Miriam Defensor Santiago et al vs COMELEC

Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with COMELEC a “Petition to Amend the Constitution to Lift Term Limits of elective Officials by People’s Initiative” on 6 Dec 1996. The COMELEC then, upon its approval, set the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country, caused the necessary publication of the said petition in papers of general circulation, and instructed local election registrars to assist petitioners and volunteers in establishing signing stations. On 18 Dec 1996, MD Santiago et al filed a special civil action for prohibition against the Delfin Petition. Santiago argued the following:

1.) the constitutional provision on people’s initiative to amend the constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress and no such law has yet been passed by Congress

2.) RA 6735 indeed provides for three systems of initiative namely, initiative on the Constitution, on statues and on local legislation.

The two latter forms of initiative were specifically provided for in Subtitles II and III thereof but no provisions were specifically made for initiatives on the Constitution. This omission indicates that the matter of people’s initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some future law – as pointed out by former Senator Arturo Tolentino.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 6735 was intended to include initiative on amendments to the constitution and if so whether the act, as worded, adequately covers such initiative.

HELD: RA 6735 is intended to include the system of initiative on amendments to the constitution but is unfortunately inadequate to cover that system. Sec 2 of Article 17 of the Constitution provides: “Amendments to this constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least there per centum of the registered voters therein. . . The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right” This provision is obviously not self-executory as it needs an enabling law to be passed by Congress. Joaquin Bernas, a member of the 1986 Con-Con stated “without implementing legislation Section 2, Art 17 cannot operate. Thus, although this mode of amending the constitution is a mode of amendment which bypasses Congressional action in the last analysis is still dependent on Congressional action.”  Bluntly stated, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of inititative would remain entombed in the cold niche of the constitution until Congress provides for its implementation. The people cannot exercise such right, though constitutionally guaranteed, if Congress for whatever reason does not provide for its implementation.

 

***Note of course that this ruling has been reversed on November 20, 2006 when ten justices of the SC ruled that RA 6735 is adequate enough to enable such initiative.

Lambino et al vs COMELEC

Facts: Petitioners Raul Lambino, Erico Aumentado and other members of the “Lambino Group” filed a petition with COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition using RA 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act. They stated that their petition includes the support of 6,327,952 people constituting the required number of at least 12 per centum of all registered voters and which 3 per centum of registered voters of each legislative district is represented in the petition therein. COMELEC verified these said number of signatures. The group called for the shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of Government. COMELEC then blocked the said petition for lack of enabling law.

Issue: whether the petition of the Lambino group is in accordance to Sec.2 Article VXII of the Constitution regarding amendments to the Constitution through people’s initiative.

Held: NO. The Constitution clearly states that amendments to the Constitution shall be “directly” proposed by the people through a petition. With this, our framers clearly intended that the people must author the said petition and shall thus include his or her signature and no other individual can sign in his/her behalf, and that as an initiative the proposal must be embodied in the petition. The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the face of the petition, or attached to it. If so attached, the petition must state the fact of such attachment. The Constitution clearly intends that the people shall sign on a petition that contains the full text of the amendments so as to inform those signatories of the nature and effect of the proposed amendments. The Lambino group clearly failed in this matter as they conducted their collection of signatures by merely asking in the signature sheet if the people agree of the shift from a Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of Government and thus clearly did not include the facts that proposed amendments. Therefore, the petition of the Lambino group is unconstitutional for it did not “directly” proposed amendments to the Constitution through people’s initiative.

Case Digest: The Holy See vs. Rosario, Jr.

G.R. No. 101949                01 December 1994

FACTS:

This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land consisting of 6,000 square meters located in the Municipality of Paranaque.  Said lot was contiguous with two other lots.  These lots were sold to Ramon Licup.  In view of the refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots sold, a dispute arose as to who of the parties has the responsibility of evicting and clearing the land of squatters.  Complicating the relations of the parties was the sale by petitioner of the lot of concern to Tropicana.

ISSUE:

Whether the Holy See is immune from suit insofar as its business relations regarding selling a lot to a private entity

RULING:

As expressed in Section 2 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution, we have adopted the generally accepted principles of International Law.  Even without this affirmation, such principles of International Law are deemed incorporated as part of the law of the land as a condition and consequence of our admission in the society of nations.  In the present case, if petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary course of real estate business, surely the said transaction can be categorized as an act jure gestionis.  However, petitioner has denied that the acquisition and subsequent disposal of the lot were made for profit but claimed that it acquired said property for the site of its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines. 

The Holy See is immune from suit for the act of selling the lot of concern is non-proprietary in nature.  The lot was acquired by petitioner as a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila.  The donation was made not for commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct thereon the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio.  The decision to transfer the property and the subsequent disposal thereof are likewise clothed with a governmental character.  Petitioner did not sell the lot for profit or gain.  It merely wanted to dispose of the same because the squatters living thereon made it almost impossible for petitioner to use it for the purpose of the donation.  

G.R. No. L-30671 November 28, 1973REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.HON. GUILLERMO P. VILLASOR, ET. AL.

FACTS:In the petition filed by the Republic of the Philippines, a summary

of facts was set forth thus: A decision was rendered in favor of respondents P. J. Kiener Co.,

Ltd., Gavino Unchuan, and International Construction Corporation, and against the petitioner herein, confirming the arbitration award in the amount of P1,712,396.40, subject of Special Proceedings. Respondent Judge Villasor, issued an Order declaring the aforestated decision final and executory, directing the Sheriffs of Rizal Province, Quezon City [as well as] Manila to execute the said decision. Pursuant to the said Order, the corresponding Alias Writ of Execution [was issued]. On the strength of the afore-mentioned Alias Writ of Execution, the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal (respondent herein) served notices of garnishment with several Banks, specially on the monies due the Armed Forces of the Philippines in the form of deposits sufficient to cover the amount mentioned in the said Writ of Execution. The Philippine Veterans Bank received the same notice of garnishment. The funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines on deposit with the Banks, particularly, with the Philippine Veterans Bank and the Philippine National Bank [or] their branches are public funds duly appropriated and allocated for the payment of pensions of retirees, pay and allowances of military and civilian personnel and for maintenance and operations of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

ISSUE: WON the Republic can invoke state immunity from suit.

HELD: YES.Since government funds and properties may not be seized under

writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by law. The functions andpublic services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law.

See also digest from AAA

Case Digest: Sanders and Moreau, Jr. vs. Veridiano II

10 June 1988                      G.R. No. L-56930

FACTS:

Rossi and Wyer were advised that their employment had been converted from permanent full-time to permanent part-time.  Their reaction was to protest this conversion and to institute grievance proceedings conformably to the pertinent rules and regulations of the US DoD.  Moreau sent to the Chief of Naval Personnel explaining the change of employment status of the two from which Rossi and Wyer filed in the Court of First Instance of Olongapo City a complaint for damages against the herein petitioners claiming that the letters contained libelous imputations against the two.  Due to the failure to appear in the court, Moreau and Sanders were declared in default.

ISSUE: 

Whether the petitioners were performing their official duties when they did the acts for which they have been sued for damages.

RULING:

It is abundantly clear in the present case that the acts for which the petitioners are being called to account were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties.  Sanders, as director of the special services department of NAVSTA, undoubtedly had supervision over its personnel and had a hand in their employment, work assignments, discipline, dismissal and other related matters.  The same can be said for Moreau.  Given the official character of the above-described letters, it can be concluded that the petitioners were being sued as officers of the United States government.  There should be no question by now that such complaint cannot prosper unless the government sought to be held ultimately liable has given its consent to be sued.

Ichong v. Hernandez

Lao Ichong is a Chinese businessman who entered the country to take advantage of business opportunities herein abound (then) – particularly in the retail business. For some time he and his fellow Chinese businessmen enjoyed a “monopoly” in the local market in Pasay. Until in June 1954 when Congress passed the RA 1180 or the Retail Trade Nationalization Act the purpose of which is to reserve to Filipinos the right to engage in the retail business. Ichong then petitioned for the nullification of the said Act on the ground that it contravened several treaties concluded by the RP which, according to him, violates the equal protection clause (pacta sund servanda). He said that as a Chinese businessman engaged in the business here in the country who helps in the income generation of the country he should be given equal opportunity.

ISSUE: Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted principles.

HELD: Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case, there is no conflict at all between the raised generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal protection of the law clause “does not demand absolute equality amongst residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced”; and, that the equal protection clause “is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.”

For the sake of argument, even if it would be assumed that a treaty would be in conflict with a statute then the statute must be upheld because it represented an exercise of the police power which, being inherent could not be bargained away or surrendered through the medium of a treaty. Hence, Ichong  can no longer assert his right to operate his market stalls in the Pasay city market.

Akbayan vs Aquino - digest

FACTS:Petition for mandamus and prohibition was filed by the petitioners, as congresspersons, citizens and taxpayers, requesting respondents to submit to them the full text of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA).

Petitioner emphasize that the refusal of the government to disclose the said agreement violates there right to information on matters of public concern and of public interest. That the non-disclosure of the same documents undermines their right to effective and reasonable participation in all levels of social, political and economic decision making.

Respondent herein invoke executive privilege. They relied on the ground that the matter sought involves a diplomatic negotiation then in progress, thus constituting an exception to the right to information and the policy of full disclosure of matters that are of public concern like the JPEPA. That diplomatic negotiation are covered by the doctrine of executive privilege.

Issue:Whether or not the petition has been entirely rendered moot and academic because of the subsequent event that occurred?

Whether the information sought by the petitioners are of public concern and are still covered by the doctrine of executive privilege?

Held:On the first issue, the Supreme Court ruled that t]he principal relief petitioners are praying for is the disclosure of the contents of the JPEPA prior to its finalization between the two States parties,” public disclosure of the text of the JPEPA after its signing by the President, during the pendency of the present petition, has been largely rendered moot and academic. The text of the JPEPA having then been made accessible to the public, the petition has become moot and academic to the extent that it seeks the disclosure of the “full text” thereof.The petition is not entirely moot, however, because petitioners seek to obtain, not merely the text of the JPEPA, but also the Philippine and Japanese offers in the course of the negotiations.

Moving on to the second issue, The Supreme Court Ruled that Diplomatic negotiations, therefore, are recognized as privileged in this jurisdiction, the JPEPA negotiations constituting no exception. It bears emphasis, however, that such privilege is only presumptive. For as Senate v. Ermita holds, recognizing a type of information as privileged does not mean that it will be considered privileged in all instances. Only after a consideration of the context in which the claim is made may it be determined if there is a public interest that calls for the disclosure of the desired information, strong enough to overcome its traditionally privileged status.The court adopted also the doctrine in PMPF v. Manglapus, Wherein petitioners were seeking information from the President’s representatives on the state of the

then on-going negotiations of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement. The Court denied the petition, stressing that “secrecy of negotiations with foreign countries is not violative of the constitutional provisions of freedom of speech or of the press nor of the freedom of access to information.

Oposa v. Factoran FactsThis case is unique in that it is a class suit brought by 44 children, through their parents, claiming that they bring the case in the name of “their generation as well as those generations yet unborn.” Aiming to stop deforestation, it was filed against the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, seeking to have him cancel all the timber license agreements (TLAs) in the country and to cease and desist from accepting and approving more timber license agreements. The children invoked their right to a balanced and healthful ecology and to protection by the State in its capacity as parens patriae. The petitioners claimed that the DENR Secretary's refusal to cancel the TLAs and to stop issuing them was "contrary to the highest law of humankind-- the natural law—and violative of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and perpetuation." The case was dismissed in the lower court, invoking the law on non-impairment of contracts,so it was brought to the Supreme Courton certiorari.

IssueDid the children have the legal standing to file the case?

Ruling Yes. The Supreme Court in granting the petition ruled that the children had the legal standing to file the case based on the concept of “intergenerational responsibility”. Their right to a healthy environment carried with it an obligation to preserve that environment for the succeeding generations. In this, the Court recognized legal standing to sue on behalf of future generations. Also, the Court said, the law on non-impairment of contracts must give way to the exercise of the police power of the state in the interest of public welfare.

 1. Title: OPOSA v. Hon. Fulgencio Factoran Jr.GR No. 10183 July 30, 1993Davide, JR., J:Facts: The principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal petitioners, areall minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents. Impleadedas an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI),a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purposeof, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of ourenvironment and natural resources. The original defendant was the HonorableFulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environmentand Natural Resources (DENR). His substitution in this petition by the newSecretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered uponproper motion by the petitioners. 1 The complaint 2 was instituted as ataxpayers' class suit 3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens ofthe Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit,use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country'svirgin tropical forests." The same was filed for themselves and others whoare equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "sonumerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court." Theminors further asseverate that they "represent their generation as well asgenerations yet unborn."

Angara v. Electoral Commission

In the elections of Sept 17, 1935, Angara, and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua et al. were candidates voted for the position of member of the National Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas. On Oct 7, 1935, Angara was proclaimed as member-elect of the NA for the said district. On November 15, 1935, he took his oath of office. On Dec 3, 1935, the NA in session assembled, passed Resolution No. 8 confirming the election of the members of the National Assembly against whom no protest had thus far been filed. On Dec 8, 1935, Ynsua, filed before the Electoral Commission a “Motion of Protest” against the election of Angara. On Dec 9, 1935, the EC adopted a resolution, par. 6 of which fixed said date as the last day for the filing of protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the NA, notwithstanding the previous confirmation made by the NA. Angara filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that by virtue of the NA proclamation, Ynsua can no longer protest. Ynsua argued back by claiming that EC proclamation governs and that the EC can take cognizance of the election protest and that the EC cannot be subject to a writ of prohibition from the SC.

ISSUES: Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over such matter.

Whether or not EC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the election protest.

HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Angara. The SC emphasized that in cases of conflict between the several departments and among the agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the SC as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism devised finally to resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries.

That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases and controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the government transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority.

That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific powers and functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification to the legislative than to any of the other two departments of the government.

That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly.

Case Digest: Dante O. Casibang vs. Honorable Narciso A. Aquino

20 August 1979

FACTS:

Yu was proclaimed on November 1971 as the elected mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan.  Casibang, his only rival, filed a protest against election on the grounds of rampant vote buying, anomalies and irregularities and others. During the proceedings of this case, the 1973 Constitution came into effect.  Respondent Yu moved to dismiss the election protest of the petitioner on the ground that the trial court had lost jurisdiction over the same in view of the effectivity of the new Constitution and the new parliamentary form of government.

ISSUES:

1. Whether Section 9, Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution rendered the protest moot and academic; and

2. Whether Section 2, Article XI thereof entrusted to the National Assembly the revamp of the entire local government structure.

RULING:

1. As stated in Santos vs. Castaneda, “the constitutional grant of privilege to continue in office, made by the new Constitution for the benefit of persons who were incumbent officials or employees of the Government when the new Constitution took effect, cannot be fairly construed as indiscriminately encompassing every person who at the time happened to be performing the duties of an elective office, albeit under protest or contest" and that "subject to the constraints specifically mentioned in Section 9, Article XVII of the Transitory Provisions, it neither was, nor could have been the intention of the framers of our new fundamental law to disregard and shunt aside the statutory right of a candidate for elective position who, within the time-frame prescribed in the Election Code of 1971, commenced proceedings beamed mainly at the proper determination in a judicial forum of a proclaimed candidate-elect's right to the contested office.”

2. Section 2 of Article XI does not stigmatize the issue in that electoral protest case with a political color. For simply, that section allocated unto the National Assembly the power to enact a local government code "which may not thereafter be amended except by a majority of all its Members, defining a more

responsive and accountable local government allocating among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and providing for their qualifications, election and removal, term, salaries, powers, functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units" but "... any change in the existing form of local government shall not take effect until ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose." 

Rodriguez v. Gella

Rodriguez et al seek to invalidate EO. 545 and 546 issued in 1952, the first appropriating the sum of P37,850,500 for urgent and essential public works, and the second setting aside the sum of P11,367,600 for relief in the provinces and cities visited by typhoons, floods, droughts, earthquakes, volcanic action and other calamities. These EO’s were pursuant to CA 671. Note that prior to Araneta vs Dinglasan, Congress passed HB 727 intending to revoke CA 671 but the President due to the Korean War and his perception that war is still subsisting as a fact vetoed the same. ISSUE: Whether or not the EO’s are valid. HELD: As similarly decided in the Araneta case, the EO’s issued in pursuant to CA 671 shall be rendered ineffective. The president did not invoke any actual emergencies or calamities emanating from the last world war for which CA 671 has been intended. Without such invocation, the veto of the president cannot be of merit for the emergency he feared cannot be attributed to the war contemplated in CA 671. Even if the president vetoed the repealing bill the intent of Congress must be given due weight. For it would be absurd to contend otherwise. For "while Congress might delegate its power by a simple majority, it might not be able to recall them except by two-third vote. In other words, it would be easier for Congress to delegate its powers than to take them back. This is not right and is not, and ought not to be the law." Act No. 671 may be likened to an ordinary contract of agency, whereby the consent of the agent is necessary only in the sense that he cannot be compelled to accept the trust, in the same way that the principal cannot be forced to keep the relation in eternity or at the will of the agent. Neither can it be suggested that the agency created under the Act is coupled with interest.

 US v Ang Tang HoGR L-17122February 27, 1922JohnsFacts:The Philippine Legislature enacted Act 2868 with one of its salient provisions, Section 1,authorizing the governor-General “fro any cause resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate temporary rules and emergencymeasures for carrying out the purposes of the Act”. Thus, on August 1, 1919, theGovernor-General signed EO 53, fixing the price of rice. On August 6, 1919, Ang TangHo was caught selling a ganta of rice at the price of eighty centavos, a price higher thanthat fixed by EO 53. Defendant was found guilty and now assails the constitutionality of the Act 2868 for invalid delegation of legislative powers.

He appealed the sentence countering that there is an undue delegation of power to the Governor General. ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation to the Governor General. HELD: Fist of, Ang Tang Ho’s conviction must be reversed because he committed the act prior to the publication of the EO. Hence, he cannot be ex post facto charged of the crime. Further, one cannot be convicted of a violation of a law or of an order issued pursuant to the law when both the law and the order fail to set up an ascertainable standard of guilt. The said Act, as to the judgment of the SC, wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what the standard policy should contain, so that it could be put in use as a uniform policy required to take the place of all others without the determination of the insurance commissioner in respect to matters involving the exercise of a legislative discretion that could not be delegated, and without which the act could not possibly be put in use. The law must be complete in all its terms and provisions when it leaves the legislative branch of the government and nothing must be left to the judgment of the electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti, but which may be left to take effect in future, if necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.

Ynot v. IAC

There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos (EO 626). To strengthen the law, Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only banned the movement of carabaos from interprovinces but as well as the movement of carabeef. On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot was caught transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo. He was then charged in violation of EO 626-A. Ynot averred EO 626-A as unconstitutional for it violated his right to be heard or his right to due process. He said that the authority provided by EO 626-A to outrightly confiscate carabaos even without being heard is unconstitutional. The lower court ruled against Ynot ruling that the EO is a valid exercise of police power in order to promote general welfare so as to curb down the indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos.

ISSUE: Whether or not the law is valid.

HELD: The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due process. EO 626-A created a presumption based on the judgment of the executive. The movement of carabaos from one area to the other does not mean a subsequent slaughter of the same would ensue. Ynot should be given to defend himself and explain why the carabaos are being transferred before they can be confiscated. The SC  found that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.

Case Digest: Emmanuel Pelaez vs. The Auditor General

FACTS:

From September 4, 1964 to October 29, 1964 the President of the Philippines issued executive orders to create thirty-three municipalities pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code.  Public funds thereby stood to be disbursed in the implementation of said executive orders. 

Suing as a private citizen and taxpayer, Vice President Emmanuel Pelaez filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction against the Auditor General.  It seeks to restrain from the respondent or any person acting in his behalf, from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of the executive orders aforementioned.

ISSUE:

Whether the executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that the President does not have the authority to create municipalities as this power has been vested in the legislative department.

Held:

Petition granted. The said EOs was declared null and void. The rationale is that Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code grants the President the power to create municipalities does not meet the requirements for the delegation of powers. It does not carry out any policy implemented by the president. If the validity of the delegation were upheld, there would no longer legal basis to whatever the president would do that may require public welfare or interest. Doctrine: Congress may delegate but it is essential that it should be complete that there is a policy to be executed and there is a fix standard; that there is a limit that the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions

Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC

Facts: Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte. Private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, a candidate for the same position, filed a petition for cancellation and disqualification with the COMELEC alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. Private respondent contended that petitioner lacked the Constitution's one-year residency requirement for candidates for the House of Representatives.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner has satisfied the residency requirement as mandated by Art. VI, Sec. 6 of the Constitution

Held: For election purposes, residence is used synonymously with domicile. The Court upheld the qualification of petitioner, despite her own declaration in her certificate of candidacy that she had resided in the district for only 7 months, because of the following: (a) a minor follows the domicile of her parents; Tacloban became petitioner’s domicile of origin by operation of law when her father brought the family to Leyte; (b) domicile of origin is lost only when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose; in the absence of clear and positive proof of the concurrence of all these, the domicile of origin should be deemed to continue; (c) the wife does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile because the term “residence” in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law; when petitioner married President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not a domicilium necessarium; (d) even assuming that she gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired the right to choose a new one only after her husband died, her acts following her return to the country clearly indicate that she chose

Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice.

Held see AAA

Case Digest: Osmeña, Jr. vs. Pendatun, et. al.

G.R. No. L-17144               28 October 1960               

Ponente: Bengzon, J.

FACTS:

Congressman Osmeña took the floor on the one-hour privilege to deliver a speech, entitled ‘A Message to Garcia’ wherein said speech contained serious imputations of bribery against the President.  Being unable to produce evidence thereof, Osmeña was then found to be guilty of serious disorderly behaviour by the House of Representatives.  Osmeña argues that the Constitution gave him complete parliamentary immunity, and so, for words spoken in the House, he ought not to be questioned.

 ISSUE: Whether or not Osmena’s immunity has been violated? HELD: Section 15, Article 6 of the 1935 Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity upon member s of the legislature which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every parliament in a democratic world. It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum outside the Hall of Congress. However, it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body whenever his words and conduct are considered disorderly or unbecoming of a member therein. Therefore, Osmena’s petition is dismissed.

Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. vs. Hon. Pedro Gimenez[GR No. L-17931 February 28, 1963]

Facts:This is a request for review of the Auditor Generals decision of denying the petitioner refunds pertaining to their purchase of foreign exchange for the importation of urea and formaldehyde.Sec 2 of RA 2609 exempts payment of foreign exchange for those importing 'Urea formaldehyde" for the manufacture of plywood and hardboard.

Issue:WON "Urea formaldehyde" and 'Urea and formaldehyde' be considered the same and be exempt from payment of foreign exchange.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Auditor General. Urea formaldehyde is distinct comparing to the terms Urea and Formaldehyde. The latter being the two separate chemicals while the latter is formed as a condensation product from definite proportions of urea and formaldehyde under certain conditions relating to temperature, acidity, and time of reaction.

HeldNo. The RA 2609, Section 2 paragraph XVII reads:“The margin established by the Monetary Board pursuant to the provision of section one hereof shall not be imposed upon the sale of foreign exchange for the importation of the following:XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardboard when imported by and for the exclusive use of end-users.”

Senate of the Philippines vs. Eduardo ErmitaG.R. No. 169777 April 20, 2006

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Facts: The Committee of the Senate as a whole issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China National Machinery and Equipment Group (hereinafter North Rail Project).

The President then issued Executive Order 464, "Ensuring Observance of the Principle of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and For Other Purposes," which, pursuant to Section 6 thereof, took effect immediately.

Issues: 1. Whether or not E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress;

2. Whether or E.O. 464 violates the right of the people to information on matters of public concern; and

3. Whether or not respondents have committed grave abuse of discretion when they implemented E.O. 464 prior to its publication in a newspaper of general circulation.

Held:1. The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution. This power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch; it is co-extensive with the power to legislate. The matters which may be a proper subject of legislation and those which may be a proper subject of investigation

are one. It follows that the operation of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation.

2. Yes. Although there are clear distinctions between the right of Congress to information which underlies the power of inquiry and the right of the people to information on matters of public concern, any executive issuance tending to unduly limit disclosures of information in investigations in Congress necessarily deprives the people of information which, being presumed to be in aid of legislation, is presumed to be a matter of public concern.

3. Yes. While E.O. 464 applies only to officials of the executive branch, it does not follow that the same is exempt from the need for publication.

Romulo Neri v. Senate Committee on Public Accountability

On 21 April 2007, DOTC entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of $329,481,290.00 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the PRC. The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. On the other hand, De Venecia issued a statement that several high executive officials and power brokers were using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA. Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared in one hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking “executive privilege”. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve. He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the SRBC averring that the communications between GMA and Neri is privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs Ermita be applied. The SRBC cited Neri for contempt.

ISSUE: Whether or not the three questions sought by the SRBC to be answered falls under executive privilege.

HELD: The oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by

compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation.

The communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege.

1st, the communications relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable power” of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.

2nd, the communications are “received” by a close advisor of the President. Under the “operational proximity” test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyo’s cabinet. And

3rd, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance

Tolentino et al is questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716 otherwise known as the EVAT Law. Tolentino averred that this revenue bill did not exclusively originate from the HoR as required by Sec 24, Art 6 of the CONST. Even though RA 7716 originated as HB 11197 and that it passed the 3 readings in the HoR, the same did not complete the 3 readings in Senate for after the 1st reading it was referred to the SW&M Committee thereafter Senate passed its own version known as SB 1630. Tolentino averred that what Senate could have done is amend HB11197 by striking out its text and substituting it w/ the text of SB 1630 in that way “the bill remains a HB and the Senate version just becomes the text (only the text) of the HB”. Tolentino and co-petitioner Roco even signed the said SB. ISSUE: Whether or not EVAT originated in the HoR. HELD: By a 9-6 vote, the SC rejected the challenge, holding that such consolidation was consistent with the power of the Senate to propose or concur with amendments to the version originated in the HoR. What the Constitution simply means, according to the 9 justices, is that the initiative must come from the HoR. Note also that there were several instances before where Senate passed its own version rather than having the HoR version as far as revenue and other such bills are concerned. This practice of amendment by substitution has always been accepted. The proposition of Tolentino concerns a mere matter of form. There is no showing that it would make a significant difference if Senate were to adopt his over what has been done.

Bengzon v. Drilon

On 15 Jan 1992, some provisions of the Special Provision for the Supreme Court and the Lower Court’s General Appropriations were vetoed by the President because a resolution by the Court providing for appropriations for retired justices has been enacted. The vetoed bill provided for the increase of the pensions of the retired justices of the Supreme Court, and the Court of Appeals as well as members of the Constitutional Commission. ISSUE: Whether or not the veto of the President on that portion of the General Appropriations bill is constitutional. HELD: The Justices of the Court have vested rights to the accrued pension that is due to them in accordance to Republic Act 1797. The president has no power to set aside and override the decision of the Supreme Court neither does the president have the power to enact or amend statutes promulgated by her predecessors much less to the repeal of existing laws. The veto is unconstitutional since the power of the president to disapprove any item or items in the appropriations bill does not grant the authority to veto part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of said item. NOTES: Pocket Veto Not Allowed Under the Constitution, the President does not have the so-called pocket-veto power, i.e., disapproval of a bill by inaction on his part. The failure of the President to communicate his veto of any bill represented to him within 30 days after the receipt thereof automatically causes the bill to become a law.

This rule corrects the Presidential practice under the 1935 Constitution of releasing veto messages long after he should have acted on the bill. It also avoids uncertainty as to what new laws are in force. When is it allowed? The exception is provided in par (2),Sec 27 of Art 6 of the Constitution which grants the President power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill. The veto in such case shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object. 3 ways how a bill becomes a law. 1. When the President signs it2. When the President vetoes it but the veto is overridden by 2/3 vote of all the members of each House; and3. When the president does not act upon the measure within 30 days after it shall have been presented to him.

Marcos v. Manglapus, et. al.

Facts: Former President Ferdinand Marcos petitions the SC for mandamus and prohibition asking to order respondents to issue travel documents to him and his immediate family and to enjoin the implementation of the President’s decision to bar their return to the Philippines.

Issue: WON the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines, in the exercise of the powers granted in her by the Constitution.

Ruling: Affirmative. Although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of “executive power”. The powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. Whatever power inherent in the government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive. Even the members of the Legislature has recognized that indeed Mrs. Aquino has the power under the Constitution to bar the Marcoses from returning, as per House Resolution No. 1342.

Marcos v Manglapus, et. al.

Facts: Same as above, except that Ferdinand has died.

Held: Among the duties of the President under the Constitution, in compliance with his (or her) oath of office, is to protect and promote the interest and welfare of the people. Her decision to bar the return of

the Marcoses and subsequently, the remains of Mr. Marcos at the present time and under present circumstances is in compliance with this bounden duty. In the absence of a clear showing that she had acted with arbitrariness or with grave abuse of discretion in arriving at this decision, the Court will not enjoin the implementation of this decision.

Estrada v. Desierto; Estrada v. Macapagal-Arroyo

Estrada alleges that he is the President on leave while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo claims she is the President. From the beginning of Erap’s term, he was plagued by problems that slowly but surely eroded his popularity.  His sharp descent from power started on October 4, 2000.  Singson, a longtime friend of the Estrada, went on air and accused the Estrada, his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords. The exposé immediately ignited reactions of rage. On January 19, the fall from power of the petitioner appeared inevitable.  At 1:20 p.m., the petitioner informed Executive Secretary Edgardo Angara that General Angelo Reyes, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, had defected. January 20 turned to be the day of surrender. On January 22, the Monday after taking her oath, respondent Arroyo immediately discharged the powers and duties of the Presidency.  After his fall from the pedestal of power, the Erap’s legal problems appeared in clusters.  Several cases previously filed against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion.

ISSUE: Whether or not Arroyo is a legitimate (de jure) president.

HELD: The SC holds that the resignation of Estrada cannot be doubted.  It was confirmed by his leaving Malacañang.  In the press release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with the reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation.  He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and that he was going to

re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them.  Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President; (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our country.  Estrada’s reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.  Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the presidency.  The press release was petitioner’s valedictory, his final act of farewell.  His presidency is now in the past tense. Even if Erap can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily.  That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure President made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.

Case Digest: Ulpiano Sarmiento III and Juanito G. Arcialla vs. Salvador Mison and Guillermo Carague

No. L-79974        December 17, 1987En Banc

FACTS:

When Salvador Mison was appointed to the Office of the Commissioner of Bureau of Customs, this petition for prohibition filed by taxpayers, lawyers, members of the IBP and professors of Constitutional was filed on the grounds that said appointment is in violation of Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution for it was not approved by the Commission on Appointments.

ISSUE:  Whether said appointment is indeed unconstitutional basing on Section 16, Article VII.

RULING:

Mison’s appointment is constitutional.  Sec. 16, Article VII states that:

“Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. x x x”

It is clear that the first group shall need the confirmation of the CoA.  Also, it can be seen from reviewing the records of deliberation of the 1986 Constitutional Commission that it has beenclearly stated that appointments to the second and third groups of officers can be made by the President without the confirmation of the CoA.  In the issue at hand, it is evident that the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one of those within the first group of appointments where the consent of the CoA is required. 

Furthermore, the President is expressly authorized by law to appoint the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs under Sec. 601 of R.A. 1937 which states that “Sec. 601. – x x x The Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner of Customs shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines.”

Villena v. Interior

AAA

David v. Macapagal-Arroyo

3. "Take Care" Power of the President4. Powers of the Chief Executive5. The power to promulgate decrees belongs to the Legislature

FACTS:

These 7 consolidated petitions question the validity of PP 1017 (declaring a state of national emergency) and General Order No. 5 issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. While the cases are pending, President Arroyo issued PP 1021, declaring that the state of national emergency has ceased to exist, thereby, in effect, lifting PP 1017.

ISSUE:

4. Whether or not PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 arrogated upon the President the power to enact laws and decrees

5. If so, whether or not PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional

HELD:

“Take-Care” Power

This refers to the power of the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed, based on Sec. 17, Art. VII: “The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.”

As the Executive in whom the executive power is vested, the primary function of the President is to enforce the laws as well as to formulate policies to be embodied in existing laws. He sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his department. Before assuming office, he is required to take an oath or affirmation to the effect that as President of the Philippines, he will, among others, “execute its laws.” In the exercise of such function, the President, if needed, may employ the powers attached to his office as the Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces of the country, including the Philippine National Police under the Department of Interior and Local Government.

The specific portion of PP 1017 questioned is the enabling clause: “to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction.”

Is it within the domain of President Arroyo to promulgate “decrees”?

The President is granted an Ordinance Power under Chap. 2, Book III of E.O. 292. President Arroyo’s ordinance power is limited to those issuances mentioned in the foregoing provision. She cannot issue decrees similar to those issued by Former President Marcos under PP 1081. Presidential Decrees are laws which are of the same category and binding force as statutes because they were issued by the President in the exercise of his legislative power during the period of Martial Law under the 1973 Constitution.

This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority to promulgate “decrees.” Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Sec. 1, Art. VI categorically states that “the legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.” To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify President Arroyo’s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees.

But can President Arroyo enforce obedience to all decrees and laws through the military?

As this Court stated earlier, President Arroyo has no authority to enact decrees. It follows that these decrees are void and, therefore, cannot be enforced. With respect to “laws,” she cannot call the military to enforce or implement certain laws, such as customs laws, laws governing family and property relations, laws on obligations and contracts and the like. She can only order the military, under PP 1017, to enforce laws pertinent to its duty to suppress lawless violence.

Monsanto v. Factoran

Monsanto was the Asst Treasurer of Calbayug City. She was charged for the crime of Estafa through Falsification of Public Documents. She was found guilty and was sentenced to jail. She was however granted pardon by Marcos. She then wrote a letter to the Minister of Finance for her to be reinstated to her former position since it was still vacant. She was also requesting for back pays. The Minister of Finance referred the issue to the Office of the President and Factoran denied Monsanto’s request averring that Monsanto must first seek appointment and that the pardon does not reinstate her former position. Also, Monsanto avers that by reason of the pardon, she should no longer be compelled to answer for the civil liabilities brought about by her acts.

ISSUE: Whether or not Monsanto should be reinstated to her former post.

HELD: A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for the past. It affords no relief for what has been suffered by the offender. It does not impose upon the government any obligation to make reparation for what has been suffered. “Since the offense has been established by judicial proceedings, that which has been done or suffered while they were in force is presumed to have been rightfully done and justly suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be required.” This would explain why petitioner, though pardoned, cannot be entitled to receive backpay for lost earnings and benefits. On the other hand, civil liability arising from crime is governed by the RPC. It subsists notwithstanding service of sentence, or for any reason the sentence is not served by pardon, amnesty or commutation of sentence. Petitioner’s civil liability may only be extinguished by the same causes recognized in the Civil Code, namely: payment, loss of the thing due, remission of the debt, merger of the rights of creditor and debtor, compensation and novation.

Case Digest: Kilosbayan, Incorporated, et. al. vs. Teofisto Guingona, PCSO and PGMC

05 May 1994                       G.R. No. 113375

Ponente: Davide, JR., J.

FACTS:

The PCSO decided to establish an online lottery system for the

purpose of increasing its revenue base and diversifying its sources of funds.  Sometime before March 1993, after learning that the PCSO was interested in operating on an online lottery system, the Berjaya Group Berhad, with its affiliate, the International Totalizator Systems, Inc. became interested to offer its services and resources to PCSO.  Considering the citizenship requirement, the PGMC claims that Berjaya Group undertook to reduce its equity stakes in PGMC to 40% by selling 35% out of the original 75% foreign stockholdings to local investors.  An open letter was sent to President Ramos strongly opposing the setting up of an online lottery system due to ethical and moral concerns, however the project pushed through.

ISSUES:

6. Whether the petitioners have locus standi (legal standing); and7. Whether the Contract of Lease is legal and valid in light of Sec.

1 of R.A. 1169 as amended by B.P. Blg. 42.RULING:

6. The petitioners have locus standi due to the transcendental importance to the public that the case demands.  The ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect the social, economic and moral well-being of the people.  The legal standing then of the petitioners deserves recognition, and in the exercise of its sound discretion, the Court brushes aside the procedural barrier.

Sec. 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, prohibits the PCSO from holding and conducting lotteries “in collaboration, association or joint venture with any person, association, company, or entity, whether domestic or foreign.”  The language of the section is clear that with respect to its franchise or privilege “to hold and conduct charity sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similar activities,” the PCSO cannot exercise it “in collaboration, association or joint venture” with any other party.  This is the unequivocal meaning and import of the phrase. By the exception explicitly made, the PCSO cannot share its franchise with another by way of the methods mentioned, nor can it transfer, assign or lease such franchise.  

Sixto Brillantes, Jr. vs. Haydee B. Yorac[G.R. No. 93867.  December 18, 1990.] FACTS: Respondent, as Associate COMELEC Chairman, was appointed by the President as Chairman thereof, replacing former Chairman Hilario Davide; the former chairman was appointed to the fact-finding commission regarding the December 1989 Coup d’ etat.

Petitioner moved for her removal, stating that her appointment was contrary to Article IX-C, Section 1(2) of the 1987 Constitution, where "(I)n no case shall any Member (of the Commission on Elections) be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity." Issue: Is respondent’s appointment as Chairman in the case at bar unconstitutional. Ruling: Yes. Article IX-A Section 1 of the Constitution expressly provides for the independence of the Constitutional Commissions from the executive department; this means that they are governed by the Constitution itself and cannot be under the control of the President.

Francisco v. House of Representatives

FACTS: Within a period of 1 year, 2 impeachment proceedings were filed against Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario Davide. The justiciable controversy in this case was the constitutionality of the subsequent filing of a second complaint to controvert the rules of impeachment

provided for by law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives is constitutional, and whether the resolution thereof is a political question — h; as resulted in a political crisis.

HELD: Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the House of Representativesare unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.

RATIO: Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the imp eachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial a ction taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, anothe r may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former P resident Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Comm ittee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Re presentatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the

Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition again st the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable office r within a one-year period.