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SourcesCoddington, Edwin B. The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in Command(New York: Charles

Scribners Sons, 1968).Frassanito, William A. Gettysburg: A Journey in Time(New York: Charles Scribners Sons,

1975).

Gallagher, Gary W, ed. The First Day at Gettysburg: Essays on Confederate and UnionLeadership(Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1992).

Greene, A. Wilson. From Chancellorsville to Cemetery Hill: O. O. Howard and Eleventh Corps

Leadership. The First Day at Gettysburg: Essays on Confederate and Union Leadership ,

Gary W. Gallagher, ed. (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1992): 57 91.Grimsley, Mark, and Brooks D. Simpson. Gettysburg: A Battlefield Guide(Lincoln: University

of Nebraska Press, 1999).

Jacobs, Michael. Meteorology of the Battle. Gettysburg Star and Sentinel, August 11, 1885.Jacobs, Michael.Notes on the Rebel Invasion of Maryland and Pennsylvania and the Battle of

Gettysburg(Gettysburg: Times Printing House, 1909).

Katz, Harry L., and Vincent Virga. Civil War Sketch Book: Drawings from the Battlefront(New

York: W. W. Norton, 2012).Knowles, Anne Kelly, et al. What Could Lee See at Gettysburg? In Placing History: How

Maps, Spatial Data, and GIS Are Changing Historical Scholarship(Redlands, CA: ESRI

Press, 2008): 235 65.Ladd, David L., and Audrey J. Ladd.John Bachelders History of the Battle of Gettysburg

(Dayton, OH: Morningside, 1997).

Ludlum, David M. The Weather at Gettysburg. Weatherwise13.3 (1960): 101-130.Pfanz, Harry W. Gettysburg: The Second Day(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,

1987).

Sears, Stephen W. Gettysburg(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2003).Stewart, George R. Picketts charge: A Microhistory of the Final Attack at Gettysburg, July 3,

1863(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1959).

Symonds, Craig L. Gettysburg: A Battlefield Atlas(Baltimore: Nautical & Aviation PublishingCompany, 1992).

Maps and atlases

Laino, Philip. Gettysburg Campaign Atlas(Dayton, OH: Gatehouse Press, 2009).Sauers, Richard A. The John B. Bachelder Gettysburg Map Set(Dayton, OH: Morningside

House, n.d.).

Warren, G. K. and A. A. Humphreys. Battle Field of Gettysburg. Scale 1:12,000. Julius Bien,lithographer. 1874. National Archives and Research Administration, RG77, CWMF E105.

Digital dataNational Elevation Dataset. U.S. Geological Survey, Earth Resources Observation Science

Center. Accessed 31 May 2013.

We wish to thank Major Paul N. Belmont III and Col. Gian P. Gentile, Department of History,United States Military Academy, for their assistance in researching key viewpoints during

the battle.

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BACKGROUNDER

K P

Winning Without Fighting:The Chinese PWarfare Challenge

Dean Cheng

No. 2821 | JULY 11, 2013

Over the past decade, the Peo-ples Republic of China has exhib-

ited growing interest in waging

asymmetrical warfare.

To this end, the PRC releasedpolitical work regulations for

the Peoples Liberation Armyaddressing the importance of

waging the three warfares: pub-

lic opinion warfare, psychological

warfare, and legal warfare. The three warfares repre-sent the PRCs commitment to

expanding potential areas of

conflict from the purely military(i.e., involving the direct or indi-

rect use of military forces) to the

more political.

Such expansion will be supportedby manipulation of an enemys

leadership, including through

intimidation and coercion, alien-ation, and deception.

To avoid being psychologicallyoutmaneuvered by a PRC intenton winning without firing a shot,

the U.S. must strengthen its own

psychological warfare capabili-

ties, including strategic commu-nications, public diplomacy, and

media outreach capabilities, as

well as dedicated psychological

operations units.

AbstractBeijing hopes to win future conflicts without firing a shot. How? By us-ing psychological warfare to manipulate both a nations leaders and

its populaceaffecting the thought processes and cognitive frame-

works of allies and opponents alike. Indeed, the PRCs psychological

warfare operations are already underway despite the fact that there is

no active conflict. It is therefore essential that the United States coun-

ter such psychological operations now while preparing to use its own

arsenal of political warfare weapons should a conflict ever arise.

One of the elements distinguishing the Chinese Peoples Libera-tion Army (PLA) from many of its counterparts is its contin-ued role as a Party army. The PLA is, first and foremost, the armed

wing of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). This distinction both

obligates the PLA to help maintain the CCPs grip on power and

gives it an additional set of tools with which to defend the CCP and

the Chinese state. At the moment, the PLA is not only planning for

operations on the physical battlefield; it is also preparing to conduct

political warfare, including what is termed the three warfares:

public opinion warfare, legal warfare, and psychological warfare.

Psychological warfare is in some ways the most far-reaching

of the three warfares. It involves the application of specialized

information and media in accordance with a strategic goal and in

support of political and military objectives.1Such efforts are aimed

at a variety of potential audiences and usually involve operationalmissions against an opponents psychology and cognitive capacities.

This paper, in its entirety, can be found at http://report.heritage.org/bg2821

Produced by the Asian Studies Center

The Heritage Foundation

214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE

Washington, DC 20002

(202) 546-4400 | heritage.org

Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reflecting the views of The Heritage

Foundation or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any b ill before Congress.

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BACKGROUNDER

K P

Egypt: A Way Forward After a Step Back

James Jay Carafano, PhD, and James Phillips

No. 2824 | JULY 11, 2013

Egypts army was justified inousting President Mohamed

Morsi, whose increasingly

authoritarian rule was leading

Egypt into a civil war.

The army, however, is sitting on avolcano and knows it.

The U.S. must recognize thatEgypt is much closer to becom-

ing a failed state or economic

basket case than it is to becom-

ing a genuine democracy.

To salvage the increasingly diffi-cult situation in Egypt, the United

States should press the Egyptian

military to lay the groundwork

for a return to civilian rule as

soon as possible.

Washington should attachtighter strings to U.S. aid and

recalibrate the aid program to

focus on fighting terrorism and

preventing food shortagesthechief threats to Egypts future.

No amount of aid from Wash-ington can resolve Egypts deep

economic problems, but the

U.S. can encourage Cairo to

undertake free-market eco-

nomic reforms to rejuvenate its

economy.

Egypts army recently ousted President Mohamed Morsi, just as itremoved Hosni Mubarak in 2011, to prevent growing civil disor-

der from undermining the power of the state and its own privileges

within the state. The intervention was widely applauded by opposi-

tion political parties and the overwhelming majority of the millions

of protesters who demanded that Morsi step down.

By taking steps to preserve public order, the military could help

to salvage Egypts chances of making the difficult transition to a sta-

ble democracy. Clearly, Egypt was headed for a civil wa r as a result of

a surging rebellion against Morsis increasingly authoritarian rule.

To salvage the increasingly difficult situation in Egypt, the

United States should press the Egyptian military to lay the ground-

work for a return to civilian rule as soon as possible, attach tighterstrings to U.S. aid, and recalibrate the U.S. aid program to focus on

fighting terrorism and preventing food shortagesthe chief threats

to Egypts future.

Morsis Threat to DemocracyPresident Mohamed Morsi was his own worst enemy. He

ruled in a secretive, authoritarian, and exclusionary manner

that derailed Egypts democratic experiment and alienated far

too many Egyptians, even some of his former supporters. During

his year in office, he focused more on maximizing his own power

and that of the Muslim Brotherhood than on addressing Egypts

worsening economic, social, and politica l problems. When chal-lenged, he arrogantly ignored, marginalized, and demonized


Produced by the Douglas and Sarah Allison

Center for Foreign Policy Studies




(202) 546-4400 | heritage.org



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2

BACKGROUNDER | NO. 2824

JULY 11, 2013

opposition political parties, which he linked to for-

eign conspiracies.

Under these conditions, Egypts army justifiably

intervened to restore order in support of the majority

of Egyptians who were rebelling against an Islamist

authoritarian regime. On July 3, Egyptian Defense

Minister General Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi announced

that Morsi, who had failed to meet the demands of

the people, was relieved of his duties and that the

Islamist-written constitution was suspended.

Unlike Gamal Abdel Nassers coup in 1952 or the

2011 coup that brought down Hosni Mubarak, this

time the military sought the endorsement of reli-

gious leaders, political leaders, and youth activists,

many of whom shared the stage when General el-Sis-

si announced Morsis ouster in a televised statement.

During his year in office, MohamedMorsi focused more on maximizinghis own power and that of the MuslimBrotherhood than on addressingEgypts worsening economic, social,and political problems.

The next day, the military authorities announcedthat Adly Mansour, chief justice of the Supreme

Constitutional Court, had been sworn in as interim

president. Mansour is a little-known but respect-

ed low-key technocrat. As a judge, he could be well

suited to steering the writing of a new constitu-

tion to replace the Islamist document that Morsi

had rammed through in December. mr. Mansour

pledged to continue the democratic reforms of the

2011 revolution so that we stop producing tyrants

and said that new elections were the only way for-

ward, although he gave no indication of when they

would be held.President Mansour initially chose former oppo-

sition leader Mohamed el-Baradei as prime min-

ister of the interim government on July 6, but this

appointment was later rescinded under pressure

from the Nour Party, one of the few Islamist groups

that supported the coup. Baradei, a secular liberal

who led the National Salvation Front, a coalition of

leftist and liberal parties, frequently clashed with

the United States over the Iran nuclear issue when

he led the International Atomic Energy Agency.

It is expected that President Mansour will soon

announce the formation of a new government with a

cabinet composed of technocrats and careta kers.

Morsi has been detained at an undisclosed loca-

tion. The authorities have sought to arrest more

than 200 top leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood and

other Islamist organizations on charges of inciting

their followers to kill anti-Morsi demonstrators, but

Islamist leaders have vowed not to give up without

a fight.

Mohammed Badie, the supreme leader of the

Muslim Brotherhood, has called for continued pro-

tests until Morsi is reinstated as president. Speakingat Cairos Rabaa Mosque during a demonstration on

Rejection Friday, Badie warned, We are all will-

ing to sacrifice our necks and our souls for him.1

Tens of thousands of Morsi supporters poured out

of mosques on Friday to protest Morsis ouster. Pro-

Morsi demonstrations were quickly countered by

anti-Morsi protests in a highly charged atmosphere

that degenerated into widespread clashes, leav-

ing at least 36 dead and more than 1,000 injured.

On Monday, at least 51 of Morsis supporters were

killed when troops responded to an attack on the

Republican Guard headquarters where Morsi waslast seen before his ouster.

Egypts mushrooming political violence will be

hard to control. Even in the unlikely event that the

Muslim Brotherhood reins in its members as part

of some deal to allow it to compete in future elec-

tions, more radical Islamists are sure to push back

violently.

Islamist militants in the northern Sinai, a hot-

bed of Islamist extremism, launched coordinated

attacks against police facilities and an airport at

El Arish, the provincial capital. Ansar al-Sharia in

Egypt (Supporters of Islamic Law), a new Islamistgroup, announced its formation on an online forum

for militants in the Sinai region and proclaimed

that it will gather arms and train recruits for a jihad

against Egypts new government. Similar organiza-

tions in Libya, Yemen, and Tunisia have served as

front groups for attracting recruits to al-Qaedalike

terrorist organizations.

1. Matt Bradley, Tamer El-Ghobashy, and Reem Abdellatif, Post-Coup Violence Spreads in Egypt, The Wall Street Journal, July 6, 2013, http://

online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323899704578587131736732940.html (accessed July 8, 2013).

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Islamist militants will likely soon expand their

attacks beyond the Sinai region to include army,

police, and government facilities; anti-Morsi political

groups; symbols of the anti-Morsi revolution such as

Tahrir Square; and symbols of foreign conspiracies

such as the U.S. embassy, American companies, and

other Western companies. Egypts Coptic Christian

minority, about 10 percent of Egypts more than 80

million people, will likely become even more of a

lightning rod for terrorist attacks. Islamists charge

that Egypts ancient Christian community was com-

plicit in inciting protests to bring down Morsi. There

will likely be a surge in anti-Christian attacks, par-

ticularly in southern Egypt, a focal point for sectar-

ian violence.

The splintered Islamist movement is by no meansunified in support of Morsi. The Nour Party, a Sala fist

movement that favors the immediate imposition of

Sharia law and resented Morsis high-handed efforts

to monopolize political power, joined non-Islamist

opposition parties in pushing for early elections.

Other Islamists will likely increasingly criticize and

ostracize the Nour leaders, who supported the mili-

tary intervention.

An outburst of violence by Islamist extrem-

ists could open a dangerous new chapter in Egypts

unfinished revolution. Left unchecked, it could

devolve into an even bloodier version of Algeriascivil war, which has consumed more than 100,000

lives since the Algerian Army stepped in to avert an

Islamist election victory in 1991.

Sitting on a VolcanoEgypts army is sitting on a volcano and knows

it. Egypt has fallen into dire economic straits, and

political stability will likely be elusive until the

countrys worsening economic situation is reversed.

Nearly one-quarter of Egypts workers are unem-

ployed, and the figure is much higher for young

men, who form the shock troops for street protests.Egypts economic woes have created a huge reser-

voir of unemployed youth who are vulnerable to the

siren call of radical ideologies, particularly Islamist

extremism.

The political turmoil a nd rising crime rates of the

past two years have severely hurt tourism, which

formerly generated the bulk of Egypts foreign cur-

rency earnings and provided jobs to about one of

every seven workers. Morsi further sabotaged the

tourism industry by appointing as governor of Luxor

Province a member of the Islamist terrorist group

that massacred 62 tourists in Luxor in 1997not

exactly a reassuring signal for nervous tourists.

Islamist extremists will likely target tourists once

again to undermine the new government.

The army cannot stabilize Egyptwithout resolving Egypts worseningeconomic problems, which willrequire considerable American andinternational support.

Egypt is imploding in a bitter political strugglefought amid economic collapse, social turmoil, surg-

ing crime rates, widespread unemployment, falling

standards of living, and rising sectarian tensions.

The imminent bankruptcy of Egypts state-domi-

nated economy could quickly lead to catastrophic

food shortages, bread riots, labor strikes, and grow-

ing political polarization. Foreign currency reserves

are nearly exhausted, which will make it difficult to

pay for wheat imports, which provide nearly half of

Egypts food consumption.

The army needs to put Egypts house in order

quickly and then get out of the way. It inevitablywill lose popular support the longer it rules, as it

did between Mubaraks fall in February 2011 and

Morsis purge of top army leaders in August 2012.

The army can only do so much to repair Egypts dys-

functional political system. Moreover, it cannot sta-

bilize Egypt without resolving Egypts worsening

economic problems, which will require considerable

American and international support.

U.S. Help Needed in theStruggle for Freedom

Egypt, the largest Arab country, is a bellwetherfor the Arab Middle East. The United States has a

national interest in stabilizing Egypt, preventing

the rise of an Islamist totalitarian state, and pre-

venting the eruption of a full-blown civil war on

the scale of Algerias in the heart of the Arab world.

Washington also has a huma nitaria n interest in pre-

venting food shortages if Egypt s social fabric con-

tinues to unravel.

The Obama Administration has been asleep at

the switch for much of the past two years. It eagerly

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4


JULY 11, 2013

embraced Morsis Muslim Brotherhooddominated

government and was surprised that Egypts people

so quickly became violently opposed to Islamist

rule. The Administration gambled that the practical

responsibilities of governing would dilute the hostile

anti-Western ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Yet once in office, Morsi relentlessly expanded his

own power in a winner-take-all manner while

neglecting Egypts festering economic problems.

The Obama Administrations enthusiasm for

the Muslim Brotherhood led it to turn a blind eye

to Morsis power grabs, the rising persecution of

Egypts Coptic Christian minority, the crackdown

on pro-democracy nongovernmental organizations

(NGOs) that the Mubarak regime formerly tolerat-

ed, and the restrictions that the Morsi governmentplaced on freedom of the press, freedom of speech,

and freedom of religion.

The Obama Administration failed to publicly crit-

icize Morsis excesses, power grabs, and abuses. This

led Egypts secular and liberal opposition to turn

to Egypts army in despair, angry that the Obama

Administration uncritically supported the Morsi

regime. Many protesters demonstrating against

Morsi before the coup also carried signs protesting

President Obamas support for the Morsi regime.

Morsi, for his part, felt no need to compromise with

the opposition or temper his Islamist ambitionsbecause the Administration was reluctant to use the

leverage afforded by $1.5 billion in annual U.S. aid to

Egypt.

Secular, democratic, and liberal Egyptians

opposed to an Islamist takeover should be natu-

ral allies of the U.S., not leading a backlash against

American policy. The fact that Egyptians resent the

Obama Administrations courting of the Muslim

Brotherhood should be a wake-up call for the White

House. It is a sad sign that U.S. policy toward Egypt

has gone off the rails. Egy ptian advocates of freedom

should know that Americans support their effortsand do not side with an Islamist authoritarian leader

who is hostile to American values and policies.

The United States should support freedom in

Egypt to advance its own interests as well as those

of the Egyptian people. The interim government

established by the army has a better chance of laying

the groundwork for a democratic transition than did

Morsis regime, which was headed for dictatorship.

Military coups have advanced the prospects for

democracy at least two times in the past: Portugal

in 1974, and Egypt in 2011. It remains to be seen

whether Egypt s latest coup will succeed in salvag-

ing Egypts dim democratic prospects. However,

General el-Sissi reportedly was a student at the U.S.

Army War College in 2006, in which case he may

have absorbed the professional standards and non-

partisan apolitical tradition of the U.S. Army. In any

event, Egypts military leaders are much more likely

than Morsis cronies to advance freedom in Egypt,

support economic reforms to revive the economy,

and play a stabilizing role in the volatile Middle East.

What the U.S. Should Do

In addressing Egypts deepening crisis, theUnited States should:

Press Egypts army to hold elections and stepaside as soon as possible. General el-Sissis

road map for a democratic transition included

no dates. President Mansour has laid out a vague

timetable for a constitutional referendum in four

and a half months and parliamentary elections in

six months. Washington should urge the interim

government to adhere to this timetable. It should

also find an inclusive way of writing a new consti-

tution to establish the rules of the political com-petition before elections. The lack of a shared

understanding of the rules of the game enabled

Morsi to stage a power grab. The Administration

has called for a transparent and inclusive political

transition process, but the Muslim Brotherhood

and other Islamist parties should be allowed to

participate only if they publicly choose a path of

nonviolence.

Attach tight strings to any U.S. aid.The ObamaAdministration has stopped short of calling the

armys intervention a coup to avoid triggeringan aid cutoff. Section 7008 of the Department of

State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs

Appropriations Act, 2012, as contained in the

Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, bars

any assistance to the government of any country

whose duly elected head of government is deposed

by military coup dtat or decree or, after the date

of enactment of this Act, a coup dtat or decree

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ISSUE BRIEFCost of a Climate Policy:The Economic Impact of Obamas Climate Action Plan

David W. Kreutzer, PhD, Nicolas D. Loris, and Kevin D. Dayaratna

No. 3978 | JUNE 27, 2013

President Obama recently released his ClimateAction Plan, which is a continuation of the costly,

ineffective policies from his first four years in office:

Solyndra-style loan guarantees, nice-sounding but

too expensive efficiency mandates, and his war on

coal. It is this war on coal that would prove the most

costly, with hundreds of thousands of lost jobs and

$1.47 trillion of lost national income by 2030.

Bankrupting Coal Hurts American Families.

When Senator and presidential candidate Barack

Obama pushed his cap-and-trade plan in 2008, he

said that if someone wants to build a coal-powered

plant, they can. Its just that it will bankrupt thembecause they are going to be charged a huge sum for

all that greenhouse gas thats being emitted.1

Congress rejected his and other cap-and-trade

plans, but in his recent speech on climate change,

President Obama vowed to go around Congress to

reduce greenhouse gas emissions. In case anyone

thinks the Administration has since backed off from

the anti-coal agenda, Obama climate advisor Daniel

Schrag just this week said that a war on coal is

exactly whats needed.2

In a speech on June 25, President Obama called

on the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to

reduce carbon dioxide emissions from new and exist-ing power plants, which would adversely affect coal-

fired plants the most. These regulations are part of

a broader effort from the President to significantly

reduce coal as an affordable, reliable energy source

the effect of which is to drive up prices for American

families and businesses. The Heritage Foundation

modeled the effects of significantly reducing coal-

fired plants in America and found devastating eco-

nomic effects.

Regulations Pile On. With 497 billion tons of

recoverable coal in the United Statesenough to

provide electricity for 500 years at current con-sumption rates3coal has the potential to be an

important resource long into the future. The EPAs

constant attacks on coal threaten to close off access

to this dependable energy source.

In March 2012, the EPA proposed a rule that

would prohibit new power plants from emitting

more than 1,000 pounds of carbon dioxide per mega-

watt of electricity generated. Without the addition

of carbon capture and sequestration, a prohibitive-

ly costly and technologically challenging require-

ment,4the regulation would effectively ban the con-

struction of new coal-fired plants.5Whether the finalrule reflects the proposed rule remains to be seen.

The Presidents recent announcement also

threatens existing plants and would adversely affect

the more than 1,100 coal-fired generators at near-

ly 600 plant locations that generate 40 percent of

Americas affordable, reliable energy.6

Last year, the EPA finalized new mercury and air

toxics standards that will force utilities to use maxi-

mum achievable control technology standards to

reduce mercury emissions and other hazardous air

This paper, in its entirety, can be found at

http://report.heritage.org/ib3978

Produced by the Center for Data Analysis




(202) 546-4400 | heritage.org

Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reflecting the views

of The Heritage Foundation or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage

of any bill before Congress.

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BACKGROUNDER

K P



No. 2824 | JULY 11, 2013














soon as possible.










economy.














to Egypts future.














(202) 546-4400 | heritage.org



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BACKGROUNDER

K P

Winning Without Fighting:The Chinese Psychological Warfare Challenge

Dean Cheng

No. 2821 | JULY 11, 2013

Over the past decade, the Peo-ples Republic of China has exhib-

ited growing interest in waging

asymmetrical warfare.

To this end, the PRC releasedpolitical work regulations for

the Peoples Liberation Armyaddressing the importance of

waging the three warfares: pub-

lic opinion warfare, psychological

warfare, and legal warfare. The three warfares repre-sent the PRCs commitment to

expanding potential areas of

conflict from the purely military(i.e., involving the direct or indi-

rect use of military forces) to the

more political.

Such expansion will be supportedby manipulation of an enemys

leadership, including through

intimidation and coercion, alien-ation, and deception.

To avoid being psychologicallyoutmaneuvered by a PRC intenton winning without firing a shot,

the U.S. must strengthen its own

psychological warfare capabili-

ties, including strategic commu-nications, public diplomacy, and

media outreach capabilities, as

well as dedicated psychological

operations units.

AbstractBeijing hopes to win future conflicts without firing a shot. How? By us-ing psychological warfare to manipulate both a nations leaders and

its populaceaffecting the thought processes and cognitive frame-

works of allies and opponents alike. Indeed, the PRCs psychological

warfare operations are already underway despite the fact that there is

no active conflict. It is therefore essential that the United States coun-

ter such psychological operations now while preparing to use its own

arsenal of political warfare weapons should a conflict ever arise.

One of the elements distinguishing the Chinese Peoples Libera-tion Army (PLA) from many of its counterparts is its contin-ued role as a Party army. The PLA is, first and foremost, the armed

wing of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). This distinction both

obligates the PLA to help maintain the CCPs grip on power and

gives it an additional set of tools with which to defend the CCP and

the Chinese state. At the moment, the PLA is not only planning for

operations on the physical battlefield; it is also preparing to conduct

political warfare, including what is termed the three warfares:

public opinion warfare, legal warfare, and psychological warfare.

Psychological warfare is in some ways the most far-reaching

of the three warfares. It involves the application of specialized

information and media in accordance with a strategic goal and in

support of political and military objectives.1Such efforts are aimed

at a variety of potential audiences and usually involve operationalmissions against an opponents psychology and cognitive capacities.


Produced by the Asian Studies Center




(202) 546-4400 | heritage.org



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BACKGROUNDER

K P



No. 2824 | JULY 11, 2013














soon as possible.










economy.














to Egypts future.














(202) 546-4400 | heritage.org



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3


JULY 11, 2013















ian violence.








tary intervention.
















extremism.








































tinues to unravel.



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Egypt.















































nonviolence.










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JULY 11, 2013

very perceptions that inform decision making, from

the context to the biases. Successful psychologi-

cal operations will therefore have repercussions at

every level of operations, influencing the course of

the conflict. To be effective, however, psychologi-

cal warfare operations cannot be limited to war-

time. Instead, peacetime psychological operations

are necessary, both to understand an opponent bet-

ter and to lay the groundwork for effective wartime

operations.

PLA writings emphasize that moderninformation technology blurs thelines between peacetime and wartime,

between military and civilian, andamong strategy, operations, and tactics.

Peacetime applications of psychological war-

fare techniques involve influencing and altering an

opponents unconscious, implicit views in order to

make that opponent more susceptible to coercion.

By employing various forms of strategic communi-

cations, including diplomatic efforts, one ca n foster

a positive national image and i ncrease foreign sym-

pathy and support for ones own policies and goals.At the same time, such techniques attempt to iso-

late opponents, undermining their positions, por-

traying them as fostering ill i ntentions, and forcing

them to react to a variety of charges so that their

energy is dispersed.

In addition, employing all the tools of communi-

cations, including various forms of media, empha-

sizes ones own strengths as well as a willingness to

employ that strength to deter and coerce opponents

more effectively. All the while, one must be work-

ing to counter opponents efforts to foster their own

image of strength and unity. It is also likely that anopponent will attempt to demoralize ones populace

and that appropriate defensive measures will have

to be taken.

In wartime, psychological operations shift

emphasis towards more specifically military tar-

gets and goals. The primary objective of such efforts

is to generate confusion, doubt, anxiety, fear, terror,

regret, and exhaustion in an opponent, especially

among senior military and civilian leaders. Ideally,

such a campaign will induce neglect and maxi-

mize the chances of an opponent making mistakes.

Wartime psychological warfare operations also aim

to generate a sense of uncertainty and indecisive-

ness at all levels, thereby degrading opposition deci-

sion-making processes. The ability to interfere with

an opponents information systems, coupled with

efforts to influence decision makers, can create a

strong psychological impact.

Another facet of wartime psychological opera-

tions is the sowing of discord and a sense of hopeless-

ness in the enemy. Not only will this help generate

war-weariness among enemy forces and populations

and discourage resistance, but once the conflict isconcluded, such operations may facilitate peace

negotiations and induce more concessions. When

one defeats the enemy, it is not solely by killing the

enemy, or winning a piece of ground, but is mainly

in terms of cowing the enemys heart.6 In order to

undermine the opponents morale, one must empha-

size information favorable to oneself through vari-

ous forms of media as well as through third parties,

friendly elements in the opponents society, and sim-

ilar outlets.

Finally, offensive psychological warfare opera-

tions must be complemented by defensive measures,since an opponent will also be trying to undermine

ones own forces, population, and leaders. One must

therefore attempt to solidify popular support for the

conflict, highlight ones successes and the enemys

failures, and instill confidence and support for the

Party and the state. Such defensive measures require

tight control of information flows in ones own soci-

ety and the insulation of ones decision-makers and

decision-making processes from enemy informa-

tion warfare efforts. This need for control explains

Beijings efforts to limit cyber access to the larger

population, including the Great Firewall of China.

Chinese Concept of PsychologicalWarfare Tasks

For the PLA, psychological warfare is the res-

posibility of the General Political Department

(GPD), working in coordination with the rest of the

PLA. The GPD not only ensures political orthodoxy

6. Guo, Psychological Warfare Knowledge, p. 14.

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Specifically:

There are myriad targets and objects of psycho-

logical warfare; it is applied against the enemy,

but also against friends; it targets externally, but

also internally; it must deal with allied countries,

but also the entire globe, a nd one must rely on the

media acting in multiple directions jointly, with

effective coverage of many areas, in order to com-

prehensively realize the various goals.2

The goal of psychological warfare is to influence,

constrain, and/or alter an opponents thoughts, emo-

tions, and habits while at the same time strengthen-

ing friendly psychology.3

Psychological Warfare and InformationWarfare

Psychological warfare operations are integral

to the broad concept of information warfare (xinxi

zhanzheng). A product of the Information Age, infor-

mation warfare is the struggle to dominate the gen-

eration and flow of information in order to enhance

and support ones own strategic goals while degrad-

ing and constraining those of an opponent. The

ability to triumph in future Local Wars Under

Informationized Conditionsthe most likely form

of wars in the Information Agerests upon the abil-ity to secure information dominance (zhi xinxi

quan). This in turn requires the ability to collect,

manage, and exploit accurate information more

quickly than an opponent.

Information dominance rests on two primary

factors: modern information technology, which is

integral to information collection and transmission,

and the ability to degrade the quality of information,

whether by slowing down transmission or by intro-

ducing false or inaccurate data. But in the Chinese

conception of psychological warfare, the users of

informationboth high-level decision-makers andlower-level policy implementers (individual soldiers,

clerks, etc.)are as important as the computers and

networks and the software that runs them. Efforts

to secure information dominance, therefore, will

target not only the physical information infrastruc-

ture and the data that pass through it, but also the

human agents that interact with those data, espe-

cially those who are making decisions.

Given the nature of modern technology and

informationized societies, operations designed

to influence a rival nation can no longer be aimed

solely at military leaders or reserved for wartime.

The interconnected nature of information, as well

as information systems, makes clear-cut classifica-

tions of military and civilian almost impossible.

Similarly, information collection, and even exploita-

tion, is not necessarily restricted by wartime ver-sus peacetime categorizations. As one Chinese vol-

ume observes, information warfare is constant and

ongoing, whether in wartime or peacetime. Because

of the complex, intertwined nature of modern inter-

national politics and economics:

[I]t is necessary in peacetime to undertake infor-

mation warfare in the political, economic, tech-

nical, and military realms, as only then can one

scientifically establish operational plans, appro-

priately calculate gains and losses in a conflict,

appropriately control the level of attack, precise-ly strike predetermined targets, and seek the best

strategic interest and long-term benefit.4

This philosophy is echoed in other PLA writings,

which emphasize that modern information technol-

ogy blurs the lines between peacetime and wartime,

between military and civilian, and among strategy,

operations, and tactics.5Rather than trying to draw

artificial boundaries among these categories, the

implication is that information should be treated as

an integrated whole.

In this context, psychological operations are seenas an essential part of future conflicts, affecting the

1. Guo Yanhua, Psychological Warfare Knowledge(Beijing, PRC: National Defense University Press, 2005), p. 1.

2. Nanjing Political Academy, Military News Department Study Group, Study of the Journalistic Media Warfare in the Iraq War, China Military

Science, No. 4 (2003), p. 30.

3. Academy of Military Science, Operations Theory and Regulations Research Department and Informationalized Operations Theory Research

Office, Informationalized Operations Theory Study Guide(Beijing, PRC: Academy of Military Science Press, November 2005), p. 404.

4. Li Naiguo, New Theories of Information War(Beijing, PRC: Academy of Military Science Press, 2004), p. 154.

5. Yuan Wenxian, The Science of Military Information(Beijing, PRC: National Defense University Press, 2008), pp. 7779.

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opposition political parties, which he linked to for-

eign conspiracies.

Under these conditions, Egypts army justifiably

intervened to restore order in support of the majority

of Egyptians who were rebelling against an Islamist

authoritarian regime. On July 3, Egyptian Defense

Minister General Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi announced

that Morsi, who had failed to meet the demands of

the people, was relieved of his duties and that the

Islamist-written constitution was suspended.

Unlike Gamal Abdel Nassers coup in 1952 or the

2011 coup that brought down Hosni Mubarak, this

time the military sought the endorsement of reli-

gious leaders, political leaders, and youth activists,

many of whom shared the stage when General el-Sis-

si announced Morsis ouster in a televised statement.

During his year in office, MohamedMorsi focused more on maximizinghis own power and that of the MuslimBrotherhood than on addressingEgypts worsening economic, social,and political problems.

The next day, the military authorities announcedthat Adly Mansour, chief justice of the Supreme

Constitutional Court, had been sworn in as interim

president. Mansour is a little-known but respect-

ed low-key technocrat. As a judge, he could be well

suited to steering the writing of a new constitu-

tion to replace the Islamist document that Morsi

had rammed through in December. mr. Mansour

pledged to continue the democratic reforms of the

2011 revolution so that we stop producing tyrants

and said that new elections were the only way for-

ward, although he gave no indication of when they

would be held.President Mansour initially chose former oppo-

sition leader Mohamed el-Baradei as prime min-

ister of the interim government on July 6, but this

appointment was later rescinded under pressure

from the Nour Party, one of the few Islamist groups

that supported the coup. Baradei, a secular liberal

who led the National Salvation Front, a coalition of

leftist and liberal parties, frequently clashed with

the United States over the Iran nuclear issue when

he led the International Atomic Energy Agency.

It is expected that President Mansour will soon

announce the formation of a new government with a

cabinet composed of technocrats and careta kers.

Morsi has been detained at an undisclosed loca-

tion. The authorities have sought to arrest more

than 200 top leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood and

other Islamist organizations on charges of inciting

their followers to kill anti-Morsi demonstrators, but

Islamist leaders have vowed not to give up without

a fight.

Mohammed Badie, the supreme leader of the

Muslim Brotherhood, has called for continued pro-

tests until Morsi is reinstated as president. Speakingat Cairos Rabaa Mosque during a demonstration on

Rejection Friday, Badie warned, We are all will-

ing to sacrifice our necks and our souls for him.1

Tens of thousands of Morsi supporters poured out

of mosques on Friday to protest Morsis ouster. Pro-

Morsi demonstrations were quickly countered by

anti-Morsi protests in a highly charged atmosphere

that degenerated into widespread clashes, leav-

ing at least 36 dead and more than 1,000 injured.

On Monday, at least 51 of Morsis supporters were

killed when troops responded to an attack on the

Republican Guard headquarters where Morsi waslast seen before his ouster.

Egypts mushrooming political violence will be

hard to control. Even in the unlikely event that the

Muslim Brotherhood reins in its members as part

of some deal to allow it to compete in future elec-

tions, more radical Islamists are sure to push back

violently.

Islamist militants in the northern Sinai, a hot-

bed of Islamist extremism, launched coordinated

attacks against police facilities and an airport at

El Arish, the provincial capital. Ansar al-Sharia in

Egypt (Supporters of Islamic Law), a new Islamistgroup, announced its formation on an online forum

for militants in the Sinai region and proclaimed

that it will gather arms and train recruits for a jihad

against Egypts new government. Similar organiza-

tions in Libya, Yemen, and Tunisia have served as

front groups for attracting recruits to al-Qaedalike

terrorist organizations.

1. Matt Bradley, Tamer El-Ghobashy, and Reem Abdellatif, Post-Coup Violence Spreads in Egypt, The Wall Street Journal, July 6, 2013, http://

online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323899704578587131736732940.html (accessed July 8, 2013).

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ISSUE BRIEF | NO. 3978

JUNE 27, 2013

pollutants. By the agencys own admission, the rule

will cost $10 billion by 2015 but have only $6 million

in purported benefits from mercury reductions.7 In

addition, the EPA is also regulating coal combustion

residues and cooling water intake structures and is

considering more stringent smog standards, all of

which make the use of coal power more expensive.

Most recently, the Supreme Court granted the

EPAs request to review its cross-state air pollution

rule, which would compel companies to retire three to

seven gigawatts of electricity generation and retrofit

up to 576 plants.8 In the absence of these new regula-

tions, U.S. air quality has improved significantly over

the past several decades. Emission of toxic pollutants

has dropped as much as 96 percent since 1980.9

The attack on coal reaches well beyond powerplant construction and operation. Although not a

new problem, regulations from the Office of Surface

Mining Reclamation and Enforcement and the Mine

Safety and Health Administration make building

new coal mining operations or expanding exist-

ing operations increasingly difficult.10 Coal mining

operations are subject to 10 federal environmental

laws as well as state requirements and regulations.

Climate Policy and Coal. While it may not be

clear exactly which policies will be used, it seems clear

that zeroing-out coal-fired electric power plants is a

goal of this Administrations environmental team.

This paper will analyze the economic impact of set-

ting such a target. We look at the first 16 years of a

20-year phase-out of coal power: 20152030.

The analysis shows significant economic loss-

es extend beyond the obvious areas of coal mining

and power generation. In particular, we find that by

2030:

Employment falls by more than 500,000 jobs;

Manufacturing loses over 280,000 jobs;

A family of fours annual income drops more than$1,000 per year, and its total income drops by

$16,500 over the period of analysis;

Aggregate gross domestic product (GDP) decreas-es by $1.47 trillion;

Electricity prices rise by 20 percent;

Coal-mining jobs drop 43 percent; and

Natural gas prices rise 42 percent.

The Energy Markets Respond. The analysis

was carried out using the Heritage Energy Model

(HEM).11

As coal-fired power generation is ratcheted

1. Senator Barack Obama (DIL), interview with the San Francisco Chronicle editorial board, January 17, 2008, http://www.youtube.com/

watch?v=DpTIhyMa-Nw (accessed June 26, 2013).

2. Aaron Blake, Obama Science Adviser Calls for War on Coal, The Washington Post, June 25, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/

post-politics/wp/2013/06/25/obama-science-adviser-calls-for-war-on-coal/ (accessed June 26, 2013).

3. Institute for Energy Research, North American Energy Inventory, December 2011, http://www.energyforamerica.org /wp-content/

uploads/2012/06/Energy-InventoryFINAL.pdf (accessed June 24, 2013).

4. To date, no one has successfully operated a utility-scale carbon-capture power plant. Perhaps even more problematic is how to dispose of the

1520 super tankers worth of liquid carbon dioxide that widespread carbon capture would create.

5. Under the proposed rule, those plants already in the permitting process would not be included.

6. U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, What Is the Role of Coal in the United States? July 18, 2012, http://www.eia.gov/energy_in_brief/article/role_coal_us.cfm (accessed June 24, 2013).

7. Anne E. Smith, Technical Comments on the Regulatory Impact Analysis Supporting EPAs Proposed Rule for Utility MACT and Revised NSPS

(76 FR 24976), NERA Economic Consulting, August 3, 2011, http://www.nera.com/nera-files/PUB_Smith_EPA_report_0811.pdf (accessed

June 24, 2013).

8. North American Electric Reliability Corporation, 2010 Special Reliability Scenario Assessment: Resource Adequacy Impact of Potential U.S.

Environmental Regulations, October 2010, http://www.nerc.com/files/EPA_Scenario_Final_v2.pdf (accessed June 24, 2013).

9. Steven F. Hayward, 2011 Almanac of Environmental Trends, American Enterprise Institute, April 2011, p. 34, http://www.aei.org /

files/2011/04/20/Hayward-almanac2011.pdf (accessed June 25, 2013).

10. Nicolas D. Loris, The Assault on Coal and the American Consumer, Heritage Foundation BackgrounderNo. 2709, July 23, 2012, http://www.

heritage.org/research/reports/2012/07/the-assault-on-coal-and-american-consumers.

11. See the appendix for a description of the HEM and the methodology used in this paper.

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down, HEM creates the least-cost adjustment to

the lost power generation. This adjustment includes

increases in natural-gas power and renewable

electricity along with conservation as consumers

respond to the higher energy prices.

However, the adjustments do not fully compen-

sate for the lost coal power and result in higher

energy prices. By 2030, the higher electricity prices

induce a 42 percent increase in the amount of wind

and solar power, but this increase is from a very

small base compared to coal power. The increase

in all renewable power generation replaces only 4.5

percent of the lost coal power.12 An increase in nat-

ural gas production and a diversion of natural gas

from other uses replaces 74 percent of the lost coal

power. Increases in nuclear power close the gapabout 3 percent, but that leaves about 19 percent of

the lost coal power with no replacement.

In addition, there is a surprisingly large increase

in natural gas prices as this resource is shifted away

from other uses (such as manufacturing) to power

generation.

The net loss in production and the associated

higher prices for electricity force consumers to

reduce usage. The higher cost of electricity and nat-

ural gas increases the cost of production across most

of the economy. At the same time, consumers have

less to spend on non-energy items. This combinationreduces employment and national income.

Mandates Do Not Help. The Presidents Climate

Action Plan employs the same wishful thinking on

efficiency mandates as previous climate policies. The

fallacy here is assuming that efficiency standards for

buildings, appliances, and vehicles would reduce

the cost of meeting the energy cuts necessitated by

the carbon policy. The logic of efficiency mandates

assumes co

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