The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 18 | Issue 15 | Number 6 | Article ID 5435 | Aug 01, 2020

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Misplaced Priorities, Unnecessary Effects: Collective Sufferingand Survival in Pandemic Philippines

Nastassja Quijano, Maria Carmen (Ica) Fernandez, Abbey Pangilinan

Abstract: Despite one of the world’s strictestand longest lockdown policies, the Philippines’securitized approach to containing theCOVID-19 pandemic has led to unnecessarysuffering, especially in poor communities. Thisart ic le explores how the Phi l ipp inegovernment’s prioritizing of punitive policiessuch as detaining quarantine violators orattempting to decongest Manila by sendingpoor families to neighbouring provinces,magnifies existing socio-spatial inequalities andfurther spreads disease. In many of thesecommunities, poverty is a co-morbidity. As localgovernments struggle to provide frontlinehealth and social welfare services, high-profilearrests, media shutdowns, and the proposedAnti-Terrorism Bill spark concerns aboutrestrictions on free speech while movement iscurtailed. Nevertheless, community and privatesector efforts around localized healthcare, foodsecurity, and inclusive mobility indicatepotential paths towards a ‘better normal’ thatgoes beyond just survival.

Keywords: COVID-19; coronavirus;Philippines; poverty; urbanisation; slums;securitisation; human rights

"I will not hesitate. My orders are to the policeand military,

as well as village officials, if there is any

trouble,

or occasions where there's violence and yourlives are in danger,

shoot them dead,"

-Rodrigo Duterte, President of thePhilippines

April 1, 2020, during the president’s weeklylate-night address to the nation

and Day 21 of the global pandemic

The president’s orders were clear—thePhilippines’ response to the COVID-19pandemic would be led by the military and thepolice instead of the beleaguered civilian healthministry. Thus, the Philippine Inter-AgencyTask Force on Eradicating Infectious Diseasesand its implementing bodies would not be ledby the Secretary of Health, but by seniormilitary staff. Set on a war footing, thePhilippines has enforced one of the world’sstrictest and longest lockdown policies, and yetis still struggling to contain infections across anarchipelago of approximately 7,500 islands. TheDepartment of Health has confirmed 44,254cases and is still verifying 10,341 more as ofth is wri t ing (Department of Health ,2020b)—validating early estimates predicted bythe University of the Philippines that thecountry would breach the 30,000 case mark bymid-June (Guido, Rye and Agbulos, 2020). Thisnumber is projected to double in a month’stime (Guido, Rye, Agbulos and Austriaco,

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2020).

Three months into various stages of quarantine,the Philippines now has the second highestnumber of infections in the ASEAN region andrecently reported the steepest jump inconfirmed cases (8,143) for the entire WesternPacific (Yee, 2020). It also has the secondhighest case fatality rate (3.6%) compared withits ASEAN neighbours (Center for Strategicand International Studies, 2020). The regionaldirector of the World Health Organization(WHO) also observed that the Philippines hasone of the highest mortality rates for frontlineworkers worldwide. Almost 13% of allCOVID-19 deaths are doctors and othermedical personnel, when other countries in theregion remain at only 2-3% (CNN Philippines,2020e).

Figure 1. COVID-19 Cases, Deaths, andRecoveries (log scale) as of 6 July 2020

Source: The ASEAN Post, 2020

Economic losses for the year have reached anestimated PHP 2.2 trillion (USD 44 billion)based on reports by the National EconomicDevelopment Authority (NEDA) (de Vera,2020); this estimate does not fully reflect the

Philippines’ sizeable informal economy. Bigcompanies have announced massive layoffs,especially those from the tourism, travel, andservice industries. There is also a decrease inremittances with the forced return of hundredsof thousands of overseas workers who havehistorically kept the Philippine economy afloat(Laforga, 2020).

COVID-19 exposes the structural limitations ofthe Philippine health system, which wasassessed by the 2020 Global Health SecurityIndex report as only “somewhat prepared”(47.6 on an index score of 100) to prevent,detect, and respond to epidemics or pandemics.Prior to COVID-19, the Philippines did not haveenough doctors and nurses with 0.6 doctors per1,000 population, which is still below the WHOrecommended physician density rate and at themedian among ASEAN countries (WorldDevelopment Indicators, 2017). There are only10,447 doctors (37%) and 30,368 nurses (27%)in public hospitals in Metro Manila, whereCOVID-19 cases have been concentrated(Department of Health cited in Fernandez, et.a l . , 2 0 2 0 ) . M a n y h e a l t h c a r eprofessionals—reaching around 20,000departures in 2012 (Dayrit et. al., 2018)—havealready gone overseas to work in hospitals inthe US, UK, and the Middle East, illustrated byUK Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s post-COVIDconvalescence photograph wearing a t-shirtwith a ‘Philippines’ logo fuelled speculation hewas paying tribute to the numerous Filipinonurses working in the UK during the pandemic.Low pay at home is a factor contributing to thisexodus; while the police and the Philippines’armed forces continue to see an increase insalaries, this is not the case for health sectorworkers (Morallo, 2018).

Based on 2018 data, not enough hospital bedsare available should even 1% of the over-100million national population be infected (Dayritet al., 2018). Private hospitals outnumberpublic hospitals, comprising 70% of the totalnumber of hospitals despite serving a small

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segment of the population (Department ofHealth, 2018). Recently, public health doctorsassigned to geographically isolated anddisadvantaged communities under the “Doctorsto the Barrios” program protested thegovernment’s order reassigning them to privatehospitals in the emerging hotspot of Cebu City,citing that doing so would leave their ruralservice areas without medical care (Palma,2020). Testing and tracing capacity also remainlow compared to other countries. ThePhilippines has conducted an estimated800,000 tests to date However, testing capacityfalls short of the daily target of 30,000 tests,only reaching just over 17,000 per day(Department of Health, 2020c). As of May,38,315 contact tracers were hired, but at least94,000 more personnel are required to hit the1:800 ratio (Magsambol, 2020).

The low investment in the health sector reflectsa growing anti-science attitude among publicofficials, which intensified with the post-2016demonization of an anti-dengue fever vaccinethat was administered to schoolchildren underthe previous administration. Despite limitedevidence that the Sanofi-developed Dengvaxiacaused child deaths, vaccine confidence in thePhilippines dropped from 93% in 2015 to 32%in 2018 thanks to a highly politicized healthmisinformation campaign (Larson, Hartigan-Goand de Figueiredo, 2018). A measles outbreakensued, as did the resurfacing of polio whichwas already deemed eradicated nearly twodecades ago (Punay, 2018, Rola, 2019).

Despite the “healthworkers-as-heroes” rhetoric,the Philippine medical and R&D sector ishampered not only by limited funding but alsodeadly misinformation. A prominent localofficial has drawn fire for not wearing masksand advocating steam inhalation as acoronavirus cure despite a massive outbreak inher city (ABS-CBN News, 2020). The earlyweeks of the pandemic saw incidents of healthworkers being shunned, driven out of theirneighbourhoods, or assaulted with bleach. This

led to cities such as Manila, Pasig, andMuntinlupa adopting ordinances againstdiscrimination of COVID-related cases.However, these incidents are likely to continuewithout extensive information dissemination toaddress fears (Hallare, 2020; Kabagani, 2020;Manila Standard, 2020; Mendez, 2020; Robles,2020).

As a result, the Philippines has been ranked the9th riskiest and least safe country amid thepandemic globally, and the least safe in theentire Asia-Pacific region (Deep KnowledgeGroup cited by Rappler, 2020). These rankingsindict the highly-securitised approach led bymilitary and police personnel. By focusing onmobility restrictions first and health and socialwelfare second—driven by an overridingrhetoric that the government must punish the‘pasaway’ (stubborn, non-compliantcitizens)—the effect has heightened existinginequalities and vulnerabilities and led tounnecessary suffering, especially in poorcommunities.

Outbreak and the Response: MisplacedPriorities?

Critics state that the Philippines has prioritisedthe wrong policies in its COVID-19 response,beginning with losing its geographic advantageby not putting up border restrictions fastenough.

The country’s first reported COVID-19 cases inJanuary were both foreign nationals travellingfrom China. It was only in March 2020 thatcommunity transmission in Metro Manila wasconfirmed after COVID-19 cases in Taiwan andAustralia were traced to travel from thePhilippines (Department of Health, 2020a). Inresponse, the Philippine government declared aNational State of Calamity (Proclamation No.929), which placed large portions of thecountry under the euphemism ‘Enhanced

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Community Quarantine (ECQ)’, or what isreferred to elsewhere as a hard lockdown.While cases were originally concentrated inManila, it appears that the three-day lagbetween ECQ announcement and enforcementled many people to flee the city for thecountryside, bringing infection along withthem.

Further transmission was facilitated by thereturn of so-called ‘locally stranded individuals’to their hometowns after mobility restrictionswere eased at the 100-day mark. A since-suspended national program called BalikProbinsya (literally translates to “return to theprovince”) offered urban poor families and outof work Overseas Filipino Workers cash andlivelihood assistance provided that they returnto their provinces, with the aim of decongestingthe national capital region. There were reportsthat local government units were ordered toaccept individuals who availed of the programand some returning overseas Filipino workerseven if proper coordination and documentationwas incomplete, increasing the risk ofcommunity transmission (Marquez, 2020b).

Official DOH data as of 12 June 2020 statesthat only 12 out of 81 provinces in the countryare deemed “COVID-19 free”, with theremaining 69 provinces having at least oneconfirmed COVID-19 case. However, themovement of residents has led to new spikes inthe cities of Cebu, Davao, and Zamboanga, thethree major urban hubs outside of MetroManila (Department of Health, 2020b).

Map 1. Coronavirus in the Philippines as of12 June 2020

Source: Department of Health Data Dropas of June 12, 2020

The executive was quick to request emergencypowers through Republic Act No. 11469 or theBayanihan to Heal-As-One Act, which gavePresident Duterte authorization to reallocate allavailable resources to the COVID-19 response.The massive PHP 350 bi l l ion budget(approximately USD 7 billion) includes PHP 200billion (USD 4 billion) cash assistance for 18million poor households. An estimated PHP 370billion (USD 7.4 billion) in loans have also beensecured with the Asian Development Bank,World Bank, China’s Asian InfrastructureInvestment Bank, and the Japanese governmentto finance COVID-19 response programs,including continued infrastructure spendingthrough the infamous “build, build, build”program to bolster the flagging economy(Report to the Joint Oversight CongressionalCommittee cited in Esguerra, 2020; GMA News

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Online, 2020b).

President Duterte’s emergency powers lapsedon 24 June 2020. While the law was in effect, itdid not hasten the provision of cash aid nor didit enable local governments to use resources torespond to the crisis. Focus was placed onmobility restrictions implemented by themilitarized national leadership, where illnesswas blamed on citizens not cooperating withthe stay at home order. With this stern “hands-off” approach, the national government tookcontrol of resources and decision-making whilepassing the burden of responsibility to the localgovernment units, the private sector, andordinary citizens.

Select local government officials from MetroManila have expressed dismay with how thenational government has handled the crisis,stating there is lack of consultation,coordination, or concrete and detailed actionplans to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic(Ranada, Tagolong, Got inga, 2020) .Inconsistent pronouncements from thepresident—often shared in hours-long, latenight talks announced only shortly inadvance—caused confusion and tensionbetween national and local officials. Informedof national decisions barely hours beforeexecution, local officials struggled to put uplocalised testing facilities and provide transportfor health workers (Tan, 2020; GMA NewsOnline, 2020a).

Both national and local governments areplagued by slow disbursement of funds: weeklyreports from the executive branch show thatonly 63% of the reported budget has beenspent thus far. Meanwhile, apparently only 15%of the PHP 3.9 billion (USD 78 million) ingrants for local governments have been utilized(COVID-19 Citizen Budget Tracker, 2020). Inthe meantime, the nimbler private sectorstepped in to address the gap. Businessorganizations invested more than two billionpesos (USD 40 million) to supplement national

and local relief efforts and support hospitalswith PPE and medical supplies in the first threemonths of the pandemic, while struggling tokeep their employees on the payrol l .Companies such as ABS-CBN, the country’sbiggest broadcast media company, which wasrecently shut down by the government, raisedPHP 400 million (USD 8 million) to assist urbanpoor communities while trying to stay on air(Castro, 2020). Private sector groups were thefirst to react when national governmentofficials violated the quarantine rules, as withthe cases of a Philippine senator and a highranking police official, but the President rushedto defend these violators, setting a bad example(Marquez, 2020a).

Ongoing tussles regarding local and masstransport exemplify this mismatch betweennational-level decision-making and citizens’needs. On the first few days of lockdown,thousands of commuters in Metro Manila werestranded because of the suspension of publictransport, and the system of rigid andsometimes arbitrary checkpoints set upthroughout the megacity. These localcheckpoints were manned by armed police,many of whom were not provided with PPE oradequate training on health protocols. Morered tape came in the form of additionalcheckpoints set up by city and village-levelofficials, who often had their own system ofpermits.

Given that 70% of the population in MetroManila uses public transport (Abad, 2019), theshutdown forced healthcare frontliners to walkfor hours or ride a bicycle despite the absenceof safe bike lanes. While attempting to useretrofitted tricycles to transport healthworkers, a popular local off ic ial wasreprimanded (and later scolded by thepresident in a televised speech) for havingviolated social distancing rules—despitecurrent Davao city mayor and presidentialdaughter Sara Duterte continuing to usetricycles in her city (Inquirer.net, 2020a).

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Several hospital frontliners were killed invehicular accidents while biking to work. Thesuspension of mass transportation alsotranslated to heavy losses amongst low-incometransport workers, including drivers of theiconic Philippine jeepney who were bannedfrom operating but ordered to comply with acontested modernization program. Some havebeen forced to beg for aid (Pedrajas, 2020). Sixmostly elderly jeepney drivers were jailed forstaging a protest against the ban; two out ofthe six later tested positive for COVID-19 afterbeing released from detention (CNNPhilippines, 2020a).

Figure 2: Hundreds of commuters werestranded at the checkpoint along the

boundary of Metro Manila (Valenzuela)and the province of Bulacan. Source:

Jonathan Andal, GMA News, 17 March2020.

Poverty as Co-morbidity: CommunityBurdens and Unnecessary Suffering

All evidence points to poverty as a co-morbidityof COVID-19. The way poverty shapes aperson’s access to the social determinants of

health such as economic stability, education,health care, the neighbourhood and builtenvironment, and the social context of acommunity, greatly affects vulnerability to apandemic such as COVID-19. Prior toCOVID-19, the poor were already exposed tovarious health issues due to substandard livingconditions and limited access to basic services,which are highly correlated to chronicimpoverishment (Diwakar and Sheperd, 2018).With limited means to comply with healthprotocols such as physical distancing and handwashing, the poor are more vulnerable to thedisease. This is seen in the case of MetroManila, the first epicentre of COVID-19 in thePhilippines. As one of the densest urbansettlements in the world where 2.5 out of 13million residents live in slums, povertycompounds the effects of a pandemic. Map 2shows the poorest areas (the darker the colour,the higher the magnitude of poor households inthe areas) and their proximity to COVID-19cases.

For highly segregated megacities like MetroManila, the concentration of COVID-19 cases isa reflection of those who were able to accesstesting facilities and hospitals, which many ofthe urban poor communities do not have accessto (Fernandez et al. , 2020). Access togovernment assistance is also a challenge forimpoverished members of the large informaleconomy, because they are not included ingovernment databases (Karaos, 2020). Low-income families dependent on daily wages slidfurther into poverty when their primary sourcesof income were halted by prolonged quarantinerestrictions, thus doubling the incidence ofinvoluntary hunger over the past three months(Social Weather Station, 2020).

Map 2. NCR and Coronavirus Cases

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These dynamics are more clearly seen at thecity level. Map 3 looks at Quezon City, one ofMetro Manila’s larger cities with a populationof 2.9 million, 52,000 of whom are poor basedon official poverty data (Department of SocialWelfare and Development, 2017). At present,137 of 142 barangays (villages) in QC havepandemic infections, including two of thecountry’s densest slums, Payatas and Batasan;105 of these communities were tagged to havehigh to moderate risk based on the number ofCOVID-19 cases. For poorer areas, the level ofrisk is between high and moderate, thusrequiring local villages to impose strictlockdowns for an extended period. Followingthe same pattern throughout Metro Manila,poorer areas have closer proximity toCOVID-19 cases but are not close to COVID-19care facilities. Figure 3 shows the weeklyreport provided by the Quezon City government

on verified COVID-19 positive cases whichremains on an upward trend (Quezon CityGovernment, 2020).

These same impoverished areas are vulnerableto environmental disasters such as flooding,fires, and earthquakes, causing regularevacuations during the rainy season. ThePhilippines is one of the most disaster-pronecountries in the world; as such, COVID-19 isjust one additional risk that poor families haveto endure (Bündnis Entwicklung Hilft, 2017.Once the typhoons arrive, cash-strapped localgovernments need to provide evacuationfacilities compliant with the necessary healthprotocols, despite having drained existingresources during the first lockdown.

Map 3. Quezon City COVID-19 Cases as of26 June 2020

Source: Quezon City Epidemiology andSurveillance Unit COVID-19 Master Data

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Figure 3. Weekly rate of increase ofverified COVID-19 cases, Quezon City (June

2020)

Source: Quezon City Government, 2020

‘Shoot Them Dead’: Punitive Policies asAdded Vulnerability

The Philippine National Police (PNP) recordedaround 152,000 curfew and quarantineviolations since the beginning of the lockdownand 71,540 people have been arrested (CNNPhilippines, 2020d; Bajo, 2020). Some of thesearrests have led to deaths--a police shootingand killing of a retired military personnel at acheckpoint on 22 April and a 28 April maulingof a fish vendor without a mask are only two ofthe publicised incidents of alleged abuse ofpower by state actors (Ferreras and Cahiles,2020; Gonzales, 2020).

Local village officials also employed punitiveapproaches in punishing alleged quarantineviolators in their jurisdiction. Punishments arelargely arbitrary and have ranged anywherefrom monetary fines, to being imprisoned incages made for impounded dogs, to doing ‘duckwalks’, push-ups or squat jumps, or other forms

of public humiliation (Human Rights Watch,2020b). Gated communities are also notexempt, with incidents of the police enteringthe pool area of a posh condominium orengaging in an altercation with a foreignerresident in an exclusive village in Metro Manila(Ong, 2020). While alleged violators from poorcommunities get punished immediately, thetreatment and handling of violations in affluentcommunities and positions of power tendstowards greater leniency.

That this highly securitised approach has led tomultiple cases of excessive use of force bypolice officers and barangay officials is notsurprising given the escalation of human rightsviolations in the Philippines, particularly thosetied to the Duterte administration’s so-called‘war on drugs’. Duterte’s “shoot them dead”order for quarantine violators echoes the publicshoot-to-kill order he gave earlier in hisadministration, but this time instead ofadvocating the executions of the so-called“nanlaban”, or drug personalities who fightback, the crosshairs are set on the so-called“pasaway” - those who do not comply. All ofthis is consistent with the findings of a 2020UN Human Rights Council report (OHCHR,2020) on widespread killings and arbitrarydetentions in the country, which are made evenmore deadly by disinformation and thevilification of dissent.

The COVID response powers given to Dutertealso had provisions that have been used to goafter perceived critics of the administration. A“Task Force COVID Kontra Peke”’ whosemandate is “prevent and report fake news” ledto the arrest of at least 32 people in Aprilincluding teachers and other individuals taggedas left-wing supporters (CNN Philippines,2020b). The government also cemented theconviction of investigative journalist MariaRessa over trumped-up cyber-libel charges, andfast tracked the passage of the controversialAnti-Terrorism Bill, which was signed into lawby the president on 3 July 2020. Its loose

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definition of terrorism allows police, lawenforcement, and military personnel authorisedby an appointed Anti-Terrorism Council tocarry out warrantless arrests on tagged“terrorists” who can then be detained for up to24 days, wiretapped for up to 90 days, and iffound guilty, imprisoned from 12 years to a fulllife sentence (Ratcliffe, 2020; CNN Philippines,2020c).

Other major human rights concerns related toCOVID-19 include infections in prisons andamongst internally displaced populations andprotocols for LGBTQ+ families whose partnersdie from COVID-19 but are not given the fullspousal or civil partnership rights accorded bylaw to heterosexual couples (Human RightsWatch, 2020a). As in other countries, thelockdown and its behavioural stresses have ledto a rise to violence against women andchildren (UN Women, 2020). The Departmentof Justice reported online sexual harassmentcases increased by an alarming 264% sinceMarch 2020 (Chapman, 2020). The Commissionon Human Rights and the Department of SocialWelfare and Development has already set uphotlines for referral of these kinds of cases, butthe burden for monitoring also depends onstretched local government mechanisms.

Keeping each other alive: Reimaginingcollective resilience in a time of COVID-19

As the world realizes that old methods of crisisresponse and recovery no longer apply, thePhilippine case points to how a securitisedapproach that prioritises punitive policy overhealth and social protection—especially onethat implements these policies in a one-sided,arbitrary fashion—will not succeed in stampingout COVID-19 infections. One of the overusedconcepts by the national governmentthroughout this pandemic has been the conceptof bayanihan, or the Filipino practice ofcommunity action to accomplish a specific task.By using a familiar rallying call to work

together to “flatten the curve,” the nationalgovernment was able to stealthily pass on theburden of response and survival to thepopulace--specifically the private sector, localgovernment units, and everyday citizens.However, bayanihan is impossible in anenvironment of fear and mistrust.

As in many other countries, the health crisis isoccurring in an environment of populism,impunity, anti-poor sentiments and an assaulton human and civil rights. At the same time,the Duterte administration’s pivot to China hasvery local implications. Secret Chinese-onlyunderground clinics have been discoveredtreating the uncounted POGO (Philippineoffshore gaming operators) workers, aeuphemism for online gambling workers whohave set up shop in the country to sidestepmainland China law. It appears that they mayhave spread the coronavirus undetected(Straits Times, 2020).

For all of these reasons, the COVID-19battleground is not just in hospitals but alsowithin communities. The country’s existingvulnerabilities call for a community-centredapproach that promotes accountability and putscitizens, especially the poor and vulnerable, atthe centre of its programs and interventions.Beyond imposing mobility restrictions andcreating a climate of fear, the outbreakcountermeasures require harmonised efforts toaddress the problems of poverty, mobility, andfood security as critical elements in diseaseprevention.

The pandemic is testing the limits of the socialcontract on a global scale. When the nationalgovernment fails to deliver on its promises,local community leaders are forced to innovateto deliver basic services and protect citizens’rights. Modest attempts by local officialsinclude setting up local testing facilities andmobile markets to make fresh produceavailable to their communities (GMA NewsOnline, 2020a). Local officials have also pushed

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back against the national government’s BalikProbinsiya program as a means to tightenborder controls which contribute to the spreadof the disease in the provinces (Marquez,2020b). Community led innovations are beingdeveloped with support from the private sectorsuch as food chain models where pop-upneighbourhood kitchens and volunteers havebeen distributing hot meals and relief goods inpoor communities (Layno, 2020). Mental healthservices led by volunteer psychologists andcounsellors are also being offered for free forboth health workers and citizens. These earlymodels are indications that the communityplays a vital role in collective resilience(Biong,2020; Lozada, 2020).

However, these social services are not enough.Battling COVID-19 means breaking the anti-science culture and focusing on aggressivelytesting, treating, and isolating cases whilekeeping priority industries running and familiesfed. A major part of this is transparency andensuring community access to accurateinformation—which is currently at odds withthe media crackdown and official governmentclaims that the Philippines has among thelowest number of COVID-19 cases and deathsin Asia (Rappler.com, 2020a).

The economic impact of the pandemic is likelyto worsen in the coming months. With themonsoon season, food security and incomesupport for the poor and vulnerable is nolonger optional. Instead of sending the poorback to the provinces, proper preconditions toenable households to comply with the ‘stay athome’ directive must be put in place. Thisincludes access to decent housing andsanitation in addition to income support forthose who lost their jobs and sources oflivelihood. Existing systems must adjust tohandle prolonged periods of relief and responseand ensure basic food security of affectedhouseholds, while reopening the local economy.All these require laser-sharp focus on keepingcitizens alive—not shooting them dead.

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This article is a part of the Special Issue: Pandemic Asia, Part II. See the Table ofContents here.

See the Table of Contents for Part I.

Readers of this special may be also interested in another COVID-19 special, VulnerablePopulations Under COVID-19 in Japan, edited by David H. Slater.

Nastassja Quijano is a development professional specializing in monitoring andevaluation. nbquijano@protonmail.com

Ica Fernandez is a spatial planner working on the intersections of urban governance,culture, and armed conflict. mcfernandez@protonmail.com

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Abbey Pangilinan is an urban planner and development worker immersed in socialprotection and poverty reduction programs. pangilinan.abbey@protonmail.com

This report contains maps by spatial planner Wilfredo Dizon, Jr. and the authors.