) within FICOD, e.g. by enlarging the definition of a regulated entity according to Article 2 (4) FICOD and by amending Article 3 FICOD respectively.

Option 2:

Maintain the status quo; such that IORPs would not be included within group wide supervision at cross5sectoral level, given that prudential risks posed by IORPs to financial conglomerates have not been demonstrated. However, this might imply that relevant financial activities of IORPs might not be taken into account when identifying a financial conglomerate and applying supplementary supervision. 5. Recommendation 2:

Mixed financial holding companies (MFHCs), even if unregulated, should be made subject to supplementary supervision or any type of requirements that are proposed below. Accordingly, MFHCs should be included together with regulated entities as the legal addressee of supplementary supervision. 6. Recommendation 3:

Companies undertaking solely industrial activities (with no financial services activity at all), such as industrial conglomerates, should not be subject to direct financial supervision as the supervisory focus might be diverted from financial undertakings.

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Mixed activity holding companies (MAHCs) and mixed activity insurance holding companies (MAIHCs) should not become direct addressees of FICOD, but the supervisor should have the ability to access relevant information from such MAHC and MAIHC within its supervisory tool kit. The following supervisory tools are not mutually exclusive and the ESAs welcome the views of the stakeholders in order to assess the implication of this recommendation further.

7. Supervisors should be empowered:

Tool 1 – To require the creation of an intermediate financial holding which is responsible for all the entities (or at least, all the regulated entities) carrying out financial activities subject to supplementary supervision and which will be the “addressee” for supervision.

Tool 2 –

To designate one single “point of entry” at the top of the unregulated entities in place of a formal ‘common chapeau’ of the financial entities in the group. This point of entry is not a legal person, but a simple reference for the supervisors (e.g. a specific team or division or a member of the Board of the parent entity). Tool 3 –

To designate a specified regulated entity as point of entry which does not necessarily need to be the top entity of the entire financial conglomerate. This option has merit if the enforcement requirements and sanctioning measures addressed to the top entity cannot be adequately enforced by the supervisors.

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Question 2 CfA: Given your experience and expertise, which legal entity in a conglomerate should be responsible and qualify for compliance with group wide requirements, i.e. which legal entity should be the responsible parent entity?

8. Recommendation 4:

The European Commission should identify and define an ultimate responsible entity for the financial conglomerate according to the following minimum criteria: control, the dominant entity from the market’s perspective (market listed entity) and the ability to fulfil specific duties towards its subsidiaries and its supervisor.

Question 3 CfA: Given your supervisory experience and expertise, which requirements should be imposed on this qualified parent entity in the context of group wide supervision?


This ultimate responsible entity should be responsible for compliance with group wide requirements. The European Commission should explicitly require the ultimate responsible entity to have a coordinating and directing role over the other entities of the conglomerate. Moreover, some existing requirements for regulated entities and requirements that can be derived from the ESAs’ guidelines on Internal Controls should also be applicable for the top parent entity, whether the regulated entity is a Holding Company or a Financial Holding Company (FHC), Insurance Holding Company (IHC) or a MFHC.

Question 4 CfA6: Given your supervisory experience and expertise, which incentives (special benefits or sanctions) would make the enforcement of the group wide requirements more credible?


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In order to ensure that the group wide requirements are enforceable, the European Commission should develop an enforcement regime towards the ultimate responsible entity and its subsidiaries. This would imply a dual approach with enforcement powers towards the top entity for group5wide risks and towards the individual entities for their respective responsibilities. Corrective measures should be directed towards the entity that is responsible for the respective breach.


In any case, the supervisor should have a minimum set of measures, consisting of informative and investigative measures, at hand (see Recommendation 3). Supervisors should be able to administer sanction measures addressed at the MAHC or MAIHC, where this entity does not to provide the requested information. Moreover, when (under Tool 1, Recommendation 3) an intermediate financial holding company has been established, supervisors should be able to administer sanction measures at this intermediate financial holding company.

Question 5 CfA: When reflecting upon this advice, would supervisors in Europe need other or additional empowerment in their jurisdictions?


Whilst the FICOD provides the ESAs and the supervisors with a large supervisory tool kit, supervisor’s actual use of this tool kit should be enhanced. Further a minimum set of enforcement measures that national supervisors should have at their disposal towards the group (Article 16 FICOD), should be achieved by the ESAs developing guidelines or by

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being asked to develop binding technical standards for a common reporting scheme on risk concentrations and intra group transactions, (including the possible development of guidelines for quantitative limits under Article 7 (3) and 8 (3) FICOD). This also implies creating a minimum set of sanctioning measures that should be applied towards the group in case of a breach of group wide requirements. In addition, the European Commission should take into account sectoral differences that may arise between CRD IV and Solvency II.

Structures of a financial conglomerate

The following example illustrates that there are some group structures that make it very difficult to identify a financial conglomerate: In some cases a subgroup within a large complex group (hereafter LCG) qualifies as a financial conglomerate. But after calculating the threshold for the entire group (including the “real” industry) this group does not fulfil the FICOD’s 40% threshold and, therefore, the whole group will not be subject to supplementary supervision.

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This situation may also be a way of avoiding supplementary supervision. By setting up a chain of holding companies with subsidiaries of “real” industry the 40%5threshold will not be fulfilled after a certain point. Currently, the supervisor is only allowed to address the regulated entity (e.g. in order to get information). The regulated entity has to cooperate with its parent entity (and is responsible for the delivered information to the supervisor) but has (under company law) no powers to get necessary information. Therefore the possibility to address supervisory issues concerning information and sanctions to holding companies should be strengthened. In addition, there might be structures which are even more complex. In these cases industrial groups may have many different regulated entities which are not held by one parent entity but are spread over the group.

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In this case, it is almost impossible for supervisors to identify the holding company which may qualify as MAHC or MAIHC. Further, supervisors might not be able to supervise the group on a groupwide level to avoid double gearing; but the regulated entities of the banking and insurance sector are all supervised on a solo level. The potential negative effects (arising from intragroup transactions or risk concentrations) are scarcely visible. This may lead to spillover effects (either from the industrial part to the financial part or vice versa).

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Consequently, supplementary supervision on a group wide level would help (if this group does not qualify as a financial conglomerate according to Article 3 FICOD). Thus, introducing a responsible entity within the group as an addressee for supervisory actions would lead to more clarity from a supervisory point of view.

To learn more: http://www.eba.europa.eu/cebs/media/Publications/Consultation%20Papers/2012/JC%2001/JC-CP-2012-01--ESAs-Joint-CP----EC-call-for-advice-on-fundamental-FICOD-review-.pdf

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Market entry criteria revised for banking sector in Hong Kong The Banking Ordinance (Amendment of Seventh Schedule) Notice 2012, which seeks to update certain market entry criteria for the banking sector in Hong Kong, will be gazetted on Friday, 18 May 2012. A spokesman for the Financial Services and the Treasury Bureau said, “These amendments seek to remove from the Banking Ordinance certain licensing criteria for banks, which have become unnecessarily restrictive and put Hong Kong at a disadvantage when compared with other international financial centres. These licensing criteria to be repealed may restrict well-managed and reputable domestic and overseas institutions from establishing a presence in Hong Kong.” The Notice seeks to remove the present licensing requirement under which an applicant for a bank licence must have total customer deposits of not less than HK$3 billion and total assets of not less than HK$4 billion. The Notice also seeks to remove some present impediments which restrict foreign banks from entering the Hong Kong market through the establishment of a locally incorporated subsidiary. A spokesman for the Hong Kong Monetary Authority said, “Some international financial institutions do not take deposits as part of their normal business. The proposed revisions will allow a broader range of qualified domestic and international institutions to participate in our

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financial markets, without compromising the stability of Hong Kong’s banking system.” The proposed amendments arose from a review last year by the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, which concluded that some licensing conditions under the Banking Ordinance applying to Hong Kong are not found in other major financial markets such as the United Kingdom, the US, Germany, Switzerland, Australia and Singapore. These conditions are also not part of the international standards for banking supervision and regulation. The Notice will be tabled before the Legislative Council on Wednesday, 23 May 2012. Subject to the negative vetting of the Notice by the Legislative Council, the amendments will take effect on July 12, 2012. Hong Kong Monetary Authority 16 May 2012

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Certified Risk and Compliance Management Professional (CRCMP) Distance learning and online certification program. Companies like IBM, Accenture etc. consider the CRCMP a preferred certificate. You may find more if you search (CRCMP preferred certificate) using any search engine. The all-inclusive cost is $297. What is included in the price:

A. The official presentations we use in our instructor-led classes (3285 slides) The 2309 slides are needed for the exam, as all the questions are based on these slides. The remaining 976 slides are for reference. You can find the course synopsis at: www.risk-compliance-association.com/Certified_Risk_Compliance_Training.htm

B. Up to 3 Online Exams You have to pass one exam. If you fail, you must study the official presentations and try again, but you do not need to spend money. Up to 3 exams are included in the price. To learn more you may visit: www.risk-compliance-association.com/Questions_About_The_Certification_And_The_Exams_1.pdf www.risk-compliance-association.com/CRCMP_Certification_Steps_1.pdf

http://www.risk-compliance-association.com/Certified_Risk_Compliance_Training.htm

http://www.risk-compliance-association.com/Certified_Risk_Compliance_Training.htm

http://www.risk-compliance-association.com/Questions_About_The_Certification_And_The_Exams_1.pdf

http://www.risk-compliance-association.com/Questions_About_The_Certification_And_The_Exams_1.pdf

http://www.risk-compliance-association.com/CRCMP_Certification_Steps_1.pdf

http://www.risk-compliance-association.com/CRCMP_Certification_Steps_1.pdf

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C. Personalized Certificate printed in full color. Processing, printing, packing and posting to your office or home.

D. The Dodd Frank Act and the new Risk Management Standards (976 slides, included in the 3285 slides) The US Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act is the most significant piece of legislation concerning the financial services industry in about 80 years. What does it mean for risk and compliance management professionals? It means new challenges, new jobs, new careers, and new opportunities. The bill establishes new risk management and corporate governance principles, sets up an early warning system to protect the economy from future threats, and brings more transparency and accountability. It also amends important sections of the Sarbanes Oxley Act. For example, it significantly expands whistleblower protections under the Sarbanes Oxley Act and creates additional anti-retaliation requirements. You will find more information at: www.risk-compliance-association.com/Distance_Learning_and_Certification.htm

http://www.risk-compliance-association.com/Distance_Learning_and_Certification.htm

http://www.risk-compliance-association.com/Distance_Learning_and_Certification.htm

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Visit our Risk and Compliance Management Speakers Bureau The International Association of Risk and Compliance Professionals (IARCP) has established the Speakers Bureau for firms and organizations that want to access the expertise of Certified Risk and Compliance Management Professionals (CRCPMs) and Certified Information Systems Risk and Compliance Professionals (CISRCPs). The IARCP will be the liaison between our certified professionals and these organizations, at no cost. We strongly believe that this can be a great opportunity for both, our certified professionals and the organizers. To learn more: www.risk-compliance-association.com/Risk_Management_Compliance_Speakers_Bureau.html

www.risk-compliance-association.com/Risk_Management_Compliance_Speakers_Bureau.html

www.risk-compliance-association.com/Risk_Management_Compliance_Speakers_Bureau.html

http://www.risk-compliance-association.com/

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http://www.risk-compliance-association.com/New_Member_Orientation_Newsletters.html

Monday May 21 2012 - Top 10 risk and compliance management related news stories and world events...

Economy & Finance

Transcript of Monday May 21 2012 - Top 10 risk and compliance management related news stories and world events...