Modification 500 slides for Workgroup
description
Transcript of Modification 500 slides for Workgroup
Modification 500 slides for Workgroup
Malcolm Montgomery
Matthew Hatch
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Session 1 – Primary Processes
Auction Overview
Process Overview
Joint Booking Platform
Available Firm Capacity
Ascending Clock Auctions
Uniform Price Auctions
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Content – Further Sessions
CMP Surrender
CMP LT UIOLI
Transfers
Scale backs
Buy backs
Unbundling
Voluntary Bundling
Tariffs & Charging Methodology
Transitional Arrangements
Contingency
User PRISMA Registration
Credit / Invoice / Over-run / Neutrality / Termination / Voluntary Discontinuance
PRISMA
Secondary Processes Supporting Processes
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CAM/CMP high level auction overview
Surrenders
NG
GE
MIN
IP
RIS
MA
SH
IPP
ER
Oth
er T
SO
Compileauction data
LT UIOLI, Oversubscription
,+Prices
CA
M c
alen
dar
Compileauction data
Surrendercut-off
Calculatebundle
AuctionInvite(s)
Run Auctions
On going Viewauction
Submitbids
Receiveoutcomes
Post auctionprocessing
Receiveinvoices
NG &Shipper inventory
Viewinfo
Publishresults
TO BE DEFINED BY OTHER TSO
TSO informed of bundled/unbundled
split
TSO informed of bundled/unbundled
split
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Interconnector Capacity & Auctions
Annual Yearly Interconnector Capacity Auction
Annual Quarterly Interconnector Capacity Auction
Rolling Monthly Interconnector Capacity Auction
Rolling Day Ahead Interconnector Capacity Auction
Interruptible Rolling Day Ahead Interconnector Capacity Auction
Within Day Interconnector Capacity Auction
Annual NTS Interconnector Capacity
Quarterly NTS Interconnector Capacity
Monthly NTS Interconnector Capacity
Daily NTS Interconnector Capacity
Interruptible NTS Interconnector Capacity
Daily NTS Interconnector Capacity
Auction Capacity
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CAMStandard capacity products - auction calendar
Auction Frequency ProductCapacity
Commencing
Start of the
auction
Invitation publication
AllocationAuction
algorithm
Annual Yearly
annually
FirmY1 to Y15
annual strips
1st October1st
Mondayof March
1 month before
auction startsnext
business day
(after the closing
bid window)
Ascendingclock
Annual Quarterly
FirmQ1 to Q4
1st October1st January
1st April1st of July
1st Mondayof June
2 weeks before
auction starts
RollingMonthly
monthlyFirm
monthly tranche
1st day of each month
3rd Mondayof the month
1 week before auction starts
RollingDay ahead
dailyFirm &
InterruptibleD+1
Start of the gas day
Firm 15:30*
Interrupt’ [16:30]
At the start of the auction
30 minutes after the bidding round closes Uniform
price
Within Day hourlyFirm
D
Hour bar +3.5 from end of bid window
D-1[18:00]
After closure of the day
ahead auction
30 minutes after the bidding round closes
* All times are GMT for winter and BST for summer
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PRISMA
CAM Regulation requires that TSOs offer capacity via a joint web based booking platform.
NG launched open letter consultation on PRISMA.
NG is now signed up as a shareholder of PRISMA along with other TSOs in (NW) Europe.
Users will need to complete Registration on PRISMA before using PRISMA functionalities.
Relevant User data will be exchanged between NGG and PRISMA for the purposes of completing processes within modification 500.
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NG / PRISMA Processes Overview
User Registration
User Registration
Credit Limit
Credit Sanction
Grid Point Data Maintenance
Add Location
Surrender Request
Surrender Process
Run Auction
Set up Auction
Process Results
Secondary Transactions
Transfers
PRISMA Processes
NG Processes
Assignment
Buybacks
Oversubscription
LT UIOLI
TariffsScalebacks
InvoicingRecall
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Over-subscription
Available Firm Capacity
LT UIOLI
Surrender
Unsold Technical
NG Available Capacity
Available Bundled
Available Unbundled
PRISMA Adjacent TSO
Available Capacity
NG Technical Capacity = Licence Baseline
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Technical Capacity Set Asidefor shorter term auctions
Y+6 to Y+15
Y+1 to Y+5
- 20% of Technical Capacity
- 10% of Technical Capacity
Relevant for Annual Yearly Interconnector Auctions only
In the event that technical capacity has sold out to more than 80/90% for a relevant gas year then all remaining unsold technical capacity will be set aside for shorter term auctions.
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Uneven sold profile over Year Y
SoldQ1
SoldQ2
SoldQ3 Sold
Q4
Unsold‘a’
Unsold ‘b’Unsold ‘c’
Unsold ‘d’
Technical Capacity
(80/90% level)
Technical Capacity made available for the year above in an Annual Yearly Auction = ‘b’
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CAM Cross border bundling - unsold capacity
Available to ‘bundle’
Available Capacity
NG
Unbundled
Where more available firm capacity exists on UK side – NGG may offer excess as unbundled product
Bundled Capacity
Consists of corresponding entry and exit capacity on both sides of the IP
Cross border bundling of unsold capacity has to be given priority
Unbundled Capacity
Where more available firm capacity exists on one side of an IP, this can be offered as an unbundled product up to 1 year ahead except for matching up to the sold level
Available Capacity
Adjacent TSO(s)
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Restriction in sale of unbundled capacity (>Y+1)
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Available Interruptible Capacity
In line with existing UNC provisions.
Entry Release (as per UNC Section B 2.5.10):
Exit Release (as per UNC Section B 3.6.2):
Reverse Flow
An amount equal to the forward flow technical capacity.
Ascending Clock Auctions
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Ascending Clock Auctions – overview
Allow Users to place volume bids for capacity in bidding rounds at pre-defined prices (starting with the reserve price)
The price increases in each round (by the Large Price Step) until the demand for capacity has reduced such that the bids can be allocated in full
But if a First Time Undersell happens (when aggregate demand is first less than the offered capacity)
a further bidding round will be undertaken with the price equal to the previous round’s price plus the Small Price Step
Users can submit more than 1 bid per round
Total volume of bids in any round from the same User must be less than or equal to the capacity offered in the auction
Bids can be modified or withdrawn up to the close of the relevant bid window
Once the bidding round closes, no changes can be made
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Auction Invitation
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Ascending Clock Bid windows
Bid Window
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Ascending Clock Auctions – Algorithm (1-to-1)
1st round of auction
Capacity offered atReserve price (P0)
Are aggregate bids <=Offered capacity?
Auction Closes
Allocate in full at the Reserve price
2nd and subsequent rounds
Capacity offered atPrevious Round’s price +
Large Price Step
Are aggregate bids =Offered capacity?
Auction Closes
Allocate in full at the Offered price(Previous Round’s price + LPS)
Are aggregate bids <Offered capacity?
First Time Undersell
YES
NO
NO
YES
YES
NO
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Ascending Clock Auctions – First Time Undersell (1-to-1)
First Time Undersell (FTU)
Capacity offered atPrevious completed round Price + Small Price Step
Are aggregate bids <=Offered capacity?
Auction Closes
Allocate in full at the Offered price(Previous completed round’s price +
SPS)
2nd and subsequent rounds
Capacity offered atPrevious FTU price +
Small Price Step
Are aggregate bids <=Offered capacity?
Auction Closes
Allocate in full at the Offered price(Previous FTU price + SPS)
YES
NO
YES
NO
Iterate round until Offered price is equal to price which led to FTU occurring - SPS
Auction will then close at this point, with capacity allocated at price which led to FTU occuring
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Auction in Progress example screen - 1
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Auction In Progress example screen - 2
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Ascending Clock example (1)
Shipper Qty
A 100
B 90
C 50
The available quantity is 200.
Applicable Price for round 1 is equal to the reserve price
Shipper bids are as follows
The bid demanded in round 1 is 240
This is greater than the available, so the auction progresses to the next round and the price increments by 1 large price step.
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The bid demanded in round 2 is 220
This is greater than the available, so the auction progresses to the next round and the price increments by 1 large price step.
Ascending Clock example (2)
Shipper Rd 1 Rd 2
A 100 90
B 90 85
C 50 45
Applicable Price for round 2 is equal to the reserve price + 1 Large Price Step.
Shipper bids are as follows.
Note: Rd 2 quantities must be less than or equal to the Rd 1 quantity
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Applicable Price for round 3 is equal to the reserve price + 2 Large Price Step.
Shipper bids are as follows
Ascending Clock example (3)
Shipper Rd 1 Rd 2 Rd 3
A 100 90 80
B 90 85 75
C 50 45 35
The bid demanded in round 3 is 190
This is less than the available for the first time
so the auction progresses to the next round and the price decrements by 1 large price step and increments by 1 small price step.
Note: Rd 3 quantities must be less than or equal to the Rd 2 quantity
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Applicable Price for round 4 is equal to the reserve price + 1 Large Price Step + 1 small price step.
Shipper bids are as follows
Ascending Clock example (4)
Shipper Rd 1 Rd 2 Rd 3 Rd 4
A 100 90 80 86
B 90 85 75 81
C 50 45 35 41
The bid demanded in round 4 is 208
This is greater than the available so the auction progresses to the next round by 1 small price step.
Note: Rd 4 quantities must be between Rd 2 and Rd 3 quantities
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Applicable Price for round 5 is equal to the reserve price + 1 Large Price Step + 2 small price steps.
Shipper bids are as follows
Ascending Clock example (5)
Shipper Rd 1 Rd 2 Rd 3 Rd 4 Rd 5
A 100 90 80 86 83
B 90 85 75 81 77
C 50 45 35 41 36
The bid demanded in round 5 is 196
This is less than the available, but not for the first time, so the bids for round 5 are allocated in full.
4 units of capacity remain unsold.
Note: Rd 5 quantities must be between Rd 3 and Rd 4 quantities.
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Ascending Clock Auctions – Prices paid
The User pays the cleared price for the capacity as determined through the auction algorithm
Set at the reserve price plus the relevant auction premium (multiples of the LPS and/or SPS as relevant)
If the auction is for unbundled capacity, National Grid NTS invoices the User for the cleared price obtained in the auction
If the auction is for bundled capacity, National Grid NTS invoices the User for its share of the cleared price obtained in the auction
[Determined by the reserve price plus the relevant multiples of the LPS/SPS]
Uniform Price Auctions
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Uniform Price Auctions – overview
There is a single bidding round in which Users bid a price as well as a quantity
Users can submit up to 10 bids
Multiple bids from the same User are treated independently
Total volume of bids from the same User must be less than or equal to the capacity offered in the auction
Bids can be modified or withdrawn up to the close of the relevant bid window
Once the bidding round closes, no changes can be made
Only Daily or Within-Daily Capacity is offered
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Daily Auction Bid Windows
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Uniform Price Auction Invitation (unbundled)
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Uniform Price Auction Invitation (bundled)
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Uniform Price Auctions – Algorithm (1-to-1)
Uniform Price Auction
Capacity offeredUsers bid quantity and price
Bids are ranked in price order, highest first
Are aggregate bids <=Offered capacity?
Auction Closes
Allocate in fullUsers pay clearing price
Are all the bids allocated in full?
NO
YES
YES
Allocate capacity to
highest priced bids first
up to available capacity
All users pay the clearing price, set as follows:
•if demand is less than offered capacity, the clearing price is the reserve price or
• if demand is above offered capacity, the clearing price is the price of the lowest successful bid
Auction Closes
Allocate in fullUsers pay clearing price
Allocate remaining available
capacitypro-rated to
remaining bids*
Auction Closes
Some users have beenallocated in full, some
pro-ratedUsers pay clearing price
NO
* Providing the pro-rated amount is above the Users’ minimum quantity submitted
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Uniform Price Example (1)
Available quantity for auction is 400.
3 Shippers enter 6 bids.
At the end of the auction then all bids are sorted by price.
Bids at the same price create a bid price group
Shipper Qty Min Qty Price
A 100 100 4
B 50 20 4
A 70 1 3
C 80 5 2
B 150 10 2
C 150 1 1
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Uniform Price example (2)
Shipper Qty Min Qty Price Provisional allocation
Remaining capacity
Group < supply?
A 100 100 4 100
50
400
B 50 20 4
A 70 1 3 70 250
C 80 5 2 80
150
180 x
B 150 10 2
C 150 1 1 0 0 n/a
Pro-rate 3rd bid group to reduce bid group quantity (230) down to the remaining available capacity for that group (180)
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Uniform Price example (3)
So after pro-ration the bid for 80 is reduced to 62.6 and the bid for 150 is reduced to 118.4
Shipper Qty Min Qty Price Provisional allocation
Min < pro-rated qty?
A 100 100 4 100
50
B 50 20 4
A 70 1 3 70
C 80 5 2 62.6
118.4
B 150 10 2
C 150 1 1 0 n/a
If pro-rated bids > min requested quantity then allocation is complete.
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Uniform Price example (4)
Shipper Qty Min Qty Price Provisional allocation
Min < pro-rated qty?
A 100 100 4 100
50
B 50 20 4
A 70 1 3 70
C 80 5 2 62.6
118.4
xB 150 150 2
C 150 1 1 0 n/a
If pro-rated bids < min requested quantity then bid is ‘killed’.
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Uniform Price example (5)
Bid stack is re-evaluated with any ‘killed’ bid(s) reduced to zero.
Shipper Qty Min Qty
Price Provisional allocation
Remaining capacity
Group < supply?
Min < pro-rated qty?
Final allocation
A 100 100 4 100
50
400 100
50B 50 20 4
A 70 1 3 70 250 70
C 80 5 2 80
0
180
x
80
0B 150 50 2
C 150 1 1 150 100 x 100
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Uniform Price Auctions – Prices paid
The User pays the cleared price for the capacity as determined through the auction algorithm
If the auction is for unbundled capacity, National Grid NTS invoices the User for the cleared price obtained in the auction
If the auction is for bundled capacity, National Grid NTS invoices the User for its share of the cleared price obtained in the auction
Determined from the National Grid NTS applicable reserve price plus a [50%] share of the auction premium
Post Auction
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Post Auction Reporting
Aggregate auction results will be published on the Joint Booking Platform.
Individual auction results will be sent directly from the Joint Booking Platform to Users.
In addition to this:
Auction information will be viewable on Gemini;
Net entitlements will be updated and viewable on Gemini.
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View Aggregate Uniform Price Details - 1
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View Aggregate Uniform Price Details - 2
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Additional Info in case of competition - 1
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Additional Info in case of competition - 2
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View Aggregate Ascending Clock Details - 1
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View Aggregate Ascending Clock Details - 2
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Individual Auction Result Info from PRISMA
TSO
Auction ID
Deal ID
Product
Network Point Name
Network Point ID
Direction of gas flow
Market Area
Category (bundled/unbundled)
Quantity
Capacity Period
Type of gas
Regulated Tariff
Surcharge
Total (clearing) price
Split factor (uniform price)
User details (i.e. User who placed bid)
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Post Auction processing by National Grid
Allocate bundled results first:
Unsold > Surrenders > LT UIOLI > Oversubscription
Then allocate unbundled results:
Remaining unsold > remaining surrenders > remaining LT UIOLI > remaining oversubscription
This way all unsold must be used before re-allocating surrenders; all surrenders before LT UIOLI; and all LT UIOLI before non-ob.
unsold Surrender LT UIOLI Non-Ob
U S L O
Auction results come back from PRISMA.
- Bundled bid demand
- Unbundled bid demand
Next Steps
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Next steps
Date for next Workgroup
Content for future Workgroup sessions
Feedback from this session
AOB
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National Grid UNC Mod (CAM & CMP adaptations)Initial Estimated Timescales
Jun 14 Jul 14 Aug14
Modification WG
development
UNC Panel Vote on
FMR and submission to Ofgem
Modification WG
development
Nov 14Oct 14Sep 14
Ofgem Decision
Dec 14
EUWorkgroup
Modification WG
Development
Modification WG development
EU Workgroup
Consultation
Nov 15
Implementation Date
May 14
Draft CAM Mod shared with EU WG
Modification raised at UNCPanel
Modification WG
Development
Finalise WG Report and submit to
Panel
UNC Panel to review
WG report and issue to consultation
Feb 15Jan 15
1 M
ay
15 M
ay
5 Ju
n 3 Ju
l
7 A
ug 4
Sep
2 O
ct
Feb
1st N
ov*
20 N
OV
18 D
EC
6 N
OV
*W.E.F 1st November 2015