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Military operations

Military operations are the coordinated military actions of a state in response to a

developing situation. These actions are designed as a military plan to resolve the situationin the state's favour. Operations may be of combat or non-combat types, and are referred

to by a code name for the purpose of security. Military operations are often known for their more generally accepted common usage names then their actual operationalobjectives.

Parallel to and reflecting this framework for operations are organized elements within the

armed forces which prepare for and conduct operations at various levels of war. While

there is a general correlation between the size of units, the area within which theyoperate, and the scope of mission they perform, the correlation is not absolute. In fact, it

is ultimately the mission that a unit performs that determines the level of war within

which it operates.[1]

Military operations can be classified by the scale and scope of force employment, andtheir impact on the wider conflict. The scope of military operations can be:

• Theatre: this describes an operation over a large, often continental area of 

operation and represents a strategic national commitment to the conflict such as

Operation Barbarossa, with general goals that encompass areas of considerationoutside of the military such as the economic and political impacts.

• Campaign: this describes either a subset of the theatre operation, or a more limited

geographic and operational strategic commitment such as Battle of Britain, andneed not represent total national commitment to a conflict, or have broader goals

outside of the military impacts.

• Operational battle: this describes a subset of a campaign that will have specificmilitary goals and geographic objectives, as well as clearly defined use of forces

such as the Battle of Gallipoli, which operationally was a combined arms

operation originally known as the "Dardanelles landings" as part of the

Dardanelles Campaign, where about 480,000 Allied troops took part.• Engagement: this describes a tactical combat event of contest for specific area or 

objective by actions of distinct units. For example the Battle of Kursk , also known

from its German designation as Operation Citadel, included many separateengagements, several of which were combined into the Battle of Prokhorovka.

The "Battle of Kursk" in addition to describing the initial German offensive

operation (or simply an offensive), also included two Soviet counter-offensive

operations Operation Kutuzov and Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev.

[edit] Operational level of war

The operational level of war occupies roughly the middle ground between the campaign's

strategic focus and the tactics of an engagement. It describes "a distinct intermediate levelof war between military strategy, governing war in general, and tactics, involving

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individual battles."[2] For example during World War II the concept applied to use of 

Soviet Tank Armies.[3]

Effects-Based OperationsFrom Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

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Effects-Based Operations (EBO) is a United States military concept which emerged

during the 1991 Gulf War for the planning and conduct of operations combining militaryand non-military methods to achieve a particular effect. The doctrine was developed to

take advantage of advancements in weaponry and tactics, from an emerging

understanding that attacking a second-order target may have first order consequences for a variety of objectives, wherein the Commander's intent can be satisfied with a minimum

of collateral damage or risk to his own forces.

EBO has been an emerging concept, with multiple views [1] on what it meant and how it

could be implemented. Most notably, military scientists at the Air Force Research Lab,the Army Research Lab and DARPA engaged in research to develop automated tools to

annotate options and recommend courses of action. This is hard science and tools are

slow to be implemented. For air forces, it supported the ability for a single aircraft toattack multiple targets, unlike tactics of previous wars, which used multiple aircraft to

attack single targets, usually to create destruction without thought of later re-use by allied

forces or friendly civilians.

EBO concepts emphasise the importance of technological sophistication in theInformation Age, arguing that casualties can be avoided on both sides by taking

advantage of the technological advances made since the end of the Cold War - for 

example, by utilising precision munitions and UAV attack drones. EBO conceptstraditionally take a "systemic approach" to the enemy, arguing that the enemy's centre of gravity can be disrupted by attacking the command and control "mainframe" and the

"support nodes" surrounding this central mainframe.

In 2008, Joint Forces Command, the caretaker of US Military Joint Warfighting doctrine,noted the failure of US Army's EBO tool and issued memorandum and a guidance

documents from the commander, Marine General James Mattis, on Effects Based

Operations. In these documents dated 14 August 2008 Mattis says, "Effective

immediately, USJFCOM will no longer use, sponsor or export the terms and conceptsrelated to EBO...in our training, doctrine development and support of JPME (Joint

Professional Military Education)." Mattis went on to say, "...we must recognize that theterm "effects-based" is fundamentally flawed, has far too many interpretations and is atodds with the very nature of war to the point it expands confusion and inflates a sense of 

 predictability far beyond that which it can be expected to deliver."[2]

Contents

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[hide]

• 1 Definition

o 1.1 Batschelet's Seven attributes of EBO

o 1.2 Center of gravity

•

2 EBO in practice• 3 See also

• 4 References

[edit] Definition

As defined by the United States military Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), effects-

 based operations are "a process for obtaining a desired strategic outcome or effect on the

enemy through the synergistic and cumulative application of the full range of militaryand nonmilitary capabilities at all levels of conflict." The intent and desired outcome of 

an effects-based approach is to employ forces that paralyze the enemy forces and

minimize its ability to engage friendly forces in close combat. [3]

Rather than focusing specifically on causing casualties and physical destruction resultingin the attrition or annihilation of enemy forces, effects-based operations emphasizes end-

state goals first, and then focuses on the means available to achieve those goals. For 

instance, psychological operations, electronic warfare, logisitical disruptions and other non-lethal means can be used to achieve the demoralization or defeat of an enemy force

while minimizing civilian casualties or avoiding the destruction of infrastructure. While

effects-based operations does not rule out lethal operations, it places them as options in aseries of operational choices for military commanders.

[edit] Batschelet's Seven attributes of EBO

JFCOM's description of the doctrine is quoted by LTC (now BG) Allen Batschelet,

author of the April 2002 study Effects-based operations: A New Operational Model?[4]

He was later appointed in 2004 as commander of the Fires Brigade, the newly-

reorganized 4th Infantry Division Artillery Brigade which deployed to Iraq to implement

such theories in practice.

According to Batschelet's paper, seven elements comprise and differentiate EBO [4]:

1. Focus on Decision Superiority2. Applicability in Peace and War (Full-Spectrum Operations)

3. Focus Beyond Direct, Immediate First-Order Effects

4. Understanding of the Adversary’s Systems5. Ability of Disciplined Adaptation

6. Application of the Elements of National Power 

7. Ability of Decision-Making to Adapt Rules and Assumptions to Reality

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[edit] Center of gravity

The core of the doctrine, to support superior decision-making and to understand the

enemy's systems, lies in determining and calculating the philosophical (not physical)center of gravity (COG) of the combatants. "COGs are those characteristics, capabilities,

or localities from which a military derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or willto fight" (such as leadership, system essentials, infrastructure, population, and fieldmilitary). A similar modeling scheme refers to these as National Elements of Value

(NEV). A relative weighting is made as to which of the elements are most critical to be

targeted by operations.[5]

[edit] EBO in practice

Although it was not called EBO at the time, the strategic bombing of Nazi rail lines from

the manufacturing centers in Normandy to the interior of Germany disrupted critical

resupply channels, weakening Germany's ability to maintain an effective war effort.

Removing a few key bridges had the same effect as large-scale bombing.

The first examples of effects-based approach to the use of limited military actions to

create strategic effects with little collateral damage occurred when the US dropped CBU-

94B anti-electrical cluster bombs filled with 147 reels of fine conductive fiber. Thesewere employed on high-voltage electrical transmission lines leading to Serbia to short

them and "knock the lights out." On the first attack, these knocked out 70% of the

electrical power supply, crippling the enemy's command and control and air defense

networks.

During the first Gulf War in 1990 and 91, USAF LtCol (now Ret LtGen) Dave Deptula

argued against the dominant view of targeting for destruction, instead opting for alternateand unconventional means to achieve desired effects. For example, as chief air power  planner, he chose to target the Iraqi air defenses first, removing opposition that would

have kept subsequent missions from creating effective precision attacks. This allowed

him to achieve desired effects with far fewer munitions, reserving those critical assets for 

future missions. [6][7]

The January –February 2004 issue of  Field Artillery magazine featured a report on the

implementation of Effects-Based Operations in Afghanistan "to help shape an

environment that enables the reconstruction of the country as a whole."[8] United States

 policy objectives are to create a "government of Afghanistan committed to and capable of 

 preventing the re-emergence of terrorism on Afghan soil." All mission efforts areundertaken with that end-state goal in mind. To coordinate endeavors, the US military

maintains a Joint Effects Coordination Board (JECB) chaired by the Director of theCombined/Joint Staff (DCJS) which serves to select and synchronize targets and

determine desired effects across branches and operational units. Besides representatives

from combat maneuver organizations, staff also is drawn from the Staff Judge Advocate (SJA), Psychological Operations (PSYOP) and Public Affairs (PA). Weekly Joint Effects

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Working Group (JEWG) targeting team meetings provide recommendations and updates

to the JECB based on three priorities:

• Enable Afghan institutions

• Assist in removing the causes of instability

•

Deny the enemy sanctuary and counter terrorism.

The result is a three-week-ahead planning window, or   battle rhythm, to produce the

desired effects of the commanders, as defined in operations orders (OPORDs) every threeweeks and fragmentary orders (FRAGOs) each week to update the standing OPORDs.

Activities include both lethal and non-lethal missions, including civil-military, public

affairs, reconstruction, intelligence and psychological operations and feedback as well as

conventional combat and fire support missions.

An FA lieutenant, as an “Effects Support Team” (EST) leader, must understand how to

employ lethal and non-lethal assets to realize the maneuver company commander’s vision

of future operations. He must be able to work with civil affairs teams, special operations,coalition and host-nation forces, as well as NGOs and OGAs.[8]

This requires a shift away from "hot steel" (artillery fire) as a solution to all problems,

and a focus on integration of multiple dimensions and methods to achieve desired results.

A recent study concluded that a contributing factor to the Israeli Defense Force's defeat in

the Israeli-Hezbollah Conflict in the Summer of 2006 was due in large part to an over reliance on EBO concepts.[9]