Military Technology and World History - A Reconnaissance (Barton C. Hacker)

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Military Technology and World History: A ReconnaissanceAuthor(s): Barton C. HackerReviewed work(s):Source: The History Teacher, Vol. 30, No. 4 (Aug., 1997), pp. 461-487Published by: Society for History EducationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/494141 .

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Military

Technology

and

World

History:

A

Reconnaissance*

Barton C.

Hacker

Lawrence

Livermore ational

Laboratory

MILITARY INSTITUTIONS,like other social institutions,organize

major

areas

of

values, attitudes,

and interests

in the

service

of critical

social needs.

Unlike most social

institutions, however,

military

institu-

tions

appear

only

in

state or near-statesocieties.

They

are

closely

linked

with the

origin

of

civilization,

may

in

fact be a

necessary

if

not sufficient

cause

for the

transition o state

organization

and civilized life.

Whatever

their causal

role,

military

nstitutions ie

very

close

to the core of civiliza-

tions as

they

have

developed,

both the armaturearoundwhich

complex

societies have

shaped

themselves and the model

they

have often followed

in organizing social action.1Institutions of such importancedeserve a

good

deal

more

study

than

they

have

usually

received.

Relationships

between

military

institutions

and

technological

change

have

also

regularly

made

history.

Understanding echnological

change

requires

paying

attentionto interactions

between

technology

and social

institutions,

because social

change impacts

technology

no less than

tech-

nological

change impacts society.

And

just

as

military

nstitutions

are but

varieties of social

institutions,

so too

military-technological

hange

is but

a

variety

of social

change.

Technological

nnovationof almost

every

kind

has historicallyansweredmore to militarypurposethancommonly al-

lowed. This is not

simply

a matterof

technological

change

fostered

by

The

History

Teacher Volume 30 Number

4

August

1997

?

The

Society

for

History

Education



462 Barton

C.

Hacker

wartimedemands.The

sporadic mpact

of

a

specific

war or

wars,

or even

of

war

in

general,pales

in

comparison

with the

powerful

and

persistent,

f

not

always

obvious,

interaction

of

military

with

other

social

institutions

over

extended

periods

of time.

By

the

same

token,

changing

technolo-

gies,

whether

explicitly

military,

military

sponsored,

or

military

influ-

enced,

have exerted

profound

nstitutionaleffects.2

Fundamental

hanges

in

military

echnology

and

institutions

may

well

serve

as

useful benchmarks or

organizing

a

study

of

general

history

that

addresses

deeper

structures

of

stability

and

change

in

addition

to more

superficial

patterns

of

event and

personality.

This

is

militaryhistory

of

a

kind,

but

not the usual kind. In

my story,

the

plot hinges

far less on

battles

and wars than on the

significance

of

militaryorganization

and

weaponry

in

the

development

of

civilizations and their

interactions,

and the actors

are

primarily

nstitutions,states,

and

societies rather han individuals

or

smaller

groups.

It

begins

with

the

invention

of armies

in

the neolithic

Near East and

concludes

early

in

the twentieth

century,

when Western

military

practice

has become the universal

norm.

My

goal

is to

suggest,

at

least

in

part,

the how

and

why

of that outcome from

a

global viewpoint.

The

first

question

must be the

origins

of

military

institutions.

Much

writing

about war and its

history

shares the

ahistorical

assumption

that

innatehuman raitssomehow account orthe formsof

organized

violence

that

really

arose

only

a

few thousand

years

ago

with the

origin

of

armies

and states.3

Differentiated

military

nstitutions irst

appeared

n

the Near

East

during

the

late

neolithic,

the fourth millennium

BC,

when

armies

began

to

supplant

he war

parties

of

kin-based

society.

Neolithic

peoples,

like

virtually

all human

groups,

fought

each

other,

but

such

fighting

should be understood

n

the

context of

primitive

warfare,

he term com-

monly applied

to

intergroup

ighting

among

nonstate

peoples.

Ritualized,

anarchic,

and

transient,

primitive

warfare s best classed with

feuding,

brawling, and other forms of

physically expressed

hostility between

individuals or small

groups,

more akin to

the

agonistic

behavior

of

nonhuman

species

than the

civilized

war

of

organized

states.4

Through

most of the neolithic

era,

archaeology

provides

few

hints of

armed

forces

or

organized

warfare

anywhere

n

Eurasia.5

Neolithic

sites

rarely

show

signs

of

fortification,

although

walls

became

the hallmark

of

the cities that define civilization.6

Specialized weapons

likewise seem

to

have been

unknown. The

first

distinct

weapon technology

emerged

with

metallurgy

n

the

transit o civilization. Other han

ornaments,

he earliest

bronze artifacts are clearly weapons, like the mace, and not merely

hunting

tools that

might

double

as mankillers.7

As bronze

weapons replaced

stone,

soldiers

replaced

warriors

and

armies became the bedrock

upon

which arose

chiefdoms,

states,

king-



Military

Technology

and

World

History:

A

Reconnaissance

463

doms,

and

empires.

The Near Eastern invention

of

armies

during

the

fourth

millennium

marked

the first and

greatest

military

revolution.

The

army

was a social

invention,

a means of

organizing

coercive

force,

of

controlling

and

directing

the efforts

of

disparate

ndividuals

toward

col-

lective

goals,

of

promoting

the

disciplined

order

necessary

to

civilized

life. War

between armies differed

radically

from

primitive

or nonstate

warfare. As a

corporate

activity

of

hierarchically

organized

state-spon-

sored

military

forces,

civilized

war demanded

cooperation

and

discipline

more than individual

prowess

or

courage.8

Developing

armies and

rising

states

went hand

in hand.

Military

forces,

however

modest,

were the

indispensable prelude

to

building

states;

growing

states,

in

turn,

yielded

resources for

enlarged

armies.

Military

institutions divided

prehistory

rom

civilization,

and the

army

was

the decisive invention.9

Bearing

this

in mind

will

go

a

long way

toward

resolving

the

paradox

Lewis

Mumfordonce

noted,

that the

rise

of

warriors...preceded

war. '0

Distinct from the

intergroup

ighting

it

succeeded,

civilized warfare

was

more

a

by-product

of armies than

their

cause.

Mesopotamian city-states

appear

first to have

crossed

the

military

divide,

followed

closely

by

the

kingdom

of

Egypt.

Armies

and

states

proliferated

during

the third millennium

BC,

either

directly

modeled on

Mesopotamian

and

Egyptian

example

or

inspired

by

word

of

distant

developments,

perhaps

sometimes even

invented

independently.

Civi-

lized

military

institutions

spread

to the

lands between

Mesopotamia

and

Egypt,

to Iran

and the

steppe

frontier,

to Anatolia

and the

European

frontier.1

Despite

once

widespread

opinion

to the

contrary, they

also

spread

o Crete and India.

Undeciphered

writing

and a dearthof

fortifica-

tions led

scholars

to

imagine

an anomalousMinoan

state,

prosperous

and

unwarlike.We

now

see the

anomalymainly

in

the

naval orientation

of

the

island's military

institutions.12

Harappan ndia, too, has lost its peaceful

image

with the

discovery

of

fortifications

and other

evidence

of armed

force,

though

its written

anguage

remains

unreadable.As

yet

unanswer-

able is

what,

if

any, military

debt

the so-called Indus

civilization

owed

to

Mesopotamia

or

Iran.13

Throughout

he earliest

period,

soldiers

marched

on foot and

fought

in

formationarmed

with

mace, axe,

sword,

spear,

and

shield. A

new

weapon,

the

composite

bow,

joined

the

armory

n the mid third

millennium.

This

mechanical innovation converted

archery

from an

annoyance

on

the

battlefield to a potentiallydecisive arm of great rangeandpower.Com-

posite

bows

demanded

much time and skill

to

manufacture,

making

them

very costly,

but their

revolutionary

implications

appear

obvious-the

first

great empires

in

the

Near

East coincide

with their

spread.

Unfortu-



464

Barton

C.

Hacker

nately,

details are

lacking

and the

precise

course

of

events remains

unclear.14From the mid

fourth to

the

mid second

millennium,

the

storywas

everywhere

much the

same-relatively

small and isolated

civilized

nuclei

expanded

sporadically

but

inexorablyagainst neighboring

societ-

ies that

succumbed

readily

to the

very

real

attractionsof

civilized

life

or

lacked the

numbers,

arms,

and

organization

o sustain

prolonged

resis-

tance. 15

When

civilized

military

techniques spread

to the

hinterlands,

a new

dynamic

evolved as the union

of

horse-drawn

hariot

and

composite

bow

in the mid

second millennium BC ostered another

military

transforma-

tion. Whether

originating

on

the

steppes,

in

the Iranian

border

zone,

or

perhaps

even in the

Mesopotamian

heartland,

armies built aroundrela-

tively

small

numbersof

chariot-borne owmen

swept

all

before

them;

on

suitable

terrain

hey

appeared

ll

but

invincible.

6

Chariotarmies

attacked

and overthrew

civilized

centers

everywhere

n

Eurasia.

Disruptions

n the

Near

Eastern

heartlands,

hough

severe,

remained

argely

without

long-

lasting

results.

Where civilized roots ran less

deeply,

more

far-reaching

consequences

ensued.

Relatively

fragile

states in the eastern Mediterra-

nean and

south Asia

collapsed

under

Aryan

assault,

Mycenaean

Greece17

and

Vedic

India18

ising

on

the

ruins.

Further

east,

Bronze

Age

chari-

oteers

may

also havefoundedthe first Chinesestate,

long

identifiedwith

the

Shang

dynasty.19

Chariots themselves became

potent

symbols

of

power,

widely

adopted

even in lands

where

they

served little

practical

purpose.20

By

the late

second millennium

BC,

elements

of

still

other

radical

changes

in

military

technology

and

organizationbegan

to coalesce.

Iron-

working

techniques apparently

devised

in

Anatolia

by

the mid second

millennium

diffused

widely

after the

Hittite

empire

fell.21

Cheap

iron

displaced

costly

bronze

as

the

preferred

metal

for

weapons

and

armor.

Lower equipmentcosts swelled the potentialnumbersof men-at-arms,

dulling

the

once-decisive

edge enjoyedby

aristocratic harioteers.22

When

iron

became

common,

infantry

reasserted tself

on civilized

battlefields

and remained the

core of state armies

for the next

thousand

years

and

more. The

spread

of iron

technology

coincided with

another

wave

of

internal

upheavals

and

barbarian

nvasions,

exemplified

in

the

Greek

dark

ges.23

The

demise of

chariotryonly temporarily nterrupted

he horse's

mili-

tary

career.

By

the

ninth

century

BC,

after

Eurasian

steppe

dwellers

had

learned how to draw the bow fromhorseback,mountedarchersbecame

the

arbitersof battle.

Equestrian echniques spread

most

widely

on the

fringes

of

civilized

society.

The

lifelong

association

of

steppe

pastoralists

with horses

gave

them

an

inherent

and

often

decisive tactical

advantage



Military

Technology

and World

History:

A Reconnaissance

465

over

sedentary

farmers for the next two

millennia. With

this

cavalry

revolution

began

the

long

era

when

animal-herding

nomads

regularly

threatened,

and

periodically conquered,

their

civilized

neighbors.24

The

apparently

Indo-European

Scythians

created the first

mounted nomad

empire

in the

West.25

Civilized

societies

could

normally

offset the

advantages

of

steppe

horsemenor

other nvaders

with

larger

populations

and

greater

resources.

By

the first

millennium

BC,

growing

economies could

support

standing

armies.26

Pioneered

by

the

neo-Assyrian

empire

early

in

the

millen-

nium,27

then

improved by

the

Persians,28

tanding

armies of even

a few

thousandmen

greatly

reinforcedcentral

power

and became

the basis for

even

greater empires.

The familiar lineaments of the classical world

became visible

by

the mid

first

millennium

BC

On the western

fringes

of

the

Persian

empire

a

constellation of Greek

city-states

asserted

their

independence29

hile

squabbling

ndlessly

among

themselves.30 In

India,

too,

wider

military

participation

made

possible

by cheaper

arms

pro-

moted

a

rough egalitarianism

within constellations of small

states con-

stantly

at war.31

The

Warring

States

period

in

China reflected

much the

same

conditions.32

But the

eclipse

of

empire proved

relatively

short-lived,

as

imperial

power

reasserted tself all acrossEurasia rom the third

century

BCo the

fifth

century

AD.

In the

West,

his

father's

reorganization

f

the

Macedonian

state

and

its

armedforces33

nabled Alexander

to

conquer

the Near

East,

Persia,

and

India.34 he Hellenistic successorscontendedwith the

Roman

republic35

ntil

Rome

emerged triumphant

nd

imperial,36

ivaled

only

to

the

east

by

Iranian

states,

first

Parthian,

hen Sasanian.37

he successive

Mauryan

and

Gupta

empires

in

India,38

f Ch'in and Han still

farther

east,39

completed

a

contiguous

chain of centralizedmonarchies

and

em-

pires

based

on

standing

armies

which

stretched rom Mediterranean

ands

to the China Sea. Fringingthis civilized band to the south in the arid

reaches of Arabia and

Africa,40

to

the

north

in vast

Eurasian

grasslands,

arose

warlike

and

intermittently

ormidable

chiefdoms,

confederations,

and

incipient

states.41

Standing

armies

helped

shield civilized societies from outside

attack,

although

raiders

constantly

probed

the bordersand

their numbers

might

quickly

swell into

full-scale assault at

signs

of

weakness

or

disorganiza-

tion. For

centuries,

heavy cavalry

armed

with

composite

bows

proved

a

most

effective counter

to

nomad

raiding.

Essential to this

success

were

the large, grain-fedhorses first bredalongthe Iranian teppefrontier ate

in the

first millennium Bc

Bigger

and

stronger

than

grass-eating

steppe

ponies,

they

could

carry

riders armored

against

nomad

weapons,

yet

move quickly

enough to block most incursions.

Because the

great

horses



466 BartonC. Hacker

lacked the stamina

or

long pursuit

and

could not flourishon the

steppe's

meagerforage, however,

the result tended toward

standoff.The frontier

fluctuated

as

first one

side,

then the

other,

gained

fleeting

advantage.42

Yet the

use

of

heavy

cavalryspread

more

slowly

from ts central

Asian

homeland than its effectiveness

might

have warranted.

Expense

was

the

reason. Civilized societies could

not

matchthe

integral

place

of horse

and

horsemanship

in

pastoral

economy

and

society

that made

cavalry

a

straightforward

xpression

of

steppe

culture.

Creating, raining,

andmain-

taining

special-purpose

cavalry

absorbed

substantial

resources;

how to

meet the costs of such

forces became

a

problem

for

every

state that

adopted

them,

and

the

costs

might

be more

than economic.

Feudalism,

the answer

pioneered

on the

Iranian

frontier,

created centers of local

military

power

that

regularly

threatened entral

authority.Despite

such

problems,

heavy

cavalry provided

an

effective

defense in

depth against

steppe raiding.

Byzantium

in

due course

adopted

its

own

version but

rejected

the feudal

trappings;

t maintained

a

centralized,

ax-supported

force

to deal

only

with seriousincursions.43

Persia and

Byzantium

both survived the mid-firstmillenniumbarbar-

ian

invasions

intact,

while even

Gupta

India benefited from the

prowess

of Iranian

heavy cavalry

whose defense of their own lands

shielded the

subcontinent rombarbariannvasionuntillatein the fifth

century

AD.44At

the further

reaches of

Eurasia,

resistance

faltered. Barbarians

irst

be-

came

legionaries,

then

rulers,

as the western Roman

empire

disinte-

grated,45

nd

through

most of the first millennium

Europe

remained a

backwater

besieged

by

wave afterwave of

invasion,46

specially

from the

north.47

In

Europe,

as

in

central

Asia,

the best

defense seemed

heavy

cavalry

based

on

feudalism.

Unlike

eastern

riders, however,

European

armored

horsemen

relied

mainly

on

lance and

stirrup,

on shock rather

than missile.48

Recovery

in

China came

more

quickly,

although

nearly

three centuries of

fragmented

polity

followed the final

collapse

of the

Han

dynasty

in

220 AD

The

restored Chinese

empire

under

the

Tang

dynasty

became an

expansionist military power during

the

later

first

millennium,

its

armies

penetrating

Korea, Indochina,

and

deep

into

cen-

tralAsia.49

During

the last half of the first millennium

AD, however,

nothing

matched

the

military expansion

of Islam. Tribal

peoples

unified for

the

first time

by

Muhammadand his successors

erupted

from the Arabian

peninsula

in

the seventh

century

AD

to create one of

the

greatest

of

all

conqueststates,the Umayyadcaliphateand its Abbasid successor. Mili-

tary

innovationhad little

to

do

with

early

Arab

successes,

nor

were Arab

armies

particularly

arge.50

Very

soon,

however,

Islamic

state-building

did

produce

a radical

innovation,

the institution

of slave

soldiery.

Slave



Military

Technology

and World

History:

A

Reconnaissance

467

soldiers

remaineda feature of Islamic

military

organization

or

the

next

millennium and

more.51

Although

their

burning

aith

and

their new state

effectively

converted

Arab

tribal warriors

into

disciplined

soldiers,

their

greatest

advantage

may

well

have been the

coincidentally

propitious

moment at

which

they

launched their

assault.

When

Arab armies marched

on

the Near Eastern

heartlands,

they

found

societies

and economies

disrupted

by

endemic

warfare,

regimes

weakened

or

distracted,

and

populations

disaffected

from

their Greek

and Persian rulers.52Within a

century,

Arab and allied

arms

carriedIslam

from the

Pyrenees

n the

west to the Hindu

Kush

in the

east. Even

Persia,

which

had

long

resisted

attack

from the

steppes

and

fought

Byzantium

to a

draw,

succumbedto

invasion

from the

south;

the

interactionof

Persian

and Arab

ultimately

transformed

slamic

military,

as well

as other

secular,

institutions.53

Constantinople

alone

survived,

withstanding

wo sustained

sieges

and so

forestallingEurope's

conquest

from

the

east,54

as the

Frankish

victory

at Tours

repelled

the Muslim

thrust n

the

west.55

As

the

second millennium

began,

however,

slowing

Muslim

expan-

sion

and

resurgence

n far

east

and

west restored he ancient

parity

among

the

civilized centers

of Eurasia.

Europe's

mounted,

armoredwarriors

had

become formidable

indeed,

as the

Crusades

testified,

though

locally

based

military

power protected

by

castle walls

kept

central

authority

precarious.56

Under

the

Sung

successors

of

the

Tang dynasty,

China

experienced

an

incipient

industrial

revolution stimulated

n

part

by

the

logistic

demands of a

million-man

army.

Military

technological

innova-

tion

also

flourished

under

official

auspices.-7

Gunpowder

irst

appeared

in

the

historical record at the

beginning

of the

eleventh

century

AD,

the

first true

firearms

toward

the

end

of the

thirteenth.Both

gunpowder

and

firearms

spread

rapidly

from China

throughout

he civilized

world.58

The ancientconditionsthat

shaped

military

relationsbetweenciviliza-

tion

and barbarism

also

had

begun

to

erode,

although

firearms

did

not

appear

soon

enough

to counter the last

great irruption

of

steppe

nomads,

the

Mongol

conquest.

The

groundwork

or

the

Mongol

empire

had been

laid

during

the

two centuries

preceding

its rise. Powerful but

relatively

short-lived

nomad states

along

China's northern rontiers

had elaborated

and

improved

administrative

and

command structures

modeled

on those

of their more

settled

neighbors. Mongol

success owed

much

to this

reorganization

of

steppe

military

and

political

institutions.59

Although

other

steppe

dwellers swelled their ranks,

Mongol

armies

seldom

matched their foes

in

size.

Sophisticated organization,

adroit

leadership, rapid

movement,

and skillful tactics-not

the vast hordes

imagined by

stunned

victims-accounted

for the

extraordinary

Mongol



468

Barton C.

Hacker

victories.6

From their

central

Asian

homeland,

Mongol

armies

swept

across

Eurasia, founding

a new

dynasty

in

China,61yoking Russia,62

overthrowing

Iran,63

and

defeating

every

European

army they

faced.64

Only

the

Mamluks,

perhaps

he most notable nstanceof a

regime

founded

by

slave

soldiers,

defeated

them

on

the

approaches

to

Egypt;65

every-

where else

geography

alone limited their

advance.66

Ironically,

these

greatest

triumphs

of

steppe

arms came

just

as the

relation

of forces that made such

feats

possible

was

fading

away.

Fire-

arms undercut

the ancient bases of nomad

military

superiority

and the

independence

of

the

steppe peoples.

No

longer

could

they rely

on their

own

skills and

resourcesto arm

themselves,

and the

very

arms

they

were

compelled

to seek

in

settled lands

would in time drive horses from the

battlefield.

Properly

equipped standing

armies at last freed civilized

society

from the

age-old

threatof barbarian ncursion.

As

Adam

Smith

observed

in

the late

eighteenth century,

The invention of

fire-arms,

an

invention which

at first

sight appears

to be

so

pernicious,

is

certainly

favourable

both to the

permanency

and to the extension of

civilization. 67

In

contrast to the

painful

and

much-prolonged

decline of

cavalry,

fortifications

of

every

kind

became obsolete almost

overnight.

Every-

where

in

Eurasia

during

the

early

gunpowder

era,

great guns

seemed

to

inspire military

maginations

o a far

greaterdegree

than did small arms.

Although artillery

improved rapidly,

every

increase in

power

meant

heavier, clumsier,

and costlier

guns.

In

the

attack

and defense of

fixed

positions,

such

shortcomings

mattered ess thanthe enormous

weight big

guns

could

throw,

and

their

great

expense

meant hatcentral

governments

ordinarily

enjoyed

near

monopolies

on their

use.68

Throughout

most of

Eurasia,

guns

weakened

all

forms

of

resistance

to central

authority.

Gunpowder

empires-Ottoman

in

the

Near

East,69

Safavid

in

Persia,70

Mogul

in

India,'71--consolidated

ower

across the ancient band of Asian

civilization, while lesser

empires

spread

on the

periphery,

n southeast

Asia,72

in

Japan,73

and in Russia.74

Although

not

really

comparable

o the

Islamic

gunpowderempires,

the

Ming

dynasty

was their

contemporary

nd

reflectedsome similar

rends.75

Perhaps

the

most

spectaculardisplay

of

Chinese

prowess

came

early

in

the

fifteenth

century

with

a series of

impressively

mounted

Ming

naval

expeditions hroughout

he IndianOcean.These

voyages

endedas

abruptly

as

they

began.

China declined to institutethe kind of

permanent

evolu-

tion that

later characterized he

West,

and little

trace

of China's earlier

naval enterprise survived when the first Europeansarrivedin Asian

waters.76

Only

in

the western reaches of Eurasiadid the

imperial impulse

fail,

though

just

barely.

Economically

innovative and

intensely competitive



MilitaryTechnology

nd

World

History:

A

Reconnaissance

469

European

states

had

the

resources to maintain

strong

armed

forces and

the

motivation to

keep

them

well

practiced.77

That

no individual state

matched the

power

of the

Habsburgempire

and its allies mattered

ittle.

Because

the

empire rarely enjoyed

freedom

to concentrate

on a

single

opponent,

smaller

states

could

deploy

forces well able to resist

imperial

aggrandizement.78

The

pattern

of interstate

military

competition

that

created the

standoff

persisted

and

intensified,

with

far-reaching

conse-

quences,

not least

among

them the modem

nation-state.79

European

armed forces

steadily

expanded, weapons

and tactics

im-

proved,

and

organization

and coordination

grew

more

sophisticated,

n

contrast to the relative

stagnation

that

overtook

military

institutions

where

empire

had become

firmly

established.These

early

modemEuro-

pean

innovations

that Michael

Roberts termed

the

military

revolution

may

well have been

the

key

factor that

disrupted

n the West's favor

the

rough

parity

in

technology,

economy,

and

polity

prevailing

until

the

fifteenth

century

among

civilized communities

all

across

the Old

World.80

Initially,

the

West's

advantage

was

modest,

limited

largely

to

the

heavy

guns

of

ocean-going sailing

ships,

a combination that

far out-

classed

anything

henafloat. 8Western nclaves lourishedunder

shipborne

guns

along

the coasts of

Africa82

nd

Asia,83

and even

expanded

sporadi-

cally

in

India,84

but elsewhere Westernforces could makelittle

headway

against

either the

vigorous

new

gunpowder empires

in civilization's

classic centers

or

the

relatively

weaker

states

of Africa and southeast

Asia.85

Before the

19th

century,only

Petrine

Russia

sytematically

sought

to emulate

Western arms and

military

organization.86

The

limits

of

power

made

themselves felt even in

the

less-developed

world.

Americancivilizations

clearly

rested on

military

oundations,87

n

Mesoamerica88

nd the

Andes89

like.

Notwithstanding

ormer

scholarly

opinion

to the

contrary,

these foundations had

deep

historical

roots.

Undecipheredwriting

and the absenceof

city

walls inMayanAmerica,as

in Minoan Crete

and

Harappan

ndia,

persuaded

cholars

they

had

found

a

peaceful society.

This view has

proved ust

as

false in the

New World

as

the

Old.9

Although

military

radition

and

practiced

armies characterized

the two

major

New

World states

Europeans

encountered,

he Aztec91

nd

Inca92

empires,

both

collapsed

before

European

assault.

Technological

shortcomings

of an

essentially

neolithic foe doubtless

facilitated

Euro-

pean conquest

in

Mexico93

and

Peru,94

s

it

did

the later

conquest

of

warlike

chiefdoms

in

the

Pacific,95

but such victories

may

have owed

moreto Eurasiandiseases thanto European

arms.96

Despite

terrible

losses,

Native

Americans survived

the

initial

on-

slaught

and learnedhow to

fight

back.97

They

proved

resilient

enough

to

resist with considerable

success

attempts

by any European

state

to ad-



470

Barton

C.

Hacker

vance

colonization

very

far

beyond

the continental

ringes

for

centuries.98

American success in

part

resulted from skillful

adaptations

of firearms

and

equally

skillful

manipulation

of rival

Europeans

o maintain

sources

of

supply.99

Western

firearms

proved

no less attractive

n

subsaharan

Africa,

where

they

became

major

actors

n

18th- and

19th-century

tate-

building.100 hey

exerteda

degree

of

fascination

even in

the old

centers

of

civilization,

though

other

aspects

of Western culture seldom held

much

appeal.101

But not

until well into the

nineteenth

century,

after

military,

scientific,

and

industrialrevolutionshad

worked

their

ransformations,102

did West-

ern

arms achieve an

almost uncontested

hegemony

over

most

of the

world.103

Only

then did Western

military

nstitutionsbecome the model

for all

others.

By

the

early

twentieth

century,

the last of the old

empires

had

passed away

or

transformed

hemselves,

a

process

that

began

invari-

ably

with the

westernization of their

military

institutions.104Ottoman

reform,015

Manchu

self-strengthening,106

nd

Meiji

restoration107

re

only

the

best-known instances. In the

late nineteenthand twentieth

centuries,

all

armies

became Western n

organization,

n

equipment,

and in

spirit.

With the

West

triumphant,

with

all non-Western

military systems

defunct or

moribund,

he

global history

of

military

nstitutionsand tech-

nology

has enteredanew and

unprecedented hase.Technologicalchange

ever

more

rapid

ransforms

military

nstitutionsas well as

social

systems,

just

as new

forms of

military

and social

organization

aise ever

higher

the

demand for

new

technology.

In the

reordered industrial state of the

twentieth

century,

military

managers

have

gained

control of

unprec-

edented

resources and

have learnedto harness

technological

innovation,

holding

out

the

promise

(or threat)

of even more

sweeping

changes

in

the

future

social

order.108

But that

truly

is

another

story.

Military

history

is

too

important

o

remain

the

sole

province

of tradi-

tional

military

historians. An alternativevision of

military

history

fo-

cused on the

persistent

and

pervasive

interactionof

military

with other

social and

cultural

nstitutions

holds

high promise,

the

more

so

if

it

adopts

a

global

framework

tressing

the centralrole of

military

nstitutions

n all

civilized or

state societies. While

such

a

project

may

draw

extensively

on

archaeology,

anthropology,

area

studies,

and other social

sciences,

it

must

rely primarily

on the

work of historians.Whatevermakes the

West

unique

is

clearly

a matterof

degree

rather han

kind,

and its elucidation

must

rely

on

the

record of the

past. Providing

a

global

context for the

Westerntraditionwill allow historiansto understandhow thattradition

reflected

ancient

patterns

n

many respects,yet

in

others

diverged sharply

from them in

recent

centuries,

with

consequences

at once so awesome

and

so terrible.



Military

Technology

and

World

History:

A

Reconnaissance 471

NOTES

*

An

earlier and

shorterversion of this

paper

was

presented

at the

World

History

Association

annual

meeting,

Pomona,

Cal.,

June 1996. Some of these ideas

also

appeared

in

Taking

a

Larger

View:

Why

We Need

A

World

History

of

Military

Institutions,

presented

at the

Society

for

Military

History

annual

meeting,

Durham,N.C.,

March

1991;

and

in

Military

nstitutionsandWorld

History,

TheHistorian 54

(1992),

425-440.

Here

the notes are

intended

chiefly

as readers'

guides

to

reasonably

accessible books and

articles,

emphasizing

recent

work and

sources

of

illustrations.

1.

Michael

Mann

follows

military

institutions

as one of the four

pillars upon

which

civilized

societies have rested from the

beginning

n

The

Sources

of

Social

Power,

vol.

1,

A

History of

Power

from

the

Beginning

to AD1760

(Cambridge,

1986).

For a clear

and systematicmodel of how to applybasic social science conceptsto civilized origins,

see Charles

Keith

Maisels,

The

Emergenceof

Civilization:

From

Hunting

and

Gathering

to

Agriculture,

Cities,

and the State in the Near East

(London

and

New

York,

1990),

especially

chap.

8,

From

Status to

State,

pp.

221-61.

Two

recent

histories

of war treat

their

subject

as a social

phenomenon

rather han

an excuse to

refight

old

battles;

hey

also

manage

to

shed,

at least

partly,

the

Western blinders

otherwise

typical

of this

genre:

see

Robert L.

O'Connell,

Ride

of

the Second Horseman: The Birth and

Death

of

War

(New

York,

1995);

John

Keegan,

A

History

of

Warfare

New

York,

1993).

For an

equally

wide-

ranging

compilation

of

primary

sources,

see G6rard

Chaliand, ed.,

The

Art

of

War in

World

History:

From

Antiquity

o the Nuclear

Age (Berkeley,

1994).

2.

For

the

historiography

f

military echnology,

see Barton

C.

Hacker,

Military

Institutions,Weapons, and Social Change:Toward a New Historyof MilitaryTechnol-

ogy, Technology

and Culture35

(1994),

768-834.

Three

recent

surveys

of

the

history

of

military

technology may

be of some

value,

though

each has serious flaws:

Robert L.

O'Connell,

Of

Arms and Men: A

History of

War,

Weapons,

and

Aggression

(New

York,

1989);

Martin van

Creveld,

Technology

and War: From 2000

BC to the Present

(New

York,

1989);

TrevorN.

Dupuy,

TheEvolution

of Weapons

and

Warfare Indianapolis

and

New

York,

1980).

See also the

heavily

illustratedarticles

in

Richard

Holmes,

ed.,

The

WorldAtlas

of

Warfare:

Military

Innovations

That

Changed

the Course

of

History

(New

York,

1988).

3.

Sociobiology

is the chief modem

culprit, classicly expounded

in

Edward

O.

Wilson,

Sociobiology:

The New

Synthesis (Cambridge,

Mass.,

1975),

especially

the

section on Warfare, p. 572-74, in chap.27, Man:FromSociobiology to Sociology.

More recent

statements include R. Paul Shaw and Yuwa

Wong,

Genetic

Seeds

of

Warfare:

Evolution, Nationalism,

and Patriotism

(Boston, 1989);

Johan

M.

G.

van der

Dennan

and Vincent S.

E.

Falger,

eds.,

Sociobiology

and

Conflict:EvolutionaryPerspec-

tives on

Competition,Cooperation,

Violenceand

Warfare

London,

1990);

Lionel

Tiger,

Biological

Antecedents

of Human

Aggression,

in William

A.

Mason

and

Sally

P.

Mendoza, eds.,

Primate Social

Conflict (Albany,

N.Y.,

1993);

Richard

W.

Wrangham

and Dale

Peterson,

Demonic Males:

Apes

and the

Origin of

Human

Violence

(Boston,

1996).

4.

The classic

modem

study

is

Harry

Holbert

Turney-High,

Primitive

War: Its

Practice and

Concepts

(2d

ed.; Columbia,

S.C.,

1971;

paperback

d.,

1991).

Cf. Lawrence

H. Keeley, Warbefore Civilization:TheMythof thePeacefulSavage (New York, 1996).

Three recent collections

explore

the

gamut

of

primitive

or nonstate warfare

upon

which

much of our

understanding

f

prehistoric

warfare s based: S.

P.

Reyna

and

R. E.

Downs,

eds.,

Studying

War:

Anthropological Perspectives

(Langhorne,

Pa.,

1994);

Jonathan

Haas, ed.,

The

Anthropology

of

War

Cambridge,

1990);

R. Brian

Ferguson,

ed.,

Warfare,



472

BartonC. Hacker

Culture,

and Environment

Orlando,

Fla.,

1984).

See also

Ferguson,

Tribal

Warfare,

Scientific

American 266

(Jan.

1992),

108-13.

5. Andrew M. T. Moore, TheDevelopmentof Neolithic Societies in the Near

East,

Advances in

World

Archaeology

4

(1985),

1-69;

Marilyn

Keyes Roper,

Evidence

of

Warfare

n the

Near East

from

10,000-4,300

BC,

in

MartinA.

Nettleship

et

al., eds.,

War:

Its

Causes

and Correlates

(The

Hague,

1975),

pp.

299-343;

Anne

P.

Underhill,

Warfare

during

the

Chinese

Neolithic

Period:

A Review

of

the

Evidence,

in Diana

Claire

Tkaczuk

and Brian

C.

Vivian, eds.,

Cultures

n

Conflict:

Current

Archaeological

Perspectives (Calgary,

1989),

pp.

229- 37.

6.

Amihai

Mazar,

The

Fortification

of Cities

in

the Ancient Near

East,

n

Jack

M.

Sasson et

al., eds.,

Civilizations

of

the Ancient Near

East

(4

vols.;

New

York,

1995),

vol.

3,

pp.

1523-37. More

generally,

see

Timothy

Champion,

Fortification,

Ranking

and

Subsistence,

in

Colin Renfrew and

Stephen

Shennan, eds.,

Ranking,

Resource and

Exchange:Aspectsof theArchaeologyof Early EuropeanSociety(New York, 1982),pp.

61-66;

Michael

J.

Rowlands,

Defence: A Factor n the

Organization

f

Settlements,

n

Peter J.

Ucko

et

al., eds.,

Man,

Settlementand Urbanism

London, 1972),

pp.

447-62.

7. The

best

survey

is

still

Yigael

Yadin,

TheArt

of Warfare

n

Biblical

Lands: In

the

Light

of Archaeological

Study,

trans.

M.

Pearlman,

2

vols.;

New

York,

1963).

More

recent overviews include Oliver

Dickinson,

Weapons

and

Armour,

n The

Aegean

Bronze

Age (Cambridge,

1994),

pp.

197-207;

Anthony Harding,

Stone,

Bronze

and

Iron,

in

Multimedia

Books

Limited,

comp.,

Swords and

Hilt

Weapons

(New

York,

1993),

pp.

8-19. See also

LeonardM.

Dudley's

comments

on the

special

significance

of

metal

weapons

in

The

Age

of

Gilgamesh,

chap.

2 in

The

Wordand the Sword:

How

Techniquesof Information

and Violence Have

Shaped

Our World

(Cambridge,

Mass.,

and

Oxford,

1991),

pp.

47-76.

8.

For

a

fully

annotated

discussion

of

the

social invention

of

armies,

see Barton

C.

Hacker and

Sally

L.

Hacker,

Military

nstitutionsand the

Labor

Process: Noneconomic

Sources of

Technological Change,

Women's

Subordination,

and the

Organization

of

Work,

Technology

and

Culture

28

(1987),

757-64.

Two

recent

studies,

though

focused

on

battles rather

han

nstitutions,

do touch

aspects

of

the same

topic:

Richard

A.

Gabriel,

The

Culture

of

War: Invention and

Early

Development

(New

York,

1990),

relatively

lightweight;

and,

more

substantial,

Arther

Ferrill,

The

Origins

of

War: From

the

Stone

Age

to

Alexander

the Great

(London,

1985).

See

also

the

well-illustrated

articles in John

Hackett,

ed.,

Warfare

n the

Ancient World

London,

1989).

9. On the links

between

armiesand

states,

the seminalmodernstatement s Robert

L.

Carneiro,

A

Theory

of the

Origin

of

the

State,

Science 169

(1970),

733-38,

widely

reprinted.

For

further

developments,

ncluding

Carneiro's

esponse

to

his

critics,

see

Paul

B.

Roscoe and

Robert

B.

Graber,eds.,

Circumscription

nd the Evolution of

Society,

American

Behavioral Scientist 31

(1988),

403-511. See also David L.

Webster,

Warfare

and

the

Evolution of the

State:

A

Reconsideration,

American

Antiquity

40

(1975),

464-

70;

Herbert S.

Lewis,

Warfare

and

the

Origin

of

the

State: Another

Formulation,

n

Henri J.

M.

Claessen

and

Peter

Skalnfk,eds.,

The

Study

of

the State

(The

Hague,

1981),

pp.

201-21;

Jonathan

Haas,

The Evolution

of

the Prehistoric State

(New

York,

1982);

Ronald

Cohen,

Warfare

nd

State

Formation:Wars Make

States and States Make

War,

in

Ferguson, Warfare,

Culture,

and Environment

note 4),

pp.

329-58.

10.

Lewis

Mumford,

The

Mythof

the

Machine,

vol.

1,

Technics

and Human

Develop-

ment

(New

York,

1967),

p.

217. See also Slavomil

Vencl,

War

and

Warfare

n

Archaeol-

ogy,

trans.Petr

Charvait,

ournal

ofAnthropologicalArchaeology

3

(1984),

116-32.

11.

The

four-volume reference work edited

by

Sasson et

al.,

Civilizations

of

the

Ancient Near East

(note 6),

providesup-to-date

surveys

of

early military

nstitutions:

ee



Military

Technology

and World

History:

A

Reconnaissance

473

Stephanie

Dalley,

Ancient

Mesopotamian

Military Organization,

vol.

1,

pp.

413-22;

and

Alan

R.

Schulman,

Military

Organization

n Pharaonic

Egypt,

vol.

1,

pp.

289-301.

See also J. N.

Postgate,

WarandPeace,

chap.

13 in Early

Mesopotamia:

Society and

Economy

at the Dawn

of History

(Rev.

ed.;

London and

New

York,

1994),

pp.

241-59.

12.

Keith

Branigan, Society

and Social

Organization, hap.

6 in

The Foundations

of

Palatial Crete: A

Surveyof

Crete in the

Early

Bronze

Age

(New

York,

1970),

pp.

114-

25,

notes the

apparent

ack of interest in

matters

military,

unique among

bronze

age

societies.

Colin Renfrew

vigorously

dissents

in

The

Emergence

of

Civilization:

The

Cyclades

and the

Aegean

in

the Third Millennium

BC

(London,

1972),

especially

in

sections on

Piracy

and

Security

in

the Prehistoric

Aegean,

pp.

262-64;

The

Develop-

ment of

Weapons

in

the

Third Millennium

BC,

pp.

319-25;

and

Hostility

and the

Inception

of

Warfare,

pp.

390-99.

For

a recentreview of the

myth

of

Cretan

pacifism,

see

Testing

the Tradition

n

Rodney

Castleden,

Minoans:

Life

in

Bronze

Age

Crete

(Lon-

don and New

York,

1990),

pp.

162-67;

he also discusses Armsand

Armour,

pp.

18-21.

As

Stuart

W.

Manning

observes

( The

Military

Function

in

Late Minoan

I

Crete:

A

Note,

World

Archaeology

18

[1986],

284-88),

lack

of evidence for a

military

presence

does not mean

there was

none.

13.

Mortimer

Wheeler,

Military

Aspects

of the

Indus

Civilization,

n

The

Indus

Civilization:

Supplementary

Volume

to the

CambridgeHistory

of

India

(3rd

ed.;

Cam-

bridge,

1968),

pp.

72-78;

B.

K.

Thapar,

New

Traits

of the

Indus

Civilization

at

Kalibangan:

An

Appraisal,

n

Norman

Hammond,

ed.,

South

Asian

Archaeology

(Park

Ridge,

N.J.,

1973),

pp.

85-104. Cf.

M. S.

Mate,

Harappan

ortifications:

A

Study,

Indian

Antiquary

(Bombay),

3rd

series,

vol.

4

(1970),

75-84.

A

well-informedoverview

is

Bridget

Allchin

and

Raymond

Allchin,

TheRise

of

Civilization

n India and Pakistan

(Cambridge,

1982).

14.

Malcolm F.

Farmer,

The

Origin

of

Weapon

Systems,

Current

Anthropology

35

(1994),

679-81;

Joseph

Needham

et

al.,

ProjectileWeapons

I,

Archery:

The

Bow,

section

30,

pt.

(d) (1),

in

Military

Technology:

Missiles and

Sieges,

vol.

5,

pt.

6,

of Science

and

Civilisation

in China

(Cambridge,

1994),

pp.

101-20;

Robert

L. Miller et

al.,

Experimental

Approaches

to

Ancient

Near Eastern

Archery,

World

Archaeology

18

(1986),

178-95;

EdwardMcEwen et

al.,

Early

Bow

Design

and

Construction,

cientific

American

264

(June

1991),

76-82. See

also Vic

Hurley,

First

Appearances

of the Bow

in

War,

chap.

6

in

Arrows

against

Steel:

The

Historyof

the

Bow

(New

York,

1975),

pp.

53-

59.

15. Recent

surveys

include Wolframvon

Soden,

Stateand

Society:

The

Army

and

Warfare, chap.

6.5 in

The

Ancient Orient:

An

Introduction o the

Study of

the

Ancient

Near

East,

trans.

Donald

G.

Schley

(Grand

Rapids,

Mich.,

and

Leominster,

1994),

pp.

82-

86;

Terence

Wise and

Angus

McBride,

AncientArmies

of

the

Middle

East

(Osprey

Men-

at-Arms Series

109;

London,

1981).

16. Stuart

Piggott,

Chariots and

Chariotry,

chap.

2 in

Wagon,

Chariot

and

Carriage: Symbol

and Status n the

History

of Transport

New

York,

1992),

pp.

37-68;

P.

R.

S.

Moorey,

The

Emergence

of

the

Light,

Horse-drawn

Chariot

n

the

Near-East,

c.

2000-1500

Bc,

World

Archaeology

18

(1986),

196-215;

Mary

Aiken

Littauer

and Joost

H.

Crouwel,

Chariots

and Related

Equipment

rom

the

Tomb

of

Tut'ankhamun

Oxford,

1985);

Littauer

and

Crouwel,

Wheeled Vehiclesand RiddenAnimals

in

the

Ancient

Near

East

(Leiden,

1979),

chaps.

8-9.

17. OliverDickinson, Artsand Crafts:WeaponsandArmour, hap.5.(x) in The

Aegean

Bronze

Age (Cambridge,

1995),

pp.

197-207;

A. F.

Harding,

Warfare,

Weapons

and

Armour,

chap.

6

in

The

Mycenaeans

and

Europe

(London, 1984),

pp.

151-87;

William

Taylour,

War and

Trade,

chap.

7 in The

Mycenaeans

(rev.

ed.;

New

York,

1983),

pp.

135-54.



474

BartonC.

Hacker

18.

G. D.

Bakshi,

Mahabharata:

A

Military Analysis

(New

Delhi,

1990);

S. P.

Sharma,

Artof War n Ancient

India,

n

H. S.

Bhatia, ed.,

Political,

Legal

and

Military

History of India (5 vols.; New Delhi, 1984), vol. 1, pp. 366-76; Sarva Daman Singh,

Ancient Indian

Warfare:

With

Special

Reference

to the

Vedic

Period

(Leiden,

1965;

reprint

Delhi,

1989).

19.

Edward

L.

Shaughnessy,

Historical

Perspectives

on the

Introduction

of

the

Chariot

nto

China,

Harvard

Journal

ofAsiatic

Studies48

(1988),

189-237;

Kwang-chih

Chang,

Shang

Civilization

(New

Haven,

1980);

David N.

Keightley,

ed.,

The

Origins of

Chinese

Civilization

(Berkeley,

1983);

C. J. Peers and

Angus

McBride,

Ancient

Chinese

Armies,

1500-200

Bc

(Osprey

Men-at-ArmsSeries

218;

London,

1990).

20. John

Coles,

Paradeand

Display: Experiments

in

Bronze

Age Europe,

in

Vladimir

Markotic,

ed.,

Ancient

Europe

and the Mediterranean:Studies Presented

in

Honour

of Hugh

Hencken

(Warminster,1977),

pp.

50-58;

Peter

Gelling

and

Hilda

Ellis

Davidson, The Chariot

of

the Sun: And OtherRites and

Symbolsof

the NorthernBronze

Age

(New

York,

1969).

21.

Richard

H.

Beal

has

studied

in

detail The

Organisationof

the

Hittite

Military

(Heidelberg,

1992);

he

provides

a

convenient

summary

of Hittite

MilitaryOrganization

in

Sasson et

al.,

Civilizations

of

the

Ancient

Near East

(note 6),

vol.

1,

pp.

545-54.

See

also

J. G.

Macqueen,

Warfare

nd

Defence,

chap.

4

in The

Hittites,

and

Their

Contem-

poraries

in Asia Minor

(rev.

ed.; London,

1986),

pp.

53-73.

22.

James D.

Muhly

et

al.,

Iron in

Anatolia and the Nature

of

the Hittite

Iron

Industry,

Anatolian Studies 35

(1985),

67-84;

RobertMaddinet

al.,

How the Iron

Age

Began,

Scientific

American 237

(Oct.

1977),

122-31;

Theodore

A. Wertime and James

D.

Muhly,

eds.,

The

Coming

of

the

Age of

Iron

(New

Haven,

1980);

N.

K.

Sandars,

The

Sea

Peoples:

Warriors

of

the Ancient

Mediterranean,

1250-1150

BC

(rev.

ed.; London,

1985);

Robert

Drews,

The

End

of

the

Bronze

Age: Changes

n

Warfare

and the Catastro-

phe

ca.

1200

Bc

(Princeton,

1993).

23. Hans Van

Wees,

Status

Warriors:

War,

Violence and

Society

in

Homer

and

History

(Amsterdam,1992);

Robert

Drews,

The New

Warfare,

hap.

5

in The

Coming

of

the Greeks:

Indo-EuropeanConquests

in the

Aegean

and

the Near

East

(Princeton,

1988),

pp.

74-

120;

Anthony

M.

Snodgrass,

Interaction

by Design:

The Greek

City

State,

in

Colin Renfrew and John

F.

Cherry,

eds.,

Peer

Polity

Interaction

and

Socio-

Political

Change

(Cambridge,

1986),

pp.

47-58;

Mary

Aiken Littauer and Joost H.

Crouwel,

Chariots

n

Late Bronze

Age

Greece,

Antiquity

57

(1983),

187-92.

24.

David W.

Anthony

and Dorcas R.

Brown,

The

Origins

of Horseback

Riding,

Antiquity

65

(1991),

22-38;

Anthony

et

al.,

The

Origin

of

Horseback

Riding,

Scientific

American 265

(Dec.

1991),

94-100;

Chauncey

S.

Goodrich,

Riding

Astride

and the

Saddle in Ancient

Times,

Harvard Journal

of

Asiatic

Studies

44

(1984),

279-306. See

also John

Ellis,

The

Coming

of the War Horse: The

Beginnings

to 750

BC,

chap.

1

in

Cavalry:

The

History of

Mounted

Warfare

New

York,

1978),

pp.

7-21.

25. Renate

Rolle,

ArmedWarriorson Red

Steeds,

chap.

5

in

The World

of

the

Scythians,

trans. F. G. Walls

(Berkeley,

1989),

pp.

64-91;

E. V. Cernenko et

al.,

The

Scythians,

700-300

Bc

(Osprey

Men-at-Arms

Series

137; London,

1983).

On nomads

in

the

eastern

reaches of

Eurasia,

see

Jenny

F. So

and

Emma

C.

Bunker,

The Arrival

of

Mounted Tribes: Seventh-Sixth

Century

BC,

n

Tradersand Raiders

on China's

North-

ern Frontier

(Seattle, 1995), pp. 47-50;

Jaroslav

Prusek,

Chinese Statelets

and the

Northern

Barbarians,

1400-300

Bc

(Dordrecht

and

Prague,

1971).

26.

Israel

Eph'al,

On Warfareand

Military

Control

in

the

Ancient Near Eastern

Empires:

A

Research

Outline,

n

H.

Tadmor

and M.

Weinfeld,

eds.,

History,Historiog-

raphy

and

Interpretation:

Studies in

Biblical and

Cuneiform

Literatures

(Jerusalem,



Military

Technology

and World

History:

A

Reconnaissance

475

1983),

pp.

88-106. See also Frances

F.

Berdan,

The

Reconstruction

of

Ancient

Econo-

mies:

Perspectives

from

Archaeology

and

Ethnohistory,

n

Sutti

Ortiz,

ed.,

Economic

Anthropology: Topics and Theories (Lanham, Md., 1983), pp. 83-95, especially the

section on

The

Role

of

the

Economy

in

ImperialExpansion.

27.

Norman

Kotker,

The

Assyrians,

Military

History

Quarterly

3

(Summer

1991),

8-

19;

H.

W.

F.

Saggs,

The

Assyrian Army, chap.

16

in The

Might

That Was

Assyria

(London, 1984),

pp.

243-68;

D.

J.

Wiseman,

The

Assyrians,

in

Hackett,

Warfare

n the

Ancient World

note 8),

pp.

36-53.

28.

Duncan

Head,

The Achaemenid

Persian

Army

(Stockport,

England,

1992);

Muhammad

A. Danamaev

and Vladimir G.

Lukonin,

The Social Institutions

and the

Economic Structureof the

Achaemenid

Empire:

The

Army,

chap.

2,

pt.

K,

in The

Culture

and

Social Institutions

of

Ancient

Iran,

trans.

Philip

L. Kohl with D.

J.

Dadson

(Cambridge,

1989),

pp.

222-37;

J. M.

Cook,

The

ArmedForces

and

Communications,

chap.

10 in The Persian

Empire

(New

York,

1983),

pp.

101-12;

Nick

Sekunda,

The

Persians,

n

Hackett,

Warfare

n the Ancient

World

note 8),

pp.

82-103.

29.

Peter

Green,

The

Greco-Persian Wars

Rev.

ed.;

Berkeley,

1996);

Jack Cassin-

Scott,

The Greek

and Persian

Wars,

500-323

Bc

(Osprey

Men-at-ArmsSeries

69;

Lon-

don,

1977);

Chryssis

P.

Pelekidis

and

Alexander

I.

Despotopoulis.

FromMarathon

o

Thermopylai,

Salamis

and

Plataiai,

in

History

of

the

Hellenic World: The

Archaic

Period

(University

Park,Penn.,

1975),

pp.

296-373.

30.

Victor Davis

Hanson has

lately

reexamined

he characterand culture

of

Greek

warfare;

see The

Western

Way of

War:

Infantry

Battle in

Classical

Greece

(New

York,

1989);

The

Other

Greeks:

The

Family

Farm

and the

Agrarian

Roots

of

Western

Civiliza-

tion

(New

York,

1995);

see

also his

edited

collection,

Hoplites:

The Classical

Greek

Battle

Experience

(London

and New

York,

1991).

Good

overviews

are J. K.

Anderson,

Wars

and

Military

Science,

in

Michael Grantand Rachel

Kitzinger,

eds.,

Civilization

of

the

Ancient

Mediterranean:

Greece and Rome

(3

vols.;

New

York,

1988);

Pierre

Ducrey,

Warfare

n

Ancient

Greece,

trans.

Janet

Lloyd

(New

York,

1985).

For

other

viewpoints,

see

Joseph

M.

Bryant,

Military

Technology

and

Socio-Cultural

Change

in

the Ancient

Greek

City,

Sociological

Review

38

(1990),

484-516;

Jean-Pierre

Vemrnant,

City-State

Warfare,

hap.

2

in

Myth

and

Society

in Ancient

Greece,

trans.

Janet

Lloyd

(New

York,

1988),

pp.

29-53;

R. T.

Ridley,

The

Hoplite

as

Citizen: Athenian

Military

Institutions

n

Their

Social

Context,

L'antiquiteclassique

48

(1979),

508-48.

The

articles

n

John

Rich

and

Graham

Shipley,

eds.,

War

and

Society

in

the

Greek World

London, 1993),

must

be

treatedwith

caution.

31.

George

Erdosy, City

States of North India and

Pakistan at the Time

of

the

Buddha,

chap.

7

in

F. R.

Allchin,

The

Archaeology

of Early

Historic South

Asia:

The

Emergence

of

Cities and

States

(Cambridge,

1995),

pp.

99-122;

Tara

Bhusan

Mukherji,

Inter-State

Relations

in

AncientIndia

(Meerut,

1967);

B. P.

Sinha,

Artof War

in

Ancient

India,

600 Bc-300

AD,

Cahiers d'histoire mondiale

4

(1957),

123-60.

32. Mark

Edward

Lewis,

Sanctioned Violence in

Early

China

(Albany,

N.Y.,

1990);

Needham et

al.,

ChineseLiteratureon the Art of

War,

chap.

30

(b)

in

Military

Technology

(note 14),

pp.

10-66;

Ch'i-ytin

Chang,

The

Strategists

Who Left behind

Books

on

Strategy, chap.

12 in

China's Cultural

Achievements

during

the

Warring

States

Period,

trans. Orient

Lee

Yangmingshan

(Taiwan, 1983),

pp.

345-66;

Cho-yun

Hsu, WarsandWarriors, hap.3 in AncientChinain Transition:AnAnalysis of Social

Mobility,

722-222

BC

(Stanford,

1965),

pp.

53-77;

Frank

A.

Kierman,Jr.,

Phases and

Modes of

Combat

n

Early

China,

n Kiermanand

John

K.

Fairbank, ds.,

Chinese

Ways

in

Warfare

Cambridge,

Mass.,

1974),

pp.

27-66.

33.

Eugene

N.

Borza,

What

Philip

Wrought, Military

History

Quarterly

5

(Sum-



476 BartonC.

Hacker

mer

1993),

104-109;

N.

G.

L.

Hammond,

The

Winning

of

Military Supremacy,

359-

323,

chap.

6

in

TheMacedonianState:

Origins,

Institutions,

nd

History

(Oxford,

1989),

pp.

100-36;G. T. Griffith, Peltastsand the

Origin

of the MacedonianPhalanx, n Harry

J.

Dell, ed.,

Ancient Macedonian Studies

in Honor

of

Charles

F. Edson

(Thessaloniki,

1981),

pp.

161-67;

Minor M. Markale

III,

TheMacedonian

Sarissa,

Spear,

and

Related

Armor,

American

Journal

of

Archaeology

81

(1977),

323-39;

Markale,

Use

of

the

Sarissa

by

Philip

and

Alexander

of

Macedon,

bid.

82

(1978),

483-97.

34.

A.

B.

Bosworth,

Alexander

and

the

Army,

part

2.C

in

Conquest

and

Empire:

The

ReignofAlexander

he Great

Cambridge,

988),

pp.

259-77;

Arther

Ferrill,

Alexander

in

India:

The Battle

at

the

Edge

of

the

Earth,

Military History

Quarterly

1

(Autumn

1988),

76-

84;

Donald

W.

Engels,

Alexander he

Greatand

the

Logistics

of

the Macedonian

Army

(Berkeley,

1978);

P.

H. L.

Eggermont,

Alexander's

Campaigns

in Sind

and

Baluchistan

and

the

Siege of

the BrahminTown

of

Harmatelia

Louvain,

1975).

35. Victor Davis

Hanson,

From Phalanxto

Legion,

350-250

bc,

in

Geoffrey

Parker, ed.,

The

Cambridge

Illustrated

History

of

Warfare:

The

Triumph

of

the West

(Cambridge,

1995),

pp.

32-49;

Lionel

Casson,

Demetrius,

Besieger

of

Cities,

Military

History

Quarterly

2

(Autumn 1989),

102-109;

Bezalel

Bar-Kochva,

The Seleucid

Army:

Organization

and Tactics

n

the Great

Campaigns Cambridge,

1972);

William

V.

Harris,

War

and

Imperialism

n

Republican

Rome,

327-70

Bc

(corrected

ed.; Oxford, 1985).

36.

Victor Davis

Hanson,

The

Roman

Way

of

War,

250

bc-AD

300,

in

Parker,

The

Cambridge

Illustrated

History of Warfare

note

35),

pp.

50-61;

M. C.

Bishop

and

J.

C.

N.

Coulston,

Roman

Military

Equipment:

From the Punic Wars

to the Fall

of

Rome

(London,

1993);

Lawrence

Keppie,

The

Making

of

the Roman

Army:

From

Republic

to

Empire(London,1984);

Brian

Campbell,

The

Roman

Army,

31 BC-AD337.

A

Sourcebook

(London,

1994);

Yann

Le

Bohec,

The

Imperial

Roman

Army,

rans. rom

the

French

New

York

and

London,

1994);

Hugh

Elton,

The

Army

on the

Frontier,

chap.

5

in

The

Frontiers

of

the

Roman

Empire (Bloomington,

1996),

pp.

59-76;

Michael Simkins and

James

Field,

Warriors

of

Rome: An Illustrated

Military History of

the Roman

Legions

(London,

1988).

Like

their volume on

Greece,

John

Rich and Graham

Shipley,

eds.,

War

and

Society

in

the Roman World

London, 1993),

requires

cautious

use.

37.

Ehsan

Yarshater, d.,

The

Seleucid,

Parthian,

and Sasanian

Periods,

vol.

3 of

The

CambridgeHistory

of

Iran

(Cambridge,

1983);

Peter

Wilcox

and

Angus

McBride,

Rome's

Enemies

(3):

Parthians

and Sassanid Persians

(Osprey

Men-at-ArmsSeries

175;

London,

1986);

Malcolm

A.

R.

Colledge,

King

and

Government,

chap.

4 in

The

Parthians

(London, 1967), pp.

57-76.

38.

Allchin,

The

Mauryan

State

and

Empire, chap.

10 in The

Archaeology of

Early

Historic

South Asia

(note 31),

pp.

187-221;

Chandra B.

Khanduri,

Military

Advancement

n

Ancient

India,

I.

Chanakya's

War

Machine,

n

Bhatia,

Political,

Legal

and

Military History of

India

(note

18),

vol.

2,

pp.

342-52;

C. S.

Sangameswaran,

Ancient

Military

India,

I.

King

and His

Army,

in

ibid.,

vol.

3,

pp.

347-56;

Radha

Kumud

Mookerji,

The

Army, chap.

10 in

ChandraguptaMaurya

and

His

Times

(4th

ed.;

Delhi,

1988),

pp.

165-82;

Romila

Thapar,

The

State

as

Empire,

n

Claessen

and

Skalnik,

The

Study of

the

State

(note 9),

pp.

409-26;

Thapar,

StateFormation

n

Early

India,

International

Social

Science Journal

32

(1980),

655-69.

39.

Chris Peers and

Michael

Perry,

Imperial

Chinese

Armies:

(1)

200

Bc-589

AD

(Osprey Men-at-Arms Series 284; London, 1995); Ch'in Dynasty Pit Archaeological

Team,

Excavation

of the

Ch'in

Dynasty

Pit

ContainingPottery

Figures

of

Warriors

and

Horses at

Ling-T'ung,

Shensi

Province,

trans. Albert

E.

Dien,

Chinese

Studies

in

Archaeology

1

(1979),

8-55;

Ira

Meistrich,

The

MortuaryArmy

of Ch'in

Shih

Huang

Ti,

Military

History Quarterly

6

(Winter

1994),

50-57;

R. W.

L.

Guisso

and

Catherine



Military

Technology

and World

History:

A

Reconnaissance

477

Pagani,

with David

Miller,

TheLandof

Hungry

Ghosts:

Warfare n Ancient

China,

part

2

in The

First

Emperorof

China

(New

York,

1989),

pp.

40-81;

Hans

Bielenstein,

The

Army, chap.4 in TheBureaucracyof Han Times(Cambridge,1980), pp. 114-24.

40.

Israel

Eph'al,

The Ancient Arabs:

Nomads

on the

Borders

of

the

Fertile

Crescent,

9th- 5th

Centuries

Bc

(Jerusalem

nd

Leiden,

1982);

G.

W.

Bowersock,

Bound-

aries and

Defenses,

chap.

7 in Roman

Arabia

(Cambridge,

Mass.,

1983),

pp.

90-109;

S.

Thomas

Parker,

Romansand Saracens:

A

History of

the ArabianFrontier

(Winona

Lake,

Ind.,

1986);

D. J.

Mattingly,

War

and

Peace in

Roman North Africa: Observations

and

Models of

State-Tribe

Interaction,

n R. Brian

Ferguson

and Neil

L.

Whitehead, eds.,

War

n

the

Tribal

Zone:

Expanding

States and

Indigenous

Warfare

Santa

Fe,

1992),

pp.

31-60.

41.

Thomas J.

Barfield,

The

Hsiung-nu Imperial

Confederacy:

Organization

and

Foreign

Policy,

Journal

of

Asian

Studies

41

(1981),

45-61;

David

Christian,

Inner

Eurasiaas a Unit of World

History,

Journal

of

World

History

5 (Fall 1994), 173-211;

Denis

Sinor,

Inner Asian

Warriors,

Journal

of

the

American Oriental

Society

101

(1981), 133-44;

Thomas

J.

Barfield,

TheDevil's

Horsemen:

Steppe

Nomadic

Warfare n

Historical

Perspective,

n

Reyna

and

Downs,

Studying

War

(note 4),

pp.

157-82.

42.

William H.

McNeill,

The

Rise

of

the West:

A

History of

the

Human

Community

(Chicago,

1963),

pp.

321-23. See

also

Juliet

Clutton-Brock,

TheHorses

of

Scythia

and

the

Orient,

chap.

7

in

Horse

Power:

A

History of

the Horse and

Donkey

in Human

Society

(Cambridge,

Mass.,

1992),

pp.

96-105;

Geo

Widengren,

On

Horsemanship:

A

Review

Article,

Ethnos

48

(1983),

210-20;

Mikl6s

Jankovich,

They

Rode into

Europe:

The

Fruitful

Exchange

in the

Arts

of

Horsemanship

between

East

and

West,

trans.

Anthony

Dent

(New

York,

1971).

On Chinese efforts

to maintain

cavalry,

see

H.

G.

Creel,

TheRole of the Horsein Chinese

History,

AmericanHistorical Review 70

(1965),

647-

72.

43.

Warren T.

Treadgold,

Byzantium

and Its

Army,

284-1081

(Stanford,

1995);

David

Nicolle and

Angus

McBride,

Romano-Byzantine

rmies,

4th-9th

Centuries

Osprey

Men-at- Arms

Series

247; London,

1992);

Mark C.

Bartusis,

TheLate

ByzantineArmy:

Arms

and

Society,

1204-1453

(Philadelphia,

1992).

On

special aspects

of

Byzantine

military

institutions,

see Ann

Hyland, Byzantium

and Her

Enemies,

chap.

2

in

The

Medieval

Warhorse:

From

Byzantium

o the

Crusades

(Stroud, 1994),

pp.

18-53;

Walter

Emil

Kaegi, Byzantine

Logistics:

Problems and

Perspectives,

n

John

A.

Lynn,

ed.,

Feeding

Mars:

Logistics

in

Western

Warfare rom

the

Middle

Ages

to the Present

(Boulder,

1993),

pp.

39-55;

Clive

Foss

and David

Winfield,

ByzantineFortifications:

An

Introduction

Pretoria,

1986).

44.

C. R.

Whittaker,

Warlordsand

Landlords

n

the Later

Empire,

chap.

7 in

Frontiers

of

the

Roman

Empire:

A

Social

and Economic

Study

(Baltimore,

1994),

pp.

243-78;

C. D.

Gordon,

The

Age of

Attila:

Fifth-Century

Byzantium

and the Barbarians

(Ann

Arbor,

1960;

reprint

New

York,

1992);

Walter

Goffart,

Rome,

Constantinople,

nd

the

Barbarians,

mericanHistorical

Review86

(1981),

275-306;

J. H.

W. G.

Liebeschuetz,

Barbarians

and

Bishops:

Army,

Church,

and State in the

Age ofArcadius

and

Chrysostom

(Oxford,

1990);

Irfan

Shahid,

Byzantium

nd the Arabs in the

Fifth

Century

Washington,

1989);

Wilcox

and

McBride,

Parthians and Sassanid Persians

(note

37),

pp.

24-42;

Stanley

Wolpert,

The

Classical

Age

(AD

20-ca.

700),

chap.

7

in

A

New

History

of

India

(4th ed.; New York andOxford,1993), pp. 88-103.

45. BernardS.

Bachrach,

OnRoman

Ramparts,

300-1300,

in

Parker,

Cambridge

Illustrated

History of Warfare

(note

35),

pp.

64-91;

Malcolm

Todd,

Armamentand

Warfare,

hap.

5 in The Northern

Barbarians,

100

BC-AD

300

(London,

1975),

pp.

159-

81;

Thomas S.

Burns,

Warriors nd the

Military System, chap.

8 in

A

History

of

the



478

BartonC. Hacker

Ostrogoths

(Bloomington,

1984),

pp.

184-201;

Lucien

Musset,

The Germanic

Invasions:

The

Making

of

Europe,

AD

400-600,

trans.

Edwardand ColumbaJames

(London,

1975;

reprint

New York,

1993);

JustineDavis Randers-Pehrson, arbariansand Romans: The

Birth

Struggle of

Europe,

AD

00-700

(Norman,

1983);

P. S.

Bamrnwell,

mperor,

Prefects,

and

Kings:

The Roman

West,

395-565

(Chapel

Hill,

1992);

Walter

Goffart,

Barbarians

and

Romans,

AD

18-584: The

Techniques

ofAccommodation

Princeton,

1980).

46. Tim

Newark

and

Angus

McBride,

The

Barbarians: Warriorsand Wars

of

the

Dark

Ages

(London, 1985);

Csaba

Hiddin,

The

Military

Tactics

of

the

Ancient

Hungar-

ians,

in

Csilla

Sikl6di, ed.,

Between East and West

(Budapest,

1996),

pp.

39-67;

Jankovich,

They

Rode

into

Europe

(note

42).

47. P.

H.

Sawyer, Kings

and

Vikings:

Scandinavia

and

Europe,

700-1100

(London,

1982);

Peter

Foote

and

David

M.

Wilson,

Warfare,

hap.

8 in The

Viking

Achievement:

The

Society

and

Culture

of Early

Medieval Scandinavia

(rev.

ed.; London,

1980),

pp.

263-85;

James

Graham-Campbell,

Viking

Warriors,

hap.

3 in The

Viking

World

New

Haven,

1980),

pp.

20-35;

Paddy

Griffith,

The

Viking

Art

of

War

(London

and

Mechanicsburg,

Penn.,

1995).

48.

Philippe

Contamine,

War

in

the Middle

Ages,

trans. Michael Jones

(Oxford,

1984);

Nicholas

Hooper

and Matthew

Bennett,

Cambridge

llustratedAtlas

of Warfare:

The Middle

Ages,

768-1487

(Cambridge,

1996);

Robert

Bartlett,

The

Makingof Europe:

Conquest,

Colonization,

and Cultural

Change,

950-1350

(Princeton,

1993);

Michael

Prestwich,

Armies

and

Warfare

in the Middle

Ages:

The

English

Experience

(New

Haven,

1996);

Kelly

DeVries,

Medieval

Military

Technology (Peterborough,

Ont.,

and

Orchard

Park,N.Y.,

1992);

David

Edge

and John Miles

Paddock,

Arms and Armor

of

the

Medieval

Knight:

An

Illustrated

History of Weaponry

n the Middle

Ages (New York,

1988).

See also John R.

Kenyon,

Medieval

Fortifications

(Leicester, 1991).

49. Kierman

and

Fairbank,

Chinese

Ways

n

Warfare

note 32);

Arthur

E.

Wright,

The Sui

Dynasty:

The

Unification

of

China,

AD

581-617

(New

York,

1978);

Wang

Gungwu,

The Structure

of

Power

in North

China

during

the Five

Dynasties

(Koala

Lumpur,

1963;

reprint

Stanford,

1967);

Karl Heinz

Ranitzschand

Angus

McBride,

The

Army of

Tang

China

(Stockport,England,

1995).

50. For

how Arab raidersbecame

conquering

Muslim

armies,

see

Moshe

Sharon,

The

Military

Reforms of Abu

Muslim,

Their

Background

and

Consequences,

n Moshe

Sharon, ed.,

Studies

of

Islamic

History

and

Civilization:

In Honour

of Professor

David

Ayalon

(Jerusalem

and

Leiden,

1986),

pp.

105-43. See also Elias

Shoufani,

Al-Riddah

and

theMuslimConquestofArabia(Toronto, 1973);David C. Nicolle, Armiesof theMuslim

Conquest(Osprey

Men-at-ArmsSeries

255; London,

1993);

Fred McGraw

Donner,

The

Early

Islamic

Conquests

Princeton,

1981).

51.

Daniel

Pipes,

Slave

Soldiers

and

Islam:

The Genesis

of

a

MilitarySystem

New

Haven,

1981);

Patricia

Crone,

Slaves on Horses:

The

Evolution

of

the

Islamic

Polity

(Cambridge,

1980);

Jere L.

Bacharach,

African

Military

Slaves

in the

Medieval

Middle

East: The Case of

Iraq

869-955)

and

Egypt

(808-1171),

International

ournal

of

Middle

Eastern Studies

13

(1981),

471-95;

Allen R.

Meyers,

Slave Soldiersand State

Politics

in

Early

'Alawi

Morocco,

1668-1727,

nternational ournal

ofAfrican

Historical

Studies

16

(1983),

39-48.

More

generally,

see V. J.

Parry,

Warfare,

n P. M. Holt

et

al., eds.,

Islamic

Society

and

Civilization,

ol. 2B of The

CambridgeHistory

of

Islam

(Cambridge,

970),

pp.

824-50;EdmundBosworth, Armiesof theProphet, n BernardLewis, ed.,Islamand the

Arab World:

Faith,

People,

Culture

New

York,

1976),

pp.

201-24;

David

C.

Nicolle,

The

Armies

of

Islam,

7th-11th

Centuries

Osprey

Men-at-ArmsSeries

125;

London,

1982).

52.

Fergus

Millar,

The RomanNear

East,

31 BC-AD

337

(Cambridge,

Mass.,

1993),

especially chaps.

4

and

5;

Benjamin

Isaac,

Enemies

and

Allies

after

Setpimius

Severus,



Military

Technology

and World

History:

A

Reconnaissance

479

chap.

5 in The

Limits

of Empire:

The

Roman

Army

n the East

(rev.

ed.; Oxford,

1993),

pp.

219-

68;

Michael

H.

Dodgeon

and

Samuel

N. C.

Lieu,

comps.

and

eds.,

The

Roman

Eastern Frontier and the Persian Wars,AD226-363 (London, 1991); Michael Whitby,

The

Emperor

Maurice and His Historian:

Theophylact

Simocatta

on

Persian and

Balkan

Warfare

Oxford,

1988).

53.

'Abd al-Husain

Zarrinkub,

The

Arab

Conquest

of Iranand Its

Aftermath,

n

Richard

N.

Frye,

ed.,

The

Period

from

the Arab

Invasion

to the

Saljuqs,

vol.

4

of

The

Cambridge History of

Iran

(Cambridge,

1975),

pp.

1-56;

David

Morgan,

Medieval

Persia,

1040-1797

(London

and New

York,

1988);

Ann K.

S.

Lambton,

The

Constitu-

tion

of

Society

(1).

Elements

of

Change:

The

Ruling

Family

and

the 'Men

of

the

Sword,'

chap.

7

in

Continuity

and

Change

in

Medieval Persia:

Aspects

of

Administrative,

Eco-

nomic

and

Social

History,

]]th-14th

Century Albany,

N.Y.,

1988),

pp.

221-57.

See also

Clifford

Edmund

Bosworth,

The

Army,

chap.

3 in The

Ghaznavids:

Their

Empire

in

Afghanistan

andEastern

Iran,

944-1040

(Edinburgh,

1963;

reprint

New

Delhi,

1992),

pp.

98-128.

54.

Walter

Emil

Kaegi, Byzantium

and

the

Early

Islamic

Conquests (Cambridge,

1992);

Kaegi,

Heraklius nd

the

Arabs,

Greek

Orthodox

Theological

Review 27

(1982),

109-33;

John W.

Jandora,

The

Battle of Yarmuk:A

Reconstruction,

ournal

of

Asian

History

19

(1985),

8-21.

55.

Roger

Collins,

The

Arab

Conquest

of

Spain,

710-797

(Oxford,

1989);

Elena

Lourie,

Crusade

and

Colonisation:

Muslims, Christians,

and Jews in Medieval

Aragon

(Aldershot

and

Brookfield, Vt.,

1990);

Bernard

S.

Bachrach,

Merovingian

Military

Organization,

481-751

(Minneapolis,

1972).

56. R.

C.

Smail,

CrusadingWarfare,

1097-1193

(2d

ed.;

Cambridge,

1995);

Ronald

C.

Finucane,

Soldiers

of

the

Faith: Crusadersand Moslems at War

(New

York,

1983);

Maya

Schatzmiller,

The

Crusades

and Islamic Warfare-A

Re-evaluation,

Der

Islam

55

(1992),

247-88;

John

France,

Victory

in

the

East:

A

Military

History of

the

First

Crusade

(Cambridge,

1994);

Norman

Kotker,

The First

Crusade,

Military

History

Quarterly

2

(Winter

1990),

24-35;

Jonathan

Riley-Smith,

The First Crusade

and the Idea

of

Crusading (Philadelphia,

1986);

Christopher

Marshall,

Warfare

in the Latin

East,

1192-1291

(New

York,

1992);

R.

Rogers,

Latin

Siege

Warfare

n the

TwelfthCentury

(Oxford, 1992);

T. E.

Lawrence,

CrusaderCastles

(2d

ed.;

New

York,

1988).

57.

William H.

McNeill,

The

Age

of

Chinese

Predominance,

1000-1500,

chap.

2

in

The

Pursuit

of

Power:

Technology,

Armed

Force,

and

Society

since

AD

000

(Chicago,

1982), pp.

24-62;

John

WinthropHaeger, ed.,

Crises

and

Prosperity

in

Sung

China

(Tucson,

1975);

Morris

Rossabi, ed.,

China

among Equals:

TheMiddle

Kingdom

and Its

Neighbors,

lOth-14th

Centuries

(Berkeley,

1983).

58.

Joseph

Needham

et

al.,

eds.,

Military

Technology:

The

GunpowderEpic,

vol.

5,

pt.

7,

of

Science and

Civilization

in China

(Cambridge,

1986);

Sang-woon

Jeon,

Gun-

powder,

n

Science and

Technology

n

Korea: Traditional nstruments nd

Techniques

(Cambridge,

Mass.,

1974),

pp.

269-72;

Iqtidar

Alam

Khan,

Early

Use

of Cannon and

Musket

in

India,

AD

1442-1526,

Journal

of

the Economic

and

Social

History

of

the

Orient 24

(1981),

146-64;

Halil

Inalcik,

The

Socio-Political Effects

of

the Diffusion of

Fire-Arms n the

Middle

East,

n

V. J.

Parry

and

M.

E.

Yapp,

eds., War,

Technology

and

Society

in the

Middle East

(London,

1975),

pp.

195-217;

David

Ayalon, Gunpowder

and

Firearms in theMamlukKingdom:A Challengeto a MediaevalSociety(2d ed.; Totowa,

N.J.,

1978);

Weston E.

Cook,

Jr.,

The

Hundred

Years

War

or

Morocco:

Gunpowder

and

the

Military

Revolution

n the

Early

ModernMuslim World

Boulder, 1994);

William H.

McNeill,

The

Gunpowder

Revolution and the Rise

of

Atlantic

Europe,

n Pursuit

of

Power

(note 57),

pp.

79-102.



480 BartonC. Hacker

59. Thomas J.

Barfield,

The Perilous Frontier:Nomad

Empires

and

China

(Cam-

bridge,

Mass.,

and

Oxford,

1989);

Sechin

Jagchid

and Van

Jay Symons,

Peace, War,

And

Trade

along

the Great Wall: Nomadic-Chinese Interaction

through

Two Millennia

(Bloomington,

1989);

Gary

Seaman

and Daniel

Marks, eds.,

Rulers

from

the

Steppe:

State

Formation

on

the Eurasian

Periphery

(Los

Angeles,

1991).

More

generally,

see S.

A.

M.

Adshead,

Central Asia

in

World

History

(New

York,

1993);

Luc

Kwanten,

Imperial

Nomads: A

History

of

Central

Asia,

500-1500

(Philadelphia,

1979).

60.

Robert

Marshall,

Storm

rom

the East: From

Genghis

Khan to KhubilaiKhan

(Berkeley,

1993);

Paul

Ratchnevsky,Genghis

Khan: His

Life

and

Legacy,

ed.

and trans.

Thomas N.

Haining

(Oxford, 1992);

Leo

de

Hartog,

The

Mongol

Army,

chap.

5 in

Genghis

Khan:

Conquerorof

the

World

New

York,

1989),

pp.

42-54;

David

Nicolle,

The

Mongol

Warlords

New

York,

1990);

David

O.

Morgan,

The

Mongol

Army,

in

The

Mongols

(Oxford, 1986),

pp.

84-96;

Sechin

Jagchid

and Paul

Hyer, Military

nstitutions:

Structureand

Function,

n

Mongolia's

Culture and

Society

(Boulder

and

Folkestone,

1979),

pp.

364-74;

Morris

Rossabi,

All

the

Khan's

Horses,

Natural

History

103

(Oct.

1994),

48-57;

John

Masson

Smith,

Jr.,

MongolCampaign

Rations:

Milk,

Marmots,

and

Blood? Journal

of

TurkishStudies 8

(1984),

223-28.

61. Elizabeth

Endicott-West,

Imperial

Governance

in

Yuian

Times,

Harvard

Journal

ofAsiatic

Studies46

(1986),

523-49;

Ch'i-ch'ing

Hsiao,

The

Military

Establish-

ment

of

the

Yiian

Dynasty

(Cambridge,

Mass.,

1978);

Romeyn Taylor,

Yuan

Origins

of

the

Wei-so

System,

in Charles

O.

Hucker, ed.,

Chinese

Government

n

Ming

Times:

Seven Studies

(New

York,

1969),

pp.

23-40.

62.

Charles

J.

Halperin,

Russia and the

Golden

Horde: The

Mongol Impact

on

Medieval Russian

History(London, 1987);GeorgeVernadsky,

The

Mongols

and

Russia,

vol. 3 of

A

History

of

Russia

(New

Haven and

London,

1953).

63.

David

O.

Morgan,

The

Mongol

Armies in

Persia,

Der Islam

56

(1979),

81-

96;

Claude

Cahen,

The

Mongols

and the

Near

East,

n

RobertLee

Wolff, ed.,

A

History

of

the Crusades

(2d

ed.;

2

vols.;

Philadelphia,

1969),

vol.

2,

pp.

715-34. See also John

Andrew

Boyle,

ed.,

The

Saljuq

and

Mongol

Periods,

vol.

5

of

The

Cambridge

History of

Iran

(Cambridge,

1968).

64. James

Chambers,

The

Devil's Horsemen: The

Mongol

Invasion

of

Europe

(New

York,

1979).

65.

Reuven

Amitai-Preiss,

Mongols

and Mamluks:TheMamluk-Ilkhnid

War,

1260-

1281

(Cambridge,

1995);

John

Masson

Smith,

Jr.,

'Ayn

Jalut: Mamluk Success or

Mongol

Failure? Harvard

Journal

of

Asiatic

Studies

44

(1984), 307-45;

R.

Stephen

Humphreys,

The

Emergence

of the Mamluk

Army,

Studia Islamica 45-46

(1977),

67-

100, 147-82;

Hassanein

Rabie,

' The

Training

of the Mamluk

Faris,

n

Parry

and

Yapp,

War,

Technology

and

Society

in the

Middle East

(note

58),

pp.

153-63;

David

Ayalon,

Preliminary

Remarks on the Mamluk

Military

Institution

n

Islam,

ibid.,

pp.

44-58;

Ayalon,

The

Auxiliary

Forces

of

the

Mamluk

Sultanate,

Der Islam

65

(1988),

13-37.

66.

Kyotsu

Hori,

' The

Economic

and Political Effects of the

Mongol

Wars,

in

John

W.

Hall and

Jeffrey

P.

Mass, eds.,

Medieval

Japan:

Essays

in Institutional

History

(New

Haven,

1974;

reprint

Stanford,

1988),

pp.

184-98;

William

E.

Henthomrn,

orea:

The

Mongol

Invasions

(Leiden,

1963).

67.

Adam

Smith,

An

Inquiry

nto the Nature

and Causes

of

the

Wealth

of

Nations,

ed. EdwinCannan rom the 5thed., London,1789 (New York, 1937), p. 669.

68. MarshallG. S.

Hodgson

first

emphasized

he idea of

gunpoweder

empires;

see

The

Gunpowder

Empires

and Modern

Times,

vol.

3

of The Venture

f

lslam:

Conscience

and

History

in

a

World

Civilization

(Chicago,

1974).

More recent

surveys

include

William H.

McNeill,

The

Age of GunpowderEmpires,

1450-1800

(Washington,

1989);



Military

Technology

and

World

History:

A

Reconnaissance

481

Arnold

Pacey,

GunpowderEmpires,

1450-1650,

chap.

5

in

Technology

in World

Civilization:

A

Thousand-Year

History (Cambridge,

Mass.,

1990),

pp.

73-91;

Stephen

Morillo, Gunsand Government:A

ComparativeStudy

of

Europe

and

Japan,

ournal

of

World

History

6

(Spring

1995),

75-106.

For an

up-to-date

overview,

see

Jeremy

Black,

Warfare

n

the

Wider

World, 1490-1700,

chap.

1

in

Cambridge

Illustrated

Atlas

of

Warfare:

Renaissance to

Revolution,

1492-1792

(Cambridge,

1996),

pp.

8-45.

69. Silah

Ozbaran,

TheOttomans'

Role

in

the Diffusion of Firearms

and

Military

Technology

in

Asia

and Africa

in

the

Sixteenth

Century,

rans.

Segil Akgiin,

Revue

internationald'histoire militaire no.

67

(1988),

77-84;

Godfrey

Goodwin,

The

Ottoman

Armed

Forces,

chap.

4

in

TheJanissaries

(London, 1994),

pp.

65-108;

David

C.

Nicolle,

Armies

of

the

Ottoman

Turks,

1300-1774

(Osprey

Men-at-Arms

Series

140;

London,

1983);

Ozer

Ergeng,

The

Qualifications

and Functions

of Ottoman

Central

Soldiers,

trans.

Segil Akgtin,

Revue internationale d'histoire

militaire no. 67

(1988),

45-56;

Caroline

Finkel,

The Administration

of Warfare:

The

Ottoman

Military

Campaigns

in

Hungary,

1593-1606

(Vienna, 1988).

70. Laurence

Lockhart,

The

Persian

Army

in

the Safavi

Period,

Der Islam 34

(1959),

89-98;

Masashi

Haneda,

TheEvolutionof the Safavid

Royal

Guard,

rans.

Rudi

Mautthee,

Iranian Studies 22

nos.

2-3

(1989),

57-85;

Adel

Allouche,

The

Origins

and

Development

of

the

Ottoman-SafavidConflict

906-962/1500-1555)

(Berlin, 1983);

Rob-

ert W.

Olson,

The

Siege of

Mosul and Ottoman-Persian

Relations,

1718-1743:

A

Studyof

Rebellion in the

Capital

and War n the

Provinces

of

the Ottoman

Empire

(Bloomington,

1975).

See

also Peter Jackson and Laurence

Lockhart,eds.,

The Timurid

and

Safavid

Periods,

vol.

6

of The

CambridgeHistory

of

lran

(Cambridge,

1986).

71. M. K.

Zaman,

The

Use

of

Artillery

n

MughalWarfare,

slamic Culture57

(1983),

297-304;

S.

P.

Verma,

Fire-Arms n

Sixteenth

Century

India

(A

Study

Based on

Mughal

Paintings

of Akbar's

Period),

Islamic

Culture

57

(1983),

63-69;

Douglas

E.

Streusand,

The

Process

of

Expansion, chap.

3 in The

Formation

of

the

Mughal Empire

(Delhi,

1989),

pp.

51-

81;

R. K.

Phul,

Armies

of

the Great

Mughals,

1526-1707

(New

Delhi,

1978).

See

also

Stephen

P.

Blake,

The Patrimonial-Bureaucratic

mpire

of the

Mughals,

n

Hermann

Kulke, ed.,

The State

in

India,

1000-1700

(Delhi,

1995),

pp.

278-

303;

John F.

Richards,

The

Mughal

Empire,

vol.

5,

pt.

1,

of

The New

CambridgeHistory

of

India

(New

York,

1993).

72.

Anthony

Reid,

The

Military

Revolution,

in

Southeast

Asia

in the

Age

of

Commerce,

1450-1680,

vol.

2,

Expansion

and Crisis

(New

Haven,

1993),

pp.

219-33;

Reid, ed., Southeast Asia in the Early ModernEra: Trade, Power, and Belief (Ithaca,

N.Y.,

1993);

Donald G.

McCloud,

The

Military

Subsystem

and

War,

n

System

and

Process

in Southeast Asia: The Evolution

of

a

Region

(Boulder

and

London,

1986),

pp.

101-105;

M. C.

Ricklefs, War,

Culture

and

Economy

in

Java,

1677-1726:

Asian

and

European Imperialism

n

the

Early

KartasuraPeriod

(Sydney,

1993).

73. John

Whitney

Hall,

The Bakuhan

System,

n

Marius

B.

Jansen,

ed.,

Warrior

Rule

in

Japan (Cambridge,

1995),

pp.

147-201;

Naohiro

Asao,

The

Sixteenth-Century

Unification,

in

John

Whitney

Hall and James

L.

McClain,

eds.,

Early

Modern

Japan,

vol.

4

of

The

CambridgeHistoryofJapan

(Cambridge,

1991),

pp.

40-95;

Michael

P.

Birt,

Samurai

n

Passage:

Transformation

f the

Sixteenth-Century

Kanto,

Journal

of

Japa-

nese

Studies

11

(1985),

369-89;

Conrad

Totman,

Tokugawa

eyasu,

Shogun:

A

Biography

(San Francisco, 1983); StephenR. Turnbulland RichardHook, SamuraiArmies,1550-

1615

(Osprey Osprey

Men-at-ArmsSeries

86; London,

1979).

74.

Gustave

Alef,

The

Origins of

Muscovite

Autocracy:

The

Age of

Ivan

III

(Wiesbaden,

1986);

ChristopherBellamy,

The Firebird

and the

Bear:

600

Years of

the

Russian

Artillery, History Today

32

(Sept.

1982),

16-20;

Thomas

Esper,

Military

Self-



482

BartonC. Hacker

Sufficiency

and

Weapons Technology

in

Muscovite

Russia,

Slavic Review 28

(1969),

185-208;

Richard

Hellie, Warfare,

Changing

Military

Technology,

and the Evolution of

Muscovite Society, in JohnA. Lynn,ed., Toolsof War:Instruments, deas,and Institu-

tions

of

Warfare,

1445- 1871

(Urbana,1990),

pp.

74-99.

75. Edward L.

Dreyer,

MilitaryOrigins

of

Ming

China,

n Frederick

W.

Mote

and Denis

Twitchett, eds.,

The

Ming Dynasty,

1368-1644,

vol.

7 of The

Cambridge

History

of

China

(Cambridge,

1988),

pp.

58-106;

Albert

Chan,

The

Glory

and

Fall

of

the

Ming Dynasty

(Norman, 1982);

C.

J.

Peers

and

David

Sque,

Medieval Chinese

Armies,

1260-1520

(Osprey

Men-at-Arms Series

251; London,

1992);

Lynn

A.

Struve,

The

Southern

Ming,

1644-1662

(New

Haven,

1984).

76.

Joseph

Needham et

al.,

Nautical

Technology, chap.

29

in

Civil

Engineering

and Nautics. vol.

4,

part

3,

of Science

and

Civilization

n China

(Cambridge,

1971),

pp.

379-699,

includes an

account of the

great voyages, pp.

486-535.

See also Nora

C.

Buckley,

The

Extraordinary

Voyages

of Admiral

Cheng

Ho,

History Today

25 (1975),

462-71;

Louise

Levathes,

When

China

Ruled

the

Seas:

The TreasureFleet

of

the

Dragon

Throne,

1405-1433

(New

York,

1994);

Shih-shan

Henry

Tsai,

Eunuchs and

Ming

Maritime

Activities,

chap.

7

in

The Eunuchs n the

Ming Dynasty

(Albany,

N.Y.,

1996),

pp.

141-64.

77. William H.

McNeill,

The

Gunpowder

Revolution,

Military History

Quar-

terly

3

(Autumn

1990),

8-17;

ThomasE.

Arnold,

Fortifications nd

the

Military

Revolu-

tion: The

Gonzaga

Experience,

1530-1630,

in

Clifford J.

Rogers,

ed.,

The

Military

Revolution Debate:

Readings

on

the

Military Transformation

f

Early

Modern

Europe

(Boulder, 1995),

pp.

201-26;

ChristopherDuffy, Siege

Warfare,

vol.

1,

The Fortress in

the

Early

Modern

World,

1494-1660

(London, 1979);

John

A.

Lynn,

The

trace italienne

and theGrowthof Armies:The French

Case,

Journal

ofMilitary

History

55

(1991),

297-

330;

Simon

Pepper

and

Nicholas

Adams,

Firearmsand

Fortifications:

Military

Architec-

ture and

Siege

Warfare

n

Sixteenth-Century

iena

(Chicago,

1986).

78.

Simon

Adams,

Tactics

or Politics?

'The

Military

Revolution'

andthe

Hapsburg

Hegemony,

1525-1648,

in

Lynn,

Tools

of

War

note 70),

pp.

28-52;

I.

A.

A.

Thompson,

War

and Government n

Habsburg

Spain,

1560-1620

(London, 1976);

Geoffrey

Parker,

Dynastic

War, 1494-1660,

in

Parker,

Cambridge

llustrated

History

of Warfare

note

35),

pp.

146-63;

Jeremy

Black,

Warfare

n

Europe,

1490-1600,

chap.

2 in Renaissance

to Revolution

(note

68),

pp.

46-63.

79. The

modern discussion

of this

topic

has

largely

belonged

to social

scientists,

beginning

with

Charles

Tilly, ed.,

The

Formation

of

National States

in Western

Europe

(Princeton,

1975);

see also

Tilly's

latest

essay

on this

topic,

Coercion,

Capital,

and

European

States,

AD990-1992

(Rev.

ed.;

Cambridge,

Mass.,

1992).

Other

recent works

include Samuel

Clark,

State

and

Status: The Rise

of

the

State and Aristocratic

Power in

Western

Europe

(Montreal,

1995);

Bruce

D.

Porter,

War

and the Rise

of

the State:

The

Military

Foundations

of

Modern Politics

(New

York,

1994);

Brian

M.

Downing,

The

Military

Revolution

and Political

Change:

Origins

of

Democracy

and

Autocracy

n

Early

Modern

Europe

(Princeton,

1992);

Karen

A.

Rasler and William

R.

Thompson,

Warand

State

Making:

The

Shaping

of

the

Global

Powers

(Boston, 1989);

Peter

T.

Manicus,

The

Legitimation

of the Modem State:

A

Historical

and Structural

Account,

n

Ronald

Cohen

and JudithD.

Toland, eds.,

State Formationand

Political

Legitimacy

(Political

Anthro-

pology, vol. 6; New Brunswick andOxford, 1988), pp. 173-97;JohnA. Hall, War

and

the Rise

of

the

West,

in Colin

Creighton

and Martin

Shaw,

eds.,

The

Sociology

of

War

and Peace

(Dobbs

Ferry,

N.Y.,

1987),

pp.

37-53.

80.

Michael

Roberts,

The

Military

Revolution, 1560-1660,

n

Essays

in Swedish

History (Minneapolis,

1967),

pp.

195-225.

For a

full,

extensively

annotated

discussion,



Military

Technology

and

World

History:

A

Reconnaissance 483

see

Geoffrey

Parker,

The

Military

Revolution:

Military

Innovation

and the

Rise

of

the

West,

1500-1800

(Cambridge,

1988).

For

contrasting

views,

see

Bert S.

Hall,

Weapons

and Warfare n RenaissanceEurope(Baltimore:JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress, 1997);

Rogers,

The

Military

Revolution

Debate

(note 77).

See also Janice

E.

Thomson,

Merce-

naries,

Pirates,

and

Sovereigns:

State-building

and ExtraterritorialViolence

in

Early

Modern

Europe

(Princeton,1994);

Jeremy

Black,

A

Military

Revolution?

MilitaryChange

and

European

Society,

1550-1800

(Atlantic

Highlands,

N.J.,

1991);

Gerhard

Oestreich,

The

Military

Renascence,

chap.

5

in

Neostoicism and

the

Early

Modern

State,

ed.

Brigitta

Oestreich and H.

G.

Koenigsberger,

rans.David McLintock

(Cambridge,

1982),

pp.

76-89.

81. The

classic

study

is Carlo

Cipolla,

Guns,

Sails,

and

Empires: Technological

Innovationand

the

Early

Phases

of

EuropeanExpansion,

1400-1700

(New

York,

1965).

Recent

studies include

Roger

C.

Smith,

Vanguard

of Empire:

Ships

of Exploration

n the

Age

of

Columbus

(New

York,

1993);

Carla Rahn

Phillips,

Six Galleons

for

the

King

of

Spain:

Imperial

Defense

in the

Early

Seventeenth

Century

(Baltimore, 1986);

Frank

Howard,

Sailing

Ships

of

War,

1400-1860

(New York,

1979).

82. Richard

Hall,

Desperate

Citadel,

Military History Quarterly

6

(Summer

1994),

72-

81;

Malyn

Newitt,

PortugueseConquistadores

n

Eastern

Africa,

History

Today

30

(August

1980),

19-24;

A.

C. de

C.

M.

Saunders,

The

Depiction

of

Trade as

War

as a

Reflection

of

Portuguese

Ideology

and

Diplomatic Strategy

in

West

Africa,

1441-1556,

Canadian

Journal

of History

17

(1982),

219-34;

John

Vogt, Portuguese

Rule on the Gold

Coast,

1469-1682

(Athens,

Ga.,

1979).

83. John H.

Elliott,

The Seizure of OverseasTerritories

by

the

European

Powers,

in

Hans

Pohl,

ed.,

The

EuropeanDiscoveryof

the Worldand

Its

Economic

Effects

on Pre-

Industrial

Society,

1500-1800

(Stuttgart,

990);

David B.

Quinn

andA.

N.

Ryan,England's

Sea

Empire,

1550-1642

(London, 1983);

Pierre-Yves

Manguin,

Of

Fortresses

and

Galleys:

The 1568

Acehnese

Siege

of

Melaka,

after

a

Contemporary

Bird's-Eye

View,

Modern

Asian

Studies

22

(1988),

607-28;

F.

David

Bulbeck,

The

Landscape

of the

Makassar War:

A

Review

Article,

Canberra

Anthropology

13

(1990),

78-99;

Pierre-

Yves

Manguin,

The

Vanishing Jong:

InsularSoutheastAsian Fleets

in

Trade and

War

(Fifteenth

to Seventeenth

Centuries),

n

Reid,

SoutheastAsia

in the

Early

Modern Era

(note 72).

84.

Bruce

P.

Lenman,

The

Transition

o

European

Military

Ascendancy

in

India,

1600-1800,

in

Lynn,

Tools

of

War

(note 70),

pp.

100-30;

I.

Bruce

Watson,

Fortifica-

tions and

the 'Idea' of Force in

EarlyEnglish

East India

Company

Relations

with

India,

Past

&

Present,

no. 88

(August

1980),

70-87;

T. A.

Heathcote,

The

Military

in British

India: The

Development of

British Land

Forces in South

Asia,

1600-1947

(Manchester,

1995);

Ahsan Jan

Qaisar,

The

Indian

Response

to

European Technology

AD

498-1707)

(New York,

1982).

For

later

developments,

see

Donald

Featherstone,

Victorian

Colonial

Warfare:

India,

from

the

Conquest

of

Sind to the

Indian

Mutiny

(London,

1992);

M. R.

Kantak,

The First

Anglo-Maratha

War,

1774-1783:

A

Military

Studyof

the

Major

Battles

(Bombay,

1993);

Byron

Farwell,

Armies

of

the

Raj:

From

the

Mutiny

to

Independence,

1858-1947

(New York,

1991);

Ian

Knight

and

Richard

Scollins,

Queen

Victoria's En-

emies

(3):

India

(Osprey

Men- at-Arms Series

219;

London,

1990).

85.

Kenneth

R.

Andrews, Trade, Plunder,

and Settlement:Maritime

Enterprise

and the Genesis of the British Empire, 1480-1630 (Cambridge,1984); Peter Padfield,

Tide

of

Empires:

Decisive

Naval

Compaigns

in the Rise

of

the West

(2

vols.; London,

1979-1982);

Urs

Bitterli,

Cultures n

Conflict:

Encounters

between

European

and

Non-

European

Cultures, 1492-1800,

trans.Richie Robertson

Stanford,1989);

John

E.

Wills,

Jr.,

Maritime

Asia,

1500-1800:

The Interactive

Emergence

of

European

Domination,



484 BartonC.

Hacker

American Historical Review 98

(1993),

83-105;

Geoffrey

Parker,

Joint

Stock

and

Gunshot:

European Conquest

and

Trade, 1500-1800,

Military History Quarterly

4

(Summer 1992),

8-17;

P.

J.

Marshall,

Western

Arms

in

Maritime Asia

in the

Early

Phases of

Expansion,

ModernAsian Studies

14

(1980),

13-28.

86.

Evgenii

V.

Anisimov,

The

Reforms

of

Peter

the

Great:

Progress

through

Coercion

in

Russia,

trans. John

T.

Alexander

(Armonk,

N.Y.,

1993);

John

L. H.

Keep,

Soldiers

of

the Tsar:

Army

and

Society

in

Russia,

1462-1874

(New

York,

1985);

Bruce

W.

Menning,

Russia and the West:

The

Problem

of

Eighteenth-Century

Military

Mod-

els,

in

A.

C.

Cross,

ed.,

Russia and

the West in the

Eighteenth

Century

(Newtonville,

Mass.,

1983),

pp.

282-

93;

ChristopherDuffy,

Russia's

Military

Way

o

the West:

Origins

and

Nature

of

Russian

Military

Power,

1700-1800

(London,

1981).

See also

William

C.

Fuller,

Jr.,

Strategy

and

Power in

Russia,

1600-1914

(New

York,

1992);

87. Brian M. Fagan,Kingdomsof Gold, Kingdomsof

Jade:

The Americas

before

Columbus

(London, 1991);

Stuart

J.

Fiedel,

Chiefdoms

and

States:

The

Emergence

of

Complex

Societies,

chap.

6

in

Prehistoryof

the

Americas

(Cambridge,

1987),

pp.

223-

339;

Manuel Lucena

Salmoral,

Warriors nd

Priests,

n

America

1492:

Portrait

of

a

Continent500 Years

Ago

(New

York,

1990),

pp.

193-223;

Robert

L.

Carneiro,

Point

Counterpoint:Ecology

and

Ideology

in the

Development

of

New

World

Civilizations,

n

Arthur

A. Demarest and

Geoffrey

Conrad,

eds.,

Ideology

and

Pre-Columbian

Civiliza-

tions

(Santa

Fe,

1992),

pp.

175-203.

88. The

standard account

is

now Ross

Hassig,

War and

Society

in Ancient

Mesoamerica

(Berkeley,

1992).

See also

Diane Z. Chase

and Arlen F.

Chase, eds.,

Mesoamerican Elites: An

Archaeological

Assessment

Norman,

1992);

John

M.

D. Pohl

and Angus McBride,Aztec, Mixtec and ZapotecArmies (OspreyMen-at-ArmsSeries

239; London,

1991).

89. Walter Alva

and

Christopher

B.

Donnan,

Tales

from

a Peruvian

Crypt,

Natural

History

103

(May

1994),

26-35;

Richard

L.

Burger,

Chavin

and the

Origins

of

Andean

Civilization

(New

York,

1992);

JonathanHaas et

al.,

eds.,

The

Origins

and

Development of

the Andean

State

(Cambridge,

1987);

Craig

Morris and

Adriana von

Hagen,

The Inka

Empire

and Its Andean

Origins

(New

York,

1993);

Michael E.

Moseley,

The Incas

and

Their

Ancestors:

The

Archaeology

ofPeru

(New

York,

1992);

Katharina .

Schreiber,

Wari

Imperialism

n

Middle

Horizon

Peru

(Ann

Arbor,

1992).

90.

The

idea

of

peaceful

Mayan

civilization

prevailed

nto the

1960s,

most

forcefully

arguedby

the then-deanof

Mayanists,

J. Eric

S.

Thompson;

ee,

e.g.,

The

Rise and Fall

of

Maya Civilization 2nded.; Norman,Okla.,1966).For a discussion he dramatic hange n

understanding

uing

the

past

three

decades,

see

Jeremy

A.

Sabloff The New

Archaeology

and the Ancient

Maya

(New

York,

1990),

especially

the section

on The Evidence of

Warfare,

p.

84-91;

see also articles

by

Diane

Z.

Chase,

David I.

Freidel,

Joyce

Marcus,

ArthurG.

Miller,

Mary

Ellen

Miller,

PrudenceM.

Rice,

David

Stuart,

ndDavid Webster

n

Sabloff and John

S.

Henderson, ds.,

Lowland

Maya

Civilization

n the

Eighth

Century

D

(Washington,

1993);

and John M.

Weeks,

Maya

Civilization,

ResearchGuides

to Ancient

Civilizations1

(New

York

and

London,

1993).

The

decipherment

f

Mayan

writing

contrib-

uted

greatly

to this

revolution;

see

Linda Schele

and

Mary

Ellen

Miller,

Warfare

and

Captive

Sacrifice,

chap.

5

in

The Blood

of Kings: Dynasty

and

Ritual n

Maya

Art

(New

York

and

Fort

Worth,

1986);

Joyce

Marcus,

Raiding

nd

Warfare,

hap.

11

inMesoamerican

WritingSystems:Propaganda,Myth,andHistory n FourAncientCivilizationsPrinceton,

1992),

pp.

353-434;

MichaelD.

Coe,

Breaking

he

Maya

Code

(New

York,

1992).

91.

Ross

Hassig,

Aztec

Warfare: mperialExpansion

nd

Political

Control

Norman,

1988);

Hassig,

Aztec

Flower

War,

Military

History Quarterly

9

(Autumn

1996),

8-20;

Inga

Clendinnen,

Warriors,

riests

and

Merchants,

hap.

4 in

Aztecs.:

An

Interpretation



Military

Technology

and World

History:

A

Reconnaissance

485

(Cambridge,

1991),

pp.

111-40;

David

Carrasco,

The

Religion

of

the

Aztecs:

Ways

of

the

Warrior,

Words of

the

Sage, chap.

3 in

Religions

of

Mesoamerica: Cosmovision

and

Ceremonial Centers

(San

Francisco,

1990),

pp.

58-91; Richard F. Townsend, The

Warriors,

n

The

Aztecs

(London, 1992),

pp.

195-200.

92. Alan L.

Kolata,

Understanding

iwanaku:

Conquest,

Colonization

nd

Clientage

in

the South-Central

Andes,

n Don

S.

Rice,

ed.,

Latin

American

Horizons

(Washington,

1992);

John

Victor

Murra,

The

Expansion

of the Inka

State:

Armies, War,

and Rebel-

lions,

in

Murraet

al., eds.,

Anthropological

History

of

Andean

Polities

(Cambridge

and

Paris,

1986),

pp.

49-58;

Thomas C.

Patterson,

The

Inca

Empire:

The

Formation

and

Disintegration

of

a

Pre-Capitalist

State

(New

York and

Oxford,

1991).

93. Ross

Hassig,

Mexico and the

Spanish

Conquest

London

and New

York,

1994);

Inga

Clendinnen,

'Fierce and Unnatural

Cruelty':

Cort6s

and the

Conquest

of

Mexico,

in

Stephen

Greenblatt,ed.,

New

World Encounters

(Berkeley,

1993),

pp.

12-47;

Jane

MaclarenWalsh and

Yoko

Sugiura,

The Demise

of

the Fifth

Sun,

in Herman

J.

Viola

and

Carolyn

Margolis,

eds.,

Seeds

of Change:

A

Quincentennial

Commemoration

Wash-

ington,

1991),

pp.

17-

41.

94.

John F.

Guilmartin,

Jr.,

The

CuttingEdge:

An

Analysis

of the

Spanish

Inva-

sion and Overthrowof

the

Inca

Empire,

1532-1539,

in

KennethJ. Andrien

and Rolena

Adorno, eds.,

TransatlanticEncounters:

Europeans

and Andeans in the Sixteenth Cen-

tury

(Berkeley,

1991).

More

generally,

see

Patricia

Seed,

Conquest

of the

Americas,

1500-1650,

in

Parker,

Cambridge

llustrated

History of Warfare

note

35),

pp.

132-45;

Alistair

Hennessy,

The

Nature of

the

Conquest

and the

Conquistadores,

n Warwick

Bray,

ed.,

The

Meeting

of

Two

Worlds:

Europe

and the

Americas,

1492-1650

(Oxford,

1993), pp. 5-36;

Terence Wise and

Angus McBride,

The

Conquistadores Osprey

Men-

at-Arms

Series

101; London,

1980).

95.

James

Belich,

The New

Zealand

Wars and the Victorian

Interpretation

of

Racial

Conflict

(Auckland,

1986);

Margaret

Rodman and Matthew

Cooper,

eds.,

The

Pacification

of

Melanesia

(Ann

Arbor,

1979);

Brian M.

Fagan,

Clash

of

Cultures

(New

York,

1984).

96.

Bray, Meeting

of

Two

Worlds

(note 94),

articles

by

Francis Frei

Berdan,

Don

Brothwell,

and

Linda

A.

Newson;

Viola and

Margolis,

Seeds

of Change

(note 93),

articles

by

Alfred W.

Crosby,

John W.

Verano and

Douglas

H.

Ubelaker;

David E.

Stannard,

American

Holocaust:

Columbusand the

Conquest

of

the New World

New

York,

1992);

Stannard,

Before

the

Horror: The

Population

of

Hawai'i on the Eve

of

Western

Contact

(Honolulu, 1989); David E. Stannard, Disease and Infertility:A New Look at the

DemographicCollapse

of Native

Populations

n

the Wake

of

Western

Contract,

ournal

of

American

Studies

24

(Dec. 1990),

325-50;

O.

A.

Bushnell,

The

Gifts of

Civilization:

Germs

and Genocide in Hawai'i

(Honolulu, 1993).

97. Ian

K.

Steele,

Warpaths:

Invasions

of

NorthAmerica

(New

York,

1994);

Hans

Koning,

The

Conquestof

America:

How the

Indian

Nations Lost Their

Continent

New

York,

1993);

JeraldT.

Milanich,

FloridaIndiansand the Invasion

rom Europe

Gainesville,

1995).

98. Andrew J.

Knaut,

The

Pueblo

Revolt

of

1680:

Conquest

and Resistance

in

Seventeenth-Century

New

Mexico

(Norman, 1995);

Roberto Mario

Salm6n,

Indian

Re-

volt in

Northern

New

Spain:

A

Synthesis

of

Resistance

(1680-1786)

(Lanham,

Md.,

1991);

Adam J. Hirsch, TheCollision of MilitaryCulturesin Seventeenth-CenturyNew En-

gland,

Journal

of

American

History

74

(1988),

1187-1212;

Tkaczuk

and

Vivian,

Cul-

tures

in

Conflict

(note 5);

Gregory

Evans

Dowd,

A

Spirited

Resistance: The

North

American ndian

Struggle or Unity,

1745-1815

(Baltimore,

1991);

Alan

Axelrod,

Chronicle

of

the

Indian Wars: From

Colonial

Times to Wounded

Knee

(New

York,

1993).



486

BartonC.

Hacker

99. Patrick

Mitchell

Malone,

The

Skulking

Way of

War:

Technology

and Tactics

among

the

Indians

of

New

England

(Lanham,

Md.,

1991);

Brian

J.

Given,

The

Iroquois

Wars and Native

Firearms,

n Bruce Alden

Cox,

ed.,

Native

People,

Native Lands:

Canadian

Indians,

Inuit and

Metis

(Ottawa,

1987),

pp.

3-13;

Donald E. Worcesterand

Thomas F.

Schilz,

The

Spread

of Firearms

among

the Indians

of the

Anglo-French

Frontiers,

American

Indian

Quarterly

8

(1984),

103-15;

Schilz and

Worcester,

The

Spread

of

Firearms

among

the Indian Tribes on

the NorthernFrontier

of New

Spain,

American

Indian

Quarterly

11

(1987),

1-10.

100.

The classic

study

is Jack

Goody,

Technology,

Tradition

and the

State

in

Africa

(Oxford,

1971;

reprint

Cambridge,

1980),

especially chap.

5,

Polity

and the

Means

of

Destruction. More recent

studies include

Stephen

P.

Reyna,

Wars without End: The

Political

Economy of

a

Precolonial

African

State

(Hanover,

N.H.,

1990);

Robert S.

Smith,

Warfare

and

Diplomacy

in

Pre-Colonial West

Africa (2d

ed.;

Madison, 1989);

Richard

Pankhurst,

Changing

Features

of

Social Life: The

Coming

and

Increasing

Diffusion

of

Fire-Arms,

pt.

4,

chap.

1,

in

A

Social

History

of Ethiopia:

TheNorthern

and

Central

Highlands rom

Early

Medieval

Times

o the Rise

of

Emperor

Tiwodros II

(Addis

Ababa,

1990;

reprint

Trenton,

N.J.,

1992),

pp.

277-88. See also

ChristopherSpring,

African

Arms

and Armor

(Washington,

1993).

101.

Frederic

Wakeman,Jr.,

The Great

Enterprise:

The

Manchu

Reconstruction

of

Imperial

Order in

Seventeenth-Century

China

(2

vols.;

Berkeley,

1985);

Joanne

Waley-

Cohen,

China

and Western

Technology

in the

Late

Eighteenth Century,

American

Historical Review 98

(1993),

1525-44;

Geoffrey

Parker,

Taking

up

the

Gun,

Military

History

Quarterly

1

(Summer 1989),

88-101;

Stewart

Gordon, Marathas, Marauders,

and

State

Formation n

Eighteenth-Century

ndia

(Delhi, 1994);Kantak,

The First

Anglo-

Maratha

War

(note

84);

Pradeep

Barua,

MilitaryDevelopments

in

India,

1750-1850,

Journal

of

Military

History

58

(1994),

599-616.

102. Daniel R.

Headrick,

The Tools

of

Empire:

Technology

and

EuropeanImperial-

ism

in

the Nineteenth

Century

New

York,

1981);

Headrick,

The Tentacles

of

Progress:

Technology Transfer

n the

Age

of

Imperialism,

1850-1940

(New York,

1988);

Maurice

Pearton,

The

Knowledgeable

State:

Diplomacy,

War

and

Technology

since

1830

(Lon-

don,

1982).

103. V.

G.

Kiernan,

European Empires fom

Conquest

to

Collapse,

1815-1960

(London, 1982);

J.

A. de

Moor

and H.

L.

Wesseling,

Imperialism

and

War:

Essays

on

Colonial Wars

in

Africa

and

Asia

(Leiden,

1989);

Gayl

D.

Ness and William

Stahl,

Western mperialistArmies in Asia, Contemporary tudiesofSocial History19(1977),

2-29.

104. David B.

Ralston,

Importing

the

EuropeanArmy:

The

Introduction

of

Euro-

pean

Military

Techniques

and Institutions nto the

Extra-European

World,

1600-1914

(Chicago,

1990);

Barton

C.

Hacker,

The

Weapons

of the

West:

Military

Technology

and

Modernization n

Nineteenth-Century

China

and

Japan, Technology

and Culture 18

(1977), 43-55;

M. E.

Yapp,

The

Modernization of Middle

Eastern Armies

in

the

Nineteenth

Century:

A

Comparative

View,

in

Parry

and

Yapp,

War,

Technology

and

Society

in

the

Middle

East

(note 58),

pp.

330-66.

105.

Alberto

Elena,

Models

of

European

Scientific

Expansion:

The

Ottoman

Em-

pire

as a

Source

of

Evidence,

in

Patrick

Pettijean

et

al.,

eds.,

Science and

Empires:

Historical Studies about ScientificDevelopmentand European Expansion(Dordrecht,

1992),

pp.

259-67;

Musa

?adirci,

Renovations

n

the Ottoman

Army

(1792-1869),

trans.

Segil

Akguin,

Revue internationale

d'histoire

militaire no.

67

(1988),

87-102;

Serafettin

Turan,

Relations

between

the

Ottoman

Military

and Administrative

Units

during

the

Second

Constitutional

Era,

trans.

Seqil

Akgtin,

ibid.,

pp.

153-66;

Rhoads



MilitaryTechnology

and World

History:

A

Reconnaissance

487

Murphey,

The Ottoman Attitude towards the

Adoption

of Western

Technology:

The

Role of the

Efrenci

Technicians

n Civil and

Military

Applications,

Collection

Turcica

3

(1983),

287-98.

106. Samuel C. Chu and

Kwang-ching

Liu, eds.,

Li

Hung-chang

and China's

Early

Modernization

Armonk,

N.Y.,

1994);

David

Pong,

Shen Pao-chen

and

China's

Modern-

ization

in the

Nineteenth

Century(Cambridge,

1994);

Ting-yee

Kuo

and

Kwang-ching

Liu,

Self-strengthening:

The

Pursuit

of Western

Technology,

n

John K.

Fairbank, d.,

Late

Ch'ing,

1800-1911,

vol.

10,

part

1,

of The

Cambridge

History

of

China

(Cambridge,

1983),

pp.

491-542.

107. D. Eleanor

Westney,

The

Military,

n

Marius

B. Jensen

and Gilbert

Rozman,

eds.,

Japan

in Transition: From

Tokugawa

to

Meiji

(Princeton,

1988),

pp.

168-94;

Shin'ichi

Kitaoka,

The

Army

as a

Bureaucracy:

apanese

Militarism

Revisited,

Journal

of MilitaryHistory

57 no. 5

(Special

Issue,

Oct.

1993),

67-86;

Meirion

Harries

and Susie

Harries,

Soldiers

of

the Sun: The

Rise

and Fall

of

the

Imperial Japanese

Army

(New

York,

1991);

Stewart

Lone,

Japan's

First

Modern

War:

Army

and

Society

in

the

Conflict

with

China,

1894-1895

(London,

1994).

108. BartonC.

Hacker,

Engineering

a New Order:

Military

Institutions,

Technical

Education,

and the Rise of the Industrial

State,

Technology

and Culture

33

(1993),

1-27;

Mary

Kaldor,

The

Baroque

Arsenal

(New

York,

1981);

John

Tirman,ed.,

The

Militariza-

tion

of

High Technology Cambridge,

Mass.,

1984);

JohnR.

Gillis, ed.,

The

Militarization

of

the Western

World

New

Brunswick,

N.J.,

1989).

Military Technology and World History - A Reconnaissance (Barton C. Hacker)

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