. Ss:cRIET

gECUR1TY INFORMATION-

H, aio1195,VChief, HI

Chief of Mission, Frankfurt

Operational/CADORY

BDJ White Book

REF: ?RAN 1551

1. Herewith is forwarded one cOpy of the book *Der Bund DeutscherJugend und wain Technischer Dienst“ (The League of German Youth and its

• "Technical Service").

2. The book was published by the Executive (Vorstand) Committee of

the SPD.

Approved:

Distribution:

3 - Addressee . 1 Enc. h/w as above.DE CLASSIFI ED AND RE LEASED BYCENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCYSOURCESMET HOOSEXEMPT ION 3828NAZI WAR CR IMES DI S CLOSURE ACTDATE 2007

This document is part of an Integrated

Ills. It separatee. hem the 3h 3 in -4 bk

subleLted to sysiemat,a

con

oecurity Information

15 April 1953

MENORANDUM FOR: CI Chief, EE/PP/Germany

SUBJECT Analysis of SFD Whitebook on the Bund Deutscher Jugend (BDJ)

UMMARY-

The SPD Whitebook is a biased account of the BDJ and the Apparat.In an effort to raise a facade of objectivity some favorable materialis brought to light, but on the whole the effort is half heaAhd, anddoes not succeed. There is a great deal of information in the white.book which is confirmed by LCPROWL reports and home office debriefingsbut there are also many distortions and half truths contained therein.The whitebook does not prove the existence of the so-called murder or"Proskriptionsliste", but does make an effort to slant the informationso that the reader would normally infer that such a list containingthe names of leading SPD figures was compiled by the "Dechnischer Dienst"(Technical ServiceXTD). The book is extremely critical of the UnitedStates role in the BDJ, but does make a concession in not attackingthe U.S. outrightly. The intense emnity felt by the SPD towards theBDJ is evident throughout the book. In closing, the SPD bemoans theutter futility of partisan warfare in Germany.

* * * *

1. The whitibook opens with a resume of the charges leading tothe four Lgnder ban of the BDJ. The organization is indicted forillegal partisan activity, planning civil war, right) and left wingradicalism. Although the anti-Bolshevist character of the BDJ is ad-mitted, the accusation of neo -Nazism is emphasized throughout thewhitebook. The secret services of foreign occupational powers andGerman industry are named as the financial supporters of the BDJ,

2. Raul Lueth, described as a self torn personality, formercommunist and black marketeer, is called the founding father andideological driving force of the BDJ. The whitebook points out thatthe organization was patterned on Lueth i s book, "Citizen and Partisan",a document which was the "Mein Kampf" of the BDJ movement. In accor-dance with previous plans the security division of the BDJ, section If,began the collection of data on KPD members and sympathizers. TheSF!) attacks Lueth rigoriously for paying out large sums of money toDr. Wagner of MUnith for information on suspicious SPD personalities.The whitebook also contains charges in this section to the effect thatthe allies requisitioned the Abwehr in toto after the war.

3. Among the supporters of the BDJ the SF!) names E.:In actuality these were the field aliases used byand

_1 and c7 J. Four private firms, Dr. Lehr, andthe Kaiser Ministry in addition to "American sources " are nailed as

SECRETthis c'cr-: . -

r-Hri 6f am InfaFi:ratesfile, ft Me ie trnst b.805AL:too It ivl i lots:natio roview.

SECRETSecurqy Information

-2 .

financial supporters of the BDJ. The salaries paid to Lueth and theBDJ leaders are branded exhorbitant, and attractive primarily todubious leaders such as Norbert Hamacher and Hans Otto. The lattersubsequently betrayed the Apparat to the Frankfurt police.

4. The whitebook then launches a tirade against the internalmethods utilized in the BDJ and the TD, in particular critisizingthe use of personal history statements. This is followed by a des-cription of the TD and several of its leaders. C. a is thenmentioned by although the SPD suspects his real nano is C

Zr. The raining site in Wnldmichelbach, the curriculum, the coverbusin the inferior motivation of Peters are discussed.

5. At this point the whitebook takes up a careful study of theSecurity Section of the TD. A definite attempt is makde to provethat the "Proskriptionsliste" contained the name of persons who wereto be assassinated in case of a Soviet invasion. Hans Otto was theonly person who agree with this interpretation. Rietdorf admitted thiswas a possible interpretation, but he did state that this was notnecessarily true. RoAemacher claimed the persons named on the "Pros-kripstionsliste" were to be arrested in case of Soviet invasion. Thewhitebook, nevertheless, concludes there was no doubt as to the fatein store for these persons.

6. In Chapter XV the SPD charges that the BDJ carried out ablatant propaganda role while the "night workers" in the TD preparedfor a Soviet invasion. Herbert Stettner, Frankfurt Falken leader,Martin Niemoller, Gustav Heineman, and Prof,Noack are maDtioned asinnocent targets of the BDJ. In this attack the SPD co*Piiikertiter, rf ,fanBDJ for pro4DC activities, in a sense revealing the smiltill,a0IC` r. 1, " f" .u inuhiuuid 5 mot beof tolerance permitted by the SPD itself. )1'0411;46u,mmw

7. Perhaps the most revealing facts are establithed when theSF]) charges that the TD was not satisfied with the American support.The whitebook states that i l led TD men to Lich where they attemp-ted to locate an American Army cache. Reference was also made tocorruption in the TDahr the whitebook correctly states that tiat one Vine asked Peters to cover deficits of DM 40'000. The whitebookalso rOrials that Garwood was shortly thereafter succeeded by anotherAmerican who attempted to cut all ties with the BDJ and reduce theTD to 300 members. When he discovered this could not be done, theAmerican announced en May 19, 1952 all financial support will be endedby September 1952. (This reference obviously refers to t7 awho succedded L7 :7) The SPD also stated In-4he-epaalse.e.f...19412 thatthe BFV and LFV knew of the existance and mission of the TD long beforeSeptember 1952.

8. As a part of the attempt to present an objective picture thewhitebook includes an annex by a former TD member who points out thatthe TD originated after the Korean war from the realization that Germansmust defend their homeland. The annex points out that the "Proskriptions-listeAP were designed to take Russian collaborators into custody and

SECRET

SECRETSecurity Information

- 3

thus save untold suffering among thousands of Germans who will surelybe their victims. The former TD member also denied that any of the per-sons named by Zinn were included in the TrD"Proskriptionsliste". Hewas equally outspoken in his denial that the TD intended to follow a

policy or engage in activities which might invite retaliationin a Soviet occupied Germany.

9. In conclusion the SPD bemoans the futility of partisan varmfare in West Germany, pointing out that "partisans at home and the atombombs of the Western allies would eliminate the necessity of a Germanliberation". The whitebook asserts that any objective observer mustconclude the TD was intended for domestic political goals.

10. The CDO and U.S. Government are criticized for abetting andsupporting the BDJ. Not only is Paul Lueth, former BDJ leader, attackedfor creating the BDJ with the assistmsc of the Bonn Governmeqt, theoccupation povez; former Nazi leaderigrillegal news agenciesOin theclosing sentence he is said to have relations the the Soviets. Thislast conclusion is apparently little more than wistful SPD thinkingin an effort to discredit Lueth Sam all directions.

A study of this whitebook reveals clearly that the SPD consideredthe BDJ a paramount enemy, entirely capable of generating a new totali.tarian force in Germany. In their fear of Lueth and company the SPDlost objectivity, and did not hesitate to condemn the United States,private German industry, and other democratic German political partiesfor their real or imagined roles as supporters of the BDJ. Neither wasthe SPD reluctant to utilize German nationalism, or the forces ofneutraliam or pacifism in the struggle to eradicate the BDJ. The SPDrevealed itself closely bound by its own party dogma, and onlynominally tolerant of those who did not share its views. In a positionof strength the SPD exhibi#ed little willingness to compromise, a factorwhich should be borne in mind for future contingencies

_

Tse1 n integrated

fifG, !f , tf iiti it m • st be

systuaLitie.

'6ECR