Military Review July 1966

7/27/2019 Military Review July 1966

1/117

d

\ ~ 2 ~ / In This IS8Ue

*Guerr i l la Warfare*The ObjectiveandVietnamo MechanizedFightingVehicle


2/117

UNITED STATES ARMY COMMANDAND GENERAL STAFF COLLE6EFORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS . COMMANDANT

i l fa j Gen Ha r r u J . L em l eu , J r .ASSISTANT COMMANDANT

Br i g Gen Rober t C . Ta ber


3/117

Military ReviewProfessional Journal of the US Army

M echan ized Fight ing Vehicl e . . . . . Col Robert P. Zeigl er, USA 3Guerri l l a Warfare Patt ern . . Brig J. Mi chael Calvert , Bri t ish Army, Ret 13War of Independence . , . Col M . Dugu6 Mac Cart hy, French Army, Ret 19Berl in Confront at i on . . . . . . . . . . Jean Edward Smit h 26Intel l i gence Role in Polic ymaki ng . . . Capt Roy H. Pink ert on, USNR 40Red Chhra Coloni zes Tibet . Wg Cdr M . K. Chopra, Indian Air Force, Ret 52Th e M c M aho n Li ne . . . . . . . . . . . . Ear l B. Shaw 6 1The Americ an Revolut ion . . . . . M aj Ray L. Bowers, Jr. , USAF 64

Anatomy of Foreign Pol ic y Deci sions . . . . . . . Dean Rusk 73The Objec ti ve and Vietnam . . . . Lt Col John%. D. Clel and, USA 62Soviet Mi l i tary Li t erature for 1966 . . . . . Harr iet Fast Scot t 67Cheap Solut ions f or wi nning Wars? . . . . Col Robert B. Rigg, USA 91M i i i t ary Not es . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97M i l i t ary Books . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106

TheVIE WSxpressedn this ma ga zine a nd not n ecessa r ilyRETH EAU TH ORS t hoseof t heU SArmyor the C omma nd S t a ffC ollege.ndGenera l


4/117

IJOTICEAfter 17 year s a t th e sa me subscription ra te, th e price

for t he MIL ITARY RE VIE W w ill be increa sedby 50$ effectiveI September 1966. Annual subscript ion ra t es w illbe @$.00 ayea r in th e U nited St a tes including AP Os a nd in th osecount ries w hich a re members of th e P a n-America n P osta l U nion(including Spa in); $5.00 a yea r in a ll other count ries. S ubscriptions ent ered before 1 S ept ember w ill be a t t he old ra te,

I f you w ould l ike to renew or extend your current subscription a t th e old ra te, simply f il l out a nd ma il th ea t ta ched form before 1 S ept ember 1966..---- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----

(Date)To: Mili ta ry Review Subscription S ervice, B ook Depar tm ent,U SACG SC , Fort Leavenworth, Ka nsas 66027

P lea se (renew ) (extend ) w curr ent subscription to t heMIL ITARY RE VIE W for (1 yea r) (2 yea rs) a t t he ra t e effect ive un t il 1 S eptem ber 1966. N& check for$is inclosed.

(Grade ) (Na me )

(Address)

(city) (St a te or Country)

(Zip Code)


5/117

Editor in Chief Col Donald J. DelaneyAssociate EditorCol John B. McKhrneyArmy Wer CollegeAssistant EdNor

Lt Col A. Leroy Covey

Featuras Edit orMaj Charies A, Gatzka

SpanishAsrerican EditorMaj Ren6 Ramos

Brasi l i an Edit orsLt Col Paulo A. F. VianaLt Col Walter J. Faustht i Production OfRcerM aj Norman C. Mur raystaff Art ist

Charies A. Moore

MILITARYEVIEW-Publlshadont hly a ndG enera l ForJl.ea vy t heU .S . Arm C omma nd S t a ffC ollege,en w or t h, in E nI ish ,S pa n ish ,n dP or t ugu ese. of t hispublicsflonsna a a , a s of fundsfor pr in t ing ha sbeenWOVCIJy HSS& IS#SS$ Oapr t meo t of t ho ASW, 28 htS Ye65.3ecorr&cleaaos tage id a t or t Leavenwor th ,a nsa s. ret ex$3.50{U Scurrency)ubscr ipt ion a yea rin t t reU nit ed ta t % nifa dS t a tesmilit a ry w hich pfeatoffices,a n dt h osecou nt r ies a r em em ber st heP a n-Ameria en Oncludin $4.50a Yea rin a ll ot herceunt fies.Addressub= rlet el U nion S pa in);t ionma ilto th a SW ltepertma nt ,. / WnrYC omma nd S t sffS oU ege,ndG enera l Fortlea venvmrt ~. Kaneaa6027.


6/117

The Military Review announces the selection of the following arti-cle from the May 1966 issue as a MILITARY REVIEW AWARD ARTI-CLE: The IWyth of the Thud ManLieutenant Cokmel I r v in M . Kent , USA, andM ajor Ri char d A. J ones, U SAThree broad avenues of attack against insurgency are currently recog-nized. Counterguerrilla and environmental improvement are two whichare fairly clearly established under Country Team responsibility. How-ever, the man responsible for a population and resources control pro-gram is more difficult to identify. Military personnel with military gov-ernment or civil affaira training may inherit the responsibility for imcha program. The nuclei around which the principles and techniques canbe taught are already in existence at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, andFort Gordon, Georgia.

+7 * *COMING:Lieutenan t Colonel H a rry O. Amos, a former a rt i llery bat ta lion comm a nder inVietn a m, w ritea of problems met a nd overcome by U S a rt i llery units in Art illerySupport of Vietna mese. These unite ha ve found t ha t tbe ah nda ~ forw a rd Ob.server and liaiaon organization can provide effective firepower zupport to theVietn a mese comm a nder.C olonel A. E , Youn ger in S elf-Tra ining for S enior Otlicera discusa ea severa la reas of str a tegy w ith w hich t he senior officer should become a cqua inted. H e ala ourgea th e St a ff C olleges to institut e program s to stimula te officer interest insel f-tra ining w hich ma y sta r t th em on th e roa d t o higher posta w ithin the ArmedForces.

I


7/117


8/117

The t iew e ez17rea 8t?dn t hie a rt icleare the authore and are not nece88a rily t hoee of th e Depar tm ent ofth e Army, Depar tm ent of D efense,or the U . S. AmmI Comman d a ndG enera l St a ff Colkge.-E ditor.

HE search for new conceptsT ha s ha en underwa y for 20 yea rs ,a nd noth ing of grea t consequence ha ea ppea red. This is not ba eaus e t hereare no new concepts available. Thereal problem lice w ith th oee w ho a rehunting for something new. Theyw a nt a new look, but one tha t is familiar enough to suit their own tastes.

Alternately, they proclaim that orderly evolution ie the key to progressor that conditions cannot be satisf iedMy 1900

w ith a nyt hing less tha n a revolut ion. I tshould he clea r by now t ha t no revolutionary concepts will ha forthcomingon an automatic baeis. The raquirament for a qua ntum jump a f feetetoo ma ny people a nd inst i tutions to hapalatable. This is because the neededchangee enhancq some and detreetfrom others according to the inteneityof w a rfa re u nder dkwussion.Contr a ry t o the view of moat military pareone,the art of soldiering is atrade, not a science. The turdschangeconsta nt ly, a nd tbe method of a pplica tion should be changed to adapt the

tools to the job at hand. The solutiont o a eeient itic problem ca n be prdieted w ith a high degree of a ccura cy.Such precision is not poeeible inkthe8


9/117

MECBAMIZED VEl t lGIEmilita ry profession, a nd, i f w e a re toaccelerate progress, this inaccuracyshould be recognised.

The usua l a rgum ents a re cont inuingamong our branches, each basing itsrecommendations on tradition abettedto a degree by progress. Some armormen w ould relegat e th e infan tr y to t heMiddle Ages while they mount theirtrust y steeds and ga l lop off to w in t hefray. The infantry points to thosesi tuat ions w herein t a nks ca nnot opera te , and th e art i llery ha s concentra tedits development on missiles. As a result, our convent iona l a rt illery s upporthas shrunk, and the pieces are notsignificantly improved over those of20 years ago.S h ~ t o RearThe Army now finds itself largelyequipped w ith tools a nd d oct rine tofight World Wa r II in a su perior ma nner. As the World War II group progressed in a ge, th e Arm y emphasis ha sshif ted toward the rear in certa in respects . We ha ve improved comm un ica t ions in tbe rear ; w e a re a utomat ingthe rear so that generals can controlsquads. There are mobile commandvans to follow troops back and forth,even t hough our doctr ine rema ins essentia l ly l inear in na tur -nd th eequipment and impedimenta supportthis scheme of operation.

The crit eria for a new concept inColoa el Robert P . Zeigler is Ch ief ofthe Organisat ion and Doet?ine Division, H eadq ua rt er Combined ArmsG roup, a t Fort Leavenw ort h. A gra duat e of the U nivers ity o f Omaha andth e Air Comma nd a w dS ta f f College, heha s ee:ved w ith th e U S Arm v ArcticTeet B oa rd a t F ort G reely, Alaska, a mfw a s wit h t he 29th Infa ntt y Divieiondur ing World Wa r II . H e is t he a ut horof the reeerztlripublished book, The

Dog Chases the Bird.

the Army a re somewha t di f ferent tha nthey were 20 yeara ago. This is notbecause we have nuclear weapons,helicopters, or missiles. It is not dueto the many new missions and widesprea d d eploym ent s. We need differentcriteria beca uee it a ppear s w e sha ll behea vily outn umbered in a ny conflict oflarge proportions.Incerrect ApproachWha t th en should be our a pproach?First, w e n eed efficiency on t he ba tt lefield. This is ha rd to get, but it is notha rd t o get a greet improvement overwhat we have now. The wrong approa ch is to sit dow n and dema nd abetter tank, rifle, cannon, or missile.The second incorrect approach is tooversophkticate a combat system thatis almost identical to that of theenemy, and, additionally, one whereinyou a re out nu mber ed five or 10 t o oneat tbe outset .Most combat experience is gainedin what might be termed t raumat iccircums t a nces. As a r esult, it isdeeply engra ved upon t he m ind. Whensometh ing bett er is requ ested, mostpeople go ba ck in a sort of tr a uma ticpsychodrama and relive the experience w ith a bett er w eapon or oth erdevice that would have solved a historic problem. Any new idea tha t doesnot f i t the eagraving is of ten summarily rejected.~ ~D oct rina l field ma nua ls producedfollow ing World Wa r II provide a g oodexa mple. I t took t w o to t hree yea rs toproduce man ua ls th a t w ere, in effect ,a coordinated description of how thewar was fought in di f ferent environments. Actually, these manuals onlydetailed the experiences of one forcestructure versus another in many respects.The books were written, and thenew st udents w ere required to m emo-

MilitaryOVieW


10/117

r ize the new dogma. Unfortunately ,there is scarcely any other way tolearn, but the teachera should not endeavor to guard the dogma from desirable changes. I t would be interesting t O surmiee w ha t w ould be inexieting manuals had there been 20fewer Allied divisione on the Western.., .,-, . ... ~ ,,, .O.. ., ; ,, ,, ~

.MECIIANIZED VEHICLE

w hen mobili ty w a s being used tQ th ema ximum extent by ground forcee, th eneed for f irepower wae apparentlylessened during that space of time.This revolutionary, but misdirected,thinking is with us stil l ,The trend over the past 100 yearsbse pla ced more a nd more w eapons at,.. . -~. .. . ,,. :.;J ;,,-;,.. , ..

AWIW New. [email protected] OV-1Mehaw kca n providebrigade a nd bat ta l ion cemara ndersmmedia tea eria l reconn a ieea ncea nd surveilla nceinforma t ionFr ont dur ing World Wa r II . We w ouldhave won anyway, but via di f ferentexperiences.

In retroepeet, World War I wea akind. of l inea r siege w a rfa re. WorldWar II featured linear lines of foxholes and occupants that sometimesmoved a t a ra te of a pproxima tely fourkilometer per hour, w ith t he exception of breakthroughs where, on occasion, mobili ty w a s n ot hindered by a nyopposition. P roduct improvement s onth e ta nk a nd airplane a ppea red to @vea new complexion t o t he pictur e. Thus ,My 1986

the disposal of the frontline unitsmachinegune, carriers , tanks, nightvision equipment, and mortars. Theideal solution is to package these capabil i t ies in a form that makes themmore lethal and, at the same ti lme,greatly assists the frontline soldier indoing his job. Squads must also become more independent in nature tocontribute to a truly mobile defense.The comba t reeponse w ill t hus be morein line with communication capabili .ties regarding direction.

If the l inear foxholes are mecha1

5


11/117

MECtlAtilZEO VEtSGUnized, so to spea k, th e flexibility of t hestr ucture is grea tly a tfeeted. The pointin quest ion is w heth er or not the foxholes should be converted to merea rmored mobili ty ; or mobili ty a nd fmepow er; or mobility, firepow er, a ndchock effect. The latter is possible,hut not unlees tra dit iona l idea s ar echanged.The linear linee and positions ofWorld Wa re I a nd H w ere idea l ta rgetsfor a rt i l lery, morta rs, a nd a ircra ft .Unite guarded terrain with fierce determina tion, w hich fixed th em in pla ceas ideal targets for indireet f ire systems.Movement and SidingOne of th e fea tur es of a new doctrine should be to opera te in a fash iontha t ta kes some of th e teeth out of th eefficiency of a rt illery, including miesilea. This should not be accomplishedby putt ing more effort in digging holes. It should be accomplishedthrough movement and hiding. Fixedand mobile hedgehogs should be usedto such a degree tha t it is ditlicult forth e enemy to determine how deep th edefenees are in given areas. The newatructuree should be amenable to nuclear or n onnuclea r condit ions th roughcha nges in front a ges w ithout the needto reanalyze command and control,service support, intelligence, and mobility.The doctrine for inferior numbersmust embrace other changes. We needto reexamine our choice of objectives.The trend t o centra l aut hority must bereversed. Some automation should beput a t t he front . Whenever possible w eshould avoid comba t in lar ge cit ies a ndforests. These featuree are actuallyobstacles requiring large masees ofinfantry to eepture or hold. The de,fense should utilise large open areaswhenever possible, and in the at tack

shou!d seek to go around such obstacles, using air lines of supply in lieuof the road nets in and near urbanareas .We should n ot devote great eums ofmoney and effort to tbe organizat ionof defensive zones. The money shouldbe invested in the mobile force to defend the zone. Withdrawal and retrogra de opera t ions should bedome a dril lthat permits inflict ion of maximumcasualt ies.The composition of the force should

embra ce opera t t one tha t call for fewersma ll decieions. The combin a t ion of infantry and armor in one team wil lgreat ly assist in thie regard. Complexcoordin a t ion problems must be a voidedto obtain rapid response against asuperior force. E mpha sis should beplaced on destroying enemy units asopposed to guarding terrain features.Night operat ions should feature increa sed employment of foot element sto offeet dayt ime vulnerabili ty tomecha nized fires.Surveil lanceIn mobile w a rfar e, the ba t ta l ion a ndbrigade comma nder must ha ve firstcall upon surveillance. Higher commanders need information, too, hutfirst th ought should be given to t heimmedia te situa tion. There is a leo needfor a better f low of informationth rough la tera l cha nnels. For exa mple,t he Air Force could be deta iled tofurnish corps, army, an d theat er aerial reconnaissance requirements, andth e Arm y could put its entir e resourcesa t t he disposa l of comma nders a t division and below.A suitable mobile defeneive systemmust be able to detect, close with, anddestroy a numerically superior aophiet ica ted enemy. The defeneemust move,a bsorb, ew a llow , a nd digest th e intrusion. Needless to ca y, t he inferior

Militaryeview


12/117

force must have better intelligence onenemy loca tions. I n part , this can bea ccomplished by frequ ent movementof friendly forces to alternate locatione ae opposed to depending solelyon technology to improve an in-placecapabil i ty.Basical ly, mechanized f irepower,whether offensive or defensive, shouldbe thought of somewhat in the termsof th e old int erlockhg ba nds ofmachlnegun f ire that crossed the bat

ta l ion front, but a djusted t o th e ma jor

end t he squa ~ should be invested w i thmobility , mecha nized firepow er a dequate to deetroy any vehicle on thebattlefield plus shock action, and theca pa bility to convert immedia tely frommounted to ground at tack and viceverea. We must spend our money toplace th ie ca pa bility a t t he foxhole, notbehind bat ta l ion and brigade rearboundaries.

We n eed a l ight mecha nized fight ingvehicle (MFV) th a t is a n a rm ored personnel ca rrier , a nt imecha nized w eaP


13/117

MEcHANlzEn VEHICLE

greater lethali ty, which is al l importa nt now beca use letha l ity ha s a lrea dyoutrun mob]lity.The new MFV should serve as adua l ta nk and ca rrier vehicle. I t sh ouldbe provided with a miniaturized Sitdtelagh or TOW-type missile systemthat would also use conventional ammun ition. A ema ll coa xial m a chinegunshould be provided.The front section of the vehicleshould cont a h provision for a four-man operating crew consisting of avehicle commander, driver, gunner,and loader. The center section of thevehicle should cont a in t he pow er pack-

cording to availability. The vehicledesign must provide a good swimmingcapabil i ty without a kit . In this respect, t he vebicIe should ha ve a pproximately 46 centimeters of freeboard.There are equally good reasons fora light vehicle from tactical and operational points of view. Extremelyhea vy vehicles ar e not only costly, buta mobility differential over enemyforces is difficult to obta in using t hesevehicles. Aside from these factors,modern anti tank missiles give assurance that land battleships can beknocked out just a s r ead ily as a m uchlighter vehicle.

Mili tary8YkW


14/117

MECHANIZED VEHICLEThe vehicle must be at least asground mobile as the current M119 ifit is to execut e t he r ole for w hich it

is intended. Adherence to this conceptwould permit employment in suchareas as southeast Asia, or in temperate, desert, or arctic environments.Tests have shown that regardless ofother variables, tracked vehicles provide the best cross-country mobility.Armor-Weight RatiosThe a rm or-w eight ra tios sh ould not,und er a ny circumst a nces, exceed thoseassociated with the armored reconnaissance airborue assault vehicle.Auxiliary power units, environmentalcontrol units, automatic stabilizationequipment , a nd other sophistica ted devices should not be hung on the vehicle. Nuclea r s hielding should be pr ovided t hrough exterior a pplique a t alater date. There should be no specialintegral provisions for anti-infraredor antiradar protection.One object in designing such a relatively simple vehicle is to acquire agreat density tha t w ill ma ke less probable a one-sided duel with an enemyequipped with more sophisticated vehicles. The M4 ta nk versus t he G erma nTiger was an object lesson in numbersversus sophistica tion, w eight , a nd firepower.

The accompanying chart shows theapproximate number of personnel,tanks, and carriers in the maneuverbatta l ions of typical armored andmechanized divisions. Personnel tigures a re ba sed upon 11 men per car rierand four men per tank. An MFV issubsti tuted for each ta nk and ca rrier ,and new MFV batta l ions are substitu ted on a one for one basis to give a nequivalent number of maneuver batta lions in th e sa me division10 in th emecha nized infan tr y division a nd 11in t he a rm ored division, P ersonnel forJ uly1986

the MFV are based upon 10 men pervehicle, four men for the driver andmain armament system, and six menfor the assault portion of the vehiclesquad. This arrangement triples the gun-pow er in t he m echa nized division, using t he sa me num ber of vehicles foundin the current table of organizationa nd eq uipment (TOE ). It increa sest he ma jor ca liber tubes in t he ar moreddivision by 74 percent over currentTOE.The number of new MFVa to beplaced in compa ny a nd ba tt a lion TOErequires considerable study. As a general appreciation, 60 percent of thepersonnel would be ground orientedw ith respect to t heir comba t function.Major EchelonsThe divisional organization of theMFV force sh ould be in four ma jorechelons to permit two echelons forw a rd a nd tw o ba ck. There should be asepar a t ion of from five t o 10 kilomet ers bet w een t he echelons t o permita good reception for attackers thatbreak through the front islands ofresistance. This would permit attackhelicopters, a rt i llery, a nd a ircra ft tow ork on t he enemy before he reachedthe second zone. Additionally, thiswould permit time for the front zonedefense to move to the rear in sufficient strength to a ugment the depthof the second zone of defense.Advantages of an MFV force arema n y :

There would be a net increase insystem efficiency w ith a dua l arm orand infantry capabil i ty in one package . The new force would be less suscept ible t o 10S Sof moment um in goingfrom one form of combat to another.o It w ould be less vulnera ble toenemy a rt i l lery a nd a ir a t ta ck. \

9


15/117

-$W0

gm

MiayRVCW

1


16/117

Competition for funds for twoexpensive mecha nized w eapon eystems%a nks a nd a rm ored personn el ca r-rierswould be eliminated. B a tt lefield coordina tion w ould beenhan ced a nd ta nk-infa ntry a ct ionewould be integrated at the outset. Tailoring forces for tactical situa tion, a nd providing ta ctica l reservee w ould be simpler a nd, a t th esa me t ime, proba bly more effective.. Road space a nd movement con

eiderhtions would he 1sss complex. Two epecial types of divieionecould be eliminat edth e a rmored a ndt he mecha nized-by forming a singlecombined-arm type division. The antimechanized defeneeproblem would be nearer to solutionw ith out so mu ch dependence uponoverly sophistica ted eystems tha t ma y

not be available when needed. The 10 spaces in the current infantry r i f le squad would man the en

tire vehicle, and the man-machine effectiveness ratio weuld be improved. A powerful weapon would beplaced in the hands of the squad. Inturn, the number of men is sufficientto make the weepon more effective inloca l securit y, removing mines, enga ging roadblocks, and overcoming obetaclee tha t reqnire ma nua l labor. Engineer support and maintenance would be greatly simplified. More direct fire weapons wouldbe brought to the front and would bedirect ly responsive t o th e needs of t he

lower unit commander. Tbe nu mber of duplica t ing w ea pons a nd commun ica tions syetemewould be greatly reduced. The fight ing port ion of t he mecha nized comba t etructure w ould cont a inmore mobility, firepow er, a nd men fortbe money invested.

J uly1966

MECHANIZED VENICLEI t is recognized tha t th ere a re somedisadva nt a ges to this concept, but t heyhave to be weighed largely againstwh a t w a s or wh a t is . The modem

a nt ita nk miesile appea rs to be the keytha t deman ds a return to a l ighter a ndmore flexible combat vehicle.Thie concept doee not endorse themuRipurpose weapons approach, because a weapon appropriate for theta rget is included a s a n integral partof tbe vehicle. What it does suggest ieth a t t he personnela re to become multi

purpose orient e~ sI t would be naive to think thatbranch a t t i tudes w ould not ent er intoevalua ting t he need for such a vehicle.The continned need for conventionala rmored reconna issance, infan tr y, a nda irborne units ie beyond question. B utcompared to the bulk of the combatstructure a nd th e existing t rends, theyw ould OCC U P Y progressively sma llerelite of the structure.Administrative ProblemsThere is room for such specialization witbin a combined combat arms.Officere or enlisted men w ith a givenmilita ry occupa t iona l specialt y (MOS)should be able to function effectivelyin most of th e resulta nt orga nizat ions.It ie recognized that this proposalwould necessitate changee in tbeMOS-schord structures, a nd t ha t i twould also create some problems involving peacetime and mobilisationtraining requirements. For the mostpart , these are administrative problems that are not beyond solution.

P rior t o the 1950 deca de, it w a s sa feto say that the soldier with his hootsand r i f le was a key fea ture on theba tt lefield-in t he sophistica t ed environment. Now, without detractingfrom the soldiers etature, it is betterto hold that the key fea ture on thebattlefield is a machine operated ~d11


17/117

MECHANIZED VEHICLEtended by tbe soldier, who departsfrom i t w hen he has a chore tha t ca nnot be performed otherwise. The presence of a potent vehicle w ould do muchto assuage the feeling of impotencythat of ten a f fects a squad.While the battalion has been lookedupon a s a basic unit for a number ofgood reasons, it would be well to consider what the real basic unit can accomplish if fitted out for maximumeffect. Dual capabilities should beginat the squad level .The relative size of opposing forcesis a key fa ctor in the design an d composition of systems. We should notdevise too many systems or one thatbas too many variables beyond thecont rol of th e comma nder a t th e low erlevels.Quick respons e is needed a t division

and below for mobile operations. Attbe Army level, quick response shouldbe thought of in the rapidity withw hich a ir a nd art i llery support ca nbe delivered and reserves committed.The most fertile field for a milita ryrevolution lies in combining technological performances with adaptationsin military organization. The chiefproblem here lies in overcoming opposition within existing organizations. This can delay revolutions by afa ctor of one or severa l deca des or,indeed, channel tbe revolution intoIese effective expenditures.The mechanized fighting vehicleconcept certainly does not solve all ofthe problems faging tbe commander.It does, how ever, give bim a fight ingmachine that can be the focal pointfor future ground actions.

I COMMENTS INVITEDThe Milita ry Review w elcomes your comment s on a ny ma t e

ria l published. An opposit e viewpoint or a new line of t houghtw ill a ssist us a nd ma y lead to publica tion of your idea s. I f youa re a n a uthority on a cer ta in sub.iect , why not wri te a n a r t iclefor our considera tion? If you ha ve only a n idea, qu ery us; perha ps we can assist you in developing a n a ccepta ble a rt icle.

Militaryeview2


18/117

-

~he Puftern of

GWEIWLLAWARFARE

r igadierJ . Micha elC a lvert , B ri t ish Army, Ret ired

T H E more mecha nized, civilized,and industrial ized a country orarmy becomes, the easier it is to bringabout i ts downfal l by put t ing a spauner in i ts delicately balanced works.A predomina nt ly a gricultura l na tionhas i ts roots deep in f irm foundationsa nd is not easi ly upset even by th emost modern weapons of war. A nuclear at tack on an agricul tural nat ionis not much worse in the amount ofdamage done, and may even be less ,tha n tha t experienced thr ough droughtor flood.Industria l orga niza t ions a nd w eaponsystems have tended to become largerand more complicated. This lays thew a y open for a compar a t ively ema l lbut intel l igent nation with l imitedmeans to exercise every form of ingenui ty and cunning in turning thevery assets of the larger nat ion intoliabil i t ies that can destroy i t .

Large concerns necessitate rigiddiscipline and regimentation to makethem work. The weaker nation cankdy 1966

use this military virtue of dkciplineagainst its disciple. The Yugoslavguerri l las once used traff ic management a s their w eapon. Dressed a s G erma n mili ta ry policemen, th ey a l teredthe road eigns on a mountain roadand careful ly guided tanks and vehicles of an armored regiment, whichthey ha d summoned by a ruse, oneby one over a prceipice.

This is t he a rt of jujits u, w her e t hesmaller competi tor uses the strength,a ggressiveness, a nd bigness of his OP ponent to destroy him by pull ing himin th e direction t ha t he w a nts t ,o go,but off ba lan ce.The ma keup of a guerr illa mindmust have a certain love of blackcomedy, a s w ell a s a n element of rut hlessness an d w ile. A guerri l la must a lways look for both the strong andw eak points of a n opponent . The w eakpoints are the pressure points , thenerve centers, w here a car efully a imedthrust can hurt and disable mos$

In th e ma keup of modern indnst$ial13


19/117

p=-

GUERRILLA WARFAREmeiety, we have seen, for instance,hew one faulty signal box can paralyae a suburban ra i lw a y sjmtem; how afau lt in a n el ic pow er eystem ca nbring New Yor to a sta ndst i ll ; a ndhow a few dissidents at vi ta l pointsin a fa ctory, a n airport , a t docks, oron a commercial supply line can bringan industry or even a nat ion to i tskneea . There is n o greet mu ecula rstrength shown here, only a carefullycalculated guile.An AnalogyThe word gu errilla mea ns a lit t lewar, euch ae was waged with decisiveresults against the most efficient ,highly disciplined, and superblyequipped French armies in the penineula. An analogy could be made withthe g la d la ter a rmed wi th the net a ndtrident , the net being the Spanishguerri l la enta ngling the ma gnit lcent lyfit opponent , a nd th e trident of th eDuke of Welfingtens armies strikinghis ha ndica pped a dversary a ga in a nda ga in to event ua l destruction.

We must uever neglect to manufactu re a n et to ent a ngle our enemiesbefore at tempting to strike them withth e trident of our regular forces.One lesson of nuclear war is to getclose to your enemy so that he cannotuse weapons of mass destruction tow ipe out y our forces, a nd th ere isno closer embrace than the in-fightingof the guerrilla.

B rigadiev J . Micha el Ca lvert , B ri t .ich ArmI I, Retired, baa ha d extensiveexpemen cein epecia l w a rfa re a nd jun gle opera tions. He eevved w ith OrdeC. Wingate in Burma and commandedth e B rit ish Wa rfa re School th ere dur ing World War II. He also commaadedth e B ritish Specia l Air S ervice Regiment , an organizat ion 8imitar to USS pecia l Forcee, a nd nu permeed its. tr a ining in deep jung le opera tion.

G nerr il Ia wa r fare in the widersense bas come to mean the art ofcombat waged by the weak to overcome tbe strong. But it is not wildcat scrimmage. It ie s highly intelligent form of art in which needle-t ipped force is eurgiea lly a ppfied tothe vital points of ones oppanentebody politic. It is not the action ofa n ill-form ed, un cont rolled ra bble a lthough, at t imee, the guerrilla contr ol ma y w ish to ma ke uee of mobpsychology for part icular ends.Knowledge of Sfmof ursThe succeesfuI pra ctice of guer rillawarfare requires an intr icate knowledge of t he opponent s st ructu rew heth er milita ry, government a l, commercial, economic, or political. Thew eakest a nd most vulnera ble w ouldbecome the target .Every fa ctory ma na ger and everycommercial or public utility directorknowe, or should know, the vital andmost delica tely ba lan ced part s of ldeenterprise, a nd ca n say I f tha t goes,were really eunk!The vulnera ble part s of London an dother vi ta l centers in the last warwere known and assessed by engineere a nd th e beade of sta tutory bodice, such as the Metropolitan WaterBoard, the Central Electr ic i ty Generat ing Boarde, and the hoards control l ing the rai lwaye, eubways, andother transport systeme. Theee pointew ould ha rdly be gueeeed at by al ayman .An example ie a main sewage piperunning over Sloane Square Stat ionw hlcb, if punctured, w ould ha veflooded most of Westminst er a ndPimlico in a few meters of disease-bearing sewage. Another is Bruneiatunnel under the Thames which now,w ith d redg ing, pr ojects come metersa bove th e bed of th e river. I f rup-


20/117

tured by a bomb or underwatercharge, this could siphon water andflood hug e a reas of th e undergr oundra i lway system.In t he industr ia l a nd other spheres,th e vita l short a ges a nd, th erefore,targets for at tack were the unlikely,bedfellows of ball bearinge, fighterpilots, nuclear physicists, and indus-

GUERRILLA WARFAREsystem which controlled and siftedmuch of th e ra il tra ffic of South ernEurope; get himself accepted; and,then, on the outbreak of war andthereafter, carefully consign goods,tru cks, a nd,tra ins in th e w rong direction. This he did until 1946. His meetmemorable coup was in 1942 when atr a inloa d of iron ore rea ched th e a m-

trial diamonds. In another crisis, i tmight be zirconium, mineral lubricating oil, or meteorologists.By knowing your body structureand its weaknesses, you can assesstha t of your opponent while a lsoma king allow a nce for his assets. B ut

this requires a continuous study ofthe other fellow, not only by the services, but by economists, industrialists,a nd physicists. .

Ha ving decided on the ta rgets , thedirectors of guerrilla warfare mustfashion the instruments of destruct ion of t hese ta rgets . This includesthe choice of the right type of instrument, i te forging or training, and itsplacement rea dy for use.

In 1938 a man called Sullivan wasintroduced into the Vienna marshaling yards. His job was to learn theJ uly1336

munit ion-starved Germans outsideSt rd ingrad and a complementarytr a inloa d of shells a rrived in theRubr.Worthwhile targets are not necessa rily th e obvious ones. J unctions ca nbe temporarily disrupted by bombing,but a l l the meana of ra pid repair a resituated at a junction. A determinedenemy ca n q uickly right th e destruction he can see on bis doorstep, bothby cannibalizat ion and workshop repair, in spite of a ny overhea d interruptions. Fa r more difficult to repairis damage done to the t ransport eystem at some remote spot. Also, this isa mu ch easier ta rget for th e uniformedguerrilla and could do juet as much,i f not more, last ing da ma ge to thetransport eystem.

The guerrilla ba nd might be gi~ en15


21/117

GUERRILLA WARFAREthe orders to cut , and keep cut , a remote section of a main trunk routebetween two vital centers. They couldstart with an init ial cut . Then theycould a mbush the r econna issan ce pa rt ysent out to locate the cut and prepareplans for ite repair. This could continue until the enemy had built up acovering force around the repair parties. These could then be isolated bycuts on either side of them. By usingtime charges and boobytraps, thisharassment could go on indefinitely.

This is a comparatively simple taskfor the guerrilla as long as there isa n efficient ground orga niza tion onwhich he can work and from whichhe can obtain information, supplies,tr a ined replacements, medica l a id, an dother forms of administrat ion. Guerri lla w a rfa re is, in essence, a rea wa rfar e. As in a ra i lw a y netw ork, theguerrilla bands, like rolling stock,need a netw ork of lines prepar edfor them on which they can operate.Otherwise, they wil l f ind that nearlya ll th eir energies a re ta ken up purelyin a struggle to live and exist , leaving little time or inclination to Operate offensively.Support NeededIt is not often real ized tha t a n a rmyrequires at least 10 t imes its strengthin a dministra t ive personnel to support i t so that i t can get on with i tsjob of fight ing t he enemy w ithout distr a ction. Active guerrilla ban ds a lsoneed a t least a similar proport ion oforganized sympathizers to feed them,keep them informed, recruit replacement , and look after casualt ies.Oth erwise, th ey will be of l it t le w ort h.

Ideal ly , the ground organizat ionshould be created before the activeguerrillas take the field. But in guerri lla w a rfa re i t must never be forgot ten that you are deal ing with

high ly emotiona l, idea listic people w howill respond to leadership, example,battle cries, and emotions of all sorts,but rarely to orders as such.Direct ivesDirectives stat ing the objective andthen allowing the local leader to workout how and when he wil l carry i tout are the rule. A direct order toblow a bridge on a part icular date atall costs is not the right way to getthe best out of guerrillas as so manyregular generals throughout historyha ve found out . Orders sh ould not hegiven to a net to apply pressure sinceit is the vict ims own struggles thatt ighten the net .In I ta ly , during WorJ d Wa r I I ,a rmy headq ua rters ga vei orders forBrit ish Special Air Service CaptainRoy Fa rran to a t t a ck a G erma n corpsheadquar ters on a par t icular da te .Ca pta in Fa rran ha d ra ised a guerr i llaforce-ma inly by his own persona litya nd exa mpl= omprised of I ta l ia npartisans, Soviet escaped prisoners,and about 10 of his own Special AirService men. BY that date, he hadraised the morale of his motley forceto such a pitch by rumors of atrocit ies and rewards to come, coupledw ith a ppeals to their undying patr iotism, that they were eager to at tackat any price.

Then came the order from army topostpone th e at ta ck for a fort nightand conform to the army ~imetable.By this t ime, the guerrilla force wasassembled and on the move. A postponement would disintegrate theforce, security would be lost, andthere would never be another opportunity. The attack was carried outwith great success. Captain Farrannarrowly mieeedbeing court-martiaIedfor disobedience, but was finally rew a rded w hen the facts of guerri lla

MitaryReview


22/117

warfare were made clear to armyheadquarters .

The pattern of a guerril la war thusta kes sha pe. At th e top a re t he directors who lay down policy and plan theconsecutive phases. These phasesgradua te from irregula r a rmed bandsto more organized, possibly uniformed, units, then to general armedcomba t with th e guerril la force sup-

the directors will be much concernedwith the morale of their emergentforces during this time. The directorsa re I ikely to la y dow n ta rgets, a ppointfield commanders, and aet up the administra tive organ izat ion, leaving ta ctics to the commanders in the fie]d.

The administrative network wouldnecessar ily include an int elligence system. This m ight be ma nn ed by law -

US Annu Aviat ion Dige;An a ir cont rol center is a vulnera bleta rget w hose da ma gecould creat e ha voc over aw ide a reaported by a government-in-exile, withor without outside help from some interested party. The final phase occursw hen t he occupa t ion force is demora lized an d its support ers a t home a reweakening in their resolve.

The new nation is now at arms ina general insurrection with the guerril las now formed into a more orthodox organization of an army. Thisdevelopment might ta ke years, a ndJuly 1966

yers a nd ban kers a t w hose offices personal and secret conferences wouldnot be out of place. The medical organization might be based on the useof isolation hospitals, leper colonies,a nd ment a l homes w here curiosity a ndinterference is least likely.

Ammun ition a nd w eapon supply ca nbe obtained from two sources-externally and from the occupationforces. The antiguerrilla would coqrr

17


23/117

6UERRILLA WARFAREter this by supplying them with insta nt a neous fuze grena des an d breech-exploding bullets. Idealistic schoolma sters a re often th e best inst rumentsfor recruiting young guerril la s. Ha ndto-hand communications are usuallyca rried out by w omen a nd children,but today a more sophisticated wireless netw ork of commu nicat ions is a lsoorganized and expected.

There must be police to control anddiscipline tbe guerrilla bands andtheir helpers, preventing backsliding,treasonable activities, and lack of enthusiasm. They also have the task ofcollecting taxes to pay for the forcesof insurrection.

These police; by t he very na t urenf their tack, do not attract the beettypes and are often recruited fromt he crimina l element of t he commun ity. B eaides kil ling or ma imin th eirow n backsliders, they are 1 suallychosen to carry out acts of terrorismagainst the enemy who occupies theircountry.

Tbe type of guerrilla warfare mustnaturally be adapted to suit the country where i t is to be waged whetherit is overpopula t ed or epa rsely cultivated, whether primarily industrial oragricultural . But the principles rema in th e same. All na tions st udy t histype of w a rfare , a nd pow erful na tions fea r it. I t is t he w eepon of apoor nation and cannot be defeatedeasily by the sophisticated weapons ofa rich and powerful country.

Tbe British, who enjoy ingenuityand take pride in paradox, had tofea r this form of wa rfare w hen th eywere a great power with great poseessione, but resort ed to it w ith success when things were bad and theybad no a l l ies and few arms. Bri ta inha d forgotten tha t sbe ha d becomegreet through this ingenuity, skil l ,

and ini t ia t ive and not by big bat ta lions. Now Bri ta in can and must learnagain to use this particular art ofconflict w hich, coupled w ith idea lisma nd a high sense of purpose, ca n bringdown a Golia tb without having to betoo reliant on allies. If these methodsa re used a gainst us , w ha t a re the bestmethods of combating them?

There are two well-tried methods.One is to counter terrorism by coun.t erterrorism. If a bridge is blow n, boldall the neighboring villages responsible a nd execut e hosta ges. This met hodstopped th e Ch inese in J a pan ese-occupied China. In Yugoslavia, itstopped a ll but th e Communists w hocarried on regardless of retaliation.I t curt a iled man y of our operat ions inWestern Europe in the period beforeour own military offensive.

The other method is not so brutal,but much more w ort hw hile a s i t forcesits exponent to exa mine his own idea ls,principles, an d purpose. It is ba sed ontbe tenet, I f you ca nt bea t them,join them.There is nothing new in this teaching. Maurice de Saxe, Belisarius, Sim6n B olfva r, Na poleon, a nd othershave said the same thing in differentways. The only way to beat guerril lasis to live, move, and fight in tbe sameelement a s the guerril la , a nd so meet,and, with superior weapons, training,and morale, defeat him.

This makes i t essential that theantiguerr i l la must be tra ined andequ ipped so a s t o be even more mobile,harder, and more idealistic even thanthe guerrilla. The antiguerrillas mustbe able t o win over t he populat ion, theground organisation, by being missiona ries of th eir own w a y of l ife,w huee exempla ry bebavior a nd dedicat ion present an a l ternat ive to theguerrillae ideals.


24/117

Wa

Colonel M . D ugu6 Ma cCa rt hy,Fr ench .-t rmg,RetiredOTHE American War of Independence, th e F renchma n remembers especially the aid given hyhie country to the insurgent BritishColonies which were destined to formthe United States. This primacy inmemory is entirely justified when itis considered that the aid by Francewas, in part , tbe origin of a fr iendship between the two countries, abrother-in-arms, which twice contributed to the saving of France.

From the start , the insurrection received favorable opinion in Francefor several reasons: Sentimentally, since the Americans were fighting in the defense ofl ibert ya n idea great ly in favor inFrance due to the current of ideas

set in motion by the philosophers. Politically, besause France stillfelt the humiliation suffered in the

tr eat ies of 1763, a nd also beca use Eu gJ uly1986

land had bsen her tradi t ional enemyfor a long time. Economically, because the Versail les Government hoped that i tstrade would be easier with an independent Uni ted S ta tes tha n w ith English Colonies.In 1776 th e America n C ongress ha dsent Benjamin Frankfin to France asa clandestine a mba ssador. His skN,his simple and dirsst manners, hkhigh order of int elligence, a nd t heequa lly high order of Cha rles de Vergennes, French Minister of ForeignAffairs, were to result i? modest

French a id to th e U nited Sta tss .Weapons, ammunition, equipment,and, above all , numerous infantry, art illery, a nd enginser officers w ere discreetly landed in America. The technica l a dvisor role of t hese officers w a sto be of prime importance in the organizat ion, equipment, and t ra i ing1

19


25/117

WAR OF INOEPENOENCEof t he insurgent a rmy. On e of t hem,the Marquis de Lafayette , was to become the friend of George Washington a nd w ould soon comma nd a n American division.Moral Support

With respect to this first form ofFrench aid, i t is important to remember tha t during th e diff icult yearsof 1777 and 1778 the Americans, including Wa shingt on, w ere losing courage, and many were incl ined towarda compromise with England. Butthe moral support of France, a support rend ered concrete by t he presenceof French officers in the Americanranks, and the certa inty that Francehad no ambitions in the direction ofa colonial conquest, played a stimulat ing role, r estoring confidence, courage, and determination to the Americans.

Throughout the early part of thewar , Washington was real ly the hearta nd eoul of th e resista nce. He ha dbeen obliged t o ma ke use of t he Fr enchpromise to sustain the energies, toshake of f the apathy, and to prod theinertia of some of his compa tr iotswho, on the verge of despair , weretempted to give up.The vict ory of G enera l H ora tioG at es over G enera l J ohn B urgoyne a tSaratoga on 17 October 1777 had a

Colonel M. Duguc! MacCarthy,French Army, Retired, was with theH istorica l S ervice of t he Fr ench Arm yuntil his retirement in 1965. While onactive duty he served in Morocco, thewestern Sahara , Indochina , and theFrench front in 19.10.He was an instructor a t th e Armor School at Sa umur and a Professor of Military Histor2t a t t he ficole S up6rieure deG uerre. H is a rt icle, The Corps of t heArmy: A Historical Summary, appeared in the May 1965 issue of theMILI TARYRE VIE W.

considerable effect in Europe. Thecapitulation of Saratoga, signed on 6Februa ry 1778 in P a ris in th e H 6te1de Coislin, P lace de 1a Concorde, justa few steps from the present US Embassy, resulted in the alliance ofFrance with the United Sta tes .

This t rea t y ha d considera ble influence on the American resistance. Thealliance signified, in fact , that thenew Republic w a s officia lly recognizedby a grea t E uropea n pow er. I t a nnounced, moreover, strong and concrete milita ry a id. I t posed, lastly, asa condit ion th a t in no pea ce concludedwi th England , may America renounce her independence, a nd comeagain under the English domination.Mutual ExchangeThrough this stipulation, the pledgeposeessed a solemn cha ra ct er of reciprocity . Fr a nce pledged herself to aidth e insurgents by cast ing int o th e bala nce th e w eight of her a rms. On th eirpart , th e America ns pledged th emselves to continne the struggle nntilthey had obtained full and completeindependence.

This w a s precisely t he moment tha tth e London G overnment choee forsending a large diplomatic mission toAmerica charged with proposing tothe American Congress the cessationof hostilities im t he ba$is th a t th eB ritish G overnment w ould be w ill ingto gra nt to t he America n Colonies a lltha t t hey dema nded, except irrdependence.

I t is diff icult to understa nd howsuch a move, following close on thesignal American mili tary victory atSaratoga and the conclusion of atr eat y of a llia nce full of promises fort he insu rgence, could ha ve been un dertaken. The morale of the Americanpopulation and Army was, in fact ,particularly high. The insurgents had

20 Militaryaview
http:///reader/full/19.10.Hehttp:///reader/full/19.10.He


26/117

WAR OF INOEPENOENCEno doubts of the possibility of aprompt settlement of the conflict bya rms, a nd the promises of French military aid reinforced this conviction.

The first reinforcements sent byFra nce w ere th e 12 shipa of th e squadron of Admira l J ean dE sta ing w hicha rr ived in D ela w a re B a y on 17 J une1778. G enera l Sir H enry Clinton, w hosucceeded G enera l Willia m H owe a tth e hea d of tbe B ritish forces, t husfound himself blockaded at Philadelphia , . t he Bri t ish na val forces ha vingfailed to intercept the French Fleet.Clinton, fearing an investment ofPhiladelphia by the American troops,hurriedly evacuated the city and fellback on New York. Washingtonelowly followed and established himself on the Hudson, thus inveetingNew York by land.Superior in Numbers

U nfort una tely, dEst a ings sq ua dronwas not capable of measuring up tothe Englieh Fleet which was snperiorin numbers, and it was impossible toblockade New York. Moreover, theFrench admiral was not subordinatedto Washington and had orders fromLouie XVI t o execut e a mission ofliaison with the French possessionsin the Antillee which were beinggreatly worried by the English.

In 1779, England reinforced herforcee in America. But, instead ofconcent ra t ing a ll ber forces a ga instWa shingto~ s sma ll a rmy, she dispersed them between Peneacola andNew York, wishing to retain controlof porte and future landing sites.B ri t ish G enera l S ir G eorge P revost ,who was in command in the South,won a few victories in Georgia andseized possession of S a va nn a h. D E staing, back from a bril l iani campaignin tbe Caribbean, levied 4,000 i]lfantrymen from the French garrison of

th e islands a nd a tt empted to reoccupySavannah. This operation ended in atotal failure in spite of the valor ofthe troops and the courage of the admiral w ho wa e tw ice w ounded w hilepersona l ly lea ding an aseault . B ut thela ck of coheren ce of t he opera t ionsconducted by dEst a ing i llustra ted the

Nat imn l Archive. -G enera lJ ohn B urgoyne,w hose defea t a tSsra toga opened the wa y for French irrtervention in t he Wa r of In dependenceneceesity, and algo the difficulty, ofachieving unity of command.

The year of 1780 began badly forthe Americans. On 11 May, Clintonobtained the snrrender of Charlestona fter 40 da yg of siege. He th en retur ned to New York, giving comma ndin the South to Lord Charles Cornwallis .

The ta king of Ch a rleston, cominga f ter f ive years of a ha rd and exha ust ing wa r for the f ina nces of theyoung state, resulted in a serious crisis m the morale of the insurgents.Wa shington indefa tiga bly bolst~ red


27/117

.

WAR OF INOEPENOENCEthe waning energiee. He wrote lettersto Congress in which he said that acollapse of America would be a dishonor and that the Americans musta ssociat e t hemselves w ith th e goodwill of France by means of extraordinary efforts. He added:

The present juncture ie so interesting t ha ti f i t does not produce cor-respondent exertions, it wilt be aproof that motivee of honor, publicgood, and even eelf preservation havelost their influence upon our miade.. . . The Court of Fra nce ha ma dea glonoew effort for our delivera nce,and if we disappoint it$ intention bgour s rcpinonees w e mw st become contemptible in the egee of all mankind;nor ca n we a f ter tha t venture to coufide that our alliee will persist in ana t t empt t o eeta blieh w ha t i t wi l l a ppear we want inclination or abil i ty toaseia t them in,

We see that Washington, torch ofthe American resistance, made use ofthe promises made by France, evenbefore the ar rival of t he w rench E xpeditionary Corps, for awakening inhis fellow countrymen the will to fightand a national coneciouenese.French Forces

On 10 J uly 1780 th e expeditiona ryforce of Lieutenant G enera l J ean deRochambeen disembarked in RhodeIsland. Of a strength of 5,000 men,it comprised eight battalions of infantry, three squadrons of cavalry, adeta chment of a rti l lery, a nd a compa ny of en gineere. At t he t ime of th edecisive operations of 1781, the 25ships of the squadron of AdmiralFra nWis de G ra ese w ould be a ddeda nd 3,500 men levied from th e F renchgarrisons of the Antilles. The Frenchforces would comprise, therefore, inaddition to a large fleet, approxima t ely 9,000 men .2s

On the sca le of modern a rmies w itht heir enormoue num bers of men, th isfigure may not appear large, butWa shingtons a rmy, with a th eoretica lst rengt h of 15,000 men, wa s scarcelyever able to place in the line of battle more than 4,000 to 5,000 combatants a t one t ime.Operationalmmobility

Almost a year was to go by beforeth e forces of Rocha mbea u a ctu a llypart icipa ted in the opera tions, At tha ttime, no means existed for instantaneous communication or for rapidtransportation. The entrance into theline of battle of the French Expedit iona ry Corps could not, t herefore, beprepared by any conference betweenthe respective headquarters.

In a ddition to this, F ra nce w a s notable to keep a large naval force int he America n t hea t er before 1781. Forthie reason, the French Army tnukup defensive positions at Newport,Rhode Island, as soon as i t landed.

Rocha mbeau w a e, in fact , obligedto assume the defensive because hisf leet was weak and he had to insurethe defense of his ships. Their numerica l st rength w a s insufficient forholding out a lone a ga inst t he B ritishFleet. Let us note, in passing, thata chief w ho w a s in fear, of runn ingtoo great ricks could have delayed hisdeparture from France unti l he wasable to have an adequate naval forceat his dieposal.

The end of the year 1780 went by,therefore, in a etate of operationalimmobili ty. Washington was carryingon th e blocka de of New York, a nd Rocba mbea n wa s blocka ded, himself, inNewport . Only North Carol ina wasthe th ea ter of a cer ta in a mount ofactivity. There, Cornwallis and hieadversary were carrying on an epicduelthe first wishing to carry the

Militaryeview


28/117

WAR OF IHOEPENOEMCEwar into the rich province of Virginia; the second prohibiting himw ith the a id of Lafa yet te w ho wa scomma nding a sma ll America n division.In J une of 1781, th e Newport ga rrieon, reinforced by militiamen,joined Washington before New York.While the siege developed, a n even teecurred in th e South which w a e to

w ord of th is, he decided t o direct hlsefforts against Yorktown, The Frenchna va l force of 39 ships un der Admira lde G ra eee, w hose arr iva l w a s scheduled for the month of Auguet, wouldparticipate in the operations. Washington held th e at tent ion of Clintonby diversiona ry ma nuevers beforeNew York, while the main body ofthe allied forces2,000 Americans

us AmwCooperetienof th e French a nd Amerieen Arnr ieean d th e Fr ench Na vy forced LordCharlesCemwa13iee surrenderat Yorktowndecide th e fat e of t he w a r. Cornw a llis ,exha usted by the ha ra esed pureui t ofthe elusive troops of General Nathanael Greene and Lafayet te , received the order from Clinton to goto Yorktown where he would be ina position to come to the rescue ofNew York in case the allied pressureon the city became too dangerous.La fay ette fol low ed elow ly a f ter Cornw a llis a nd succeeded in hemming himin Yorktown.

Ae soon as Washington receivedJ uly1933

a nd 4,000 French und er the comma ndof Rocha mbea u-w a e directed inforced marches against Yorktown.Cornwall is found himself invested,from 25 September OL by the com

bined forces of La fa yett e, Wa shington, a nd Rocha mbea u, w hi le G ra ese,after having disembarked 3,000 menfrom t he Antilles, denied him a ll helpby way of the sea.

The Englieh bravely attempted twoeeca peeon 10 a nd 16 Oct ober a nd w ereeeverely repulsed by t he Du ke of Lpu

123


29/117

WAR OF INOEPENOENCEzun. On 17 October, Cornwallis surrend ered w ith 7,000 men, 171 can non,22 flags, and 20 transport veseels.1 his ca pitula tion put a n end to lan doperations on the American Continent .

In Engla nd i t caused the fa l l of theCabinet, and the members of the opposition constituted the new government . Cha rles J . Fox a seumed thepost of Minister of Foreign Affairs.Diplomatic Efforts

In h is first speech hefore t he P a rl iament, Fox declared that i t seemedOPPortuneto him to grant the independ ence of t he Amer ica n C oloniee.He added that the sacri f ice that England would make in eo doing wouldbe compensa t ed for by r equirin g ofthe Americans a limitation of theirliberties in the matters of commerceand navigat ion, a l imitat ion whichwould be of such a nature as to procure great commercial advantages forEngland.

Mr. Fox doubtless forgot that, inorder to reqnire, one has to he in aposit ion of strength, which was notthe case wi th England juet af ter aspectacular eurrender. But he quicklyrealized that i t was not possible forhim to maintain such an at t i tude. InMa y 1782 he a cknow ledged tha t E ngland was in a much more eeriousstate of weakness than he had imagined. H e a dded tha t If America isnot granted her total independencew ithout condition, E ngla nd is hopelessly lost. And Fox conclud ed bisepeech by aff irming that the America ns, t ouched hy this a ct of generosityon the part of England, would imposesacrifices on themselves and wouldfavor Brit ish commerce.

On these bases, th e London G overnment proposed a separate peace toAmerica. This was forgetftd of the24

fact tha t such proposa ls w ere cont ra ryboth to the honor and to the interestof America. At the same time, Foxha d negotia tions opened w ith Fra nceto lea d her to a ccept a sepa ra te pea ce.These proposale, too, were contrary=to the honor and to the interest ofFrance.The results of these diplomatic effort s w ere diametr ica l ly opposed to

th e one w hich t he B rit ish G overnmentw a s eeeking. Fa r f rom ma king an endto the al l iance between France andthe Uni ted Statee, they s trengthenedthe ties.On the seas , a f ter a l ternate successee and reverses in the Caribbean,French n a va l forces f ina lly defea tedan English Fleet off the coasts ofIndia .On 30 November 1782 the BritishGovernment signed the preliminariesof pea ce. The Versa illes Trea t y, sign edon 3 S eptem ber 1783, officia lly esta blished the independenceof the UnitedSta tes .Lessons Learned

The American War of Independencepreeents numerous analogies withmore recent conflicte of a enbvereivena ture . I t demonstra ted tha t :

Outside aid is important evenbefore it a ppea re a t tbe ecene of t beconfl ict . The fact that a great worldpower hae endorsed tbe insurrectiona nd ha s promised to eupport i t pla yedthe role of a powerful st imulant toth e mora le of th e insurgents, s trength ening t heir w ill an d their capabil it ies.

Ma esive mili ta ry intervention bya third power will be decieive. Thestrength of the la nd a nd nava l forcessent by France to America t ipped thescales in an irreversible manner infa vor of th e ineurgente a nd insuredthe ult imate victory of their cause.

The personality of tbe leader ofMilitaryeview


30/117

WAR OF INOEPENOENCEth e insurrection is of par a mount import a nce. Without a ny doubt, th echoice of Wa shingt on w a s a most fortuna te one. With a lea der w ho wa sless tena cious, less ma gna nimous, a nimat ed w i th less w i llpow er, a nd w howa s less grea t , the America n re- .sistance might not have been able toendure to th e end. Negotiations with insurgents en

tered into from a posit ion of w eakness w ill fail . The negotia t ions un der ta ken by England a f ter Sa ra t oga ,

as wel l as af ter Yorktown, show thatthe London Cabinet had not thoroughly understood the true nature ofthe conflict. When a war is, in fact,an insurrection, negotiation betweenequals is impossible. Ideological anta gonism, pass ions , a nd ha tred a re sostrong that there cannot be eithervictor or va nqu ished. U nder these circumsta nces, a government can not opennegotiations with the rebels with anychance of success unless it is in theposition of conqueror.

Wha t w e need more of teda y a re persevera ncea nd pa tienceto see ourpurpose th rough. We need t e remin d ourselves of our own perilous, prot rac ted ef for t to implan t the torch of J iher tyin Amer ica .We need to reca l ltha t Amer ican Colon is t s began their res is t ance to ha rsher Br i t ish celon ia lla w s in 1763; t ha t 12 y ea r s la t er t h e sh ot r a n g ou t a t L exin gt on ; t h a t eig htmore yea rs of b it ter s t ruggle fol low edbefore the Treat y of P ar i s wa s s ignedending th e Revolutiona ryWa r; tha t six more year s w ere consumedin ourendea vor to forge a document of government w hich ha s stood th e test oft ime, inehufinga civil w a r. It took 26 yea rs to forge our Na tion, yet th eSout h Vietn a meseha ve been building one since 1954-only 12 year s. Fr eedom w ort h f ight ingfor is w ort h th e t ime a nd tea rs te build.

G enera l Ha rofd K. J ohnson

iJ uly1966 25


31/117

Confrontation3ean E dwa rdSmith

A LLI E D vict ory in World Wa rH left Berlin jointly occupiedby the Uni ted S ta tes , Grea t Br i t a in ,Fra nce, a nd the S oviet U nion. J ointoccupation symbolized Allied unity.Berl in was to be the seat of the All ied Control Council for G erma ny, a ndfrom there Allied policy for Germanyw a s to be coord ha t ed. The occupat ionwas to be short . Cooperation amongthe vic tors was to insure that Germany never again menaced the peaceof Europe.This dream faded quickly. In theeuphoria of wartime partnership, l i tt le at tention had been devoted tolikely causes of discord. Friction withthe Soviet U nion wa e inadequa tely a nticipated. Allied diplomacy, for exam-

pie, located Berlin 160 kilometerswithin the Soviet zone of occupation.Explicit access provisions had beenconsidered unnecessary. To the worldof 1966, t hese omissions a ppea r culpable, but in 1945 the arrangementsseemed eminently appropriate.As Eaet and Weet drew apart inthe postw a r years , B erlin beca me aflash poirit of cold w a r t ension. Str esseselsewhere were reflected in Berl in.And Berl in, as a result of i ts anomalous position, proved a ready testingground for cold war confrontation.The methods of conflict employedin Berlinshow of force, bluff , intimidation, blockade, economic pressure,gra dua l encroa chment , a nd the extensive nse of proxiesw ere not n ew .

MilitmyReview6


32/117

BERLINWhat was new was the changed technologica l a nd politica l environment inw hich th ey w ere employed. .There ha ve been t w o ma jor B erlinconfrontations: the blockade of 194849, a nd tbe closing of t he! Ea st B erlinsect or bound a ry of 1961. E a ch of t hesecrises r efleets th e cha nging na tur e ofint erna t iona l conflict ; ea ch illust ra test he impa ct of profoun d t echn ologica l,political, and psychological change;a nd each exhibits th e intima te rela tionebip between political objectivesa nd milita ry force.In t he immediat e postw a r y eare, deteriora ting Ea st-West rela tions w erereflect ed by increa sed S oviet pr eseurein Berlin. This preesure took twoform s: increased ha ra ssment of Western milita ry ga rrisons, a nd a ccelera ted effort s to captu re cont rol of th ecitys political organe. The first effortwa s spearhea ded by the Soviet Army;the second by the Communist Partyof G erma ny (KP D), la t er the Social ist U nity P a rty (SE D ). B oth, itseems fair to sa y, were direct ed bythe Soviet occupation authority.SovietCoals

Soviet goale appear varied and flexible. Maximum snccess involved driving tbe Western Powers from Berlinand incorporating the entire city inthe Soviet occupation zone. Failingthie, the division of the city into Communist a nd demucra tie sectors offeredan at tract ive a l ternative. I t wae forthis la t ter a l ternative that the Berl inblockade wae finally lifted.Beginning in 1946, Soviet occupation authorities accelerated their ef-

J ean Edwa rd Smith , a former USArm g oficer, ie Associa t e P rofeeeorof Political Economy at the Vnivereitg of Toront o. ,H e is a cont ribu t orto va rious periodica l , a nd the a uth orof the book, The Defense of Berlin.

forts to capture political control inBerlin, Preparatory to the firet postw a r elect ions, S oviet officia ls eough tto merge Berlins large CommunistP a rty with the even larger SocialDemocra tic P a rt y (SP D). On 31March 1946 the SPD rejected mergerin a ci tyw ide r eferendum. In t he threeWestern eeetors, the vote went 19 totwo againet tbe proposal. In the Soviet sector, voting was interruptedunder varioue pretexts, and no countw a s t a ken. Thr ee weeke la t er, S ovietauthori t ies went forward with themerger in their eector and in tbe Suviet sone of Germany.Postwar ElectionsThe first postwar e ctions in Berlin in October 1946 g } ve the SPD 63seat e in the Cit y Assembly, the Chr iet ian Democra t ic U nion (CD V) 29sea ts, t he Communist -domina ted Social ist U nity P a rty (SE D) 26 64.%and the Liberal Democratic Party(LD P ) 12. Dr . Ott o Oetrow ski (S P D )w a s elect ed Oberb ur ger-me$eterby t heCity Assembly in December.Ostroweki proved unable to withstand tbe combination of blandishment a nd pressure direct ed a t himhy the Soviets. His complicity withSoviet occupation authorities forcedhis repudiation by the City Assembly.Dr. Ernst Reuter (SP D), w ho wa selected to replace Ostrowski, was prevent ed from t a king office by S ovietvet o on 27 J un e 1947. Thr oughout ,t hie period, C omm unist preeeure t ocapture Berlin public opinion wae intenee. Failure to do so led to theadoption of other meane.On 25 February 1948 the coalitiongovern ment of Czechoelova kla yieldedto Communist coup. In Berlin, Sovietpressure int ensified. U SS R occupa t iona uth orities imposed paes requirement @on al l German nationals travel idg

J uly1366 21

1


33/117

BERLINthrough the Soviet zone to Berlin.Following signature in Brussels ofthe European Mutual Defenee Treatyin March, Marshal Vasili I . Sokolovsky, Soviet Military Governor forGermany, walked out of the AlliedControl Council.On 30 March, Soviet authorities,imposed extensive documentation demands on Western military traffic toBerl in . Rather than submit , US occupation authorities organized the Litt le Airlift w hich ferried g oods a ndpersonnel betw een West G erma ny a ndthe Allied garrison in Berlin.On 3 April the Soviet military administration severed all rail links between Berlin and the Western zonesexcept via Helmstedt. A few dayslater, individual clearances were demanded of a l l tra ins travel ing theH elmst edt r out e, a nd on 20 April simila r requirements w ere imposed on a llba rge t ra ffic to B erlin. Additiona l r estrictions were imposed one monthlat er. On 11 J nne rail service bet w eenB erlin a nd H elmstedt wa e interruptedfor 48 hours. The autobahn bridgeacross the Elbe was closed for repairson 12 J une. Four da ys la ter, the Soviet sector commandant in Berlin leftthe quadripartite Allied government.Currency ReformsA new currency was introduced bythe Western Powers in their respective zones of G erma ny on 18 J une,but Berlin was not affected. The following day, Soviet authorities responded by suspending all highwaya nd ra i l passenger t ra f fic betw een B erlin and the West.On 23 J une the Soviets intr oduceda currency reform of their own, including the entire city of Berlin under ita pr ovisions. Tha t evenin g, Western Milita ry G overnors extended t henew West G erma n currency t o their

2e

sectors of Berlin. The Soviets countered by suspending all remainingtraffic between Berlin and the Western zones. The blockade had begun.On 25 J une, G enera l Lucius D. Cla ycommenced t he B erlin Airlift, a nd thefirst cargo planes landed the following day. A formal Western protestwas delivered to Marshal Sokolovskyby the British Military Governor,G enera l Sir B ria n H . Robert son. Sokolovsky replied on 29 J une tha t th einterruption was due to technicaldifficulties and pledged a prompt resumption of service.Soviet PressureUnable to capture public opinion inB erlin, t he Soviets pa ra lleled th eirpressure on the Western garrisonswith a series of moves designed tointimidate the city government. InJ une, a t hr ong of 5,000 Commun istdemonetrators besieged the city hall(loca t ed in th e S oviet sect or) a nddisrupted a meeting of the City Assembly. Similar harassment continuedthr oughout J uly a nd August . P lea sfor Soviet assistance in controllingthe demonstrat ions went unanswered.U na ble to conduct i ts businese, th e a ssembly withdrew to the British sector in September.In October and November, perceiving, perhaps, that the Western Powers might not depa rt , th e Sovietssevered governmental ties, betweenth eir sector a nd th e rest of th e city.Non-Commu nist borough officia ls w eredismissed in tbe Soviet sector, cityoffices a nd depa rt ments w ere removedto th e West, a nd separ a te orga ns w ereestablished by the Soviets.On 30 November 1948 an extraordinary session of the City Assemblywas convened in the Soviet sector. Itw a s a t t ended exclusive]y by C ommunist delegates and functionaries and

Milkw yReview


34/117

BERLINproclaimed a new city government .Three days later, Soviet occupationauthorities recognized the new creation a s th e only orga n of city government in Berlin.

Negotiations to lift the blockade bega n unfruitfully. On 6 J uly 1948 th eU ni ted S ta tee, Br i ta in, a nd Fra nceprotested the blockade to Moscow asa clear violation of existing agreement s. Moscow replied tha t t he block

. . ..,.... .3 ~. .

lifting the blockade in return for int roduction of Soviet zone cur rency inBerlin. Discussions by the four Milita ry G overnors on mea ns to a ccomplish this resulted in deadlock. TbeWestern Powers then referred theBerlin question to the UN SecurityCouncil. A Security Council resolutionproviding for settlement w a s vetoedby the Soviet Union on 25 October.A compromise proposal by Security

5?7- - . .\. \ U SArmuThis U S Air Force G lobemmt er ca rries a loa d of 20 t ona of J four d&ing t he B erfinAMifta de w a s a result of Weet ern violat ions Council neutrals was rejected byof agreements on Germany, including the Uni ted S ta tes shor t ly a f terward .th e curr ency r eform a nd th e dia mem- On 30 J a nua ry 1949, Mar sha l Sta linberment of Germany. gra nted a n interview to J oseph Klngs-

Meetings between the Western Am- bury-Smith of the International Newsbassadors an d J oseph Sta l in and Service. Among the issues discussedVyacheslav M. Molotov in Moscow was Berlin. Smiths question and St?during August resulted in agreement Iins a nsw er w ere a s follow s: \J uly1966 29


35/117

BERLINQuestion: If the governments ofthe United Statee of America, the

U nited Kingdom a nd Fra nce a greedto p08tp0718th8 88tnblishmcnt Of @8eparate West German 8tate, pendirzga meeting of th e CoutuS l of Formgndfinieter8 to con8ider the Gevmanproblcm as a whole, wenld the Gov~ernmcnt of the U.S.S.R. be preparedto remove the reetrictionc which theSoviet authorities have imposed oncemmunicatioae between Berlin andt he We8t ern zone8 of G erma ny ?Anew er: P rovided t he U nited Na te8of America, Great Bmtain,and Franceob80rve the conditions 8et forth[a bove], t he S oviet G overn ment 8ee8no obet&?le8 t o l if t ing tra ~ port re8tmction8,on the understanding, however, that tra n8port a nd tra de re8tnctien8 introduced by three powere8houhf be lifted 8imult inemw ly.Following coneultetione in Washington, D r. P hi3ip C. J essup, U S Representative to the UN Security Council, queried h]e Soviet counterpart,Yakov A. Ma lilG se t o w heth er St a lins omi8sion of the currency issuein his reply tv Klngebury-Smith waeaccidental . Malik replied that Strdineomiesion of t he curr ency problem wa snot accidents]. Discussions betweenJ eseup a nd Malik cont inued thr oughout March and April.Blookade l i f tedOn 4 May a four-power declarationwa s ieeued in New York a nnouncingt he lift ing of t he hloekede in retur nfor t he convenin g of. a confer ence ofForeign Ministers in Parie on 23 May.The blcdmde wae lifted without incident on 12 May 1949.Currency reforms in the Westernzones paved the way for formationof a Wa et G erma n G overnment . On1 September 1948 a special Parliamentary Council composed of dele

gates from tbe United States, Bri t ish,a nd F rench zones of omupa t ion convened in Bonn to draft a constitution.A dra ft w a s 8ubmitt ed to the Western Military Governors in March1949. At that time, the Military Governore took exception to provisionincorpora ting B erlin into th e new government. Merger of the three zoneswae approved in protocole iesued inWashington on 8 April 1949. Following a pprova l of th e final dra ft of basiclaw by the P a rl ia menta ry C ouncil, a pproval of t he Weet em Milita ry G overnore w a e a dded on 12 Ma y 1949 w ithcetiln exceptions concern ing t heeta tue of B erlin.

Unique SettingBerlins peculiar location gives riseto the assumption that all aspecte ofthe Berlin problem are unique. Tbea ssumption ie understandable.An ieolated baetion 160 kilometers withinunfriendly territory is without precedent. Yet once that is eaid, the familiar beeomee dominant. Goale andmethods on both sidee, again complica t ed by allia nce considera t ion, reeemble notldng eo much ae th e t ra ditiona l t eehniq ueeof greet pow ere hovering a t t he brink of w a r, yet ea chintent on avoiding the precipice.

The B erlin blocka de of 1948-49 w a ea prime example. Clearly, the SovietU nion sought to extend her hegemonyin centra l Eur ope; B erlin wa e clea rlycardinal to that purpoee; and, juet aeclearly, the methods to be employedwere necessarily restricted. An outbrea k of hoet ilitiee-given t he U S nu clea r monopoly a nd t he deplet ed etzt eof Soviet resourcee in 1948-woulddeny the Soviet Unions immediategoal and probably much more beeides.Thue, I imite w ere imposed on w ha t th eS ovieta might do in B erlin. To achievecontrol of the city, they were pre-

MilitaryOVi8Vl30
http:///reader/full/understandable.Anhttp:///reader/full/understandable.An


36/117

eluded from using t he most directmea nsna mely, to invoke their prepondera nt lan dpnwer a nd forcibly dictate a solution.Hindsight makes this appear lucid,but in 1948 perception of t his rea lityca me ha rd. Indeed, th e problems facedby t he West just to st a y in B erlinseemed insurmount a ble. B y focusingon our own difficulties, the hazardsfaced by our opponent nearly wentun noticed. Tbia ia scar cely a new phenomenon in politica l a nd milita ry confront a tions. B ut beca uee th is confrontat ion was taking place in a aett lngso uniq ue, t he peculia r difficult ies ofour own predicament were streseedout of proportion.The Soviets, it seems fa ir t o sa y,enjoyed a more exact appreciation ofth e possible. Rejecting t he a lterna tiveof open hostilities from t he beginnin g,all lesser means were carefully Orchestra t ed to d rive the West fr om t hecity.Soviet Control

. If in the end the Sovieta fa i led,t heir ability t o keep t he crisis ca refully modula t ed-indeed, to dicta tet he level of conflict -deser ves respect,At no time did the Soviet Union losecontrol of the situation. Escalationthrough various phases from local political action to military blockade waspurposefully controlled. And when theSoviets reached the end of the ecalein this case, blocka d+ w ithoutachieving their goal, they quickly l iquidated the encounter .The changing nature of contlict reveals itself in the political and military l imits imposed. Given the Sovietgoa l of driving t he Weat from B erlin, preeaure wae carefully l imited.Throughout the duration of the confrontation, each step was carefullyprepared in advance. Soviet actionsJ uJ s18S 8

BERLINdid not exceed the bounds of neeeesity, nor were those selected likely tot rigger a , violent Western responee.The met hods by w hich pressure wa sexerted are alao revealing. As thechronology makes clear, f irat intbdation of Soviet dea irea w a e th e a t t emptof th e loca l Communist Pa rty to ca pture the dominant Sucial DemocraticP a rt y ma chinery. Western officia la inB erlin ma de no move to oppea e th etakeover. Rebuffed by the Socialite,the Communists endeavored, nonetheless, to win the 1946 election. Theirdefea t taught them tha t the road topow er lay elsewhere tha n t hrough freeelt i lona . B ut it w a s not unti l tb iebeca me clea r tha t more extreme ma a sures were taken.MilitsryPressureThe same holds true for the milita ry pressure w hich r epla ced loca l political efforts. Introduction of the~ , b lockade w as ha l t ing a nd gradua l .The ground was carefully tested before each step. At no time would ithave heen impossible for the Sovietsto pull back. The lesson for a studyof th e cha nging na tur e of w a r is tha tt he a pplica t ion of force becomes morediscriminate, that increasing risks demand increased control of all instrument s of policy. WJ dle t he overt useof force is restricted, the entire struggle reflect e t he r eciproca l r elat ion between the total potential force whicheach side can bring to bear.When the Soviets lifted the blockade, i t was for much less than theirorigina l goal. Instea d of d riving theWest from B erlin, th ey achieved a bsolute control over a portion of thecity only. This the West was in noposition t o deny . B ut th e Ieeeon isexplicit : politica l goa ls in t he cont extof great power confrontation tend tobe l imi ted and var ied ; what cann~t

M


37/117

BERLINbe a chieved immediat ely ma y yieId togradual encroachment; and all posit ions tend to be temporary, tend toprovide takeoff points for further action when the climate has improved.

Diploma tically, t he B erlin crisis of194S-49 revea led t he inher ent difficulty of coalition operations. Ach]eving a united Western front was longa nd a rduous. Not only w ere there differences between London, Paris, andWashington, but there were seriousdifferences between Western ofiicials

in Berlin and their respective capitalsas well .The role of the United Nations alsodeserves comment. Given the natureof t he disput%a qu a rr el involvingthe permanent members of the Security Councilthe formal appartus ofthe organization proved ineffective.Original reference of the dispnte by

th e Western P ow ers wa s int ended pri3f

ma rily a s a n a ppeal to public opinion.Mediation by neutra l members ofthe Security Council was rejected byt he West w hen t he solution suggest edwent beyond that considered necessa ry .

Noneth eless, tbe orga niza tion didplay a major role in lifting the blockade. By providing a recognized channel of conta ct , U nited Sta tes and S oviet delegates to the Security Councilwere able to negotia te informally andeventua l ly a rr ive a t a mutua l ly a gree

.

able formula. To be sure, both sidessought agreement a t tha t t ime. Butthe opportunity for informal contactoffered by the United Nations provedhighly effective.P sychologica l factors play ed a ma jor role in the Berlin blockade. Initially, Soviet efforts were directedtoward capturing public opinion in

Berlin. Control of the traditionallyMilit a ryfeview


38/117

dominantSocial Democratic Party wasa means to tha t end. Ca pita l izing onthe w idesprea d ha rdship prevalent inpostw a r B erlin, t he S oviets employedtheir economic resources to the hilt.B efore t he elect ion of 1 46, food, fuel,1nd long-neglect ed lU XUy items w erevirt ua lly preseed on re&ident s of t heS oviet sect or. Notebooks w ere dist ribut ed fr ee t o s chool children -compliments of the Social ist U nity P a rty .Unfortunately for the Soviets , theear lier a ct ione of th e Red Army dur ing th e B a tt le of B erlin crea ted suchanimosity among the Berl iners thata ll subsequent protesta tions of Communist good fait h seemed ingenuous.The ra pe of t be city by t he forces ofMarshal Georgi K. Zhukov permanently eat ra nged th e w orkers of B erlin from supporting the Soviets. TheG erma n Communist P a r ty bore thestigma of a Soviet a ppenda ge. Thiseffectively prevented the USSR fromwinning control in Berlin throughpar l iam enta ry means .Popular SupportIn spite of a lack of success by theSoviets, their attention to Berlin public opinion focuses on a well-recOgnized a djunct of modern conflict : t hevital role of popular support. Indeed,the Soviets pursued this goal relentlessly.Aft er t he 1946 election conv incedmost Soviet officiala tha t th ey couldnot win a free election in Berlin, theyat least sought to deny popular support to the West. Thie involved extensive efforts to intimidate Westernsupporters, to capitalize on fears thatth e West w ould not rema in, a nd to induce such hardships among the populat ion that capitulat ion might appearpreferable to further resistance.General Lucius D. Clay was a lertto these dangers. He assiduouslyJ IJ ly966

BERLINsought out Ernst Reuter a t the t imeof t he blocka de t o verify B erliner morale. Repeated efforts by Washh@onto eva cua te U S dependent s in B erlinwere steadfast ly resisted by GeneralClay because of the possible adveraeeffect on the local population. And bymeeting each new Soviet encroachment vigorously, General Clay convinced the Berliners of Western resolve.Tho Airlift

The a irlift offers the bea t exa mple.The Berliner continuously saw orheard the visible proof of Western determina tion. In deed, th e plight of t hepilots evoked grea t sympa th y am ongthe Berliners. A feeling of comradeship developed. And for t he B erliners,enduring their hardships resolutelywas their part of the compact .Thus, the airli f t galvanized Germanresistance. Until then, most Europeans had stood on the sidelines, anxious not to offend a seemingly unstoppable Communist expa nsion. B ut withU S forces holding fast, a ra llying postwas provided for those longing to resist. Decisive action in this case provided the margin of victory.The B erlin blocka de a nd th e US a irlift were psychologically importantelsewhere. One by one the conntriesof Ea stern a nd centra l E urope ha dyielded to Communist regimes. Werethe West to relinquish Berlin, allG erma ny w ould possibly follow. Thevery difficulty posed by Berlin proveda singular advantage for the West .The cit ys isola t ed posit ion ca ptur edpublic imagination. Previous identification of Berlin with Adolf Hitlerscapital gave place to symbolic resistance to Communist aggression. Publ ic sympathy was overwhelming.The West was able to mount theB erlin Airlift beca use of overw be\ m

33


39/117

ing technological superiority. Thatth e S oviet U nion chose not t o interfere with the air l i f t can be at tr ibutedto th e sa me fa ctor, for th e nuclearmonopoly w ldch th e U nited Sta tes enjoyed a t t ha t t ime ma de th e r isks ofdoing so una ccepta ble. As G enera l

a period of almost one year staggersthe ima ginat ion. Ma yor Reuter , w eare told, was clearly skeptical of theoperat ion when f irst advised by Genera l C la y . B ut G enera l CIa y a nd Lieutenant G enera l Cur t is LeMay w ere determined that Berlin could be sup-

USAWIU!U nited St a tes-Soviet confront a t ion at Cheekpeint Cha rl ie reassured Serl iners tha tt he West w ould sta nd firmClay advised Washington, the Sovietacould only disrupt th e a irlif t by sh ooting down planes. They would not takethis risk unless they were bent onwa r , a nd, in t ha t ca se, wa r w ould comeregardlees.

Thus, modern technology made itpossible for the United States to remain in Berlin. The airli f t wae pessible only bemuse of the tremendousair strength of the United States. Tosupply a city of two million by air for

plied by air . And in the end, theirdetermination carried the day.Besides the effest of airpower itself , teshn ologiea l cha nge wa s centra lto ot her a spaeta of tbe B erlin problem. Without all-weather navigationa ids, th e a ir li ft w ould certa inly ha vebogged down during the fog-shroudedmonths o f Deeember , J a nuary , a ndFebruary. Advanced packaging techniques also contributed to the succese

of th e a ir li ft . B y removing w a terMilitaIYWiEW4


40/117

BERLINfrom most food substances, for example, avai lable space went many t imesfurther. The introduction of largecargo aircraft became of crucial import a nce a s th e w inter bega n, an dfuel was added to the i tems carried.CommunicationsWhen a city is isolated to the extent of B erlin, comm unica tions a reoften as important as transportat ion.Had the Western garrisons been entirely dependent upon lsndline t elephone ext ending t hrough t he Sovietcone, i t is certa in th a t long-term resistance would have been impossible.As it w a s, Western hea dqu a rt er inBerlin were linked inetanteneouslywith their respective capitals. GeneralClay in Berlin could seek instructionsor offer advice on a moments notice,a nd th e sa me wa s t rue of his B ri t ishand French counterparts .B ut to a certa h extent , technologycuts both w a ys. B erlin in 1948 w a sa city subsisting at a minimal level of luxury. Recovery had scarcely begun. Life wa s rigorous; requirement swere limited. Industrial and consumerdeman ds w ere ea t isf ied wit h a minimal tonnage. Today, taebnologicalprogress and industrial recovery impose demands many t imes greeter .Higher standards of l iving enjoyedby the Berliners further complicatethe picture. Stated differently, technologica l development ma kes m a nmore dependent . And a t B erlins present sta te of development , i t w ould behighly unlikely that a new air l i f twould prove adequate.The Berlin blockade offers important evidence concerning the close relat ion betw een stra tegic a nd ta ct ica lforces. Almost by definit ion, t he Western garrisons in Berl in were capableof .notbing except tbe most limit edholding action and the control of civil

disturba nces. Yet beca use of U S stra t egic domina nce, t hese forces w eresufficient to deter overt S oviet a ggression. Indeed, the threat of armed action was never offered.Also, the relation between strategica nd ta ctical forces t ende t o be reciprocal. Had the Western garriaons notbeen a dequa te to cont iln potent ialCommunist-inspired riots and demonstr a ti lone, t he Sovieta could ha ve ca pt ured cont rol of

Military Review July 1966

Documents

Transcript of Military Review July 1966