Modelling the ‘violence paradox’ in irregular warfare and terrorism Paul Edward Strong Defence...

Modelling the ‘violence paradox’ in irregular warfare and terrorism

Paul Edward Strong

Defence Policy Analysis Group

© Crown copyright 2011. Published with the permission of the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory on behalf of the Controller of HMSO

Dstl is part of the Ministry of DefenceUNCLASSIFIED

© British Crown Copyright 2009

Agenda• Context / Introduction

• Strategic Utility and Background

• Demonstrating the State’s Weakness

• Internal Enemies

• The Power of Myth

• Exploring the Paradox

• How can we reverse the paradox?

• The Continuing challenge

• Analysis and Planning Issues

• Resolving the Paradox

• Conclusion

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Context• This study is informed by the analysis

being conducted at Dstl to examine the UK Ministry of Defence’s contribution to Stabilisation

• This analysis programme contributes to a wider understanding of the issues involved in stabilisation operations

• Any views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of Dstl, MOD or any other UK government department



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Introduction• Although the motives for committing violent acts in an irregular or

terrorist campaign are often assumed to include ‘irrational’, ‘cultural’ or ‘ideological’ factors, these concepts cannot explain all of the complex dynamics involved

• For example, a complex cultural context does not make violent conflict inevitable but it often provides a range of contributory factors that initiate or intensify the violence

• While it is possible to oppose a regime through non-violence, and an insurgency can be based on a justified reaction against a tyrannical regime, this presentation focuses on scenarios where the insurgents/terrorists consciously utilise propaganda of the deed to achieve their objectives



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Strategic Utility• Violence does not always elicit a response that assigns the entire

blame for an action to the perpetrator

• Particularly in cases where the state’s legitimacy is in question, the blame for an outbreak of violence may even be assigned to the force that ‘fails to protect’ the victim

• Directing attacks to symbolically undermine the claim of a regime that it protects the populace can thus benefit the insurgent / terrorist even if they have little direct strategic effect (‘surrounding Kabul’)

• Understanding the dynamics of this paradox can illuminate the decisions made by terrorist/insurgents and offer insights into countering strategies based upon terror



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Background 1• This paradox dates back to the earliest conflicts

• It is predicated on the idea that success in conflict enables a military elite to claim that it controls a region or populace in return for the provision of security

– Modern states usually claim the same justification for their authority

• Control therefore depends on proving that this security is provided and this determines the targets that are generally selected to disprove this claim by opponents of the regime

• Eliminating soft targets has little operational or strategic impact but can have a huge political impact as the failure to protect the populace invalidates the basis of the authority of the state

• The English campaigns in France from 1066 to 1453 were almost entirely based upon this strategic concept



The Inventors of Systematic Terror

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Sennacherib at Lachish in 701 BC demonstrating the King of Judea’s inability to protect his people



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Background 2

• Demonstrating a failure to protect its own people can therefore have a direct negative effect on the targeted regime

• At the same time, targeting a opponent population (often a scapegoat) can also have a positive effect on a group’s internal cohesion

– This process can therefore lead to increased ruthlessness against the ‘enemy’ and to an eventual backlash

– Thus while this process often unifies the supporters it often alienates outsiders

– “The Bosnian Serbs (were) seemingly unaware that however much the coverage of their deeds might please them and their domestic audience, it revolted the external viewer” (Rupert Smith, P.353)

– The Bosnian Muslims manipulated this perception as part of their StratCom



Bosnia

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Demonstrating the State’s Weakness 1

• Targeting the populace has often been used in state vs state conflicts

• When a state gains its authority from a constitutional/contractual relationship based upon its claim to be the protector of the populace it cannot afford to allow an opponent to devastate its territory without contesting the intrusion

• There are few states where ‘face’ is unimportant or where a national humiliation can be ignored (or re-directed e.g. Athens in 431 BC)

Pericles



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Demonstrating the State’s Weakness 2

• Used by William the Conqueror to draw Harold southwards in 1066

• Used by English kings in France during the 100 Years War – the infamous chevauchée

• Used by Marlborough to force Marshal Tallard and the Elector of Bavaria to fight at Blenheim in 1704

• Used by Sherman to shatter the morale of the Confederacy in the ‘March though Georgia’ in 1864

• Used by Carl Spaatz (USAF) over Germany in 1945 to force the Luftwaffe to engage his fighter escorts



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Internal Enemies• A nascent state claiming a monopoly of violence cannot afford to

allow internal enemies to conduct violent campaigns within its territory

– As a result, early states ruthlessly crushed regions or groups that challenged the unified state’s monopoly of violence (the Border Reivers, le Compte de Bouteville, the Streltsy)

– Centres of resistance were ‘slighted’ and roads built to facilitate movement by security forces (General Wade)

• Resistance to this process is often romanticised (Hereward the Wake, the Mount Liang rebels, William Tell, Rob Roy, centuries of Afghan bandits) and this has often provided the foundation for the pernicious myth of heroic resistance to the ‘oppressor’



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The Power of Myth• In fragile or evolving states, internal

predators conveniently omit the negative impact of their own activities when they are creating the mythology upon which their campaign is based

• Their target is the centralising authority which is attempting to moderate their predation

• Demonstrating that the state cannot protect the populace has the double advantage of undermining the regime and legitimising their own violent (and often profitable) activities



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Exploring the Paradox – Green Factors• In most cases, the security forces share opprobrium with the

perpetrators of violence (often receiving more blame if they are perceived as failing to provide security)

• Modellers looking at insurgent/terrorist motivations should take account of the claims of the host nation regarding security

• Therefore the impact of the violence paradox is most obvious in the media coverage of the campaign

– Modelling insurgency without the media being included is highly counter-productive

• The role of coalition forces may be counter-productive

– Reinforcing the impression that the state is not capable of taking responsibility for its own security and unifying opposition to the ‘outsiders’

– ‘Superior technology’ can create unrealistic expectations



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Exploring the Paradox – Red Factors

• Red targeting and coalition StratCom analysis should take account of the strategic impact of ‘security failure’

• Attacks directed ‘at the centre’ of the state can counter large-scale military deployments in the insurgent/terrorist heartland

– Chechen attacks on Moscow follow this logic (“we can hurt them!”)

• Outrageous acts should have the capacity to alienate support

– The Anbar Awakening or the revulsion that followed the Omagh Bombing

• Long-term failures in the provision of security can lead to the spoiler factions replacing the host nation as providers of security for their own communities

– Shadow governance in Afghanistan



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How can we reverse the paradox? 1

• Violent spoiler factions need to be challenged to prove they can provide a genuine alternative

– Insurgent/terrorist groups are often exploitative and incompetent at governance and this needs to be highlighted

• Therefore StratCom needs to focus on the overall negative impact of the insurgent/terrorist campaign

– The IRA campaign undermined the Northern Ireland economy

– The Taliban target traditional structures as well as the regime and this leads to wider social failure in the regions they contest

• Cultural sensitivities need to be understood

– Prudence may be required on issues that are seen as essential by our own culture but offensive to another



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• Security successes and efforts need to be highlighted

– Where security units demonstrate a willingness to face risks to reduce civilian casualties this undermines insurgent/terrorist propaganda

• Security contexts and challenges need to be better explained

– A few bombs do not mean that the capital is surrounded

– Abuses need to be dealt with quickly and openly

• When coalition forces are assisting the host nation, damaging events (Abu Graib, Pastor Terry Jones) will be exploited by spoiler factions

– The host nation will be accused of supporting intruders that oppress the populace (or target their beliefs) – therefore potential outbreaks need to be countered as quickly as possible

– Identification and extraction of personnel may be necessary

How can we reverse the paradox? 2



The Continuing Challenge

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The Continuing challenge• Spoiler factions will make limited claims based on core competencies

– The Taliban claim to be better and more moral providers of justice than GIRoA

• Insurgents are usually less concerned about the wider populace and to maintain their core support often claim to target ‘traitors’ or despised communities

– Victims drawn from one of these groups will be seen as being of less value than any casualties received in a security force counter-operation

– Convincing a populace of the wider implications of violence can be problematic

• NGOs will continue to attempt to provide neutral aid to all communities and this will often sustain even incompetent insurgent/terrorist campaigns



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Analysis Issues

• The violence paradox can lead to sudden shifts in allegiance

– The tipping point will depend on the context and the dynamics of the scenario

• Analysis should therefore take account of the ‘Grey Faction’ in the scenario

– In most scenarios, the populace is neutral or indifferent to the objectives of the nascent or fragile state

– The violence paradox emerges from the reaction of these groups (or individuals) to failures by those who claim to protect them

– Losing the tacit acquiescence of these groups can therefore seriously undermine a stabilisation/COIN operation



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Planning Issues• Plan the narrative

• Expose the paradox and target the weaknesses of the insurgents / terrorists

• Explain the limits of security and ensure that the perpetrator is held to account (instead of the most accessible player being blamed)

• Support and not supplant the host nation’s security forces

• Ensure that the host nation security forces are of the highest quality possible

• Each faction need to evaluated to see how they would react to a range of events



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Resolving the Paradox



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Resolving the Paradox• The violent insurgent/ terrorist depends on ignorance, mythology

and fear to thrive

– Dissect and expose the myths

• They rarely offer a coherent alternative to the state structures they oppose

– Reveal the weakness in their position

– Set the insurgent / terrorist narrative a challenge

• Establish a new narrative based upon an ethos that increases confidence in the fundamental structures of the state

– Security Sector Reform, anti-corruption policies, enhance/empower traditional representative mechanisms



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Conclusions• By undermining the host nation state, the terrorist or insurgent

creates the opportunity to thrive on the resulting chaos or supplant the existing regime

• Undermining security does not require the insurgent/terrorist to target the armed security forces of the state – they merely need to demonstrate that those same forces cannot protect the populace

• The targeted populace may despise the murderous insurgent / terrorist but the success of each atrocity further erodes both the legitimacy and effectiveness of the state

• Winning the narrative may depend on resolving the paradox



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Questions?

Modelling the ‘violence paradox’ in irregular warfare and terrorism Paul Edward Strong Defence...

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