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Transcript of Modern Safety Management System & Risk Assessmentrisk Assessment Mix
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Handal Wira Mandiri Consult ing, Training & Services
Website:http://www.handal.co.id & www.handalconsulting.com
En h a n c in g y o u r
p e r f o r m a n ce
MODERN SAFETYMODERN SAFETYMANAGEMENT SYSTEM &MANAGEMENT SYSTEM &
RISK ASSESSMENTRISK ASSESSMENT
Ir. Alfino Alwie MScIr. Alfino Alwie MScIr. Alfino Alwie MSc
MULIAMULIA--HOTEL, JakartaHOTEL, Jakarta
1717--19 December 200719 December 2007
Public TrainingPublic Training
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• Latar Belakang Safety Management System
- Key Learning Points
- General Methodology
• Assessing Risks- Risk Definition
- ALARP region
- Risk Tools
• Protecting Our Environment
AGENDA AGENDA
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I. INTRODUCTIONI. INTRODUCTION
Safety Management System is vital to the success of losscontrol system. The term of “Safety Analysis” is generic value
for study of the system, identification of dangerous aspects ofthe system, and correction them. It is a compilation ofengineering analyses and management practices that controldangerous situation, especially in identify hazard in a system,
determine the underlying causes of those hazards and developengineering or management controls to either eliminate thehazards or mitigate their consequences.
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I.1. Accident in IndustryI.1. Accident in Industry
Mainly, Accident are caused by human element and human error. Research into healthand safety at work should be directed towards mistakes and failings on the part of
workers in order to advance understanding about the causes human factor in accidents
in order that they can be better prevented.
Pipeline LeakagePipeline LeakagePiper Alpha
28 April 1988 Aloha
Accident, Killing FA &
Injuring 8 peoples
Railway Accident
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ANGKA KECELAKAAN KERJA MASIH TINGGI
Data Jamsostek tahun 2002 : 66.367 kasus, jumlah kematian 4.142
orang, luka berat/cacat 20.970 orang, 87.390 orang tidak mampubekerja lagi. Tahun 2003 : 7 kematian setiap hari dari 400 kasuskecelakaan kerja (PERSI, 2005).
Triwulan I 2004: angka kecelakaan kerja nasional sebanyak 20.937
kasus (setiap hari rata-rata 349 kasus). Dari kasus tersebut 2.133mengalami cacat/lebih 35 orang cacat setiap hari (Depnakertrans,2005).
PENYEBAB KECELAKAAN
88% faktor manusia (unsafe act), 10% kondisi kerja tidak aman(unsafe condition), 2% faktor lainnya .
PERAN PERILAKU DALAM KESELAMATAN KERJABerkembang pendekatan behavioral base safety
I.2. DATAI.2. DATA--DATA K3DATA K3
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• What are your responsibilities as a manager?
-A serious accident happening in your organization
-Injured workers-Company Reputation
I.4. Why is it important to control SAFETY?I.4. Why is it important to control SAFETY?
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I.5. Layer of protection analysis (LOPA)I.5. Layer of protection analysis (LOPA)
SIS= safety interlocked system
ESD= emergency Shutdown system
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Examples Of Identifying & Managing Safety and Health RiskExamples Of Identifying & Managing Safety and Health Risk
Next few slides….
Identify
Assess
Control
Recovery
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Safeguards (IndependentProtective Layers)
Emergency preparedness
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I.5. 2. Management StandardsI.5. 2. Management Standards
• “ Management system” refers to what the organization does to manage itsprocesses, or activities
• What requirement your quality system must meet not HOW they should be
met in your organization- Generic Standard: ISO, OSHAS, etc
“A house divided against itselfcannot stand”
==Abraham Lincoln==
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I.5.3. Preliminary Hazard AnalysisI.5.3. Preliminary Hazard Analysis
• Identify TARGETS to be protected
-Personnel - Product - Environment
-Equipment - Productivity - Others
• Recognize Risk Tolerance Limits
(Risk Matrix Boundaries)
• “SCOPE” system as to: (a) physical boundaries; (b) operating phases (e.g.,
shakedown, startup, standard run, emergency stop, maintenance); and (c) other
assumptions made (e.q., as-is, as-designed)
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I.5.6.I.5.6. RegulationRegulation
Risk management and consultation>hazard identification>risk assessments>risk controls>OHS Committees
Work premises>general duties of controllers of premises>fall prevention>electricity>asbestos
Use of places of work>lighting>heat and cold>noise management>atmosphere
>fire and explosion>confined spaces
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Plant
cranes, forklifts, boilers
Hazardous Substances carcinogens, sensitisers, toxics
Dangerous Goods
dry ice, ammonium nitrate
Hazardous Processeswelding, spray painting
Construction Work
I.5.7.I.5.7. RegulationRegulation
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I.5.8. Chemistry of FireI.5.8. Chemistry of Fire
Fire Tetrahedron
In order for fire to occur four things must be
present, Oxygen, Fuel, Heat, and a ChemicalChain Reaction. This is represented by the Fire
Tetrahedron.
When any of the four items are removed, the
fire will go out.
Fire extinguishers function by removing one of
the four components of the Fire Tetrahedron.
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•• Maximum corridor dead end length: 20 ft.Maximum corridor dead end length: 20 ft.
-- (absence of sprinkler system)(absence of sprinkler system)
•• Preliminary floor plan violates requirement.Preliminary floor plan violates requirement.
•• Now let us illustrate why this is an issue.Now let us illustrate why this is an issue.
Fire EventFire Event
Too much time wasted traveling in theToo much time wasted traveling in thewrong direction (away from an exit)wrong direction (away from an exit)
Life Safety IssueLife Safety Issue
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I.5.12. Real life risk assessmentI.5.12. Real life risk assessment
Crossing a roadCrossing a road
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1. What is the activity? 2. Who is at risk?
I.5.13.Real life risk assessmentI.5.13.Real life risk assessment
Crossing a roadCrossing a road
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3. What is the hazard? 4. What is the risk?
I.5.14. Real life risk assessmentI.5.14. Real life risk assessment
Crossing a roadCrossing a road
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II. Assessing RisksII. Assessing RisksII. Assessing Risks
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What is a hazard and What is a risk? What is a hazard and What is a risk? What is a hazard and What is a risk?
A hazard is an inherent physical or chemical characteristic thathas the potential for causing harm to people, property or the
environment
Risk is usually defined as the combination of the severity andprobability of an event. In the other words, how often can it
happen and how bad is it when it does? Risk can evaluated
qualitatively or quantitatively
II. Assessing Risks?II. Assessing Risks?
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II.1 BEBERAPA PERTANYAANII.1 BEBERAPA PERTANYAAN
Catastrophic; any event that may cause death or serious personnel injury, or
loss of system (e.g., anhydrous ammonia tanker truck overturns, resulting in a
major spill)
Critical-any event that may cause severe injury, or loss of mission – criticalhardware or high-dollar-value equipment (e.g., regulator fails open and over
pressurizes a remote hydraulic line, damaging equipment and bringing the
system
Minor – any event that may cause minor injury or minor system damage , butdoes not significantly impact the mission (e.g., pressure control valve fails
open, causing pressure drops and increased caustic levels)
Negligible – any event that does not result in injury or system damage and
does not affect the mission (e.g., lose commercial power, causing shutdownof plant cafeteria)
HOW SAFE IS SAFE ENOUGH?• WHAT CONSTITUTES A CATASTROPIC ACCIDENT?
• WHAT CONSITUTES A CRITICAL ACCIDENT?• IS THE COST OF PREVENTING THE ACCIDENT ACCEPTABLE?
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System Definition
Hazard
Identification
Probability
Consequence
Risk Level
II.2.Risk AnalysisII.2.Risk Analysis
II 2 1 Ri k M P
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II.2.1.Risk Management ProcessII.2.1.Risk Management Process
Environment
&
Strategy
Monitoring
&
Continuous Improvement
Risk
Identification
Information
&
Communication
Risk Identification
&
Evaluation
Risk Mitigation
&
Control Activities
II 3 Ri k B d A h M h d l
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II.3. Risk Based Approach MethodologyII.3. Risk Based Approach Methodology
• Qualitative Approach assess each plant item with aposition in 5 x 5 risk matrix (EXAMPLE)
• A likelihood of failure is determined from the sum of six
weighted factors;o Amount of Equipment
o Damage Mechanism
o Usefulness of inspection
o Current of equipment condition
o Nature of process
o Safety Design and mechanism
i (C )
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Generally, the quantitative analysis is to establish details onthe process, the equipment and other pertinent information.
Risk can be calculated as the product of each consequence
and likelihood for each damage scenario.
Risks = Cs x Fs
S = Scenario
Cs = Consequence of scenario
Fs = Failure frequency of scenario
Risk item = Σ Risks Ref: DNV
Risk Based Approach Methodology (Risk Based Approach Methodology (ContCont’’ndnd))
II 3 1 Ri k M t M th d lII 3 1 Ri k M t M th d l
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Describing and quantifying a specific risk andthe magnitude of the risk usually requires some
modeling. Typical tools use in risk analysis are
Network analysis
Life cycle analysis
Probability analysis
Estimating relationships
WBS
Logic Analysis
Technology use
II.3.1. Risk Management MethodologyII.3.1. Risk Management Methodology
Ri k A l i A hRi k A l i A h
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• Qualitative Approach
Faster in time, Need Engineering Judgments
from experts
• Quantitative Approach
More Detail and Accurate
• Semi-Quantitative Approach
Combination of Qualitative and Quantitativeapproaches
Risk Analysis Approach:Risk Analysis Approach:
II 3 2 Qualitative ApproachII 3 2 Qualitative Approach
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A qualitative analysis of risk based approach procedures have threefunctions, there are:
Screening the level of analysis needed and to ascertain the
benefit of further analysis (Quantitative Approach or some other technique).
Rating the degree of risk within the units in order to assigning theminto a position within a risk matrix
Identifying areas of potential concern at the plant that may meritenhanced inspection programs
II.3.2. Qualitative ApproachII.3.2. Qualitative Approach
II 4 QUALITATIVE APRROACHII 4 QUALITATIVE APRROACH
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The RBA program has condensed these effects into four basic risk categories ;
a. Flammable events
b. Toxic releases
c. Environmental risks
d. Business interruption
II.4. QUALITATIVE APRROACHII.4. QUALITATIVE APRROACH
II 4 QUALITATIVE APRROACH (II 4 QUALITATIVE APRROACH (CntnCntn’’dd))
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LIKELIHOOD CATEGORY :LIKELIHOOD CATEGORY :
There are six factors should be considered in term of thelikelihood of large leak. The following Each factor is weightedand their combination results in the likelihood factor;
• Amount of Equipment
• Damage Mechanisms
• Appropriateness of Inspection
• Current Equipment Condition
• Nature of the process• Equipment Design
II.4. QUALITATIVE APRROACH (II.4. QUALITATIVE APRROACH (CntnCntn’dd))
II 3 3 Risk MatrixII 3 3 Risk Matrix
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II.3.3. Risk MatrixII.3.3. Risk Matrix
ExtremelyUnlikely VeryUnlikely Unlikely
Catastrophic
Significant
Major
Severe
Minor
Improbable
6
5
4
3
2
7 8 9
6 7 8
5
4
3
6 7
5
4
6
5
10
9
8
7
6
Probable
Ref; Control of Major Accident Hazard Regulation 1999 (COMAH)
II 3 3 Risk Matrix (2)II 3 3 Risk Matrix (2)
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II.3.3. Risk Matrix (2)II.3.3. Risk Matrix (2)
Ref; ISO 17776
Severity
RankingSafety Environment Business
Very Low
(< 1x10-5)
Low (<
1x10-4)
Medium
(< 1x10-3)
High (<
1x10-2)
Very High
(> 1x10-2)
0 Zero Injury Zero EffectZero
Damage
1 Slight Injury Slight EffectSlight
Damage
2 Minor Injury Minor EffectMinor
Damage
3 Major Injury Local EffectLocal
Damage
4Single
FatalityMajor Effect
Major
Damage
5Multiple
FatalityMassive Effect
Extensive
DamageHigh Risk Area
Consequence Probability of Failure
Low Risk Area
Medium Risk Area
II 3 4 FAILURE CONSEQUENCESII 3 4 FAILURE CONSEQUENCES
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II.3.4. FAILURE CONSEQUENCESII.3.4. FAILURE CONSEQUENCES
Question of Risk
10-7
10-6
10-5
10-4
I believe I haveComplete control(driving car)
I believe I Havesome control andchoice aboutExposing mySelf (at work)
I believe I Have noControl but IDon’t have toExpose myself (aircraft pax)
I have no Control and noChoice about Exposing myself (off-site exposureTo industrial accident)
II 5 Risk Acceptance CriteriaII.5. Risk Acceptance Criteria
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II.5. Risk Acceptance CriteriaII.5. Risk Acceptance Criteria
Risk acceptance criteria are the limits of the risk tolerance. These criteria must be defined for each type of risk to be
assessed.
The risk acceptance criteria are used to derive theinspection interval that to be scheduled before exceeding
those acceptance limits. This would allow either the
reassessment of the risk level based upon betterinformation, detailed evaluation of any damage, or the
timely repair or replacement of the degraded component.
Illustration of ALARP RegionIllustration of ALARP Region
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Acceptable
Region
Tolerable
Region
Intolerable
Region10-3
10-6
Tolerable only if
Risk reduction is
impractical
Tolerable if cost
of reduction would
exceed the
improvement gainedl
Necessary to maintain
assurance that risk
remains at this level
Risk can not be
justified except
in extraordinary
circumstances
A L A R
P
(one fatality in
1.000 manyrs)
(one fatality in
1.000.000 manyrs)
Illustration of ALARP RegionIllustration of ALARP Region
Risk Acceptance CriteriaRisk Acceptance Criteria
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Risk Acceptance CriteriaRisk Acceptance Criteria
There are 3 regions of risk acceptance criteria :
- Intolerable region
- Tolerable region- Acceptable region
Example : COMPANY GOAL / TARGETExample : COMPANY GOAL / TARGET
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Example : COMPANY GOAL / TARGETExample : COMPANY GOAL / TARGET
(in term of risk to personnel)(in term of risk to personnel)-Individual risk of fatality of personnel who are
operating, maintaining or attending the facilities
shall not exceed 1x10-3 per manyears-IRPA < 1x10-3
(less than one fatality in 1.000 man years).
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Acceptable
Region
TolerableRegion
Intolerable
Region
10-3
10-6
IRPA Acceptance Criteria
Tolerable only if
Risk reduction is
impractical
Tolerable if cost
of reduction would
exceed the
improvement gainedl
Necessary to maintain
assurance that risk
remains at this level
Risk can not be
justified except
in extraordinary
circumstances
(one fatality in
1.000 man
yrs)
(one fatality in
1.000.000 manyrs)
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Acceptable
Region
TolerableRegion
Intolerable
Region
1x10-3
1x10-6
IRPA Acceptance Criteria
(one fatality in
1.000 man
years)
(one fatality in
1.000.000 man
year)
Tolerable only if
Risk reduction is
impractical
Tolerable if cost
of reduction would
exceed the
improvement gained
Necessary to maintain
assurance that risk
remains at this level
Risk can not be
justified except
in extraordinary
circumstances
= 0,001 = 0,1%
= 0,000001 = 0,0001%
Illustration of Risk Acceptance CriteriaIllustration of Risk Acceptance Criteria
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Acceptable
Region
TolerableRegion
Intolerable
Region
10-3
10-6
Tolerable only if
Risk reduction is
impractical
Tolerable if cost
of reduction would
exceed the
improvement gained
Necessary to maintain
assurance that risk
remains at this level
Risk can not be
justified except
in extraordinary
circumstances
(one fatality in
1.000 man
years)
(one fatality in
1.000.000 man
years)
pp
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Individual Risk Criteria from other countries forpeople working at plants
10-3
10-8
10-5
10-6
10-7
10-4
Australia
(New Plant)
(COPI - Belanak
FPSO)
I n
d i n i v i d u a l
f a t a l i t y p e r
y e a r
10-6
10-7
10-6
10-5
10-3
10-5
Netherland
(New Plant)
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Individual Risk Criteria fromother countries for people working at plants
10-3
10-8
10
-5
10-4
10-6
10-7 Australia
(New Plant)
(COPI - Belanak
WHP-A)
a t
a l i t y p e r y e a r
10-6
10-7
10-610-6
10-3
10-5
Netherland
(New Plant)
I n d i n i v i d u a l f
10-3
Is there any Risk Acceptance Criteria withinIs there any Risk Acceptance Criteria within
I d i R l tIndonesian Regulatory
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Acceptable
Region
Tolerable
Region
Intolerable
Region
?
?
Indonesian RegulatoryIndonesian Regulatory
Tolerable only if
Risk reduction is
impractical
Tolerable if cost
of reduction would
exceed theimprovement gained
Necessary to maintain
assurance that risk
remains at this level
Risk can not be
justified except
in extraordinarycircumstances
How to achieve ALARP condition ?
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• ALARP = As low as Reasonably Practicable
• ALA RP
Regulasi / Peraturan
Recommended Practice
=
R
e a s o n a b l y
P r a c t i c a b l e
Rp (Cost & Benefit Analysis)
RP = Reliable Parts
RP = Rules and Procedures
How to achieve ALARP condition ?(How to get the risk level as low as possible with the prevention and
mitigation measures are reasonably practicable ?)
Industrial Risk related studies MappingIndustrial Risk related studies Mapping
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51Handal Consult ing & Training A.A
F o r m a l S a f e t y A s s e s s m
e n t
Q u a n t i t a t i v e R i s k A s s e s s m e n t
C o m
p a n y V a l u e s
S o c i e t a l V a l u
e s
I n c r e
a s i n g C o m p l e x i t y a n
d H a z a r d s o f D e v e l o p m e n t
C o d e s a n d S t a n d a r d s
G
o o d P r a c t i c e
E n g i n e e r i n g J u d g e m
e n t
Typical Developments
1
Exploration drilling
activities
Simple wellhead platform
Simple subsea development
Simple production platform
Large production platform or FPSO
Large complex multi-product
production platform or FPSO
Large complex petrochemical facility
2
UKOOA Industry Guidelines on Framework For Risk Related Decision support
II.6. Generic Steps in Risk Analysis:II.6. Generic Steps in Risk Analysis:
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52Handal Consult ing & Training A.A
1. Identification of accident scenarios / hazard2. Identification of potential deterioration mechanisms and modes of
failure3. Assessment of the probability of failure on each mechanism/mode4. Assessment of the consequences resulting from equipment failure5. Determination of risks from equipment failure6. Determine risk mitigation
7. Risk ranking and categorization
p yp y
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53Handal Consult ing & Training A.A
Risk Assessment = Risk Analysis + Mitigation
Risk Analysis
Risk Level :
Menentukan tingkat resiko pada pekerja,
masyarakat di sekeliling, lingkungan hidupdan asset
ALARP Demontration :
Mendemonstrasikan bahwa
usaha-usaha untuk mengurangi
resiko ada dalam kondisi ALARP
Mitigasi :
Usaha-usaha untuk mengurangi resiko
Risk Assessment =Risk Assessment =
+ + +
RISK BASED GOALSRISK BASED GOALS
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54Handal Consult ing & Training A.A
DEFINED RISK BASED GOALSDEFINED RISK BASED GOALS
PERSONNELPERSONNEL< 1 x 10< 1 x 10--33/year /year
ENVIRONMENTENVIRONMENT
< 1 x 10< 1 x 10--3/year3/year
CAPITAL ASSETCAPITAL ASSET
< 1 x 10< 1 x 10--2/year2/year
US$ 5 MillionUS$ 5 MillionReputationReputation
< 0.6%< 0.6%
UnavailabilityUnavailabilityHSE Interface
Identification of SCE within the designIdentification of SCE within the design
Define PS for the aboveDefine PS for the above
HSE Interface to Assist DisciplineHSE Interface to Assist Discipline
Mech.Mech. Elec.Elec.
Inst.Inst.
Building/ Building/ StructStruct..
HVACHVAC
Power PlantPower Plant
MedicalMedical SupprtSupprt EquipEquip
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55Handal Consult ing & Training A.A
Hazards P r e
v e n t i o n
o f h a z a r
d s
f o r c a
u s i n g
b i g g e r
h a z a r d s
MAH
Detection &
Controlling
Prevention /
Isolation
TR EER P r o b a
b i l i t y o
f
M A H
t a k i n g
p l a c e
C o n s e q
u e n c e
o f M A H
t o f a t a
l i t y
P r e v e n t i o n
o f M A
H o c c u
r r i n g
M i t i g a
t i o n o f
M A H c
o n s e q u
e n c e
Each of Identified HazardsEach of Identified Hazards
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56Handal Consult ing & Training A.A
Consequences
People Assets Environment Reputation
No
Injury
No
Damage
No
Effect
No
Impact
Slight
Injury
Slight
Damage
Slight
Effect
Single
Impact
Minor
Injury
Minor
Damage
Minor
Effect
Limited
Impact
Major
Injury
Localised
Damage
Localised
Effect
Considerable
Impact
SingleFatality MajorDamage MajorEffect NationalImpact
Multiple
Fatality
Extensive
Damage
Massive
Effect
International
Impact
Never heard of in oil & gas industry
Has occured
in oil & gasindustry
Has been experienced
bymost operators
Happens several
times per yearper operator
Happens several
times per yearper facility
Qualitative Risk MatrixQualitative Risk Matrix
Risk Level
R i s k s i n
t o l e r a b l
e R i s k
s t o l e r a b l e
i f A L A R P
R i s k s a c c e p t a
b l e i f m
a n a g e d
f o r
R i s k s a c c e p t a
b l e i f m
a n a g e d
f o r
c o n t i n o
u s c o n
t i n o u s i m
p r o v e m e n t
i m p r o v e m e
n t
FSA : (FERA,TGRA, DORA, SCRA)
Quantitative Risk AssessmentQuantitative Risk Assessment
FSA( SGIA, EERA, ESRAA, TRIA)
II. 7. Formal Safety Assessment MethodologyII. 7. Formal Safety Assessment Methodology
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57Handal Consult ing & Training A.A
Objectives Process
Hazard
Identification
Hazard & RiskAnalyses
Assessment of
Results
Risk Reduction
Measures
Apply ALARP
Principles
* Overall FSA Process
* Safety Goal Criteria
* Hazard Listing
* Hazard Ranking
* Consequence Studies
* Risk Assessment Studies
* Sensitivity Studies
Hazard
Documentation:
MAE’s
* Major Risk Contributor
* Potential Risk Reduction Measure
Access Acceptability
Against Criteria
* Risk Reduction Method Adopted
En h a n c in g y o u r
p e r f o r m a n ce
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Handal Wira Mandiri Consult ing, Training & Services
Website:http://www.handal.co.id & www.handalconsulting.com
MULIAMULIA--HOTEL, JakartaHOTEL, Jakarta1717--19 December 200719 December 2007
MODERN SAFETYMODERN SAFETYMANAGEMENT SYSTEM &MANAGEMENT SYSTEM &RISK ASSESSMENTRISK ASSESSMENT
Ir. Alfino Alwie MScIr. Alfino Alwie MScPublic TrainingPublic Training
II.8. RISK TOOLSII.8. RISK TOOLS
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59Handal Consult ing & Training A.A
• Failure Mode and Effect Analysis adalah Failure Analysis tool yang dilakukan dengan melibatkannara sumber yang dianggap ahli danberpengalaman di bidang masing-masing
• FMEA merupakan prosedur untuk melakukanevaluasi yang sistematis dari potensi-potensimodus kegagalan dan dampak yang diakibatkanoleh gagalnya suatu sistem terhadap sistem
integrasinya.• FMEA sudah memiliki format standar yang telah
dibakukan sehingga tinggal mengisi format bakutersebut
Failure Mode Effect Analysis (FMEA)Failure Mode Effect Analysis (FMEA)
TYPICAL FMEA FORMTYPICAL FMEA FORM
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60Handal Consult ing & Training A.A
Funct ion :
Fun ct ional Fai lure :
Item N am e Item N o Loca l E ffe c t E nd E ffec t
P ro jec t : D a te :S ys tem : P repa red by :
S ub sys tem : C hecked by :
Issued : A pp roved by :
S hee t : o f
F A IL U R E M O D E A N D E F F E C T A N A L Y S IS
( F M E A )
I tem Ident i f icat ionF a ilu re M ode C aused by
Fai lure Ef fectS eve rity D e tec tion R em ark
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FAILUREFAILURE CONSEQUENCESCONSEQUENCES
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62Handal Consult ing & Training A.A
HIDDEN AND EVIDENTHIDDEN AND EVIDENT
Categories of Evident Failure Consequences• safety and environmental consequences
- Injure or kill someone- Breach of environmental standard• operational consequences
- Affect production or operation
• non-operational consequences- non safety and operational- Direct cost of repair
FAILURE CONSEQUENCESFAILURE CONSEQUENCESSAFETY AND PROACTIVESAFETY AND PROACTIVE
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63Handal Consult ing & Training A.A
SAFETY AND PROACTIVESAFETY AND PROACTIVE
Does the failure mode
Cause a loss of functionWhich could injure or killsomeone
Proactive is worth doing
If it reduces the risk of The failure to tolerableLow level
If proactive task can not be found, redesign is compulsory
No
Does the FM could breach
Any known environmentalstandard
yes yesNo
(see nextChapter)
For an FM with safety or environmental
consequences, a proactive task is only worth
doing if it reduces the probability of the failure toa tolerable low level
FAILURE CONSEQUENCESFAILURE CONSEQUENCESOPERATIONAL CONSEQUENCESOPERATIONAL CONSEQUENCES
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64Handal Consult ing & Training A.A
A failure has operational consequences if it has a direct
adverse effect on operational capabilityFailure affect operation in four ways :• they affect total output• they affect product quality
• they affect customer service• increase operating cost in addition to the direct cost of
repair
OPERATIONAL CONSEQUENCESOPERATIONAL CONSEQUENCES
FAILURE CONSEQUENCESFAILURE CONSEQUENCESHIDDEN FAILURE CONSEQUENCESHIDDEN FAILURE CONSEQUENCES
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Hidden Failure and Protective Device
• fail-safe protective device
- “a fail safe protective device is one whose failure on its own will
become evident to the operating crew under normal circumstances”
- A system which includes a fail-safe protective device, there are three
(3) possible states
> Neither device failed
> Protected function fails before the protective device> Protective device fails before the protected function
HIDDEN FAILURE CONSEQUENCESHIDDEN FAILURE CONSEQUENCES
FAILURE CONSEQUENCESFAILURE CONSEQUENCESHIDDEN FAILURE CONSEQUENCESHIDDEN FAILURE CONSEQUENCES
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66Handal Consult ing & Training A.A
HIDDEN FAILURE CONSEQUENCESHIDDEN FAILURE CONSEQUENCES
Hidden Failure and Protective Device
• non fail-safe protective device
- The fact that the device is unable to fulfill its intended function is not
evident under normal circumstances
- A system which includes a non fail-safe protective device, there are
four (4) possible states
> Neither device failed
> Protected function fails while the protective device is still
functioning
> Protective device fails while the protected function is still
functioning
> The protective device fails then protected function fails while theprotective device is in failed state (multiple)
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CONTOH FMEA OUTPUTCONTOH FMEA OUTPUT
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68Handal Consult ing & Training A.A
Function : 1. Mengolah ref ormed gas menjadi reformed gas dengan komposisi CH4 < 0.41% dengan T pada range 340 – 370 oC
Functional Failure : 1.1 Gagal Mengolah reformed gas menjadi reformed gas dengan komposisi CH4 < 0.41% dengan T pada range 340 – 370 oC
Item Name Item No Local Effect End Effect
Secondary Reformer D-1002 Vessel fail Creep Major Visual
Castable rontok TI
Burner tip fail Crack Cut rate Moderate TI
Kotor
Alumina ball fail Pecah Performance turun Plant Shutdow n Major PI
Deposit
Katalis fail Sintering Performance turun Plant Shutdow n Major PI, AR
Poisoning TI
Dusting
Dome katalis fail patah Plant Shutdow n Major PI
Project Pabrik Ammonia Date :
System : Reforming Prepared by :
Sub system : Secondary Reforming Checked by :
Issued : NE Approved by :
Sheet : of
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECT ANALYSIS
(FMEA)
Item IdentificationFailure Mode Caused by
Failure EffectSeverity Detection Remark
Secondary Reformertidak berfungsi
Katalis jatuh, outletbuntu
Secondary Reformer
tidak berfungsi
Safety/Plant
Shutdown
Jika terjadi leak,
kandungan gasproses memiliki sifat
f lammable
Pembakaran tidak
sempurna
Kerusakan biasanya
baru teridentifikasi
pada saat TA
Jika rusak,
penggantian sekitar
10 - 14 hari
Jika rusak,
penggantian sekitar
10 - 14 hari
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Functional Block Diagram (FBD)Functional Block Diagram (FBD)
IN Interfaces
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70Handal Consult ing & Training A.A
te aces
• Natural Gas – from SKG• Fuel Gas – from Utility Plant (KO Drum)• MP Steam – from Steam Header MP• Process Air – from Air Compression• Power Supply – from Utilitas (P-xxxx-1; P-xxxx-3; P-xxxx-2)• H2 – from HRU & Back End (Syn gas Compressor 1st discharge)
• Boiler Feed Water – from Utilitas (G-xxxx)• Boiler Water – from Utilitas (F-xxxx)• Sea Water Supply – from Utility Plant• Cooling Water Supply – from Utility Plant• Instrument Air – from Utility Plant
Work BreakDown Structure
Functional Block Diagram (FBD)Functional Block Diagram (FBD)
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71Handal Consult ing & Training A.A
OUT Interfaces
• Reformed Gas – to Shift Conversion.
• Flue Gas – to Atmosfer
• HP Steam Superheated – to Steam Header
• Boiler Feed Water – to E-xxxx & E-xxxx
• Boiler Water – to Utilitas System ( F-xxxx )• Cooling Water Return – to Utility Plant
• Sea Water Return – to Outfall
Functional Block Diagram (FBD)Functional Block Diagram (FBD)
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72Handal Consult ing & Training A.A
Internal OUT Interfaces
• Natural Gas – from D-xxxx to E-xxxx• Reformed Gas – from C-xxxx to D-xxxx
• Process Air – from E-xxxx to D-xxxx
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Functional FailureFunctional Failure
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1 Gagal mengolah reformed gas menjadi reformed gas
dengan komposisi CH4 < 0.41% dengan T pada range 340
– 370 oC
2 Gagal memanfaatkan panas reformed gas
Functional FailureFunctional Failure
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75Handal Consult ing & Training A.A
1.1 Gagal mengontrol temperature
1.2 Gagal mengontrol pressure
1.3 Gagal memproteksi temperature
1.4 Gagal memproteksi tekanan
II.10. FUNCTIONAL BLOCK DIAGRAMII.10. FUNCTIONAL BLOCK DIAGRAM
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II.11. REMAINING LIFE ASSESSMENTII.11. REMAINING LIFE ASSESSMENT
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77Handal Consult ing & Training A.A
XY
Z
10688.
10188.
9689.
9189.
8689.
8190.
7690.
7190.
6691.
6191.
5691.
5192.
4692.
4192.
3693.
3193.
2693.
V5
L1
C1
G16
Output Set: MSC/NASTRANCase 1
Contour: Plate TopVonMises Stress
(Intangible, Difficult or
Impossible to Measure)
HIDDEN FAILURE
(Intangible, Difficult or
Impossible to Measure)
HIDDEN FAILURE
R alistic(Realistik)
Simple ( Singkat/jelas)
Measurable ( Terukur )
Achievable( Dapat dicapai)
Time frame(Batas waktu)
MaterialsDimensions
Load
MaterialsDimensions
Load
Review Service Conditions
• Stress
• Temperature
• Environment
• Etc
Review Service Conditions
• Stress
• Temperature
• Environment
• Etc
RISER PIPELINE CORROSIONRISER PIPELINE CORROSION
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CORROSION On PRESSURE VESSELCORROSION On PRESSURE VESSEL
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II.12. Risk Facility ProfileII.12. Risk Facility Profile
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80Handal Consult ing & Training A.A
The individual risk per annum (IRPA) is calculated basedupon the number of people died per annum for each
worker;
maintenance staff secondary breaker
sealing operator
supervisor others
What are Needed for ensuring safety ? What are Needed for ensuring safety ?
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81Handal Consult ing & Training A.A
• For a Simple Facility (e.g. WHP, Buoy,Pipeline, drilling rig, etc)
• Use recognised Codes and Standards.
• Good Practice.• Engineering Judgement• Standard Equipment• Qualitative Risk Assessment
• For a Complex Facility (e.g. FPSO)• As for a simple facility PLUS• Formal Safety Assessment (FSA)
• Quantitative Risk Assessment(QRA)
Some Questions in Design PhaseSome Questions in Design Phase
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HOW DO WE KNOW A DESIGN IS SAFE?HOW DO WE KNOW A DESIGN IS SAFE?
HOW ARE WE SHOWING OUR DESIGN IS SAFE?HOW ARE WE SHOWING OUR DESIGN IS SAFE?
WHY DO WE WANT A SAFETY CASE?WHY DO WE WANT A SAFETY CASE?
WHAT IS IN THE SAFETY CASE?WHAT IS IN THE SAFETY CASE?
WHAT ACTIVITIES ARE THE PROJECT CARRYING OUTWHAT ACTIVITIES ARE THE PROJECT CARRYING OUT
TO SUPPORT THE SAFETY CASE?TO SUPPORT THE SAFETY CASE?
Hazard Severity CategoriesHazard Severity Categories
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Description Category Definition
Catastrophic
Critical
Marginal
Negligible
I
II
III
IV
Death, system loss, or severeenvironmental damage
Severe injury, severe occupational illness,
major system or environmental damage
Minor injury, minor occupational illness, or minor system or environmental damage
Less than minor injury, occupational
illness, or less than minor system or
environmental damage
Source: U.S Department of Defense 1993, “System Safety Program Requirements” MIL-STD-882C
Qualitative Hazard Probability LevelsQualitative Hazard Probability Levels
Source: U.S Department of Defense 1993,Source: U.S Department of Defense 1993, “ “ System SafetySystem Safety
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Program Requirements Program Requirements” ” MIL MIL--STDSTD--882C 882C
Level
A
B
C
D
Description
Frequent
Probable
Occasional
Remote
Improbable E
Fleet or Inventory
Continuously experienced
Will occur frequently
Will occur several time
Specific Individual Item
Likely to occur frequently
Will occur several times in the life
of an item
Likely to occur some time inThe life of an item
Unlikely but possible to occur in
the life of an item
So unlikely that it can be assumed
Occurrence may not be experienced
Unlikely but reasonably be
Expected to occur
Unlikely to occur, but
possible
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSISPRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
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PHA FORMPHA FORM
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THE TERMINOLOGY for RISK STUDIES:THE TERMINOLOGY for RISK STUDIES:
1 Ri k l i th ti ti f i k f th b i
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1. Risk analysis - the estimation of risk from the basicactivity “as is”.
2. Risk assessment - a review as to acceptability of risk
based on comparison with risk standards or criteria,and the trial of various risk reduction measures.
3. Risk management - the process of selecting appropriate
risk reduction measures and implementing them in the
on-going management of the activity
II.10. Reliability Block Diagram AnalysisII.10. Reliability Block Diagram Analysis
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88Handal Consult ing & Training A.A
• RBD adalah salah satu metoda reliability modeling, yang bertujuanuntuk menanalisa dan mengambarkan kehandalan sistem secarakeseluruhan
• RBD dapat menggambarkan secara grafis tentang hubungan /
interaksi antar komponen dalam suatu integrated system dimanapengaruh kehandalan setiap komponen individu dapat dilihatdampaknya terhadap kehandalan integrated system.
• Komponen-komponen tersebut disusun berdasarkan blok-blok, dan
terhubungkan dengan suatu logical gate system
ContohContoh Reliability Block Diagram (RBD)Reliability Block Diagram (RBD)
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DD
AA
BB
A,B,..: Components
Numbers: availability
II.11. Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)II.11. Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
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• FTA juga merupakan suatu metoda dalam melakukan Reliability
Modeling
• FTA mendefinisikan suatu top event, yang diikuti oleh
penidentifikasian komponen-komponen dari sistem itu yang dapat
berkontribusi pada terjadinya top event
• Setiap komponen ini dihubungkan dalam suatu symbolic logic
diagram with AND/OR gates
CONTOH: PIPELINE OUTAGE FTACONTOH: PIPELINE OUTAGE FTA
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Advanced MethodAdvanced Method
II.12 Root Causes Analysis (RCA)II.12 Root Causes Analysis (RCA)
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Failure
Events
Failure
Events
• Principal Analyst
Required
• Involves All Levels
• Part Time/Full Time
• Root Cause Analysis
• Extremely Disciplined/High
Attention to Detail
Significant Few LossesSignificant Few Losses
• Hourly/Supervisory
Level
• Part Time
• Problem Analysis &
Problem Solving Skills
• Less Attention to Detail
Matters Of Consequence
100% Coverage
RCA
Methods
Basic
Failure
AnalysisBasic Failure Analysis
Is Sporadic Failure is more costly than Chronic Events?
Don’t Unresolved Chronic issues lead to those Catastrophic, Sporadic Events
D il P d tiD il P d ti
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Daily ProductionDaily Production
100,000
50,000
Time
Status Quo
}
Sporadic Failures
Reactive
Chronic Failures
Proactive
Opportunities
JUST WHAT WILL RCA DO FOR YOU AND JUST WHAT WILL RCA DO FOR YOU AND
YOUR COMPANY? YOUR COMPANY?
MinimizeMinimizess Consequences of Events to CriticalConsequences of Events to CriticalE i t
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MinimizeMinimizess Consequences of Events to CriticalConsequences of Events to CriticalEquipmentEquipment
ReducesReduces thethe Cost of Poor QualityCost of Poor Quality
ReducesReduces thethe Defects inDefects in thethe Final ProductFinal Product
ArrivesArrives atat Opportunities for ImprovementOpportunities for ImprovementFocusFocuseses on Priority Issues Using GAP andon Priority Issues Using GAP and
Opportunity AnalysisOpportunity Analysis
EliminatesEliminates thethe Risk of Problem/Event RecurrenceRisk of Problem/Event Recurrence
CAN YOU IDENTIFY EVERY CHRONIC EVENT INCAN YOU IDENTIFY EVERY CHRONIC EVENT IN
YOUR OPERATIONS? YOUR OPERATIONS?
CAN YOU PUT A DOLLAR FIGURE TO THEM?CAN YOU PUT A DOLLAR FIGURE TO THEM?
Advanced Advanced RCARCA forfor MajorMajor EventsEvents
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1. Describe the Failure Event
2. Describe the Failure Modes
3. Hypothesize
4. Verify the Hypotheses
5. Determine Physical Rootsand Verify
6. Determine Human Roots
and Verify
7. Determine Latent Roots
and Verify
Impact
First
EffortSecond
Chronic Conveyor
Roller Problems
Thus avoiding Trial and Error on the Front LineBasicBasic FailureFailure Analysis Analysis forfor MinorMinor EventsEvents
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IMPACT
E F F O R T
LOW
1
MEDIUM
3
HIGH
5
Hard
5
Moderate
3
Easy
1
1 - 5 3 - 5 5 - 5
1 - 3 3 - 3 5 - 3
1 - 1 3 - 1 5 - 1 Is it either this,
or that?
Recommendations
Step 1
Generate a list of problems/events and
slot them into the priority matrix
Step 2Define your problem/event usingthe TOP BOX
Step 4
Make recommendations thatstate the problem/event, its
impact and your solution to theproblem/event based on youranalysis.
Step 3
Formulate a hypothesis for each leg
of the tree using the either/ortechnique and verify.
Have you seen
this happen
before?
Bearing
LeakageCorrosion Blown
SealsMaterial
Buildup
Heavy Objects
Fall On RollersHot
Bearings
En h a n c in g y o u r
p e r f o r m a n ce
3 RISK ASSESSMENT &
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3. RISK ASSESSMENT &MITIGATION
3.13.1 FOREWORDFOREWORD
Adapted from ‘Risk
Risk Assessment Element
Risk UnderstandingRisk Understanding
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Assessment Method’, ABS
GeneratorTurbine
Production
WellGeothermal Zone
Injection Well
Air andWater Vapor
Air Air
Water
Waste Brine
Steam Steam
Direct Heat Uses
Risk UnderstandingRisk Understanding
What can go wrong?What can go wrong?How likely is it?How likely is it? What are the impacts?What are the impacts?
HistoricalHistorical
Experience?Experience?
Foundation for Risk Assessment
Analytical Analytical
MethodMethod
KnowledgeKnowledge
JudgmentJudgment
Ri k A t M th dRisk Assessment Methods
3.23.2 RISK ASSESSMENT METHODSRISK ASSESSMENT METHODS
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Risk Assessment MethodsRisk Assessment Methods
HazzardHazzard
IdentificationIdentification
MethodsMethods
FrequencyFrequency
AssessmentAssessment
MethodsMethods
ConsequenceConsequence
AssessmentAssessment
MethodsMethods
RiskRisk
EvaluationEvaluation
MethodsMethods
Literaturature
Search
What If Review
Safety Audit
Walk Through
Checklist
Brainstorming
HAZOP
FMEA
HAZID
Historical
Records
Fault Tree
Analysis
Even Tree
Analysis
Human
Reliability
Analisis
Common Cause
Failure Analysis
Source Term
Models
Atmospheric
Dispersion
Models
Blast And
Thermal
Radiation Models
Aquatic
Transport
ModelsEffect Models
Mitigation
Models
Risk Matrix
F - N Curve
Risk ProfileRisk Isopleth
Risk Density
Curve
Risk Index
3.3. Redundancy in Critical Systems3.3. Redundancy in Critical Systems
If a hazard analysis identifies accidents that can be causedby the failure of a single component redundant componentsIf a hazard analysis identifies accidents that can be causedby the failure of a single component redundant components
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yby the failure of a single component, redundant components
should be installed
Examples of critical components:
Flow-regulators, valves, exhaust fans, pumps,
compressors.
Redundant systems must be completely independent
Examine conditions which may adversely affect a given layer
of defense at the same time that they produce a safety
challenge to that layer
(Such conditions in complex systems can be studied with
Fault Tree Analysis)
yby the failure of a single component, redundant components
should be installed
Examples of critical components:
Flow-regulators, valves, exhaust fans, pumps,
compressors.
Redundant systems must be completely independent
Examine conditions which may adversely affect a given layer
of defense at the same time that they produce a safety
challenge to that layer
(Such conditions in complex systems can be studied with
Fault Tree Analysis)
Redundancy in Critical Systems
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> If a hazard analysis identifies accidents that can be caused by the failure of a
single component, redundant components should be installed
> Examples of critical components:
Flow-regulators, valves, exhaust fans, pumps, compressors.> Redundant systems must be completely independent
> Examine conditions which may adversely affect a given layer of defense at the
same time that they produce a safety challenge to that layer
(Such conditions in complex systems can be studied with Fault Tree Analysis)
3.4 Hazard Reduction (Design Phase)3.4 Hazard Reduction (Design Phase)
NASA (1993) mengembangkan hirarki dari hazard reductionyang antara lain;
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( ) g gyang antara lain;
o Design out the hazard
o Safety Devices
o Warning Devices
Hazard Reduction (Design Phase, (contn’d))
o Safety Devices
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o Safety Devices
• Berdasarkan Design Philosophy (Fails safe)
• Pada chemical plant umumnya concern pada temperatur (Valve, fail open)
o Warning Devices
• Smoke Detector, ---- alarm
• Gas detector, i.e, ammonia, hydrocarbon
fuels, hydrogen, methane, etc
• buzzer --- ammonia, siren --- nitrogen
StandardsStandards
• ProductM t i l Ch i l /P l /M t l
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• Materials; Chemicals/Polymer/Metals• Process• Management system standards
• Prescriptive• Performance
HUMAN FACTORSHUMAN FACTORS
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MODELS:
♠ Accuracy
♠ Consistency
♠ Usefulness
♠ Resources
HEART (Human Error Assessment & Reduction Technique)
Developed by J.C Williams during early 1980s
Task Probability of error
Totally unfamiliar, perform at speed, no idea of outcome 0.55
HUMAN FACTORSHUMAN FACTORS
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Restore system to new or original on a single attempt 0.26
without supervision or procedure checks
Complex task requiring high level of comprehension and 0.16
skill
Fairly simple task performed rapidly or given scant 0.09
attention
Routine highly practised, rapid task involving relatively 0.02
low level of skill
Restore system to new state following procedure checks 0.003
Totally familiar task, performed several times per hour, 0.0004
well motivated, highly trained staff, time to correct errors
Respond correctly when there is augmented supervisory 0.00002
system providing interpretation 0.03
Miscellaneous task - no description available
3.3 AN ILLUSTRATION EXAMPLE:
THE PROPELLANT TANK
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Adapted from ‘Probabilistic Risk Assessment’, NASA
3.6 ELEMENTS OF PROBABILISTIC3.6 ELEMENTS OF PROBABILISTIC
RISK ASSESSMENTRISK ASSESSMENT1. Setting the scenarios:
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Adapted from ‘Probabilistic Risk Assessment’, NASA
ELEMENTS OF PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENT
(Cntn’d)Application of Event Trees
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Adapted from ‘Probabilistic Risk Assessment’, NASA
EVENT TREE MODEL
Example of Event Tree on Hydrazine leak:
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Adapted from ‘Probabilistic Risk Assessment’, NASA
4. Modeling of Pivotal Events
FAULT TREE MODEL
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Adapted from ‘Probabilistic Risk Assessment’, NASA
Quantification of Basic Event.
Basic events corresponding to component failure may be quantified using reliability models. A simple andid l d d l i th ti l di t ib ti th t i b d th ti f t t ti t f il
ELEMENTS OF PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENT
(Cntn’d)
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widely used model is the exponential distribution that is based on the assumption of constant time-to-failure
Exponential Distribution Model ( Prf (t) = 1− exp(−λt) for λ=0.001 per hour))
Adapted from ‘Probabilistic Risk Assessment’, NASA
5. Quantification POF of Basic Events.
ELEMENTS OF PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENT
(Cntn’d)
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6. Uncertainty Analysis
ELEMENTS OF PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENT
(Cntn’d)
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Example Illustration on Application of Bayes Theorem
Adapted from ‘Probabilistic Risk Assessment’, NASA
Example Illustration Results on All Probabilities Being Quantified:
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En h a n c in g y o u r
p e r f o r m a n ce
MODERN SAFETYMODERN SAFETYMANAGEMENT SYSTEM &MANAGEMENT SYSTEM &
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MULIAMULIA--HOTEL, JakartaHOTEL, Jakarta
1717--19 December 200719 December 2007
Public TrainingPublic Training
Protect Your EnvironmentProtect Your Environment
RISK ASSESSMENTRISK ASSESSMENT
Ir. Alfino Alwie MScIr. Alfino Alwie MScIr. Alfino Alwie MSc
• What the impact of industry on the environment?
• How can we control pollution and waste?
4.1 How can you answer the following Questions?4.1 How can you answer the following Questions?
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• How can we control pollution and waste?
• What are the main elements of an environmental management system
• Air quality
• Water quality
4.2. Five Issues4.2. Five Issues
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Water quality
• Waste reduction & management
• Energy consumption
• Protection of natural areas & corridors
• It can be a condition of getting a license to operate
• It enables effective cost control
4.3. Some Key Benefits of an EMS for your Organization4.3. Some Key Benefits of an EMS for your Organization
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It enables effective cost control
• It gives better access to product and capital markets
• It improves relations with general public
Coincident or Not ?Coincident or Not ?
If,A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
Equals,
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
Then,
K + N + O + W + L + E + D + G + E11 + 14 + 15 + 23 + 12 + 5 + 4 + 7 + 5 = 96%
H + A + R + D + W + O + R + K8 + 1 + 18 + 4 + 23 + 15 + 18 + 11 = 98%
Both are important, but the total falls just short of 100%
But, A + T + T + I + T + U + D + E1 + 20 + 20 + 9 + 20 + 21 + 4 + 5 = 100%
Safety really is about attitude. Make 100% Safe Behavior your choice
both ON and OFF the job
En h a n c in g y o u r
p e r f o r m a n ce
CASE STUDY:Risk Analysis of Heat ExchangerRisk Analysis of Heat Exchanger
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Risk Analysis of Heat Exchanger Risk Analysis of Heat Exchanger
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GOALSGOALS
• To predict the heat exchanger risk, based on its life data analysis
• To manage the risk heat exchanger at low level by constituting the
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g g y g
inspection interval
HEAT EXCHANGER DATAHEAT EXCHANGER DATA
P d
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• Processed Gas: Frigorif NH3
• Coolant: Seawater
• Date of Manufactured: 1975
• Design Temp (o
C) / Pressure (kg/cm2
):- Shell side: 72/20
- Tube Side: 67/45
Seawater
ProcessedGas
ASSUMPTIONS AND FACTS ASSUMPTIONS AND FACTS
• Historical failure follows Weibull Distribution• Turn Around (TA) is scheduled every 2 years• Suspected failure modes:
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p- Fouling- Tube leak due to local / pitting corrosion
- Tube leak due to crack• Mechanical Cleaning is conducted every TA due to Fouling• The minimum remaining tube thickness, is judged, should be 60% of the initial thickness
due to the heat transfer effectiveness
HISTORICAL FAILURE DATA
Tubing Failures:
Start: 1993
# of Tubes 3260
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Tube Failure of HX
0
106122
0
44
68
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
Aug-95 Jul-97 Sep-98 May-01 Mar-03 Mar-05
In-service Time
# o
f T u b e s
Date of Failure Failure Mode
Aug-95 OK
Jul-97Tube buntu dan penipisan
tube total 106, di plug
Sep-98
1 bocor pada lasan tube. 122
ea plug dari 3260 atau
3.7% di plug
May-01 Tidak ada Bocor, OK
Mar-03
Utara 44 ea, ptm 9 ea, plug
lama 137 ea. Status
terakhir retubing 37tube, total plug 153 ea.
Mar-05
Utara 68 ea, ptm 9 ea, plug
lama 148 ea. Status
terakhir retubing 77
tube, total plug 148 ea.
RISK CRITERIARISK CRITERIA
< 10-5 10-5-10-4 10-4-10-3 10-3-10-2 >10-2
Insignificant
•
No safety or environmental
consequences•
Process capability not impacted.
(<US$10.000)
Mi di l t t t fi t Mi l f d ti it
Severity
Level
Safety and Environmental
Aspect CriteriaBusiness Aspect Criteria
Acceptable PoF(per year)
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•
Minor medical treatment or first
aid for Plant personnel•
Minor loss of production capacity
(<10%) for short term (<48 hours),
(US$10.000 – US$100.000)
•
Non reportable environtment
incident
• Medical treatment for personnel • Loss production capacity (10 –
50%) for short term (< 48 hours)
•
Minor reportable environmental
incident• Minor Loss of production
capacity (<10%) for long term (>48
hours)
•
Financial impact at a unit level
(US$100.000 – US$1.000.000)
•
Death of one company orassociated person
• Signifcant loss productioncapacity (50–100%) for short term
(< 48 hours)
•
Severe injury or illness of
multiple plant personnel, Limited
impact on public safety
•
Loss of production capacity (<1
–50%) for long term (>48 hours)
•
Major reportable environmental
incident• Financial impact at a facility level
(US$1.000.000 – US$10.000.000)
•
Multiple fatalities of companyor associated personnel
•
Major production loss
•
Severe injury, illness, or
fatalities of one or more members
of the community, serious impact
on public safety
• Financial impact at corporate
level (US$10.000.000 –
US$100.000.000)
•
Catastrophic environmental
Catastrophic
Minor
Moderate
Major
CONSEQUENCE ASSESSMENT OFCONSEQUENCE ASSESSMENT OF TUBE FAILURETUBE FAILURE
• This equipment has become the plant shutdown item, i.e. whenever the problemoccurs in this equipment, it may cause to stop production
f f
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• There is no safety and minor environmental issues on the equipment failure,Only business issues become the concern
• The shutdown duration depends on the type of failure mode occurred• Tube leaks is estimated to cause 5-day shutdown period, and it was defined asMajor Consequences (Production Loss > 2 Days)
POF ANALYSISPOF ANALYSIS
• Equipment Failure follows the Weibull Distribution
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⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎟ ⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−−=
β
η
t
t F exp1)(
)()( t T Pt F <= Shape factorScale factor
Need to bedefined!
Cumulative Probability Distribution Function
POF ANALYSIS (CONTINUED)POF ANALYSIS (CONTINUED)
Weibull Line Fit Plot
Time of Failure
(Months)
45
59
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-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
5.2 5.4 5.6 5.8 6
Cycles
R a n k
⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
⎟⎟
⎠
⎞⎜⎜
⎝
⎛ −−=
β
η
t t F exp1)(
LN(1/(1-F(t))) = (t/η)β
LN(LN(1/1-F(t))) = β.LN(t) – β.LN(η)
Y = β.X + α
123
147
PoFPoF Analysis (Continued) Analysis (Continued)
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.959343016
R Square 0.920339023
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Adjusted R Square 0.880508534
Standard Error 0.348343886
Observations 4
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 2.803810033 2.803810033 23.10639543 0.040656984
Residual 2 0.242686926 0.121343463
Total 3 3.046496959
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept -7.985080357 1.571457943 -5.081319797 0.036615972 -14.74652287 -1.223637841 -14.74652287 -1.223637841
X Variable 1 1.697833705 0.353206795 4.806911215 0.040656984 0.178106465 3.217560945 0.178106465 3.217560945
Shape Factor, β: 1.697833705
Scale Factor, η: 110.2884504
RESIDUAL OUTPUT
Observation Predicted Y Residuals
1 -1.522000478 -0.230893796
2 -1.062099851 0.345382602
3 0.185208437 -0.235474585
4 0.487844292 0.12098578
PoFPoF Analysis (Continued) Analysis (Continued)
Shape Factor, β: 1.70
Scale Factor, η: 110.29 Cumulative PoF of HX Tube Failure
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⎥⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎣
⎡
⎟⎟ ⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−=
β
η
t t F exp1)(
)()( t T Pt F <=
0.00E+00
2.00E-01
4.00E-01
6.00E-01
8.00E-01
1.00E+00
1.20E+00
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
In-service time, in Months
P r o b a b i l i t y ,
i n %
Equipment Risk MatrixEquipment Risk Matrix
Severity Level: Major
PoF Target: 1x10-4
– 1x10-3
/th
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132Handal Consult ing & Training A.A
< 10-5 10-5-10-4 10-4-10-3 10-3-10-2 >10-2
Insignificant
•
No safety or environmental
consequences•
Process capability not impacted.
(<US$10.000)
•
Minor medical treatment or first
aid for Plant personnel•
Minor loss of production capacity
(<10%) for short term (<48 hours),
(US$10.000 – US$100.000)
•
Non reportable environtment
incident
• Medical treatment for personnel • Loss production capacity (10 –
50%) for short term (< 48 hours)
•
Minor reportable environmental
incident• Minor Loss of production
capacity (<10%) for long term (>48
hours)
•
Financial impact at a unit level
(US$100.000 – US$1.000.000)
•
Death of one company or
associated person• Signifcant loss production
capacity (50–100%) for short term
(< 48 hours)
•
Severe injury or illness of
multiple plant personnel, Limited
impact on public safety
•
Loss of production capacity (<1
–50%) for long term (>48 hours)
•
Major reportable environmental
incident• Financial impact at a facility level
(US$1.000.000 – US$10.000.000)
•
Multiple fatalities of company
or associated personnel•
Major production loss
•
Severe injury, illness, or
fatalities of one or more members
of the community, serious impact
on public safety
• Financial impact at corporate
level (US$10.000.000 –
US$100.000.000)
•
Catastrophic environmental
Acceptable PoF(per year)
Minor
Moderate
Major
Catastrophic
Severity
Level
Safety and Environmental
Aspect CriteriaBusiness Aspect Criteria
Criteria beingmet Low Risk
MediumRisk
HighRisk
• Please feel Free if you have any comments or suggestions
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Thank youThank you