Mobility of Rights1

Exchange Rates, Labor Mobility and Immigration Policies in anIntegrated World

Adrian J. Shin

University of Michigan

November 9, 2012

1Prepared for IPES 2012. This material is based upon work supported by the National ScienceFoundation Graduate Student Research Fellowship under Grant No. DGE 0718128.

Adrian J. Shin (University of Michigan) Mobility of Rights November 9, 2012 1 / 15

How do policymakers respond to exchange rate shocks?

Exchange rate policy.Ï Dollar appreciation: Dollar Politics in United States (1981–1986)Ï Yen appreciation: foreign exchange interventions in Japan(1991–ongoing)

Trade policy against currency appreciation.Ï WTO disputes.Ï Anti-dumping measures.

Immigration policy.Ï Why?Ï How?

Adrian J. Shin (University of Michigan) Mobility of Rights November 9, 2012 2 / 15

How do policymakers respond to exchange rate shocks?

Exchange rate policy.Ï Dollar appreciation: Dollar Politics in United States (1981–1986)Ï Yen appreciation: foreign exchange interventions in Japan(1991–ongoing)

Trade policy against currency appreciation.Ï WTO disputes.Ï Anti-dumping measures.

Immigration policy.Ï Why?Ï How?

Adrian J. Shin (University of Michigan) Mobility of Rights November 9, 2012 2 / 15

How do policymakers respond to exchange rate shocks?

Exchange rate policy.Ï Dollar appreciation: Dollar Politics in United States (1981–1986)Ï Yen appreciation: foreign exchange interventions in Japan(1991–ongoing)

Trade policy against currency appreciation.Ï WTO disputes.Ï Anti-dumping measures.

Immigration policy.Ï Why?Ï How?

Adrian J. Shin (University of Michigan) Mobility of Rights November 9, 2012 2 / 15

Relevant Preferences

Firms have strong preferences for exchange rate levels.Ï Purchasing power vs. price competitiveness.Ï Exporters and import-competing firms prefer undervalued currency.Ï Firms in the non-tradable sector prefer overvalued currency.

Migrant workers are extremely sensitive to exchange rate fluctuationsfor remittances.

Ï Appreciation of the host country’s currency = remittances ↑.Ï Depreciation of the host country’s currency = remittances ↓.

How do exchange rate levels affect labor-intensive firms that rely onmigrant workers?

Adrian J. Shin (University of Michigan) Mobility of Rights November 9, 2012 3 / 15

Relevant Preferences

Firms have strong preferences for exchange rate levels.Ï Purchasing power vs. price competitiveness.Ï Exporters and import-competing firms prefer undervalued currency.Ï Firms in the non-tradable sector prefer overvalued currency.

Migrant workers are extremely sensitive to exchange rate fluctuationsfor remittances.

Ï Appreciation of the host country’s currency = remittances ↑.Ï Depreciation of the host country’s currency = remittances ↓.

How do exchange rate levels affect labor-intensive firms that rely onmigrant workers?

Adrian J. Shin (University of Michigan) Mobility of Rights November 9, 2012 3 / 15

Relevant Preferences

Firms have strong preferences for exchange rate levels.Ï Purchasing power vs. price competitiveness.Ï Exporters and import-competing firms prefer undervalued currency.Ï Firms in the non-tradable sector prefer overvalued currency.

Migrant workers are extremely sensitive to exchange rate fluctuationsfor remittances.

Ï Appreciation of the host country’s currency = remittances ↑.Ï Depreciation of the host country’s currency = remittances ↓.

How do exchange rate levels affect labor-intensive firms that rely onmigrant workers?

Adrian J. Shin (University of Michigan) Mobility of Rights November 9, 2012 3 / 15

Currency Depreciation (Open Trade)

Migrants return home.

Ï Around 200,000 Poles returned home from the U.K. in 2008.Ï Filipinos and appreciating Philippine peso in the early 2000s.Ï Mishra and Spilimbergo (2011)

F 1 percent depreciation of the real exchange rate ↔ 0.5−1.2 percentincrease in the emigration rate.

F 1 percent change in the real exchange rate ↔ 0.15−0.4 percent changein wages.

Firms in the tradable sector gain price competitiveness.Ï Labor-intensive firms can raise the prices of their goods and can endurehigher wages.

Ï Capital-intensive firms do not lose from return migration.Firms in the non-tradable sector lose.

Ï Labor-intensive: labor shortages and rising prices of imports.Ï Capital-intensive firms: rising prices of imports.

Adrian J. Shin (University of Michigan) Mobility of Rights November 9, 2012 4 / 15

Currency Depreciation (Open Trade)

Migrants return home.Ï Around 200,000 Poles returned home from the U.K. in 2008.

Ï Filipinos and appreciating Philippine peso in the early 2000s.Ï Mishra and Spilimbergo (2011)

F 1 percent depreciation of the real exchange rate ↔ 0.5−1.2 percentincrease in the emigration rate.

F 1 percent change in the real exchange rate ↔ 0.15−0.4 percent changein wages.

Firms in the tradable sector gain price competitiveness.Ï Labor-intensive firms can raise the prices of their goods and can endurehigher wages.

Ï Capital-intensive firms do not lose from return migration.Firms in the non-tradable sector lose.

Ï Labor-intensive: labor shortages and rising prices of imports.Ï Capital-intensive firms: rising prices of imports.

Adrian J. Shin (University of Michigan) Mobility of Rights November 9, 2012 4 / 15

Currency Depreciation (Open Trade)

Migrants return home.Ï Around 200,000 Poles returned home from the U.K. in 2008.Ï Filipinos and appreciating Philippine peso in the early 2000s.

Ï Mishra and Spilimbergo (2011)F 1 percent depreciation of the real exchange rate ↔ 0.5−1.2 percent

increase in the emigration rate.F 1 percent change in the real exchange rate ↔ 0.15−0.4 percent change

in wages.

Firms in the tradable sector gain price competitiveness.Ï Labor-intensive firms can raise the prices of their goods and can endurehigher wages.

Ï Capital-intensive firms do not lose from return migration.Firms in the non-tradable sector lose.

Ï Labor-intensive: labor shortages and rising prices of imports.Ï Capital-intensive firms: rising prices of imports.

Adrian J. Shin (University of Michigan) Mobility of Rights November 9, 2012 4 / 15

Currency Depreciation (Open Trade)

Migrants return home.Ï Around 200,000 Poles returned home from the U.K. in 2008.Ï Filipinos and appreciating Philippine peso in the early 2000s.Ï Mishra and Spilimbergo (2011)

F 1 percent depreciation of the real exchange rate ↔ 0.5−1.2 percentincrease in the emigration rate.

F 1 percent change in the real exchange rate ↔ 0.15−0.4 percent changein wages.

Firms in the tradable sector gain price competitiveness.Ï Labor-intensive firms can raise the prices of their goods and can endurehigher wages.

Ï Capital-intensive firms do not lose from return migration.Firms in the non-tradable sector lose.

Ï Labor-intensive: labor shortages and rising prices of imports.Ï Capital-intensive firms: rising prices of imports.

Adrian J. Shin (University of Michigan) Mobility of Rights November 9, 2012 4 / 15

Currency Depreciation (Open Trade)

Migrants return home.Ï Around 200,000 Poles returned home from the U.K. in 2008.Ï Filipinos and appreciating Philippine peso in the early 2000s.Ï Mishra and Spilimbergo (2011)

F 1 percent depreciation of the real exchange rate ↔ 0.5−1.2 percentincrease in the emigration rate.

F 1 percent change in the real exchange rate ↔ 0.15−0.4 percent changein wages.

Firms in the tradable sector gain price competitiveness.Ï Labor-intensive firms can raise the prices of their goods and can endurehigher wages.

Ï Capital-intensive firms do not lose from return migration.Firms in the non-tradable sector lose.

Ï Labor-intensive: labor shortages and rising prices of imports.Ï Capital-intensive firms: rising prices of imports.

Adrian J. Shin (University of Michigan) Mobility of Rights November 9, 2012 4 / 15

Currency Depreciation (Open Trade)

Migrants return home.Ï Around 200,000 Poles returned home from the U.K. in 2008.Ï Filipinos and appreciating Philippine peso in the early 2000s.Ï Mishra and Spilimbergo (2011)

F 1 percent depreciation of the real exchange rate ↔ 0.5−1.2 percentincrease in the emigration rate.

F 1 percent change in the real exchange rate ↔ 0.15−0.4 percent changein wages.

Firms in the tradable sector gain price competitiveness.Ï Labor-intensive firms can raise the prices of their goods and can endurehigher wages.

Ï Capital-intensive firms do not lose from return migration.

Firms in the non-tradable sector lose.Ï Labor-intensive: labor shortages and rising prices of imports.Ï Capital-intensive firms: rising prices of imports.

Adrian J. Shin (University of Michigan) Mobility of Rights November 9, 2012 4 / 15

Currency Depreciation (Open Trade)

Migrants return home.Ï Around 200,000 Poles returned home from the U.K. in 2008.Ï Filipinos and appreciating Philippine peso in the early 2000s.Ï Mishra and Spilimbergo (2011)

F 1 percent depreciation of the real exchange rate ↔ 0.5−1.2 percentincrease in the emigration rate.

F 1 percent change in the real exchange rate ↔ 0.15−0.4 percent changein wages.

Firms in the tradable sector gain price competitiveness.Ï Labor-intensive firms can raise the prices of their goods and can endurehigher wages.

Ï Capital-intensive firms do not lose from return migration.Firms in the non-tradable sector lose.

Ï Labor-intensive: labor shortages and rising prices of imports.Ï Capital-intensive firms: rising prices of imports.

Adrian J. Shin (University of Michigan) Mobility of Rights November 9, 2012 4 / 15

Currency Appreciation (Open Trade)

Illegal immigration increases.Ï Hanson and Spilimbergo (1999)

F 10% devaluation of the Mexican peso (relative appreciation of theU.S. dollar) = 6−8% ↑ of border apprehensions.

Firms in the tradable sector lose price competitiveness.Ï Capital-intensive firms ask for trade protection.Ï Labor-intensive firms ask for trade protection and/or open immigration.

Firms in the non-tradable sector gain from rising purchasing power.

Adrian J. Shin (University of Michigan) Mobility of Rights November 9, 2012 5 / 15

Currency Appreciation (Open Trade)

Illegal immigration increases.Ï Hanson and Spilimbergo (1999)

F 10% devaluation of the Mexican peso (relative appreciation of theU.S. dollar) = 6−8% ↑ of border apprehensions.

Firms in the tradable sector lose price competitiveness.Ï Capital-intensive firms ask for trade protection.Ï Labor-intensive firms ask for trade protection and/or open immigration.

Firms in the non-tradable sector gain from rising purchasing power.

Adrian J. Shin (University of Michigan) Mobility of Rights November 9, 2012 5 / 15

Currency Appreciation (Open Trade)

Illegal immigration increases.Ï Hanson and Spilimbergo (1999)

F 10% devaluation of the Mexican peso (relative appreciation of theU.S. dollar) = 6−8% ↑ of border apprehensions.

Firms in the tradable sector lose price competitiveness.Ï Capital-intensive firms ask for trade protection.Ï Labor-intensive firms ask for trade protection and/or open immigration.

Firms in the non-tradable sector gain from rising purchasing power.

Adrian J. Shin (University of Michigan) Mobility of Rights November 9, 2012 5 / 15

Preferences for Policy Intervention under Depreciation

Depreciation (Return Migration)Sector Factor Intensity Trade ImmigrationTradable Capital-Intensive Low Low

Labor-Intensive Low IndifferentNon-Tradable Capital-Intensive Low Low

Labor-Intensive Low Migrants’ Rights

Hypothesis 1. Policymakers are more likely to offer rights to migrants undercurrency depreciation as the economic and political significance ofnon-tradable labor-intensive firms increases.

What do I mean by “rights?”

Adrian J. Shin (University of Michigan) Mobility of Rights November 9, 2012 6 / 15

Preferences for Policy Intervention under Depreciation

Depreciation (Return Migration)Sector Factor Intensity Trade ImmigrationTradable Capital-Intensive Low Low

Labor-Intensive Low IndifferentNon-Tradable Capital-Intensive Low Low

Labor-Intensive Low Migrants’ Rights

Hypothesis 1. Policymakers are more likely to offer rights to migrants undercurrency depreciation as the economic and political significance ofnon-tradable labor-intensive firms increases.

What do I mean by “rights?”

Adrian J. Shin (University of Michigan) Mobility of Rights November 9, 2012 6 / 15

Preferences for Policy Intervention under Depreciation

Depreciation (Return Migration)Sector Factor Intensity Trade ImmigrationTradable Capital-Intensive Low Low

Labor-Intensive Low IndifferentNon-Tradable Capital-Intensive Low Low

Labor-Intensive Low Migrants’ Rights

Hypothesis 1. Policymakers are more likely to offer rights to migrants undercurrency depreciation as the economic and political significance ofnon-tradable labor-intensive firms increases.

What do I mean by “rights?”

Adrian J. Shin (University of Michigan) Mobility of Rights November 9, 2012 6 / 15

Scope of Migrants’ Rights

Expanding migrants’ rights.Ï Access to public goods: education, employment, health care, housing,public benefit eligibility, etc.

Ï Family reunion, labor market mobility, etc.Ï Export of social security benefits (“Mobility of Rights”).

Restricting rights.Ï Elimination of benefits mentioned above.Ï Aggressive policies towards undocumented immigrants.

Adrian J. Shin (University of Michigan) Mobility of Rights November 9, 2012 7 / 15

Scope of Migrants’ Rights

Expanding migrants’ rights.Ï Access to public goods: education, employment, health care, housing,public benefit eligibility, etc.

Ï Family reunion, labor market mobility, etc.Ï Export of social security benefits (“Mobility of Rights”).

Restricting rights.Ï Elimination of benefits mentioned above.Ï Aggressive policies towards undocumented immigrants.

Adrian J. Shin (University of Michigan) Mobility of Rights November 9, 2012 7 / 15

Preferences for Policy Intervention under Appreciation

Appreciation (Illegal Immigration)Sector Factor Intensity Trade ImmigrationTradable Capital-Intensive High Low

Labor-Intensive High Open ImmigrationNon-Tradable Capital-Intensive Low Low

Labor-Intensive Low Indifferent

Hypothesis 2. As the magnitude of exchange rate appreciation increases,policymakers will restrict rights to migrants.

Hypothesis 3. If labor-intensive firms in the tradable sector can employmigrant workers, their demand for trade protection under currencyappreciation decreases.

Adrian J. Shin (University of Michigan) Mobility of Rights November 9, 2012 8 / 15

Preferences for Policy Intervention under Appreciation

Appreciation (Illegal Immigration)Sector Factor Intensity Trade ImmigrationTradable Capital-Intensive High Low

Labor-Intensive High Open ImmigrationNon-Tradable Capital-Intensive Low Low

Labor-Intensive Low Indifferent

Hypothesis 2. As the magnitude of exchange rate appreciation increases,policymakers will restrict rights to migrants.

Hypothesis 3. If labor-intensive firms in the tradable sector can employmigrant workers, their demand for trade protection under currencyappreciation decreases.

Adrian J. Shin (University of Michigan) Mobility of Rights November 9, 2012 8 / 15

Preferences for Policy Intervention under Appreciation

Appreciation (Illegal Immigration)Sector Factor Intensity Trade ImmigrationTradable Capital-Intensive High Low

Labor-Intensive High Open ImmigrationNon-Tradable Capital-Intensive Low Low

Labor-Intensive Low Indifferent

Hypothesis 2. As the magnitude of exchange rate appreciation increases,policymakers will restrict rights to migrants.

Hypothesis 3. If labor-intensive firms in the tradable sector can employmigrant workers, their demand for trade protection under currencyappreciation decreases.

Adrian J. Shin (University of Michigan) Mobility of Rights November 9, 2012 8 / 15

What happens when trade is closed?

Currency depreciation (return migration) affects all labor-intensivefirms negatively.Currency appreciation decreases the likelihood of the provision ofrights to migrants.

Adrian J. Shin (University of Michigan) Mobility of Rights November 9, 2012 9 / 15

Two Exchange Rate Shocks

Migrants and firms can be exposed to different exchange rate shocks.

Adrian J. Shin (University of Michigan) Mobility of Rights November 9, 2012 10 / 15

Two Exchange Rate Shocks

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Australia Austria Belgium Canada Czech Rep Denmark

Finland France Germany Greece Hungary Iceland

Ireland Italy Japan Korea Luxembourg Mexico

Netherlands New Zealand Norway Poland Portugal Slovak Rep

Spain Sweden Switzerland Turkey UK US

Migration RER (Mishra and Spilimbergo, 2011) REER (World Bank)

Exchange Rates

Year

OECD Countries

Adrian J. Shin (University of Michigan) Mobility of Rights November 9, 2012 11 / 15

Two Exchange Rate Shocks

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France Germany India Indonesia Italy

Kazakhstan Korea Mexico Morocco Pakistan

Philippines Poland Portugal Romania Russia

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Migration RER (Mishra Spilimbergo, 2011) REER (World Bank)

Exchange Rates

Year

Top Migrant-Sending Countries

Adrian J. Shin (University of Michigan) Mobility of Rights November 9, 2012 12 / 15

Two Exchange Rate Shocks

TrendsÏ Both MRER and REER show volatile levels.Ï MRER is increasing in the post-Bretton Woods era, while REER showsdivergent movements.

Long-term ImplicationsÏ Less migrants are attracted to the developed world.Ï Policymakers in sending countries have to deal with two differentexchange rate shocks.

Ï Increasing share of labor-intensive firms in the non-tradable sector inmigrant-receiving states.

Ï The rise of migrants’ rights.Ï My theory as an alternative hypothesis to the “norms” argument for theprovision of migrants’ rights.

Adrian J. Shin (University of Michigan) Mobility of Rights November 9, 2012 13 / 15

Two Exchange Rate Shocks

TrendsÏ Both MRER and REER show volatile levels.Ï MRER is increasing in the post-Bretton Woods era, while REER showsdivergent movements.

Long-term ImplicationsÏ Less migrants are attracted to the developed world.

Ï Policymakers in sending countries have to deal with two differentexchange rate shocks.

Ï Increasing share of labor-intensive firms in the non-tradable sector inmigrant-receiving states.

Ï The rise of migrants’ rights.Ï My theory as an alternative hypothesis to the “norms” argument for theprovision of migrants’ rights.

Adrian J. Shin (University of Michigan) Mobility of Rights November 9, 2012 13 / 15

Two Exchange Rate Shocks

TrendsÏ Both MRER and REER show volatile levels.Ï MRER is increasing in the post-Bretton Woods era, while REER showsdivergent movements.

Long-term ImplicationsÏ Less migrants are attracted to the developed world.Ï Policymakers in sending countries have to deal with two differentexchange rate shocks.

Ï Increasing share of labor-intensive firms in the non-tradable sector inmigrant-receiving states.

Ï The rise of migrants’ rights.Ï My theory as an alternative hypothesis to the “norms” argument for theprovision of migrants’ rights.

Adrian J. Shin (University of Michigan) Mobility of Rights November 9, 2012 13 / 15

Two Exchange Rate Shocks

TrendsÏ Both MRER and REER show volatile levels.Ï MRER is increasing in the post-Bretton Woods era, while REER showsdivergent movements.

Long-term ImplicationsÏ Less migrants are attracted to the developed world.Ï Policymakers in sending countries have to deal with two differentexchange rate shocks.

Ï Increasing share of labor-intensive firms in the non-tradable sector inmigrant-receiving states.

Ï The rise of migrants’ rights.Ï My theory as an alternative hypothesis to the “norms” argument for theprovision of migrants’ rights.

Adrian J. Shin (University of Michigan) Mobility of Rights November 9, 2012 13 / 15

Two Exchange Rate Shocks

TrendsÏ Both MRER and REER show volatile levels.Ï MRER is increasing in the post-Bretton Woods era, while REER showsdivergent movements.

Long-term ImplicationsÏ Less migrants are attracted to the developed world.Ï Policymakers in sending countries have to deal with two differentexchange rate shocks.

Ï Increasing share of labor-intensive firms in the non-tradable sector inmigrant-receiving states.

Ï The rise of migrants’ rights.

Ï My theory as an alternative hypothesis to the “norms” argument for theprovision of migrants’ rights.

Adrian J. Shin (University of Michigan) Mobility of Rights November 9, 2012 13 / 15

Two Exchange Rate Shocks

TrendsÏ Both MRER and REER show volatile levels.Ï MRER is increasing in the post-Bretton Woods era, while REER showsdivergent movements.

Long-term ImplicationsÏ Less migrants are attracted to the developed world.Ï Policymakers in sending countries have to deal with two differentexchange rate shocks.

Ï Increasing share of labor-intensive firms in the non-tradable sector inmigrant-receiving states.

Ï The rise of migrants’ rights.Ï My theory as an alternative hypothesis to the “norms” argument for theprovision of migrants’ rights.

Adrian J. Shin (University of Michigan) Mobility of Rights November 9, 2012 13 / 15

Next Steps

Examine the implications of the Uruguay Round for my theory.

Extend my theory to include the classical gold standard and theBretton Woods system (adjustable pegs).Find ways to come up with comparable measures of MRER from theperspective of receiving countries in the early 20th century to seehow labor mobility, exchange rates, trade openness, and immigrationpolicies have moved together.

Adrian J. Shin (University of Michigan) Mobility of Rights November 9, 2012 14 / 15

Next Steps

Examine the implications of the Uruguay Round for my theory.Extend my theory to include the classical gold standard and theBretton Woods system (adjustable pegs).

Find ways to come up with comparable measures of MRER from theperspective of receiving countries in the early 20th century to seehow labor mobility, exchange rates, trade openness, and immigrationpolicies have moved together.

Adrian J. Shin (University of Michigan) Mobility of Rights November 9, 2012 14 / 15

Next Steps

Examine the implications of the Uruguay Round for my theory.Extend my theory to include the classical gold standard and theBretton Woods system (adjustable pegs).Find ways to come up with comparable measures of MRER from theperspective of receiving countries in the early 20th century to seehow labor mobility, exchange rates, trade openness, and immigrationpolicies have moved together.

Adrian J. Shin (University of Michigan) Mobility of Rights November 9, 2012 14 / 15

Thank You!

Adrian J. Shin (University of Michigan) Mobility of Rights November 9, 2012 15 / 15