Name: Andhyta Firselly Utami

Matriculation No.: N1200283B

Course: HY9202 – Moral Philosophy

“The Not-So-Moderate Objective of Moderate Objectivism”

Do not get Moderate Objectivists wrong: they are not a group of conformists who try

to bridge the ever-disagreeing ethical absolutists and moral skeptics. Instead, they stand

independently in arguing that there exists a set of objective moral principles and standards

that are applicable to all rational human beings in all social environments (later named

‘core moral principles’). Moderate Objectivism falls under the meta-ethical branch of Moral

Objectivism, which believes that there is an objective apparatus of moral standards that are

true and can be objectively used to ground moral claims, despite human opinions toward

them. This essay seeks to further: 1) elaborate the postulations of Moderate Objectivism, 2)

provides defenses for it, 3) evaluates prevailing arguments against it, and eventually 4)

draws a conclusion upon its actual objectives as a moral theory.

I. Morality According to Moderate Objectivism

Before this article shall jump deeper into the premises of Moderate Objectivism, it is

profoundly essential to first put forth a clear understanding towards Moral Objectivism and

contrast it with Moral Skepticism as well as its moral theories such as Subjectivism, Cultural

Relativism, Expressivism, and Error Theory. As the name suggests, Objectivism mainly

denotes the thesis that morality exists independently regardless the feelings or opinions

towards them (mind-independent), and is therefore objective. The Skeptics, on the other

hand, do not believe that such properties actually exist and hence hold that there is no such

thing as right or wrong because moral judgments simply yield from human’s limited

capacity to assert and compose their intended codes of morality.

The main advocates of today’s Moderate Objectivism are L.P. Pojman and J. Fieser,

although accounts of the earliest Moderate Objectivism principles root back to the ethics of

Sir William D. Ross, which adhere to the basic notions of the Natural Law Theory. He

proposes what are today known the ‘prima facie principles’ i.e. valid rules of action to which

one should generally adhere to but, in cases of moral conflicts, may be overridable by

another moral principle (prima facie means ‘at first glance’ or ‘on the surface of things’).1

                                                                                                               1 W.D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1932), page 18, as seen in L.P. Pojman, How Should We Live? An Introduction to Ethics (Wadsworth: Cengage Learning, 2005) accessed from Google Books, http://books.google.com.sg/books?id=vQzYqrVuJmIC

These self-evident prima facie duties in moral judgments are like axioms in

arithmetic or geometry: they have to be reflected on a case-per-case basis. A prima facie

duty, then, is one that all human beings have to obey in general way before any other

considerations enter into the picture. Ross’s list includes, inter alia:2

1. Fidelity or faithfulness – the duty to fulfill explicit and implicit agreements or

contracts to which one has entered, the duty to tell the truth, or the duty to keep

actual and implied promises;

2. Reparation – the duty to make up for wrongful acts previously done to others;

3. Gratitude – the duty to recognize what others have done for us and extending

our gratitude to them, the duty to repay others for past favors done for oneself;

4. Fairness or justice – the duty to prevent the improper distribution of good

and bad that is not in keeping with what people merit or deserve;

5. Beneficence – the duty to improve the conditions of others in these respects;

6. Self-improvement – the duty to improve one’s own condition;

7. Non-maleficence/ non-injury – the duty to not and prevent injury to others.

Pojman and Fieser later develop the aforementioned points in Ethics: Discovering

Right and Wrong. Departing from arguments against Absolutists’ notion that moral

principles are exceptionless and non-overridable, they contend that there can still be

universal and objective moral principles valid for all people and social environments

although exceptions and overridings of principles are possible.3 Moderate Objectivism’s

distinctive features include the fact that their objective moral truth does not base on the will

or existence of God, and is consequentially compatible with the view that morality is man-

made or socially constructed.4 In other words, Moderate Objectivism holds that moral

principles are objective, but not necessary absolute.

Moderate Objectivism is an example of moral naturalism as it acknowledges natural

features that are wither observable or have observable effects as its moral grounds. In

relation with utilitarianism, virtue ethics, theory of social contract, and other influential

theories in normative ethics, Moderate Objectivism provides a supporting foundation and

principles that are consistent and not contradictory. These specific theories can be further

seen as providing a more precise interpretation of what it means for a moral principle to

‘meet the needs and promote the most significant interests of human (or rational beings)’.5

                                                                                                               2 Ibid. 3 Louis P. Pojman and James Fieser, Ethics: Discovering Right and Wrong, 7th Edition (Boston: Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 2012), page 38 4 Andres Luco, Week 6 Notes, page 2 5 Ibid.

II. Arguments For Moderate Objectivism

One of the strongest arguments supporting Moderate Objectivism is the premise of

‘Common Human Nature’, which proposes that human nature is relatively similar because

each of us has a common set of basic needs and desires, physically and emotionally.6 For

example, all of us will naturally be starving after not eating for several days, and emotionally

we yearn to have families or similar social belongings. Simultaneously, we are all vulnerable

to disease, despair, and death. Because human nature is relatively similar in essential

respects, it is reasonable to conclude that there is an objectively valid set of moral principles

applicable to all groups of rational beings (human).7

The second argument departs from functionality and optimality theses. Pojman and

Fieser believe that moral principles are instituted to perform the function of meeting the

basic needs and interests of human beings, and consequentially there are moral principles

that are socially optimal (some more than the others) which will function as a compatible

social tool to accommodate these needs when followed within a particular environment, and

some that are relevant in all kinds of social environment. Therefore, what they claim as

’objective moral principles’ are ones that are socially optimal in a general setting. They also

contend that although there is only one objective moral principle that binds all people

regardless nations or kinds, then the falsehood of relativism has been proved false. In fact,

Pojman and Fieser proposes ten duties which are dubbed as core of morality:8

1. Do not kill innocent people;

2. Do not cause unnecessary pain or suffering;

3. Do not steal or cheat;

4. Keep your promises and honor your contracts;

5. Do not deprive another person of his or her freedom;

6. Tell the truth or, at least, do not lie;

7. Do justice, treating equals as equals and unequals as unequals;

8. Reciprocate, show gratitude for services rendered;

9. Help other people, especially when the cost to oneself is minimal;

10. Obey just laws.

These principles, according to Pojman and Fieser, are constitutive elements of a

successful community, necessary for the good life because they enable social cohesion along

with personal well-being, such that they reduce conflicts and promote cooperation. These

principles are thenceforth perceived central to the fluid progression of human interaction.

                                                                                                               6 Pojman and Fieser, page 41 7 Ibid., page 42 8 Pojman and Fieser, page. 40.

III. Arguments Against Moderate Objectivism

There are three main arguments against Moderate Objectivism that also oppose the

Ethical Objectivism and Moral Realism premises in general:9 1) it undermines prospects for

moral autonomy, 2) the case that certain moral standards are the correct ones are often

uncertain and the question of ‘what makes moral judgments true’ often embarrass them,

and 3) unlike Constructivists that can argue that correctness is a virtue of their being

selected or created by someone, Moral Objectivists can only say that a judgment is simply

right or simply wrong. Are all of these rebuttals valid and sound?

First and foremost, just because a truth is not of our making, it does not mean that

the opportunity to make autonomous decisions in this realm also disappears. For example,

the truths in chemistry or geology are not ‘constructed’, but rather discovered as human

beings develop science and knowledge about them. It does not mean, however, that this robs

chemists or geologists of the opportunity to make their own call about these truths.

Autonomy is not compromised by the presence of such truths. Another instance: for a

mathematician, it is not necessarily a restriction on autonomy that one cannot make 2+2=5.

The second argument against Moral Objectivism lies on the following notions: 1)

laws require lawmakers, 2) if there are moral laws, there must be moral lawmakers, and 3)

these lawmakers are either us, an idealized version of us, or God. The most problematic part

of this assessment is the 1st and 2nd one: just because there are chemistry or physics laws, it

does not mean that someone creates them. The moral laws proposed by Pojman and Fieser,

therefore, are simply a discovery rooted from ‘a common human nature’, just as chemistry or

physics discover how the nature works.

Thirdly, Moderate Objectivists, just like other Ethical Objectivists, can always argue

that their set of core moral principles are not ‘simply right’ or ‘simply wrong’. As elaborated

in the previous sub-titles, certain moral principles are socially optimal to achieve social

cohesion, cooperation, and general productivity. This has become one of the main logic in

saying that there exist certain moral standards and features that are objectively true.

The last argument against Moderate Objectivism is proposed by relativists (a.k.a.

postmodernists), which claims that the idea of a common human nature is a mere illusion.10

Basically, postmodernists’ criticism against any objective truth relies on epistemological and

ideological reasons, such that human can never be epistemologically objective and driven by

                                                                                                               9 Russ Shafer-Landau, Moral Realism: A Defence (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005), page 44 10 Daniel Salberg et. al., “Postmodernism and Its Critics” (University of Alabama course notes), accessed from: http://anthropology.ua.edu/cultures/cultures.php?culture=Postmodernism%20and%20Its%20Critics

subjectivity in making their decisions upon what is objective. Nietzsche on truth:11

“Truth, …in short, a sum of human relations, which have been enhanced,

transposed, and embellished poetically and rhetorically, and which after long use seem

firm, canonical, and obligatory to a people; truths are illusions about which one has

forgotten that this is what they are.”

However, as Pojman and Fieser also argues in their book, human knowledge about

genetics, anthropology, and history, has been providing us overwhelming evidences that all

of homo sapiens are related by common needs, interests, and desires—both physically and

emotionally. It is not an ‘illusion’ that humans, as social animals, generally prefer to survive,

be happy, experience love and friendship rather than hatred and enmity, as we also want to

be successful in reaching our goals.

IV. Conclusion: Are Moderate Objectivists’ Objectives Really Moderate?

As what I initially promised: Moderate Objectivists are not a group of conformists

who try to bridge the ever-disagreeing ethical absolutists and moral skeptics. Instead, they

propose a self-evident principles as ‘core of morality’, including ‘do not kill innocent people’

and ‘do not cause unnecessary suffering’, which are based on common human nature and

functionality as well as social optimality theses.

Having comprehensively asserted arguments for and against Moderate Objectivism

and assessed their compatibilities with normative ethics (e.g. utilitarianism, virtue ethics, as

well as theory of social contract), it is reasonable to conclude that Moderate Objectivists aim

bigger than just providing a ‘moderate’ moral theory to bridge the extreme sides of

absolutists and skeptics. Rather, it offers the consequentialist12 core principles that can

actually be implemented in real life and played a significant role as the catalyst for social

development. Its flexibility in saying that morality is situational—i.e. certain principles can

be applied differently in different contexts—does not make it inconsistent. Rather, these

principles enable rooms for human autonomy to evaluate deeds on a case-per-case basis and

later develop them to meet the advancement and varieties of social interactions.

Word count: 2020.

                                                                                                               11 F. Nietzche, On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense (1954), pp. 46-47 12 To contrast with deontological objectivists which sees certain actions to be objectively wrong as it is, without primarily assessing the context of case, as elaborated in L.P. Pojman, An Argument Against Ethical Relativism (2010), accessed from http://timgier.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/pojman-moral-objectivism.pdf

Works Cited

Pojman, L.P. How Should We Live? An Introduction to Ethics. Boston: Wadsworth, Cengage

Learning, 2005 (accessed from http://books.google.com.sg/books?id=vQzYqrVuJmI)

Pojman, L.P. and James Fieser. Ethics: Discovering Right and Wrong, 7th Edition. Boston:

Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 2012.

Pojman, L.P. An Argument Against Ethical Relativism. 2010. (Accessed from

http://timgier.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/pojman-moral-objectivism.pdf)

Luco, Andres. Week 6 Notes.

Nietzche, F. On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense. 1954.

Ross, William D. The Right and the Good. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1932.

Salberg, Daniel et. al. “Postmodernism and Its Critics”. University of Alabama course notes,

(access accessed from: http://anthropology.ua.edu/cultures/cultures.php?culture=

Postmodernism%20and%20Its%20Critics)

Shafer-Landau, Russ. Moral Realism: A Defence. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005.