The

Good

FightA

LIF

EIN

LIB

ER

AL

PO

LIT

ICS

WA

LT

ER

MO

ND

AL

EW

ithD

avidH

age

SC

RIB

NE

R

New

York

LondonToronto

Sydney

TH

EG

OO

DF

IGH

T

7cia1

issuessuch

asV

ietnamor

abusesof

theG

enevaC

onvention?T

hebest

buLwark

we

haveis

astrong,

independentSenate.N

evertheless,therules

mustbe

shapedto

strikea

balancebetw

eencarefuldeliberation

andabuse

bythe

minority. Senator Tom

Harkin

ofIowa

hasproposed

areform

whereby

thenum

berof

votesrequired

forcloture

would

declineslow

lyover,say,a

month

ofdebate,untilonlya

mere

majority

isrequired.Iworry

aboutsuchan

approach:I think

senatorsw

ouldsim

plyw

aitouttheclock

andthe

Senatew

ouldbecom

em

orelike

theH

ouse,where

theleadership

;can

forceanything

throughand

thebody

becomes

atoolfordeliverance,

notdeliberation.

Maybe

them

agicnum

bershould

declineslow

lyover

am

onth, butnofurther

thanfifty-eightor fifty-seven

votes.I

would

alsoprohibit

the“hold”

strategythat

allows

onesenator

toblock

ajudicial

nomination

ora

bill.I

thinkthat

much

power,

placedin

thehands

ofonesenator,

humiliates

theSenate

andm

akesa

farceof

thenom

inatingprocess.

Perhapsthe

Senateneeds

arule

allowing

theleadership

tocall up

issuesby

majority

voteundercertain

circumstances.

Despite

whatthe

rulesnow

say,it’sim

portanttorem

ember

thatthe

Sen

atecan,

with

theclear

mandate

ofthe

Constitution,

adoptnew

rulesby

majority

vote,at

leastat

theoutsetof a

newC

ongress.We

made

historyand

establishedthatprecedent during

that pivotalweek

in1975.

Ialso

wish

thatA

merican

votersw

ouldask

whether

thecandidates

seekingtheir

supportw

illcontribute

tothis

impasse

inW

ashington,this

divisivenessthat

gripsour

nation,orw

hetherthey

canbe

aforce

forreform

andpublic

comprom

ise.I spent

many

yearsofm

ylife

inthe

Sen.ate,and

Ideeplybelieve

inits

capacityfor

progressand

comprom

ise.I’vebeen

inthe

Senatew

henitreally

worked,and

I believeitcan

work

again.B

ut we

haveto

takecare

thatwe

make

itwork.

Spies,

Security,

andthe

Rule

ofL

aw

DU

RIN

GM

YS

EN

AT

Eyears

1liked

toset

asideseveral

hoursevery

Sundayfor

reading—books

onpublic

affairs,journalsof

opinion,andthree

orfour

Sundaynew

spapers.Ialways

foundsom

ethingthat

boreon

my

work

inthe

Senateor

deservedattention

fromC

ongress,andIw

ouldusually

gointo

theoffice

onM

ondaym

orning

with

abriefcase

IuIIofclippings,notes,

andideas

forthe

staff.B

utone

Sundayin

late1974

stoodout

fromthe

others.O

nD

ecember

22the

New

YorkThnes

publisheda

front-pagestory

bySeym

ourH

ershdetailing

am

assiveand

long-standinggovernm

entcampaign

ofillegal

spyingon

Am

ericancitizens.

Hersh

wrote

thatthe

CIA

hadconducted

illegalsurveillance,surreptitiously

openedthousands

ofpiecesofm

ail,conducted

illegalbreak-ins,andinfiltrated

dozensofdom

esticdissident

organizations—all

inviolation

ofitscharter.

Inthe

Senatew

ehad

beenhearing

rumors

ofthis

sortof

thingfor

months,

huteven

so,the

storycam

eas

ashock.

Within

afew

daysm

ycolleagues

startedm

akingtheir

way

down

tothe

Senatefloor

totalk

aboutit.

My

friendJohn

Pastoreof

Rhode

Islandgave

anelegant

speechasking,

Flowcould

thesethings

occurw

ithoutanyone

inC

on

gressknow

ingabout

them?

Who’s

watching

theseagencies?

What’s

happenedto

ourcountry?T

hatdayhe

andM

ikeM

ansfieldbegan

draft-

134

35

TH

EG

OO

DF

IGH

TSpies,

Security,and

theRule

ofLaw

inga

resolutionto

establisha

specialSenatecom

mittee

toinvestigate

thebehavior

ofthe

intelligenceagencies—

acom

mittee

whose

work

would

dominate

my

lifefor

much

of thenextyear.

When

Hersh’s

storybroke,

most

mem

bersof

Congress

were

feelingnum

bon

theissue

oftrustanddeceit

ingovernm

ent.W

ehad

spentmost

of1971

readingthe

PentagonPapers

andabsorbing

theirlessons—

howgenerals

andpresidents

hadlied

tothe

publicabout

Vietnam

.T

henw

ehad

goneright

intothe

morass

ofW

atergateand

thetraum

aof

Nixon’s

resignation.E

venso,the

CIA

revelationsstunned

us.We

hadcom

eofage

assuming

thatw

ew

erea

nationof

laws,

andthat

theintelligence

agenciesto

protectedthe

Am

ericanpeople.It w

illseemnaive

today,perhapsincredi

ble,butwhen

Ifirstcame

intogovernm

ent,Am

ericansstillpresum

edthat

government

expertsw

eregenerally

rightand

publicleaders

were

generally

honest. Mostofm

ycolleagues,and

most ofthe

votersw

erepresented.

believedour

countryhad

enemies

overseasw

how

eredangerous,

andcrim

inalsat

home,

andthat

we

neededstrong,

aggressivesecurity

agencies

toprotect

us.W

ealso

generallyagreed

thatif

theseagencies

were

goingto

dotheir

work

properly,it had

tobe

secret.Iknew

fewpeople

inC

ongressw

how

ouldhave

arguedotherw

ise.T

hisattitude

was

reflectedin

congressionaloversight

ofthe

intelligence

comm

unity.N

ocongressionalcom

mittees

hadfull,form

alauthority

overthose

agencies,nor didany

comm

itteeshave

unambiguous

power

tocom

peltestim

onyfrom

them.

If theheads

oftheagencies

didcom

eup

tothe

Hillto

report,theirsw

asjust anodyne

testimony.T

heem

barrassingactivities—

therisky

operations,the

secretpro;ects—

would

bedisclosed

toonly

two

orthree

peopleon

Capitol

Hill,

maybe

thehead

ofA

ppropriations

becausehe

controlledtheir

money,

orthe

headof

Judiciary,w

hoknew

howto

keepa

secret.M

oreover,these

generallyw

erem

embers

whom

theagencies

themselves

choseto

brief.T

hisw

asfine

with

most

mem

bersof

Congress.

Am

ericanshad

alot

offear

inthe

mid-1960s

andearly

1970s,and

most

people,1

would

say,believed

thatthe

Com

munists

were

bentondestroying

us.We

hadlived

throughW

orldW

arIIandthen

Korea.T

heSoviets

andthe

Chinese

were

regardedas

frighteningforces,

andpatriotic

Am

ericansnever

doubtedthat

we

hadto

protectourselves

athom

eand

abroad.John

Stennisof

Mississippi,

known

inthe

Senateas

JudgeStennis,

chairedthe

Arm

edServices

Com

mittee, and

Ionceheard

himsay

thathehad

toldthe

directorof the

CIA

,You

justgodo

yourwork,and

youdon’thave

tocom

ehack

tom

ew

ithallthis

information.

Soalthough

some

ofm

ycolleagues,

includingG

eneM

cCarthy,

hadstarted

raisingquestions

aboutthe

CIA

,even

if we

hadw

antedgreater

scrutinyofthese

agenciesw

ew

ouldhave

facedinstitutional

harriers.W

ew

ouldhave

hadto

changethe

way

Congress

was

structuredand

thew

ayit com

pelledinform

ationfrom

theseagencies,

andw

eprobably

couldn’thave

passedsuch

changesin

thosedays.

As

forthe

FBI,no

onecould

touchit

aslong

asJ.Edgar

Hoover

was

incharge.

Evenw

henhe

was

senescentand

behavingerratically,he

stillintim

idatedpeople.T

hisstem

med

inpartfrom

hisreputation

asa

crime

hghter, aguy

who

knewhow

tokeep

criminals

offthestreet.

But

Hoover

was

alsorum

oredto

keepsecretfiles

inhis

personaloffice—em

barrassingm

aterial,w

hichhis

agentsaround

thecountry

were

supposedlyencour

Led

tocall

into

himpersonally.

Later,w

henw

ew

ereinvestigating

thereig

nassassination

plots,for

example,

ourcom

mittee

uncoveredcv

idence

thatJohn

Kennedy

was

havinga

liaisonw

ithJudith

Cam

pbell,w

how

asthe

girlfriendof

SamG

iancana,a

mafioso

who

was

alsow

orking

with

theC

IAto

assassinateC

astro.O

urevidence

showed

thaton

[the

veryday

Hoover

heardabout

thisaffair,he

wrote

aletter

aboutit

toBobby

Kennedy,

thenlater

went

tosee

PresidentK

ennedyafter

gettingFBI

mem

odescribing

theaffair.N

oone

knows

whatthey

talkedabout,

bit

Hoover’s

approach, when

hefound

something

ugly, was

togo

tothat

someone

andsay,“D

on’tworry

aboutit.Trust

me.

lt’shere

andit’s

underw

rapsand

nothingis

goingto

happento

it.”M

aybethat’s

why

LyndonJohnson

refusedto

fireH

oover.Johnson,who

hadan

earthyTexas

way

of[saying

things,used

tosay,“It’s

betterto

haveH

ooverinside

thetent

pissm

goutthan

outsidethe

tent pissingin.”

For allthesereasons—

patriotism, the

fearofgenuinesecurity

threats,iitim

idationby

thepeople

who

ranthese

agencies—C

ongress’sattitude

.137.

136

TH

EG

OO

DF

IGH

TSpies,

Security,and

theR

uleofLaw

hadforyears

beenhands-off,

leavethem

aloneand

letthemdo

theirjobs.

That

attitudebegan

tochange

duringV

ietnamand

afterthe

release

ofthe

PentagonPapers.

That

hadbeen

acold

shower,

astory

ofdecep

tionand

manipulation

thatran

fromthe

Pentagonrightup

tothe

White

House.T

hegenerals

andthe

intelligenceexperts

hadlied

tous,had

kept

vitalinform

ationfrom

thepublic

andeven

leadingm

embe.s

ofC

on

gress—and

inaddition

hadm

adesom

eextrem

elypoor

military

calcula

tions.Vietnam

hadfailed

andthe

countryw

asnow

more

skeptical.

Bythe

mid-l970s,

many

Am

ericanspresum

edthat

thegovernm

ent

was

wrong

much

ofthetim

e.Nixon

hadleft office

indisgrace,and

people

understoodthat

apresidentofthe

United

Stateshad

comm

andeeredand

politicizedagencies

thatw

eresupposed

toprotect

therestof us.A

public

opinionsurvey

at thetim

easked,“D

oyou

thinkgovernm

entofficialstell

thetruth

mostof the

time

ordothey

liem

ostofthetim

e?”Shocking

per

centagessaid

theylie

mostofthe

time.So

when

Seymour

Hersh’s

exposé

came

along,it stirred

thecesspoolofpublic

cynicism.

Tom

akem

attersw

orse,shady

behaviorw

ithinthese

agenciesw

as

startingto

undermine

thebroader

justicesystem

.Frank

Johnson,a

dis

tinguishedfederaljudge

fromA

labama,later

toldm

ethat,over

theyears,

henoticed

thatjuries

grantedless

andless

credenceto

thetestim

onyof

FBIagents.

The

word

was

outthat

theyw

ereplaying

games.H

esaid

thi

5

troubledhim

becausethe

agenciesthatw

ereso

importantto

thecrim

inal

justiceprocess

hadbegun

tolose

thepublic’s

confidence.

The

Seymour

Hersh

storiesand

alot

offine

subsequentreport

ingbrought

allthis

toa

crescendo.T

heold

guard,the

hands-offcrowd,

startedgiving

way

tothe

youngersenators,

andto

anew

ideathat

while

theseagencies

areessential

toour

securityand

must

operatein

secret,

theym

ustalso

operateunder

thelaw

andm

akethem

selvesaccountable

tothe

legislativebranch

andthe

courts.The

generalfeelingw

asthat

the

Congress

hadto

takeresponsibility

forthese

agencies,tofind

out what

it

didn’t know—

andhadn’t w

antedto

know.A

sM

ikeM

ansfield,them

ajor

ityleader,observed,“Itused

tobe

fashionable..

. formem

bersofC

ongress

tosay

thatinsofar

asthe

intelligenceagencies

were

concerned,the

less

theyknew

aboutsuch

questions,the

better.W

ell,in

my

judgment,

itis

138

abouttim

ethat

attitudew

entout

offashion.It

istim

efor

theSenate

to

takethe

trouble,and,yes,therisks,ofknow

ingm

orerather

thanless.”

Inthe

firstweek

of January1975

Washington

wason

fireover the

CIA

allegations,and

PresidentFord

appointeda

comm

issionto

investigate,

with

Vice

PresidentRockefeller

aschairm

an.Ford

probablythought

that

would

calmthings

down

andpacify

theskeptics

inC

ongress,hut

hew

as

wrong.Pastore

hadraised

alotof serious

questions,anda

numberof sena

torsfelt w

ehad

simply

not beendoing

our job.In

addition,some

feLt that

theR

ockefellerCom

mission

wouldn’tget

tothe

bottomofthe

matter

for

fearof embarrassing

Nixon

andpeople

who

hadw

orkedin

hisadm

inistra

tion.Three

weeks

later,actingon

aresolution

byPastore,the

Senatevoted

82to

4to

establisha

selectcomm

itteeto

conductits

own

investigation.

FrankC

hurch,w

how

ason

theForeign

Relations

Com

mittee

andhad

beenin

theSenate

almost

twenty

yearsw

ithoutchairing

am

ajorcom

mittee, w

asM

ansfield’schoice

aschairm

an.W

illiamM

iller,aform

erF

or

eignService

officerand

atalented

Senatestaff

mem

ber,w

asappointed

staff director.T

heother

Dem

ocraticm

embers

were

PhilH

artof

Michi

gan, oneof the

deansof our delegation,and

threerelatively

newsenators:

Robert

Morgan

ofNorth

Carolina,

Walter

Huddleston

ofKentucky,

and

Gary

HartolC

olorado. The

Republican

mem

bersw

ereallrespected

sen

atorsofgreatintegrity:John

Towerof Texas,

Barry

Goldw

aterof A

rizona,

Charles

“Mac”

Mathias

ofMaryland,R

ichardSchw

eikerof Pennsylvania

andH

oward

Bakerof Tennessee.

Ialsoasked

tobe

onthe

comm

ittee.Ihad

beenshaken

bythe

lossof

publictrust

afterV

ietnam,

andI

was

stilloffended

byN

ixon’sabuse

of

publicoffice.

Ihad

written

abook,

The

Accountability

ofPow

er,w

hich

made

thecase

forgreater

accountabilityof

thepresidency

tothe

other

branchesofgovernm

entandto

thepublic.

I stillbelieved

ingovernm

ent

asa

forcefor good,hut

I wasn’tsure

howlong

we

were

goingto

beable

to

hangon

tothe

public’sconfidence.T

hisw

asn’tjustam

atterof afew

little

spycapers.T

hisw

asa

questionofw

hetherlarge, pow

erfulagenciesof the

executivebranch

andeven

theW

hiteH

ousew

eregoing

toobey

thelaw

andm

akethem

selvesaccountable.

139

.

TH

EG

OO

DF

IGH

TSpies,

Securicy,and

theR

uleofLaw

Everyoneon

thecom

mittee

understoodthatw

ehad

avolatile

assignm

ent,but

when

we

firstconvened

we

weren’tsure

howto

proceed.T

hem

andatew

asim

mense.W

ew

eresupposed

toexam

ineevery

federalintel

ligenceagency,

includingthe

CIA

,the

FBI,the

Defense

IntelligenceA

gency,and

theN

ationalSecurity

Agency,

allovera

spanofforty

yearsof

activity.W

ehad

astaffof

135,including

53investigators.

We

hadto

developdocum

entrequests,

drawup

witness

lists,w

ritechronologies

ofthe

abusesw

eknew

about,andinvestigate

whetherthere

were

others.Pas

torehad

toldreporters

heassum

edthe

comm

itteew

ouldm

eetexcLusivelyin

“executivesession,”

thatis,behind

closeddoors.C

hurch,onthe

otherhand,said

hehoped

tohold

anum

berof hearingsin

public.There

was

noprecedentfor

ourw

ork.W

ehad

aprofound

investigation,perhaps

neverto

berepeated.W

ew

eregoing

tobe

lookingatthe

filesandclassified

docum

entsofourm

ostsecretagencies,andthathad

neverhappenedbefore.

The

comm

itteeitselfhad

differenttheorieson

howto

proceed.Some

Republican

mem

bers,John

Tower

andB

arryG

oldwater

among

them,

didn’tw

antto

doan

awful

lotat

first.M

anyclung

tothe

ideathat

we

shouldn’tbe

diggingaround

inthe

operationsofsecret

intelligenceagen

cies.I’m

suresom

ealso

worried

thatthis

would

justbe

aN

ixonw

itchhunt.

BillM

iller,for

whom

Idevelopedgreat

respect,thought

we

couldconduct

ourinvestigation

mainly

throughinterview

sw

ithagents

andagency

officials,then

putthe

storytogether

without

diggingaround

inthe

sewer

forfacts.

That

vieww

asnot

sharedby

thecom

mittee’s

chiefcounsel,F.A

.0.

Schwarz

Jr.,who

came

down

fromN

ewY

orkto

jointhe

comm

ittee’sstaff. Fritz,as

hew

asknow

n,was

anheir

tothe

toy-retailingem

pirebut

was

asuccessful

triallaw

yerand

laterhead

ofthe

Brennan

Center

forJustice

atthe

New

York

University

Schoolof

Law.

He

was

aH

arvardLaw

graduateand

apartner

atC

ravath,Sw

aine&

Moore,

who

hadadvised

theN

ewY

orkPolice

Departm

entondifficult

issuessuch

asuse

ofdeadlyforce

andhandling

ofpublicprotests.Schw

arzw

asalitigator

atheart,

aninvestigator,

andhe

feltwe

hadto

seethe

files,getthe

docum

ents,startdigging,andthen

draftthequestions

andcallw

itnesses.Fritz

arguedthat

without

exposingspecifics

we

couldn’tdocum

enta

casefor

genuinereform

.

140

Mostofus

endorsedSchw

arz’sstrategy,

hutPresident

Fordw

asreluc

tantto

letus

gettoo

close.In

February,w

ehad

privatesessions

with

Edward

Levi,Ford’sattorney

general,andW

illiamC

olby,the

CIA

director,

toset

groundrules

forthe

investigation.In

earlyM

arch,C

hurch,Tow

er,MiH

er,andSchw

arzw

entto

theW

hiteH

ousefor

am

eetingw

ithFord

andhis

secretariesofdefense

andstate,Jim

Schlesingerand

Henry

Kissinger,

tospecify

theso

rtof

documents

theyplanned

torequest.

In1973

theC

IAhad

beenim

plicatedin

Watergate,

andSchlesinger,

thenC

IAdirector,

askedhis

staffto

compile

alist

ofall

activitiesconducted

outsidethe

agency’scharter,a

listthatbecam

eknow

nas

“thefam

ilyjew

els.”W

ew

antedthat.

We

alsow

anteda

copyof

areport

thatC

olbyhad

preparedfor

Fordon

allegedC

IAinvolvem

entin

overseasassassination

plots.In

addition,C

hurchasked

fora

seriesof

classifiedW

hiteH

ousedocum

entsand

mem

orandafrom

theN

ationalSecurityC

ouncil.For

severalw

eeksw

esent

document

requestsof

thisnature

overto

theW

hiteH

ouseand

gotthe

stalltreatm

ent—”W

ecan’t

findthat”

or“It

will

takeus

some

time

toproduce

thosedocum

ents.”Fritz

Schwarz

andFrank

Church

evenm

et with

Rockefeller

topry

loosethe

documents

beingdelivered

tohis

comm

ission.Schwarz

toldm

elaterthatR

ockefellercharm

edhim

,m

entioningthe

family

toystore,

huthe

didn’tgiveup

thedocum

ents.Som

em

embers

ofour

comm

itteew

erefine

with

this.T

heydidn’t

wantto

embarrass

Fordand

theyw

eren’tsureaboutthe

scopeofour

man

date.B

utafter

thisw

entonfor

afew

more

weeks,

we

kneww

ew

ereget

tingstonew

alledby

theexecutive

branch.Ifthiscontinued,w

ew

ouldjust

bew

astingourtim

eand

perpetuatingthe

original problem—

anexecutive

branchunaccountable

toC

ongress.M

eanwhile,

thestory

continuedto

unfoldin

thepress.

Inlate

Feb

ruary,D

anielSchorr

ofC

BS

New

sreported,

forthe

firsttim

e,that

theC

IAw

asalleged

tohave

developedplots

toassassinate

foreignleaders.

Over

thenextm

onth,additionaldetailson

allegedassassination

attempts

continuedto

trickleout.

At

thesam

etim

ethe

CIA

,oragents

actingon

theirown,had

beguna

coun

tero

ffen

siv

e.T

hey

saidour

investigation,anda

parallelinvestigation

inthe

House,

threatenedto

exposecovert

work

TH

EG

OO

DF

IGH

T

andcripple

thenation’s

intelligencegathering.

One

eventold

acolum

nistthat

hew

asprepared

tolie

underoathbefore

ourcom

mittee

ifthat’sw

hatit took

toprotect nationalsecrets. T

hatwas

thestartofa

conservative

drumbeat

againstour

work

thatw

ouldcontinue

forthe

restof

our-

investigation.O

riginallyw

eplanned

tocom

pleteour w

orkin

eightm

onths.Gener

allyw

hensenators

establisha

select comm

itteeon

atopic,they

areanx

iousthat

itnot

turninto

aperm

anentcom

mittee.

Isoon

sawthat

ourdeadline

was

unrealistic,andthat

ifwe

setourselvesan

artificialtimeline,

theFord

administration

would

haveno

troublew

aitingus

out.Finally,

ata

comm

itteem

eetingon

April

23,w

eargued

itout.

Gary

Hart

saidw

eneeded

abackup

strategyin

casethe

White

House

continuedto

stall.

Goldw

aterthought

we

shouldscale

backthe

document

requests;he

was

afraidw

ew

ouldget

something

sensitiveand

thensom

eoneon

thecom

mittee

orthe

staffw

ouldleak

itto

thepress

andem

barrassus.

But

PhilH

art seemed

tospeak

formost ofus

when

hesaid,“T

heW

hiteH

ousehas

justgiven

ustw

o‘go

tohells.’

What

isour

responsegoing

tobe?”

Iw

asnotas

seniorasPhilH

art orB

arryG

oldwater, butIdid

havesom

eexperi

enceconducting

investigationsand

working

with

reluctantsources.I

lit

acigar—

oftensm

okein

comm

itteem

eetingsin

thosedays—

pushedm

ychair

back,and

said,“W

ew

illhave

tow

aitthem

out.”W

ehad

toget

in

aposition

where

theW

hiteH

ouseknew

we

were

goingto

bearound

aslong

asnecessary.

My

colleaguesagreed,

andin

May

we

votedto

extend

ourtim

etable.In

today’senvironm

entI

don’tbelieve

thatw

ouldw

ork.T

heparti

sandivide

is sodeep

that, unfortunately,apresident can

usuallycounton

mem

bersof

hisow

nparty

inC

ongressto

protecthim

.T

hisis

precisely

what

we

sawin

2007and

2008,w

henC

ongresstried

toinvestigate

the

intelligencefailures

thatled

tothe

war

inIraq.

Bush

andC

heneyknew

theyw

ouldbe

out of officeby

January2009

andfigured

theycould

string

outtheinvestigators

untilthen.B

utit w

asdifferentforus.BillM

iller,our

comm

itteestaff director, had

beena

staffaidefor

SenatorJohnSherm

an

Cooper, a

Republican. W

ehad

Republicans

suchas

Dick

Schweiker,M

ac

Mathias, and

How

ardB

aker, who

haddem

onstrateda

gooddealof

inde

Spies,Security,

andthe

RuleofLaw

pendencefrom

theW

hiteH

ouseon

Vietnam

andW

atergate.W

ehad

JohnTow

er,the

comm

itteecochair,

who

ultimately

earnedconsiderable

prestigeby

making

thiscom

mittee

work.

These

peoplew

erem

oderates,senators

forwhom

theseissues

were

reallynotpartisan

matters.T

heintel

ligenceabuses

hadoccurred

underboth

parties—w

edocum

entedabuses

undereveryadm

inistrationfrom

FranklinR

ooseveltto

Richard

Nixon—

andpeople

who

believedin

thelaw

andaccountability,

Republican

andD

emocrat,w

eretroubled

byw

hattheyw

erehearing.T

heyallw

ereserio

us

aboutthe

Senate’sconstitutional

responsibilityto

overseethe

executivebranch,and

theyinsisted

thatthe

White

House

producew

hatwe

needed.In

addition,the

Republicans

hadjust

come

throughthe

embarrass

ment

ofWatergate.

They

hadsupported

apresident

who

letthem

down

andhum

iliatedthem

.Irem

emberG

oldwater

tellingm

ethat

hehad

oncetold

Nixon,“T

heonly

time

youever

hadm

eup

tothe

White

House

was

when

yougot

yourass

ina

crack.”So

theR

epublicanside

hada

mood

ofself-preservation,a

sensethat

theyw

ouldhe

loyaltothe

White

House

intheirfashion.

Then,

too,our

Republican

friendsbegan

torealize

thatthe

investigation

was

playingw

ellw

iththe

pressand

thepublic.

As

ourcom

mit

teebegan

uncoveringa

seriesof

far-fetchedC

IAespionage

plans,B

arryG

oldwater

calleda

news

conferenceone

dayto

discussa

bizarregadget

developedby

theagency,a

“hio-innoculator”that

was

supposedto

injectpoisons

intotargeted

victims

fromlong

distances.He

drewa

bigcrow

dof,

andthe

nextday

hispicture

ranon

thefront

pageofnew

spapersaround

thew

orld.I

teasedhim

,saying

thathe

hadstaged

apublicity

stunt.“O

fcourse

Idid,”he

saidw

itha

bigsm

ile.“1learned

itfromH

ubert.”E

ventuallyFord

came

around.H

ew

asa

loyalRepublican,

huthew

asnot

anideologue.

His

attorneygeneral,

Edward

Levi,the

distinguishedform

erdean

ofthe

University

ofC

hicagoLaw

School,understood

thegravity

oftheabuses.A

ndthe

politicsw

erew

ithus. People

were

confusedand

angryaboutw

hattheyread

inthe

newspapers.

Mem

bersofC

ongressw

ereunder

alot

ofpressure

todo

something

onthis.

They

couldn’tjust

walk

away

fromtheir

responsibilities,as

theytried

todo

laterw

iththe

intelligencefailures

onIraq.

A1

42

14

3

TH

EG

OO

DF

IGH

TSpies,

Security,and

theR

uleofL

aw

But

we

made

accomm

odationson

ourside,

too.W

edidn’t

want

theinvestigation

toseem

partisan,or

something

designedto

embar

rassem

ployeesof

theseagencies.

Iinsisted

thatw

eget

keydocum

ents,

butI

alsoargued

thatw

eshould

limit

thedegree

ofdetailw

easked

for.

We

wanted

onlyto

learnabout

what

happenedand

howit

happened.

We

were

notout

toget

individuals.I knew

thatif

itlookedlike

we

were

undermining

Am

erica’ssecurity,

we

were

goingto

getshut

down—

and

probablydeservedly.

Inaddition,

we

knewthat

ourinquiry

hadlittle

precedentfor

inthe

Senate’slong

history.D

uringthe

Civil W

ar,a

Conduct ofW

ar Com

mit.

teehad

made

Lincoln’slife

miserable. T

henin

the1920s

theresom

ehear

ingsw

ereheld

onthe

Palmer

Raids

onsuspected

anarchists.B

utbefore,

duringand

afterW

orldW

arII,

nobodyw

antedto

interferew

ithintelli

genceoperations. T

hisw

asthe

first time—

andm

aybeit w

ouldbe

thelast

time—

thata

congressionalcom

mittee

would

beable

tooperate

thew

ay

we

did,conducting

adeep,

broad,and

unrestrictedinvestigation

ofour

nation’ssecret

agencies.Fritz

Schwarz

andBill

Miller

spenta

lotof time

figuringout how

toslice

thisw

atermelon

sow

ecould

get what w

eneeded

without hurting

theagencies

or riskingour country.

These

questionsgenerated

nolittle

frictionin

theSenate,

with

someI

ofour

colleaguescharging

thatthe

probew

ouldhelp

theenem

yand

exposeagents

torisk.

InD

ecember

1975,the

CIA

bureauchief

inA

th-1

ens,R

ichardW

elch,w

asgunned

down

onhis

way

home

froma

partyi

anincident

thatshocked

usall.

Afew

months

afterthat,

my

colleague

Milton

Young

of North

Dakota

gavea

speechon

theSenate

floorim

ply-.

ingthat

we

were

responsiblefor

revealingW

elch’sidentity

and,thus,foi

hisdeath. Fortunately, the

factsw

ereon

our side. Iwent right dow

nto

the

floor myself and

pointedout that the

comm

itteehad

never beengiven

his

name.

We

insistedon

thatrule—

we

neverreceived

names

andcouldn’t

haveleaked

any. Ialsopointed

out thataG

reeknew

spaper hadpublished

theaddress

ofthe

CIA

officein

Athens.

Nevertheless,

we

hadto

step

carefullybecause

thoseaccusations

circulatedfrequently.

Eventually

Ford’sstalling

tacticsfailed

andthe

administration

beg

making

witnesses

available.O

nM

ay15,

behindclosed

doorsin

aw

in-

dowless, bunkerlike

roomhigh

upin

theC

apitol,w

econducted

ourfirst

formal

hearing,and

William

Colby

presenteda

historyof

CiA

covert

actions.A

week

laterhe

confirmed

toour

comm

itteethat

theC

IAhad

sponsoredseveral foreign

assassinationplots, including

aplan

tokill Fidel

Castro

anda

bungledattem

pt onthe

lifeof Patrice

Lamum

ba, prime

min

isteroftheC

ongo.W

henm

embers

oftheR

ockefeller Com

mission

sawthe

assassination

files,they

realizedthat

theycouldn’t

handleit

ontheir

own.

The

topic

wasso

fullof

explosiveallegations

that,I

think,they

decidedthey

had

tohave

some

sortof

understandingw

iththe

Congress,

particularlyw

ith

theSenate.A

t theend

ofthat month, they

concludedtheir

investigation

ratherabruptlyand

beganturning

theirfilesover

tous.

InSeptem

berw

ebegan

ourpublic

hearings,and

peoplebegan

to

graspthe

gravityof

theinvestigation.

We

producedevidence

ofa

series

of embarrassing

CIA

activities, includingoutlandish

programs

todevelop

shellfishtoxins

andother

poisons.W

ealso

examined

theH

ustonPlan,

astrategy

developedby

aN

ixonaide

named

TomC

harlesH

ustonto

use

theFBI

andthe

CIA

toconduct

illegalburglaries

andopen

them

ailof

thousandsofA

merican

citizens.A

tthis

point,a

seconddynam

icbegan

working

inour

favor.M

any

of theCIA

’scareer

professionalsw

ereoffended

bythe

illegaloperations

andw

erew

illingto

sayso.For the

goodagents,the

professionals, thatw

as

LooneyTunes

time.

One

agentin

particularstood

out—he

hadan

Irish

surname,

althoughin

ourreports

we

usedpseudonym

sto

protectagents’

safety.W

easked

himto

testifyabout

theeffort

toassassinate

Patrice

Lumum

ba.H

ethought

theproject

was

shameful.

He

said,“W

henthe

agencyw

antedto

dosom

ethinglike

that,they

always

pickedan

ethnic

likem

e.That’s

thekind

ofw

orkw

edo.

The

niceguys

upin

thefront

.shop—

theW

aspyIvy

Leagueguys—

don’tdo

thatsort

ofthing.”

The

image

of classyprofessionalism

beganto

crumble

prettyquickly.

FC

learly,these

doubtsran

straightup

anddow

nC

IA,

tothe

point

where

intelligence-gatheringhad

become

dysfunctional.W

elearned

thatthe

headof

counterintelligence,Jam

esA

ngleton,w

homthe

other

ents

calledM

other, was

sow

aryof corrupted

intelligencethathe

simply

______

.14

5.

‘44

TH

EG

OO

DF

IGH

T

stopped

readin

gth

eag

ency

’sow

nintelligence

reports.Even

BillC

olby,w

hohad

beeninvolved

insom

epretty

brutalstuff

duringthe

Phoenixcounterintelligence

programin

Vietnam

,cam

eto

feelthat

thesecret

projectsw

eredestroying

theagency.

Peoplelike

Colby,

who

were

stillrational,

understoodthat

theagency

hadrun

offthe

railsand

couldnot

correctcourse

internally.C

olbylater

wrote

inthe

New

York

Times

thatcongressional oversight w

ould“strengthen

Am

ericanintelligence.”

InN

ovember

ourfocus

turnedto

theFBI, and

we

sawthe

same

pat

tern.By

noww

ehad

dividedour

work

between

two

subcomm

ittees,onefor

theforeign

intelligenceagencies

andone

forthe

domestic

agencies,and

I was

askedto

chairthe

domestic

taskforce.

Ithought we

hada

top

notchinvestigative

staff,and

Ihappily

duginto

thedocum

entsand

ranthe

hearings.W

eproduced

evidencethat

theIR

Shad

sharedconfiden

tialtaxpayer

filesw

iththe

intelligenceagencies,

andthat

theFBI

hadconducted

“blackbag”

jobs—that is, burglaries—

againstallegeddom

esticsubversives

allthew

ayback

tothe

1940s.A

llthis

was

deeplyem

barrassing—infuriating

topeople

onboth

sidesofthe

aisle—and

itsuggestedthat

thiscancer

hadspread

beyondthe

foreign

intelligenceagencies

intodom

esticoperations.

William

Sullivan,the

number

threeofficiaL

inthe

FBI,testifiedthatJ.

EdgarHoover had,in

hislater years, com

pletelypoliticized

theagency. A

sa

result,allthethings

thatareim

portant toan

FBI agent—his

professionalismasan

investigatorand

asa

factfinder—

were

givensecond

placeto

thepolitical

activitiesH

ooverw

antedto

pursue.Sullivan

saidthey

hadspent

more

time

pursuing

Hoover’s

enemies

thanthey

didcatching

crooks.T

henw

em

adeone

of ourgreat

investigativebreakthroughs,

aset of

discoveriesthat

shockedus

andbroke

thedom

esticinquiry

wide-open.I

was

concernedabout

intelligenceabuses

directedagainst

Am

ericanciti

zens,andI w

aspushing

our staffhard. Iwanted

witnesses

anddocum

ents,not

vaguerum

ors.O

neday

oneof ourstaff investigators,M

ikeE

pstein—a

brilliantguy,

unbelievablytenacious—

came

intom

yoffice

andsaid,

“Senator,Ihave

some

thingyou’d

betterlook

at.They’re

calledC

OIN

TE

LPR

Ofiles, and

youw

on’t believew

hat’sin

here.”T

heacronym

CO

INT

EL

PRO

was

Bureau

slangfor

“counterintelli

Spies,Security,

andthe

Rule

ofLaw

genceprogram

,”T

heBureau’s

own

programfor

fightingsubversive

activity—

orw

hatitconsidered

subversiveactivity—

insidethe

United

States.W

hatw

eread

inthose

filesis

well-know

nnow

,hut

atthe

time

itw

asastonishing.

Inits

paranoia,the

FB1had

keptsecret

fileson

1m

illionA

merican

citizens.Hoover

haddesignated

twenty-six

thousandindividu

alsto

bearrested

andjailed

inany

nationalem

ergency,including

Martin

Luther

King

andN

orman

Mailer.

The

FBihad

conductedhundreds

ofburglaries

atoffices

ofpoliticalgroups.

Ithad

investigatedhalf

am

illion“subversives”

without

everobtaining

acourt

order.It

hadengaged

U.S.

army

intelligenceagents

toinfiltrate

meetings

ofvariousprogressive

organizations

hereat

home,

includingthe

NA

AC

P,environm

entalgroups,

andw

omen’s

rightsorganizations.T

heC

iA,

with

thecooperation

ofthe

U.S.

PostOffice,had

illegallyopened

them

ailofhundreds

ofAm

ericancitizens

form

orethan

twenty

years,including

thepersonal

mail

ofJohnSteinbeck,

Hubert

Hum

phrey,A

rthurB

urns,and

evenN

ixonhim

self.T

herew

asutter

contempt

forthe

ideaof

accountability,and

itw

asall

there,in

officialagencydocum

entsthatcouldn’t

hedenied.

Worst

ofall

was

thepersecution

ofM

artinL

utherK

ing.FBI

mem

osshow

edthat

Hoover

consideredK

inga

“hateleader”

andbelieved

thatK

inghad

conspiredw

iththe

Com

munist

Party.H

ooverhoped

toreplace

himw

ithsom

eoneelse

ofHoover’s

choosing.The

Bureau

hadtried

topre

ventKing

fromm

eetingw

iththe

pope. Ittriedto

keephim

out ofthebet

terhotels

inM

emphis

byw

ritinganonym

ousletters

thatasked,“W

hatis

aN

egrodoing

ina

high-classhotel

likethis?”

Iteventried

topreventhim

fromattending

thecerem

onyatw

hichhe

receivedthe

NobelPeace

Prize.Itbugged

hishotel

rooms—

hehad

girlfriends, andthe

FBIm

adesure

thatM

rs.K

ingknew

aboutthat.

And

o1course

agentsw

rotethe

notoriousanonym

ousletter, m

ailedw

itha

setof tapes,suggestingthat K

ingcom

mit

suicide:“King,there

isonlyone

thingleft foryou

todo.Y

ouknow

what

it

is.Y

OU

aredone.T

hereishutone

way

outforyou.You

bettertake

itbeforeyourfilthy,fraudulent self isbared

tothe

nation.”A

ftergoing

throughthese

documents

we

calledA

ndrewY

oung,w

hohad

beensecond-in-com

mand

atthe

SouthernC

hristianL

eadershipC

onferenceand

King’s

lieutenantin

theearlyl960

s.K

ingand

Young

14647

TH

EG

OO

DF

IGH

T

knewall

alongthat

theB

ureauw

asw

atchingthem

.Y

oungtestified

that

theyfelt

saferw

henFBi

agentsw

erearound

because,in

some

ofthose

mean

countiesin

theD

eepSouth, the

Ku

Klux

Klan

behaveditself w

hen

federal agentsw

erein

thevicinity. Y

oungtold

usthey

learnedto

identify

FBIagents.

An

agentalw

aysdrove

agreen

Plymouth

sedanand

always

wore

ablack

suitw

itha

blacktie,

white

shirtand

ahat—

evenin

hun

dred-degreew

eatherin

Alabam

a.“We

kneww

hothey

were

becausethey

always

hada

whip

aerial ontheir car,”

Young

toldus.

Testimony

of thiskind

was

almost com

ical,butalso

sadand

infuriat

ing. After

Young

testified, we

startedcalling

FBIagents,and

theirstories

revealedthat

theagency

hadgone

haywire.

Hoover

orderedthe

agency

tocelebrate

several occasionsever

year—the

thirtiethanniversary

ofthe

FBI, for example, or

thethirtieth

anniversaryofthe

dayhe

became

direc

tor—and

onthese

daysthe

agentsw

ereexpected

tobring

himpresents.

One

daya

storyappeared

inthe

Washington

Postrevealing

thatH

oover

was

manipulating

theagency

toget

presents.H

oovercalled

inhis

key

peopleand

said, “Thisis offensive

tom

e. How

many

times

haveI told

yoi

thatI do

not wantany

gifts?”T

henthe

next dayhe

sentw

ordaround

he

would

likean

ice-making

machine.

Much

more

serious,it

became

clearthat

thepeople

runningthese

agenciesw

ereincapable

of resistingpolitical

pressureand

drawing

aline

between

thelegal and

theillegal. W

etraveled

toN

ewH

ampshire

tointer

viewSullivan,

andunder

cross-examination

headm

itted,“N

everonce

didI

hearanybody,

includingm

yself,raise

thequestion,

‘Isthis

course

of action,w

hichw

ehave

agreedupon,

lawful?

isit

legal?is

it ethical

moral?’

We

nevergave

anythought

tothis

lineof reasoning

because

were

just naturallypragm

atic.”

We

gota

similar

responselater

when

1 questionedB

ensonB

uftham,

deputydirector ofthe

National Security

Agency, about one

of itssurve4.

lanceprogram

s:

Mondale: W

ereyou

concernedabout

itslegality?

Buffham

: Legality?

Mondale: W

hetherit w

aslegal.

Spies,Security,

andthe

Rule

ofLaw

Buffham

:In

what

sense?W

hetherthat

would

havebeen

alegal

thingto

do?M

ondale:Yes.B

uffham:T

hatparticularaspectdidn’tenterinto

thediscussion.

Mondale:

Iwas

askingyou

ifyouw

ereconcerned

aboutw

hetherthatw

ouldbe

legalandproper.

Buftham

:W

edidn’tconsider

itatthetim

e,no.

My

approachto

thedom

esticsubcom

mittee

hearings,as

inall

my

work,

was

toprepare

intensively_readingdocum

ents,interview

ingexperts,debriefing

ourstaff.Inthese

hearingsthatw

ascrucial

becausethe

issuesw

entlayers

deepand

thew

itnesses’testim

onyw

asoften

baffling.W

easked

FBIdirector

Clarence

Kelley

totestify

onthe

CO

INT

EL

pRO

activities.I

askedhim

which

activitiesw

ereinside

thelaw

andw

hichw

ereoutside.

He

answered

bysaying

thatsom

etimes

you

haveto

giveup

some

rightsto

protectothers.Isaid,“That’sfine.W

ouldyou

tellme

which

rightsyou

aregiving

tip?”“W

ell,”he

said,“1didn’tm

eanitthatw

ay.”T

hissloppy

thinkingprevailed

inthe

agencies_theidea

thatahigherpurpose

allowed

theseagencies,

with

theencouragem

entofthe

White

House,

todisregard

thelaw

.Ifound

asecond

patternequally

troubling.W

ew

ouldask

some

lowlevelagent,W

hogave

approvalfortheseactivities?

He

would

say,Well,I

don’tknow—

you’llhaveto

asksom

eonehigher

up.We

would

gostraight

upthe

chainofcom

mand,and

theyallsaid

thesam

ething,

noneofthem

[kiieww

hohad

authorizedanything.T

heprocess

was

clearlydesigned

forkg—

tohide

responsibilityand

preventanyone

fromever

beingcalled

toco

unt.

InD

ecember

our

work

came

toa

headin

afinalpublic

hearing.K

eHey

Wasstilltrying

tostonew

allus,insistingthat

theillegalactivities

hadlong

iice

come

toan

end.B

utwe

hadbeen

toldthat

ElliotRichardson,

when

was

Nixon’s

attorneygeneral,

hadordered

theFBI

tocom

pilea

listofillegalactivities

overthe

years.Iknew

thatifw

egot

Richardson’s

list,co

uld

verifyw

henthis

activ

itystarted

andw

henitended.So

we

caJiedtom

eyG

eneralLevito

testify,andIasked

himto

producethat

list.

.4

j49

TH

EG

OO

DF

iGH

TSpies,

Security,and

theR

uleof Law

When

thehearing

got under way, how

ever, Levi headedoff in

adiffer

entdirection.

He

wanted

toargue

thatthe

JusticeD

epartment

deserved

akind

oflegal

escapehatch

todo

preventiveinvestigations,

akind

of

penumbral area

where

thelaw

didn’t apply. I askedhim

thelegal basis

for

suchan

argument, and

toexplain

why

hisagencies

couldn’t simply

obey

thelaw

. He

went off into

what I thought w

asa

filibuster, along

answer to

avoidaddressing

thequestion.

You

couldsee

hew

asslipping

all over. He

didn’thave

anansw

er.H

ew

asone

ofthe

most

respectedlegal

scholars

inA

merica,

buthe

hadan

impossible

positionto

defend,so

Ibrought

himback

tothe

issueof

thedocum

entw

ehad

requested.T

hisw

asour

exchange:

Mondale:

I amasking

you, asthe

headof the

JusticeD

epartment,

if we

couldget those

reports.

Levi:W

ell,1 do

notknow

if youcan

ornot,

butw

ew

illcertainly

considerit.

Mondale: W

hynot

1

Levi:B

ecauseI

thinkthat

itis

onething

togive

reportsof

that

kindin

confidenceto

acom

mittee

ofthis

kindand

another

thingto

make

thempublic.

Mondale: T

heC

IAgave

theirsto

us. Why

can’t you?

Levi: Well, I am

notin

theC

IA.

I donot care

tobe.

I donot w

ish

tobe.

Mondale:

Do

youconsider thata

goodansw

er?

Levi:I—

yes, I consider theansw

er as goodas

thequestion.

Mondale, to

Senator Church: W

ell, I thinkthat kind

of arrogance

is why

we

havetrouble

between

theexecutive

andthe

legisla

tivebranch. T

hankyou, M

r. Chairm

an.

I later regrettedit testy

exchange. I soundedlike

a smart aleck

when

allI

1 was

tryingto

dow

asto

underscorethe

importance

of therule

of law. B

et.

I don’t want that colloquy

tom

isrepresent what I think

of Levi. Hew

a

first-ratescholar

anda

goodperson.

1 thinkhe

realizedthat

theage

hesupervised

hadgone

off ina

directionthat could

not bedefended, an

J.

hew

entback

tothe

JusticeD

epartment

andbegan

lookingfor

ways

to

get themback

oncourse.Levi becam

eindispensable

toour

reformefforts:

He

wrote

agood

setof

operatingguidelines

forthe

FBI,w

hichbanned

“preventiveaction”

andother

civilliberties

abuses,and

hehelped

con

vinceFord

toacceptproper C

ongressionaloversight.

He

dida

great deal

tobring

integrityback

tothose

agenciesbecause

he,too,

believedthat

theyshould

obeythe

law.

Byearly

1976w

ehad

calledeight

hundredw

itnesses, reviewed

more

than1 10,000

pagesof

classifieddocum

ents,and

documented

along

historyof

abuse.W

ehad

issuedone

publicreport,

onthe

CIA

foreign-

assassinationsprogram

,and

were

ak)utto

publisha

powerful

second

volume,

IntelligenceA

ctivitiesand

theRights

of Am

ericans,w

hichdetailed

thefindings

of ourdom

estictask

force.T

hestaff

was

finishingw

orkon

severalm

orecom

mittee

reports,w

hichw

ouldinclude

more

thaneighty

recomm

endationsto

reformthe

intelligencecom

munity—

some

of which

were

quitehard

onC

ongressitself.

LochJohnson,a

University

of Geor

giapolitical

scientistw

hoserved

onthe

comm

itteestaff,

latersurnina

rizedthat

aspectof our

work:

“lna

politicalsystem

basedon

checksand

balances,C

ongresshad

providedtoo

fewchecks

andperm

itteda

shift

inbalance

fromthe

overseersto

theoverzealous.

The

supervisorsin

the

executivebranch

hadfailed

toperform

anybetter.”

Now

ourchallengew

asto

write

alaw

that would

preventtheseabuses

fromhappening

again.A

tfirstw

etried

touse

thecom

mon-law

method.

We

tookactual

casesfrom

thefiles

andthe

testimony

andtried

todis

cernw

hichactivities

must

beoff-lim

its,w

hichw

eretruly

necessary,and

which

couldhave

beenconducted

legaLly.W

eforced

ourselves,through

thediscipline

of dealingw

ithfacts

andevents, to

come

upw

itha

seriesof

iideLines,w

hichw

ethought

might then

heenacted

intoa

law.W

espent

ys—tw

elve-hourdays

andm

ore—for

acouple

ofweeks.

But

theissues

were

simply

toocom

plex.A

nyguideline

we

wrote

was

toodetailed

and

olong,and

theagencies

feltit w

ouldjusttie

themin

knots.

[In

theend

we

keptrunning

intothe

same

two

conundrums:

We

Douldn’t w

riterules

broadenough

toanticipate

everycontingency

ina

tional

securitycrisis,

andw

ecouldn’t

seehow

toim

posepublic

over-

-‘v,

151

TH

EG

OO

DF

IGH

T

sighton

agenciesthat

must

operatein

secret.O

uransw

erw

asa

pieceof

legislationthat

became

theForeign

IntelligenceSurveillance

Act,

or

FISA.

Sincew

ecouldn’t

write

guidelinesto

coverevery

possibility,w

e

createda

new, separate

courtw

iththe

authorityto

examine

eachcase

as

itcame

up. We

wouldn’ttie

theagencies’hands

inadvance,but w

ew

ould

requirethat

theym

aketheir

casebefore

acourt

oflaw

.T

hatw

assom

e

creativew

ork, butI think

it was

agood

answer,and

bythe

springof

1976

we

haddraft

Legislation.

Bythe

time

theFISA

legislationstarted

advancingin

bothhouses

of

Congress,

I was

inthe

White

House

aspart ofthe

Carter

administration.

Thus

I was

onthe

otherside

of thetable,

inthe

administration

andseek

ingpragm

aticsolutions

with

thepeople

who

ranthe

FBIand

theC

IA.

But

thatw

asfortunate,

1 think,because

I couldrecom

mend

toPresident

Carter

andthe

attorneygeneraL

ways

tom

akeFISA

work;

I couldm

ake

theargum

entthat

theFISA

courtw

asgood

forus.

When

we

gotinto

a

quandary,I

was

ableto

bringin

FritzSchw

arz,then

inprivate

practice.

orcom

mittee

staff fromthe

Hill,

togive

ustheir

readingon

thelaw

and

congressionalintent.

Am

easureof

thedifficulty

ofthis

issueis

thateven

peoplew

orking

forthe

same

administration

oftenhad

differingpoints

ofview

.C

arter

hadestablished

aspecial

White

House

coordinationcom

mittee

consist

ingof representatives

fromthe

CIA

,theN

SA, the

Departm

entsofState,

Defense,

andJustice, and

theN

ational SecurityC

ouncil,andoften

I w

them

ainadvocate

fortough

courtoversight

ofthe

surveillance.O

na

fewpoints,

suchas

whether

thelaw

shouldprotect

Am

ericancitizem

when

theyw

ereoverseas, only

I andperhaps

Griffin

Bellw

ouldbe

arraycd

againstZbigniew

Brzezinski, Stansfield

Turner,theN

SA, and

others.(

afew

of thosetopics

Carter

himselfhad

tocall

thefinal com

promise.Y

,

onthe

whole, w

ehelped

Congress

write

agood

lawand

it provedtobel

exceptionalexam

pleof

sophisticated,legislative-executive

cooperari

tobring

about reform.

After

threeyears

of investigations, hearingsand

debate, theFISA

1

passedthe

Senatein

1978by

avote

of 95to

1.In

additionto

theR

S

law, C

ongressplaced

aten-year

termlim

iton

thedirector

ofthe

FBI

152

preventanotherJ.EdgarH

ooverfrom

emerging

andcreated

aperm

anentpanel,

theSenate

IntelligenceC

omm

ittee,w

ithauthority

overthe

federal

intelligenceagencies.

Ithinkitw

asa

historicachievem

ent,notjustfine

investigativew

orkby

ourstaff,

andnot

justresourceful

work

indrafting

the

legislation,hut

proofthatourpolitical

systemis

strongenough

andw

iseenough

toco

nfront

athreat

toour

constitutionalfram

ework,

make

corrections,and

leavethe

democracy

stronger.Am

ericansunderstood

thatleaders

oftheirgovernm

enthad

abusedthe

powers

ofoffice,and

thenthey

sawthat

we

hadtranscended

partisanshipto

investigatethose

abusesand

hadrallied

publicsupportfordram

aticand

far-reachingchanges

tothe

way

ourin

telligence

agenciesw

ork.LochJohnson

would

laterw

rite:

The

intelligenceinvestigation

of1975

must

surelyrank

asone

ofthe

most

significantinquiries

conductedby

theU

nitedStates

Senate.It

representedthe

firstseriousexam

inationof

the“dark

side”ofgovernm

entsincethe

establishmentofthe

modern

intelligencebureaucracy

in1947;

itunearthedm

oreinfi)rm

ation(m

uchof

ithighlyclassified)

fromthe

executivebranch

thanany

previouscongressional

inquiryhad

done;it

setin

mot ion

forcesthat

would

revolutionizethe

approachto

intelligencepolicy

onC

apitolH

illand,

consequently,w

ithinthe

intelligencecom

munity.

The

newsystem

changedbehavioratourintelligence

agencies.When

swore

inW

illiamW

ebsteras

FBIdirector

in1978,

Igave

hima

copyour

comm

itteereport

andtold

himto

readit

beforehe

didanything

‘else.I

thinkit

hadan

impact

onhis

tenure.Stansfield

Turner,the

CIA

directorunder

PresidentCarter,cam

eto

feelthe

same

way;

hew

rotethat

ong

congressionaloversight

“ensuresagainst

ourbecom

ingseparated

min

thelegal

andethical

standardsof

oursociety.”

George

Tenet

later-

me

thesam

ething.

When

heran

theC

IA,

hesaid,

hisagents

likedFISA

systembecause

theyknew

theauthority

ofthe

courtsstood

md

them.

Itprofessionalized

theagency

again.That

laww

orkedw

ell

Spies,Security,

andthe

Rule

ofLaw

I

153

TH

EG

OO

DF

IGH

TSpies,

Security,and

theR

uleofLaw

throughC

arter,through

Reagan, through

Bush

1,throughC

linton.They

all worked

with

it,andI began

tothink:

Now

,atleastforour generation,this

issueis settled.

Then

came

theB

ush-Cheney

administration

andthe

disasteroftheirw

aronterror.

They

tooka

horribleset ofevents—

theattacks

of9/11—and

usedthem

tocreate

aclim

ateof

fearthat

would

justifytheir

driveto

reinterpretthe

Constitution

andarrogate

greatpow

erto

themselves.

They

threwout

aconstitutional

andlegal

framew

orkthat

theyw

erepledged

toprotect

andthat

hadsurvived

throughfour

administrations

andm

orethan

two

decades.T

heydeliberately

defiedthe

FISAlaw

andundertook

illegal surveillancew

ithout seekingcourtapproval.T

heycom

missioned

legalm

emos

justifyingtorture,

thenkept

thosem

emos

secretfrom

thevery

authoritiesw

iththe

most

expertise.T

heydestroyed

tapesthat

documented

theirow

ntorture

practices—in

plaincontem

ptofthe

9/11C

omm

ission, which

hadlegal

authorityto

reviewevidence.

Atthe

coreof

allthese

activitiesw

asthe

same

dangerousprem

isew

einvesti

gatedin

theC

hurchC

omm

ittee:that the

presidentcan,unilaterallyand

insecret,do

as hechooses

despitethe

law.T

hedefenders

oftheseactivities

saidour

nationfaced

agreatthreat,

thatthey

hada

constitutional dutyto

protectthe

Am

ericanpeople.But

noone

deniesthis.W

eargued

that point,andsettled

it,duringourSenate

hearingsm

orethan

thirtyyears

ago.T

hequestion

we

consideredin

theC

hurchC

omm

itteeisnotw

hetherA

merica

needsstrong

intelligenceagencies

andsecretsurveillance

activities,

which

we

do,but

whether

thepresident,

andthe

presidentalo

r,gets

todecide

what

islegal

andw

hatis

not,w

hatviolatesthe

Constitu

tionand

what does

not.In

creatingthe

congressionalintelligence

comm

itteesand

enactizFISA

, Congress

voted,with

largebipartisan

majorities, thatthe

answ

er

no—the

president cannotarrogatethese

powers

tothe

executivebrand

or decide,in

isolation,toreinterpret standing

law.A

sFrank

Church

to_

theW

ashingtonPostin

1976, “The

lessonto

belearned

isnotjustthatilIe

gal actionsw

erejustified. R

atheritis

thatoncegovernm

entofficialsstag

believingthat

theyhave

thepow

erand

theright

toact

secretlyouts

-

thelaw

,we

havestarted

down

along,slippery

slopew

hichculm

inatesin

aW

atergate.”W

hatIfound

most

gallingafter

9/11is

thatthe

Bush

administration

couldhave

askedC

ongressto

updatethe

intelligencelaw

sand

make

themcurrent

with

developments

intechnology

andthe

terroristthreat.

But

theyhad

nointerest

inm

akingthe

laww

orkor

incooperating

with

Congress.

They

were

tryingto

buildtheir

theoryof

the“unitary

executive,”

acom

mander-in-chiefprivilege

thatwould

allowthem

tosetpolicy

withoutansw

eringto

anyonehutthem

selves.Itwas

different,intone

anddepth

andbreadth,from

anythingthis

countryhad

seenbefore.

Apresident

who

isaccountable

tono

one—not

theC

ongressor

thecourts—

isa

presidentwho

willhe

tempted

torew

ritethe

lawfor

hisow

nconvenience,

todecide

who

isan

enemy

ofthestate,

toviolate

constitutional

protectionsofour

liberties.A

systemofgovernm

entcannot

operate

thisw

ay.That

definesthe

imperialpresidency

thatgaveour

foundersnightm

ares.T

herew

illalw

aysbe

threatsto

ournational

security,and

therew

illalw

aysbesom

eonew

hoargues

thatshortcutsare

necessaryto

keepussafe.

Butthat

isno

argument

tosubvert

thelaw.

Ifyouw

antto

adaptto

newF

circumstances

ornew

threats,then

youam

endthe

law.There

isno

cvi

dencethat

Bush

andC

heneyaccom

plishedanything

bystepping

outside

[the

lawthat

theycouldn’t

haveaccom

plishedw

ithinits

boundaries.A

tofevidence

suggeststhat

what

they’vedone

hasw

eakenedA

merica.

When

youviolate

theG

enevaA

ccords,w

henyou

operateA

buG

hraih-d

Guantanam

o,when

youuse

extraordinaryrendition

totorture

peoplew

holater

turnout

tohe

innocent,youlose

respectin

thew

orld.You

crcangeragainstthe

United

Statesand

youspaw

nviolence

andem

power

rrorists.W

henyou

abusethe

toolsof

ourm

ilitaryand

intelligenceagencies,

usubvert

democracy

itself.A

mericans

wonder

why

theyshould

su

p

prt

aforeign

policyw

hoserationale

iskept

secretfrom

them,

orpar

ipatefully

intheirdem

ocracyifthe

toolsoftheirow

ngovernm

entcanturned

againstthem

when

theydissent.T

hequality

ofyourdecisionserio

ratesbecause

youare

afraidto

testthemin

openargum

ent.

1c4

TH

EG

OO

DF

IGH

T

Areassuring

cycleof

self-correctionruns

throughA

merican

history,of citizens

recognizinga

problemin

theirm

idst anddem

andingthat their

leadersaddress

it.B

utw

ecan’t

trustour

civilliberties

tosom

eabstract

theoryof history.

We

needto

takecare

of themevery

day. The

foundersleft us

agreat gift, an

elegant but durabledem

ocracythat gives

expressionto

thew

isheso

them

ajorityw

hile, byand

large, protectingthe

rightsA

them

inority.Events

will

testthat

structurefrom

time

totim

e—a

civilw

ar,aterrorist

attack—and

we

cannot simply

assume

thatit w

ill survivethe

challenge.T

helesson

of Am

ericanhistory

is that,in

threateningtim

es, fearcan-

overtakeour

betterjudgm

ent.It

happenedw

iththe

Alien

andSedition

Acts

atthe

endof

theeighteenth

century,w

iththe

Palmer

Raids

a’-’W

orldW

arI, w

iththe

internment

of JapaneseA

mericans

inthe

l94

with

J.Edgar Hoover’s

abuseof pow

erin

the1960s.W

ehave

strayedI

ourvalues

time

andagain

inour

history,alw

aysin

times

offear,and

ww

erealm

ost always

ashamed

of ourselvesw

henw

erecovered

oursenses..,

Meeting

aN

ewD

emocrat

JN

1973

AN

D1974, having

heardthe

callthatm

anysenators

hear,I took

atestrun

atacam

paignforthe

presidency.Bythattim

e1 had

worked

ona

numberofnational

issuesin

theSenate,and

Iwanted

tosee

ifIcouldhave

anational

impactw

ithvoters.

That

turnedoutto

bea

toughperiod.Iw

ason

theroad

everyw

eekendform

orethan

ayear,

raisingm

oneyand

puttingm

yselfbeforeaudiences

instates

where

I was

not well-know

n.It was

time

away

fromm

yfam

ily,fromM

innesota,andfrom

my

work

inthe

Senate.A

fterm

orethan

ayearof constant

travel,consta

nt

fund-raising,andconstant

speeches,Ihad

pulledabout

evenw

ith“N

oneofthe

Above”

innational

opinionsurveys,and

I droppedthatbid—

tow

idespreadapplause.

On

theday

IannouncedIw

asending

thatexperiment,

Ifeltahuge

ienseof

relief.A

fterthat

1had

nointention

ofgoing

backinto

thetio

nal

arena.1feltIhadfound

my

sweetspotin

theSenate.

Then

oneday

inM

ayof

1976,m

ychief

ofstaff,

Dick

Moe,

sugsted

thatwe

havecoffee

with

Hum

phrey,who

was

backin

theSenate

resentin

gM

innesota.Governor Jim

my

Carter

of Georgia

hadcom

eit

of nowhere

with

asuperb

campaign

fortheD

emocratic

presidentialm

tnination,and

thenew

spapersw

erestarting

tospeculate

aboutpos

lerunning

mates.

My

name

was

onall

thelists,

alongw

iththose

ofM

uskie,JohnG

lenn,andseveralother

Dem

ocraticsenators.W

henpolitical

writers

begancalling

me,

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