Module 1: Evolution and Economics
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Transcript of Module 1: Evolution and Economics
Module 1: Evolution and Module 1: Evolution and EconomicsEconomics
An Analysis of You:An Analysis of You:Prisoner’s DilemmaPrisoner’s Dilemma
Prisoner’s DilemmaPrisoner’s Dilemma This game is played by two This game is played by two
people, designated A and B. people, designated A and B. A plays first and can either A plays first and can either
cooperate or defect. cooperate or defect. Knowing A’s choice, B can Knowing A’s choice, B can
then either cooperate or then either cooperate or defect. defect.
A
C
D
BC D
A:$30B:$30
A:$10B:$45
A:$15B:$15
A:$45B:$10
Player A goes first without knowing what B will do.Player B goes second after learning A’s response.
Possible StrategiesPossible Strategies
Possible strategies of the sequential game
A B, if A plays C B, if A plays D StrategyC C C UNCONDITIONAL COOPERATORC C D OPTIMISTIC CONDITIONAL COOPERATORD C D PESSIMISTIC CONDITIONAL COOPERATORC D D OPTIMISTIC CONDITIONAL DEFECTORD D D UNCONDITIONAL DEFECTORC D C ?D C C ?D D C ?
Unconditional Cooperator: Unconditional Cooperator: CCCCCC
Friendly Tit-for-Tat: CCDFriendly Tit-for-Tat: CCD
Optimistic Non-Cooperator: CDDOptimistic Non-Cooperator: CDD
Pessimistic Tit-for-Tat: DCDPessimistic Tit-for-Tat: DCD
Unconditional Non-Cooperator: Unconditional Non-Cooperator: DDDDDD
Wingnuts:Wingnuts:CDC, DCC, DDCCDC, DCC, DDC
A DDC Player:“Player A will know I helped them and they might help me in the future.”
Your Population?Your Population?
1 23 T-4
T-4
A DCD Player:“I don’t think there are too many people in here who wouldn’t want $45 over $30 if we both decided to cooperate.”
TRUSTTRUST Cooperation by Player A demonstrates trust.Cooperation by Player A demonstrates trust.
A CDD Player:“If my partner sees that I chose to cooperate, they may choose to be altruistic and cooperate too so that we both get thirty dollars.”
RECIPROCITYRECIPROCITY Cooperating with a cooperative first mover Cooperating with a cooperative first mover
demonstrates reciprocity.demonstrates reciprocity. A CCD Player:“I would cooperate because that’s what I wanted somebody to do, and I’m a nice guy.”
A CDD Player:“Because I will make more money this way and the first player can’t stop me.”
Self-SacrificeSelf-Sacrifice Cooperating with a non-cooperative first Cooperating with a non-cooperative first
mover demonstrates self-sacrifice.mover demonstrates self-sacrifice.A CCC Player:“The effect on me is minimal, but it helps the other person immensely.”
The Scientific MethodThe Scientific Method Intro: Ask a question, make a hypothesis.Intro: Ask a question, make a hypothesis. Methods: Do an experiment.Methods: Do an experiment. Results: Analyze outcomesResults: Analyze outcomes
Topics for Today:GenderPunishment (&
Gender)One Idea From MeA Few From You
Statistical TestsStatistical Tests
Statistical TestsStatistical Tests Effect SizeEffect Size
The magnitude of the relationship between The magnitude of the relationship between variables.variables.
Specific to a particular test.Specific to a particular test. pp-value-value
The probability that an effect size is observed by The probability that an effect size is observed by chance.chance.
As the sample size increases, the As the sample size increases, the pp-value goes -value goes down.down.
Statistical TestsStatistical Tests t-testt-test::
A t-test determines whether the means of two A t-test determines whether the means of two separate groups are equal or not.separate groups are equal or not.
Do Males and Females Behave Do Males and Females Behave Differently in the Game?Differently in the Game?
Null HypothesisNull Hypothesis There is no relationship between gender and first There is no relationship between gender and first
mover behavior.mover behavior. Alternate HypothesisAlternate Hypothesis
One gender offers cooperation more often than the One gender offers cooperation more often than the other.other.
Trust Behavior Between GendersTrust Behavior Between Genders
Do Males and Females Behave Do Males and Females Behave Differently …Differently …
In trust behavior?
Male Offers = Female Offers?
Male Mean = .64Female Mean = .65Males = 58 Females = 57
p-value = .901.901 > .05
Insignificant!
Reciprocity Between GendersReciprocity Between Genders
Do Males and Females Behave Do Males and Females Behave Differently …Differently …
In reciprocity?
Male Reciprocity = Female Reciprocity?
Male Mean = .45Female Mean = .57Males = 58 Females = 57
p-value = .120.120 > .05
Insignificant!
Punishment:Punishment:Strategy DifferencesStrategy Differences
Without Punishment With Punishment
Using VariablesUsing Variables Independent VariableIndependent Variable
Something that is controlled for by the researcher.Something that is controlled for by the researcher. Dependent VariableDependent Variable
Something that is observed in terms of the Something that is observed in terms of the independent variables.independent variables.
Independent Variable:
Punishment
Dependent Variables:
TrustReciprocity
Altruism
What Punishment Does…What Punishment Does…TrustTrust
A CCC Player:“I would cooperate so I wouldn’t get punished.”
Played DDD in the first game.
What Punishment Does…What Punishment Does…TrustTrust
Offers of Cooperation:w/o Punishment = .64w/ Punishment = .90
p < .0001Significant!
What Punishment Does…What Punishment Does…ReciprocityReciprocity
Offers of Cooperation:w/o Punishment = .50w/ Punishment = .85
p < .0001Significant!
What Punishment Does…What Punishment Does…Self SacrificeSelf Sacrifice
A CCC Player:“Because if I don’t cooperate, A could punish me.”
Played CDD in the first game.
What Punishment Does…What Punishment Does…Self-SacrificeSelf-Sacrifice
Offers of Cooperation:w/o Punishment = .09w/ Punishment = .20
p < .012Significant!
How Do People Punish?How Do People Punish?
Punishment:Punishment:In-Class Study #2In-Class Study #2
Selfish Selfish PunishersPunishers
More MalesMore Males Invest More in Invest More in PunishmentPunishment
Moralistic Moralistic PunishersPunishers
More FemalesMore Females Invest Less in Invest Less in PunishmentPunishment
PunishmentPunishment
Cooperative/ Non-
Cooperative Behavior
Investment in
Punishment
Male/Female
Selfish vs. Moralistic Punishers:Selfish vs. Moralistic Punishers:SexSex
Moralistic Moralistic PunishersPunishers
Selfish Selfish PunishersPunishers
MalesMales 2424 1818
FemalesFemales 1818 2222
Null Hypothesis:Moralistic & Selfish Punishers are distributed equally between the sexes.
Alternate Hypothesis:They are not.
p = .272Do not reject null
hypothesis!
PunishmentPunishment
Cooperative/ Non-
Cooperative Behavior
Investment in
Punishment
Male/Female
Selfish vs. Moralistic PunishersSelfish vs. Moralistic PunishersInvestment in PunishmentInvestment in Punishment
Null Hypothesis:Moralistic & Selfish Punishers punish equally.
Alternate Hypothesis:They do not punish equally.
p = .683Do not reject null
hypothesis!
PunishmentPunishment
Cooperative/ Non-
Cooperative Behavior
Investment in
Punishment
Male/Female
Selfish vs. Moralistic PunishersSelfish vs. Moralistic PunishersInvestment in PunishmentInvestment in Punishment
Null Hypothesis:Males & Females punish equally.
Alternate Hypothesis:They do not punish equally.
p < .001Reject null hypothesis!
Males punish more!
PunishmentPunishment
Cooperative/ Non-
Cooperative Behavior
Investment in
Punishment
Male/Female
Social Dependency
Predictors of Cooperation:Predictors of Cooperation:In-Class Study #1In-Class Study #1
Risk Taking Behavior
Trusting PeopleSocial Integration
First Mover Behavior:First Mover Behavior:Based on Trust?Based on Trust?
Will People Reciprocate
?
First Mover Behavior
Risk Taking Behavior
p = .087
p = .378
Risk BehaviorRisk BehaviorQuestion For Sure Your
ColorOther Color
1 Win $2.00 Win $10.00
Win $2.00
2 Win $3.00 Win $10.00
Win $2.00
3 Win $4.00 Win $10.00
Win $2.00
4 Win $5.00 Win $10.00
Win $2.00
5 Win $6.00 Win $10.00
Win $2.00
6 Win $7.00 Win $10.00
Win $2.00
Score = 6Most Risky
Risk BehaviorRisk BehaviorQuestion For Sure Your
ColorOther Color
1 Win $2.00 Win $10.00
Win $2.00
2 Win $3.00 Win $10.00
Win $2.00
3 Win $4.00 Win $10.00
Win $2.00
4 Win $5.00 Win $10.00
Win $2.00
5 Win $6.00 Win $10.00
Win $2.00
6 Win $7.00 Win $10.00
Win $2.00
Score = 3Mildly Risky
Risk BehaviorRisk BehaviorQuestion For Sure Your
ColorOther Color
1 Win $2.00 Win $10.00
Win $2.00
2 Win $3.00 Win $10.00
Win $2.00
3 Win $4.00 Win $10.00
Win $2.00
4 Win $5.00 Win $10.00
Win $2.00
5 Win $6.00 Win $10.00
Win $2.00
6 Win $7.00 Win $10.00
Win $2.00
Score = 1Least Risky
Risk BehaviorRisk Behavior
Risk Behavior and Gender:Risk Behavior and Gender:Discussion Section 1Discussion Section 1
Null Hypothesis:Moralistic & Selfish Punishers punish equally.
Alternate Hypothesis:They do not punish equally.
p = .061Do not reject null
hypothesis!
Ambiguity BehaviorAmbiguity BehaviorQuestion For Sure Your
ColorOther Color
1 Win $2.00 Win $10.00
Win $2.00
2 Win $3.00 Win $10.00
Win $2.00
3 Win $4.00 Win $10.00
Win $2.00
4 Win $5.00 Win $10.00
Win $2.00
5 Win $6.00 Win $10.00
Win $2.00
6 Win $7.00 Win $10.00
Win $2.00
Are people…
Pessimistic
Or Optimistic?
Ambiguity BehaviorAmbiguity Behavior
Ambiguity Behavior, Trust and Ambiguity Behavior, Trust and Upbringing?Upbringing?
Discussion Section 6Discussion Section 6Trust
Behavior?Reaction to Ambiguity
Rural/Urban
p = .901
p = .112
Delayed PayoffsDelayed PayoffsQuestion Next Week One Day
Later1 $35.00 $40.00
2 $30.00 $40.00
3 $25.00 $40.00
4 $20.00 $40.00
5 $15.00 $40.00
6 $10.00 $40.00
7 $5.00 $40.00
Score = 0Most Patient
Delayed PayoffsDelayed PayoffsQuestion Next Week One Day
Later1 $35.00 $40.00
2 $30.00 $40.00
3 $25.00 $40.00
4 $20.00 $40.00
5 $15.00 $40.00
6 $10.00 $40.00
7 $5.00 $40.00
Score = 4Mildly Patient
Delayed PayoffsDelayed PayoffsQuestion Next Week One Day
Later1 $35.00 $40.00
2 $30.00 $40.00
3 $25.00 $40.00
4 $20.00 $40.00
5 $15.00 $40.00
6 $10.00 $40.00
7 $5.00 $40.00
Score = 7Least Patient
Delayed PayoffsDelayed Payoffs
Delayed Payoffs and Urban/Rural:Delayed Payoffs and Urban/Rural:Discussion Section 3Discussion Section 3
Null Hypothesis:Desire for immediate pay is unrelated to urban/rural upbringing.
Alternate Hypothesis:People from different upbringings fel differently about delayed payoffs.
p = .159Do not reject null
hypothesis!
A Biological PerspectiveA Biological Perspective
A Biological PerspectiveA Biological Perspective
Dopamine Dopamine SystemSystem
Bilateral InsulaBilateral Insula
Brain CenterBrain Center
Reward circuitryReward circuitry
Disgust, Pain, Disgust, Pain, HungerHunger
JobJob
During mutual During mutual cooperationcooperation
During low During low offers in U.G.offers in U.G.
Stimulated Stimulated during during
Games?Games?
Strength correlates Strength correlates with cooperation with cooperation and punishment.and punishment.
Increases Increases PunishmentPunishment
Operation Operation during Games?during Games?
An Evolutionary PerspectiveAn Evolutionary Perspective
Need for Cooperation in Evolutionary
Past
Neurology which
Supports Cooperation
Cooperative Behavior
“Does my Environment
Need Cooperation?”