Valera vs. Tuason 80 Phil 823- MESINA

Facts:

Judge Federico Paredes, transferred a case of forcible entry to justice of the peace of La Paz, the nearest municipality.

The justice of the peace of La Paz returns the case to Judge Paredes with a decision.

However, there was a new appointed justice who replaces Paredes.

The new justice of the peace of Lagayan found the challenge well founded, declared the judgment null and void, and ordered the case reset for hearing before him.

The Lagayan justice's cites the Section 211, Rev. Adm. Code for the invalidating the previous judgment of the justice of the peace of La Paz, who base the transfer of case by virtue of section 73 of the Code of the Civil Procedure.

Issue: Whether section 211 of the rev.admin code or the section 73 of the Code of the Civil Procedure.

Held: The above-quoted provisions can stand together. By a fair and reasonable construction, section 73 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended, may be said to apply to disqualifications under section 8 of that Act, and section 211 of the Revised Administrative Code to disqualifications or disabilities not embraced in the Code of Civil Procedure.

From another angle the presumption against repeal is stronger. A special law is not regarded as having been amended or repealed by a general law unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest. Generalia specialibus non derogant. And if this is true although the terms of the general act are broad enough to include the matter in the special statute. (Manila Railroad Company vs. Rafferty, 40 Phil., 224.) At any rate, in the event the harmony between provisions of this type in the same law or in two laws is impossible, the specific provision controls unless the statute, considered in its entirely, indicates a contrary intention upon the part of the legislature. granting then that the two laws can not be reconciled, in so far as they are inconsistent with each other, section 73 of the Code of Civil Procedure, being a specific law, should prevail over, or considered as an exemption to, section 211 of the Administrative Code, which is a provision of general character. a general law is one which embraces a class of subjects or places and does not omit any subject or place naturally belonging to such class, while a special act is one which relates to particular persons or things of a class. (Statutory Construction, Crawford, p. 2645.)

Espiritu vs. Cipriano G.R. No. 3243, February 15, 1974 55 SRCA 533 (1974)- NARTATES

PRIMITIVO AND LEONORA ESPIRITU vs RICARDO CIPRIANO and THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

GR No.32743-15 February 1974

Facts: Republic Act 6126 which regulate rentals of dwelling units was enacted after the action of petitioners against private respondent Cipriano for non payment of increased rental fee. Private respondent moved to dismiss the case in view of the aforementioned RA 6126 which was approved by the respondent court giving it a retroactive effect. The court held that RA 6126 being remedial in nature can be given retroactive effect which was later on affirmed by the Court of Appeals

Issue: whether or not RA 6126 can be applied to the case and given a retroactive effect

Held: No, the court held that the lower court erred in giving RA 6126 a retroactive effect for being remdial in nature. The supreme court explained that RA 6126 cannot be remedial for it affects substantive rights. As such and in view of Art. 4 of the civil code which provides that laws shall not be given retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided, it must strictly be given a prospective

application. As further held by the court, RA 6126 was enacted as a temporary measure to meet a temporary situation which gives it a limited period of operation. The said law, did not, by its express terms, purport to give a retroactive application. The supreme court set aside the previous decisions and held costs against the private respondents.

Homeowners Assn. of the Philippines vs. Municipal Board of Manila G.R. No. 23979 August 1968, 24 SCRA 856- NOCUM

FACTS: This is an action, against the Municipal Board and the Mayor of the City of Manila, for a declaratory relief. It was brought by the Homeowners' Association of the Philippines, Inc. and its President, Vicente A. Rufino, to nullify Municipal Ordinance No. 4841 of the City of Manila, approved on December 31, 1963, to take effect on January 1, 1964. After appropriate proceedings, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered judgment declaring said ordinance "ultra vires, unconstitutional, illegal and void ab initio. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of First Instance was correct in declaring the Ordinance unconstitutional.

HELD: Yes. The decision of the court is correct in declaring the Ordinance ultra vires, unconstitutional, illegal and void ab initio.

Where a statute is designed to meet an emergency, it ends upon the cessation of such emergency. Since an emergency is by nature temporary in character, so must the statute intended to meet it, be. A limit in time to tide over a passing trouble may justify a law that may not be upheld as a permanent one.

Occena vs. Comelec 95 SCRA 755 (1980)- ONG

FACTS:

Petition for prohibition seeking to restrain respondents from implementing Batas Pambansa Big. 51 (providing for the elective and/or appointive positions in various local governments), 52 (governing the election of local government officials scheduled on January 30, 1980), 53 (defining the rights and privileges of accredited parties), and 54 (providing for a plebiscite, simultaneously with the election of local officials on January 30, 1980, regarding the proposed amendment of Article X, Section 7, of the 1973 Constitution).

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Interim Batasang Pambansa has the power to authorize the holding of local elections

COURT RULINGS:

The legislative power has described generally as being a power to make, alter and repeal laws. It is the peculiar province of the legislature to probe general rules for the government of society. It is a recognized principle in constitutional law that the legislative body possesses plenary power for all purposes of civil government. The legislative power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa is, therefore, complete, subject only to the limitation that the Interim Batasang Pambansa shall not exercise the power of the National Assembly in the ratification of treaties. The power to regulate the manner of conducting elections, to prescribe the form of the official ballot, and to provide for the manner in which candidates shall be chosen is inherently and historically legislative. Petitioner has not cited any provision of the Constitution, as amended by the Amendments of 1976, which expressly or by implication deny to the Interim Batasang Pambansa the authority to call for local elections. It is a well established rule that where no exception is made in terms, none will be made by mere implication or construction. The wordings of a constitutional provision do not have a narrow or contracted meaning, but are used in a broad sense, with a view of covering all contingencies.

Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance 235 SCRA 630 (1994)- PILAR

Facts: An additional attack on the formal validity of RA 7716 is made by Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL), namely, that it violates Art.VI., Sec. 26 (1) which provides that:

“Every bill passed by Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.”

It is contended that neither House Bill No. 11197 nor Senate Bill No. 1630 provided for removal of exemption of PAL transactions from the payment of the VAT and that this was made only in the Conference Committee bill which became RA 7716 without reflecting this fact in its title.

The title of RA 7716 is:

AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUE-ADDED TAX (VAT) SYSTEM, WIDENING ITS TAX BASE AND ENHANCING ITS ADMINISTRATION, AND FOR THESE PURPOSES AMENDING AND REPEALING THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

Issue: Whether or not RA 7716 is valid

Held: The constitutional requirement that every bill passed by Congress shall embrace only one subject shall be expressed in its title is intended to prevent surprise upon the members of Congress and to inform the people of the pending legislation so that, if they wish to, they can be heard regarding it. If, in the case at bar, petitioner did not know before that its exemption had been withdrawn, it is not because of any defect in the title but perhaps for the same reason other statutes, although published, pass unnoticed until some event somehow calls attention to their existence. Indeed, the title of RA 7716 is not any more general than the title of the PAL’s own franchise under P.D. No 1590, and yet no mention of its tax exemption.

The trend in our cases is to construe our constitution requirement in such manner that courts do not unduly interfere with the enactment of the necessary legislation and to consider it sufficient if the title expresses the general subject of the statute and all its provisions are germane to the general subject thus expressed.

Marcos vs. Manglapus 177 SCRA 668 (1989)- PREZA

FACTS: A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by petitioners for the denial of their motion to allow return of the family of Marcos and his remains. Commenting on the motion for reconsideration, the Solicitor General argued that the motion for reconsideration is moot and academic as to the deceased

Mr. Marcos. Moreover, he asserts that "the 'formal' rights being invoked by the Marcoses under the label 'right to return', including the label 'return of Marcos' remains, is in reality or substance a 'right' to destabilize the country, a 'right' to hide the Marcoses' incessant shadowy orchestrated efforts at destabilization." [Comment, p. 29.] Thus, he prays that the Motion for Reconsideration be denied for lack of merit.

ISSUE: Whether or not the return of the Marcoses to the country is detrimental to the country

HELD: After a thorough consideration of the matters raised in the motion for reconsideration, the Court is of the view that no compelling reasons have been established by petitioners to warrant a reconsideration of the Court's decision. Contrary to petitioners' view, it cannot be denied that the President, upon whom executive power is vested, has unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant of executive power and which are necessary for her to comply with her duties under the Constitution. The powers of the President are not limited to what are expressly enumerated in the article on the Executive Department and in scattered provisions of the Constitution.

People vs. Purisima 86 SCRA 542- MANUEL

Facts: Purisima, et. al, were charged for violating Presidential Decree No. 9 after they carried pointed weapons outside their houses.

On a motion to quash filed by the accused, the three Judges mentioned above issued in the respective cases filed before them an order quashing or dismissing all the case on common ground that the information did not allege facts which constitute the offense penalized by Presidential Decree No. 9 because it failed to state one essential element of the crime.

Issues: Whether or not the case filed by the People sufficient in form and substance to constitute the offense of "illegal possession of deadly weapon" penalized under Presidential Decree (PD for short) No. 9?

Ruling:

COURT DISMISSED ALL MOTIONS MADE BY THE PETITIONER AND AFFIRMS ALL DECISIONS MADE BY THE RESPONDENT JUDGES.

The problem of determining what acts fall within the purview of a statute, it becomes necessary to inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree and this can be found among others in the preamble or, whereas" clauses which enumerate the facts or events which justify the promulgation of the decree and the stiff sanctions stated therein.

It is a salutary principle in statutory construction that there exists a valid presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative measure, and that a construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil, and injurious consequence

People vs. Echavez 95 SCRA 663 (1980)- SILVESTRE

Facts: Fiscal Ello filed an information against Aparili for squatting in violation of Section 1 of PD772. Judge Echaves dismissed the information on the ground that agricultural land does not come within the purview of PD772. Fiscal Ello assailed the order of dismissal in this Court.

Issue: Whether or not PD772, which penalizes squatting and similar acts applies to agricultural lands.

Held: No, it does not apply to agricultural lands because its preamble shows that it was intended to apply to squatting in urban communities or more particularly to illegal constructions in squatter areas made by well-to-do individuals.

Philconsa vs. Gimenez - GARDUQUE

FACTS:This is a case to decide the grave and fundamental problem of the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 3836 "insofar as the same allows retirement gratuity; commutation at the highest rate received on vacation and sick leave to Senators and Representatives, and to the elective officials of both houses (of Congress);

The suit was instituted by the Philippine Constitution Association, Inc. (Philconsa, for short), a non-profit civic organization, duly incorporated under Philippine laws, by way of a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction.

ISSUE: Whether or not Republic Act No. 3836 is unconstitutional?

HELD: Yes, Republic Act 3836 violates three constitutional provisions, namely: first, the prohibition regarding increase in the salaries of Members of Congress; second, the equal protection clause; and third, the prohibition that the title of a bill shall not embrace more than one subject.

Republic Act No. 3836 is declared null and void, in so far as it refers to the retirement of Members of Congress and the elected officials thereof, as being unconstitutional. The restraining order issued in a resolution dated December 6, 1965 is y made permanent. No costs

De Guzman vs. Comelec 336 SCRA 2000- TUD

AGRIPINO A. DE GUZMAN, JR., et al. vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. No. 129118. July 19, 2000

Facts: Petitioners are assailing the validity of Section 44 of Republic Act No. 8189 (RA 8189) otherwise known as "The Voter’s Registration Act of 1996".

Section 44 thereof provides:

"SEC. 44. Reassignment of Election Officers. - No Election Officer shall hold office in a particular city or municipality for more than four (4) years. Any election officer who, either at the time of the approval of this Act or subsequent thereto, has served for at least four (4) years in a particular city or municipality shall automatically be reassigned by the Commission to a new station outside the original congressional district."

By virtue of the aforequoted provision of law, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) promulgated Resolution Nos. 97-0002 and 97-0610 for the implementation thereof. Thereafter, the COMELEC issued several directives reassigning the petitioners, who are either City or Municipal Election Officers, to different stations.

Petitioners theorize that Section 44 of RA 8189 is violative of the "equal protection clause" of the 1987 Constitution because it singles out the City and Municipal Election Officers of the COMELEC as prohibited from holding office in the same city or municipality for more than four (4) years. They

maintain that there is no substantial distinction between them and other COMELEC officials, and therefore, there is no valid classification to justify the objective of the provision of law under attack.

Issue: whether Section 44 of RA 8189 is valid and constitutional.

Held: Yes. In determining the constitutionality of a statute dubbed as defectively titled, the presumption is in favor of its validity. Respect due to co-equal departments of the government in matters entrusted to them by the Constitution, and the absence of a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion suffice to stay the judicial hand.

The petition is DISMISSED; and the constitutionality and validity of Section 44 of RA 8189 UPHELD..

People vs. Carlos 78 Phil 535 (1947)- YULO

FACTS: This is an appeal from a judgment of the People’s Court. The appellant was found guilty of treason by the People’s Court and was sentenced to reclusion perpetua. Several Filipinos were seized by the Japanese soldiers and were taken to Fort Santiago where they were tortured and maltreated because of ther refusal to divulge the whereabouts of a guerrilla who escaped from the Japanese. These happened because of the false accusations of Carlos who divulge the information to the Japanese based on his suspicions.

ISSUE: Whether or not the decision in this case should be reversed and set aside because the law creating the People’s Court is unconstitutional.

HELD: No. Appellant alleges that Commonwealth Act 682 provides for the designation of judges to another pace outside of their respective districts without the consent of the Supreme Court implying that Section 7 of Art VIII of the Constitution is violated. People’s Court is no violation of the Constitutional mandate. If the provisions of the law creating the special court should show a clear purpose of making a discrimination, pro or against those who may be tried under it, then the law must be declared unconstitutional, hence null and void. Such is not the case of the law under discussion.

Decision affirmed.

Mirasol vs. CA 351 SCRA 44 (2000)- BANJAO

NONE

Alba vs. Evangelista 100 Phil 683, (1957)-BELTRAN

FACTS:

The private petitioner was appointed by the President as a vice-mayor and thereafter impliedly removed him by appointing another official to take over his position. The petitioner filed an action questioning his removal from office contending that after becoming a civil service eligible, he was entitled to a permanent appointment to the position from which he was removed.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 2545 of the Revised Administrative Code is applicable in this case.

HELD:

The Court ruled that the tenure of office of the vice-mayor has been made expressly dependednt upon the pleasure of the President of the Philippines. The person thus appointed by the Chief Executive has to leave the position when the President in the exercise of his power legally apppoints another person in his stead.  Whereas the power of the President to remove at pleasure the officials under Section 2545 of the Revised Administrative Code should be preceded by legal cause. 

The term "public office" is frequently used to refer to the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of government, to be exercised by that individual for the benefit of the public.

Every law enjoys the presumption of validity. The presumption rests on the respect due to the wisdom, integrity, and the patriotism of the legislative, by which the law is passed, and the Chief Executive, by whom the law is approved,  For upholding the Constitution is not the responsibility of the judiciary alone but also the duty of the legislative and executive. To strike down a law as unconstitutional, there must be a clear and unequivocal showing that what the fundamental law prohibits, the statute permits. The annulment cannot be decreed on a doubtful, and arguable implication. The universal rule of legal hermeneutics is that all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a law. 

Peralta vs. Commission on Election G.R No. 47771, March 11, 1978, 82 SCRA 30-ILAGAN

The specific provisions of the 1978 Election Code which are assailed as being in violation of the equal protection clause are questioned.

Whether or not the voting system provided for in Sections 140 and 155, sub-paragraphs 26 to 26, of the 1978 Election Code, granting to the voter the option to vote either for individual candidates by filling in the proper spaces in the ballot the names of candidates he desires to elect or to vote for all the candidates of apolitical party, group or aggrupation by simply writing in the space provided for in the ballot the name of the political party group or aggrupation, violates Section 1 of Article IV and Section 9(1) of Article XIIC of the Constitution.

At this juncture, it may be relevant to note the efforts of the Commission on Elections to give more substance and meaning to the intent and spirit of the Constitution and the 1978 Election Code by giving the same practicable opportunities to candidates, groups or parties involved in the April 7, 1978 interim Batasang Pambansa elections. Thus, in Resolution No. 1289, the COMELEC removed the so-called undue advantage which the Nacionalista Party and the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL) had over the Lakas ng Bayan (LABAN) in terms of authorized election expenses, appointment of election watchers and use of print and broadcast media. This circumstance, contrary to the claims of petitioners, shows that the Commission on Elections, as a constitutional body charged with the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections, and with broad powers, functions and duties under the 1973 Constitution, can give candidates, irrespective of parties, equal opportunities under equal circumstances.

Drilon vs. Lim 235 SCRA 135 (1994)-FELICIANO-GARCIA

Facts: The Secretary of Justice (on appeal to him of four oil companies and a taxpayer) declared Ordinance No. 7794 (Manila Revenue Code) null and void for non-compliance with the procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and for containing certain provisions contrary to law and public policy.

The RTC revoked the Secretary’s resolution and sustained the ordinance. It declared Sec 187 of the LGC as unconstitutional because it vests on the Secretary the power of control over LGUs in violation of the policy of local autonomy mandated in the Constitution. The Secretary argues that the annulled Section 187 is constitutional and that the procedural requirements for the enactment of tax ordinances as specified in the Local Government Code had indeed not been observed. (Petition originally dismissed by the Court due to failure to submit certified true copy of the decision, but reinstated it anyway.)

Issue: WON the lower court has jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of Sec 187 of the LGC

Held:Yes. BP 129 vests in the regional trial courts jurisdiction over all civil cases in which the subject

of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Moreover, Article X, Section 5(2), of the Constitution vests in the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over final judgments and orders of lower courts in all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.

In the exercise of this jurisdiction, lower courts are advised to act with the utmost circumspection, bearing in mind the consequences of a declaration of unconstitutionality upon the stability of laws, no less than on the doctrine of separation of powers. It is also emphasized that every court, including this Court, is charged with the duty of a purposeful hesitation before declaring a law unconstitutional, on the theory that the measure was first carefully studied by the executive and the legislative departments and determined by them to be in accordance with the fundamental law before it was finally approved. To doubt is to sustain. The presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the clearest showing that there was indeed an infraction of the Constitution.

Integrated Bar of the Phil vs. Zamora 338 SCRA 81 (2000)- GOBANTES

Facts:

Due to alarming increase in violent crimes in Metro Manila, President Joseph Ejercito Estrada verbally ordered, the PNP and the Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols to prevent crimes. In response, PNP Chief, through Police Chief Superintendent Edgar B. Aglipay issued Letter of Instruction (LOI) on February 2000 formulating Task Force called Tulungan.

On 17 January 2000, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (“IBP”) filed the instant petition to annul the LOI and to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines, null and void and unconstitutional, arguing that there is no emergency situation; the said deployment is in violation of Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution and it creates a dangerous tendency to rely on the military to perform the civilian functions of the government. Further, The Solicitor General questions the constitutionality of the President’s order.

Issue:

(1) WON IBP has legal standing to raise the issue; (2)  WON the President’s mandate to call the armed forces is subject to judicial review; and, (3) WON the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the constitutional  provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the PNP.

Ruling:

The petition has no merit.

IBP failed to show that it has standing to raise the issues in the petition. While it is true that IBP has a duty to preserve the rule of law, it is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. The Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure if it is of paramount importance to the public.

The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution. The Court cannot agree with the Solicitor General that the issue involved is a political question beyond the jurisdiction of this Court to review. When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom.  This is clear from the intent of the framers and from the text of the Constitution itself. 

The Court, thus, cannot be called upon to overrule the President’s wisdom or substitute its own.  However, this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. 

The Marines render nothing more than assistance required in conducting the patrols.  As such, there can be no “insidious incursion” of the military in civilian affairs nor can there be a violation of the civilian supremacy clause in the Constitution.

Petition is hereby DISMISSED.

Ople vs. Torres G.R. No. 127686 July 23, 1998- COLOCADO

NONE

Shell Phils. Inc., vs. Central Bank 162 SCRA 628 (1988)- JUAREZ

Facts: Congress approved RA 6125 imposing a stabilization tax on consignments abroad. In August, 1970, the Central Bank, through its Circular No. 309 provided that: The stabilization tax shall begin to apply on January 1st following the calendar year during which such export products shall have reached the aggregate F.O.B. value of more than US $5 million, and the applicable tax rates shall be the rates prescribed in Schedule (b) of Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6125 for the fiscal year following the reaching of the said aggregate value. During 1971, appellee Shell, Philippines, Inc. exported seria residues, a by-product of petroleum refining, to an extent reaching $5 million. Under the Central Bank Circular No. 309, implemented by Resolution No. 47, appellee had to pay the stabilization tax beginning January 1, 1972, which it did under protest. Appellee filed suit against the Central Bank before the Court of First Instance of Manila, praying that Monetary Board Resolution No. 47 be null and void, and that Central Bank be ordered to refund the stabilization tax it paid during the first semester of 1972. The lower court sustained appellee, and it declared Monetary Board Resolution No. 47 as void and it ordered refund of the stabilization tax paid by appellee during the period January 1 to June 30, 1972.

Issue: Whether or not trial court erred in failing to consider the authority granted to the appellant to promulgate rules and regulations in the implementation of the stabilization tax law.

Held: No, the trial court was correct in declaring Monetary Board Resolution No. 47 void. The said resolution runs counter to the provisions of R.A. 6125 which provides that "(A)ny export product the aggregate annual F.O.B. value of which shall exceed five million United States dollars in any one calendar year during the effectivity of this Act shall likewise be subject to the rates of tax in force during the fiscal year following its reaching the said aggregate value."

People vs. Lim 108 Phil 1091 (1960)- BAUTISTA

NONE

Free Telephone Workers Union vs. Ministry of Labor and Employment G.R. No. 58184, October 30, 1981,108 SCRA 757- OPLE

Facts: The constitutionality of the amendment to the Article of the Labor Code regarding strikes "affecting the national interest" is assailed in this petition which partakes of the nature of a prohibition proceeding filed by the Free Telephone Workers Union, whose strike was preempted by compulsory arbitration provided for in BP 30. As amended, the particular Article now reads xxx In labor disputes causing or likely to cause strikes or lockouts adversely affecting the national interest, such as may occur in but not limited to public utilities, companies engaged in the generation or distribution of energy, banks, hospitals, and those within export processing zones, the Minister of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the

Commission for compulsory arbitration. Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout. If one has already taken place at the time of assumption or certification, all striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to work and the employers shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. The Minister may seek the assistance of law enforcement agencies to ensure compliance with this provision as well as with such orders as he may issue to enforce the same." The Labor Union contends that delegating to the Minister of Labor and Employment the power and discretion to assume jurisdiction and/or certify strikes for compulsory arbitration to the National Labor Relations Commission, and in effect make or unmake the law on free collective bargaining, is an undue delegation of legislative powers.

Issue: Whether there is an undue delegation of legislative power to the Minister of Labor to settle disputes

Ruling: The power of compulsory arbitration, while allowable under the Constitution and quite understandable in labor disputes affected with a national interest, to be free from the taint of unconstitutionality, must be exercised in accordance with the constitutional mandate of protection to labor. The arbiter then is called upon to take due care that in the decision to be reached, there is no violation of "the rights of workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work.

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. During the pendency of the compulsory arbitration proceedings, both petitioner labor union and private respondent are enjoined to good faith compliance with the provisions of Batas Pambansa Blg. 130.

Edu vs. Ericta G.R. No. 32096, October 24, 1970 35 SCRA 481-LIM

NONE

Maceda vs. Macaraeg 197 SCRA 771 (1991)-CORRO

NONE

Cemco Holdings Inc., vs. National Life Insurance Co., GR. No 171815 August 7, 2007-BUELA

Facts:

Bacnotan Consolidated Industries (BCI) informed the Philippine Stock Exchange (PSE) that it and its subsidiary, Atlas Cement Corporation (ACC) had passed resolutions to sell to Cemco Holdings Inc. (CEMCO) BCIs stocks in Union Cement Holdings Corporation (UCHC) equivalent to 21.31% and ACCs stocks in UCHC equivalent to 29.69%.  It was stated that as a result of petitioner Cemcos acquisition of BCI and ACCs shares in UCHC, petitioners total beneficial ownership, direct and indirect, in UCC has increased by 36% and amounted to at least 53% of the shares of UCC. Philippine Stock Exchange (PSE) inquired to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) whether the Tender Offer Rule under Rule 19 of the Implementing Rules of the Securities regulation Code is not applicable to the purchase by petitioner of the majority of shares of UCC. SEC en banc resolved that the Cemco transaction was not covered by the tender offer rule. The Share purchase Agreement was executed by ACC and BCI, as sellers, and CEMCO, as buyer. Respondent National Life Insurance Company of the Philippines, Inc. filed a complaint with the SEC asking it to declare the purchase agreement. SEC ruled in favor of the respondent. Petitioner filed a petition with the Court of Appeals challenging the jurisdiction of SEC; the decision of SEC was affirmed. Hence, this petition for Review.

Issue: Whether or not the SEC has jurisdiction over respondents complaint and to require Cemco to make a tender offer for respondents UCC shares.

Held: Yes, SEC has jurisdiction. In taking cognizance of respondents complaint against petitioner and eventually rendering a judgment which ordered the latter to make a tender offer, the SEC was acting pursuant to Rule 19(13) of the Amended Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Securities Regulation Code. Rules and regulations when promulgated in pursuance of the procedure or authority conferred upon the administrative agency by law, partake of the nature of a statute, and compliance therewith may be enforced by a penal sanction provided in the law.

Phil. Internal Trading Corp. vs. COA 309 SCRA 177 (1999)-BAGAOISAN

FACTS :

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure to annul Decision No. 2447 dated July 27, 1992 of the Commission on Audit (COA) denying Philippine International Trading Corporation's (PITC) appeal from the disallowances made by the resident COA auditor on PITC's car plan benefits; and Decision No. 98-048 dated January 27, 1998 of the COA denying PITC's motion for reconsideration.

COA relied on DBM-CCC No. 10 as basis for the disallowance of the subject car plan benefits. DBM-CCC No. 10 which was issued by the DBM pursuant to Section 23 of RA 6758 mandating the said agency to issue the necessary guidelines to implement RA 6758 has been declared by this Court in De Jesus, et al. vs. Commission on Audit, et al. as of no force and effect due to the absence of publication thereof in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation.

ISSSUE:

Whether or not later publication of DBM-CCC No. 10 will cure the defect and retroact to the time that the above-mentioned items were disallowed in audit?

HELD:

No. The reason that publication is required as a condition precedent to the effectivity of a law. To inform the public of the contents of the law or rules and regulations before their rights and interests are affected by the same is deemed required. From the time the COA disallowed the expenses in audit up to the filing of herein petition the subject circular remained in legal limbo due to its non-publication. Prior publication of laws before they become effective cannot be dispensed with, for the reason that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it.

PNB vs. Court of Appeals 222 SCRA 134 (1993)-DE CASTRO

FACTS:

Security Pacific National Bank (SEPAC) of Los Angeles which had an agency arrangement with Philippine National Bank (PNB), transmitted a cable message to the International Department of PNB to pay the amount of US$14,000 to Mata by crediting the latter's account with the Insular Bank of Asia and America (IBAA), per order of Star Kist. Upon receipt of this cabled message on February 24, 1975, PNB's International Department noticed an error and sent a service message to SEPAC Bank. The latter replied with instructions that the amount of US$14,000 should only be for US$1,400.

On the basis of the cable message dated February 24, 1975 Cashier's Check No. 269522 in the amount of US$1,400 (P9,772.95) representing reimbursement from Star Kist, was issued by the Star Kist for the account of Mata on February 25, 1975 through the Insular Bank of Asia and America (IBAA).

However, PNB effected another payment through Cashier's Check No. 270271 in the amount of US$14,000 (P97,878.60) purporting to be another transmittal of reimbursement from Star Kist, private respondent's foreign principal.

Six years later, requested Mata for refund of US$14,000 (P97,878.60) after it discovered its error in effecting the second payment.PNB filed a civil case for collection and refund of

US$14,000 against Mata arguing that based on a constructive trust under Article 1456 of the Civil Code, it has a right to recover the said amount it erroneously credited to respondent Mata.  After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Manila rendered judgment dismissing the complaint ruling that the instant case falls squarely under Article 2154 on solutio indebiti and not under Article 1456 on constructive trust. The lower court ruled out constructive trust, applying strictly the technical definition of a trust as "a right of property, real or personal, held by one party for the benefit of another; that there is a fiduciary relation between a trustee and a cestui que trust as regards certain property, real, personal, money or choses in action." 

In affirming the lower court, the appellate court added in its opinion that under Article 2154 on solutio indebiti, the person who makes the payment is the one who commits the mistake vis-a-vis the recipient who is unaware of such a mistake. 3 Consequently, recipient is duty bound to return the amount paid by mistake. But the appellate court concluded that petitioner's demand for the return of US$14,000 cannot prosper because its cause of action had already prescribed under Article 1145, paragraph 2 of the Civil Code.

The instant petition for certiorari proceeding seeking to annul the decision of the appellate court on the basis that Mata's obligation to return US$14,000 is governed, in the alternative, by either Article 1456 on constructive trust or Article 2154 of the Civil Code on quasi-contract. 

ISSUE: Whether or not the lower and appellate courts can indulge in semantics by holding that in Article 1456 the recipient commits the mistake while in Article 2154, the recipient commits no mistake?

RULING: Yes, we agree with petitioner's stand that under Article 1456, the law does not make any distinction since mutual mistake is a possibility on either side — on the side of either the grantor or the grantee. 27 Thus, it was error to conclude that in a constructive trust, only the person obtaining the property commits a mistake. This is because it is also possible that a grantor, like PNB in the case at hand, may commit the mistake.

Garvida vs. Sales, Jr., 271 SCRA 767 (1997)- BARSAGA

NONE

Vir-jen Shipping & Marine Services Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 58011, July 20, 1982, 115 SCRA 347-ELAURIA

FACTS:Private respondents are seamen who have a manning contract for a period of one year with a Filipino recruiter, Vir-jen Shipping, herein petitioner, in representation of its principal Kyoei Tanker Co. Ltd. The terms and conditions of said contract were based on the standard contract of the National Seamen's Board (NSB). The manning contract was approved by the NSB. However, a side contract was executed between the petitioner and private respondents regarding salary rates for seamen being imposed by an international organization, the International Transport Workers Federation (ITF). ITF salary rates are higher than those received by private respondents and if ITF would know that private respondents are receiving lower rates, the vessel will be detained.On March 23, 1979, the master of the vessel who is one of the private respondents sent a cable to petitioner, while said vessel was en route to Australia which is an ITF controlled port, stating that private respondents were not contented with the salary and benefits stipulated in the manning contract, and demanded that they be given 50% increase thereof, as the "best and only solution to solve ITF problem." Petitioner agreed to increase the seamen's salary to 25% but only to avoid the vessel being detained in Australia. Because of what the crew did, Kyoei Tanker Co. management terminated the manning contract and deported the crew the moment they reached Japan. The NSB believes that the termination of the services of the seamen was legal and in accordance with the provisions of their respective employment contracts. Considering the findings of the Board that the seamen breached their contracts, their subsequent repatriation was justified. The claim of the seamen for the payment of their salaries for the unexpired portion of their employment contracts should be denied. This is so because of the findings of the Board that their dismissal was legal and for a just cause. However, the NLRC issued a decision in favour of the seamen. The NLRC ordered the petitioner to pay the seamen their salaries for the unexpired portion of their employment.

ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the NLRC prevails over the NSB decision

HELD: The Court declared that the NSB decision prevails over the NLRC considering that the NSB is created to regulate and supervise the activities of Filipino seamen and it shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all matters or cases including money claims, involving employer-employee relations, arising out of or by virtue of any law or contracts involving Filipino seamen for overseas employment. The Court considered the view that the decision of the NLRC under question constitutes grave abuse of discretion and should be set aside in favor of the NSB's decision. Ruling in relation to statcon:The appeal made to the NLRC by the private respondents was filed out of time, considering that copy of said decision was received by the respondents on July 9, 1980 and they filed their memorandum of appeal only on July 23, 1980 or fourteen days later, whereas under article 223 of the Labor Code which governs appeals from the NSB to the NLRC per Article 20(b) of the Code provides that such appeals must be made within ten days. However, under Section 7, Rule XIII,, Book V of the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code, the ten-day period specified in Article 223 refers to working days. Computing the number of working days from July 9 to July 23, 1980, the appeal in question must be held to have been made on time.

CHAPTER 2

Miranda vs. Imperial - MANUEL

Facts: Elias Imperial used his three parcels of lands to obtain a loan from Miranda. It was agreed by the parties that the said properties would be given to Imperial until the loan was paid. However, the Imperial spouse contended that they instead received P 500 as assistance from Miranda to rescue their harvests. Miranda said that he indeed gave P1,000 loan to the Imperials.

Miranda sued the Imperial spouse to recover the amount and the harvests from the parcels of lands as interest. However, the Supreme Court had a hard time in deciding the case because most of the pertinent documents relating to the case turned into ashes after the World War II erupted in Manila.

Issue: Whether or not a decision in prior case from lower court can be used to decide the case?

Ruling: Yes, court rulings in prior cases can be used to decide the said case. This is part of the rule that well settled issues must be sustained. The SC used the ruling of the Court of Appeals in Santa Rosa vs. Noble in deciding the case.

CHAPTER 3

Santiago vs. COMELEC – MESINA

Private respondent Atty. Jesus Delfin, president of People’s Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA), filed with COMELEC a petition to amend the constitution to lift the term limits of elective officials, through People’s Initiative. He based this petition on Article XVII, Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides for the right of the people to exercise the power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution. Subsequently the COMELEC issued an order directing the publication of the petition and of the notice of hearing and thereafter set the case for hearing. At the hearing, Senator Roco, the IBP, Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon, Public Interest Law Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino appeared as intervenors-oppositors. Senator Roco filed a motion to dismiss the Delfin petition on the ground that one which is cognizable by the COMELEC. The petitioners herein Senator Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Isabel Ongpin filed this civil action for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against COMELEC and the Delfin petition rising the several arguments, such as the following: (1) The constitutional provision on people’s initiative to amend the

constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed; (2) The people’s initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision thereof. Lifting of the term limits constitutes a revision, therefore it is outside the power of people’s initiative. The Supreme Court granted the Motions for Intervention.

Issues:(1) Whether or not Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.

(2) Whether or not COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific provisions on the conduct of such initiative.

(3) Whether the lifting of term limits of elective officials would constitute a revision or an

amendment of the Constitution.

Held:

Sec. 2, Art XVII of the Constitution is not self executory, thus, without implementing legislation the same cannot operate. Although the Constitution has recognized or granted the right, the people cannot exercise it if Congress does not provide for its implementation.

The portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 which prescribes rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, is void. It has been an established rule that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated (potestas delegata non delegari potest). The delegation of the power to the COMELEC being invalid, the latter cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the right to people’s initiative.

The lifting of the term limits was held to be that of a revision, as it would affect other provisions of the Constitution such as the synchronization of elections, the constitutional guarantee of equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibiting political dynasties. A revision cannot be done by initiative. However, considering the Court’s decision in the above Issue, the issue of whether or not the petition is a revision or amendment has become academic.

Eugenio vs. Drilon – GARDUQUE

FACTS:

On May 10, 1972, private respondent, Prospero Palmiano, purchased on installment basis from petitioner, Florencio Eugenio and his co-owner developer Fermin Salazar two lots in the E & S Delta Village in Quezon City;

Petitioner avers that Executive Secretary Drilon erred in applying P.D. 957 and in concluding that the non-development of the E & S Delta Village justified private respondent's non-payment of his amortizations. Petitioner avers that inasmuch as the land purchase agreements were entered into in 1972, prior to the effectivity of P.D. 957 in 1976, said law cannot govern the transaction.

ISSUES:

Whether or not P.D.957 applies even to those contracts and transactions entered into prior to its enactment?Whether or not the failure to develop a subdivision constitutes legal justification for the non-payment of amortization by a buyer on installment under land purchase agreements entered into prior to the enactment of P.D. 957 – “The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers’ Protective Decree”?

HELD:

P.D. 957 did not expressly provide for retroactivity in its entirety, but such can be plainly inferred from the unmistakable intent of the law. The intent of the law, as culled from its preamble and from the situation, circumstances and conditions it sought to remedy, must be enforced;

Yes. It follows that Section 23 of PD 957 thereof had been properly invoked by private respondent when he desisted from making further payment to petitioner due to petitioner's failure to develop the subdivision project according to the approved plans and within the time limit.

People vs. Desiderio – SILVESTRE

Facts: Desiderio was charged with smuggling under Section 3601 of RA1937, otherwise known as “The Tariff and Customs Code”. Accused filed Motion to Quash on the ground that his criminal liability had been extinguished by the compromise agreement with the Collector of Customs in accordance with Section 2307 of RA1937 – Settlement of the case by payment of fine or redemption of forfeited property.

Issue: Whether or not the criminal liability is extinguished by virtue of compromise agreement under Section 2307.

Held: No, the interpretation is not supported by law. Such interpretation would unjustly expand the law whose intent is to curtail the effects of smuggling in the economy of the country. The criminal liability cannot be compromised and such a course the court cannot sanction.

National Police Commission vs. De Guzman – YULO

FACT: This is a case regarding the Compulsory retirement of PNP officers basing on Sec 39 of RA 6975 “ An Act Establishing the Philippine National Police Under a Reorganized Department of the Interior and Local Government “. Under the said Act, the age for retirement of “officer, non officer, rank of chief superintendent, director, or deputy director general would be 56 years old”. The said Act allows the retention in the service for an unextensible period of one (1) year. Philippine Constabulary protested with the RTC stating that they are covered by Sec 89 wherein the members of the Integrated National Police (INP) , including local police force are compulsory retired at:

a. 60 y/o- 1st year of effectivity of the ACTb. 59 y/o- 2nd year of effectivity of the ACTc. 58 y/o- 3rd year of the effctivity of the ACTd. 57 y/o- 4th year of the effectivity of the ACT

RTC ruled in favor of the respondents. Petitioner claimed that INP in Sec 89 does not imply the same in PD 765 that the Philippine Constabulary as part of the INP should not be discriminated against former members of Philippine Constabulary, relying on the principle of “where the law does not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish”.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 6975 distinguishes INP from PC.

HELD: Yes. Court should not give a literal interpretation to the letters of the law if it runs counter to the legislative intent. Examining the record of the Bicameral Committee it was found that the legislature did intend to exclude members of the PC from the coverage of Section 89 insofar as to the retirement age is concerned (police-4 yr transition, PC 56 yrs old. (STAT CON: Contemporaneous Construction)

Bengzon vs. Secretary of Justice - FELICIANO-GARCIA

FACTS

The governor general vetoed section 7 of Act number 4051, the Retirement Gratuity Law. This veto was accepted by the legislature. It was, however, contended by petitioner, a justice of peace entitled to benefits under said section 7, that the law was not an appropriation bill so that the Governor General could validly veto an item or items therein.

ISSUE

Whether or not the governor general can validly veto an item on the Retirement Gratuity law.

RULING

In determining whether or not the Governor-General stepped outside the boundaries of his legislative functions, when he attempted to veto one section of Act No. 4051, while approving the rest of the bill, we are not without the aid of the construction placed on his action by both legislative and executive departments. That the Philippine Legislature intended Act No. 4051 to be an appropriation measure with various items is apparent from a reading of section 12 thereof whereby the Legislature anticipated the possibility of a partial veto of the bill by the Chief Executive. Not only this, but after the Chief Executive took action, the legislature made no attempt to override the veto or to amend the law to bring into being a section which the Governor-General had eliminated. Then the same question came again before the executive department, and all of its official united in sustaining the validity of the Governor-General’s veto.

While contemporaneous construction is not decisive for the courts, yet where a construction of statutes has been adopted by the legislative department and accepted by the various agencies of the executive department, it is entitled to great respect. It is our understanding that it has been the practice of the Chief Executive in the interpretation of his constitutional power to veto separate items in a bill analogous to that before us, and that this practice has been acquiesced in previously without objection, so that it would require a clear showing of unconstitutionality for the courts to declare against it. Since, therefore, legislative intent and executive purposes is evident, it devolves upon the judiciary to give deferential attention to the attitude assumed by the other two branches of the Government.

Everett vs. Bautista - OPLE

Facts: The partnership Everett-Bautista owned the Queen’s Theatre during the first quarter of 1937. Its gross receipts for the period was P15,881.41. The admission fees collected were not at the same rate, as there were times that less than P 0.40/seat was charged, while at others anwhere between P 0.40 to 0.70/seat was charged. Since it did not pay in due time the tax fixed by law, which is 5 per cent of the receipts, the Collector of Internal Revenue required it to pay the sum of P992.59, which represents the following items and amounts: 5% of P15,881.41 which were its gross receipts during the first quarter of 1937, as tax - P794.07 25% surcharge on P794.70 for delay in payment of this tax P198.52, for a total of P 992.59 assessed taxes for 1Q 1937. Everett-Bautista refused to pay this sum, alleging that Queen’s Theatre did not collect more than P 0.40 per seat, except Feb 1 to 4, 1937 and March 8 to 11, and that on the said dates, the theatre was leased to CONSUMERS TRADING under the condition that the latter would pay the corresponding taxes according to the gross receipts realized.

Issue: Whether the collection of the assessed tax for the first quarter of the year is in accord with law

Ruling: Commonwealth Act no. 128 provides that in addition to fixed taxes prescribed in other statutes, places of amusement such as theaters and cinematographs, are imposed with five percent tax on gross receipts, excluding receipts from the sale of liquors and beverages, or other articles subject to its own specific tax; and that the collection of tax provided for shall be made by the Collector of Internal Revenue, as may be prescribed by the Secretary of Finance. (sec. 1 and 3 of said act). However, the Collector of Internal Revenue has prescribed Regulations No. 94, which provides that theaters, cinematographs , etc. who have two or more admission prices, such as an admission price of 40 centavos or less, and an admission price in excess of 40 centavos, r a general admission of less than 40 centavos but who charge or collect other amounts in excess of 40 centavos for the privilege of occupying more desirable accommodations, shall return for taxation not only the receipts from the admission price in excess of 40 centavos or less. There ought to be no doubt that effect must be given to Regulations No. 94 referred to, because its promulgation is authorized by law. It is not in conflict therewith, and is for this reason valid and binding upon everyone falling under its provisions. We are unaware of and our attention has not been called to any explanatory note of the bill upon its submission to the National Assembly and before it was finally approved as Act No. 128, or to any other evidentiary information as to what the said National Assembly had in mind with respect to the computation of the receipts upon which the five per cent tax was to be collected. In these circumstances the rule should be that the interpretation given to a law by an officer charged by reason of his office to carry out its provisions, should be respected whenever it is assailed by someone who alleges no reasons of weight to contradict or weaken it.

Where the language of a series of statutes is dubious, and open to different interpretations, the construction put upon them by the Executive Department charged with their execution has a great and general controlling force with this court. It has come to be a well-settled rule that great weight should be given to the construction placed upon a revenue law, whose meaning is doubtful, by the department charged with its execution. Order appealed from is affirmed.

NONE

DBP vs. CA - BELTRAN

ALBA vs. EVANGELISTA

FACTS: This appeal by certiorari sprouted from the judgment of respondent Court of Appeals denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Petitioner Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) executed a "Deed of Absolute Sale" in favor of respondents over a parcel of unregistered land which is covered only by a tax declaration and is known to have been originally owned by one Presentacion Cordovez, who donated it to Luciano Sarmiento who in turn, sold it Pacifico Chica. Pacifico Chica mortgaged the land to DBP to secure a loan. However, he defaulted in the payment of the loan, hence DBP caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage and the acquisition of the property at an auction sale as the highest bidder. Its certificate of sale was entered in the Book of Unregistered Property. Pacifico Chica failed to redeem the property, and DBP consolidated its ownership over the same. Respondent spouses offered to buy the property and agreed that payment was to be made within six months. The herein assailed deed of absolute sale, which contained a waiver of the seller's warranty against eviction, was executed by DBP in favor of respondent spouses.

Thereafter, respondent spouses applied for an industrial tree planting loan with DBP. The latter required the former to submit a certification from the Bureau of Forest Development that the land is alienable and disposable. However, said office issued a certificate attesting to the fact that the said property was classified as timberland, hence not subject to disposition. The loan application of respondent spouses was nevertheless eventually approved by DBP despite the aforesaid certification of the bureau, on the understanding of the parties that DBP would work for the release of the land by the former Ministry of Natural Resources. To secure payment of the loan, respondent spouses executed a real estate mortgage over the land.The loan was then released to respondent spouses on a staggered basis but a substantial sum had been released, the DBP suspended the release of the loan because the release of the land from the then Ministry of Natural Resources had not been obtained. Respondent spouses filed a complaint against DBP in the trial court seeking the annulment of the subject deed of absolute sale on the ground that the object thereof was verified to be timberland and, therefore, is in law an inalienable part of the public domain. They also alleged that petitioner, as defendant therein, acted fraudulently and in bad faith by misrepresenting itself as the absolute owner of the land and in incorporating the waiver of warranty against eviction in the deed of sale. The trial court rendered judgment annulling the subject deed of absolute sale and ordering DBP to return the purchase price, plus interest; to reimburse to respondent spouses the taxes paid by them, the cost of the relocation survey, incidental expenses and other damages and  to further pay them attorney's fees and litigation expenses and the costs of suit. On appeal, the CA rendered judgment modifying the disposition of the court below by deleting the award for damages, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and the costs, but affirming the same in all its other aspects.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not private respondent should be ordered to pay petitioner DBP their loan obligation due under the mortgage contract executed between them and DBP.; and

2. Whether or not petitioner should reimburse respondent spouses the purchase price of the property and the amount of P11,980.00 for taxes and expenses for the relocation Survey. 11

HELD:

Considering that neither party questioned the legality and correctness of the judgment of the court a quo, as affirmed by respondent court, ordering the annulment of the deed of absolute sale, such decreed nullification of the document has already achieved finality. We only need

The Court of Appeals, after an extensive discussion, found that there had been no bad faith on the part of either party, and this r, therefore, to dwell on the effects of that declaration of nullity.emains uncontroverted as a fact in the case at bar. Correspondingly, respondent court correctly applied the rule that if both parties have no fault or are not guilty, the restoration of what was given by each of them to the other is consequently in order. 12 This is because the declaration of nullity of a contract which is void ab initio operates to restore things to the state and condition in which they were found before the execution thereof. 13

We also find ample support for said propositions in American jurisprudence. The effect of an application of the aforequoted rule with respect to the right of a party to recover the amount given as consideration has been passed upon in the case of Leather Manufacturers National Bank vs. Merchants National Bank 14 where it was held that: "Whenever money is paid upon the representation of the receiver that he has either a certain title in property transferred in consideration of the payment or a certain authority to receive the money paid, when in fact he has no such title or authority, then, although there be no fraud or intentional misrepresentation on his part, yet there is no consideration for the payment, the money remains, in equity and good conscience, the property of the payer and may be recovered back by him."

Proctle and Gamble Philippines Manufacturing Corporation vs. Commissioner of Customs – JUAREZ

Facts: Two (2) shipments of caustic soda were consigned to petitioner from the United States on board the vessels Bronxville and Banggai. From said vessels, which were then anchored outside the breakwater in Manila bay, the shipments were transferred to the warehouses of Proctor and Gamble.

The Collector of Cutoms of Manila levied and collected a total sum of P720.00 as wharfage dues imposed under Section 2802 of the Tariff and Customs Code. Petitioner formally protested said collection on the ground that it did not use a government wharf or facility to unload the merchandise in question. The Collector of Customs denied the protest. Petitioner appealed to Commissioner of Customs, who sustained the previous decision. Petitioner then appealed to the CTA and it also upheld the previous decision. Petitioner filed a review of the Tax Court’s decision.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is liable for the payment of the wharfage dues imposed therein.

Held: Yes, the petitioner is liable for the payment of wharfage dues. It should be noted that the Tariff and Customs Code levies charges on the different activities of a vessel engaged in foreign trade. For coming to the Philippines from a foreign port or for going to a foreign port from the Philippines, wharfage dues are assessed against the cargo discharged by a vessel engaged in foreign trade.

CHAPTER 4:

Aguila vs. Court of First Instance of Batangas – NARTATES

GR No.48335-15 April 1988

Facts: Juliana Matienzo had two husbands in succession with private respondents as her children in the first marriage and petitioner as her child in the second marriage. Private respondents sued petitioner for partition of properties alleging that their mother and her second husband were not able to acquire any property during their marriage and that therefore the partitioned properties belong to the first marriage. Subsequent actions were taken which were consistently resolved in favor of the respondents. The case despite being declared in res judicata, was elevated to the Supreme Court by Petitioner claiming gross ineptitude of his legal counsel and invoking equity

Issue: Whether or not the Petitioner’s prayer should be given any merit

Held: No, the court denied the petition. The court held that the claim of petitioner on his counsel’s ineptitude is not sufficient to re open a case which has already been given due process. Petitioner’s invocation of Equity was likewise denied for the court reiterated that equity is available only in the absence of law. Jurisprudence also holds that all abstract arguments based only on equity should yield to positive rules. Aequeatas nunquam contravenit legis, equity never c ontravenes law

Soriano vs. Offshore Shipping and Manning Corp - NOCUM

FACTS: Petitioner submits that public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion and/or acted without or in excess of jurisdiction by disregarding the alteration of the employment contract made by private respondent. Petitioner claims that the alteration by private respondent of his salary and overtime rate constitutes a violation of Art. 34 of the Labor Code of the Philippines.

Public respondent through the Solicitor General, contends that, “Although the employment contract seems to have corrections, it is in conformity with the Wage Scale submitted to POEA.”

ISSUE: Whether or not the private respondent violated the law in altering the employment contract of the petitioner.

HELD: No. The annotations on the employment contract does not constitute an alteration of the original employment contract but only a clarification thereof which by no stretch of the imagination can be considered a violation of the Labor Code of the Philippines.

“A literal interpretation is to be rejected if it would be unjust or lead to absurd results.”

People vs. Gutierrez – PILAR

Facts:

A group of armed persons descended on barrio Ora Centro, municipality of Bantay, Province of Ilocos Sur, and set fire to various inhabited houses therein. On the afternoon of the same day, in barrio Ora Este of the same municipality and province, several residential houses were likewise burned by the group, resulting in the destruction of various houses and in the death of an old woman named Vicenta Balboa. After investigation by the authorities, the provincial fiscal, with several state prosecutors assigned by the Department of Justice to collaborate with him, on 10 June 1970 filed in the Court of First Instance of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, two informations (Criminal Cases 47-V for arson with homicide and 48-V for arson) charging that the seventeen private respondents herein, together with 82 other unidentified persons, "confederating, conspiring, confabulating and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously burn or cause to be burned several residential houses, knowing the said houses to be occupied" and belonging to certain persons named in the filed informations in barrios Ora Este and Ora Centro, Bantay, Ilocos Sur. Accused Camilo Pilotin and Vincent Crisologo furnished bail, and on 15 June 1970 voluntarily appeared before respondent Judge Gutierrez, were arraigned and pleaded not guilty.

On 22 June 1970, the prosecution moved the respondent judge for a transfer of cases 47-V and 48-V to the Circuit Criminal Court, invoking the Administrative Orders just mentioned and calling attention to the circumstance that they were issued at the instance of the witnesses seeking transfer of the hearing from Vigan to either San Fernando, La Union, or Baguio City, for reasons of security and personal safety, as shown in their affidavits. The accused vigorously opposed such transfer, and on 20 July 1970, the respondent judge declined the transfer sought, on the ground that Administrative Order No. 258 only provided for transfer of cases to the Circuit Criminal Court where the interest of justice required it for the more expeditious disposal of the cases, and in the cases involved the accused had already pleaded; that if the objective of the proposed transfer was to subsequently obtain a change of venue from the Supreme Court under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 5179 the same should have been done right at the very inception of these cases.

Hence, petition for certiorari and mandamus, charging abuse of discretion and praying this Court to set aside the order of denial of the transfer and to compel the respondent Court of First Instance to remand the cases to the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District, as well as to authorize the latter to try the cases (47-V and 48-V) at either San Fernando, La Union, or Baguio City.

Respondents in their answer denied any abuse of discretion in view of the fact that the Administrative Order No. 226 merely authorized the court below, but did not require or command it, to transfer the cases in question to the Circuit Criminal Court, and likewise denied that the circumstances justified any such transfer. At petitioners' request this Court enjoined the respondent Judge Gutierrez from proceeding with the trial of the cases until further orders.

Issue: Whether or not the transfer of the hearing of criminal cases aforementioned are valid

Held: The court decided that:

1) That Republic Act No. 5179 creating the Circuit Criminal Courts did not, and does not, authorize the Secretary of Justice to transfer thereto specified and individual cases;

(2) That this Supreme Court, in the exercise of the Judicial Power vested by the Constitution upon it and other statutory Courts, possesses inherent power and jurisdiction to decree that the trial and disposition of a case pending in a Court of First Instance be transferred to another Court of First

Instance within the same district whenever the interest of justice and truth so demand, and there are serious and weighty reasons to believe that a trial by the court that originally had jurisdiction over the case would not result in a fair and impartial trial and lead to a miscarriage of justice.

(3) That in the present case there are sufficient and adequate reasons for the transfer of the hearing of Criminal Cases Nos. 47-V and 48-V of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur to the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District, in the interest of truth and justice.

In the particular case before us, to compel the prosecution to proceed to trial in a locality where its witnesses will not be at liberty to reveal what they know is to make a mockery of the judicial process, and to betray the very purpose for which courts have been established. Since the rigorous application of the general principle of Rule 110, Section 14 (a), would result here in preventing a fair and impartial inquiry into the actual facts of the case, it must be admitted that the exigencies of justice demand that the general rule relied upon by accused respondents should yield to occasional exceptions wherever there are weighty reasons therefor. Otherwise, the rigor of the law would become the highest injustice — "summum jus, summa in juria."

Gordon vs. Veridiano - ONG

Facts: There are two drug stores involved in this dispute, to wit, the San Sebastian Drug Store and the Olongapo City Drug Store, both owned by private respondent Rosalinda Yambao. They are located a few meters from each other in the same building on Hospital Road, Olongapo City. They were covered by Mayor's Permits Nos. 1954 and 1955, respectively, issued for the year 1980, and licenses to operate issued by the FDA for the same year. This case arose when on March 21, 1980 at about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, a joint team composed of agents from the FDA and narcotics agents from the Philippine Constabulary conducted a “test buy” at San Sebastian Drug Store and were sold 200 tablets of Valium 10 mg. worth P410.00 without a doctor's prescription. A report on the operation was submitted to the petitioner, as mayor of Olongapo City, on April 9, 1980. 6 On April 17, 1980, he issued a letter summarily revoking Mayor's Permit No. 1954, effective April 18, 1980, "for rampant violation of R.A. 5921, otherwise known as the Pharmacy Law and R.A. 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972." 7 Later, when the petitioner went to Singapore, Vice-Mayor Alfredo T. de Perio, Jr. caused the posting of a signboard at the San Sebastian Drug Store announcing its permanent closure. Then Yambao File a petition on the court seeking for the reconsideration for the revocation but it was denied, the petitioner, traces his authority to the charter of Olongapo City, R.A. No. 4645, which inter alia empowers the city mayor under Section 10 thereof:. to grant or refuse municipal licenses to operate or permits of all classes and to revoke the same for violation of the conditions upon which they were granted, or if acts prohibited by law or city ordinances are being committed under protection of such licenses or in the premises in which the business for which the same have been granted is carried on, or for any other good reason of general interest The charter also provides, in connection with the powers of the city health officer, that: Sec. 6 (k). He and his representatives shall have the power to arrest violators of health laws, ordinances, rules and regulations and to recommend the revocation or suspension of the permits of the different establishments to the City Mayor for violation of health laws, ordinances, rules and regulations.

Issued: Whether or not the mayor of Olongapo has the power to grant and revoke license from operation of drugstore or the FDA has the sole power to grant and revoke the license?

Held: the suspension of Mayor's Permit No. 1955 shall be considered valid but only until the San Sebastian Drug Store and the Olongapo City Drug Store return to their original sites as specified in the FDA licenses and the mayor's permits or until the request for transfer

Courts of justice, when confronted with apparently conflicting statutes, should endeavor to reconcile the same instead of declaring outright the invalidity of one as against the other. Such alacrity should be avoided. The wise policy is for the judge to harmonize them if this is possible, bearing in mind that they are equally the handiwork of the same legislature, and so give effect to both while at the same time also according due respect to a coordinate department of the government.

The presumption against implied repeals is classically founded upon the doctrine that the legislature is presumed to envision the whole body of the law when it enacts new legislation, and, therefore, if a repeal of the prior law is intended, expressly to designate the offending provisions rather than to leave the repeal to arise by necessary implication from the later enactment. Still more basic, however, is the assumption that existing statutory and common law, as well as ancient law, is representative of popular will. As traditional and customary rules, the presumption is against their alteration of repeal. The presumption has been said to have special application to important public statutes of long standing.

Tantuico Jr. vs. Domingo – ILAGAN

Francisco Tantuico Jr. vs. Hon. Eufemio DomingoG.R. No. 96422 February 28, 1994

QUIASON, J.:

Facts: On January 26, 1980, petitioner Francisco Tantuico Jr., was appointed Chairman of the Commission on Audit (COA) to serve a term of seven years expiring on January 26, 1987. Petitioner had discharged the functions of Chairman of the COA in an acting capacity since 1975. After the EDSA Revolution, petitioner submitted his courtesy resignation and relinquished his office to the newly appointed Chairman Guingona and applied for retirement effective immediately.

Respondent Chairman Hon. Eufemio Domingo later endorsed petitioner's retirement application to the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), certifying, among other matters, that petitioner was cleared of money and property accountability. The application was returned to the COA pursuant to R.A. No. 1568, which vests in the COA the final approval thereof. Afterwards, the inventory committee submitted a report, recommending petitioner's clearance from property accountability inasmuch as there was no showing that he personally gained from the missing property or was primarily liable for the loss thereof.

Hon. Domingo then issued a Memorandum directing the inventory committee to explain why no action should be filed against its members for, inter alia, exceeding their authority in recommending clearances for petitioner and Chairman Guingona. Respondent chairman later created a special audit team for the purpose of conducting a financial and compliance audit of the COA transactions and accounts during the tenure of petitioner. When the special audit team submitted its report, it did not make any recommendation, but instead mentioned several officials and employees, including petitioner Tantuico, who may be responsible or accountable for the questioned transactions.

Respondent Chairman Domingo thereafter informed petitioner of the approval of his application for retirement under R.A. No. 1568 however, respondent Chairman added that in view of the audit findings and inventory report, payment of only one-half of the money value of the benefits due will be allowed. Petitioner Tantuico submitted a letter-complaint, wherein he cited certain defects in the manner the audit was conducted. He further claimed that the re-audit was not authorized by law since it covered closed and settled accounts.

Issue: Can respondent Chairman Domingo withhold the benefits due petitioner Tantuico under the retirement laws?

Held: No. Pension in this case is a bounty flowing from the graciousness of the Government intended to reward past services and, at the same time, to provide the pensioner with the means with which to support himself and his family. Unless otherwise clearly provided, the pension should inure wholly to the benefit of the pensioner. It is true that the withholding and application of the amount involved was had under Section 624 of the Administrative Code and not by any judicial process, but if the gratuity could not be attached or levied upon execution in view of the prohibition of Section 3 of Act No. 4051, the appropriation thereof by administrative action, if allowed, would lead to the same prohibited result and enable the respondent to do indirectly what they cannot do directly under Section 3 of the Act No. 4051.

Well-settled is the rule that retirement laws are liberally interpreted in favor of the retiree because the intention is to provide for the retiree's sustenance and comfort, when he is no longer capable of earning his livelihood. law