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Biological Psychology 98 (2014) 1–5

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Biological Psychology

jo ur nal home p age: www.elsev ier .com/ locate /b iopsycho

odels and methods of emotional concordance

om Hollenstein ∗, Dianna Lanteigneepartment of Psychology, Queen’s University, Kingston, Ontario K7L 3N6, Canada

r t i c l e i n f o

rticle history:eceived 5 November 2013ccepted 17 December 2013vailable online 3 January 2014

eywords:

a b s t r a c t

Theories of emotion generally posit the synchronized, coordinated, and/or emergent combination of psy-chophysiological, cognitive, and behavioral components of the emotion system – emotional concordance– as a functional definition of emotion. However, the empirical support for this claim has been weakor inconsistent. As an introduction to this special issue on emotional concordance, we consider threedomains of explanations as to why this theory–data gap might exist. First, theory may need to be revised

motiononcordancemotion regulationsychophysiologymotional expressionognitive appraisal

to more accurately reflect past research. Second, there may be moderating factors such as emotion regu-lation, context, or individual differences that have obscured concordance. Finally, the methods typicallyused to test theory may be inadequate. In particular, we review a variety of potential issues: intensityof emotions elicited in the laboratory, nonlinearity, between- versus within-subject associations, therelative timing of components, bivariate versus multivariate approaches, and diversity of physiologicalprocesses.

. Introduction

Explicitly or implicitly, almost all models of emotion rely onhe idea that (a) there are multiple components in the emo-ion response system, chiefly physiological, cognitive (appraisal),xpressive, and behavioral; and (b) emotion is identified byome degree of coordination among these components (Barrett

Campos, 1987; Darwin, 1872; Ekman, 1992; Fogel et al., 1992;ross, 2007; Lang, 1994; Lazarus, 1991; Levenson, 1994; Mauss,evenson, McCarter, Wilhelm, & Gross, 2005; Quas, Hong, Alkon,

Boyce, 2000; Rosenberg & Ekman, 1997; Scherer, 2005; Sze,yurak, Yuan, & Levenson, 2010; Tomkins, 1962). Indeed, the

ssue of emotional concordance features prominently in early the-ries of emotion (Cannon, 1927; Darwin, 1872; James, 1884, 1894)nd continues to this day with modern, comprehensive modelseflecting the latest research (Damasio, 1998; Frijda, 2007; Gross

Thompson, 2007; Matsumoto & Ekman, 2009; Ortony, Clore, &ollins, 1988; Sander, Grandjean, & Scherer, 2005). The canonical

ear response, for example, should be a synchronized combina-ion of a threat appraisal, fearful facial affect, elevated sympatheticrousal, and an urge to flee the threatening situation. In this way,motion is conceptualized as a dynamic, mutual amplification ofomponents of the emotion system to create an adaptive and coher-

nt response to one’s current circumstances.

There is one non-trivial problem that has dogged this concep-ualization of emotion for more than a century: poor empirical

∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 6135333288.E-mail address: Tom.Hollenstein@queensu.ca (T. Hollenstein).

301-0511/$ – see front matter © 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.biopsycho.2013.12.012

© 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

support. Concordance has been weakly supported by the data, atbest, but often not supported, with some research even show-ing evidence for the opposite, discordance or negative associations(Adelmann & Zajonc, 1989; Hastings et al., 2009; Lang, 1968; Mauss& Robinson, 2009; Mauss, Wilhelm, & Gross, 2004). Moreover, thefile-drawer problem may be particularly relevant to examinationsof concordance and the inconsistent results in the literature couldbe the tip of an iceberg of null findings that never make it to an edi-tor’s desk. The purpose of this special issue is to shed a concentratedlight on this perennial problem with a group of papers addressingvarious aspects of the concordance of physiological responses witheach other and other emotion system components. To introducethis issue, we review subtle differences between conceptualiza-tions of concordance and provide a range of explanations as to whyconcordance may not have the expected empirical support.

2. What do we mean by ‘concordance’?

Emotional concordance has gone by various names over theyears, including concordance (Nesse et al., 1985; Wilhelm &Roth, 2001), response system coherence (Ekman, 1992; Mausset al., 2005), organization of response tendencies (Lazarus,1991; Levenson, 1994) or response components (Scherer, 1984;Witherington, Campos, & Hertenstein, 2001), or response com-ponent syndromes (Averill, 1980; Reisenzein, 2000). We preferthe term concordance – and the opposite, discordance – rather

than other terms (e.g., coherence, convergence, organization,synchrony) and their respective opposites. Concordance and dis-cordance are clear and precise terms that delineate the twopossibilities of combinations of emotional processes. Divergence

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s inappropriate because it incorrectly suggests that that responseomponents are “moving away” from each other. Incoherence lacksrecision and has a negative connotation that would not workor this context. Disorganization implies a haphazard coordina-ion among components. Synchrony can be used to describe bothemporally positive and negative associations among componentsnd asynchrony is simply a lack of that synchrony. Using the termiscordance is also favorable because it can be used effectively inombination with these other terms to describe more fine-grainedspects of emotional processes. For example, certain discordantmotional responses can be evaluated as coherent (e.g., suppress-ng expression) or incoherent (e.g., disorganized). Thus, althoughhe use of a single term may occlude these important distinctions,e argue that concordance–discordance is the best over-arching

ramework. However, in the future it may be optimal for the fieldo create a more multi-dimensional conceptualization that com-ines these important features. For example, Bulteel et al. (2014)istinguish two types of concordance: pattern and synchrony.

Regardless of the terminology, the lack of empirical supportas inspired more nuanced conceptualizations of the coordina-ion among emotion system elements. One approach has been todentify the relations among components to be a loose couplingLang, 1988) or probabilistically weak (Bradley & Lang, 2000). Otheraveats involve associating concordance with only relatively strongmotional responses (Russell, 2003; Scherer, 1984). Still othersrgue that discordance may be the norm rather than the exceptionue to regulatory efforts to disrupt emotional processes (Butler,ross, & Barnard, 2014; Dan-Glauser & Gross, 2013; Lanteigne,lynn, Eastabrook, & Hollenstein, 2012). Here, we explore a rangef possible explanations for the limited support for emotional con-ordance grouped into three broad categories: (1) theories shouldeflect the data and be revised; (2) moderating factors have not beenufficiently considered; and (3) methods have been inappropriate.

. Why is there limited support for concordance?

Theory. The first and most obvious explanation would be thathe theoretical premise behind concordance is wrong (Barrett,006; Bradley & Lang, 2000; Fridlund, 1997; Reisenzein, 2000).arrett (2006) most recently and forcefully makes the argumenthat progress in understanding emotions is impeded by the per-asive assumption that there are “natural kinds” of emotionsomprised of a set of “characteristic property clusters”. The searchor emotion-specific concordance – a unique combination of phys-ological, behavioral, and cognitive components for each “naturalind” of emotion – has been a fool’s errand. Instead, “[r]ather thaneginning with an abstract, theoretical construct (e.g., anger) thate try to identify in human behavior, perhaps we could concen-

rate our empirical efforts on identifying which observables (e.g.,ardiovascular changes, facial expressions, startle responses, elec-roencephalographic recordings, subjective experience, conscioushoughts) are implicated across instances of emoting and observe,ather than prescribe, their relationships in varying circumstancesnd time frames.” (Barrett, 2006, p. 48). Thus, from this perspec-ive concordance is still seen as important, yet only as a bottom-uprocess through which we can discover functional combinationsia inductive rather than deductive inquiry.

This bottom-up approach has also been advocated by emergentccounts of emotion (e.g., Lewis, 2005). Coan (2010), for example,akes a compelling argument that there has been a problematic

eliance on latent variable approaches for the examination of what

s generally agreed is an emergent process. With a latent approach,ndicators of emotions (e.g., physiological, cognitive, behavioral)ll reflect an underlying emotion process and are reasonably inter-hangeable. The conceptual underpinning of such an approach is

cal Psychology 98 (2014) 1–5

that there is a latent process, emotion, which is manifest in variousways in body, behavior, and felt experience. In contrast, and moreconsistent with theoretical claims, emergent approaches modelthese components as interacting elements in a dynamic systemfrom which emotion arises (Coan, 2010; Lewis, 2005). Thus, onereason why evidence for concordance has been inconsistent couldbe the traditional application of latent models for a putatively emer-gent process.

It also makes a difference which components of the emo-tion system are selected for tests of concordance. For the vastmajority of investigations, this is done with estimates of pairedassociations (e.g., correlations). With these pairings, associationsbetween self-reported experience and behavioral expression havebeen the strongest, while pairings that include physiological vari-ables have been the most inconsistent (e.g., Fischer & Roseman,2007; Mauss et al., 2005; also see Evers et al., 2014). A second kindof pairing is across various physiological measures (Bulteel et al.,2014; Gentsch et al., 2014), which has yielded the full spectrumof results: negative, positive, and null (Kreibig, Wilhelm, Roth, &Gross, 2007; Mauss et al., 2005). At least two issues stem from thiscomponent pairing approach. First, the reliance on paired associ-ations for what is, at minimum, a three-component process (e.g.,physiology, appraisals, behavior) reflects methodological limita-tions rather than a strong theoretical prediction that concordanceshould be bivariate (Bulteel et al., 2014; Lanteigne et al., 2012).Second, it could be argued that associations within a particu-lar domain of emotion components, such as physiology, do notreally capture the spirit of the concordance question by exclud-ing the experiential, cognitive, or behavioral aspects of emotionalresponse.

Another question is whether concordance should occur in thesame way for all situations. First, as argued by Evers et al. (2014),there may be at least two levels of processing which would reflectdifferent possibilities for concordance. Rapid, automatic concor-dance may not be functionally comparable to reflective processesthat occur at longer time scales. Second, the means by whichemotions are elicited may be important. Receptive or passive expe-rience of emotional content (e.g., films) is often asocial and can becontrasted to active, social or generative experiences that induceemotional arousal. Finally, there are diverse ways to operational-ize concordance. For example, the overall pattern of responsivityacross domains captures a different aspect of concordance than therelative synchrony of dynamic processes (Bulteel et al., 2014).

Moderators. Another set of reasons for why concordance hasbeen elusive is the relative neglect of important moderators ofemotion processes. For example, because emotions are situation-specific adaptations, context may be a focal rather than peripheralaspect of concordance. The Ortony, Clore, and Collings (OCC) model(Clore & Ortony, 2013; Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988), for exam-ple, asserts that emotions cohere around situations rather than justbeing constrained by context. Thus, the missing ingredient in thelist of emotion components is the situation itself and the relativeneglect of this ingredient is partly responsible for limited evidencein support of concordance.

As argued by Butler et al. (2014), the concordance problem maystem from the relative neglect of regulatory processes in emo-tion theory and research. With the inclusion of neural processesinto modern accounts of emotions, the separation of emotionalprocesses from cognition or regulation has become untenable(Lewis, 2005; Thompson, Lewis, & Calkins, 2008). That is, at nopoint during an emotional process is regulation not occurring.Emotion regulation covers a wide array of processes and most

of these target specific emotion components over others (e.g.,suppression of expression, re-appraisal, relaxation to modulatephysiological arousal). More generally, the down-regulation ofemotion is the top-down, negative feedback counterpart to the

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ottom-up, positive feedback (i.e., emergent) processes that giveise to a concordant emotional response. This could explain whyoncordance would be more evident at greater intensities whenegulatory processes are temporarily overwhelmed. Furthermore,hen emotion regulation processes are compromised, such as inysregulated clinical populations or through experimental manip-lation, greater concordance among emotion system componentsould be expected. Thus, a question that emerges in this special

ssue is whether regulatory dynamics (e.g., the ebb and flow of RSA)re part of the concordance process postulated by theory (Crowellt al., 2014) or, as Butler et al. (2014) argue, whether regulationnterferes with concordance.

Theoretically, the concordance postulate is that some form ofoordination across components of the emotion system universallyefines emotion. However, individual differences certainly haven impact on the degree to which concordance can be observed.ultural norms and socialization direct the which, where, when,ow, and with whom of emotional expressivity (Ekman, 1973; Cole

Tamang, 1998; Matsumoto, Yoo, & Fontaine, 2008). Physiologi-al responsivity, especially in the autonomic and cardiac systems,aries as a function of physical fitness and health (Salmon, 2001;chlicht, 1994). Self-reports and appraisals also vary as a functionf temperament, life-history, and culture (Kuppens & Tong, 2010;cherer, 1997). These factors complicate the assessment of concor-ance.

Despite the poor evidentiary record, concordance has not fallenut of theoretical favor. Why? Perhaps the intuitive appeal of con-ordance motivates resistance to revising models of emotion basedn a dubious collection of findings. While theoretical parsimonynd potential moderators are no doubt part of the problem, mostesearchers seem to be holding off on radical revisions to theory inieu of more concentrated and sophisticated efforts to adequately

odel concordance. This jury-is-still-out perspective reflects theap between theoretically rich models and an uncertain and lim-ted set of methodological techniques to test these claims (Richters,997). Indeed, most recent considerations of concordance placeriticism on inadequate methods, which is why we discuss methodsn more detail below and have assembled a variety of methodolog-cal approaches for this special issue.

Methods. The remaining reasons for limited support for concor-ance are methodological. First, the failure to detect concordanceay come from failures to adequately elicit specific emotions in the

ab. A recent special issue in this journal explored this possibility byemonstrating emotion-specific physiological response patternsFriedman & Kreibig, 2010; Stephens, Christie, & Friedman, 2010).

oreover, as Friedman, Stephens, & Thayer (2014) suggest, basic,ore emotions may evoke greater concordance than less canoni-al or universal emotional states. The large variety of emotionallicitation paradigms, even for one emotional state, and diversityf analytical techniques has so far made assessments of emotion-pecific concordance inconclusive.

Second, the common conceptualization of concordance is that of positive feedback process in which physiological, cognitive, andxpressive components mutually amplify each other to form emo-ional states. Because emotional states reach a finite zenith beforeventually resolving into less intense or neutral states, there mustlso be negative feedback processes (e.g., regulation) that coun-eract the positive feedback processes. These positive-negativeeedback loops are the bedrock of biological functioning and arey their very nature not linear. These non-linearities manifest ashreshold effects, for example, such as those captured by catastro-he models (Guastello, 2013). Thus, linear statistics and models

ight not be the best approach for capturing the non-linearity of

motional concordance.Another problem that has been frequently identified is the

ssue with using between-subjects approaches to a within-subject

cal Psychology 98 (2014) 1–5 3

problem (Reisenzein, 2000). At the simplest level this would entailfavoring within-subject correlations and eschewing between-subject approaches (see Butler et al., 2014 for an extensivediscussion).

Fourth, the general prediction is that concordance shouldincrease with intensity (Davidson, 1992; Mauss et al., 2005;Rosenberg & Ekman, 1997). By extension, full concordance mayonly be possible in extreme circumstances (e.g., fear in a violent,life-threatening moment). Modern challenges are typically less direthan the environmental pressures for which emotions evolved, thusconcordance may be the exception rather than rule (Friedman et al.,2014). Hence, ethical constraints and experimental reductionismmay also be a factor in limiting assessment of concordance.

Fifth, in emotion research, it is most common to use a stimulusonset as a synchronizing point for psychophysiological, expressive,and appraisal components. However, the time course of emotioncomponents may vary greatly and therefore synchronized changesin two or more time series may not be simultaneous. For exam-ple, to address 2014, some recent studies have used windows of6-10 second lags within which to find the maximum correlationbetween components (Butler et al., 2014; Dan-Glauser & Gross,2013). Whatever the solution, it is probable that analyses based onsimultaneous changes across components will produce attenuatedindices of concordance.

Finally, the diverse nature of physiological measures and theirputative psychological meaning make it difficult to generalizeabout what would constitute evidence of concordance. As can beseen in the wide range of measures used in the studies in thisspecial issue, there are important functional differences in neu-ral, autonomic, muscular, and endocrine processes that must befactored in. For example, as shown by Crowell et al. (2014), concor-dance with RSA is complex due to the nature of parasympatheticwithdrawal. This withdrawal indicates regulatory effort but alsoenables greater sympathetic arousal, which in combination couldobscure clear interpretation of concordance among system compo-nents. Thus, temporally linked divergence of emotion processes mayneed to be added to conceptualizations of emotion concordance.

4. This special issue

For this special issue, we have assembled contributions thatreflect diverse approaches to the issue of emotional concordance.Table 1 summarizes the experimental context, emotions, measures,analytical techniques, and support for concordance for each of thenovel empirical contributions. Each one addresses at least one ofthe issues mentioned above. Bulteel et al., propose a new methodol-ogy that is particularly well-suited to the detection of both patternand synchrony across multiple measures. Butler et al., test howefforts to regulate emotions might interfere with concordant pro-cesses. Crowell et al. investigate how physiological regulation (RSA)and behavior may be concordant within and between individuals.Evers et al. test a dual process model that distinguishes betweenautomatic and reflective processes. Friedman et al. use redundancyanalysis to estimate the degree of shared variance across variousmeasures of emotional responses to evocative films. Gentsch et al.explore the concordance across two physiological systems, facialmuscles and event-related potentials, as a test of the componentprocess model. Schaefer et al. provide some evidence that the inten-sity of emotional reactivity may be a factor related to concordance.Finally, the theoretical contribution of Quigley and Barrett (2014)caps off this special issue to complete the set of attempts to take

the problem of concordance seriously and tackle it head on.

Concordance is an intuitively appealing concept but one thatis fraught with theoretical and methodological issues. We hopethat this collection inspires and focuses future research, ultimately

4 T. Hollenstein, D. Lanteigne / Biological Psychology 98 (2014) 1–5

Table 1Summary of empirical contributions to the special issue.

Experimental design Emotion(s) elicited Measures Analysis Support for concordance?

Bulteel et al. Pleasant IAPS pictures Unspecifiedpositive

IBI; SCL; EMG De-Con (newtechnique for assessingconcordance)

General support for patterningand synchronizationconcordance; notableindividual differences

Butler et al. Discussion of upsettingfilm; suppression,reappraisal and controlconditions

Unspecifiednegative-positive

IBI; SCL; BP; videoself-report; observedverbal/non-verbalexpression

Multivariate multilevelmodel of auto-/cross-correlations (maxwithin ± 6 secondwindow)

Max cross-correlation = |.3| incontrol condition; evidencethat regulation disruptsconcordance

Crowell et al. Depressed andself-injuringadolescents & controls;mother-adolescentconflict discussion

Observedaversiveness

RSA and observedaversiveness of bothdyad members

Two-levelactor-partnerinteraction model

Within-individual concordancefor clinical group;between-individualconcordance for controls

Evers et al. Interrupted countingtask; lexical-decisiontask; anger self-report

Anger Automatic: angeraccessibility in lexicaltask; Reflective:self-reported anger;MAP

Multiple regression Within-system (automatic orreflective) but notbetween-system concordance

Friedman et al. Music and film clips Content, amused,fearful, angry, sad& neutral

IBI; RSA; PEP; RR; MAP;SCL; SBP; DBP; LVET;SV; CO; TPR;TI; TE;self-report of 6emotions

Redundancy analysis Up to 28% shared variance(canonical r = .53)

Gentsch et al. Feedback duringmonetary gamblingtask

Unspecified(appraisals of goalconduciveness andpower)

ERP and EMG Principal componentsanalysis

ERPs (appraisals) loaded withEMG in expected directions

Schaefer et al. Video clips of snakes(threatening andnon-threatening) andfish; fMRI; snakephobics & controls

Fear Pupil diameter; SCL;self-reported valenceand arousal; voxelactivation

ANOVAs andchi-square

Phobics had greaterconcordance in threateningsnake condition compared tocontrols

Note: IBI = interbeat interval; SCL = skin conductance level; EMG = electromyography; BP = blood pressure; RSA = respiratory sinus arrhythmia; MAP = mean arterial pres-s DBP =C iration

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ure; PEP = pre-ejection period; RR = R-to-R interval; SBP = systolic blood pressure;

O = cardiac output; TPR = total peripheral resistance; TI = inspiration time; TE = exp

llowing for greater theoretical specificity. Perhaps as Friedmant al. contend, the guiding questions should not be about the degreef concordance among emotion components but what are the fac-ors that mediate concordance.

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