“MIXING BUGS AND BOMBS” An analysis of the growing biodefense footprint within the U.S....
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Transcript of “MIXING BUGS AND BOMBS” An analysis of the growing biodefense footprint within the U.S....
“MIXING BUGS AND BOMBS”An analysis of the growing biodefense footprint within the U.S. Department of Energy Nuclear Weapons Complex and
the Implications for Policy and Public Health
byMarylia Kelley
Executive DirectorTri-Valley CAREs
Livermore, CAwww.trivalleycares.org
forAmerican Public Health Association Annual Meeting
Monday, October 27, 2008
Presenter Disclosures
(1) The following personal financial relationships with commercial interests relevant to this presentation existed during the last 12 months: No relationships to disclose
About Tri-Valley CAREs Founded in 1983; twenty-five years monitoring the nuclear
weapons complex
Expanded focus to include biodefense in 2001 when the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) unveiled plans to collocate advanced biowarfare agent research with nuclear weapons at its Lawrence Livermore (CA) and Los Alamos (NM) weapon design laboratories
Organizational methods include research, technical analysis, public education, political advocacy and litigation
More information at www.trivalleycares.org
DOE Biowarfare Agent Research
“Build” and operate a Biosafety Level 3 (BSL-3) in a portable building placed in a parking lot at Livermore Lab; proceeding on the basis of a cursory “environmental assessment” (EA)
Genetic modification, aerosol experiments, 50 liters
Build and operate a BSL-3 in a conventional structure at Los Alamos Lab; originally proceeding on the basis of an EA, now preparing a full “environmental impact statement” (EIS)
Growing DOE / Department of Homeland Security interface (NBACC West and more)
Implications for the International Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)
Dual use dilemma mixing bugs and bombs
Transparency issues at classified nuclear weapons labs
Limitations of Livermore Lab Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC)
Potential impact on negotiation of stringent verification and enforcement protocols for the BWC
Tri-Valley CAREs at the Meetings of States Parties to the BWC
Select Local and Regional Hazards
DOE history of accidents, spills and releases
Livermore Lab mishandles anthrax in BSL-2, breaks law, exposes workers, fails public disclosure and garners then-largest fine levied
Additional risks posed by BSL-3 pathogens in Livermore
Instructive examples from other U.S., international labs
Landmark Litigation Under the National Environmental Policy Act
Suit filed against Livermore, Los Alamos BSL-3s in 2003
Differing outcomes; DOE agrees to EIS for Los Alamos, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision requires terrorism analysis for Livermore Lab BSL-3
Inadequacy of DOE’s terrorism analysis
New litigation filed in 2008
Next steps, examples of expertise sought
Concluding Remarks
Implications of mixing bugs and bombs for U.S. policy
Relevance for public health professionals
Questions of public health funding decisions
Impacts on communities across the country – and some of the creative, resourceful public responses to date